influence of al-ghazali and ibn sina on descrtes

7/29/2019 Influence of Al-Ghazali and Ibn Sina on Descrtes

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The influence of Al-Ghazali and

Ibn Sina on Descartes*

Nazeem Goolam, Associate Professor, De-partment of Jurisprudence, University ofSouth Africa

In this article the author maintains thatit is necessary to engage in a renewal ofthought outside the European/Westerntradition and to reappraise the contribu-tion of Islamic legal thought to Eur-opean legal philosophy. After briefbibliographical surveys of Al-Ghazali(10581111), Ibn Sina (9801037) andDescartes (15961650) and an outline ofDescartes' theory of knowledge, theauthor poses the question: To whatextent was Descartes' famous proposi-tion `I think, therefore I am' influencedby Al-Ghazali and Ibn Sina? He ques-

tions the originality of Cartesian thoughtand proceeds to demonstrate that theprimary ideas in Descartes' theory ofknowledge, namely (1) the method ofdoubt and scepticism, (2) dualism and(3) the existence of God were directlyinfluenced by the two Islamic scholarswho preceded him by some 500 years,namely Ibn Sina and Al-Ghazali.

Ithonya lika-Al-Ghazali no-Ibn SinakuDescartes

Kulo mbhalo umbhali ubeka ukuthi kuya-dingeka ukuthi kuke kubhekwe imicabangoemisha engaphandle kosiko lwaseYurophu/

lwaseNtshonalanga, futhi kubuye kuhloli-siswe umnikelo owenziwa yimicabango ye-zomthetho yamaSulumani kuleyo ndlelaabaseYurophu ababona ngayo ezomthetho.Ngemuva kophenyo olufushane lwemibhaloka-Al-Ghazali (10581111), eka-Ibn Sina(9801037) nokohlaka lwethiyori yolwazikaDescartes, umbhali ubeka lo mbuzo:Ngabe isiphakamiso esidumile sikaDescartes

esithi AI think, therefore I am@, sithonyekekangakanani yimisebenzi ka-Al-Ghazali no-Ibn Sina? Ubuzisisa ngomsuka wendlelayokubuka izinto, olandela imibono kaDes-cartes, abeseqhubeka ekhombisa ukuthi imi-

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* Abridged version of a paper delivered at the Southern African Society of Legal Historians Conference,

Stellenbosch University, 1517 January 2003. The author wishes to thank Unisa's Research Committee for

the research grant in 2002 which enabled him to conduct this research at the School of Oriental and

African Studies at London University and the Bodleian Library in Oxford.


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bonongqangi kule thiyori yolwazi kaDes-cartes, okuyile, (1) indlela elandelwayomayelana nokungabaza nokungakholwakahle ngokuthile, (2) ukuba nezinhlangothiezimbili kokuthile, kanye (3) nokuba khonakukaNkulunkulu, yathelelwa ngqo yilezizazi ezimbili zamaSulumani ezeza nga-

phambi kwakwe ngeminyaka engama-500,okungu-Ibn Sina no-Al Ghazali.

1 Introduction

At the dawn of the twenty-first century,it is necessary to engage in a renewal ofthought outside the European/Westerntradition and to reappraise the contribu-tion of Islamic legal thought to Eur-opean legal philosophy and law. In an

article published a few years ago andentitled `Islamic influences on Europeanlegal philosophy and law' the influenceof the great intellectual activity ofIslamic Spain in the eleventh andtwelfth centuries on medieval WesternEurope, focusing particularly on theimpact of Ibn Rushd's (11261198)Aristotelian commentaries on the think-ing of St Thomas of Aquinas1 wasdiscussed. In that article, briefly over-viewing the history and development ofIslamic thought, it was stated that

[t]he Persian Abu Ibn Sina (9801037), known as Avicenna in theWest, is [regarded as] the mostnotable Islamic philosopher of theMiddle Ages. Although some of hisworks are in Persian, he wrotemainly in Arabic. His greatest philo-sophical work, the Kitab al-Shifa(Book of Healing), translated intoLatin as Liber Sufficientiae, exercisedan important influence through in-dependent circulation of its sections

on, inter alia, metaphysics andfurther had a powerful effect on

Christian philosophy in the 13th

century.2

On the transmission of knowledge

from the Islamic world to Europe,

Weeramantry was quoted as follows:

