Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Independent Directorate of Local Governance

Policy Paradigms, Subnational

Governance, and the State

Sovereignty Gap in Afghanistan

by

Farid Mamundzay,

Peter Blunt,

Nader Yama, and

Hamidullah Afghan

IDLG Discussion Paper

January 2015

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Summary: It is argued that the battle to restore the sovereignty of the

Afghan state will be won or lost subnationally. Victory will be more likely

if, following Ghani and Lockhart (2008), citizen security can be assured; if

the rule of law can be established and upheld without fear or favour; if

reasonably effective, efficient, merit-based and accountable leadership and

administrative means for service delivery can be institutionalised; and if

social policies can be implemented that cut across regions and ethnic

groups. However, progress towards these ambitious ends and the

introduction in its support of pragmatic, evidence-based policy to

strengthen the existing deconcentrated system of subnational governance

(SNG) is hampered by stakeholder conceptual confusion about SNG,

competing vested interests, and largely incommensurable and irreconcilable

SNG policy paradigms. Success will depend on whether links can be forged

between SNG pragmatic imperatives and political expediency.

‘The crisis of the state in developing countries and the unintended impact

of global aid in weakening those states have undermined their

sovereignty...If global security is dependent on the structural stability of

functioning states, then the global system must, over the medium term,

cohere around the goal of building sovereign states and make it a high

priority’ (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008, p. 169).

‘The most important lines of policy (for the Afghan state) include...

strengthening the foundational legitimacy of the government’ (Rubin, 2013,

p. 440). 1

Introduction

1. The sovereignty and legitimacy2 of any state and the ability of its citizens to

participate in and benefit from the development of national assets depend greatly on how the

geographical pieces of the puzzle that comprise it are managed, jointly and severally.

Subnational governance (SNG) should provide fundamental means for bridging what Ghani

and Lockhart (2008, pp. 3-4) refer to as the ‘sovereignty gap’, or the gap between ‘the de jure

sovereignty that the international system affords such states and their de facto...(inability) to

provide even the most basic services for their citizens’ (parentheses added)

2. We shall argue that this maxim applies with particular force to fragile and war-torn

states like Afghanistan, although difficult to implement because the obstacles to achieving

good governance3 subnationally clearly are more pronounced in conditions of widespread and

chronic conflict and where government institutions at the centre do not work as they should.

In these respects Afghanistan is not an isolated case, being one of the ‘forty to sixty states,

home to nearly two billion people,’ that, according to Ghani and Lockhart (2008, p.1), ‘are

either sliding backward and teetering on the brink of implosion or have already collapsed.’

1 The Carnegie Council describes Rubin as one of the world’s leading experts on Afghanistan, with ‘unmatched’

knowledge of the history of the region, ethnic rivalries and inter-relationships, and ‘insights into the failure of

the state’. 2 Political legitimacy derives from the explicit and implicit recognition by the people of the rights of

governments to govern, which in turn depends on government possessing sufficient authority to do so. Where

governing authorities are not viewed as legitimate, social regulation is more difficult and costly. 3 We consider good governance to be merit-based, effective, equitable, efficient, transparent and accountable

(see, for example, Blunt and Rondinelli, 1997).

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3. Like Ghani and Lockhart (2008), we take the view that the standing-room-only sign in

this development waiting room has been on for far too long - to everyone’s detriment - and

that restitution is well overdue.

4. More so than most, in the case of Afghanistan, we shall show that if there is to be any

chance of state sovereignty redemption the journey towards it must begin with SNG. Our

argument is structured as follows. First, following Ghani and Lockhart (2008), we consider

briefly the ten key functions of a sovereign state. Second, we discuss some of the major

threats to state sovereignty that are evident in Afghanistan and demonstrate why it is that

SNG has a vital role to play in their mitigation. Third, we outline the system of SNG in the

country as it is now and discuss some of the necessary conditions for good policy

development concerning it. Fourth, we analyse the competing paradigms4 of SNG policy that

have evolved and some of the other state-building challenges that Afghanistan’s new

government has to contend with. Fifth, on the basis of political economy and technical

considerations and comparative research, we take a position on what broad form of SNG in

the circumstances makes most sense for the country now and for the foreseeable future. In

doing so, we adopt the widely received contingency approach to such matters (e.g., Blunt &

Jones, 1992), where strategy and structure should depend on contextual factors, including

those suggested by Ghani and Lockhart (2008). And finally, sixth, we consider whether the

logic of our position concerning the preferred character of SNG will be able to withstand the

conflicts of interest and other vicissitudes associated with the different competing policy

paradigms that we identify.

5. The primary (qualitative) data marshalled in support of our arguments were gathered

by the authors via participant observation from May 2014 to January 2015. During this

period, all of the authors either held full-time positions in, or were associated with, the

Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)5 of the Government of the Islamic

Republic of Afghanistan – one as Deputy Minister (Policy), one as team leader of a

development assistance project, and the others, respectively, as Director and Senior Adviser

of the Strategic Coordination advisory unit within the organisation. The holding of these

positions meant that the authors either instigated or supervised or were intimately involved in,

or privy to, much of the SNG policy discussion and development that took place within IDLG

and in government more generally (see, for example, Independent Directorate for Local

Governance, 2014a, 2014b, and 2014c).

