issn 1010-9536 - bangladesh institute of international … 1010-9536 277 strengthening...

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STRENGTHENING BANGLADESH-INDIA COOPERATION

Volume 35Number 4

2014

ISSN 1010-9536

277 Strengthening Bangladesh-India Rice Seeds Cooperation: Bangladesh Perspective

Mahfuz Kabir

299 The New Government in India and India’s Neighbourhood Policy: Continuity or Change?

Monzima Haque

321 Humanitarian Intervention: Finding out Its Human Security Implications Abul Kalam Azad

Md. Fazlul Halim

338 TRIPS-Plus as a Tool for Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: Implications for Developing Countries Mohammad Atique Rahman

360 Skilled Labour Migration from Developing Countries: Causes and Consequences

Riad Khan Anas Khan Mohammad Mohabbat Khan Mohammad Habibur Rahman

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VOLUME 35

Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic StudiesDhaka

NUMBER 4 OCTOBER 2014

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this Journal are solely of the authors and do not re�ect the o�cial policy or position of Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS).

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TABLE OF CONTENT

VOLUME 35 NUMBER 4 OCTOBER 2014

Mahfuz KabirStrengthening Bangladesh-India Rice Seeds Cooperation: Bangladesh Perspective 277

Monzima HaqueThe New Government in India and India’s Neighbourhood Policy: Continuity or Change? 299

Abul Kalam AzadMd. Fazlul HalimHumanitarian Intervention: Finding out Its Human Security Implications 321

Mohammad Atique RahmanTRIPS-Plus as a Tool for Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: Implications for Developing Countries 338

Riad Khan Anas KhanMohammad Mohabbat KhanMohammad Habibur RahmanSkilled Labour Migration from Developing Countries:Causes and Consequences 360

277

BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014: 277-298

Mahfuz Kabir

STRENGTHENING BANGLADESH-INDIA RICE SEEDS COOPERATION: BANGLADESH PERSPECTIVE

Abstract

This paper is an attempt to understand the prospect for strengthening rice seeds cooperation between Bangladesh and India in modern varieties. Both the countries are trying to achieve food security through improvements in rice production, marketing, and research and development in rice seeds. Bangladesh and four states of eastern India belong to similar agro-climatic zone where rice is overwhelmingly placed as a major staple food. However, due to absence of policy and regulatory barriers to rice seeds trade in modern varieties, there are anecdotal evidences of informal flow of rice seeds across the border, which is risky for both producers and consumers. The paper finds that there is a notable presence of informal cross-border trade of many varieties of rice seeds in three bordering districts in Bangladesh. The paper suggests some doable measures to strengthen rice seeds cooperation between the two countries through, inter alia, trade formalisation, making use of SAARC seed bank, joint research and release of new modern varieties, and harmonising standards and certification procedures.

1. Introduction

With declining agricultural land and increasing population, food production is gaining the utmost importance. Farmers of Bangladesh and India cultivate varieties which are traded informally between the two countries. There is a need to formalise seed trade to meet farmers’ demand for quality seed input. Similar agro-climatic condition and food habits in Bangladesh and four eastern Indian states, viz. West Bengal, Odisha, Bihar and Jharkhand, allow a wide range of possibilities for bilateral cooperation. Rice being a staple food in both the countries offers plenty of scope for cooperation and collaboration. It would open up a window of opportunities in agricultural cooperation in much broader context in bilateral or multilateral form.

Seeds influence and direct entire agricultural scenario of a country as the most vital agricultural input. As staple food of Bangladesh, rice exerts considerable influence in determining socio-political-economic realities of Bangladesh as illustrated in World Bank report titled “Bangladesh: Rice is Life”.1 Rice contributes about one-third and

Mahfuz Kabir, Ph. D is Senior Research Fellow at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), Dhaka. His e-mail address is: [email protected]. The author is grateful to Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and CUTS International for supporting the paper and Unnayan Shamannay for undertaking field investigation in Bangladesh. The earlier version of the paper was presented at the International Conference on “Addressing Barriers to Rice Seeds Trade between India and Bangladesh”, BRAC Centre Inn, Dhaka, 22 December 2013; and seminars in Delhi, Kolkata and Jaipur in India in 2013 and 2014 organised by Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and CUTS International. © Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2014. 1 World Bank Report, available at http://www.worldbank.org/html/cgiar/newsletter/june97/9bang.html, accessed on 20 October 2014.