Some great translators, such as the

Italian Gerard of Cremona who lived

in Toledo, translated as many as 71scientific treatises from Arabic into

Latin. Indeed, the entire Aristoteliancorpus was translated from Arabicinto Latin as were also the works of

great Islamic philosophers such as

Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, [Ibn Sina] andAl-Ghazali.3

It should be borne in mind that Saint

Thomas of Aquinas was influenced not

only by Ibn Rushd but by Ibn Sina as

well. In his work De ente et essentia, inwhich St Thomas formulates the dis-

tinction between essence and existence,he relies heavily on Ibn Sina to support

his thesis. In fact, one author regards StThomas's thought in this respect as

entirely Avicennan.4

This article focuses on the impact of

Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Al-Ghazali on

European legal thinking. More particu-

larly, it focuses on their influence on the

thinking of Rene Descartes, the greatFrench philosopher. To what extent was

Descartes' famous proposition `I think,therefore I am' influenced by Ghazalian

and Avicennan thought? Since Des-

cartes was a devout Catholic and both

Ibn Sina and Al-Ghazali were Muslim,the focus now, in continuing the dis-

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1 Fundamina (1999) Vol 5 4467.2 Ibid48; see also Haren Medieval thought(1985) 122 and Jordan Western philosophy from Antiquity to the Middle

Ages (1987) 343.3 Ibid 50; Weeramantry Islamic jurisprudence: An international perspective (1988) 21.4 Khan MS The philosophy of Avicenna and its influence on Medieval Europe (1969) 95. This is a translation of

AM Goichon's La philosophie d'Avicenna et son influence en Europe Medievale.


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cussion, is on Islamic and Christianmetaphysical speculation. Who was

Ibn Sina, who was Al-Ghazali and whowas Descartes?

2 A brief bibliographical survey

2.1 Abu Ibn Sina (9801037)Abu Ali Al-Husayn Ibn Abdallah IbnSina was born in 980 of Persian parentsin the village of Afshana, near Bukhara,

in Iran. After a basic education inIslamic teaching, he studied arithmeticand later philosophy. He began practis-ing medicine at the age of 16. Togetherwith his tutor he read the Arabictranslation of the Isagoge of Porphyry,

being an introduction to Aristotle'sOrganon and to the study of philosophyitself. What troubled Ibn Sina most wasthe Metaphysics of Aristotle. More speci-fically Aristotle's First Philosophy, andthe question of what the science of beingqua being has to do with Divine Science,with a science of first principles, andwith metaphysics. He found the disci-pline of metaphysics unintelligible until

he read Al-Farabi's short work On theObject of metaphysics.5 He was then 18years old. This was the start of his careeras a philosopher. Roger Bacon would

later refer to him as the `dux et princepsphilosophiae' and the chief commentatorand exponent of Aristotle.6 Further-more, in the brief history of philosophy

which Bacon included in his Opus maiusin 1266 to 1267 he neatly identifies theplac e of Ibn Sina in the We ster n

scientific and philosophical tradition.He makes the point that the major partof Aristotle's works received little atten-tion until after the time of the Prophet

Muhammad (on whom be peace), when

Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Ibn Rushd (Aver-roes) and others `recalled it to the lightof full exposition'.7

Ibn Sina wrote more than a hundredtreatises in Persian and Arabic on, interalia, logic, mathematics, physics, medi-cine and metaphysics. A Latin transla-

tion of his chief medical treatise, Thecanon of medicine or Qanun was thestandard reference in Europe in thisfield of study until the seventeenthcentury. As stated earlier,8 his greatestphilosophical work, the Kitab Al-Shifa(`Book of Healing') healing for the soul

was translated into Latin as Libersufficientiae and exercised an importantinfluence in respect of metaphysics onlater Christian and Western thinking.Descartes' reliance although neveracknowledged by him on Ibn Sina isclear and represents but one enquiry inthis vast field.

2.2 Al-Ghazali (10581111)

Abu Hamid ibn Muhammad Al-Ghazaliwas born in Tus in 450. Besides earlytraining in theology and canon law, his

later education included science, dialec-tics, philosophy, logic and Sufi practiceand doctrine. After initial success as ateacher and consulting lawyer, he wasstruck down by a mysterious disease,his speech became impaired and hesuffered from loss of appetite. As thestrain increased, he touched the depthsof absolute scepticism; he doubted theevidence of the senses since they oftendeceived him.

