Innovation in Practice

Innovation in Practice Pilot 2010

innovation

innovation

―Innovation‖ exists in our skillful adaptive relationships to those environments in which we exist….

innovation

… our relationships to each other in those environments….

innovation

… the materials that constitute those environments….

… the objects or tools that we make with those materials that then further facilitate or ―afford‖

our relationship to those environments

innovation

… and even more specifically in those ―communities of practice‖ that provide us with the

necessary knowledge and requisite skills to do all of these things!

DISCOURSES IN INNOVATION 1:

DISCLOSING THE (K)NEW:

LEARNING, SKILL ACQUISITION AND THE PRODUCTIVIST LIMITS OF INNOVATION THEORY

Innovation in Practice Pilot 2010

DISCOURSES IN INNOVATION 1: DISCLOSING THE (K)NEW:

LEARNING, SKILL ACQUISITION AND THE PRODUCTIVIST LIMITS OF INNOVATION THEORY

• General Introduction and course overview.

• Innovation as Creative Destruction – Schumpeter and Beyond.

• Innovation as ‗History Making‘ - Ontological Design and the disclosure of the (k)new.

• Innovation and ‗Expertise‘‖ - Hubert Dreyfus and the ‗tacit‘ nature of ‗skillful‘ innovation.

• Innovation in ‗Practice‘ – The ‗tacit‘ knowledge of innovatory practice. Flores, Schon, and Nonaka.

• Innovative Change – Stephen Turner and the ―object‖ of transformative ‗practice.

• Innovation and Systemic Change – Open Source Innovation, Distributed Mind, and the Economy of Contribution.

• Summation, Critical Review and Essay Planning

Haridimos TsoukasComplex Knowledge. Studies in Organizational Epistemology

The world in which we exist – and thus ―innovate‖ within – can only be truly understood according to the ―complex‖ logic of an:

“Open Ontology” as opposed to a ―Closed Ontology‖ – that is a perception of the world or the nature of our existence that sees it as being in a constant state of flux or change, and the future as ―open, unknowable in principle‖ and always holding, ―the possibility of surprise.‖

An “Enactivist Epistemology” as opposed to a ―Representationalist‖ one – that is a perception of the world, or a theory of how we understand it, that recognizes the central role of our own ―enactive‖ participation in its construction, rather than in its ability to transparently ―re-present‖ some absolutely determinable truth or reality.

A “Poetic Praxeology” as opposed to an ―Instrumentalist‖ one – that is, similarly to the ―enactivist‖ position, an understanding of how our own individual creative development, utilization of, or taking up of those ―practices‖ that inform those contexts in which we exist, also contribute to the transformation of that background of historically available ―practices‖ that condition those contexts – much in the same way that a poet transforms the language which they use through their

utilization of it.

Open Ontology/Enactivist Epistemology/Poetic Praxeology

Pheonomenology/Pragmatism/Cybernetics/Systems Theory

Heinz Von Foerster born November 13, 1911 –

October 2, 2002

Stephen Toulmin - 25 March 1922 - 4 December

2009

Stafford Beer – born September 25, 1926 - August

23, 2002

Humberto Maturana September 14, 1928 –

Alasdair Macintyre - 12 January 1929

Richard Rorty – born October 4, 1931 – June 8,

2007

George Lakoff - May 24, 1941

Francisco Varela - September 7, 1946 – May 28,

2001

Charles Taylor - born 28 January 1948

William James - January 11, 1842 – August 26,

1910

Henri Bergson born, 8 October 1859 – 4 January

1941

John Dewey – born October 20, 1859 – June 1,

1952

Alfred North Whitehead born 15 February 1861 –

30 December 1947

Ludwig Wittgenstein - born 26 April 1889 – 29

April 1951

Michael Polanyi - March 11, 1891 – February 22,

1976

Martin Heidegger - born September 26, 1889 –

May 26, 1976

Hans-Georg Gadamer - born February 11, 1900 –

March 13, 2002

Gregory Bateson – born 9 May 1904 – 4 July 1980

Process Philosophy, Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, Pragmatism,

Cybernetics, Systems Theory, Cognitive Science, Enactive Mind

Complex/Emergent/Enactive/Collaborative

Clay Shirky - Charles Leadbeater - Chris Anderson - Nassim Nicholas Taleb - Don Tapscott and Anthony Williams

