ignalina npp presentation in stokholm

Ignalina NPP decommissioning activities are co-financed by European Union

Ignalina NPPIGNALINA NPP: REORGANIZATION FOR DECOMMISSIONING AND

NEW FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 2014 - 2020

Osvaldas Čiukšys

INPP CORPORATE DIRECTOR

10 May 2011

Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania, Stockholm


Ignalina NPP

Plant Overview

Largest and most advanced RBMK design (also with later safety upgrading)

Intended to serve NW region of Soviet Union

Supplied 70-80% of LT national demand

Closed at around mid-life

Low load factor (lack of consumers in 1990s)


Ignalina NPP

Design / preparation

Construction Operation Decommissioning Site reuse

1970 - 1987 1983 - 2009 2005 - 2029 ?

INPP LIFE CYCLE

2010-2015

Final Decommissioning Plan implementation

Decommissioning Fund Accumulated / Used / Accumulation Assumed

•Post operational period 2010 – 2015/2016: preparation for New Phase of INPP activity - Decommissioning

Transitional period


Ignalina NPPDecember 31, 2009:

change of INPP core activity

INPP was acting as nuclear power plant operator

December 31, 2009 Unit 2 reactor was shut down

Main INPP activity has been changed to decommissioning organization.


Ignalina NPPSUCCESSFUL OPERATION OF INPP

Accumulated expertise and know-how of RBMK technology – key prequalification for successful RBMK type plant decommissioning:

1974 Preparations started for construction of INPP 1983 Unit 1, 1987 Unit 2 commissioned It took 11 years to build the worlds most powerful nuclear plant Originally 4 RBMK-1500 reactors planned ~ 6000 staff employed (1989) In 27 years 308 bln kWh of electricity generated INPP specialists were the first to start using the enriched fuel with burnable absorber – erbium Unique project of Unit 1 nuclear fuel reuse in Unit 2 reactor implemented 1st time in operation history of nuclear reactors Other unique technology improvements & modifications


Ignalina NPP INPP STRATEGIC TARGETS IN 2010-2029

To perform safe, timely and effective decommissioning of INPP.

To become the services provider in the nuclear energy enterprises decommissioning market. To use existing infrastructure for business and VNPP needs.

INPP STRATEGIC TARGET IN 2010-2015 To reorganize the enterprise's activity in the most

effective way redirecting it to the next stage of activity - the decommissioning.

INPP ACTIVITY TARGETS IN 2011 To renew the enterprise personnel with

properly qualified specialists and leaders, modernize the management.

To take measures in order to ensure the transparency and efficiency of the enterprise activity.

To achieve the progress during the implementation of the basic decommissioning projects.


Ignalina NPPBUDGET OF INPP: 2010 Fact and 2011 Approved

LT Budget 6,42 %

NDF 12,37%INPP own funds 1,73 %

IP (CPMA) 47,59 %

IIDSF (EBRD) 31,89 %

LT Budget 3,99 %

NDF 4,21%

INPP own funds 3,30 %

IP (CPMA) 41,06 %

IIDSF (EBRD) 47,44%

20,52%

79,48%

11,50%

88,50%

2010 Factual budget 109.5 mln EUR:

Economy of 32.1 mln EUR or 22.7 % from approved 2010 budget

2011 planned budget 190.2 mln EUR:

Based on 2010 factual budget implementation and concentrated on key decom projects with

allocation of 102 mln EUR

EU 79.48 % LT 20.52 %

EU 88.50 % LT 11.50 %


Ignalina NPP KPIs FOR 2011 BASED ON SMART PRINCIPLES

BOARD ADOPTED & COMMUNICATED TO MASS MEDIA


Ignalina NPPDecommissioning Strategy

Advantage Drawback

Use of existing workforce:(a) social mitigation (b) staff knowledge

Costs incurred earlier

Higher radiation levels

Use of operational infrastructure

Defined regulatory framework

Better cost definition

No legacy to future generations

• Immediate Dismantling: approved by relevant legal acts and procedures


Ignalina NPPRBMK plant decommissioning: INPP

Technical difficulties:• huge primary masses of buildings• large proportion of contaminated masses• large volumes of operational waste• irradiated graphite – no established disposal method


Ignalina NPPCurrent Status

• Dismantling outside units since 2009 (e.g. service water pump house)

• Dismantling unit facilities since late 2010 (e.g. Unit 1 emergency core cooling system, turbine hall etc.)