At the age of 36 Al-Ghazali turned tomeditation and Sufism. His greatesttheological work, Ihya Ulum-ud-Din(`Revival of the religious sciences'), isregarded, after the Qur'an and the

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5 The Arabic version consisted of a mere eight pages, while the French version was no more than four pages

long. See further Goodman LE Avicenna (1992) 15.6 Wickens GM Avicenna: Scientist and philosopher (1974) 109.7 Ibid 84.8 See n 2 supra.


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Sunnah (recorded sayings, traditions and

practices of the Prophet Muhammad), as

the most authoritative reference in Is-

lam. In the field of legal philosophy, his

more important works include The ten-

dencies of the philosophers, The incoherence

of the philosophersand The deliverance from

error. In the last-mentioned work, Al-Ghazali states that irreligious ideas are

not peculiar to all areas of philosophy,

only to metaphysics. He argued that

logic and logical conditions of proof

cannot be satisfied in metaphysics and,

further, that on the ultimate issues of

truth and reality, nothing more than

speculation can be expected of the hu-

man intellect.9

Ultimately, for Al-Ghazali, Sufism

held out the promise of further progress,

beyond reason and intellect. In his own

words:

There were revealed to me things

innumerable and unfathomable. This

much I shall say about that in order

that others may be helped: I learnt

with certainty that it is above all the

mystics who walk on the road ofGod; their life is the best life, their

method the soundest method, their

character the purest character; in-

deed, were the intellect of the in-

tellectuals and the learning of the

learned and the scholarship of the

scholars, who are versed in the

p r ofu nd itie s o f r e ve ale d tr uth ,

brought together to improve the life

and character of the mystics, theywould find no way of doing so; for to

the mystics all movement and all

rest, whether external or internal,

brings illumination from the light of

the lamp of prophetic revelation; and

behind the light of prophetic revela-

tion there is no other light on the faceof the earth from which illuminationmay be received.10

According to Islamic tradition, everycentury will see a great reviver of thereligion of Islam. Al-Ghazali is regarded

as the reviver of the twelfth century orthe sixth century of the Islamic era.

2.3 Descartes (15961650)

Rene Descartes is regarded as the fatherof modern Western philosophy. He wasborn at La Haye (today La Haye Des-cartes), near Tours, in France in 1596.From his eleventh to nineteenth years

he studied classics and philosophy atthe Jesuit college of La Fleche in Anjouand took a doctorate in law at theUniversity of Poitiers in 1616. In 1618he embarked on a military career andtravelled to Holland to join the army ofPrince Maurice of Nassau. Making nomark as a soldier, he discovered hisvocation as a thinker in Bavaria in thewinter of 1619. Descartes describes this

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9 Jordan n 2 supra 349.10 Ibid 350.


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experience in his Discours de la methode,(`Discourse on the method'). In thewords of Bertrand Russell: `The weatherbeing cold, he got into a stove in themorning, and stayed there all daymeditating; by his own account, hisphilosophy was half finished when he

came out, but this need not be acceptedtoo literally. Socrates used to meditateall day in the snow, but Descartes' mindonly worked when he was warm'.11

Descartes lived in Holland for 21years, composing works on cosmology,mathematics, physics, optics, meteoro-logy and philosophy. When he initiallyleft for Holland he took only a few bookswith him, among them the Bible and theSumma theologiae of Thomas Aquinas

(since it has been shown that St Thomaswas influenced by Ibn Rushd and IbnSina, their indirect influence on Des-cartes cannot be doubted12). BertrandRussell writes that Descartes was notindustrious, worked short hours andread little, and that his work seems tohave been done with great concentrationduring short periods. Descartes wrote inFrench and Latin. His most important

works on philosophy are The discourse onthe method, published in French in 1637,the Meditations on first philosophy, pub-lished in Latin in 1642 and the Principlesof philosophy, published in Latin in 1644.Although the Principles contains themost comprehensive statement of Des-cartes' position, the Meditations `is thekey text, not only because of its relent-less and concentrated argument, butalso because it represents Descartes'

attempt to show the originality andimportance of his philosophical meth-od'.13

What then was Descartes' theory ofknowledge?

