ipp- eth zurich october 12th, 2006 laguna meeting wg 7: safety and environment report by l. mosca

October 12th, 2006 L. Mosca LAGUNA Meeting in Zurich

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IPP- ETH Zurich

October 12th, 2006

LAGUNA Meeting

WG 7: Safety and Environment

Report by L. Mosca


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Members of the WG 7

Luigi MOSCA (Fréjus) : Coordinator

Neil SPOONER (Boulby)

Timo ENQVIST (Pyhäsalmi)

W. PYTEL (Poland)

……………….

Others are welcome !


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Few general remarks

1) The safety requirements should be present since the beginning of a laboratory and detector project (not added afterwards)

2) The safety solutions need to be studied in close connection with the overall safety strategy of the host infrastructure (tunnel or mine)

3) A close cooperation with the ILIAS WG-2 will be natural and fruitful


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Proposed “guide-lines”(not exhaustive …)

• stability of the large cavities considered in the feasibility study for each site (in particular versus possible earthquakes) and in the long term

• fire detection and extinction • risk of liquids leaks (evaporation, surroundings contamination,

etc.)• risk of falls (great height)• risk of electrocution• air composition and purity (CO, CO2, NO,NO2, Radon, …)• integration of the experiment’s installation safety in the overall

safety strategy of the host infrastructure (tunnel or mine)• ……………………..


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So far two LAGUNA members contributed with a preliminary description (along the proposed guide-lines) of the safety problems and perspectives in their candidate site :

Pyhäsalmi and Fréjus

(other contributions are expected …)


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Pyhäsalmi• - Stability of large cavities• According to a pre-feasibility study (April 2002), it is possible to• excavate large-size caverns in Pyhäsalmi at the depth of 1400 - 1500• metres (4000 - 4200 mwe). This means LENA-type caverns. This is especially• true if the direction of the cavern is not important. The rock is very• stable. Some micro-seismic activity appears (it is monitored by the mine)• but they cannot be compared with earth quakes, which are extremely rare• and small in the scale (all around Finland). The long-term stability of• large caverns should also be good.

• - Fire detection and extinction• A fire is the most dangerous accident in the mine. It should take into• consideration already in the design of an experiment. Automatic detection• systems should be used. Depending on the type of fire, various (automatic)• extinction systems can be used. Water usually is not good.

• - Risk of liquid leaks• The ground water is above the 1400 metres level, and thus cannot be• spoilt due to a liquid leak.• The main activity of the mine occurs (until about 2016) at the level of• 1400 - 1450 metres. If a large-volume detector is constructed during the• life-time of the mine, it should be take care, that the leakage of liquids• doesn't risk the operation of the mine.


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Pyhäsalmi (continued)

• - Air composition and purity• The mine operation takes place at the depth of 1410 metres (the main level).• The fresh air is put directly there. This is normal or standard way of• having fresh air underground, and there are no trouble with CO, CO2, etc.• Also no trouble with radon, which is monitored regularly (by the Radiation• Safety Authority in Finland). In the new deep laboratory the fresh air• procedure can be done in the same way.

• - Integration of the safety of the experiment with the mine• This is essential. The experiment cannot be started until the mine has• accepted all its safety (and other) issues. Apparently all the safety• issues will be done (and should be done) together with the mine safety• personnel.


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Fréjus

• - Stability of large cavities :

• this item was already implicit in the Feasibility Study performed for the Fréjus site, but a more extensive investigation is needed in the frame of a Design Study

• - Fire detection and extinction :

• I agree with you that fire is the more serious risk for an underground experiment ; we have some experience with the access to, and operations inside, the present Fréjus Laboratory (LSM)

• The type of fire automatic detection and fire (automatic ?) extinction must be very seriously investigated and defined by the Design Study

• - Risk of liquid leaks :

• this risk is of course qualitatively very different for the 3 types of detectors (Water, Liquid Argon and Liquid Scintillator) and, for example, the case of Liquid Argon must be considered in very close connection with the ventilation system of both the Laboratory and the Tunnel and with a reliable monitoring of the air composition (see the next item)


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Fréjus (continued)

• - Air composition and purity :

• we have a quite long (about 25 years) and specific experience in this sector at the present (LSM) Laboratory, which should be taken into account in the Design Study

• - Integration of the safety of the experiment with the tunnel safety organization :

• here also we have a 25 years experience with the LSM laboratory : our safety equipments have been systematically discussed and defined in agreement with the Tunnel safety authorities and experts and safety tests and exercises are periodically performed with the Tunnel safety operators. So, the implication of the Tunnel safety experts in the Design Study will be an essential condition.


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Road-map for the (next) future :

- define a precise programme (more inputs are needed for that)

- fix “milestones” and “deliverables”- find partners both in our Institutions and in external

Institutions and Companies- estimate the needed budget- ………………………………- produce a draft-proposal

ipp- eth zurich october 12th, 2006 laguna meeting wg 7: safety and environment report by l. mosca

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