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ECPR General Conference, Prague Panel P429: The Relationship between Heads of State and Prime Ministers Veronika Oravcová1

Executive power in Central and Eastern Europe in comparative perspective

Draft. Please do not cite or distribute without permission of the author.

Introduction

This paper focuses on intra-executive relations in Central and Eastern Europe with particular focus on

the political systems with indirectly elected presidents. The purpose of the paper is to explore which

executive competencies are crucial in challenging legal framework, in what type of political system

those could be found (whether in parliamentary or semi-presidential as it is generally expected) and if

they are rather diminishing over time by building the constitutional tradition.

Parliamentary and semi-presidential systems in CEE

After fall of the communist regime in Central and Eastern Europe new political and economic

institutions have been formed to secure conditions for successful transition and regime consolidation.

The framework for securing democratic and free rules of the game were new constitutions (Sartori

2001). Introducing new constitutions started also the discussion about the character of the executive

branch and its relation to the other political institutions. There was a fear of concentration of the

power within one branch of the government (Tӑnӑsescu: 2008). Particular attention was dedicated to

the presidential office. It was also due to the fact that in many communist countries the office of the

president was held by a collective organ.

Thus, besides the question of the right balance of power within the state there was a question of the

right power balance within the executive. Many countries decided to introduce direct elections for

presidential office2. Thus, the authors of the constitutions did attribute dual source of legitimacy to the

executive. They did not create pure parliamentary systems, but so-called semi-presidential or mixed

political systems (Elgie 2006, 2011, Roper 2002). And these were in focus of many political scientists.

1 PhD student, Comenius University in Bratislava, Faculty of Arts; Mail: veronika.oravcova@gmail.com 2 Bulgaria and Croatia held their first presidential election by popular vote in 1992 (in 1990 Zhelyu Zhelev in Bulgaria and Franjo Tuđman in Croatia were elected by the parliament), Lithuania in 1993, Poland in 1990, Romania in 1990 and Slovenia in 1990.

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Mixed political systems were interesting especially because of directly elected president who shares

executive power with the government. Studies dealing with the concept of semi-presidentialism

usually depart from the definition of Maurice Duverger. As Duverger himself stated (1980) this “new”

type of political system should have three basic characteristics: the president is elected, has

considerable powers and shares his or her executive responsibilities with prime minister who is

responsible to the parliament.

Going deeply into this terminology and its critiques (Shugart and Carey 1992) is beyond the scope of

this paper. However, the biggest problem that is mentioned and further developed with this

terminology is the president and his or her powers. The key Duverger´s characteristic of the semi-

presidential system which are “considerable constitutional powers” of the president is often marked

as problematic (Elgie 1999, Pasquino 1997) because of the methodological difficulties. Firstly, there is

no agreement on which competences are “considerable” or more important (Kubát 2003). Secondly,

powers of presidents and prime ministers differ among the countries. So the concept of “relatively

strong president” could differ (Siaroff 2003: 292) and so many scales of measuring presidential powers

have been developed so far3.

Even if the concept semi-presidentialism is widely used by western political scientists (Roper 2002),

this definition is not really welcomed for the comparative analysis in Central and Eastern Europe

(Brunclík and Novák 2008). Political scientists speak rather of “different understanding of semi-

presidentialism” in Central Europe and in Anglo-Saxon literature. (Brunclík and Kubát 2014: 124). The

main argument of not preferring this term is to understand the real powers of the presidents and to

see how these powers are used (Hloušek 2013). Being aware of this fact in this paper is preferred to

use terminology political system with directly elected or indirectly elected president instead of using

semi-presidentialism and parliamentary regime.

Even if there is no full agreement about the wording, political systems with directly elected presidents

dwelled the attention because of two independent sources of legitimacy within executive. It has been

argued that these could cause conflict or vice-versa, they could also promote cooperation. According

to Pasquino (1997) the political competition among prime minister and president is not inevitable

feature of semi-presidential system and it is present only occasionally and in case if they belong to

different political parties. However, this assumption does not apply universally. Linz (1990) on the

3 Shugart and Carey (1992), Siaroff (2003)

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other hand brought the attention to the fact that the conflicts and unclear political responsibility

between prime minister and president could lead to contradictory political decisions.

There was also an assumption that the countries where executive power is shared between two

institutions could undermine new political democracies. Linz (1990) warned that such institutional

design is at risk and these countries are not stable. There were doubts whether such form is aptly for

new democracies as it creates the potential for intra-executive conflict (Chernykh a Cheibub 2008).

After approximately 25 years we can say that these concerns were confirmed only partially, as many

states of Central and Eastern Europe are now consolidated democracies4.

Even if the relations within executive are dwelling attention of many studies (Elgie and McMenamin

2006, Protsyk 2005, Joakim and Sedelius 2010, Sedelius and Mashtaler 2013) they are devoting their

attention to semi-presidential countries exactly because of the division of the executive power

between directly elected president and prime minister. However, direct election can be or may be not

the defining criterion of the relations within executive.

The aim of this paper will be to extend discussion about intra-executive conflicts also to pure

parliamentary regimes. Following the previous literature it tries to see if these conflicts happen rather

in political systems with directly elected presidents as it is expected and which executive competencies

are subject of such conflicts.