3 Descartes' theory of knowledge

3.1 Cartesian doubt

The heart of Descartes' philosophy wasthat `the greatest care must be taken notto admit anything as true which wecannot prove to be true'.14 Thus, in

order to have a firm foundation for hisphilosophy, he resolved to make him-self doubt everything that he couldmanage to doubt. The scope of Cartesiandoubt was fairly wide-ranging and be-gins with scepticism in respect of thesenses. He held that the entire field ofhuman sense perception could bedoubted since it might well be thatwhat is presented to humans by theirsenses is as insubstantial as dreams,illusions and hallucinations. The causeof these insubstantial presentations maywell be an evil demon and not a goodGod, he thought. So, belief in God couldnow be doubted. However, once doubtreached this stage, Descartes feared, itwould be impossible for humans tomaintain even the validity of mathema-tical truths. For this reason he writes inthe Meditations that there are beliefs that

his dreaming argument cannot with-stand and that these beliefs concernwhat is most general, such as thoseencountered in mathematics: `whether Iam awake or asleep, two and threeadded together are five, and a squarehas no more than four sides'.15 Itseemed impossible, he thought, thatsuch transparent truths could incur anysuspicion of being false.

How, then, does Descartes overcomedoubt?

3.2 The Cogito

The one thing he could not doubt was

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11 Russell B History of Western philosophy (1948) 581.12 See Introduction and n 1 supra.13 Grayling AC Philosophy I: A guide through the subject (2000) 443.14 See n 11 supra.15 Meditation 1, 20; see also Grayling n 13 supra 444.


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that Ì doubt'. But to doubt is to think.

Thus Ì think' is an indubitable fact.

However, I cannot think if I do not exist.

Thus he explains in his Discourse on themethod: Ì saw ... that from the mere factthat I thought of doubting the truth of

other things, it followed quite evidently

and certainly that I existed'.16

He further explains, in Part Four of

the Discourse:

But immediately upon this I observed

that, whilst I wished to think that all

was false, it was absolutely that I,

who thus thought, should be some-

what and as I observed that this

truth, I think hence I am, was socertain and of such evidence, that no

ground of doubt, however extrava-gant, could be alleged by the sceptics

capable of shaking it, I concluded

that I might, without scruple, accept

it as the first principle of the philo-

sophy of which I was in search.17

Descartes' conclusion is thus con-

tained in the famous Latin phrase

`Cogito, ergo sum', Ì think, therefore Iam'. Ì think, therefore I am' makesmind more certain than matter. Having

thus established his own existence,

Descartes goes on to examine his nature

and goes on to reflect upon the nature of

physical things (bodies). This would

consequently lead to his theory of

dualism the dualism of the soul and

the body.

3.3 Cartesian dualism

Bertrand Russell adequately explains the

idea of Cartesian dualism in the follow-

ing pre cis:

The I that has been proved to exist

has been inferred from the fact that I

think, therefore I exist while I think,

and only then. If I ceased to think,

there would be no evidence of myexistence. I am a thing that thinks, a

substance of which the whole nature

or essence consists in thinking, andwhich needs no place or materialthing for its existence. The soul,

therefore, is wholly distinct from

the body and easier to know than

the body; it would be what it is even

if there were no body.18

In his Meditations Descartes makes thefollowing observation:

I know that everything which I

clearly and distinctly understand is

capable of being created by God so as

to correspond exactly with my under-standing of it. Hence the fact that I

can clearly and distinctly understand

one thing apart from another is

enough to make me certain that the

two things are distinct, since they are

capable of being separated, at least by

God.19

Because Descartes clearly and dis-tinctly perceived that thought is theessence of mind, and extension theessence of body, and nothing else theessence of either, he clearly and dis-tinctly perceived that the mind is essen-tia lly d is tinc t fro m the b od y a ndtherefore in principle separable from it.There is, thus, a real distinction betweenmind and body. For him, the mind is athinking substance, in the sense com-mon to the rationalist philosophers; it isa bearer of properties, which depends

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16 Discourse on the method 32.17 See ReneDescartes A discourse on method Meditations (on the first philosophy) and Principles (of philosophy) trans

by J Veitch 1999 2425.

18 Russell n 11 supra 587.19 Meditation 6; see also Grayling n 13 supra 447 48.


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for its existence on no other thing

besides God. Yet the body is not asubstance in this sense, since it depends

for its existence on things other than

God.

It is to Descartes' demonstrations of

the existence of God that I now turn.

3.4 Descartes on the existence of

God

`Cogito ergo sum, ergo Deus est'

In his fifth Meditation Descartes pre-

sents the ontological argument, main-

taining that existence necessarily

belongs to God's essence, that God isunique, that it is necessary that He has

existed from eternity and will abide for

eternity and that He has many other

attributes.