• 2 major facilities in construction

(a) ISFSF (b) SWMSF

• 2 major facilities under design

– Landfill (constructing Buffer Store)

– Near Surface Repository


Ignalina NPPDismantling activities (1)

Open Nitrogen-and Hydrogen-Receiving Facility 2010-08

2010-08

2010-10-08



•13

Chemical Reagent Depot (Room 108)

2009-12-11

2010-04-07



•14

Service Water Pump Station (Building 120/1)

2010-01-25

2010-07-30


Ignalina NPP

15

WORKS OF UNIT 2 REACTOR DEFUELLING

HAVE STARTED

One of the most important stages of

Decommissioning started on 1 February, 2011 The Fuel Part Unloading Programme was

developed by INPP Nuclear Fuel Department The Programme was approved by VATESI 500 Fuel Assemblies to be unloaded and

transferred to the pools The completion of the Programme

foreseen in February 2012


Ignalina NPPOverall schedule

Unit 1 activities

Unit 2activities

General site activities

Dismantling & Decontamination

ISFSF

SWMSF

Landfill Facility

Near Surface Repository

Dismantling & Decontamination

Fuel in core Fuel in pools Fuel fully removed

Fuel in core Fuel in pools Fuel fully removed

Site Operation & Maintenance DemolitionD&D

Post-operation

Operation

Operation

Post-operation

Opening wastemanagement

routes(Design &

construction)

Global Decommissioning Program / Final Decommissioningg Plan

2001-2010 2011-2020 2021-2030


Ignalina NPPKey decommissioning projects

before reactors dismantling

Project B1 ISFSF

B234 SWMSF

B19 Landfill

B25 Repository

Status: Construction Delay 3 years

ConstructionDelay 3-4 years

Design B19/1Buffer storage

facility being released in 2011

Design

Price: 193 mln. Eur 123 mln. Eur 30 mln. Eur ~290 mln. Eur

Total: ~ 620 mln. Eur


Ignalina NPPBreakdown by Generic Activities

550m€

510m€

610m€200m€

100m€

210m€

110m€

Total cost: 2290 m Euro

(at 2011 prices)

•Final Site Clearance

•5%

•D&D

•24%

•Preparatory Actions

•4% •Fuel Removal

•9%

•Post-operation

•9%

•WasteRemoval

•22%

•General Site

Operation

•27%


Ignalina NPPBreakdown by Generic Costs

Adjustments

460m€

Other Investments & Procurements38% (2011)

640m€

320m€

+160m€

+140m€

870m€

Major Facilities

28% (2011)

Staffing20% (2011)

Energy14% (2011)

450m€ +150m€

Staffing23% (adjusted)

Energy17% (adjusted)

Major Facilities, Investments & Procurements60% (adjusted)

(2012-2029)Total cost: 2290 m Euro

(at 2011 prices)

+160m€

+140m€460 m€


Ignalina NPPIgnalina NPP Staffing

2001-2003

2000

2004-2009 2010-2012 2013-2016

500

1400

2017-2023

1100

500

3900

2800

2024-2026 2027-2029

4600

Staff attributable to the cost of post-operation and dismantling

Unit 1closure

600

End of unitdismantling

End of defuelling

2250

Unit 2closure

2000

Newskills

End of all D&D

1800

End of demolition

INPP applies “in house” project implementation strategy which allows to optimize costs as well as use own staff and gain new know - how


Ignalina NPPAssumptions

Field Assumption Justification

Overall decommissioningGlobal Decommissioning Plan (GDP)

has identified all possible costs

GDP was built-up from estimates developed and

refined successively in successive planning

documents (PDP, FDP, U1DP0, etc.). GDP accounts

for real costs over 2000-2010 and further development

of ongoing projects.