The Notion of Sate Sovereignty

6. It is unusual for a country’s head of state to be someone who possesses scholarly and

professional credentials that are directly related to state governance. This is currently the case

in Afghanistan, where the newly-appointed president, Ashraf Ghani, has a rare combination

of relevant experience – among others, as a professor and senior researcher of anthropology

and political science in the USA, the Netherlands, and Afghanistan, as a minister of finance

in Afghanistan and, for ten years, as chief anthropologist of the World Bank. He was named

among the twenty most influential global thinkers of 2009 and 2010 for his work on fragile

states (Rubin, 2013, p. xix).

4 A paradigm provides theoretical guidelines and sets the standards for legitimate work within the field it

governs. It shapes and directs the ‘puzzle-solving’ activities of the groups of ‘normal scientists’ (Kuhn, 1970)

that work within its confines (Blunt, 1997). Our use of the term ‘policy paradigm’ is analogous to the notion of

‘policy narrative’ (Sutton, 1999) that has become conventional wisdom in development circles. 5 IDLG is the lead central government institution responsible for non-sectoral sub-national government agencies

in Afghanistan. Established by Presidential Decree in 2007, IDLG’s purpose is to ‘oversee’ or ‘monitor’ the

performance of provincial, district and municipal offices. No other government agency has such responsibility.

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7. His most important and most widely cited publication is his book, ‘Fixing Failed

States’ (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008), whose well-constructed arguments deserve to be heard and

to exert a significant influence on policy development under the new government. However,

whether they will be able to withstand unscathed the violent swings and roundabouts of

Afghan politics, and other pressures discussed below, is open to question.

8. The central contention of the book is that the gap between the de jure and de facto

sovereignty of fragile states can only be bridged satisfactorily when governments are able to

perform effectively, and largely unaided, ten core functions. Achieving these ends requires

that the state and those who are providing it with different forms of assistance agree about

what needs to be done, how, why, when and by whom. Importantly, it also requires that the

incentives for the implementing agents of development assistance are structured to promote

the weaning of the state from dependence on external support, which Ghani and Lockhart

(2008) argue is not the case in Afghanistan.

9. The first core function of the sovereign state is to establish the rule of law, ‘the glue

that binds all aspects of the state, the economy and society’ and provides citizens with a clear

and transparent set of rules designed to govern their behaviour and that of other entities

within its boundaries. Without exception, an effective legal system should hold government

and others to account for their actions – whoever they are or whomever they may know -

thereby building public trust and confidence in relevant institutions. In its absence, informal

loci of power and control flourish, resulting in systemic malaise, particularly patronage and

other forms of corruption.

10. The second core function, which is closely related to the first, concerns the state’s

ability to monopolise the legitimate use of violence or force, against both external and

internal threats and those who break the law.

11. The third function - ‘administrative control’ - among other things entails a merit-

based government apparatus and leadership that is accountable within its own structures

(upward accountability) and, crucially, to the citizens that it is meant to serve (downward

accountability). Importantly for our discussion, and reinforcing the contingency approach that

we advocate, such a system observes the principle that ‘when a lower level of government

can handle a particular function, higher levels can stand back to monitor, plan and set the

agenda’ (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008, p. 165). This implies that the delegation of authority to

lower levels within government should be conditional, or contingent upon a range of relevant

technical and non-technical (or political economy) variables.

12. Other core functions of the sovereign state include the sound management of public

finance; investment in education (particularly professional and higher education) and training

and public health; social policies that ‘cut across gender, ethnicity, race, class, spatial location

and religion’; the provision of adequate physical infrastructure to all parts of the country; the

formation of a market economy that is subject to checks and balances and where the roles of

the state and the market are determined according to pragmatic as opposed to ideological

considerations; the sustainable management of state assets in the best interests of all citizens,

particularly natural resources and the protection of the commons (referring in both respects to

the exemplar, Norway); and ‘effective public borrowing’ (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008).

13. As we shall demonstrate below, in fragile states like Afghanistan, good SNG and state

sovereignty go hand-in-hand, in particular, with security, the rule of law, administrative

control, and social policy development and implementation that cuts across geographical and

ethnic boundaries. We argue that the condition of Afghanistan in these and other important

respects should set limits on the character of SNG and the speed of its reform.

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Challenges to State Sovereignty in Afghanistan

14. The task of establishing a well-functioning sovereign state has always been difficult

and expensive in Afghanistan, partly because its geographical position for millennia has

made it subject to geo-politically inspired attention from world powers, which has resulted in

a series of protracted wars; partly because of the incompatible interests, and interference, of

neighbouring states; and partly because of its large size, inhospitable terrain, and complex

ethnic mix. Afghanistan has been, and remains, difficult to govern for the same reasons that it

has been difficult to conquer. So much so that according to Rubin (2002), until the turn of the

century, ‘the national government (was) irrelevant to most people’ and ‘didn’t touch most of

the population’. Matters have improved since then, but not throughout the country, and not

enough to impart significant legitimacy to government at the centre (Rubin, 2013, World

Bank, 2014).