Research design and definition of conflict

Political conflicts within executive can appear from various reasons such as ambiguous constitution or

simply the fact that president and prime minister have different or contradictory opinions (Cheibub

and Chernykh 2008). Intra-executive conflicts could be defined as “political competition between the

president and prime minister over the control of political resources available to the executive branch of

government“(Protsyk 2005: 143).

Protsyk (2005, 2006) characterizes the main conditions under which president or prime minister enter

into the conflict struggling for executive competencies. Their origin is considered for the period of early

democratic transition when there were attempts to challenge the norms or to take control over the

executive.

4 With the notable exceptions of Belarus, Russia and to certain extent Ukraine which are excluded from this paper.

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Intra-executive conflicts thus are defined as strategic decisions over the control of the executive and

political competition over the control of sources available to the executive branch of the government

(Protsyk 2005: 143). Key factors are vague constitutions, political or ideological affiliation and the

majority in the parliament. Also De Raadt (2009) and Malová (2001) stress the factor of vaguely defined

constitutions. The conflict within executive is defined as “… the absence of clear limits or to make same

prerogatives to more actors” (De Raadt 2009: 2 – 3). However, the problem of vague constitutions

where intra-executive conflicts may emerge could be also the problem in pure parliamentary regimes.

Conflicts emerge from disputes over competencies as many constitutional provisions are, intentionally

or not, rather vague (Cheibub and Chernykh 2008: 203).

Despite the argument that intra-executive conflicts result from the ambiguity and overlap of the

constitutional responsibilities (Protsyk 2005: 136) the existing literature of intra-executive relations

focus mainly on systems with directly elected presidents (e.g. Roper 2002, Protsyk 2005, Sedelius

2006). Further empirical research thus starts from Elgie´s minimalist definition and that is why these

studies do not count the countries with pure parliamentary regimes into consideration.

Moreover, one of the pioneers of exploring intra-executive relations was Thomas Baylis (1996) who

focused on 6 countries in his study, only half of them with directly elected presidents5 stating that “in

all parliamentary and semi-presidential systems the existence of two separately chosen chief executives

implies a situation of “dual legitimacy” and thus the potential for conflict over prerogatives” (Baylis

1996: 301). Another study that questions the relevance of direct elections of the president argues that

“direct elections do not matter” (Tavits 2008). However, Margit Tavits in her book does not develop

further the intra-executive relations in detail, but illustrates her argument only with particular

examples.

That is why this paper focuses also on the Central and East European states that do not fit into semi-

presidential category. This paper explores the intra-executive relations in following 11 countries:

Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and

Slovenia. What is common for these states is their geographical position, communist past and

membership in “western structures”, notably the European Union6. Thus, from this point of view they

share common values: they are free, democratic and have fulfilled the criteria to join the states with

liberal democratic tradition.

5 Countries under examination were Bulgaria Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia (Baylis 1996). 6 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia took part of the 2004 enlargement of the EU, Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007 and Croatia in 2008.

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All countries included in this paper are marked as free with the exception of Bulgaria in 1990 – 1991,

Croatia in 1991 – 2000, Estonia in 1992 – 1993, Latvia in 1992 – 1994, Romania in 1991 – 1996 and

Slovakia in 1993 – 1994 and 1996 – 1998. During the above mentioned period these countries are

marked as partially free (according to Freedom House ranking). However it does not have much

influence to the indicators that are used in this paper7. Romania is the only country marked as not free

in 1990 – 1991, but despite this fact it successfully completed the process of transition and regime

consolidation. The time of the research is from the period of new democratic constitutions until 20158.

One of the limits of this paper is that it does not focus on political conflicts within executive, but only

constitutional. There is simply logic behind it. The reason is that the debate of the character of the

regime stems mainly from constitutional provisions and as it was mentioned above it is argued that

the conflicts arise from vaguely written constitutions. As the scope of this article to focus primarily on

the constitutional conflicts that is why informal presidential powers are not taken into account. The

author of the paper is aware of the importance of political pressure and informal initiatives in order to

gain more control over the executive. However very often informal political actions themselves cause

constitutional conflicts.

The constitutional intra-executive conflict thus emerge when at least one of the executives (usually it

is the president) oversteps constitutional powers (e.g. when president dismisses the prime minister

even if the constitution does not allow that), refuses to do what constitution states (e.g. when

president refuses to nominate certain officials or not to call on the referendum), does what

constitution says when it is against the position of the government (e.g. when president uses the veto,

or calls on the referendum) and to oversteps the competences without previous agreement within the

executive (e.g. foreign visits of both president and prime minister or to appeal to the Constitutional

Court).

It should be noted that intra-executive conflicts could be evident also as the tension between

presidents and parliaments. Depending on the particular case it could be considered as the conflict by

extension as “parliamentary support is the foundation on which the prime minister claims the authority

to control the executive branch of government” (Protsyk 2005: 138). In such cases, the conflict is

considered when the government backs the parliament decision. One of the example is when Slovak

7 The authors that are focusing their attention to the institutions in Central and Eastern Europe do not include only those countries that are marked as not free, because of the question of stability and regime consolidation (Elgie and McMenamin 2006, Almeida and Cho 2007, Chernykh and Cheibub 2008). That is not the case of countries included in this paper. 8 The time could vary. In case of Czech Republic and Slovakia it is from 1993 since the division of Czechoslovakia.

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president Ivan Gašparovič refused to nominate the general prosecutor elected by the parliament and

Prime Minister Iveta Radičová government backed the election. Another example could be found in

Slovenia where president Janez Drnovšek proposed the candidates for the Constitutional Court and

the parliament backed by the government of Janez Janša refused to approve them.

