international monitoring bodies: powerful tools for leveraging local change (english)

8/9/2019 International Monitoring Bodies: Powerful tools for leveraging local change (English)

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by Paul M ageeanedited by Nancy L. Pearson

In t ernat iona l M oni t or ing BodiesPowerful tools for leveraging local change

A Tactical Notebook published bythe New Tact ics Project

of the Center for Vict ims of Tort ure


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Published byThe Center for Victims of Torture

New Tact ics in Human Right s Project717 East River RoadMinneapolis, MN 55455 USAwww.cvt.org, www.newtactics.org

Notebook Series Edit orLiam Mahony

CopyeditingNate LeBout il lier, Nick Healy

LayoutBela Morr is

The Danish Institute for Human Rights and The Center for Victims of Torture wish to acknowledge thefo llow ing insti tu ti ons that provided support fo r t he New Tacti cs in Human Right s West Group regionaltr aining w orkshop, of w hich this and other tacti cal notebooks are a product:

The Paul & Phyllis Fireman Charitable Foundation,

The United States Department of State,

The United States Institut e of Peace,

The European Masters Programme in Human Rights and Democratization

Donors who wish to remain anonymous.We are also greatly indebt ed to t he work o f numerous int erns and volunt eers who have cont ribut ed their

time and experti se to t he advancement of the project and of human righ ts.

The New Tacti cs project has also benefi ted fr om more than 2000 hours of w ork fr om in dividual volunteersand int erns as well as donat ions of in-kind suppor t. Some of the insti tu ti onal sponsors of th is work includeMacalester College, t he Universit y of Mi nnesota, the Higher Education Consort ium fo r Urban A ff airs, t heMinnesot a Just ice Foundat ion and t he pub lic relat ions f irm of Padill a Speer Beardsley.

The opi nions, fi ndings and conclusions or recommendat ions expressed on t his sit e are tho se of the NewTact ics pro ject and do no t necessarily refl ect t he views of our funders For a f ull list of pro ject sponsors seewww.newtactics.org.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the New Tactics in Human RightsProject . The project does not advocate specif ic tacti cs or poli cies.

2004 Center f or Victims of TortureThis publ ication may be freely reproduced in pr int and in electronic form as longas this copyright not ice appears on all copies.


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54Author biography

Letter from New Tactics project manager

Introduction

The problem

8Building knowledge

The Center for Victims of TortureNew Tact ics in Human Right s Project

717 East River Road

Minneapolis, MN 55455 USAwww.cvt.org, www.newtactics.org

13Measuring success14 Transferability and lessons learned

15Conclusion


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Paul M ageeanPaul is a qualified solicitor working as the legal officer for

the Committee on the Administration of Justice. He quali-

fied in 1991 and spent four years as a private practice

lawyer working with PJ McGrory & Co., one of the fore-

most human rights practices in Belfast. He also has a

masters degree in international human rights law from

Queens University, Belfast.

Paul joined CAJ in 1995 and has responsibility for case-

work within CAJ and policy work in relation to emer-

gency laws, criminal justice and some policing issues. He

is also responsible for much of CAJs lobbying work at the

United Nations. He was the solicitor who brought the

Kelly and Shanaghan cases, dealing with lethal force and

collusion issues, to a successful conclusion before the

European Court of Human Rights in May 2001.

Cont act Inf orm at ionCommittee on the Administration of Justice

45/47 Donegall St.

Belfast, BTR 2BR

Tel.(028) 90961122

Fax (028) 90246706

[email protected]

Comm it t ee on t he Admin ist ra-t ion of Just iceCAJ is an independent nongovernmental organisation,

and is affiliated with the International Federation of Hu-

man Rights. CAJ monitors the human rights situation in

Northern Ireland and works to ensure the highest stan-

dards in the administration of justice. We take no posi-

tion on the constitutional status of Northern Ireland,

seeking instead to ensure that whoever has responsibility

for this jurisdiction respects and protects the rights of all.

We are opposed to the use of violence for political ends.

Since 1991, CAJ has made regular submissions to the

human rights organs of the United Nations and to other

international human rights mechanisms. These have in-

cluded the Commission on Human Rights, the Sub com-

mission on the Promotion and Protection of Human

Rights, the H uman Rights Committee, the Committee

Against Torture, the Committee on the Rights of the

Child, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-

crimination, the European Commission and Court of

Human Rights and the European Committee on the Pre-

vention of Torture, as well as the special Rapporteurs on

Torture, Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Extrajudi-cial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions and Freedom of

Opinion and Expression.

CAJ works closely with international NGOs including

Amnesty International, the Lawyers Committee for H u-

man Rights, Human Rights Watch and the International

Commission of Jurists.

Our activities include publishing human rights informa-

tion, conducting research and holding conferences, lob-

bying, individual casework and giving legal advice. Our

areas of expertise include policing, emergency laws, crimi-

nal justice, equality and the protection of rights.

Our membership is drawn from all sections of the com-

munity in Northern Ireland and is made up of lawyers,

academics, community activists, trade unionists, students

and other interested individuals.

In 1998 CAJ was awarded the Council of Europe Human

Rights Prize in recognition of its work in defence of rights

in Northern Ireland. Previous recipients of the award

have included Mdecins Sans Frontires, Raoul

Wallenberg, Raul Alfonsin, Lech WaBsa and the Interna-

tional Commission of Jurists. We acted as lawyers for the

applicants in the Kelly et al, Shanaghan and McShanecases before the European Court of Human Rights.

AcknowledgementsI would like first to acknowledge the contribution Nancy

Pearson from the Center for Victims of Torture has made

to the publication of this New Tactic. Rarely have I come

across such a conscientious, rigorous yet cheery editor

whose e-mails I actually looked forward to receiving.

Thanks are also due to the New Tactics project generally,

particularly Douglas Johnson and Liam Mahony. I would

also like to record my thanks to my colleagues at CAJ

particularly those who began our work at the UN. In

addition, I must thank all of those who participated in

the New Tactics West Group meeting in Venice in No-

vember 2003. Spending a week in one place in the con-stant company of a group of people you have never met

before would normally be a difficult experience. The only

difficult experience in Venice was leaving.