15. The roots of conflict in Afghanistan and its length and intensity make people of all

ethnic groups fearful about the possible disintegration of the country. The decades of war

have been fuelled partly as noted above by the interests of neighbouring states, with whom

regional Afghan commanders have developed close ties, and partly by the geo-political

interests of world powers. One notable effect of this is that the central government in Kabul

has less influence over parts of Afghanistan than do Iran, Pakistan or Uzbekistan. Local

commanders of private militias and insurgent groups who are sponsored by or allied with

these regional powers remain a potent force in the country to this day and are among the

biggest threats to state sovereignty and integrity (Rubin, 2013).

16. Such threats and incursions are piled on top of the infringements of state sovereignty

in Afghanistan brought about by repeated foreign invasions and by the country’s long and

heavy dependence on world powers for military, financial, and development assistance, a

dependence that is as pronounced now as it has ever been. Other ingredients of state

sovereignty, such as investments in people and infrastructure and international relations are

compromised by such dependence.

17. These make ideal storylines for the Taliban and other subversive groups to weave into

a picture of a lackey Afghan state that is incapable of exercising control over its own territory

or providing security and basic services to its people, that is, a state that is sovereign in name

only.

The Year 2014 – the Pressure Mounts 18. The pressures on the Afghan state’s ability to demonstrate otherwise rose sharply in

2014. In a country that for generations has had to contend with far more than its fair share of

cataclysms and sovereignty-threatening events, it may seem disingenuous to suggest that the

year 2014 was an unusual one in terms both of the number and significance of the political

and security challenges encountered by the state. But there are good grounds for making such

a proposition.

19. First, in relation to security, it is estimated that the number of serious insurgency-

related incidents in the country was approximately four times higher in 2014 than it had been

in 2013 - with concomitant increases in civilian casualties (Graham-Harrison, 2014; United

Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2014). For an already war-weary citizenry, these

developments cemented security’s place at the top of its list of concerns about the future (The

Asia Foundation, 2014).

20. Unsurprisingly, there is considerable pent-up popular resentment about the suffering

caused by the war, a condition made worse by the fact by the fact that, according to Amnesty

International (2014), there is no institutionalised, credible means in government for

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investigating and reporting publicly on civilian deaths and injuries caused by friendly military

operations. And perpetrators are rarely held to account or pay adequate or any compensation

for their misdeeds. This conveys the impression that they have been granted impunity by

government and its foreign allies, thereby undermining in the eyes of the public important

principles of the rule of law. Bennett (2014) observes that ‘the lack of accountability for

killings of civilians by US/NATO forces in Afghanistan sends a message that foreign troops

have free rein to commit abuses in Afghanistan and that the lives of Afghan civilians have

little or no value’. Published in August 2014, the Amnesty International report examined 10

cases that had caused the deaths of a total of 140 Afghan civilians. None of the cases had

been properly investigated either by foreign or Afghan authorities.

21. The gravity of such incidents for state sovereignty is illustrated by Rubin’s (2013, p.

427) account of the wrongful killing by US troops at a checkpoint of an Afghan boy on a

bicycle. The troops who had shot the boy kept the body for three days (a grave offence in

Islam), while the family waited outside the military camp for its return. ‘After the body was

finally returned, the village elders met and decided to join the Taliban to fight the

Americans.’

22. Second, and equally significant, was the prospect of a new government and the

protracted and acrimonious contest between the two main candidates for president, which

was underlain by interplay between a wide and complex range of patronage, ethnic and

regional vested interests.

23. The delay in the formation of a new government had been caused by allegations of

fraud surrounding the presidential election and tensions between the rivals that had risen

accordingly, to the point of deadlock. Recognising the serious implications of an impasse, the

American Secretary of State, John Kerry, flew to Kabul in July and again in early August

2014 in an attempt to broker an agreement on the basis of an impartial re-assessment of the

validity of all of the votes that had been cast. This helped to break the deadlock and a

government of national unity providing positions at its apex for both candidates – president

and a new position of chief executive - was formally announced in the second half of

September and the new president was inaugurated on 29 September 2014.6 Cabinet positions

were formally announced in mid-January 2015. This constituted the country’s first major

political transition as a nascent democracy.

24. Third was the acceleration of the phased withdrawal of foreign troops and, by the end

of 2014, the assumption by government of complete responsibility for the maintenance of

national security and law and order.

25. Fourth, and simultaneously, management of the state became severely constrained by

significant and sudden reductions in the national budget and in donor funding. These were

seismic changes to an environment of government whose baseline was already extremely

turbulent and unpredictable.

26. The stresses imposed on the state by the military, political and budgetary transitions

were compounded because they were contemporaneous and because transition scheduling

was nearly always driven by internal and external political agendas rather than development

need.