Reactor dismantlingGDP assumes immediate dismantling

FDP concluded that dismantling of reactors is

possible and foresees long-term interim storage of

associated “orphan” waste.

Macroeconomic

Rises in salaries, energy costs and

other prices do not exceed the values

presented

Macroeconomic study commissioned by Ministry of

Energy based on best available data.


Ignalina NPPRisks

Field Risk Quantification of impact

Design & Build Major Investment

Projects (ongoing)

Additional works, changes in

regulatory requirements

20% (60 m Euro approx.)

Excludes indirect impact of any further

delays.

Build-only Major Investment

Projects (planned)

Additional works, changes in

regulatory requirements 15% (50 m Euro approx.)

Reactor dismantlingRevisions of scope and

unforeseeable variations50% (20 m Euro approx.)

Bitumized waste

Upgrading of interim storage into

long-term near surface disposal

(foreseen in GDP based on

preliminary study) is not possible.

50 m Euro (approx.)

14,000 m3 to be retrieved conditioned and

disposed of in NSR

Other Investments derived

from Final Decommissioning

Plan

Revisions of scope and

unforeseeable variations10% (10 m Euro approx.)

Total 190 m Euro (approx.)

Other?


Ignalina NPPResources

EU & international

1999 - 2003

210 m€ 320 m€ 837 m€

Bilateral donors: 33 m€

2004 - 2006 2007 - 2013

•EU: 1367 m€

•Total: 1450 m€

•EU: 995.5 m€

•Total: 1078.5 m€

2011 2013•IIDSF interest: 50 m€

Legal basis of IIDSF and Ignalina Programme (from Accession Treaty) include decommissioning and consequential measures in the energy sector

Relevant to examine use of funds to date:

- proportion of funding in each sector

- current funding available


Ignalina NPPNational Decommissioning Fund

Limited by:- Soviet period

- safety power reduction

- low load factor

- early closure

Former funding- levy on INPP electricity

- no present income

Future funding - surcharge on electricity sales

(also limited)

45 m Euro29 m Euro

49 m Euro

32 m Euro

Social Mitigation

18%

Energy Sector20%

Decommissioning30%

Unallocated28%

Administration4% (6 m Euro)

TOTAL :161 MLN EURO


Ignalina NPPOther national sources

• Ignalina NPP own resources

– present cash assets: 100 m Euro

– future sales of materials: 30 m Euro

• State Budget

– taxes and ineligible income costs

460 m Euro to 2029 (at 20% tax)


Ignalina NPPConclusion

1290 m Euro

1480 m Euro

EU and international donors until 2013

2040m€

650m€ 320m€

Resources

Lithuania

Direct Costs

Direct costs to 2011 Future direct costs 2012 to 2029

1450 m Euro 2740 m Euro(adjusted)

2290 m Euro(2011 prices)

480m€ (max)

700m€

2011

190m€

2930 m Euro(adjusted incl. risk)

Risk

FUNDING GAP

Costs well-founded (cf. FDP & Greifswald) but significant funding gap Benefit to EU MS out of Ignalina NPP experience: value added for the

whole EU’s nuclear sector through ICCC and other intn’l projects Lithuania is contributing to the expected level: more than 10 % of costs Seeking EU funds to meet funding gap (with inherent risks)

LT realizes the importance of decommissioning activities for the whole EU:

- rational approach: effective use of allocated funds

- more value added for every EU MS for a funds spent


Ignalina NPPComparison with Greifswald NPP

Operational Solid Waste (to be retrieved and managed)

Operational Spent Resins (for cementation)

30,000 m3

15,000 m3

5,800 m3

2,000 m3

Steel from Equipt. Dismantling contaminated

59%

91%

130,000 tons

116,000 tons

Steel

Steel Graphite Shielding (serpentine / sand)