Based on the research design of the previous studies there are couple of hypothesis that could be

raised (Protsyk 2005, Joakim and Sedelius 2006, Sedelius and Mashtaler 2013). According to above

mentioned the most important thing is to explore if the conflicts within executive are exclusive matter

of political systems with directly elected presidents according to minimal definition of semi-

presidentialism (in Elgie´s 2006, 2011 definition) Existing studies are focusing more on the difference

within semi-presidential system itself and its division between premier-president and president-

parliamentary system (Shugart and Carey 1992).

If the conflicts are not matter of the directly elected presidents only the second thing to explore is

whether conflicts in pure parliamentary systems were only temporary within the period of transition

(Baylis 1996) or if they are present also in later years. That rises another assumption which is to see if

indirectly presidents are likely to go into conflict during their second term in the office. The argument

that lies behind this assumption is that during their first term they do not want to go into conflicts as

they want to be re-elected. The last thing is to explore if the constitutional conflicts differ in terms of

the issues comparing both types of political system.

Limits of the paper

To identify the conflicts within executive in countries with indirectly elected presidents similar method

was used as in previous studies and that was to evaluate the period of presidents and prime ministers

in the office (Baylis 1996, Protsyk 2005, Sedelius 2006). This method allows to compare the results with

previous studies (Sedelius and Mashtaler 20139) and to extend the existing findings. The unit of the

research was a period from election to election, either presidential or parliamentary. There are in total

148 periods of relations between various presidents and governments.10

Regarding presidents, there were in total 66 terms of presidential office, from which 45 presidents.

Some presidents were not counted in the research as they were not elected. That was for example the

9 Study of intra-executive conflicts compared the executive relations in eight countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia and Ukraine. This paper excludes Moldova, Russia and Ukraine and adds Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia. That is why most of the examples used in this paper focus on the examples from these six countries. 10 To identify the intra-executive conflicts except of secondary sources (see References) there were used: websites of the presidents and governments, The Political Data Yearbook, blog presidential-power, East European Constitutional Review, Freedom House, constitutions of the states

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acting president in Hungary László Kövér in 2012 after Pál Schmitt resigned after the scandal with his

PhD thesis or Artūras Paulauskas who was an acting president in Lithuania when Rolandas Paksas was

impeached in 2004. Neither Vlatko Pavletić nor Zlatko Tomčić are counted in Croatia after death of

president Franjo Tuđman. Among all the presidential elections 41 was hold by popular vote and 24

elections in parliament were held. Only the first Estonian president Lennart Georg Meri was elected in

1992 by a mixed system (by popular vote in the first round and in parliament in the second round).

More methodological difficulties could regard the number of the governments. In this paper there are

140 governments under examination. Sometimes also the government reshuffle is taken to be a new

government (as it is used in The Political Data Yearbook), however, this was not considered to be a

new case in this paper. Technocratic and caretaker cabinets were not excluded from the research even

if most of them experienced quite good relationship. However not all the technocratic governments

proofed to have unconflictful relations with Heads of State. To make an example, there was a

constitutional conflict between Zhelyu Zhelev and Lyuben Berov. It should be also taken in account

that the length of the governments differ, as some of them lasted only few months which could

possibly bring different results.

To distinguish the intensity of constitutional conflict a four point scale of conflicts is used. One point

means no constitutional conflict at all. That means good relationship among executives with the effort

to cooperate. Usually these are the case for technocratic cabinets, (Protsyk 2005) that were also in the

pure parliamentary systems.

To make an example, good cooperation was experienced during presidency of Václav Havel and prime

minister Jozef Tošovský in Czech Republic in 1997 – 1998 or the second Czech president Václav Klaus

and care-taker government of Jan Fischer in 2009 – 2010. Jan Fischer tried to use this image of

successful technocratic prime minister able in presidential elections, however, he failed because of

unclear finance of his campaign. Good cooperation among the top executives was also in Latvia during

the term of the fourth president Andris Bērziņš with prime minister Laimdota Straujuma. Period of

good relationship experienced also Slovakia under first president Michal Kováč and Jozef Moravčík in

1994.

However, not only technocratic cabinets experienced good relations among top executives. Relatively

unproblematic relations lasted also during Ivan Gašparovič and Robert Fico I and II government in

Slovakia, among president Pál Schmitt and Viktor Orbán in Hungary. Unproblematic and cooperative

relation was also in Estonia during minority cabinet of Siim Kallas with the president Arnold Rüütel.

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Two points on the scale of intra-executive conflicts were given to these relations in which there was

only (one or less frequently more) small conflict which did not threaten the cooperation. Even though

there is political conflict and not constitutional it is coded with number two. It is the case of incumbent

president János Áder and prime minister Viktor Orbán in Hungary as they were struggling over the law

regarding media. However their relation is unproblematic. Another example could be found in Estonia

between the first term of president Thomas Hendrik Ilves and prime minister Andrus Ansip. Despite

the conflict of appointment of Legal Chancellor their relationship remained good and were able to

cooperate even during serious government reshuffle.

Number three is given when there was one substantial conflict or more small conflicts that undermined

the relations between top executives. There are couple of examples later in the text, however, there

were conflicts about the appointments, policy making, referendum or forming the government.