6 As much as anything, breaking the deadlock was important because it prevented the Taliban from being able to

‘claim to have proven that the system of government adopted by Afghans with international support after their

ouster from power cannot function. The increasing capacity of the (Afghan) security forces and the extent of

their international backing (would) be irrelevant if they (had) no legitimate (government) authority to defend’

(parentheses added) (Rubin, 2014).

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27. An optimistic interpretation of the political transition would be to say that it

constituted an unprecedented symbol of progress and of shared interest among the main

power blocs in striving for peace and stability. A less sanguine view would be that the

fundamental points of difference and open antagonism between the parties are unlikely to

dissipate and that they will plague all major decisions, particularly those concerning who will

get what key positions (e.g., provincial governor) and other spoils in government. The

national mood could be said to reflect this in that only a slight majority of 55% of the

population think that the country is moving in the right direction (The Asia Foundation,

2014).

The Year 2015 – a Development Watershed

28. The year 2015 is likely to be a particularly telling one in so far as the battle to restore

state sovereignty in Afghanistan is concerned, one that is dependent upon whether sufficient

security can be maintained for government to establish the rule of law, deliver services and

sustain development, and whether political differences can be set aside – or assuaged

sufficiently - in the interests of state sovereignty and the common good.

29. The main impediment to attaining state sovereignty is the Taliban, who will either

have to be defeated militarily or accommodated and appeased politically. The less likely the

former, the more government will be compelled to consider a political settlement with a

resurgent Taliban, emboldened by the withdrawal of foreign troops and bent on exploiting the

deep political divides in a new and vulnerable government. It seems unlikely that peace and

stability will be attained and sustained without a rapprochement, a move that would likely

receive strong support from Pakistan, a long-term backer of the predominantly Pashtun

Taliban (Harding, 2001). Tomsen (2014), for example, observes that ‘the new Afghan

government…will face long odds in its effort to hold off the Taliban and counter Pakistani

meddling.’

30. The escalation of serious security incidents in the country in 2014 as compared to

2013 and the perpetuation of hostilities and attacks throughout the country during what in the

past has always been the winter off-season mean that the pressure is on government like

never before. Bearing out the plausibility of a rapprochement scenario, by January 2015, the

international news media were reporting that talks with the Taliban had begun, but that offers

of positions in the new government had been rejected by them (Loyn, 2015), suggesting that

they will not be bought-off easily.

31. Fundamental differences concerning the constitution and the bases of the legitimacy

of the state and the position of women in society are some of the main stumbling blocks in

negotiations (e.g., Kane, 2015). Even so, some suggest that despite these obstacles and its

reliance on ‘on strongmen, manipulation, and patronage networks’, the Taliban may be

shifting its ground politically, towards Afghan mainstream politics. For its part, mainstream

politics is said to be ‘becoming more violent and ruthless and in a sense...moving closer to

the Taliban’s way of doing things’ (Giustozzi & Mangal, 2015), perhaps indicating that both

sides are keen to do business and that the Taliban recognise the importance of establishing

political legitimacy.

32. These events and prospects bring to an already traumatised nation heightened

uncertainty, conflict and stress and they raise considerably the likelihood and stakes of

government failure.

33. One effect of these conditions should be to increase the importance that government

attaches to those few levers of state sovereignty influence over which it has some measure of

direct control. As noted above, these include what Ghani et al. (2006) and Ghani and Lockhart

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(2008) refer to as ‘administrative control’, ‘delineation of state and citizen rights and duties’,

‘monopoly of the means of violence’, and the establishment of the rule of law. Ghani et al.

(2006, p. 7) describe the interplay between some of these factors in terms of:

‘...both the breadth and depth of the reach of a state’s authority over its territory...In order

to establish and maintain administrative control, a state requires the following: the

existence of a coherent set of rules that determine the division of responsibilities

horizontally and vertically across functions of the state and between hierarchical levels;

the recruitment of civil servants; the spatial and functional division of administrative

roles; and flows of resources. The extent to which the citizens of a state accept that the

promulgation and enforcement of these rules serves the interest of the majority is crucial

to engendering trust between the state and its citizens and giving citizens a sense of

belonging. The structure of administration could vary in practice between highly

centralized to highly federated depending on the historical and cultural context’.

The Importance of SNG to State Sovereignty

34. In the general sense just described, but particularly in the other respects mentioned

above and below, the form and quality of SNG is clearly vital to state sovereignty and

legitimacy in Afghanistan.

35. The new government’s recognition of the importance of this link is evident in the

‘Realising Self-Reliance’ document it presented to the London Conference in December,

2014, where it made clear its intention to review (2010) sub-national policy in order ‘to

provide greater clarity on the roles and responsibilities of sub-national officials’ and to create

governance circumstances that enable ‘people across all provinces (to) have greater voice.’

(Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2014, p.12). These policy intentions

target questions of upward and downward accountability, which are of critical significance to

the establishment of state sovereignty, a maxim emphasised throughout Ghani and Lockhart

(2008) and by others like Bene and Neiland (2006) and IDLG (2014c).