Required Spent Fuel Casks (for interim storage)

190 (additional)

61

17,100 tons

2,300 t

Reactor Core Structures 2,660 tons

3,800 t 11,000 t

6 x 440 MWe VVER

Greifswald NPP Ignalina NPP

2 x 1500 MWe RBMK


Ignalina NPPComparison with Greifswald NPP

Smaller reactor size permits integral removal and storage of main vessel

Not possible for RBMK

• International experience exists in dismantling pressurised water

reactors

• Ignalina NPP is pioneering the immediate dismantling of an RBMK

more difficult to define technology and costs


Ignalina NPP Implementation of active communication strategy: INPP is socially responsible employer

“if community or your staff don’t know about your activity, opponents will create your full record instead of you anyway...”

•29

Communication strategy developed and working plan for implementation approved by the board in June 2010:

National and local communication plans

Inside communication:

- top and mid level management,

- all personnel

Corporate communication:

- national institutions

- international institutions


Ignalina NPP

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!

QUESTIONS?

[email protected]

www.iae.lt

mailto:[email protected]


Ignalina NPP

31

INPP POTENTIAL (1)

Construction period

we acquired the experience of successfuluse of unique technology and installation of the only RBMK-1500 reactors at the European territory


Ignalina NPP

32

INPP POTENTIAL (2)

Operation period:

- we obtained the experience of introduction and execution of unique processes and works;

- we obtained the experience of execution of appropriate safety analysis, which is required to ensure safety and efficiency of nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management.


Ignalina NPP

33

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INPP INTERNAL PROJECTS

Carrying out all the projects using internal INPP resources saves decommissioning funds substantially, allows to preserve qualified staff at the enterprise, accumulate unique knowledge and expertise, strengthen capacities of main designed departments of the enterprise and preconditions the opportunity to participate in international decommissioning projects in future.

We apply expertise, knowledge and motivation of functional departments, qualified specialists and workers, which has been acquired during the period of construction and operation.

In consideration of the current situation at the INPP, it is necessary to establish new job places for the needs of the INPP, develop internal potential of the INPP and strengthen its abilities.


Ignalina NPP

34

UP01

UP01Engineering on Dismantling of

Units 1 and 2 structures from

the Reactor Shafts

Strategic project UP01, which had been initiated by the INPP as internal project, was commenced to implement in April 2010


Ignalina NPP

35

Construction volume:~ 22 m × 22 m × 25 m

Weight of equipment: ~ 13 400 tons of various materials

All the types of radiation contamination: near-surface contamination, activation…

According to the estimations at the Chernobyl NPP - 99 percent of activity are bounded in the reactor's constructions, up to 80 percent of this activity are in the technological channels.

INPUT DATA (1)


Ignalina NPP

36

INPUT DATA (2)

Zones R1 & R2:

• Technical maintenance experience;• Ensuring access to implementation of

installation; • Bounded set of materials (mostly metals);• Surface radioactive contamination (excluding

channels and some internals);• Expected disposal places

* channels (stainless steel, zirconium alloy of Э125 type) may be removed.

Zone R3:

• Minor experience;• No access;• Variety of materials (sand, serpentinite,

graphite, carbon steel, stainless steel);• Irradiation (according to estimations);• Experimental works are required;• Waste disposal sited are not envisaged

R1

R2

R3


Ignalina NPP

37

2011 2014 2017 2020

TOTAL TIMESCALE

R1&R2 (Unit 1)

WP 1. Engineering studies for dismantling

WP 2. Radiological surveys

WP 3. Development of the design documentation

WP 4. Approval of the design documentation by the state authorities

WP 5. Preparatory works for dismantling

Dismantling for R1 and R2. According to a separate schedule

R3 (Unit 1)

WP 6. Engineering studies

WP 7. Development of the design documentation

WP 8. Approval of the design documentation by the state authorities

Dismantling for R3. According to a separate schedule

R1&R2&R3 (Unit 2)

WP 9. Recurrence, adaptation of work packages for Unit 2

Dismantling for R3. According to a separate schedule

2013

TIMETABLE


Ignalina NPP

38

RISK FACTORS

The loss of knowledge and expertise that are necessary for safe, efficient and transparent implementation of reactors dismantling works:

Knowledge is being imparted by humans not by "lifeless" archives or computer systems. Technical specialists rather than general profile specialists are required.