Four points are to be found in that executive relationships that ended up with serious political

consequences causing stalemate situation or institutional crises. It should be mentioned that these

conflicts has been quite rare and were present during the first years of regime consolidation. Among

these conflicts could be classified the relationship between Michal Kováč and Vladimír Mečiar in

Slovakia. However in this case it was the Prime Minister Mečiar who struggled to gain more executive

power and not the president as one would expect (Hloušek 2013).

In states with directly elected presidents such conflicts were present in Romania and Lithuania. There

was a dismissal of the prime minister which was the case of president Emil Constantinescu and Radu

Vasile in Romania in 1998. Another example could be found in Lithuania where the situation led into

the impeachment of the president Paksas and the parliament´s decision was backed by the

government.

Constitutions in CEE

As this paper deals with constitutional conflicts it is worth mentioning some of the executive

competencies of presidents in which they clash with prime ministers in Central and Eastern Europe.

Usually the main concern why intra-executive conflicts happen is because of vaguely written

constitution which applies also for pure parliamentary regimes.

Presidents in selected countries are elected for the term of 4 or 5 years. Four year term in the office

nowadays regards only the Latvian president and it the past Estonian and Romanian presidency. In

Estonia only the first president Lennart Georg Meri was elected for four years, in Romania two

presidents were elected for that term: Ion Iliescu and Emil Constantinescu which changed in 2003 with

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changing presidential powers. This change was due to presidential pressures before parliamentary

elections as presidential candidates could effectively mobilize the voters for the elections that were

held in the same year (Tănăsescu 2008: 68).

The indirect elections in Estonia provide an interesting case as the first election in 1992 was exercised

by mixed system and only for 4 years (1992 – 1996). So that in the first round there was a direct election

of the president. All the other presidents have been elected indirectly, by parliament and subsequently

by the electoral body consisting of members of parliaments and representatives of the local

government councils.

Czech Republic passed the legislation of direct presidential election in 2012 without referendum. In

Hungary the Constitutional Court rejected in 1999 the fourth initiative for direct election with the

statement that “…referendum is not entitled to determine affairs of constitutional significance”

(Ilonszki and Kurtán 2000: 406)11. The referendum about direct elections was not successful even in

Slovakia in 1997 as it was thwarted by the government together with the referendum about NATO

membership (Malová and Učeň 1998: 518)12. The attempts to introduce popularly elected presidents

in Latvia failed as the initiators of the proposed changes failed to gather the necessary support to

initiate the referendum (Ikstens 2003: 1008-1009)13.

Following the formal presidential powers outlined by Shugart and Carey (1992) it can be observed that

veto powers possess all the presidents with an exception of Slovenia. However, Slovenian president

has a right to promulgate laws. The power to issue decrees have only countries with directly elected

presidents except for Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia (compared according to Elgie and Moestrup

2008).

No president of Central and Eastern Europe possess the exclusive initiative for legislative process nor

budgetary power. Also the powers about referendum vary. The most powerful president in this issues

is that of Romania, who can all on referendum in case of national matters which is very broad definition

and was used by the president to pursue his own political agenda. President Traian Băsescu wanted to

achieve a single chamber legislature (to change the parliament into unicameral) and replace the

proportional representation system. He wanted to achieve these changes in referendum. Prime

Minister Tăriceanu strictly opposed it (Elgie and Moestrup 2008: 154).

11 The Political Data Yearbook 12 The Political Data Yearbook 13 The Political Data Yearbook

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Regarding nominating the government and dissolving the parliament the rights are basically the same

with an exception of Bulgaria where president has very limited powers and must nominate the winner

of the elections. The presidential power to form the cabinet was used by Václav Havel in Czech

Republic, Lithuanian president Valdas Adamkus and Latvian presidents Guntis Ulmanis and Andris

Bērziņš.

However, even if the presidents´ legislative and non-legislative powers conflicts could be found also

within other powers that are not defined as scoring powers by Shugart and Carey (1992). These are in

field of foreign and defence policy which was especially the case of Lithuania, Poland, Romania and

Slovenia. Another thing is the appointment of officials, judges, ambassadors. In this area every country

under examination experienced at least one intra-executive clash.

Presidential powers were substantially changed in Croatian, Slovak and Romanian constitution. In the

case of Romania, these changes were the result of the intra-executive conflicts. Based on the executive

clashes, president cannot dismiss the prime minister, is elected for 5 years and president can be in

office only for two terms in total which can also be consecutive. In Slovakia the indirect election of the

president lead into a stalemate situation and that was the reason for not only changing the way of

election but also presidential powers as a compromise (Elgie and Moestrup 2008). It was quite

paradoxical situation as the high quorum should be the result of wide cooperation among parties and

it ended with the impossibility to elect the president. The change of Croatian constitution meant

considerable abolition of the presidential executive power especially in the cabinet dismissal.

Matter of transition and direct election?

Period of transition and regime consolidation was interesting from the point of view of establishing

and shaping executive (Baylis 1996). Even if in almost all of the states there was a struggle over

executive power during the first ages of establishing democratic institutions, as it is well known the

period of Ion Iliescu with Petre Roman in Romania or Lech Wałęsa with Jan Olszewski in Poland which

were directly elected presidents, there were also power struggles among indirectly elected presidents

and the governments. That were the cases of Václav Havel struggling with Václav Klaus in Czech

Republic, Zhelyu Zhelev with Dimitar Iliev Popov and Philip Dimitrov in Bulgaria, Michal Kováč with

Vladimír Mečiar in Slovakia or Árpád Göncz with József Antall in Hungary. Interestingly, Baltic States

with the exception of Lithuania did not experienced such serious clashes during that times and the

relationship among executives cannot be marked as conflictual.