36. The wait-and-see nature of the national mood on questions of governance provides

government with an opportunity to demonstrate its credentials in these and other important

respects, but as we have shown popular patience is – and has been - under severe strain,

limiting the time available for government to be seen to be doing the right things.

Strengthening those drivers of state sovereignty that are integral to SNG will be central to

this, as confirmed by the latest survey results, which show that at the local level, apart from

security, the main problems reported by citizens have to do with electricity, roads, drinking

water, education, and healthcare (The Asia Foundation, 2014).

Necessary Conditions: Conceptual Clarity and Altruism

37. To begin to address these issues coherently and constructively, ideally all stakeholders

should be clear about the main features of the different forms of SNG that are available, or

what the options are (e.g., World Bank Institute, 1999; IDLG, 2014c), and their intentions

should be genuinely altruistic and aligned. However, as elsewhere, policy discourse

surrounding SNG in Afghanistan does not enjoy these advantages, albeit that among some of

the parties involved, there is recognition of the need for conceptual clarity, which has resulted

in steps being taken towards establishing this necessary condition (e.g., Adam Smith

International, 2014, 2015).

38. Such clarity should begin with agreement concerning the nature of the existing system

of subnational governance in Afghanistan, which can be characterised as being

deconcentrated but with limited elements of political, fiscal, and market decentralisation.

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Services are delivered subnationally by geographically dispersed units or offices of line

ministries and are controlled from the centre - although, as in any organisational structure,

varying degrees of delegation of authority and responsibility are possible within the system.

Political decentralisation manifests itself in the form of elected provincial councils, which are

the main means of downward accountability. But the roles and functions and authorities of

the councils, and of councillors, are ill-defined in existing legislation. The same is true of the

crucial positions of provincial and district governor, whose formal authorities are limited and

poorly defined (reducing upward accountability), but who wield enormous informal power

and thereby pose a significant challenge to the legitimacy of government at the centre.

39. Below, we shall refer to the existing system of SNG in Afghanistan as being

‘deconcentrated’, but this remains a term that is perhaps not as widely understood to

comprise what we have just suggested as it might be.

40. The second condition – comprising altruism and alignment, in the sense described by

Ghani and Lockhart (2008) – is more problematic, because of the variety of interests

represented among both internal and external actors. Despite rhetorical claims to the contrary,

these interests are incommensurable and therefore largely irreconcilable and levels of

altruism are variable (e.g., Chang, 2002, 2009).

41. We would expect state sovereignty not to fare very well under these circumstances –

according to some, state compliance being a much more sought after quality in the

development partners of rich countries (e.g., Chang, 2002, 2009; Chomsky, 2010; Roy,

2004). Ghani and Lockhart (2008) reach somewhat similar conclusions:

‘The central task that the aid system should perform—namely, generating prosperity by

bringing a global knowledge of stocks and flows to countries without it—is not being

performed. In view of the fact that it comprises extractive industries and technical

assistance brigades, the aid system—instead of opening countries up to legitimate

entrepreneurial activity—epitomizes the side of capitalism that is fundamentally

exploitative’ (p. 86).

42. For these reasons and others that we shall examine below, achieving policy discourse

coherence on SNG in Afghanistan, as elsewhere, is likely to be less than straightforward.

The Democracy Promotion Paradigm

43. When it comes to the distribution of power subnationally, among local actors,

Tomsen’s (2014) observations on the subject of SNG suggest that the two main Afghan

schools of thought are not that far apart. The more radical of the two is said to be prepared to

countenance devolution of limited authority to ‘elected provincial and district governors’,

while the ‘others believe that the status quo, with power rigidly centralised in Kabul, will

remain necessary as long as the insurgency continues’.

44. Tomsen’s account and his use of words like ‘rigidly’ imply that he subscribes to the

ideologically-inspired conventional wisdom of much of the donor community, a view that

sees extreme forms of decentralisation as being the end point of a virtuous natural

progression that begins with central control. In contrast, we take the view that this policy

paradigm confuses means and ends. It does so by assuming that a particular means of SNG

(decentralisation) is a desirable end in itself, based largely on ideological convictions

associated with ‘democracy promotion’. It ignores the substantial body of research evidence

that shows what limited success - in terms of development ends like poverty and inequality

reduction - decentralisation has enjoyed in developing countries, but particularly in fragile

states (Blunt & Turner, 2005, 2007). Rubin (2013, p. 122) agrees: ‘The international

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community involved in assisting Afghanistan in such matters pays lip service to the agenda of

strengthening the central government but works pragmatically with a variety of regional

forces, reinforcing fragmentation. Global trends that see decentralisation as conducive to

democracy and grassroots development legitimate such decisions.’

45. As, for example, in Cambodia, we suggest below that at least some national

politicians are likely to see things very differently, perhaps regarding democracy promotion

per se as having little value, except as rhetorical window dressing (Blunt & Turner, 2005).