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September 2004

Dear Friend,

Welcome to the New Tactics in Human Rights Tactical Notebook Series. In each notebook a human

rights practitioner describes an innovative tactic that was used successfully in advancing human

rights. The authors are part of the broad and diverse human rights movement, including

nongovernment and government perspectives, educators, law enforcement personnel, truth and

reconciliation processes, womens rights and mental health advocates. They have both adapted and

pioneered tactics that have contributed to human rights in their home countries. In addition, they

have used tactics that, when adapted, can be applied in other countries and other situations to

address a variety of issues.

Each notebook contains detailed information on how the author and his or her organization achieved

what they did. We want to inspire other human rights practitioners to think tactically and tobroaden the realm of tactics considered to effectively advance human rights.

In this notebook, we discover how the Committee on the Administration of Justice succeeded in

raising the issue of human rights abuses in Northern Ireland at the international level and, by doing

so, brought about significant improvements in human rights conditions. This was accomplished

through CAJs utilisation of the Committee Against Tortureone of the mechanisms available

through the United Nations for monitoring governments that have signed international conventions.

In order to use these international mechanisms effectively, a number of supporting tactics were

necessary, including writing submissions to the Committee, lobbying in Geneva and monitoring the

implementation and impact that the reports and recommendations of Committee Against Torture

have had on Northern Ireland in terms of actually improving the human rights situation on theground. International mechanisms can be a powerful and effective tool for human rights organisations

to leverage for change, especially when they have encountered significant obstacles and opposition at

the local and national level.

The entire series of Tactical Notebooks is available online at www.newtactics.org. Additional

notebooks are already available and others will continue to be added over time. On our web site you

will also find other tools, including a searchable database of tactics, a discussion forum for human

rights practitioners and information about our workshops and symposium. To subscribe to the New

Tactics newsletter, please send an e-mail to [email protected].

The New Tactics in Human Rights Project is an international initiative led by a diverse group of

organizations and practitioners from around the world. The project is coordinated by the Center forVictims of Torture and grew out of our experiences as a creator of new tactics and as a treatment

center that also advocates for the protection of human rights from a unique position one of healing

and reclaiming civic leadership.

We hope that you will find these notebooks informational and thought-provoking.

Sincerely,

Kate Kelsch

New Tactics Project Manager


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6

Introduct ionThere has been a violent po lit ical conf lict in Nort hern

Ireland since 1969. The conf lict invo lves three sets of

prot agonists: the Irish Republ ican Army and ot her

republican groups that want Nort hern Ireland to unit e

with the rest of Ireland; loyalist groups that want

Northern Ireland to remain w ithin the UK; and t hestate.

From the beginning of the conflict the forces of t he

state have been involved in human right s abuses. A

key aspect of the human rights abuse has involved

allegati ons of i ll-t reatment of those in custody. This

notebook will out line how the Committee on the Ad-

min ist rat ion of Justice (CAJ) was able t o successfull y

ut ilise the United Nations Commi tt ee Against Torture

to pressure the UK not on ly to address the allegations

of i ll-treatment of those in custody but also to estab-

lish mechanisms and standards ensuring protection

for t he accused and accountabili ty of stat e acto rs.

The Commit tee on t he Admin istration of Justice, the

foremost human rights organisation operating in

Northern Ireland, had long been concerned with the

rights of t hose in detent ion. Concerns about the use

and abuse of emergency law gave rise to our estab-

lishment in 1981. We had devised a set o f recommen-

dations to guarantee the right s of those arrested by

the police and particularly those held in the detent ion

centres. These proposals included suggestions that

int erviews be recorded electronically, that lawyers be

permitt ed to be present dur ing t he interviews, that

there be an independent system of monit oring t hedetenti on process, that t hose detained be brough t

before a judge or released after a short er period than

seven days and t hat there be independent investiga-

tion of complaints of ill-treatment.

These proposals were strongly resisted by the gov-

ernment and the police, who maintained that the ex-

cept ional powers granted by the emergency

legislation were necessary to deal effectively with

those suspected of paramilit ary activity. Both the gov-

ernment and police denied that any abuse was taking

place even though those who alleged ill-t reatment

and were released wit hout charge by the police oft ensuccessfully sued for damages. In addi t ion, it was dif f i-

cult to get media coverage of the issue because at t he

height of the conflict much of the media was reluc-

tant to give extensive coverage to allegations of th is

nature.

We needed to devise a response to t his problem t hat

would be eff ective in t erms of improving t he situa-

tion of those arrested under t he emergency laws but

would also t rigger such a signi fi cant news story t hat

the media could not avoid covering it . It became in-

creasingly clear t hat th is response could not be gener-

ated internally in Northern Ireland. Although we werestil l a relat ively young NGO (having hired our f irst staf f

members in 1985), we had begun t o t hink in t erms of

the boomerang theory.1 We were t herefo re increas-

ingly alive to the possibilit y of exposing what was go-

ing on in t he detention centres before an international

audience to shed light on t he situat ion f rom out side

the country, which would demand accountability and

a response from the government . It w as clear to usthat , on our own, we were not going to achieve our

goal of ending t he ill-treatment . We were not able to

cult ivate media in terest in t he issuecertainly not in

Brit ain, where the key policy-makers were based. It

was also the case that many simply disbelieved what

we were saying. It i s, of course, oft en the case that in

a society in confl ict human ri ght s act ivists are disbe-

lieved and dismissed as being part isan. This was a phe-

nomenon not exclusive to Northern Ireland, but it did

create problems fo r the credibilit y of w hat w e were

alleging and weakened our chances of creating the

necessary momentum to improve the sit uati on. We

therefore needed t o f ind a t actic that would addressthese weaknesses by raising t he prof ile o f the issue

both internationally and domestically, also lending cred-

ibil ity to w hat w e, as a small NGO in Northern Ireland,

were saying.

We were fort unate to have a number of academic

lawyers familiar w ith United Nations mechanisms on

our execut ive commi tt ee. One of them suggested t he

use of the Committee Against Torture or CAT (re-

ferred to as the Commit tee fo r the remainder of

this notebook). At t his stage, we had not accessed any

of the international mechanisms at t he UN level de-

signed to prot ect human right s.