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There were analysed the intra-executive relations in 11 countries. Countries that are (or were) pure

parliamentary systems with indirectly elected president are Czech Republic (1993 – 2013), Estonia

(1992 – nowadays), Hungary (1990 – nowadays), Latvia (1991 – nowadays) and Slovakia (1993 – 1998).

Czech Republic elected their first president by popular vote in 2013, Slovakia in 1998. Countries with

directly elected presidents are Bulgaria (1992 – nowadays), Croatia (1992 – nowadays), Lithuania (1993

– nowadays), Poland (1990 – nowadays), Romania and Slovenia (1992 – nowadays) 14.

The starting point of this analysis was the case of Slovakia. In 1998 there was a stalemate situation

during which it was not possible to elect president. Rather relatively high quorum of constitutional

majority in the parliament (three fifths of 150 MPs) disabled the elections due to high party

polarisation within the parliament (Hloušek 2013: 128). So that there was made a compromise in

changing the way of presidential elections and also his or her powers. Before direct election was

introduced (1998) the intra-executive conflicts were even threating political stability and afterwards

they rather diminished.

The conflicts between the first president Michal Kováč and prime minister Vladimír Mečiar were

common. Kováč refused to nominate Ivan Lexa for minister of privatization, refused to call on the

referendum while Mečiar used more political means and he was more the one who tried to accumulate

all the executive power. Even if the escalation of the conflict was political and not that constitutional

it provoked serious harms to institutional reliability. Their conflict escalated in kidnapping Kováč´s son

to Austria and Mečiar did not want to allow to investigate the case when it was allegedly traced to

Slovak intelligence services. Kováč and Mečiar belonged to the same political party HZDS (Movement

for Democratic Slovakia).

During the first period of transition the presidential powers were used differently. Hungarian president

Árpád Göncz even used his power as the chief commander of the armed forces (Tavits 2008: 73) so

that the army should not involve in the “gasoline crises” when taxi drivers blocked the streets even if

the government wanted to. Among Baltic States only Lithuania experienced intra-executive conflict

between president Algirdas Brazauskas and prime minister Adolfas Šleževičius when president used

the parliament to vote no confidence. Prime minister should have taken his savings from bankrupting

banks which the president saw as a moral and political problem.

14 Milan Kučan in 1990 was elected Head of the collective Presidency in Slovenia. Elections of Heads of states in 1990 in Bulgaria and Croatia were also held by parliament.

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But exploring the conflicts within time we can observe that these are definitely not the question of the

particular period. Even if Slovakia did not experienced such period as under Michal Kováč and Vladimír

Mečiar, it does not mean that it was not conflictual. The second Slovak president (the first one elected

by popular vote) Rudolf Schuster was an active politician and he was using constitutional powers to

compete with the executive such as veto power or refusal to nominate judges of the Constitutional

court. By doing so he often used the argument of direct legitimacy and he often went also into political

conflict with prime minister Mikuláš Dzurinda.

Moreover Schuster had particular political agenda in social politics which often was against austerity

measures and economic reforms of Dzurinda´s cabinet. President even agreed to make a referendum

about elections the same day of presidential election which he saw as an opportunity for his own re-

election. He calculated with the fact that trade union that organized the referendum will support him.

However, trade union did not support him and he did not get into the second round nor the

referendum was successful.

During Havel´s era the conflicts with prime minister Klaus were often demonstrated only by the

political rhetoric (Hloušek 2013: 46). However, even if there were political clashes Havel was willing to

enter also to the constitutional conflicts in order to pursue his political vision. It was demonstrated by

the appeal to Constitutional Court, conflicts in the foreign policy and entering into the cabinet

formation. Politically Havel could have been even involved in the fall of the government because of his

involvement into so-called Sarajevo assassination (Kopeček 2010) in which Václav Klaus was

challenged by Jan Ruml and Ivan Pilip to resign from his position of chairman of ODS party. Klaus was

in Sarajevo when they announced it to the media.

Also the second president of Czech Republic Václav Klaus did not hesitate to use his constitutional

powers in order to gain more control over the executive. During the cabinet of Vladimír Špidla he was

often using his veto powers especially in the field of taxes and economy. As in the case of president

Schuster in Slovakia it was his political agenda. When Špidla resigned Klaus was very active in forming

the government lead by Stanislav Gross and Mirek Topolánek.

In Hungary the conflictual situation within executive was not only during the first period of Árpád

Göncz, but also during presidencies of Ferenc Mádl and László Sólyom. Mádl during the period of the

government of Péter Medgyessy was often using veto power and were conflicting over the foreign

policy issues over signing the association treaty to NATO. Even more conflictual relation had president

László Sólyom with prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány over the nominations and decorations. President

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did not accept the proposals for state decorations blaming prime minister responsible for the moral

crises.

Regarding Baltic States Estonia and Latvia experienced quite calm period of transition. In Estonia there

were few clashes between top executives only during the government of Andrus Ansip. Latvia

experienced the biggest intra-executive conflict when president Valdis Zatlers who knew that he would

not be re-elected for the second term decided to dismiss the parliament in order to be able to call a

new parliamentary election where he could run with his own political party ZRP (Zatlers Reform Party).