Earlier, in the third Meditation, Des-

cartes had already explained that by

`God' he understood a substance that is

infinite, eternal, immutable, indepen-

dent, supremely intelligent and power-

ful, and which created everything that

exists. At the beginning of the fourth

Meditation he adds that God's perfec-

tion entails His complete lack of malice

and of trickery or deception.20

Descartes was a pious Christian. But

this is not solely why he set out to prove

the existence of God. He argued that,

without such proof, there would be no

way of refuting his scepticism. Essen-

tially he proved the existence of God

through his ontological argument and

his idea of the necessary being. How-

ever, Bertrand Russell argues that `Des-

cartes' proofs of the existence of God are

not very original'.21

On the whole, how original is Carte-

sian thinking?

3.5 The originality of Cartesian

thinking

The primary ideas in Descartes' theoryof knowledge and the central themes inhis Meditationscentre around the essenceand existence of matter, of the self andof God. Within this framework of ideas

the following are issues of fundamentalconcern:

(1) the method of doubt and scepticism(2) dualism(3) the existence of God

How original are these ideas? In thisregard two enquiries must be pursued.

The first enquiry: Are all the ideasoriginal? If the first enquiry is answered

in the affirmative, there is no need topursue the second enquiry. If, however,it is answered in the negative, thesecond enquiry follows.

The second enquiry: this would entailtwo related questions,

(i) Are some of them original?(ii) Are none of them original?

To what extent was Descartes influ-

enced by Ghazalian and Avicennanthinking? To what extent was Cartesiandoubt, to what extent was Cartesiandualism and to what extent were hisviews on God's existence influenced byAl-Ghazali and Ibn Sina?

4 The influence of Al-Ghazali and

Ibn Sina on Descartes

4.1 Cartesian doubt and scepticism

Al-Ghazali reached the depths of abso-lute scepticism and doubted the evi-dence of the senses since they oftendeceived. Long before Descartes' at-tempts Al-Ghazali, in his Deliverancefrom error, had attempted to discoverabsolute truth. He began this process by

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20 Grayling n 13 supra 149150.21 Russell n 11 supra 589.


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temporarily suspending authority inmatters of faith. If authority could notbe trusted, was it then possible tobelieve in sense perception and neces-sary truths that seem to be self-evident?A despairing Ghazali scrutinised all hiscognitions and found himself devoid of

any knowledge, except in the case ofsense-data and self-evident truths. Dur-ing his period of personal scepticism, inorder to distinguish absolute truth fromfalsity, he doubted the reliability ofsense-data and self-evident truths. Healso compared the conscious state ofwakefulness with the state of dreaming.In an attempt to show that sense-data orthe things we clearly perceive, such asour state of being awake, may be

deceptive he offered the example ofdreams. Ghazali states: `Don't you seethat when you are asleep you believecertain things and imagine certain cir-cumstances and believe they are fixedand lasting and entertain no doubtsabout that being their status? Then youwake up and know that all your imagin-ings and beliefs were groundless andinsubstantial.'

22

Indeed, the deceiving nature of sense-

data is further explained by Al-Ghazaliwith reference to the viewing of a star.When we look at a star we see it nobigger than a coin. In actual fact, it isbigger than the entire earth itself. Howdo we know this? Ghazali's answer wasthat we know this through our intellect(the reason judge), through geometriccalculations. However, Ghazali went onto doubt even mathematical and logical

truths, since even they were deceiving.Cartesian doubt follows closely themethodology of Al-Ghazali. Like Gha-zali, Descartes rejected authority orcustom and relied solely on his ownreasoning. After establishing his self-responsibility in finding the absolutetruth, Descartes also doubted the relia-

bility of the senses due to their ability todeceive. Descartes then asked: Whatabout things that we clearly perceive,such as our state of wakefulness (thesame illustration had been used by Al-Ghazali five hundred years earlier) orthe fire in front of which we are sitting?

Arguing that they, too, could be deceiv-ing, he proves his point using theexample of a dream (just as Al-Ghazalihad done). Finally Descartes, like Gha-zali, too doubted necessary and mathe-matical truths by raising the followingquestion: `Since I judge that otherssometimes make mistakes in mattersthat they believe they know most per-fectly may I not, in like fashion, bedeceived every time I add two and threeor count the sides of a square, orperform an even simpler operation, ifthat can be imagined.'23

It is on these foundations that ReneDescartes went on to demonstrate theexistence of his mind or consciousness.Since he could doubt everything exceptthe fact that he was doubting or think-ing, he arrived at his famous proposition`Cogito, ergo sum' or `I think, therefore I

am'.