The UK signed the Convent ion Against Torture in 1985

and rati fied it in 1988, becoming thereafter subject

to the reporting procedures of the Commit tee Against

Tort ure. Essent ially, this meant t hat the UK had t o

report periodically to t he Commit tee about t he ex-

tent to which the Convention was being respected in

the UK. The UK must submit each repor t in writ ten

form to the Commit tee, which then holds a hearing

on matt ers addressed in t he report and quest ions UK

represent at ives. The hearings take place in Geneva.

Generall y the Commit tee runs on a three-year cycle,

but fortui tously for us, the UK was to be examined bythe Commit tee fo r t he first time in 1991. We con-

sult ed wit h our colleagues in int ernati onal NGOs to

assist us in using this UN mechanism when t he UK had

to appear before the Committee. We have subse-

quent ly been able t o uti lise such UN mechanisms with

increasing success and the Committee Against Tor-

1 Boomerang and spiral model theories: These refer to the dynamic

effects which domestic-transnational-international linkages have on

domestic political change. (More information can be found on these

concepts and models in Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink,

Activists Beyond Borders, Cornell University Press, 1998 and

Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power

of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change,Cambridge University Press, 1999.)


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Internat ional Moni tor i ng Bodies 7

ture has been part icularly instrumental in pressuring

the state t o implement actions long-recommended

by CAJ.

These examinat ions by the Commit tee would have

occurred wit h or w ithout interventions from us. How-

ever, the Committee, like other UN human rightsmechanisms, tends to rely on NGOs and others to pro-

vide it wit h credible information on w hich to base its

questioning of the count ry involved. The previous rec-

ommendations from the Commit tee tend to set t he

parameters for each subsequent examinat ion, so i t

was import ant f or us to persuade the Commit tee to

pay att ention t o t he issues we w anted highl ight ed.

This was particularly the case in 1991, as it was the

fi rst t ime that the UK had been examined. Increas-

ingly, and certainly in 1998, the Commit tee would start

the session by asking for information on w hat t he

state had done t o meet the concerns highlighted by

the Commit tee on the previous occasion. The UK hasnot been examined since 1998, although w e antici-

pate an examination w ill be forthcoming again in the

near fut ure.

The Pro bl emDuring the 1970s, the state established a separate

legal inf rastructure to deal wi th those suspected of

involvement in terrorism. The securit y forces were

grant ed special pow ers of ar-

rest, and there were separate places of detent ion for

those arrested. In addit ion, when terrorist suspects

went t o tr ial, they faced special proceedings befo re

sing le judges sit ti ng w ithou t juries. There were also

relaxed standards for the admissibil it y of conf ession

evidence, which essenti ally meant that conf essions

that would have been excluded f rom an ordinary crimi-nal t rial because of concerns about the way they were

obt ained were admitt ed in these special courts. Alle-

gations of physical ill-t reatment were w idespread and

focused on the detent ion cent res where those sus-

pected of terrorist or paramilit ary activit y were

detained. While these allegat ions began to recede in

the mid-1980s, they began to increase later in the

decade and were reaching crisis point by 1990. At t hat

time, when suspects were arrested they could be held

for seven days wit hout being brought before a court .

It w as of ten the case that t hey were denied access to

lawyers for the f irst 48 hours of their detent ion.

Even w hen grant ed access to l awyers, t he law yers

could not att end t he int errogations themselves and

access was of ten deferred f or a furt her two days af-

ter a single visit . Physical condi tions were deliberately

sparse in t hat t here was no nat ural light and there

was no access to exercise or f resh air. Detainees were

oft en disorientated as to the t ime of day. Interviews

were not


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8

recorded, and there was no independent oversight of

the detent ion centres or t he int erview process. Alle-

gations of il l-treatment most of ten centred on t he

detective off icers who conducted the int erviews. Sus-

pects would allege slapping and punching to t he head,

chest , test icles and so on.

It w as quit e clear in our view from the late 1980s unt il

following the f irst examination of the UK by the Com-

mit tee Against Tort ure in 1991 that physical ill -treat-

ment was being author ised and orchestrated. First , it

was widespread, met hods used w ere simi lar, exist ing

safeguards did not work t o stop the abuse and indi-

vidual of ficers were not held account able. We were

of ten inf ormed for instance that detainees would be

told in the first interview that they would be assaulted

and that t his had been approved by those higher

up. It w as also t he case that the abuse was carried

out in such a way that it of ten did not leave extensive

inju ries, so evidence obt ained as a result of the use ofthese techniques was not automatically excluded by

tr ial judges. In our view, this of course was the pur-

pose of the ill-treatment to obtain confessions that

would result in t he conviction of the suspect.

It is not completely clear why the allegat ions about

th is type of treatment began t o increase again in t he

late 1980s. There had always been a level of physical

ill-treatment in t he detenti on cent res. However, it is

possible t hat t his apparent upsurge was a react ion t o

a marked rise in paramilit ary/terrori st activit y in the

late 1980s. There were also widespread allegations

of collusion at that time between elements of thesecurit y forces and loyalist paramili taries to kill se-

lected republ ican targets. The use of increasingly ro-

bust interview methods may have been a corollary

to that, meaning the state was cracking down on w hat

was seen as an upsurge in violence and f ighti ng f ire

wi th fi re. There did not seem to be any polit ical reso-

lut ion t o t he conf lict in sight and so the state may

have decided t o pursue a more securi ty-orientat ed

agenda.

Bui lding know ledgeBefore we submit ted a report t o t he Commit tee or

attended hearings, we had to develop a knowledgebase about how the Commi t tee actually worked, in-

cluding how we could transmit in formation to it and

obt ain informat ion on t he government s submission

to the Committ ee. The crucial partners in t his endeav-

our w ere our colleagues in t he internat ional NGOs.

Most o f the large NGOs have legal departments or

departments dealing wi th international mechanisms

that are a rich reservoir of knowledge about in terna-

ti onal mechanisms like t he Commi tt ee Against Tor-

ture. They are usually happy to share their knowledge

with domestic NGOs.