Luc Boltanski and Eva ChiapelloThe New Spirit of Capitalism

―As an existing concept, constructed around contemporary ideas,

technologies and research, associated with a specific vocabulary,

models of causality and mathematical models, and formed to offer

an alternative to hierarchical algorithms, ‗network' naturally enough

finds itself mobilized by capitalism. Employed in academic works in

economics and the sociology of work - disciplines that helped to

provide management with its theoretical foundations - it was almost

bound to invade the literature addressed to cadres that we have

studied. This is how the forms of capitalist production accede to

representation in each epoch, by mobilizing concepts and tools that

were initially developed largely autonomously in the theoretical sphere or the domain of basic scientific research. This is the case with

neurology and computer science today. In the past, it was true of

such notions as system, structures technostructure, energy, entropy,

evolution, dynamics and exponential growth.‖

Boltanski, L and Chiapello, E. (2005) Trans. Ellliott, G. The New Spirit of Capitalism. Verso. London. p. 104

―The Network‖

Manuel CastellsThe Network Society

Michel Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge

By episteme, we mean. . . the total set of relations that unite, at a given

period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems. . . . The episteme is not a

form of knowledge (connaissance) or type of rationality which, crossing

the boundaries of the most varied sciences, manifests the sovereign

unity of a subject, a spirit, or a period; it is the sovereign unity of a

subject, a spirit, or a period: it is the totality of relations that can be

discovered, for a given period, between the sciences when one

analyses them at the level of discursive regularities

Foucault, M. (1972) The Archaeology of Knowledge. Trans.Sheridan, A. M. Harper Collins. New York.

―Episteme‖

The fundamental codes of a culture - those governing its language, its schemas of perception, its

exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its practices - establish for every man, from the very

first, the empirical orders with which he will be dealing and within which he will be at home. At the other

extremity of thought, there are the scientific theories or the philosophical interpretations which explain

why order exists in general, what universal law it obeys, what principle can account for it, and why this

particular order has been established and not some other. But between these two regions, so distant from

one another, lies a domain which, even though its role is mainly an intermediary one, is nonetheless

fundamental: it is more confused, more obscure, and probably less easy to analyse. It is here that a

culture, imperceptibly deviating from the empirical orders prescribed for it by its primary codes, instituting

an initial separation from them, causes them to lose their original transparency, relinquishes its immediate

and invisible powers, frees itself sufficiently to discover that these orders are perhaps not the only possible

ones or the best ones; this culture then finds itself faced with the stark fact that there exists, below the

level of its spontaneous orders, things that are in themselves capable of being ordered, that belong to a

certain unspoken order; the fact, in short, that order exists. As though emancipating itself to some extent

from its linguistic, perceptual, and practical grids, the culture superimposed on them another kind of grid

which neutralized them, which by this superimposition both revealed and excluded them at the same

time, so that the culture, by this very process, came face to face with order in its primary state. It is on the

basis of this newly perceived order that the codes of language, perception, and practice are criticized

and rendered partially invalid.

Foucault, M. (1970) The Order of Things. An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. Vintage. New York. p xx-

xxi

Michel FoucaultThe Order of Things. An Archaeology of the Human Sciences

Benoît GodinInnovation: The History or ―Genealogy‖ of a Category

Joseph SchumpeterInnovation as Creative Destruction

Henry ChesbroughOpen Innovation

―The Social Construction of Reality‖Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann

Personal thoughts,

feelings, ideas, the

personal ego (I)

Social thoughts,

feelings, ideas, the

social ego (me)

Objectification

Language is institutionalized

Experiences are Reified

Social Values are Legitimized

Consciousness is intersubjective

Externalisation

Internalisation

Bruno Latour – Actor Network TheoryThe Social Construction of Scientific Facts

―Truth‖ is produced in Practice

Francisco Varela and Humberto MaturanaAutopoiesis and Cognition. The Realization of the Living.

Purpose or aims… are not features of the organization of any machine (allo or autopoietic); these notions belong to the domain of our discourse about our actions, that is, they belong to the domain of descriptions, and when applied to a machine, or any system independent from us, they reflect our considering the machine or system in some encompassing context.

