The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 18 | Issue 10 | Number 1 | Article ID 5395 | May 15, 2020

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Is There Left Populism in Japan? The Case of ReiwaShinsengumi

Axel Klein1

Abstract: The rather heterogeneous state ofpopulism research on Japan and the potentiallypopulist quality of the new political party ReiwaShinsengumi are the two key points addressedin this paper. Based on a summary of dominantconcepts of populism and the pertinentresearch on Japan I argue for an ideationalapproach to make Japan more accessible tocomparative efforts. Using Reiwa Shinsengumias an example, I conclude that there is littlepopulism to be found and suggest that futureresearch needs to look for explanations whyJapan is apparently different in this respectfrom other mature liberal democracies.

Keywords: Populism, Reiwa Shinsengumi,ideational approach

Introduction

Anyone interested in populism in Japan willquickly realize that the academic discourse onthe topic is as enlightening as it is confusing.The relatively few scholars who are active inthis field have produced a conceptually andempirically diverse body of literature. In someof it the sheer existence of populism iscontested as are its key components andconsequently its definition. The phenomenalabelled as Japanese manifestations of populisminclude a very diverse group of political actorsthat make it difficult to see a commonconceptual ground. One finding most scholarsagree upon, however, is that the case of Japanis almost non-existent in comparative efforts ofthe international political science community.

When Reiwa Shinsengumi2 (RSG) entered thepolitical arena in April 2019, it appeared as asocial activists’ movement poised to add yetanother player to Japan’s fluid and fragmentedopposition camp. With growing publicity andmedia coverage, however, RSG was convertedinto yet another piece of Japan’s heterogeneouspopulism mosaic, albeit with the qualifier “leftpopulism” attached to it. Obviously, it wasRSG’s founder and leader Yamamoto Tarō, atthe time an independent Upper House member,whose campaign style and rhetoric seemed tojustify this categorization, at least for somepolitical observers (Minami 2019, Yamaguchi2019, Takaku 2019, Asahi 02 Sept. 2019).

The potentially populist quality of RSG and therather heterogeneous state of populismresearch on Japan are the two key pointsaddressed in this paper. Based on a summary ofdominant concepts of populism and thepertinent research on Japan I argue for anideational approach, meaning a definition ofpopulism as a small set of specific ideologicalelements (see below), which is best suited tomake the case of Japan accessible tocomparative efforts of the political sciencecommunity. This seems all the more prudentgiven the increasing attention paid to thephenomenon, the more recent proliferation ofscholarship on populism and the potential fortheoretical and methodological insights thatcomparisons with other mature liberaldemocracies hold.

Based on this argument I use the case of RSGto discuss whether this new political party doesindeed constitute (left) populism. In order to

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answer this quest ion I analyze threerepresentative texts of the movement: (1) itsmission statement and party platform, (2) acampaign speech by party leader Yamamoto,and (3) a town-hall meeting featuringYamamoto in Gifu prefecture. I find thatalthough there is some overlap between RSG’stexts and elements of the ideational definitionof populism, key components are missing,rendering the label “(left) populism” for RSGinept.

Studies on Populism in Japan

In 2015 , Pet ter L indgren began h iscomprehensive review of populism studies onJapan by stating that the “literature onJapanese populism is, comparatively speaking,small.” (2015: 579)3 The few journal articles onthis subject published since 2015 all agree orassert like Yoshida Tōru that despite “rapidlygrowing literature on populism in advanceddemocracies, Japan is often overlooked” (2019:1). And indeed, although there also have beensome monographs published in Japanese sinceŌtake Hideo’s pioneering work (2003),4 the lastalmost 20 years of research on Japanesepopulism have hardly been incorporated intocomparative studies by the internationalpolitical science community. The standardliterature on this topic discusses democraciesin Europe, North America and Latin America,but Japan (as well as the other two East Asiandemocracies, for that matter) seems to be offthe academic map (Rovira Kaltwasser, Taggartet al. 2017: 1-18).

Why is that? “Nothing to see here!” is what IanBuruma (2018), Jennifer Lind (2018) and othersargue.5 In their analyses, there is no populismto speak of in Japan. According to theseauthors, the country’s apparent immunity ismostly a function of its relatively egalitariansociety, its lack of elites that “have betrayed”the ordinary people, a government that has

kept Japan’s economy the “most protected andleast globalized in the developed world”(Buruma 2018), and responsive policies that“put national interest first in immigration andtrade” (Lind 2018: 69). Clearly, the appraisal ofthese authors is based on an understanding ofpopulism derived from the experience of otherindustrialized countries.

Why is it that other scholars do find populismin Japan? Their studies reflect in one way oranother two concepts of populism that theinternational political science community hasbeen discussing for at least three decades. The“political strategic approach” argues that“populism is best defined as a political strategythrough which a personalistic leader seeks orexercises government power based on direct,unmediated, uninstitutionalized support fromlarge numbers of mostly unorganizedfollowers.” (cf. Weyland 2001: 14) On the otherhand, the “ideational approach” (cf. Mudde,Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 5) defines populism asa “thin-centered ideology that considers societyto be u l t imate ly separated into twohomogeneous and antagonistic camps, the‘pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, andwhich argues that politics should be anexpression of the volonté générale (generalwill) of the people.”