There were a series of logist ical challenges we faced,including t he acquisit ion of details such as the names

of the Commit tee members and the dates of meet-

ings. Other such challenges included:

GATHERING INFORMATION FOR OUR

SUBMISSION

The tactic was carried out in alliance wit h ind ividual

lawyers in Northern Ireland w ho provided informa-tion on the cases of those who had suf fered il l-treat-

ment during custody. This formed the basis of the

submissions we made t o t he Commit tee in Geneva.

Some of these lawyers were act ive members of CAJ.

Others had been in cont act w ith us in relation to com-

plaint s their clients had. It is also important t o remem-

ber that Nor thern Ireland is a small society and the

human rights/legal defence community is tiny and

close-knit . We used personal t estimony f rom a num-

ber of t hose who had been ill-treated in our f irst and

second submissions. Sometimes this was done through

direct contact w ith the victim; sometimes we w orked

wit h t he lawyers involved. It was also f ortunate that asingle firm in Northern Ireland represented many of

those who had been detained and that it was a dy-

namic firm int erested in our w ork. They actually sent

a local lawyer, one of t heir senior partners, to be part

of our delegation t o Geneva for the f irst Commit tee

hearing.

The import ance of having law yers as close allies was

also made evident during our f irst visit to the Com-

mit tee. The representat ives of the Brit ish government

rejected our allegations that ind ividuals were being

ill-treated in detent ion in Northern Ireland. The local

lawyer w as then able to produce a dossier detailingscores of cases in w hich he had acted. The dossier con-

tained not only medical evidence and phot ographs but

details of out -of-court sett lements wit h some of the

individuals. In other words, the author it ies in North-

ern Ireland had made payments to individuals on the

basis of injuries detainees had received in t he course

of their detention. Following t his, the Commit tee was

much more prepared to question government repre-

sentatives on t he accuracy of what t hey were saying.

Indeed, the country rapporteur on t he Commit tee said

that i f t he complaint s about ill-treatment w ere not

true t hen, the United Kingdom must have the most

loose-pocketed government I have ever known whenyou th ink a crime has not been commit ted.

The task of deciding what t o put in t he submission is

perhaps the most crucial to ensuring that t he relevant

issues get t he attention of the members of the Com-

mit tee Against Torture. Considerable att ention needs

to be given to gathering the information and deciding

what is presented and how it is presented. This can be

partly determined by the way in which the report is

writ ten. For instance, if t he government i s asserting

something in its report that you believe to be patently

false, you w ill want t o concentrate on providing infor-

mation to the Commit tee members to show that. Itwil l also of ten be the case that the most compelling


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Internat ional Moni tor i ng Bodies 9

informat ion is the personal testimony from those who

have been ill-treated. We were able to include a num-

ber of case studies in our f irst report based on in ter-

views we had had wi th such individuals. We also drew

from newspaper reports, court reports, documents

we obtained f rom local lawyers and report s conducted

by internati onal NGOs about the situation i n North -ern Ireland.In our f irst report in 1991 we included t he

follow ing statement:

Summary of al legations of i l l - treatment i n

Cast lereagh holding centre.

The following details allegations, which CAJ has re-

ceived from det ainees themselves or t heir relat ives

arising out of some 28 periods of detent ion ranging

from 1 t o 7 days. The arrests all took place between

May and September 1991. One of t hose interviewed

had no serious complaint to make. A number of

others had no allegat ions of physical abuse. In addi-tion to the cases we have documented, we have

noted press reports of f urther allegations of ill-treat-

ment covering some 20 to 25 periods of detent ion.

We have had meetings with the Nort hern Ireland

Off ice (the UK government headquarters in North-

ern Ireland), the police author ity and t he Indepen-

dent Commission for Police Complaint s to raise our

concerns and press for the introduction of safe-

guards to protect detainees under emergency leg-

islation. It is a matter of deep regret and serious

concern to us that the Chief Constable of the RUC

(the Nor thern Ireland police force) has refused ac-

cess to the holding centre to a member of parlia-ment and a member of the House of Lords.

On the basis of the experience of meeting those

involved and studying t he allegations they make,

CAJ is sat isf ied that there is serious cause for con-

cern about t he sit uati on in Castl ereagh. We have

medical evidence in relation t o a number of the

cases. In ot her cases, the t reatment involved would

be of a natu re not t o leave marks identif iable by

doctors. However, despit e the lack of corroborat ing

evidence, CAJ is satisf ied t hat the lack of safeguards

makes the regime governing detention open to

abuse and fails to provide adequate protectionagainst ill -treatment .

In addit ion, and perhaps surprising ly, it is of ten the

case that government publications cont ain informa-

ti on and statistics that undermine the case they are

putt ing t o t he Committ ee. If such inf ormation is avail-

able, it is very useful in alerting the Committee to

holes in the governments submissions. It is also al-

most impossible f or t he government to discredit . For

instance, the Uni ted Kingdom, in it s submissions to

the Commi tt ee in 1998, made great play of the fact

that t here was an Independent Commission for Police

Complaints in Northern Ireland that investigated alle-gations of ill-treatment made by those detained un-

der t he emergency law. The government did no t, of

course, alert t he Commit tee to the pitif ully low levels

of complaint s the ICPC actually upheld. These f igures

were, however, in t he public domain, and we were

able to draw the attention of the members of t he

Commit tee to t hese by comparing t hem wit h the fig-

ures about compensati on paid t o those who allegedill -treatment by pol ice. In our 1998 submission w e in-

cluded the follow ing on the issue of police complaint s:

We believe, nevertheless, that t he figures which

are publicly available in relat ion t o compensation

claims against t he pol ice, suggest t hat adverse find-

ings in such cases do not result in disciplinary charges

against of f icers. For instance, 400,000, 440,000

and 700,000 was paid in compensation in 1995, 96

and 97 respectively result ing from 640, 860 and 980

claims. Given that the number of substant iated com-

plain ts fr om members of t he publ ic in those years

was 8, 5, and 1 according to t he Chief Constablesfigures, it is difficult t o detect any correlation t o the

quit e high compensation figures.

In addit ion, there is a great deal of confusion about

the actual number of complaint s lodged against t he

police. The f igures provided by t he government (left

hand column, para 116) reflect the number of cases

not the number of complaints which are higher. Sec-

ondly, we do not know the source of t he figure in

the right hand column in para 116. It does not ap-

pear to accord w ith any publicly available f igures.