Uncertainties, that affect safety occupational and cost:

High-quality and efficient analysis of R3 zone is required. In order to carry out sampling and measurement and eliminate uncertainties, the key tasks should envisage the complexity of works, mass of waste, ensuring access to materials.

Funding withdrawal - it is necessary to ensure the execution of UP01 project major works.

Changes of normative framework and strategies are possible.


Ignalina NPP

39

ESSENTIAL TASK – GRAPHITE MANAGEMENT

Anthony Benford National Laboratory in the UK Michael Grave Doosan Babcock owned Doosan Power Systems

Ltd part

Christian Glorennec (EDF) France

Height: 9 mDiameter 15.17 m Weight: 2060 tonnes

Bugey-1

Height: 8 mDiameter ~ 14 m Weight: 1760 t per unit

INPP drawing, code РБМ-К15.сб.05СБ


Ignalina NPP

40


Problems:

Irradiated graphite is seldom managed, because such operations are expensive.

Expenditure depends on input data quality.

Input data should be specific for each reactor and optimally fit for decision-making - especially decisions which relate to such waste withdrawal, processing, decontamination or recycling for final disposal as well as seeking to demonstrate the acceptability and safety of technologies.

Does Ignalina NPP own all the data on irradiated graphite?


Ignalina NPP

41


Major Knowledge Centers

IAEA CARBOWASTE EPRI/DOE

British, French, German, and Russian scientists and industry

Lithuanian and Ukrainian scientists


Ignalina NPP

““IIgnalina gnalina CCarbon arbon

CCompetenceompetenceCCenter”enter”

COMPETENCE STRENGTHENING


Ignalina NPP

Valdymo organas

Mokslinė-techninė

taryba

Pirmaujančios

patirties

sekcija

Inovacijų ir

technologijų

sekcija

43

Decommissioning

requirements

for competence

arise

Decommissioning

requirements

for competence

SATISFIED

Management methods

of irradiated materials Any innovations

Stakeholders

receive

“Know-how”

competence

Subject 1 Subject N

Attracting

investment

for decommissioning

Subject 2

STRENGTHENING OF GRAPHITE MANAGEMENT COMPETENCE

Governing Body

Scientific Technical Council

Leadership experience section

Innovation and Technology section


Ignalina NPP

44

Areas of essential actions Nuclear facilities wherein the works are executed

Optimization of verification in real-time (number of samples, samples, methods, etc.)

Bugey-1 (France)Windscale AGR (UK)AVR (Germany)

RBMK-1000 (Ukraine)Other objects with graphite

Explanation of verification in real-time (sampling and measurement) using released publications

RBMK-1500 (Lithuania)

RBMK-1000 (Russia, Ukraine)

Other objects with graphite

Integrated methods Bugey-1 (France)

Windscale AGR (UK)

Magnox (UK),

Beloyarsk NPP (AMB),

Amplification of designed RBMK term of service

Other objects with graphite

Special conditioning, treatment and disposal options Different decisions

COMPETENCE STRENGTHENING

Task: to organize a conference of interested specialists in autumn 2011


Ignalina NPP

45

CONCLUSIONS

Issues, related to the irradiated graphite, should not be addressed alone. By sharing experience and planning in advance bounded investigative and development works, we have an opportunity to achieve success.

The INPP team is convinced that management of waste from reactor should be concerted with dismantling technology. The lack of such integration may affect the whole INPP decommissioning programme.

The INPP team has the potential to accomplish the majority of works (for example, to carry out sampling. The INPP has necessary laboratories, the INPP personnel is pro-active, we have 15 tons of pure graphite for establishment of stands). All the missing parts will be developed within the framework of 2011-2029 enterprise's activity strategy.