Maturana, Humberto and Varela, Francisco. 1980. Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living, Dordrecht: D. Reidel

Hannah ArendtThe Human Condition

―The use of the experiment for the purpose of knowledge was already the consequence of the conviction that one can only know what he has made himself, for this conviction meant that one might learn about those things man did not make by figuring out and imitating the process through which they had come into being.‖

Arendt, Hannah. 1958. The Human Condition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. p295

Gareth MorganImages of Organization

―The Social Construction of Management‖

Personal thoughts,

feelings, ideas, the

personal ego (I)

Social thoughts,

feelings, ideas, the

social ego (me)

Objectification

Language is institutionalized

Experiences are Reified

Social Values are Legitimized

Consciousness is intersubjective

Externalisation

Internalisation

As much as we might have intellectually realized the enormous ontological and epistemological significance of mans of these insights – insights that, whether in the physical sciences or philosophy we have, in many instances, been aware of for over a hundred years! – we have as yet to recognize the full implications of their significance within the machinations of our everyday lives. That is in the ways in which we actually come to know, learn, teach, and act within - or more importantly for our current purposes, design or ―innovate‖ within - this world of which we are all a part, and actively, or even more appropriately, ―enactively,‖ contribute to the construction of.

There is an absolutely massive disconnect between what in a few weeks time we will see Donald Schön and Chris Argyris call our ―espoused theories‖ and our ―theories-in-use.‖ Or what we can even more simply describe as those fundamental beliefs and practices that actually inform what we do and those that we claim to inform what we do.

Donald Schon and Chris ArgyrisSingle and Double Loop Learning

Single-loop LearningSingle-loop learning is an active process of organisational enquiry

that results in the modification of the theory-in-use to keep

organisational performance within acceptable parameters based

on values and accepted norms. The values and norms themselves

– the governing variables – are not changed (Argyris and Schön,

1996, p.20).

Double-loop Learning

Double-loop learning (Figure 1) involves the exploring and

sometimes painful reconsideration of values and strategies. This

can be done individually or on behalf of an organisation when

agents reassess the effectiveness of the organisational values.

Double loop learning is a critical part of an organisations culture of

it is to maintain unity of vision and purpose during times of

conflicting requirements or environmental change.

Ikujiro NonakaSECI Model of Innovation

Socialisation, Externalisation, Combination, Internalisation

Socialisation: This is where ―tacit‖ knowledge is

shared through face to face communication or

shared experience .

Externalisation: This is the process through which

―tacit‖ knowledge is embedded or externalised in

language and made communicable.

Combination: This is where various elements of these

externally communicable insights are combined

together to form systematic theories or models etc.

Internalisation: This is where these models are then re-

internalised and form part of our background ―tacit‖

knowledge.

Catherine MalabouWhat Sould We Do with Our Brain?

―How could we not note a similarity of functioning between this

economic organization and neuronal organization? How could we not

interrogate the parallelism between the transformation of the spirit of

capitalism (between the sixties and the nineties) and the modification,

brought about in approximately the same period, of our view of

cerebral structures...Revealing that the brain is neither a rigid structure

nor a centralized machine is not enough to stave off the threat of

alienation. In fact, neo-liberal ideology today itself rests on a

redistribution of centers and a major relaxation of hierarchies.

Domination and the crisis of centrality, in a merely seeming paradox,

are perfectly matched with each other. The restructuring of capitalism

(post-Fordist capitalism of the second industrial revolution) was

accomplished at the price of substituting control by self-organization

for planning decided and overseen by a formal centralized authority

within the company.”

Malabou, C. (2008) What Should We Do with Our Brain? Trans. Rand, S. Fordham University Press. New York.

Slavoj ŽižekFirst as Tragedy, Then as Farce – The “Logic” of “Fetishistic Disavowal”

―Not to replicate the caricature of the world: this is what we

should do with our brain. To refuse to be flexible individuals who

combine a permanent control of the self with a capacity to self

modify at the whim of fluxes, transfers, and exchanges, for fear of

explosion. ―

―To ask 'What should we do with our brain?" is above all to

visualize the possibility of saying no to an afflicting economic,

political, and mediatic culture that celebrates only the triumph of

flexibility, blessing obedient individuals who have no greater merit

than that of knowing how to bow their heads with a smile.‖

Malabou, C. (2008) What Should We Do with Our Brain? Trans. Rand, S. Fordham University Press. New York.