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two-thirds of calorie intake in India and Bangladesh, respectively. Rice production has undergone significant transformation in past few decades, which has been heavily dependent on and regulated by government. It has almost quadrupled in the last four decades at much higher rate than population growth, which helped Bangladesh attain self-dependency in food production in the face of decreasing land availability and adverse natural and economic shocks.

Graduation from traditional varieties to modern techniques and high yielding varieties (HYV) made farmers more dependent on inputs. Bangladesh is pursuing high input and high output agricultural policy, which opens up opportunities for supplying agricultural input to farmers by private enterprises. Agricultural input market is gradually becoming market-oriented through involvement of private for-profit sector, donor communities and NGO activities beside government intervention.

Against this backdrop, it is widely perceived that there are significant potentials for enhancing rice seed trade between Bangladesh and India, especially the four eastern Indian states mentioned above. This opportunity stems mainly from past market dominance of Indian seeds, similar agro-climatic condition and cost advantage over alternative options. It is assumed that Bangladesh can benefit in exporting rice seeds to India for Boro season and importing from India for Aus and Aman seasons by utilising their respective comparative advantages. The benefit would be extended to greater cooperation beyond seeds trade for attaining further mutual gain. The focus of this paper is, therefore, on understanding of rice seed sector and exploring the barriers and potential of seed trade between the two countries.

The rest of this paper has been organised as follows. Section 2 undertakes a comparative analysis of rice production and yield performance in Bangladesh and India, and Bangladesh’s import of rice seeds along with some discussion of policy and regulations pertaining to seed trade. Section 3 presents the findings of a primary field study to understand the nature and extent of cross-border informal flow of rice seeds between Bangladesh and India which needs to be formalised. Section 4 identifies the barriers of trade and issues related to trade facilitation for formal movement of rice seeds. Finally, concluding remarks and some doable policy options have been suggested in Section 5 to strengthen cooperation in rice seeds trade between the two countries.

2. Rice Cultivation and Seed Sector

2.1 Rice Cultivation in Bangladesh

In Bangladesh the rice-growing environment has been classified into three major ecosystems based on physiographic characteristics and land types. These ecosystems are (a) irrigated, (b) rain-fed, and (c) floating or deep water. The rain-fed ecosystem has been further classified as rain-fed lowland and rain-fed upland. Thus,

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all rice varieties cultivated in the country are grouped into five distinct ecotypes, such as (a) Boro, (b) Transplanted Aus (T. Aus), (c) Transplanted Aman (T. Aman), (d) Upland Aus (direct-seeded Aus), and (e) Deep water rice (floating rice). Boro rice is grown completely under irrigated ecosystem during the dry period (November to July) while T. Aman (during July to December), T. Aus (during April to August) and Upland Aus (during March to July) are cultivated under rain-fed ecosystem. Similar to India, there are three seasons for rice cultivation in Bangladesh, namely Aus, Aman and Boro. Aman is the highest rice production season.

Table 1: Trend of Rice Production in Bangladesh2

YearAus Aman Boro

Average MV %MV* % % of pro-

ductionMV %

% of pro-duction MV % % of pro-

duction

2001-02 36.20 11.65 50.73 52.97 94.64 35.38 64.57

2002-03 37.52 11.55 51.71 52.76 95.37 35.70 65.66

2003-04 37.60 11.11 52.59 52.46 94.72 36.43 66.27

2004-05 44.01 9.88 55.04 50.92 95.38 39.19 69.76

2005-06 49.97 9.82 58.82 51.56 95.72 38.62 72.20

2006-07 53.04 8.57 61.61 51.23 96.80 40.20 75.02

2007-08 61.01 8.69 67.38 47.74 97.27 43.57 79.85

2008-09 64.72 9.45 67.32 48.74 97.41 41.81 79.65

2009-10 65.79 8.67 66.63 49.88 97.72 41.45 79.44

2010-11 71.62 9.65 69.15 48.97 98.95 41.38 81.72*MV= Modern Varieties

The trend of rice production in Boro season has been increasing over time. Adoption of modern varieties seed is increasing and 98.95 per cent of the seeds in Boro season are modern varieties. On average, use of modern varieties (MV) is 81.72 per cent. Aus, Aman and Boro have 6.6, 38 and 54 per cent share of total rice production respectively.3 Boro is found to be the most productive season having the highest average yield of country. Therefore, Aus and Aman have the potential for adopting new varieties. However, newspaper citing statistics from Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE) reported 41 and 39 per cent decrease in acreage and production of hybrid rice, respectively, over the last five years despite various promotional activities by the government.