Political Expediency Paradigms

46. The vision statements or election manifestos of the new president and the chief

executive suggest that they disagree on matters that affect SNG, although it is still not yet

clear where the two main power blocs in government stand on this issue. Disagreement

between them seems likely for the reasons that we have already given, but the question is by

how much and with what implications for SNG? Rubin (2014), for example, observes that

they have different views about ‘the degree of centralisation of the state; the balance of power

between regional, ethnic, and tribal coalitions; control over the security forces; the role of the

former armed resistance, and how all of these will affect the distribution of the diminishing

flows of foreign aid’.

47. Taken at face value, these are clearly important areas of potential difference. But even

in the best of circumstances we know that political election platforms and promises are

unreliable guides to policy enactment by elected governments. Politicians everywhere are

notorious for saying one thing during elections and doing something quite different once they

are in office. The correlation between political rhetoric and policy reality is noted more for its

weakness than strength (Blunt, 2009, p. 94).

48. In relation to ‘the degree of centralisation of the state’, we argue below that there are

good reasons for supposing that, despite what may have been said by each side, in some

fundamental respects it is unlikely that there will be marked divergences between them on

this matter, and that this makes good sense.

49. We say this because it seems probable that, when it comes to making decisions about

SNG, the nature of informal power relations between the centre and the periphery, and among

different entities at the periphery, which have been problematic in Afghanistan historically

(Rubin, 2002, 2013), are likely to be of paramount concern to both parties. To the extent that

some measure of control cannot be exercised over sub-national powerbrokers,7 the state will

be significantly weakened and could fail altogether. That is to say, the multiplicity of sites of

informal power outside of Kabul (warlords and some governors) that continue to contest

control over territory and other key resources among themselves and with the centre, and

openly to flout its authority, threaten to fragment the state and to make it ungovernable

(though local power brokers seem not, as in some other countries, to be interested in

secession). This conclusion is supported by Turner (2006, p. 1), who states that, in

Afghanistan, ‘Intra-state instability is the dominant pattern which needs to be overcome.’

50. In support of our conjecture, both sides are said by Rubin (2013, p. 440) to recognise

that devolution or ‘the decentralisation of service provision’ is not just a technical matter, and

that it could inflame ‘the most potentially divisive issue, namely the relation of the state to

different ethnic groups and in particular to Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns’.

7 How this is done will need to take account of the dynamics of such local power relations, rather than to rely

solely or largely on capacity building or attempt to overwhelm them by force (Lister, 2007; Mukhopadhyay,

2009).

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51. This makes it unlikely that either side in the new government will want to move

quickly – or, for the time being, perhaps at all - towards ceding greater formal power to the

periphery, that is, to move away from the current system of deconcentration towards a more

devolved system of SNG. This is not to say, however, that the two sides would necessarily

agree about how the current system of deconcentrated SNG should be strengthened and

developed – for example, differences of opinion are likely to emerge when it comes to the

distribution of authority and resources within it and in relation to procedures governing the

appointment and removal of governors (the potential for disagreement concerning the latter is

illustrated in IDLG, 2014a).

Contingency-based Paradigm

52. If we are to take seriously the view expressed by Ghani and Lockhart (2008, p. 199) -

that ‘tailoring to context’ should be ‘a key attribute of national programs’ – then we submit

that the circumstances of the country discussed so far and other considerations set out below

make this an optimal strategy for the new government to pursue.

53. Somewhat paradoxically, perhaps, in the short to medium terms this will mean that in

order to make government more relevant to the scattered and diverse population that occupies

Afghanistan’s vast geographical space, it will be necessary first to establish effective and

legitimate government at the centre (Rubin, 2007, 2013).

54. The main reconstruction task in Afghanistan should therefore be the accommodation

and control of regionally-based (informal) powers by a central power that has the capacity to

deliver basic services of reasonable quality throughout the country and to perform the other

tasks of a sovereign state that we have outlined, a goal that for the most part is still far from

being achieved. This view is endorsed by Blunt and Turner (2007, p. 120) in their assessment

of research evidence from a number of conflict and post conflict states: ‘Deconcentration is

particularly relevant for weak or fragile states as it can be seen as a method of increasing the

strength of the state to provide its citizens with the services they are entitled to....a strong

foundation of prior centralization is a necessary basis for successful political decentralisation.

Deconcentration can be seen as a step in this direction.’

55. Support for this conclusion can also be found in Rubin’s research, which over many

years has shown that among ordinary Afghans ‘there is a universally expressed preference for

being governed by a central authority that obeys some laws and where a district governor can

be changed by the central government if he or she didn’t do the right thing’ (Rubin, 2002). As

they did then, most people now want to get rid of the ‘rule of the gun’ and regard a strong

central government as being the principal means of achieving this. In 2002, Rubin observed

that Afghans wanted this because they ‘associate local control with control by gunmen and

warlords’, a situation that in many parts of the country is likely to have become a lot worse.

Ten years later, in 2013, his views on the subject are largely unchanged, although qualified

by the observation that continuing popular support for centralisation would depend very

much on how it was implemented, noting that increasingly many Afghans want to be

‘participating citizens’ as opposed to ‘passive subjects’ (Rubin, 2013, pp. 130-131).