Gert BiestaCritique of the ―representationalist‖ epistemology of modern education

Etienne Wenger and Jean LaveCommunities of Practice/Situated Learning/Legitimate Peripheral Participation

Lave and Wenger reject the view of understanding as arising ―out of

the mental operations of a subject on objective structures‖ and locate

learning not in acquisition of structure, but in the increased access of

learners to participating roles in expert performances.

William F. Hanks,

Learning as “Situated Activity”

Learning viewed as situated activity has as its central defining

characteristic a process we call legitimate peripheral participation. By

this we mean to draw attention to the point that learners inevitably

participate in communities of practitioners and that the mastery of

knowledge and skill requires newcomers to move toward full

participation in the sociocultural practices of a community. ―Legitimate

Peripheral participation‖ provides a way to speak about the relations

between newcomers and old-timers, and about activities, identities,

artifacts, and communities of knowledge and practice. It concerns the

process by which newcomers become part of a community of

practice. A person’s intentions to learn are engaged and the meaning

of learning is configured through the process of becoming a full

participant in a sociocultural practice. This social process includes, indeed it subsumes, the learning of knowledgeable skills.

According to Wenger there are three elements that are crucial in distinguishing a community of practice from other groups and communities:

The domain. A community of practice is something more than a club of friends or a network of connections between people. 'It has an identity defined by a shared domain of interest. Membership therefore implies a commitment to the domain, and therefore a shared competence that distinguishes members from other people.‘

The community. 'In pursuing their interest in their domain, members engage in joint activities and discussions, help each other, and share information. They build relationships that enable them to learn from each other.'

The practice. 'Members of a community of practice are practitioners. They develop a shared repertoire of resources: experiences, stories, tools, ways of addressing recurring problems—in short a shared practice. This takes time and sustained interaction. '

Paul Hildreth and Chris KimbleInnovation through Communities of Practice

DISCOURSES IN INNOVATION 1:

DISCLOSING THE (K)NEW:

LEARNING, SKILL ACQUISITION AND THE PRODUCTIVIST LIMITS OF INNOVATION THEORY

Innovation in Practice Pilot 2010

DISCOURSES IN INNOVATION 1: DISCLOSING THE (K)NEW:

LEARNING, SKILL ACQUISITION AND THE PRODUCTIVIST LIMITS OF INNOVATION THEORY

• General Introduction and course overview.

• Innovation as Creative Destruction – Schumpeter and Beyond.

• Innovation as ‗History Making‘ - Ontological Design and the disclosure of the (k)new.

• Innovation and ‗Expertise‘‖ - Hubert Dreyfus and the ‗tacit‘ nature of ‗skillful‘ innovation.

• Innovation in ‗Practice‘ – The ‗tacit‘ knowledge of innovatory practice. Flores, Schon, and Nonaka.

• Innovative Change – Stephen Turner and the ―object‖ of transformative ‗practice.

• Innovation and Systemic Change – Open Source Innovation, Distributed Mind, and the Economy of Contribution.

• Summation, Critical Review and Essay Planning

―Innovation as Creative Destruction – Schumpeter and Beyond‖.

In this first lecture we will consider of some of the key ways in which innovation has come to be understood, both practically and conceptually since its inception. We will place particular emphasis on the ways in which it has been articulated within the discourses of economics, business, organisation, and management theory in particular, from Joseph Schumpeter‘s original analysis of it as ―creative destruction‖ through to Henry Chesbrough‘s most recent ideas on ―open innovation‖.