However, perhaps the most revealing f act o f all i sthat the vast majorit y of formal disciplinary charges

each year relate to complaints from supervisory

of f icers. In addit ion, a much higher percentage of

those complain ts is upheld and much heavier pun-

ishments imposed. For instance in 1997, 145 of t he

159 formal charges came from fellow of ficers. None

of these resulted in a not guilt y verdict. However,

of the 14 charges which arose from members of

the public making complaints, only one resulted in a

guilt y finding. This means that on ly one complaint

from a member of public was substant iated in 1997

out of approximately 5500 complaint s completed.

Perhaps the Commit tee could ask the government

to explain this astonishing statistic. In addit ion i t may

be useful t o ask why the Police Act w ill not provide

a mechanism for complaint s about pol icy decisions.

In fact, a Commit tee member did clearly recognise

the signif icance of these incredible statist ics and asked

the government how it w as that only one complaint

f rom 5,500 was upheld by a supposedly independent

complaint s system.

WRITING THE SUBM ISSION

Submissions need to be cogent ly argued and well writ -ten. They do no t necessarily need to ref lect int erna-


10/16

10

t ional legal expert ise, but that probably helps. Essen-

tially they need to reflect the situation in the jurisdic-

tion under consideration in a balanced, convincing and

detailed way and refer, when appropriate, to relevant

part s of the Convent ion Against Tort ure. Perhaps the

most d if f icult exercise in th is regard is knowing how

to describe actual allegations of ill-t reatment . In our1991 submission we included the following descrip-

tion of abuse in t he holding cent res:

Five people alleged that t hey were slapped repeat-

edly on the face, while one person added t hat her

mout h and chin were squeezed for long periods.

One of the most common allegations concerned

repeated hitting wit h the base or flat of the hand

or the knuckles on the side, top or f ront of the head

fo r up to fif teen minutes on one occasion. Twelve

people described t his technique, which involved no

marks as it was kept above the hairline and rarely

involved heavy blows. Three people alleged th atthey were poked or jabbed on t he temple or in t he

ribs. On one occasion th is involved prolonged pres-

sure on the temples.

It w as alleged that , on a number of occasions pro-

longed p ressure w as exerted on various parts of

the anatomy. One example w as standing behind t he

detainee and pressing dow n on the shoulders. Two

people alleged that t heir head was fo rced dow n

between the legs, on one of these occasions, it is

claimed, a detect ive sat on t he head and bounced

up and dow n. One young man says that his head

was pulled back over t he chair-upright fo r a pro-longed period. Two people say that they were held

against the wall by the throat until they nearly

passed out . Half choking w ith hands or an arm lock

was alleged by five people. Six people said t hat pres-

sure was applied t o t heir genit als by feet or hands,

in one case causing bleeding to the penis.

Heavy punching, mostly to stomach but also to arms,

thighs, chest and head w as alleged by nine people.

Two women allege they were punched by a male

detect ive. Two allegations were made of k icking.

One man said an elbow hit him across his face on a

number of occasions. Three people allege that ob-jects were throw n at them including chairs and a

bullet. Four detainees said that t hey were thrown

against the wall. A further three said they were

forcibly pulled out of the chair on w hich t hey were

sitting.

Various forms of ill-treatment involving limbs were

described to us. Four people say they w ere made to

stand fo r long periods, on one occasion w it h legs

bent and hands behind the head. Two people allege

their arm was tw isted behind their back with pres-

sure also t o t he hand. Finger bending has been a

recurrent feature in t he cases of compensation orof conf essions being t hrown out of court . The most

serious allegation involved a chair being placed over

one mans chest wh ile he was lying on the ground.

The detective then sat on t he chair and pu lled t he

mans arms while the detectives foot was placed on

the detainees genit als.

Ill-treatment involving more than one detective wasalleged on a number of occasions. Two people, one

man and one woman say they were lifted bodily

and then held upside dow n. In neither case did t his

last for long but both said that it had an extremely

disturbing effect on them. The man says that he

was dropped on t he fl oor. One man says that he

was lif ted f rom and dropped back ont o the chair. A

further tw o people said they were pushed back and

fo rth on the chair by the detectives.

Three people allege that hair was pulled out of t heir

scalp, beard or chest . One man alleges that he suf -

fered cigarett e cont act t o the face. The cont act w asfleeting but definit e. Two people allege that t heir

ears were pulled. On one of these occasions two out

of four stit ches were pulled f rom a previous wound

causing b leeding. One woman, who had a plaster

cast on her arm for an injury t o t he wri st, alleges

that her arm was att acked so severely that the plas-

ter cast was broken.

The submission should not be too long. It is also a good

idea to follow t he outline of the government submis-

sion, w hich makes it easier for t he Commi tt ee mem-

bers. It also makes it easier to rebut specific

government po int s in a w ay that is readily compre-hensible to Commit tee members. NGO activists should

remember that the NGO report s are mirror reports

which will o ft en be read in consultation w ith t he gov-

ernment reports. The government report s wi ll of ten

also f orm t he agenda for the questioning so Commit -

tee members will be look ing f or questi ons to ask un-

der relevant sections of the government report . If you

have provided that, it is likely that your questions wil l

be asked.

We adapted our submissions according ly in t hat w e

would actually include the text of the questions we

want ed asked.

We also tended, particularly in 1998, to focus the

Commit tees att ention on the failure of t he govern-

ment to adequately implement the recommendations

from the previous occasion. For instance, the f ollow-

ing excerpt f rom our 1998 submission shows the use

of th is tactic:

Recommendations following the last oral hearing

Paragraph 10 [of the government s submission] in-

dicates that t he government has given careful con-

siderat ion t o the Commit tees previous observationsand recommendati ons. The Commit tees recom-


11/16

Internat ional Moni tor in g Bodies 11

mendations in respect of Northern Ireland were as

follows:

the abolition of detention centres in North-

ern Ireland and the repeal of the emergency legis-

lation.