One major difference to Buruma, Lind andothers seems to be that some scholars whoidentify populism in Japan apply mainstreamdefinitions in a partial way, meaning that theexistence of single elements of thosedefinitional concepts is considered sufficient tolabel political actors as populists. For example,Ōtake Hideo (2003: 122-123) used a one-dimensional concept that allowed him toinclude such diverse politicians as KoizumiJun’ichirō, Ozawa Ichirō, Doi Takako, KanNaoto, Tanaka Makiko, and also IshiharaShintarō in this category. According to Ōtake(2003: 123) popul is ts share one keycharacteristic: they criticize "(selfish) elites" fordamaging the democratically legitimate

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interests of "the (virtuous) people". Lookingthrough this definitional lens, Ōtake later putforward his concept of “interest-led populism”(2006) of which former Prime Minister TanakaKakuei was a typical representative.Interestingly, some of the policies pushed bythese “interest-led populists” are the samediscussed by Buruma and Lind as protectionsagainst populism. Based on his definition,Ōtake also identified a form of populism whichevolved out of a criticism of “interest-ledpopulism” and has been referred to as“neoliberal populism”. Koizumi Jun’ichirō(Prime Minister 2001-06) was the first nationalpolitician to be labelled a “neoliberal populist”by political scientists and journalists. On thelocal level, governors like Koike Yuriko (Tokyo)and Hashimoto Tōru (Osaka) were placed inthis category.

Hashimoto also features prominently in studiesthat apply a concept of populism which is builtaround “strategic” aspects and “political style”(seiji sutairu) (Mizushima 2016: 6). In thesestudies, key definitional characteristics ofpopulists may well be summarized asprominent, polarizing, and performative, all ofwhich need to be understood against thebackdrop of standard political rhetoric andbehavior in Japan. Hashimoto was credited withgiving birth to “theatrical populism” (Arima2017) because of his “performance”, hisrhetoric, his explicit criticism of his politicalopponents, and the energetic consistency withwhich he demanded change. Koizumi was alsoincluded in this category as were othergovernors like Tanaka Yasuo (Nagano) andKawamura Takashi (Nagoya).

A review of the most recent articles in Englishacademic journals adds to the conceptualdiversity.6 Weathers (2014) combined anideational and a strategic approach in hisanalysis of former Osaka governor Hashimoto,who founded the political party Nippon Ishin noKai. Weathers finds that Hashimoto represents“a classic case of Japanese-style populist

neol iberal ism” (2014: 77). While theneoliberalism label refers among other thingsto austerity policies, “likening government toprivate business” (2014: 82) and Hashimoto’s“signature policy, unifying Osaka City andOsaka Prefecture” (2014: 78), the argument forcalling him “populist” is partly built aroundbehavioral traits like Hashimoto’s “flamboyantpolitical performance skills and ability toconnect with ordinary people”, “politicaltheatre”, “intensive use of personal interaction,social media, and television messaging” and“aggressive rhetoric” used to ”berateindividuals” (2014: 81-83). Weathers alsopoints to a part of Hashimoto’s ideological self-justification, stating that in “classic populistfashion” the former governor argued he waselected by a majority providing him with “astrong mandate from the voters” (2014: 83) andtherefore a legitimate basis for all of hispolitical projects and decisions.

Hieda, Zenkyo and Nishikawa (2019) make apoint by keeping the two basic concepts ofpopulism explicitly separate. The authors statethat the ideational approach has beendeveloped and almost exclusively applied toEuropean parliamentary systems, but not topresidential [electoral] systems such as thosethat can be found in Latin America, nor toelections for governors on the prefectural levelin Japan. Using an online survey after the 2017Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election,7 theauthors operationalize populism using 15 itemsbased on sub-categories of the ideationalelements of (anti-)elitism, sovereignty andhomogeneity of the people. Their goal was totest whether voters of the “strategic-populistparty” Tomin First, created by Tokyo governorKoike, displayed ideational populist attitudes(the authors find little correlation).

Yoshida Tōru (2019) rejects “the ideologicaland organizational aspects of populism”.Instead, he defines populism “as a form ofpolitical style that maximizes mobilization inorder to win an election in particular

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circumstances” (Yoshida 2019: 2), the core ofthis definition being the “political style” andthe “particular circumstances”. The formerrefers mostly to behavior similar to whatWeathers and Arima described in the case ofH a s h i m o t o , w h i l e t h e “ p a r t i c u l a rcircumstances” refer to the electoral system forgovernors and the institutional antagonismbetween governors and prefectural assemblies.Yoshida explains that candidates for governorneed to address “geographically dispersedconstituencies” with a dominant urbanelectorate, a situation that creates incentives topropose populist neoliberal reforms to attack“the local assembly and its councilors, blamingthem for prioritizing the particular interests ofa specific sector or industry that theyrepresent.” (Yoshida 2019: 8)

Finally, Hijino and Vogt (2019) add to thediverse understanding of Japanese populism byapplying an ideational approach to thesubnational level in their study of Okinawa’sgovernor Onaga (2014-2018) and his AllOkinawa-movement. The evidence they find forthe “new phenomenon” of “regionalistpopulism” consists of “subnational identitypolitics” and the “unity of a virtuous Okinawanpeople against a discriminatory Japanesemainland” (Hijino, Vogt 2019: 1).

The Argument for an Ideational Approach

This short review suggests that the presentstate of populism research on Japan ischaracterized by relatively few academicpublications, conceptual heterogeneity, a yetsmall base of empirical data and an expandableconnection to international comparative efforts.Of course, we may agree that there are“varieties of populism” (cf. Gidron, Bonikowski2013) and therefore any phenomenon that fitsany set of criteria should be included into thediscussion. As Yoshida (2019: 2) argues,because “[…] types of popul ism varytremendously in their form, style, and context,

it is more appropriate to discuss populisms,rather than populism” and to accept Japan asone particular (Japanese) species of the extant“variety of populisms”.

I suggest an alternative path and propose thata concept of populism should be chosen basedon meaningful comparative options. If we wantto tap into the potential of comparisons withother mature liberal democracies featuring aparliamentary system, a well-developedeconomy and a (post)materialist society,Europe is the place to turn to. Since populismresearch on European liberal democracies isdominated by ideational concepts, such anapproach seems a simple but promising choice.