Benoît GodinInnovation: The History or ―Genealogy‖ of a Category

―This paper advances three hypotheses in order to guide a genealogical history of innovation as category. The first hypothesis starts with the idea that innovation is about novelty (arising from human creativity), as etymology, dictionaries and history suggest. As such, innovation is of any kind, not only material or technological. In this sense, innovation as category has a very long history. However, over time the conjunction of two factors gave preeminence to technological and commercialized innovation in representations: 1) the culture of things and its capitalistic corollary: industrial development through technology, 2) academics, the study of technology, and the conceptual frameworks that followed for policies in science and economic growth. In fact, there is a dialectics here between reality and language. Events and changes in the world gave rise to new categories; the latter in turn brought to light changes in the world and, in doing so, contributed to these changes.‖

―The second hypothesis is that the history of innovation as “creativity” is that of three concepts (and their derivatives): Imitation → Invention → Innovation. Certainly, a lot has been written on imitation (literary theory and art theory), as well as invention (history, sociology, management and economics of technology). But no one has ever brought the two concepts together in a genealogical history, and neither has anyone looked at their contribution to the category innovation. Through Western history, imitation and invention have been contrasted, or are in tension. The dichotomy reaches its resolution with the idea of innovation in the twentieth century, particularly the idea of innovation as process: invention and imitation are two sequential steps in the process leading to innovation. ―

―The third hypothesis is about innovation as a break with the past. Innovation and the discourses on innovation serve to make sense of modern practices and values. On the one hand, innovation represents continuity with the past. It is continuity in the sense that innovation is about novelty, an idea that was present in many forms before innovation took on a central place in representations, as we will see. It is also continuity in the sense that innovation is, to many, concerned with technological invention, which is a dominant understanding of what invention came to mean over time. However, on the other hand innovation is a break with the past in the sense that it suggests that invention per se is not enough. There has to be use and adoption of the invention, namely innovation, in order for benefits to accrue. ―

Joseph SchumpeterInnovation as Creative Destruction

Schumpeter sees the inherent creative ability or ―innovatory‖ potential of all human beings,

no matter what their social standing, and the social leadership that follows such

―innovatory‖ ability, as being the most significant, and transhistorically or universally

important force at work in all economic life.

This is in marked difference to say Marx, and other ―classical economic theorists‖ of his time,

who see this capability as being an enormously historically dependant development.

For Schumpeter it is only through the entrepreneurial initiative of an ―innovative‖ individual

who is capable of reducing the costs of their means of production to a level below that of

their competitors in a ―stationary‖ and ―classical circular flow‖ model of the economy in

which the costs of the goods produced and the price paid for them are meant to be equal

– hence the ―stationary‖ model of analysis of economic system – that any capital is capable

of being freed up for further ―innovation‖ and ―entrepreneurial‖ development, or

investment, that and the economy is catapulted toward that ―dynamic‖ conceptualisation

of it that is so indicative of modern capitalism. Or as Eduardo März, says:

―The qualitative leap from the stationary to the dynamic economy is brought about by the

appearance of the entrepreneur and the innovations initiated by him in the areas of

technology, product differentiation, marketing etc‖

Eduard März, (1991) Joseph Schumpeter. Scholar, Teacher and Politician. Yale University Press. New Haven and London.

Innovation as a fundamental quality of all economic life

―Schumpeter‘s most significant potential contribution[s] to our

understanding of motion [i.e. change, progress, development,

and transformation]in all economic systems was the emphasis

he gave to the role of innovations. ―

Allen Oakley, (1990) Schumpeter’s Theory of Capitalist Motion. A Critical Exposition and Reassessment. Edward Elgar. London

―The main emphasis in Schumpeter‘s theory of development is

on the sporadic emergence in history of the innovator… [and

the] ultimate cause of social development is to be found in the

sporadic changes brought about by creative individuals

[innovators] in the ‗productive combinations‘ or, in Marx‘s

terms, in the ‗productive forces‘… [because] sooner or later

these lead to institutional adjustments giving rise to a

qualitatively new social structure. ―

Eduard März, (1991) Joseph Schumpeter. Scholar, Teacher and Politician. Yale University Press. New Haven and London.

―Innovation is possible without anything we should identify as

invention and invention does not necessarily induce

innovation.‖

Schumpeter, J. (1939) Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process. McGraw Hill

To Schumpeter innovations consists of any one of the

following five phenomena:

1) Introduction of a new good;

2) Introduction of a new method of production;

3) Opening of a new market;

4) Conquest of a new supply of raw materials or half

finished goods;

5) Implementation of a new form of organization.