Ignalina NPPExtensive Emergency Preparedness Training

organized at INPP

• 24 February, 2011 planned Emergency Preparedness training

• 267 INPP employees from management and various services participated

• New Emergency Plan reflecting new INPP configuration and organizational structure was validated

• New Scenario of drop of SFAs to the pond and their interaction was challenged

• Beyond design emergency procedures were validated

• Observed by RSC, VATESI, etc. reps

• Lessons learned – vulnerabilities and further improvement

•photo

•photo

•photo


Ignalina NPPPost Fukushima recommendations

WANO Significant Operating Experience Report 2011-2 Review

• Safety systems, procedures and staff availability and functionality

• Readiness to mitigate station blackout

• Readiness to mitigate flooding

• Readiness to mitigate fire


Ignalina NPPPost Fukushima actions plan

INPP Site Specific actions plan has been developed 2011 03 29 and presented to regulatory body: VATESI

• Verify through test or inspection that active and passive safety systems are available and functional

• Verify that the capability to mitigate station blackout conditions required by station design is valid and that the facility is actually ready for that mode

• Verify the capability to mitigate internal and external flooding

• Perform walk downs of safety related equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events and to analyze the potential that equipment’s function could be lost.

• General safety issues Action plan implemented and Final report - 2011 06 30


Ignalina NPP

•49

INFORMATION ABOUT THE CAUSES OF UNIT 1 MAIN CIRCULATION CIRCUIT SEALING FAILURE OCCURRED DURING ITS DECONTAMINATION

On 5 October 2010 during implementation of the scheduled works foreseen in Project B12 “Decontamination of internal surfaces of SE Ignalina NPP Main Circulation Circuit, Blowing, Cooling and Water Purification Systems” – Unit 1 circuit decontamination – seal failure has occurred in one of the components which resulted in the flowing out of the chemical agents (nitrogen acid (1%) and potassium permanganate) used for decontamination outside of the circuit boundaries. Since the strict safety requirements are applied for implementation of this project, the works are performed in the leak-tight rooms, the chemical agents and substances contaminated by radioactive nuclides have drained through the specific drainage systems. In order to ascertain the causes of this technological incident the Commission consisting of representatives of the employer of the project (Ignalina NPP) and the contractor of the project (JSC “Specialus Montažas-NTP”) was formed. “The Commission has concluded that responsibility for this technological incident falls on Contractor implementing project B12. The project implementation technology proposed by the Contractor had some shortcomings which caused the incident”, - the chairman of the Commission, the head of INPP Technological Service Vigantas Galkauskas stated. In opinion of the Commission Chairman the most essential is that neither INPP employees nor the environment have suffered. Moreover, INPP specialists have ascertained the causes of these malfunctions in the project implementation, so analogical technical problems shall not repeat while implementing a similar project in the future.


Ignalina NPP

• Commission concluded:

• MCC sealing failure has occurred during Unit 1 Main Circulation Circuit decontamination due to the shortcomings of the decontamination technology proposed by the Contractor. The technology proposed by the Contractor was in fact not tested in nuclear industry enterprises before. It contradicts the Technical Specification regulations of the Public Procurement Tender for the implementation of this project.

It should be added that according to the facts stated the following conclusion can be made: the contract for the project B12 implementation signed with the Contractor – an economic operators group acting on the basis of joint activity agreement – JSC “Specialus Montažas-NTP” (Lithuania), Lithuanian Energy Institute (LEI), JSC “All-Russian Research Institute for NPP Operation” (VNIAES, Russia) on 12 January 2010, was signed without taking into consideration the fact that the Contractor did not comply with the requirements stated in the Technical Specifications of the tender.

50


Ignalina NPPINPP INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR ENERGY SAFETY EVENTS

ACCORDING TO INES SCALE 1994-2010

ignalina npp presentation in stokholm

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