Adopting a common conceptual foundation forcomparative endeavors requires the separationof core elements from common satellitecharacteristics of populism or those that wouldbetter be categorized under a differentframework. There are also many shades of greyin the way “the elite”, “the people”, their “will”and other potentially populist phenomena canbe framed and understood.8 For example, in ahighly centralized state like Japan it is notuncommon to hear pol i t ic ians on theprefectural level use confrontational rhetoricagainst the central government, but that per seis not the same as the antagonism between “thepure people” and the “corrupt el ite”.Campaigning on a platform that demands cutsin public spending and less pork-barrel politicsmay sound attractive to most Japanese votersbut this attractiveness alone does not turnthese proposals into populism. The same can besaid about reform-oriented politicians who aremedia-savvy, adroit, present themselves asoutsiders to the political establishment andstrongly criticize their opponents. Otherwise,Bill Clinton and Barack Obama would findthemselves labelled populists.

The core of the ideational definition ofpopulism is the basic frame of reference itoffers to potential voters. These voters are

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referred to as the morally pure people, the(silent) majority, those who by virtue of thedemocratic ideal should be the sovereign overtheir own polity but who - according to thepopulist narrative - are either insufficientlyheard or completely cut off from power by theruling establishment. As a result, “the people”are entangled in a Manichean conflict with theestablishment, a conflict between the twomoral antagonisms of good and bad. Theconflict is over the “general will of the people”that populist leaders claim to exclusivelyrepresent and fight for. Everyone opposing thevolonté général is an enemy of the peoplewhich inevitably leads to anti-pluralism,illiberal attitudes towards society and hostilitytowards political opponents (cf. Mudde, RoviraKaltwasser 2017; Müller 2016)(Figure 1).

Figure 1: Key Elements of an IdeationalConcept of Populism

(Based on Müller 2016, Mudde & RoviraKaltwasser 2017)

Clearly, this concept of populism does notprovide a well-developed, comprehensiveideology as Socialism, Marxism, (Neo-)Liberalism or others do. Mudde and RoviraKaltwasser therefore call populism “a thin-centered ideology” (2017: 6), a term that has

drawn some criticism, among other things, forits conceptual spuriousness, the methodologicalinconsistencies it invokes, and potentialproblems of classification and measurement(Aslanidis 2016: 89). For our purpose, however,it is sufficient to understand populism as asmall set of ideological notions that allowspopulist politicians to add all kinds of elementsfrom other be l ie f sys tems, dogmas,philosophies, worldviews etc. to their particularpopulist brew and season it to taste the localsufferings. This ability accounts for the manydifferent subspecies of populism that can befound in democracies worldwide. Naturally,populism coming from the opposition cannotdraw on hegemonic ideas of the ruling elite andtherefore usual ly takes the shape ofcountervailing ideologies. As Lindgren (2015:582) stated for Europe, “nativism andauthoritarianism can be part of the ideologicalcore of the PRR [populist radical right] becausethey are not part of the core ideologies of theestablished parties.”

In other words, the only way to justify labellingsome political actors in Japan as populists in anideational sense is to lower the definitionalthreshold, both in terms of the number ofcriteria applied and in terms of the way inwhich these criteria manifest themselves. If werevisit the cases of the Japanese governors withthe ideational concept in its entirety, thepopulist label loses adhesiveness. Of course,governors need to use dualistic rhetoric thatsuggests that a large part of the prefecturalelectorate demands reforms, and that thecentral government is a natural opponent. Inaddition, neoliberalism offered a welcomeideological basis for these governors because ofJapan’s particularism, myriad of veto playersand vested interests. This is, however,significantly different from the moral claim ofpopulists to be the exclusive representative ofthe “pure people” fighting a thoroughly corruptelite. The overlap of these governors with theideational understanding proposed heretherefore seems insufficient to argue for

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popul ism as a promising concept forcomparative analysis.

The same seems to apply to the case ofOkinawa’s governor Onaga, whose movementAll Okinawa Hijino and Vogt (2019) frame as“regional populism”.9 The authors’ reasoning isthat Onaga used the shared Okinawan identityof his potential supporters to rally them behindhim and create an “us versus them” narrativein which the “virtuous people” of Okinawa“‘unite their hearts’ against an ‘indifferent’ and‘discriminatory’ mainland.” (Hijino, Vogt 2019:3) While these characteristics of Onaga’scampaign do indeed overlap with those ofpopulists, some core elements of the ideationalconcept are either only weakly pronounced ormissing. First, Onaga and his movement werenot illiberal or anti-pluralist. Secondly, they didnot claim an exclusive moral superiority fortheir fight. Different from, for example,regional populists in Italy, Onaga did not viewthe world with a “Manichean outlook” (Mudde2004) but framed the dispute with Tokyo as “asa conflict between the inherently peacefulisland of Okinawa and an overbearing centralgovernment.” (Flint 2018: 40) Finally, ifMudde’s definition applies and All Okinawashared - as Hijino and Vogt (2019: 3) write - “aworld-view that divides the world into twomonolithic, but antagonistic groups (a corruptelite and virtuous people)”, it remains unclearwhich group the majority of the Japanesepeople living in the rest of the country belongto.

Reiwa Shinsengumi

As stated in the introduction, RSG has alreadyattracted the label of a (left) populist party.Yamamoto was also confronted with thiscategorization in interviews with mass mediasoon after the Upper House election in 2019,and replied that if rescuing people was calledpopulism, he would call himself a populist.10 Acursory survey of public appearances of RSG

also reveals elements that merit an analysisaccording to an ideational definition ofpopulism. The party frames its activities as asincere fight for every single Japanese againsta selfish political elite that makes life miserablefor ordinary citizens and destroys the country.RSG also claims to be the only political force torepresent the justified demands of the people,because the political establishment (includingthe other opposition parties) failed to take onthis task.11

Although Yamamoto had been a member of theUpper House for six years (2013-19), thebehavior and policy stances of the former actorand TV-personality qualified him sufficiently asan outsider to the establishment. His publicappearances show him as a leader with distinctrhetorical talent. In contrast to standardpolitical lingo, Yamamoto delivers his campaignspeeches in everyday language. For goodmeasure, he is also media-savvy, stageexperienced and a prolific user of new socialmedia.