Challenges and Consequences of Failure

56. The challenges of strengthening government at the centre are likely to be much the

same now as they were in 2007 when Rubin observed that important central institutions are

‘deeply corrupt and plagued by a lack of basic skills, equipment and resources. Without

effective and honest administrators, police, and judges, the state can do little to provide

internal security – and if the government does not provide security, people will not recognise

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Mamundzay, Blunt, Yama & Afghan January, 2015

it as a government’. Everyone knows that there is much still to do in all of these respects, and

that the deep funding cuts that are in prospect will make everything more difficult. These

challenges are more pronounced at the periphery.

57. Yet, while more difficult, the importance of making real and rapid progress in these

respects is greater now than ever before. And the consequences of failing in this endeavour

are not difficult to imagine, among them a descent ‘into a full-scale civil war’ (Tomsen,

2014) or ‘a slide into chaos when the Americans leave and the Afghan army is pushed into a

“fortress Kabul” strategy, as the Taliban re-take the countryside, worsening ethnic conflict,

and neighbouring states arm their Afghan proxies, and a refugee crisis ensues as millions of

Afghans again flee the country’ (Rashid, 2013). It is clearly not in the interests of western

powers, of either of the two main figures in government or of the Kabul political elite in

general for any of these things to happen. As Rubin (2014) points out, all of the parties want

to win, ‘but they know that they could all lose.’

Pragmatic Imperatives of SNG

‘Once Afghanistan no longer fears for its own disintegration, it will become more

feasible for the state to experiment with forms of local governance and

decentralisation...in order to provide the services that the Afghan people are now

demanding’ (Rubin, 2013, p. 441).

58. Against this background, when it comes to the distribution of power and resources in

government subnationally, the rationality of keeping things more or less as they are (for now

and the foreseeable future) and trying to make them work better has a firm basis in national

and sub-national political economy, in the unpalatability to western powers and to both sides

in government and the Kabul political and business establishment of a return to chaos and,

most importantly, in popular preferences.

59. This position, which relies on the contingency-based paradigm, is reinforced by a

number of other considerations. First, it is well-established in the research literature that

where government institutions at the centre are weak and patronage is systemic devolving

power and resources to local governments simply provides sustenance for the spread of

patronage to the periphery and its entrenchment (e.g., Blunt et al., 2012a, 2012b). In his

discussion of governance in Afghanistan, Rubin (2002) expresses the same view when he

says that ‘international experience with devolution/decentralisation is that if you try it in a

rather chaotic situation without a strong legal system, it is a formula for corruption rather than

effective self-government’. The classic statement of this position is Diamond (1999): ‘Where

hierarchical chains of particularistic, patron–client relationships are already the dominant

mode of politics, shifting discretionary financial authority from the central to the local level

may simply shift the locus of clientelism and corruption from the central to the local arena,

making these problems even tougher to control’ (p. 244).

60. Second, as elsewhere, significant change towards decentralised government in

Afghanistan would require additional human and financial resources, and would lead

inevitably to bureaucratic inflation, at a time when government revenues and donor funding

are in steep decline and government capacity sub-nationally is weak and is likely to remain so

for some time to come - as Rubin (2013, p. 440) confirms: ‘the (Afghan) state is simply too

weak to manage decentralised service provision.’ Again, this is a conclusion that is well

supported by comparative research: ‘is it wise in circumstances where central governance

institutions are widely recognised as being weak...to embark on a difficult and costly

devolution programme? Would scarce development resources be better spent initially on

strengthening these core institutions – the legal and judicial systems for example – or on

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Mamundzay, Blunt, Yama & Afghan January, 2015

supporting existing systems of deconcentration that are the only existing means of (weak)

service delivery in crucial sectors such as health, education, and agriculture?’(Blunt &

Turner, 2007, p. 122).

61. Third, in any case, the evidence shows that more often than not devolved systems of

SNG fail to deliver in practice what they promise in theory, and that the chances of success

are sharply reduced where governance institutions at the centre are weak. In support of this

conclusion, recent research on these issues sponsored by the World Bank concludes that

decentralisation or ‘participation... appears to affect the distribution of benefits in ways that

suggest that capture is often not “benevolent” or altruistic’ (Mansuri & Rao, 2013, p. 6).

62. A similar conclusion is reached by Blunt and Turner (2007, p. 127):

‘Experience has shown how even the best-intentioned experiment in democratic

devolution can fail to live up to expectations and in some instances can leave people,

especially the poor and disadvantaged, worse off than before. Yet, despite weak central

institutions of governance and high cost, development practice nearly always eschews

deconcentration in favour of democratic decentralisation although this latter label is

frequently in name only.’

63. And, most tellingly, fourth, there is considerable evidence from conflict and post-

conflict states to suggest that more devolved systems of SNG can lead to the intensification

of inter-regional and inter-ethnic conflict (Schou & Haug, 2005).