To sum the findings, here is the table of the intra-executive conflicts in pure parliamentary systems

and in system with direct presidential election. As it can be observed serious conflicts happened in

both of the systems and thus could hardly be said that it is direct election the cause of the uneasy

constitutional coexistence (Protsyk 2005) between the top executives. There was examined 140

periods (cases) of president – prime minister relations. In 63 cases (coded with number 1) there was

no conflict at all. In 29 cases (coded with number 2) there were small conflicts that did not challenge

good cooperation among the top executives. In 48 cases (coded with numbers 3 and 4) occurred at

least one or more constitutional conflict that provoked serious disagreements or power struggles

among the executives.

Intensity of conflict Directly elected presidents Indirectly elected presidents Total

1 42 21 63

2 16 13 29

3 23 16 39

4 7 2 9

Table 1

Second term makes more conflicts?

Presidents face challenge while in the office. Some of them do not want to be only ceremonial figures

and try to pursue their own political vision using (or abusing) constitutional provisions. On the other

hand there are presidents that rather try to promote cooperation and avoid power struggles.

Moreover, when they are elected by the parliament they should try to cooperate in order to secure

their re-election. If we compare the level of conflict during first and second year in the office we can

observe that presidents thing about their re-election do enter in the conflicts even if they seek their

second presidential term. Of course the government could change but presidents who enter often into

battle over executive could not be re-elected.

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In case of the Czech Republic president Václav Havel went into conflicts during his first term in the

office (with Václav Klaus) but also during his second term. The intensity of the conflict were at the same

level. Havel was a dissident, symbol of the revolution in 1989 and enjoyed also popularity public. During

both of the terms Havel entered into forming of the government, struggled over the appointments and

conflicted also in foreign policy issues with both of the prime ministers.

Neither period with Miloš Zeman was not without conflicts. The conflict about appointing governor

and vice-governor of the Czech National Bank ended in the Constitutional Court with government

claiming that president overstepped his powers. There were also conflicts in foreinn policy in Kosovo

and about presidential powers itself.

Václav Klaus, the second Czech president experienced more conflicts during his first period in the

office. However, his second period was also conflictual with Petr Nečas even if they belonged to the

same party ODS (Civic Democratic Party).

In Estonia president Lennart Georg Meri had good relations with both governments even if there were

conflicts about nominations of the president of National Bank and judges. However these

constitutional clashes were not that serious. Arnold Rüütel on the other hand experienced quite

conflictual period with prime minister Andrus Ansip about internet elections that ended at the

Supreme Court and using veto power. Tomas Hendrik Ilves had more conflictual second term in his

office. The conflicts were again with prime minister Ansip that ended also to political clashes.

In Hungary the first period of Árpád Göncz was more conflictual but he was elected also for the second

term. Even if the presidents had good relations they did not run for the re-election. During his second

period in the office Göncz did not go into the clashes with government.

Neither in Latvia the hypothesis that more conflictual is the second presidential term seems to be valid.

The first president Guntis Ulmanis was cooperative with the government even if he was active in

forming the government leading by Andris Šķēle. However presidential activity is not per se the cause

of the intra-executive conflicts. Only president Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga was clashing more with the

government during her second term in the presidential office. She was in conflict with the government

of Aigars Kalvītis over the control of secret services, corruption and the ministry of foreign affairs. Even

if the next president Valdis Zatlers had conflictual relations with both prime ministers but he did not

want to be re-elected. His activities even forced both prime ministers Aigars Kalvītis and Ivars

Godmanis to resign.

15

Country Indirectly elected president First term

Run for re-election Second term

Conflicts during first term

Czech Republic Václav Havel 1993 – 1998 yes 1998 – 2003 Y

Václav Klaus 2003 – 2008 yes 2008 – 2013 Y

Estonia Lennart Georg Meri 1992 – 1996 yes 1996 – 2001 N

Arnold Rüütel 2001 – 2006 yes no Y

Toomas Hendrik Ilves 2006 – 2011 yes incumbent N

Hungary Árpád Göncz 1990 – 1995 yes 1995 – 2000 Y

Ferenc Mádl 2000 – 2005 no no Y

László Sólyom 2005 – 2010 no no Y

Pál Schmitt 2010 – 2012 no no N

János Áder 2012 – – incumbent N

Latvia Guntis Ulmanis 1993 – 1996 yes 1996 – 1999 N

Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga 1999 – 2003 yes 2003 – 2007 N

Valdis Zatlers 2007 – 2011 yes no Y

Andris Bērziņš 2011 – 2015 no no N

Raimonds Vējonis 2015 – – incumbent N

Slovakia Michal Kováč 1993 – 1998 yes no Y

Table 2

Conflicting issues Generally, issues of conflicts do not really change because of the vague constitution presidents and

prime ministers balance within their possible competencies. It is worth on to mention that presidents

often use their informal power to influence certain policies, public opinion or other state institutions.

Beside the frequently used informal critique of the government or informal ties with political parties.

Presidents use their legislative and non-legislative powers to control the executive. The constitutional

power to control the legislation is using the veto as Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga in Latvia, Rudolf Schuster in

Slovakia or Václav Klaus in Czech Republic who was especially active in the field of taxes and economy.

Usually, these presidents have their own political agenda and they want to pursue it throughout the

critique and vetoing the legislation.