Yamamoto became politically active after morethan 20 years in Japanese show business andappearing in a number of movies and televisionprograms.12 As he recalled during one of histown-hall meetings, his political engagementstarted after the 2011 triple-disaster in Japan’sNortheast when he shared his concerns on

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social media. Back then he also explained thatJapanese celebrities would destroy theircareers if they criticized corporations whichare considered “Gods” (kami sama) in showbusiness, since they finance the world ofcelebrities.13

Yamamoto failed in his first electoral attempt,losing his bid for the 2012 Lower Houseelection in Tokyo’s 8th single member district(SMD). In 2013, however, he successfully ranas an independent candidate from the electoraldistrict of Tokyo for a seat in the Upper House,winning 11.83% of the votes.14 In October thatyear he caused a stir and massive protestwhen, during an Imperial Festivity, he handeda letter containing information about theworking conditions at the nuclear power plantFukushima Daiichi to the Emperor. In 2014 hejoined Ozawa Ichirō’s People’s Life Party(seikatsu no tō) as a co-leader (kyōdō daihyō)15

but five years later, when Ozawa merged hisparty (then called the Liberal Party) with theDemocratic Party for the People (DPFP,kokumin minshu tō), Yamamoto left and beganwhat he called “the challenge of establishing agrassroots party on the national level”.

Yamamoto named his new party after a brigadeof lordless Samurai (rōnin). This “newly chosengroup” (shinsengumi) was founded by theTokugawa Shogunate (bakufu) at the end ofJapan’s isolationist Edō period and chargedwith upholding public order in Kyōto. RSG’sfirst electoral effort was the Upper Houseelection in July 2019 for which the party rannine candidates in the proport ionalrepresentation (PR) tier and one in Tokyo’smulti-member district. Although he was notonly party leader but also the only prominentface of RSG, Yamamoto did not put himself onthe first position of the party list. Instead, thetop position was taken Funago Yasuhiko, a 61year old graduate from Takushoku Universitywho was diagnosed with ASL at the age of 41and has been depending on an artificialrespirator since 2002. The second spot on the

party list was taken by 55 year old KimuraEiko, the founder of a self-support organizationfor physically handicapped people in Tama City,who badly fell as a toddler, damaging hercervical vertebrae, resulting in physicaldisability that left her dependent on awheelchair.16

Yamamoto also surrendered his candidacy inTokyo’s multi-member district that he had wonin 2013. Instead, Nohara Yoshimasa ran in thisdistrict. In his home prefecture of Okinawa,Nohara was an active member of Sōka Gakkai,a lay Buddhist organization whose many millionmembers treat vote-gathering for the “CleanGovernment Party” (Kōmeitō) as a componentof their religious practice (Klein, McLaughlinforthcoming). In Tokyo, Nohara was nowdirectly competing with Kōmeitō leaderYamaguchi Natsuo, aggressively criticizing theleaderships of both the religion and thepolitical party for having abandoned SōkaGakkai’s ideals. As Yamamoto said in hiscampaign speeches, Nohara’s candidacy wasintended to create an interesting and “hotfight”, potentially mobilizing otherwisedisinterested voters.17

In the Upper House election, Nohara won214,438 votes, finishing 8th, not enough to wina seat there, but in PR, RSG won 4.55% ormore than 2.2 million votes (991,756 of whichwere cast for Yamamoto), meaning that theparty had secured Upper House seats for itstop two candidates, Funago and Kimura (seeTable 1). Yamamoto, third on the party list, losthis seat. Still, since RSG had won more than2% of all PR votes it was legally recognized as apolitical party and entitled to receive publicparty subsidies.

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TABLE 1: PR-Result of 2019 Upper Houseelection for RSG

(Data source: NHK18)

In preparation for the next general electionRSG has already been fielding candidates in anumber of SMDs. Some of these candidates areexperienced former local or national politicians,but several hundred newcomers have alsoresponded to the call on RSG’s website.19 Allofficial candidates have to consent to RSG’spolicy platform. Before the Coronavirus crisistook also hold of politics in Japan, RSG hadannounced it is willing to electorally cooperatewith other opposition parties as long as theyagree to demand a reduct ion o f theconsumption tax to 5%. Otherwise RSG wouldaim at running between 100 and 131candidates on its own (see below).

***Testing RSG for Populism

In order to test RSG for ideational populism Iscreened three representative (written andspoken) texts of the party from 2019 and 2020to look for those defining criteria laid outabove.

I analyzed:(1) the party’s basic platform and its major

policies as published on its website (June2019);(2) a speech by Yamamoto during the electioncampaign for the Upper House (July 2019); and(3) an unedited video of an almost three-hourlong town-hall meeting in Gifu prefecture(February 2020);

Given my intention to identify populist rhetoricand ideas, the following pages present data inthe form of translated texts, consequentlyrendering the next three subsections quitedescriptive in nature. However, after apresentation of each text I will discuss andanalyze potentially populist elements. Given themanageable amount of text, no automatedprocesses or methods of text mining have beenapplied. Not all translations are verbatim.

Party Declaration and Platform20

RSG states in its basic declaration that its keymission is to “serve all the people (subete nohitobito) living in this country.” Explicitlymentioned are those with low or no income,those “struggling heavily with 20 years ofdeflation”, the “lost generation”,21 people withlower educational attainment, the unemployed,handicapped and chronically ill. For all of thesemembers of society RSG wants to build a“future without insecurities.”