4.2 Cartesian dualism

The essence of Cartesian dualism is,first, that the soul is wholly distinctfrom the body and, second, that upondeath the soul does not perish with thebody. Of course, the issues of theimmortality of the soul and the idea ofGod had first been analysed in Greek

philosophy. In the Republic and thePhaedrus, Plato argued that the soul isto be conceived as remaining unchangedin its essential nature through all theprocesses of birth and death, as beingborn many times into the sensible worldand departing from it again, but alwaysmaintaining the continuity of its life and

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22 Ibid.23 ReneDescartes Discourse on method and Meditations on first Philosophy trans by D A Cress (1998) 47.


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carrying with it, in a more or lessexplicit form, all the knowledge it everpossessed.

Ghazali distinguished between bodyand soul. According to him, the soul ofthe human being originates directlyfrom God and that is why it is immater-

ial, immortal and more unique than thebody or the rest of natural creation itself.The soul thus occupies a pivotal role inGhazalian metaphysics. Without thesoul the body is not complete andcannot function. Ghazali states: `Thebody is subject to dissolution as it wassubject to being compounded of matterand form, which is set forth in thebooks. And from ... verses and tradi-tions and intellectual proofs we have

come to know that the spirit [the soul] isa simple substance, perfect, having lifein itself, and from it is derived whatmakes the body sound or what corruptsit.'

24

For Ghazali, the human being is bothsoul and body, he/she is at once bothphysical being and spirit, and the soulgoverns the body. However, this dualnature of the human being does notnecessarily imply a dualism since thesoul and the body are two aspects of oneand the same entity. For him, the souland the body are interdependent.

Some six centuries before Descartes,Ibn Sina had already proven the essenceof Cartesian dualism, namely that thehuman soul is wholly distinct from thebody and that the soul does not perishwith the body. In fact, in one of hisworks he begins the section entitled

`The human soul' as follows: `The hu-man soul, as distinguished from theanimal and vegetable souls, is an im-

material substance, independent of thebody.'25

Chapter XIII26 of Avicenna's psychologyis headed `The soul does not die with thedeath of the body; it is incorruptible' andbegins thus:

We say that the soul does not die

with the death of the body and isabsolutely incorruptible. As for theformer proposition, this is becauseeverything which is corrupted withthe corruption of something else is insome way attached to it.

And anything which in some wayis attached to something else is eithercoexistent with it or posterior to it inexistence or prior to it, this priority

being essential and not temporal.

27

4.3 Descartes on God's existence

How original is Descartes' ontologicalargument that existence necessarily be-longs to God's essence? How original ishis argument that God is a NecessaryBeing? It will be remembered thatBertrand Russsell had stated that `Des-cartes proofs of the existence of God arenot very original' and that in the mainthey emanate from scholastic philoso-phy.28

In Ibn Sina's discussion of the natureof God, the first subheading is `Thatthere is a necessary being'. He arguesthat whatever has being must eitherhave a reason for its being or have noreason for it. If it has a reason, it is

contingent. If, however, it has no reasonfor its being, then it is necessary in itsbeing. Having confirmed this rule, he

43

24 See `The Ghazalian origins of modern philosophy', paper presented by Prof Cemil Akdogan of the

International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilisation, Malaysia, at the International Conference on

Al-Ghazali's Legacy: Its Contemporary Relevance, 2427 October 2001. See also Al-Ghazali AH Al-Risalat Al-Laduniyya Part II, translated by M Smith in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 1938 193.

25 Rahman F Avicenna's psychology (1952) 3.26 Ibid 58.27 Ibid.28 See n 25 supra and the section 3(4) of this article, headed Descartes on the existence of God.


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proceeds to prove that there is in being abeing which has no reason for its being.Arberry explains:

Such a being is either contingent ornecessary. If it is necessary, then thepoint we sought to prove is estab-lished. If, on the other hand, it is

contingent, that which is contingentcannot enter upon being except forsome reason which sways the scalesin favour of its being and against itsnon-being. If the reason is alsocontingent, there is then a chain ofcontingents linked one to the other,and there is no being at all; for thisbeing which is the subject of ourhypothesis cannot enter into being solong as it is not preceded by an

infinite succession of beings, whichis absurd. Therefore contingentbeings end in a Necessary Being.29

Having proven that God (Arabic,Allah) is a Necessary Being, Ibn Sinaproceeds to show that God is WithoutCause. Listing four types of causes,namely an active cause, a final orcompletive cause, a material cause and

a formal cause, he demonstrates thatGod cannot be the result of any of thesecauses, that God is exalted above any ofthese causes and that there is no cause toAllah's Attributes.30 Finally, Ibn Sinaalso demonstrates that God's Essence(Quiddity) is not other than His Identity,is not other than His Being.