All t hree detent ion centres in Northern Ireland re-

main open. Not only has emergency legislat ion not

been repealed, but the Prevention of Terrorism Act

has been renewed annually, the Emergency Provi -

sions Act has been renewed twice (in 1996 and 1998)

and t he new Crim inal Just ice (Terrorism and Con-

spiracy) Act was introduced in the wake of the

Omagh bombing.

re-education and retraining o f police off ic-

ers, particularly investigating police officers, in

Northern Ireland as a fur ther step in the peace pro-

cess.

Insofar as we are aware, no such t raining has been

int roduced. The Royal Ulster Constabulary d id i n-

troduce community awareness training but th is was

in October 1993 and therefore was not a response

to the recommendation of the Committee. The

training has litt le to do wit h t he rights of detainees

and no specif ic human righ ts training has been in-

troduced for investigating of ficers.

the extension of taping int errogations to all

cases and not merely those that do not involve t er-

rorist related activities and in any event t o permitlaw yers to be present at int errogat ions in all cases.

While the government announced t he introduction

of silent video recording of interviews of t hose indi-

viduals suspected of involvement in paramilitary

acti vity i n January 1996, this has only recent ly be-

gun. The government has recent ly announced it s

intention t o int roduce audio recording of such in-

terviews but this has not yet been int roduced. Law-

yers are stil l not permitted to be present at

interrogat ions and restrictions cont inue to be placed

more generally on t heir access to client s.

Role of nongovernmental organisations

Paragraph 12 refers to the f act that t he govern-

ment sought t he views of NGOs during preparat ion

of their report. We wrote to the government ex-

pressing our concern t hat t he main recommenda-

tions of the Commit tee had not been acted upon

and asked that t he government explain this in its

Third Report. We do not believe that the govern-

ment has adequately explained this failure in the

cont ext of their submission. We would respectf ully

urge the Commit tee to ask the government w hy

the recommendations have largely been ignored.

It is also important not t o over egg the pudding. In

other words, if you are not completely sure of your

ground on a particular point , illustrate that degree of

uncertaint y by using phrases such as it appears or

we believe. This wi ll allow Commit tee members to

use their discretion as to how to phrase their ques-

tions and will increase your credibilit y wit h them be-cause they will recognise you are not trying to be

definit ive when you are not sure. Most Commit tee

members will realise that you may not always be able

to be 100 percent certain of info rmation but it is still

import ant t hat t he matter be raised.

The government submission should be publ icly avail-

able from t he relevant government department . If

there are problems in t his regard, it is probably a good

idea to cont act t he secretary of the Commit tee. It is

also important t o contact the secretary in order to

obtain inf ormation on the likely timeline for submis-

sion of the government report, when the NGO reportneeds to be submit ted and when the hearing is likely

to be scheduled.

GETTING COPIES OF THE NGO SUBMISSION TO

GENEVA

It is import ant t o stay in contact w ith the relevant

secretary. Each of the UN human rights mechanisms

will have a secretary who is a full-time member of

staff . This person w ill no rmally be helpf ul but vastl y

overworked. Establ ishing a relat ionship wi th th is per-

son is import ant and w ill help you navigate your way

around the sometimes labyrinthine human rights

machinery of the UN. You can f ind out who this per-son is by look ing at the UNHCHR website, by calling

the UNHCHR or by asking one of the international

NGOs. There are also a number of publications that

will assist in this regard (see Resources). The secretary

wil l also be able to advise you on w ho t he count ry

rapporteur wi ll be for your countrys examination. The

count ry rapporteur w ill be a member of t he Commit -

tee Against Tort ure asked by the Commi tt ee to un-

dertake the role f or a part icular country. This wil l

probably involve summarising government and NGO

submissions fo r t he other members of the Commit -

tee, and normally the count ry rapporteur wi ll take

the lead in asking questi ons at t he actual examina-tion of t he relevant count ry.

The secretary to t he Commit tee will be able to advise

you whenand w here to send your submission. It is also

a good idea to send about five copies more than there

are members on the Committee. This can be quite

expensive and needs to be built into t he costs for t he

tactic. In addit ion, although language was not an issue

for us because we were writ ing in English, one of the

working languages of the UN, translation of submis-

sions could be required, which may entail addit ional

delay and expense.


12/16

12

SENDING A DELEGATION TO GENEVA

It is vital to send at least one representative to Geneva.

This person can make personal cont act with members

of the Commit tee, hand ou t more copies of the re-

port (or, preferably, one-page summaries), hold brief -

ings for the Commit tee members highlight ing key

concerns and, if appropriate, meet with the govern-ment representatives. It is useful to establ ish rela-

t ionships wi th Commit tee members who may serve a

number of terms and are likely to be considering at

least tw o report s from the relevant count ry over t he

course of t heir t erms.

We had received only limited f unding to do int erna-

tional work. As we began to do more internati onal

work, we built that int o funding applications to a par-

ticular funder interested in th is type of work. They

were impressed by the potent ial of the w ork and even-

tually by its impact and continued to fund it . This is not

a particularly large part of our budget, but it allowedus to cover the expenses of actually gett ing people to

Geneva and keeping t hem there for the durat ion of

the UK count ry hearing. There are also one or tw o

cheap places to stay very close to the UN building, and

if one is prepared to be relatively abstemious, Geneva

is not necessaril y an expensive place to spend a f ew

days.

GETTING ACCESS TO THE UN

We relied upon the advice of international NGOs such

as Amnesty International and the Internat ional Fed-

eration for Human Right s (FIDH)our int ernational

aff iliateto help us negot iate the UN system and t o

provide logistical support to our delegation w hen it

was in Geneva.

They were also able t o suggest informat ion we should

bring t o the att ention of the Commit tee. It is impor-

tant to establish such a relationship w ith an interna-

tional NGO with a presence in Geneva and with

consultat ive stat us at the UN. Consultat ive stat us is

normally the preserve of large NGOs that regularly

work at t he UN level. Certain UN human rights mecha-

nisms, for instance the Commission on Human Rights,

will only allow access to representatives of NGOs that

have consult ative status. The Commit tee Against Tor-

tu re does not operate like th is, but nevertheless af-

fil iating wit h a large NGO wit h consultative statusmakes sense if you want t o do any work at t he UN

level. This facilitates access to t he UN bui lding, book-

ing rooms for br iefings and access to of fice facilit ies in

Geneva. This is import ant because it is useful to ho ld a

briefing f or members of the Commit tee, where they

can listen t o a presentat ion f rom your representa-

t ive in Geneva and ask quest ions. If t here are a num-

Conventionagainst torture

Government subject to review by theCommittee Against Torture (CAT)

Organisation decisionto utilise CAT

Research, write, &submit report to CAT

Make contact with

international NGO toarrange briefing

session

Attend briefing sessionand hearing if possible

Monitor the conclusionsand recommendations

of the Committee

Think about mediastrategy for event

Publicise CATconclusions and

recommendations

Regularly checkdate for hearings

as this maychange

Check on theday for

submission ofany NGO report


13/16


ber of groups lobbying the Committ ee but only your

group holds a briefing, your agenda moves to the

forefront.