RSG aims at “raising the living [standard] of allpeople” with a policy platform that proposesmassive deficit spending to subsidize householdincome and - via increased private consumption- seeks to stimulate the economy. These areproposals taken from RSG’s website:

Abolishing the consumption tax, thuseffectively increasing real wages;Expanding affordable public housing;Waiving student loans for over fivemillion former recipients;Introducing a nationwide minimal hourlywage of Yen 1,500, guaranteed and

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subsidized by the state where necessary;Raising the minimum social securitybenefits to annually Yen 2 million perhousehold;Increasing the number of public officials;Subsidizing farm households to achieve afood self-sufficiency rate of 100%;Establishing a disaster preventionagency and employing experiencedmembers of NPOs;Creating a “new deal” for massiveinvestment in infrastructure;Paying Yen 30,000 monthly to everyperson during deflation until the inflationtarget of 2% is reached;Financing through new governmentbonds until 2% inflation target isreached, refinanced through increasedtax revenues;Enforcing “reasonable consideration” ofhandicapped citizens;

Campaign Speech22

RSG’s main campaign instruments were manydozens of small-scale, low-key speeches byYamamoto on street corners and in front oftrain stations all over Japan. In contrast tomany other candidates he did not talk to hisaudience from the top of a minivan or bus, butinstead stood at ground level and often in frontof a monitor used to project information

alongside his speech. Yamamoto began his one-hour long campaign speech in Matsue,Shimane prefecture, on 10 July 2019 bypresenting his diagnosis of what is wrong inJapan:

“In my six years in parliament I’ve seenthat issues regarding money are quicklydecided upon while issues regarding life(inochi) are hardly moved forward […]National politics is not conducted for you[his audience] but for corporations: big taxreductions for big companies and the rich,deregulation, and favors for the PrimeMinister’s friends. This violates theconstitution. The present government isnot a servant of all (zentai) but only of apart of it (ichibu). Result: The life of thepeople (hitobito) is going under. A newsurvey by the Ministry of Health, Laborand Welfare shows that 57.7% of allrespondents say their livelihood is tough(kurushii), 80% of single mothers say thesame, more than 60% of all householdsreport income below average, the worstnumber ever. You’ve all reached the limit.This situation has been caused by themistaken economic policies the LDP hasbeen pushing for the last 20 years.”

Yamamoto then presented the abolition of theconsumption tax as a first counter-measure:

“When the consumption tax was raised,the individual maximum tax rate and thecorporation tax were reduced. In otherwords: to allow corporations and the richto make more money, their taxes werereduced and the consumption tax had tobe ra ised to compensate . This i srampageous behavior (ranbō rōseki) […]The time has come for all of you to getangry. This is state run domesticviolence!”

According to RSG’s plan, the revenue tocompensate for the abolished consumption taxwould come from a higher maximum tax rate

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and from income tax on all income, includingstock profits. Yamamoto also explained hisproposal for a progressive corporate tax.

The second part of his speech was dedicated toanother major policy proposal: a nationwideminimum hourly wage of Yen 1,500 whichYamamoto also presented as an effectivemeasure to revitalize rural regions (likeShimane prefecture). People would not have tomove to the urban regions and “live a toughcity life”. Small companies, unable to pay Yen1,500, would be supported by state subsidies.

Yamamoto continued with an appeal to those“40% who have given up on politics” to supporthis movement, if only for the fact that he andhis fellow candidates would “make politicsintriguing because we can start fights aboutwhat is going on in Nagatachō and tell youabout it.”23 He promised to act in“puzzlinglycomplicated” (yayakoshii) way and not toobserve the unwritten rules of standardparliamentary behavior (kūki ga yomanai). “Nomatter how disillusioned you are, please do notsurrender the control over politics. We can turna world in which you only want to die, into aworld in which you want to live.”

Yamamoto also explained that RSG put Funagoand Kimura on the top positions of the party listfor their experience leading a handicapped life,stressing RSG’s fight against a marketisation ofhuman beings: “If we allow a world in whichthe value of people is measured by theirproductivity, it will lead to a world that will puta time-limit on life. I want a society in whichpeople with disabilities are valued and notdiscarded. I want a society in which you can tryover and over again to make things right.” Heconcluded this part with a few statistics tomake his point: “One in seven children lives inpoverty. One in three single mothers lives inpoverty as does one in five senior citizens. Weneed to stop this. What this country needs islove and money for all of you (minna san he noai to kane).”

After being told by an assistant that there wassti l l some time remaining, Yamamotoelaborated on his plans to restore dignity tomany senior citizens whose pension isinsufficient and who need to apply foradditional social benefits. Yamamoto explainedthat RSG proposes to replace the pensionsystem and the “livelihood protection system”(seikatsu hogo seido = social security benefits)with a “livelihood compensation system”(seikatsu hoshō seido) that kicks in earlier thanthe present system and targets all those whoneed support by subsidizing rent and food.

Yamamoto continued his speech by apologizingfor the rough and incomplete ideas. He told hisaudience that he needs to be educated by themand that over his six years as member of theUpper House he had been counselled by manycitizens. Then he added: “Let’s change thingstogether. […] I surely don’t want you to give upon this. Those of you disinterested in politics:Just give it a shot once. Those of you whodislike politics, give it a shot just once. Thisproject is definitely intriguing. Let’s make iteven more intriguing!”

He then explained ways to support RSG andasked for donations, describing what RSGwould do with this money. Yamamoto thenended his speech by saying: “It’s not politicianswho move this country. It’s every single oneliving in this country. The Prime Minister is onthe level of a hired shop manager of thiscountry. The owner of this country is you. Youare its stakeholders; all of you are controllingit. I want to be at the center of this, I want tobe the vanguard of this. Please let me go on arampage in parliament with a party created byall of you!”