16

It is not unusual that also indirectly elected president pursue their own political agenda using

constitutional powers. As for example Hungarian president László Sólyom (former president of

Constitutional Court) who due to his political agenda regarding environmental protection and health

lifestyle was often clashing with the government.

The conflicts over appointments were present in both political systems. Some appointments were only

subject of political discussion and president address only public critique over the appointment. An

illustrative example can be when Václav Klaus hesitated to appoint the minister Karl Schwarzenberg in

the government of Mirek Topolánek because of his ties to Austria. However, in many cases it was only

a political gesture. Also president Lennart Georg Meri in Estonia refused to appoint two ministers of

Mart Laar´s government. After the complaints, however, he fulfilled his presidential duties.

Sometimes presidents partially win and the gain their goal. Another situation arise in Slovakia when

President Kováč refused to appoint Ivan Lexa in 1994. However he then became State Secretary of the

ministry of privatization which meant that he was one of the leading figures on the ministry. Presidents

are were often involved also in the cabinet formation which was case of Václav Havel and Václav Klaus

in Czech Republic, Guntis Ulmanis in Latvia or Rudolf Schuster in Slovakia.

Not only ministers were the subject of the clashes over the appointments. In Hungary Árpád Göncz

refused to nominate vice-presidents of public media, he refused to sign their nomination (Baylis 1996:

309). The conflict ended at the Constitutional Court that stated that the president has a choice to veto

the appointment. In some cases the government had to face the win of the president. It was the case

of Estonia when president Lennart Georg Meri did not appoint the president of the Bank of Estonia

and other candidate had to be selected. Also the case of Slovakia could illustrate this point as

incumbent president Andrej Kiska refused to appoint two judges during Fico II government.

Referendum as a political tool was not used only in Romania by president Traian Basescu to promote

his own political agenda, but also by the president of Latvia when it was used by Valdis Zatlers when

he followed particular views about the government of Ivars Godmanis.

In the field of the foreign affairs, there was a general agreement between top executives about how

to conduct foreign policy. Serious clashes were experienced only in countries with direct presidential

elections: Romania, Poland, Slovenia and Lithuania. In Romania the problems were connected with the

negotiations of the EU accession and further attendance at EU Council where prime minister and

president travelled separately, even providing different agendas. This had to be solved by

Constitutional Court that stated that president should represent the country and prime minister

17

implement the decision. Also president Janez Drnovšek in Slovenia stepped his competences in a

foreign policy even conflicting with the ministry which introduced debate of competences.

Conflicts over foreign policy were especially because the unwillingness to agree on who should

represent the country. In Czech republic during presidency of Václav Havel when he travelled to Kosovo

even if he hold different view on the situation than prime minister Miloš Zeman. Another conflict

happened during presidency of Václav Klaus who was criticized by prime minister Jiří Paroubek over

his EU scepticism. Paroubek wanted that the government should approve all of the presidential foreign

trips.

Also Hungarian president Ferenc Mádl had a conflict with prime minister Péter Medgyessy over who

should signed the accession treaty do NATO. Another clash in foreign policy happened during the first

Hungarian president Árpád Göncz over the representation in international summits. Prime minister

József Antall prohibited him to attend V4 summit. President Lennart Georg Meri in Estonia was accused

by the government that he overstepped his constitutional provisions in foreign policy when he signed

treaties regarding the departure of army.

Conclusion

Intra-executive relations drew the attention during first years of the early transition period as there

appeared the concerns that dual legitimacy could threaten democratic process (Linz 1990). Previous

researches (Sedelius 2006, Protsyk 2005) have found out that the conflicts occurred in all countries

with directly elected president and they are not rare phenomenon. These studies made analytical

framework to the further research (which has been the case also of this paper) and testing in countries

outside Europe. This paper examined intra-executive relations in 11 countries over the past 25 years

and can make several conclusions with particular attention to the countries with indirectly elected

presidents15.

Intra-executive conflicts are not characteristic only for countries with direct election of the presidents.

The conflicts emerged from unclear executive competencies given in the constitutions (Malová 2001)

can be found also in pure parliamentary systems with the president elected within the parliament. Of

course, beside the institutional factor which is the vague constitution could be found also personal

traits of the leaders (Gherghina 2013). However, it is beyond the scope of the institutional debate.

15 For the conclusions in the states with popularly elected president see in particular Protsyk (2005), Sedelius (2006), Sedelius and Mashtaler (2013)

18

In should be emphasized that even if the conflicts were identified in both types of political system, the

most serious conflicts (marked with number four in this paper) occurred in countries with directly

elected presidents, that is Lithuania, Poland and Romania (7 cases in total). The only two serious

stalemate situation between indirectly elected president and government were in Bulgaria and

Slovakia during the period of early nineties which could be a symptom of democratic consolidation.

Constitutional struggles within executive were manifested not only during the early stages of

transitions during the presidency of Václav Havel in Czech Republic (there were more political than

constitutional conflicts), Árpád Göncz in Hungary and Michal Kováč in Slovakia, but they are still

present in the all countries under examination. Interestingly enough, in Baltic States with indirect

election these conflict did not arose during the period of transition, but later and they occurred

especially in Latvia and Lithuania. Presidents were willing to go into conflicts with the government even

during their first period in the office.