We found that allying ourselves visibly with int erna-

tional NGOs helped our credibilit y in t hat if they were

saying similar t hings, the Commit tee would be moreprepared t o accept their veracity. Amnesty Int erna-

ti onal w as part icularly helpful in t his regard, as was

our int ernational af f iliat e, FIDH. This is perhaps not

surprising as members of the Commit tee will prob-

ably have almost daily cont act w it h representatives

of the large int ernational NGOs when t he Commit tee

is in session. They will of ten look t o t he large NGOs to

provide them wit h information about particularly dif-

fi cult countries where local NGOs are unable to oper-

ate because of state suppression. The members of

the Commit tee will also know t hat organisations such

as Amnesty and others have careful ly buil t up their

international credibilit y over t he years and wi ll notvisibly ally themselves with groups that might dam-

age that credibilit y. If, therefore, Amnesty or FIDH or

the International Commission of Jurists is prepared t o

share a briefing wit h you or host you at a briefing, it is

a sign to the Commit tee members that t hey can t rust

what you are saying.

If you in tend to ut ilise this UN mechanism, you w ill

very likely be att ending more t han one of the Com-

mittee hearings. Then simply making contact with

Commit tee members and reminding them of your

previous involvement w ith them and w ith the Com-

mittee Against Torture can enhance the extent towhich they are prepared to rely on your inf ormation.

M easur in g successOur general goal in using t he tactic was to improve

the situation of those detained by ending t he ill-treat-

ment . We believe that using t he Commit tee Against

Torture greatly assisted in t hat goal in t hat it achieved

a number of objectives we thought had to be met

before ill-treatment would end. I mentioned some of

these issues in the int roductory sect ion, particularly in

the context of it being dif ficult for us to att ract media

coverage of our concerns and also t he relat ive ease

with which the state could dismiss our allegations.However, the Commit tee Against Torture turned our

complaint s about i ll-treatment f rom a minor domes-

tic irritant in to a major internati onal headache for

the UK. It massively raised the media profi le of the

issue, part icularly in Britain it self (as opposed to North-

ern Ireland), and educated t he Brit ish public and opin-

ion formers about w hat was happening in the holding

cent res. It also established a certain baseline in t erms

of the credibilit y of w hat w e were saying. Follow ing

the f irst i ntervention by the Commit tee in 1991, the

UK could no longer simply dismiss our concerns as the

delusions of a small NGO in Northern Ireland because

they had been echoed by a signi ficant UN Committ ee.

The situation f or t hose arrested under t he emergency

laws in Northern Ireland, particularly in the cont ext of

our goals, has improved immeasurably since we be-

gan working w ith the Commit tee Against Torture. We

have long had an internal debate as to how much of

thi s improvement can be att ribut ed to t he work in

Geneva. The polit ical and securit y sit uat ion has alsohad a sign if icant impact , as the peace process devel-

oped in t he mid-1990s, leading t o a decrease in t he

number of violent incidents and the number of ar-

rests. However, it is clear the crit icisms voiced by the

Commit tee had a direct impact on t he situation of

detainees.

For instance, some of the early crit icisms issued by the

Committee related directly to issues we had high-

light ed, such as access to law yers, video and audio re-

cording of interviews, presence of lawyers in interview,

process for extended detention and t he physical con-

dit ions in the various holding centres designed for ter-ror ist suspects. All o f t hese issues have now been

substant ively addressed by t he UK government . How-

ever, the most remarkable and immediat e achieve-

ment o f t he international embarrassment caused by

the Commit tees criticism of the UK was the speedy

end to co-ordinated physical ill-treatment in the hold-

ing cent res, which ceased bet ween the f irst and sec-

ond time t he UK was examined before the Commit tee.

Follow ing t he first report, wh ile there were still alle-

gations of physical ill-treatment, t hey were not as

widespread as earlier. The ill -treatment also was not

as bad as it had been, and court s began t o be more

intervent ionist in terms of excluding evidence. It wasalso t he case that actual ill -treatment would occur at

the time of arrest and immediately subsequent t o

that , as opposed to being part of t he interrogati on

process.

The UK has appeared bef ore the Commit tee Against

Tort ure on three separat e occasions: 1991, 1995 and

1998. We have made detailed submissions and at-

tended t he Commit tee meetings to brief members

on each occasion. Almost all of the recommendations

the Committee has made over the course of those

years concerning Northern Ireland can be t raced di-

rectly to the submissions we made. The key specificobjectives and t he overall goal have been achieved. It

is our view that t he use of t he tactic had a consider-

able impact in changing the way the UK, and particu-

larly the police in Northern Ireland, operated in

relation t o t he detention of those suspected of being

involved in paramilit ary violence in Northern Ireland.2

2 There have never been credible allegations of widespread or

orchestrated ill-treatment in relation to those arrested under the

ordinary criminal law in Northern Ireland so called ODCs

ordinary decent criminals.


14/16

14

Transfer abil it y and l esson s learn edThis tactic could be used ef fect ively by NGOs elsewhere.

There are many ot her UN human right s mechanisms

and others may find t hem more useful , but t he basic

approach is the same. We have also broadly used t his

approach wit h the Human Right s Commit tee, the Com-

mitt ee on the Elimination of Discrimination AgainstWomen, the Commit tee on t he Elimination of Racial

Discriminat ion, and the Commit tee on Economic, So-

cial and Cult ural Rights. The tact ic is eminent ly t rans-

ferable betw een these various mechanisms, although

there are technical dif ferences among t he Commit -

tees that need to be taken into account by those wish-

ing to access them.