“Chat Meeting”24

On 9 February 2020, Yamamoto concluded atour of all 47 prefectures with a “chat meeting”(oshaberi kai) in Ōgaki, a city of about 160,000

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inhabitants in Gifu prefecture. After anintroductory video, Yamamoto began by takingquestions from two journalists.25 In reply to aninquiry whether there will be RSG candidatesrunning in Gifu, Yamamoto explained RSG’splans for the coming general election, usingslides on the video-screen. As mentioned above,RSG intended to run between 100 and 131candidates in SMDs, selecting the electoraldistricts primarily according to the number ofvotes received in each district during the UpperHouse election (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Breakdown of Support for LowerHouse Candidates. Total 100 - 131Persons.

(Source: Town-hall meeting of Yamamoto Tarōin Ōgaki, Gifu prefecture, on February 9,2020)26

According to Yamamoto, the eventual numberof candidates depends on three major factors.First, the Public Office Election Law requires adeposit of Yen 6 million for each candidate.27

Given the other costs of a campaign, at leastYen 2 billion are required for 100 candidates,making RSG highly dependent on politicaldonations. Secondly, each individual candidateshould be from the respective region and ableto spend at least the last three months beforethe election mostly working the streets of theirelectoral district and campaigning. Third, asufficient local support setup for each

candidate is indispensable.

After 17 minutes, Yamamoto began takingquestions from a total of 18 citizens, sometimesconsulting a tablet computer on his lectern tobetter understand the specifics of a questionand often using content of RSG’s policyplatform in his replies. The following list showsall topics in original order that they were raisedby an audience clearly keen to hear many morecomments from Yamamoto:

Funding gap in social security starting in2040 with the retirement of the secondbaby-boomer generation;Lack of transparency in handling ofgeneral and special state budgets;Japan’s dependence on US military;Election financing of RSG;Extending RSG’s party structure to thesubnational level;“Spy prevention law” (Law to preventespionage targeting state secrets);Energy policyConsequences of abolishing theconsumption tax;Employment situation of employees inpublic libraries;Cost of winning a seat in parliament;Counter-measures against low voterturnout;Revitalization of rural regions;Working conditions of local teachers;Plea to run a candidate in Gifu’s 1st SMDagainst Noda Seiko (LDP);What can be done against this badgovernment?W h y d o e s n o o n e h a v e t o t a k eresponsibility for their misdeeds?Target group of RSG policies;RSG’s stance re. a guaranteed basicincome;Patriotic content of history classes atschool;

Toward the end of the Q&A, a 12-year-old boyasked Yamamoto for advice on how to become

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a politician. Yamamoto answered by recallinghis own path into politics and suggesting thatthe will to change things may be a similaritybetween him and the boy. “I’m waiting foryou!”, Yamamoto said before then laying outhis plans for the financing of his policies andoccasionally asking for a show of hands to getfeedback for his ideas.

He closed the event by offering a party posterto each attendee (“Please consider putting thison the wall of your house.”), inviting hisaudience members to join RSG as a volunteer,introducing two of his books,28 pointing to theopen call for candidates on RSG’s website,explaining how to donate (“Only as much asyou can reasonably afford.”), how to avoid themany legal pitfalls of political donations (“Donot simply transfer the donation to our bankaccount!”), asking for volunteers to stack upthe chairs of the venue, excepting those whowanted to take a picture with him (“Pleaseremain seated!”), and finally rushing to the exitto personally hand every attendee his namecard.

In contrast to his outdoor speeches, Yamamotospoke very matter-of-factly and without muchof the emotion and intensity displayed in hiscampaign appearances. The attacks against theLDP and the government were comparativelymeek, both in terms of language and content.Since the open and unprepared questions oftenled Yamamoto in not too familiar territory, hesometimes even apologized for his ignorance(e.g. when asked about the “spy preventionlaw”). After more than two hours Yamamotobegan to explain why Japan cannot gobankrupt, showing a number of slides packedwith text and graphs, again apologizing fortalking so long. Judging from a dialogue withan assistant standing off-stage, only a time-limitforced him to end his presentation after 2h 45m.

Is Reiwa Shinsengumi a Populist Party?

If we adopt an ideational approach, RSG doesnot fit the definitional criteria of populism eventhough there is some overlap.29 While populistsportray “the people” as the homogeneous,(morally) pure majority of a polity, RSG’saddressees are referred to as “every single oneliving in this country” and “the owners” of thecountry, those who are mobilized to regaincontrol over politics. It may be a signifier of aleft populism that a term like “(we) Japanese”(wareware nihonjin) is not used. Instead,(potential) voters are addressed as “persons”(hitobito), “every single one” (hitori hitori),“you” (anata) or “all of you” (minna san).

Two other aspects also do not match thepopulist image of “the people”. For one, thereis no complete “purity”. In RSG’s view, thereason why “the owners” are not taking theirdemocratic position as sovereign is that “morethan 40% have given up on politics”. Whilethere is sympathy for this attitude, RSG framesit as a civic duty to be politically informed andengaged. Yamamoto explicitly rejects the ideaof praising people simply for voting if they arenot sufficiently informed and admonishes hisaudience to use their power to improve “the

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quality of politics”.

Secondly, in spite of its mission statement to“serve all the people living in this country”,RSG c lear ly focusses on weaker anddisadvantaged members of society. This focusmay have a much stronger effect in terms ofidentity building than the rhetoric regarding ashared country and it does not include thoseJapanese doing wel l economical ly orprofessionally. In other words, RSG’s rhetoricdoes not address a “homogeneous people”.