5 Concluding comments

MM Sharif has cogently, coherently,adequately and effectively summarisedthe influence of Al-Ghazali on Descartesin the following words:

The influence that al-Ghazali had onmodern European thought has not sofar been fully appreciated. There is noacknowledgment by Descartes of hisindebtedness (direct or indirect) toany Muslim thinker, and yet it isdifficult to believe that he did not

know al-Ghazali's general positionand was not influenced by it throughthe Latin scholastics, whom beyondquestion he must have read ...

We notice that, exactly like al-Ghazali, Descartes came to his con-clusions by a study of his own self,al-Ghazali's starting formula being `Iwill, therefore I am' and Descartes'being `I think, therefore I am'. Hefollowed al-Ghazali's derivation of

the negative and positive attributes ofGod from the concept of necessaryexistence ... Exactly like al-Ghazalihe begins with describing how invain he interrogated in his mindevery school and every creed for ananswer to the problems that disturbedhim and finally resolved to discardall authority.31

Both Al-Ghazali's Munqidh min al-Dalal (The deliverance from error) andDescartes' Discours de la Methode areautobiographical works and they con-tain a number of significant similarities,including:

(1) both decided that they would notbelieve anything that was based ontradition, custom or example

(2) both held, for exactly the same

reasons, that the senses cannot yieldcertain knowledge

(3) the language and the example of thedefects of sense-experience given by

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29 Arberry AJ Avicenna on Theology (1951) 25.30 Ibid 2631.31 Sharif (ed) A history of Muslim philosophy (Vol II) 1966 1382.


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both of them were almost identi-

cal.32

Thus, as far as the originality ofCartesian thinking is concerned,33 theanswer to the first enquiry, namelywhether all his ideas are original, has

clearly been proven to be in the nega-tive. As to the second enquiry, namelywhether some or none of his ideas areoriginal, it cannot be said that hecontributed nothing of his own. In thelight of this article, it would be apt toconclude that originality in the thinkingof Descartes was minimal.

6 Ibn Sina's Poem of the Soul

Out of her lofty home she hath comedown

Upon thee, this white dove in all the

prideOf her reluctant beauty; veiled is sheFrom every eye eager to know her,

thoughIn loveliness unshrouded radiant.Unwillingly she came, and yet per-

chanceStill more unwillingly to be gone

from thee;So she is torn by griefs. First she

refrained,Being all unaccustomed; but at last,When she was firmly knit, she loved

the useOf being neighbour to this arid waste.And now methinks she hath forgot-

ten quiteThe tents where once she dwelt, the

far abodesShe was so little satisfied to leave.So, being now united with these

depthsAnd parted from her sandy hills of

yore,

Her wings are heavy upon her, andshe rests

Dejected mid these waymarks andmean mounds

Weeping (yet she remembereth nother home

Of yore), until her tears abundant

flow,And she not yet set forth. But when

the timeIs nigh for her departing to that placeAnd near the hour to be upon her

wayUnto the broader plain, then perching

highUpon the topmost steep, she carollethFor knowledge doth uplift the low-

liest heart

With ken of every hidden mysteryIn all the world returning, still

unstoppedThe orifice of heeding; and it provesHer coming down was necessary woeThat she might list to truth else all

unheard.Why then was she cast down from

her high peakT o t hi s d eg ra di ng d ep th ? G od

brought her low,But for a purpose wise, that isconcealed

E'en from the keenest mind andliveliest wit.

And if the tangled mesh impededher,

The narrow cage denied her wings tosoar

Freely in heaven's high ranges, afterall

S he w as a lig htning -fla sh tha tbrightly glowed

Momently o'er the tents, and thenwas hid

As though its gleam was neverglimpsed below.34

45

32 Ibid 1383.33 See 3.5 of this article.

34 Gohlman's translation; see Gohlman The life of Ibn Sina (1974) 7778.

influence of al-ghazali and ibn sina on descrtes

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