The content of our submissions, the impact on the

government , the relat ively easy access to Geneva we

had may not always be replicated elsewhere, but the

log ist ical approach may. Certain f actorsdocument -

ing and w riting the submission, submit ting it, holdingbriefings, developing a media strategy, work ing w ith

international NGOsall appear to be common aspects

of this tactic whether in Northern Ireland or elsewhere.

Several key point s should however be kept in mind.

PLAN ON A LONG-TERM INVESTMENT

This tactic will t ake time t o w ork. It is unlikely that

submit ting to t he Commit tee and att ending it once

will have the desired impact. To be successful , it i s

likely that it wil l t ake at least tw o hearings, so t hose

considering using t his tactic need t o t hink in t erms of

years of commitment. It is also a good idea if the same

staf f person could undertake th is work and build uppersonal relat ionships with Commit tee members and

the secretary to the Commi t tee.

There may be budgetary considerat ions connected to

making submissions, but most part icularly connected

to actual ly sending someone t o Geneva. This person

need not be a lawyer, but certainly shou ld be some-

one who w ill be at ease wi th any technical legal issues

that arise, because Commit tee members will of ten

ask for detailed legal information about the domesticsystem.

INCREASE DIALOGUE WITH GOVERNM ENT

One thing w e would do diff erently would be to t ry to

increase the dialogue we had wit h government in the

gaps between hearings of the Commi tt ee. We have

done this in our work w ith other UN Commit tees since,

and it has improved our standing w hen we appear in

Geneva. We have, for instance, asked t o meet with

government of fi cials to discuss their response to vari-

ous Commit tee recommendations and also t he extent

to which they are going t o disseminate them to t he

relevant government agencies. This helps to track t heextent to w hich the government is complying w ith

Committee recommendations.

The fact t hat the government know s we are going to

interact w ith the Commit tee at the next hearing gen-

erally means that w e are going t o get a reasonable

hearing f rom them.

USE THE M EDIA

In count ries that are more immune to such crit icism,

the tact ic may have less impact. How ever, the key is

to realise that no stat e likes to face crit icism at t he

UN. I have seen states go t o extraordinary lengt hs to


15/16


avoid such criticism or t o limit it . This has included states

that might be considered serious human rights abus-

ers and that might be thought to pay litt le att ention

to the UN, particularly it s human rights arm. How-

ever, states are aware of t heir int ernational image,

and ef fective NGOs working the UN system can w ield

signi ficant power.

It is likely that in o ther count ries human right s activ-

ists wi ll be placing themselves in considerable danger

by even trying to engage with the Commit tee Against

Torture. This is a serious concern when considering

using th is tact ic.

ESTABLISH A GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP

WITH AN INTERNATIONA L NGO

Establishing a good w orking relationship w ith an in-

ternational NGO that has consultat ive status at t he

United Nations or know ledge and experience work-

ing w ith the body that has jurisdiction over your issueis essent ial. The relat ionship facilit ates access to t he

buildings (including booking rooms for briefings and

so on) the Committee and other types of hearings.

Just as import ant ly, it will aff ord the local NGO access

to the expertise of t he international organisation in

terms of the actual w orkings of t he Commit tee or

other international body and potential increased cred-

ibility.

ConclusionAt t he beginning of t he notebook I mentioned the

boomerang theory. This is essentially the not ion that

if you bring the issue you are concerned about to theattent ion of an external audience, pressure from that

external source of ten result s in more change domes-

tically than campaigning at home. Without init ially

being fully aware of it , this is what w e did wit h the

Commit tee Against Torture. The tactic worked so ef -

fectively t hat it has become, over t he years, the cor-

nerstone of our work.

Following the success of our experiences wi th the Com-

mit tee Against Torture, we began to look t o other

UN mechanisms to raise other human rights concernswithin Nort hern Ireland. For instance, we raised the

absence of a prohibit ion on racial discrimination wit h

the Commit tee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimi-

nat ion. We raised serious concerns about state k ill-

ings and collusion wit h paramilitaries wi th the Human

Right s Committee. We also began t o access the Com-

mission on Human Rights and make submissions to

the Special Rappor teurs working w ith t he Commis-

sion. While th is is a very dif ferent mechanism, many

of the lessons we in iti ally learned w ith the Commit -

tee Against Torture w ere sti ll applicable.

We also began to engage wi th human right s mecha-nisms at t he European level such as the European Court

of Human Right s, wi th w hich we successfu lly lodged

cases, and the European Commit tee for t he Preven-

tion of Torture. We also lobbied extensively in the

United States at a more overt ly polit ical level for im-

provements in the human rights situation in Northern

Ireland.

The expansion and extension of our int ernational work

was very much based on t he init ial success and lessons

learned from t he Commi tt ee Against Tort ure. While

the detail of various mechanisms dif fers, many of the

basic techniques are the same, parti cularly when oneis dealing w ith the UN system. One key lesson remains

at t he heart o f our w ork: internationalising a human

rights problem, particularly in a society in conf lict, helps

to resolve it.

ResourcesJane Winter.Human Wrongs, Human Rights: A Guide to the Human Rights Machinery of the United Nations.

British Irish Rights Watch, October 1999. ISBN 0 9528528 1 0.

The U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Its Subcommission and Related Procedures: An Orientation Manual.

Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, 1993. ISBN 0-929293 14-2.

Provides a description of the principal human rights mechanisms available in the UN including the role of governments,

nongovernmental organisations and the media.

Website of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

www.unhchr.ch

International Service for Human Rights

1 Rue de Varembe

PO Box 16

CH-1211 Geneva CIC

Switzerlandwww.ishr.ch


16/16

The Center for Victims of TortureNew Tact ics in Human Right s Project

717 East River RoadMinneapolis, MN 55455

www.cvt .org / [email protected] tact ics.org / newtact [email protected]

To dow nload this and ot her publications available in the Tact ical Notebook Series,go to w w w.new tactics.org.

Online you w il l also f ind a searchable database of tact ics andforums for discussion w it h other human right s pract it ioners.

international monitoring bodies: powerful tools for leveraging local change (english)

Documents