Henry ChesbroughOpen Innovation

“Open” vesus “Closed” Innovation

Closed Innovation – Centralised R&D

The institution of the central research lab and internal product

development was thus a critical element of the rise of the

modern industrial corporation. Centrally orgaizatized

development were central to companies' strategies and were

regarded as critical business investments. R&D Functions were a

salient feature in the knowledge landscape of the economy,

relatively insulated from the universities and small enterprises,

relatively unconnected to the government, and largely self-

contained.

Underlying Logic

The logic underlying this approach to innovation was one of closed

centralized, internal R&D. At its root, the logic implies a need for deep

vertical integration. In other words, in order to do anything, one must

do everything internally, from tools and materials, to product design

and manufacturing, to sales, service, and support. Outside the fortified

central R&D castles, the knowledge landscape was assumed to be

rather barren. Consequently, the firm should rely on itself - and not

feeble outside suppliers-for its critical technologies.

Xerox

Similarly, Xerox needed to make its own toner, its own copier, its own

light lens, and its own feeding and sorting subsystems in order to deliver

high-volume, high-quality xerography to its customers. Because Xerox

was pushing mechanical and electrical systems father than anyone

else in its applications, there was no available supplier base with which

to work. During the early years, Xerox found that it even needed to

make its own paper; to get the optimal paper characteristics that

would feed well through its copier systems.

Erosion Factor 1:The Increasing Availability and Mobility of Skilled Workers

Despite the company's dominance, the mobility of disk-drive

engineers caused IBM's leadership to erode over time. An engineer

named Al Shugart left IBM to go to Memorex, where he helped

Memorex improve its hard-disk drives that plugged into IBM

mainframe computers. Then he left Memorex to start a company

called Shugart Associates' pursuing a new kind of hard-disk drive, the

8 inch disk drive, intended for minimal computers and workstations.

Eventually when he fell out with the backers of Shugart, he left to start

another new company, called Sea-gate, which made still smaller 5

inch drives for personal computers. With each job change he made,

Shugart took a substantial number of people with him to the new

company. Each of Shugart's new start-up companies was thus able to

hit the ground running.

Erosion Factor 2: The Venture Capital Market

Prior to 1980, little VC was available in the United States. Although

there were start-up companies that arose from people who migrated

out of large firms, these new enterprises had to struggle to find capital.

The ability of companies to attract older talented staff to due new

venture was also impaired by a lack of adequate capital to justify file

risk of leaving a well-capitalized company for an unknown start-up

company.

Erosion Factor 3 : External Options for Ideas Sitting on the Shelf

The earlier tensions between the incentives of the research group and

those of the development group gave rise to a buffer inventory of

ideas sitting on the shelf. The tensions between these functions are not

new, but now there is an important difference. As a result of the

combination of erosion factors I and 2 there exists a second, outside

path to market for many of these ideas.

Erosion Factor 4:The Increasing Capability of External Suppliers

When companies like IBM wanted to increase the performance of

their early mass-storage systems, they found that they could not rely

on external suppliers to supply components of sufficient technical

capability in sufficient volume with high quality. More generally,

companies seeking to create new products and services in the

middle of the twentieth century found that the surrounding

environment lacked the requisite knowledge, production

experience, and financial capital to serve as reliable partners in

building the materials, components, and systems needed to serve

the market. Thanks to the confluence of Many of the factors

already noted, such as tile expansion of universities and university

enrollments, the availability of well-trained workers to companies of

all sizes, and the increased presence of VC, the external supply

base is much more developed that it was prior to WWII

Open InnovationNew Attitudes, Directions, and Practices

The traditional paradigm that companies used to manage industrial R&D is indeed over in most industries. But that does not mean that internal R&D itself has become obsolete. What we need is a new logic of innovation to replace the logic of the earlier period. Companies must structure themselves to leverage this distributed landscape of knowledge, instead of ignoring it in the pursuit of their own internal research agendas. Companies increasingly cannot expect to warehouse their technologies, waiting until their own businesses make use of them.

The new logic will exploit this diffusion of knowicdge, rather than ignore it. The new logic turns the old assumptions on their head. Instead of making money by hoarding technology for your own use, you make money by leveraging multiple paths to market for your technology. Instead of restricting the research function exclusively to inventing new knowledge, good research practice also includes accessing and integrating external knowledge. Instead of managing intellectual property as a way to exclude anyone else from using your technology, you manage IP to advance your own business model and to profit from your rivals'