64. Accordingly, we submit that the short to medium term task in Afghanistan should be

to construct a state structure that is strong enough at the centre to unite the country, provide

security, and establish the rule of law and, within the existing system of deconcentration,

allows enough authority to permeate to lower levels in the provinces to give citizens – who,

according to Rubin (2013), ‘are politicised as never before’ – the opportunity to exercise

some influence on policies and practices that affect their lives.

Conclusion

‘A weak state results when internal and external actors prove themselves

incapable of aligning around the goal of sovereignty’ (Ghani & Lockhart,

2008, p. 177).

65. Our discussion of the necessary conditions for coherent SNG policy discourse in

Afghanistan and of the three main SNG policy paradigms suggests that aligning external and

internal actors around the goal of state sovereignty – and, hence, bridging the sovereignty gap

- will be far from straight forward. Of the two necessary conditions, achieving conceptual

clarity is feasible, but reconciling competing vested interests and ensuring undiluted or

uniform altruism seem to us to be much less so. This suggests that it may not be just a

question of incapability among stakeholders that inhibits alignment around the goal of state

sovereignty, but also – and more importantly - their willingness to do so.

66. These shaky foundations underlie SNG policy paradigms that for the most part in any

case are incommensurable and irreconcilable. The democracy promotion paradigm of SNG is

ideologically-driven and therefore - as a matter of faith – unlikely to be amenable to rational

argument. Its principal interest is to promote ‘democracy’ and decentralisation come what

may, that is, irrespective of what the evidence might suggest will be the benefits for ordinary

people or for state sovereignty. Paradigm failures, which in any event may not be measured

in the above terms, can always be rationalised or written-off as a function of some

combination of recalcitrant and corrupt local officials, a lack of political will, and insufficient

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Mamundzay, Blunt, Yama & Afghan January, 2015

capacity, that is, as the fault of the victim. These conditions are unlikely to be peculiar to

Afghanistan (e.g., Blunt, 2014).

67. The political expediency paradigms, on the other hand, are supremely pragmatic but

only in so far as certain categories of evidence are concerned. It is here we believe that the

best prospects lie for acceptance of the pragmatic imperatives that we advocate as a basis for

strengthening and maintaining for the foreseeable future the current system of deconcentrated

SNG in Afghanistan.

68. Making it clear that over-ambitious and premature devolution is likely to increase

significantly political risk and constrain progress towards state sovereignty is the key to

producing SNG policy that is optimal for equitable and sustainable development. If

decentralising government and ceding greater formal authority to governors, some of whom

already openly flout the authority of the state, will undermine the rule of law; if it will

intensify inter-ethnic and inter-regional conflict that is already at a high pitch; if it will make

security in those parts of the country controlled or threatened by the Taliban and other

insurgent groups more difficult to attain; if, because service provision is unlikely to be

improved, it will undermine the legitimacy of government at the centre; if it will increase the

financial burden on government without providing any certainty of increased fiscal return or

improved service delivery; if it will direct scarce investment away from ‘human capital’ and

physical infrastructure; and if it will limit the ability of government to introduce social

policies that benefit all regions and ethnic groups more or less equally. Then, for all of these

reasons and because, as we noted earlier, all political interests want to win but they also

realise that they could all lose, politics and pragmatism could coalesce around maintaining

and strengthening the existing deconcentrated system of SNG.

69. But despite the evident weight of political and pragmatic argument in its favour, this

happy conclusion is far from being a policy slam dunk. As with policy development

everywhere, resistance, serendipity, opportunism, and irrationality will all come in to play

(Sutton, 1999), and could tilt the balance against an optimal development or state sovereignty

outcome. It remains to be seen whether government can resist these pressures and achieve

policy discourse leadership or dominance in the interests of state sovereignty and the

common good.

70. All stakeholders have vital roles to play in this. Clearly, the more that development

assistance and different arms of government can align themselves with the president’s vision

of state sovereignty the better. We have shown here the strong links that exist between SNG

and important aspects of state sovereignty, providing clear direction for all of those who want

to see Afghanistan standing on its own feet as soon as possible, direction that should help to

make development assistance more cost-effective because it will be more likely to succeed.

And if, as Ghani and Lockhart (2008) suggest in our opening quote, genuinely sovereign

states are the building blocks of a secure, stable and peaceful global order then striving for

and supporting state sovereignty in Afghanistan could have much wider implications.

71. It should be stressed, however, that the vision of alignment expressed by the president

and outlined here is not simply donor coordination by another name. As we have shown, the

president’s vision of state sovereignty is explicit about the necessity for national leadership

and it is equally explicit about what in broad terms will need to be done.

72. Each stakeholder is likely to face different constraints in conforming to these

imperatives. However, the job of reconciling such constraints with the national interest will

be made easier if donors and other stakeholders can adopt the contingency-based approach to

programme design and policy development advocated by the president and in this paper.

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Mamundzay, Blunt, Yama & Afghan January, 2015

73. IDLG, for example, has adopted this approach in relation to forming a view about the

preferred character of SNG, and herein has demonstrated the links between policy in favour

of strengthening the existing system of deconcentration and state sovereignty. It is incumbent

upon other government and non-government stakeholders to do the same with respect to their

own areas of responsibility.

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