In addition, the enemy image of a “corruptelite” or “corrupt establishment” is not part ofRSG’s texts either. Of course, criticism isdirected at the ruling LDP,30 its economic policyand “Nagatachō”, but this rather remainswithin the bounds of standard political rhetoric.Keidanren, Japan’s Business Federation, isportrayed as an external actor to politicaldecision making that manages to influencepolicies and is rewarded for being politicallyinvolved.

Another missing element of the ideationalconcept of populism is “the will of the people”which is never evoked. Instead, RSG offers aset of policies to create a humane society, tofight against the marketisation of human life,and to restore respect and dignity of allmembers of society by, among others,supporting those in need financially. This set ofpolicies is well summarized by Yamamoto’sstatement: “What this country needs is love andmoney for all of you.”

As a consequence of the above there is neithera Manichean antagonism nor any anti-pluralistor illiberal element in RSG’s texts. Yamamotoespecially argues for inclusion of minorities andweak members of society. Even though politicaland economic power brokers and decisionmakers are being criticized for their policies,they are not referred to as “foes” or “enemiesof the people”. There is no “us vs. them”.Yamamoto even expressed understanding foryounger Liberal Democrats who do not dare to

speak up against their seniors or the PrimeMinister. Yamamoto also explained that he willnot touch the “internal reserves” (naibu ryūho)that corporations were able to set aside usinglegal opportunities.

RSG does not draw on any host-ideology either.On the contrary, the idea of ideology isconspicuously absent from its rhetoric. There isno discussion of socialism, of anti-capitalist oranti-system ideas. Even though many of RSG’sproposals fit Keynesian economic policiesKeynes isn’t part of the texts. Even morelimited concepts like “middle class” or termscommon in Japanese discourse like kakusashakai (social inequalities) are missing. Thereis very little in terms of abstract concepts to befound but mostly real-life narratives andexamples for the grievances of RSG’s targetgroups.31

The absence of abstract ideological terminologyin its political communication seems partly aresult of RSG’s origin within NPOs active insocial work and Yamamoto’s experience withinthese circles. Remarkably, Yamamoto hassucceeded in creating a nation-wide network,overcoming a hurdle that many Japanese socialand cit izens’ movements fai l to take,movements that remain on the local level withvery little public recognition. At the same time,RSG neither seeks office in subnationalparliaments nor is it building a formal partyorganization below the national level.32

RSG is focused on a limited set of policy fields,all of which promise a direct impact on thelivelihood of the party’s target groups. At thesame time, RSG’s ideas stay strictly within theboundaries of Japan’s socio-economic system.There is no reference to rising socialinequalities in other industrialized countries oran international comparison that wouldbroaden the perspective beyond Japan’s woesand ident i fy s imi lar pat terns in thedevelopment of capitalist societies in general.As RSG is still a very young political party these

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limitations may change with time. For now,however, RSG can best be understood as anational-level, social activists’ movement with aprominent leader and as a new addition toJapan’s fluid and fragmented opposition camp.

Conclusion

In th is paper I noted the conceptualheterogeneity in populism studies on Japan andargued for an ideational approach in order tomake the case of Japan more accessible tocomparative efforts and use the “coherentwealth of research” (Rovira Kaltwasser,Taggart et al. 2017: 1) on populism availablefrom the international political sciencecommunity. Given the increasing attention paidto the phenomenon, I also proposed to usemature European democracies as promisingoptions for comparative studies due to theirmany systemic similarities with Japan. Thealternative, it seems, is to argue for a widevariety of populisms and consequently definingone or more particularly Japanese categories.The price for this approach, however, may beas high as insulating research on Japan fromthe international community.

While there is an obvious benefit in pointingout the overlap between populism andempirical phenomena in Japan’s political arena,confusion looms large if the concept isrendered overly inclusive. Such a conceptualoverstretch seems imminent, for example, ifsome of populism’s core defining criteria areonly cursorily applied or left aside. Theproblem can be easily illustrated by juxtaposingKoizumi Jun’ichirō and Viktor Orbán, TominFirst and the Rassemblement National (until2018 known as Front National), or All Okinawaand Lega Nord, all of which are manifestationsof populism according to one or more of theabove-mentioned studies. Comparisons of thesepairs, however, promise only limited theoreticalinsights because of their substantialdifferences.

Finally, it is not only Reiwa Shinsengumi thatdoes not fit the label of populism. A cursoryview through the ideational lens at the politicalarena in Japan only detects traces of populismhere and there but no consistently populistparty. This finding raises the next question:Why is there none? After all, some of thecauses for the surge of populism identified instudies on other democracies can also be foundin Japan. The list includes political corruption,growing social inequalities, economic andf inancia l cr ises , negat ive ef fects ofglobalization, external shocks like the 2011disasters, and political frustration among largeparts of the population. Maybe populism is alate-comer to Japan and will develop when themany challenges of demographic change beareven s tronger on Japanese soc iety?Comprehensive studies on populist attitudesamong Japanese voters could provide importantanswers to this question.33

The dynamics and institutions that shapeJapan’s party system offer another promisingavenue for research. After all, it’s not only thenon-existence of a populist party thatdistinguishes Japan’s party system from that ofother parliamentary democracies but also theabsence of a green party, a competitivepolitical left or any strong oppositional force,for that matter. Some potential explanationscome to mind, among them: The enormouscosts of entry into the political arena areclearly prohibitive for many who may otherwiserun for office. The “catch-all” LDP may be justtoo absorbing to allow other parties to thrive.Prime Minister Abe himself, although verymuch a member of the political gentry of thecountry, has repeatedly displayed disdain forother elites like liberal journalists or scholars,possibly serving populist demands amongJapanese voters to a degree that prevents right-wing groups from growing. Should Japanindeed be immune to populism, a comparativeapproach with Europe seems all the morepromising to understand why. Given therelevance of the phenomenon for democracies

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political science should consider pursuing thispath more extensively in the future.