The last thing that should be mentioned is that the issues of constitutional conflicts are similar

regardless the type of presidential election. Between presidents and governments appear

disagreements over the legislation, over the appointments of the ministers and other appointments

as judges or general prosecutors or members of national banks. Presidents of Central and Eastern

Europe try to be visible representatives of the executive branch and not only ceremonial figures. In

some of the conflicts the Constitutional Courts play an active role which is the aspect that is worth on

to explore in further research.

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President Form of election

Presidential election

Term in the office Prime Minister

Parliamentary election Government Evaluation

Czech Republic

Václav Havel parliament 1993 1993 - 1998 Václav Klaus 1992 1992 - 1996

3 Václav Klaus 1996 1996 - 1997

Jozef Tošovský 1997 - 1998 1

Václav Havel parliament 1998 1998 - 2003 Miloš Zeman 1998 1998 - 2002 3

Vladimír Špidla 2002 2002 - 2004 1

Václav Klaus parliament 2003 2003 - 2008 2

Stanislav Gross 2004 - 2005 2

Jiří Paroubek 2005 - 2006 2

Mirek Topolánek 2006 2006 - 2009

3 Václav Klaus parliament 2008 2008 - 2013 Mirek Topolánek 2008 2008 - 2009

Jan Fischer 2009 - 2010 1

Petr Nečas 2010 2010 - 2013 3

Miloš Zeman popular vote 2013 2013 -

Jiří Rusnok 2013 - 2014 1

Bohuslav Sobotka 2013 2014 - 2

Estonia

Lennart Georg Meri mixed 1992 1992 - 1996 Mart Laar 1992 1992 - 1994 2

Andres Tarand 1994 - 1995 1

Tiit Vähi 1995 1995 - 1997 1

Lennart Georg Meri parliament 1996 1996 - 2001 Mart Siimann 1997 - 1999 1

Mart Laar 1999 1999 - 2002 2

Arnold Rüütel parliament 2001 2001 - 2006 1

Siim Kallas 2002 - 2003 1

Juhan Parts 2003 2003 - 2005 2

Andrus Ansip 2005 - 2007 3

Toomas Hendrik Ilves parliament 2006 2006 - 2011

Andrus Ansip 2007 2007 - 2011 2

Toomas Hendrik Ilves parliament 2011 2011 - Andrus Ansip 2011 2011 - 2014 3

Taavi Rõivas 2014 - 2015 1

Taavi Rõivas 2015 2015 - N

Latvia

Guntis Ulmanis parliament 1993 - 1996 Valdis Birkavs 1993 1993 - 1994 1

Māris Gailis 1994 - 1995 2

Guntis Ulmanis parliament 1993 - 1996 Andris Šķēle 1995 1995 - 1997

1 Andris Šķēle 1997 - 1997

Guntars Krasts 1997 - 1998 1

Vilis Krištopans 1998 1998 - 1999 1

Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga parliament 1999 - 2003 Andris Šķēle 1999 - 2000 2

Andris Bērziņš 2000 - 2002 1

Einars Repše 2002 2002 - 2004 2

Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga parliament 2003 2003 - 2007 Indulis Emsis 2004 - 2004 2

Aigars Kalvītis 2004 - 2006

3 Aigars Kalvītis 2006 2006 - 2007

Valdis Zatlers parliament 2007 2007 - 2011 2

Ivars Godmanis 2007 - 2009 3

Valdis Dombrovskis 2009 - 2010

3 Valdis Dombrovskis 2010 2010 - 2011

Andris Bērziņš parliament 2011 2011 - 2015 Valdis Dombrovskis 2011 2011 - 2014 2

Laimdota Straujuma 2014 - 2014 1

Raimonds Vējonis parliament 2015 2015 - Laimdota Straujuma 2014 2014 - 2016 N

Māris Kučinskis 2016 - N

Hungary

Árpád Göncz parliament 1990 1990 - 1995 József Antall 1990 1990 - 1993 3

Péter Boross 1993 - 1994 1

Árpád Göncz parliament 1995 1995 - 2000 Gyula Horn 1994 1994 - 1998 1

Viktor Orbán 1998 1998 - 2002 1

Ferenc Mádl parliament 2000 2000 - 2005 1

Péter Medgyessy 2002 2002 - 2004 3

Ferenc Gyurcsány 2004 - 2006 2

László Sólyom parliament 2005 2005 - 2010

Ferenc Gyurcsány 2006 2006 - 2009 3

Gordon Bajnai 2009 - 2010 1

Pál Schmitt parliament 2010 2010 - 2012 Viktor Orbán 2010 2010 - 2014 1

János Áder parliament 2012 2012 - Viktor Orbán 2014 2014 - 2

Slovakia

Michal Kováč parliament 1993 1993 - 1998 Vladimír Mečiar 1992 1993 - 1994 3

Jozef Moravčík 1994 1

Vladimír Mečiar 1994 1994 - 1998 4

Rudolf Schuster popular vote 1999 1999 - 2004 Mikuláš Dzurinda 1998 1998 - 2002 3

Ivan Gašparovič popular vote 2004 2004 - 2009 Mikuláš Dzurinda 2002 2002 - 2006 2

Ivan Gašparovič popular vote 2009 2009 - 2014 Robert Fico 2006 2006 - 2010 1

Iveta Radičová 2010 2010 - 2012 3

Robert Fico 2012 2012 - 2016 1

Andrej Kiska popular vote 2014 2014 - 2

Robert Fico 2016 2016 - N