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Axel Klein, PhD is a political scientists and full professor of Modern East Asian Studies andJapanese Politics at Duisburg-Essen University (Germany). Before taking his present position,he worked as Senior Research Fellow at the German Institute for Japanese Studies in Tokyo

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(2007-2011), focusing on election campaigning, demographic change and the relationship ofpolitics and organized religion in Japan. Among others, he has produced a documentary filmon Japanese elections (“Pictures at an Election”, 2008), conducted extensive field research inthe country and is an expert on the political party Kōmeitō.

Notes1 I’m very grateful to Airo Hino, Barbara Holthus, Kerstin Lukner, Steven R. Reed and TessaMorris-Suzuki for their important and helpful comments on previous versions of this paper.2 Reiwa refers to the era name under Emperor Naruhito (2019- ), Shinsengumi (新選組) is aKanji pun on a group of Samurai (新撰組) in the late Edo period (see below). Note that RSGdoes not use the Kanji for Reiwa but only Hiragana.3 Lindgren (2015: 579-580) continues: “It consists of several books and articles concernedmostly with Koizumi, but also with contributions on Hashimoto and Ishihara.”4 Ōtake based his concept on what US historian Michael Kazin (1995) had written about USpopulism.5 Burrett 2019, Hellmann 2017, Soris 2019;6 For this brief review I use four of the only seven academic articles found by a search intitles, abstracts and keywords for “populis* AND Japan” in SCOPUS, JSTOR and “Web ofScience” since 2014. The other three articles are not suited for this purpose: Lindgren (2015)summarizes the state of the field, Smith (2019) studies “online representational practices ofanti-minority political activist groups”, and Lind (2018) sets out to explain “Why PopulismMissed Japan”.7 The election system of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly is not presidential but single non-transferable voting in multi-member districts. The authors argue, however, that theirapproach is justified because all “the TFP candidates rode on Koike’s coattails to win seats.”(Hieda et al. 2019: 5)8 Kirk Hawkins (2010) in his study on Venezuela proposed an approach that measures populistdiscourse on a numerical scale.9 All Okinawa was largely driven by a single issue (opposing the central government’s policieson US military facilities).10 Cf. source 1; source 2; (Accessed: March 2020)11 Cf. Yamamoto’s campaign speech (Accessed: March 2020)12 Cf. source (Accessed: March 2020)13 Yamamoto also talked about his political beginnings in a video produced by “Labor VideoProject” which features English subtitles (Accessed: March 2020)14 Cf. source (Accessed: March 2020)15 Ozawa’s party needed a fifth member to fulfill the criteria for a parliamentary group in theUpper House.16 The election system for the Upper House allows Japanese citizens everywhere to either votefor the party or pick a candidate from the party’s list. Starting in 2019, political groups wereallowed to add a “designated frame” (tokuteiwaku) to the top of their open party list. Thiscreated the option to put certain candidates on high list positions irrespective of the number

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of votes cast for them personally. In fact, personal votes for these candidates were counted asparty votes, not as personal votes.17 The speech can be reviewed here (Accessed: March 2020). Kōmeitō’s leader Yamaguchicame in second, winning more votes than ever before (815,445).18 Cf. source (Accessed: March 2020)19 On February 9, 2020, RSG reported 599 applications, see here (Accessed: Feb 2020)20 The party declaration is available here; the policy platform here (Accessed: February 2020);RSG’s official NHK campaign video (seiken hōsō) featured very similar contents (Accessed:Feb. 2020);21 Those Japanese who graduated from school and university during the economic downturn ofthe 1990s, facing fewer employment opportunities and often being unable to find regular full-time positions (presently the cohort of 35-45 year olds).22 July 10, 2019, in Shimane, available here (Accessed: Feb. 2020). This speech isrepresentative of many other campaign speeches by Yamamoto.23 Nagatachō is the part of Tokyo that is host to parliament and party headquarters.24 Cf. source (Accessed: February 2020)25 One from a local newspaper and one freelancer.26 Screenshot from video (Accessed: March 2020)27 In fact, the legally required deposit (kyōtakukin) for a candidacy in an SMD is not 6 but 3million Yen. However, running in SMD and on the party list simultaneously doubles thedeposit for a single candidate. Therefore, Yamamoto may have misspoken or assumed that allRSG candidates will run in SMDs and on the party list.28 One book (Yamamoto 2019a) entitled “Even I could be an MoP” [Boku ni mo dekita! kokkaigiin] recalls his term as Upper House member, the second book (Yamamoto 2019b) is called“I want to make you happy“ [Anata wo shiawase ni shitain da!] and is meant to explain“everything about RSG”.29 RSG would not qualify as populist under the political-strategic concept either as a closereading of Weyland (2017) shows.30 Kōmeitō, the junior coalition partner, is not mentioned once in this regard.31 Kōmeitō uses a similar plain rhetoric in addressing concerns of its voters. Like RSG Kōmeitōwas created outside of parliament and with an economically weak clientele as target group(cf. Ehrhardt, Klein et al. 2014).32 This approach resembles that of the Happiness Realization Party (kōfuku jitsugentō) which,as a complete newcomer founded by a New Religion, entered the 2009 general election with amassive investment and 288 candidates in SMDs. Continuously failing to win a single seat atnational elections the party changed its strategy and decided to grow bottom-up, increasinglypushing candidates in local elections.33 Airo Hino, Sebastian Jungkunz and Robert Fahey are working on a study looking atexplanatory power and problems of measuring populist attitudes. Hieda, Zenkyo andNishikawa (2019) were mentioned above as another group of scholars conducting empiricalresearch on populism in Japan. Finally, a new research project at Tokyo’s Sophia Universityand Duisburg-Essen University, Germany, will join this as of now small research community.