2 Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh 2012, Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, Government of Bangladesh, 2013.3 Finance Division, Bangladesh Economic Review 2014, Dhaka: Ministry of Finance, Government of Bangladesh, 2014.

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From a farm level survey, it has been found that in 2004 Aman season, Swarna, an Indian variety was the second-most dominant variety primarily cultivated in districts bordering West Bengal despite having lower yield (3.79t/ha). The most dominant variety was BR11 (3.92t/ha) developed in 1981 which possess several desirable features for farmers like weed competitiveness or milling recovery. In Boro season, popular varieties are BRRI dhan-28 (5.11t/ha), BRRI dhan-29 (6.13t/ha), IR8 (5.99t/ha), BR8 (5.71t/ha), BINA 6 (5.38t/ha). BRRI dhan-28 gained popularity because of its shorter life cycle. It is matured in 2-3 weeks lesser time compared to other varieties. Indian varieties imported through informal exchange across the border were also grown in the Boro season. The most important of these varieties are Ratna, Bhajan, Miniket, Parija, Nayanmoni and Jaya. They were cultivated in nearly 9 per cent of the total Boro season area in 2005. They gained popularity because of their shorter maturity (Parija), drought tolerance (Nayonmoni), and superior grain quality (Miniket). The highest yielding variety was Bhajan with a yield of 5.99 t/ha. The highest number of varieties is cultivated in Aus season. Most of the varieties cultivated in this season were released for Boro season and have 1.5t/ha lower yield compared to Boro season.4

2.2 Season-wise Production of Rice in India

There are three seasons for growing rice in India, viz. autumn, winter and summer. These three seasons are named according to the season of harvest of the crop. Autumn rice is known as pre-kharif rice. The sowing of pre-kharif rice is taken up during May to August. However, the time of sowing slightly differs from state to state according to weather condition and rainfall pattern. It is harvested in September-October. Autumn rice crop is known as Aus in West Bengal, Beali in Odisha and Bhadai in Bihar. About 7 per cent crop is grown in this season. The varieties grown during this season are mostly varieties of short duration ranging from 90 to 110 days.

The main rice growing season in the country is the kharif. It is known as winter rice as per the harvesting time. The sowing time of winter (kharif) rice is June-July and it is harvested in November-December. Winter rice is known as Aman in West Bengal, Sarrad in Odisha, and Agahani in Bihar. About 84 per cent of the country’s rice is grown in this season and medium to long duration varieties are generally cultivated in this season.

Summer rice is called as Rabi in India. It is known as Boro in Assam and West Bengal, Dalua in Odissa, and Garma in Bihar. The sowing time of summer rice is November to February and harvesting time is March to June. The area under cultivation of summer rice is only 9 per cent of total area and early maturing varieties are mostly grown in this season.

4 M. Hossain, W. M. H. Jaim, M. S. Alam and A. M. Rahman, Rice Biodiversity in Bangladesh, Dhaka: BRAC Research and Evaluation Division, 2013.

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2.3 Comparative Yield of Rice

Yield varies significantly according to seasons from 1.45t/ha to 6t/ha. Yield of the four eastern Indian states is also low. Being an important factor, quality of seed that farmers can control can significantly increase production. Also, modern varieties are developed suitable for irrigation system, focusing less on rain-fed system.

Bangladesh is experiencing higher yield rate of rice than that of India and it is around the world average for the last 6-7 years. In the Asian continent, Japan is in remarkable position for efficient rice production. Japan’s yield rate is almost double compared to both the countries.

Figure 1: Trend of Rice Yield5

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Tons

per

hec

tare

s

World Japan India Bangladesh

Figure 1: Trend of Rice Yield5

According to International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), seed is a living product that must be grown, harvested and processed correctly to maximise its viability and subsequent crop productivity.6 It is always emphasised that good quality seed must be sown for optimum yield potential of any rice variety. Good/quality seed can increase yields by 5 to 20 per cent. Using good seed leads to lower seeding rates, higher crop emergence, reduced replanting, more uniform plant standard and more vigorous early crop growth. Vigorous growth in early stages reduces weed problems and increases crop resistance to insect pests and diseases. All of these factors contribute to higher yields and more productive rice farms.

5 International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), World Rice Statistics 2013, Manila: IRRI, 2013.6 Ibid.

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2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

2000

-01

2001

-02

2002

-03

2003

-04

2004

-05

2005

-06

2006

-07

2007

-08

2010

-11Yi

eld

per H

ecta

re (M

T)

World Bangladesh India

Figure 2: Trend of Paddy Yields (on Un-Milled Basis)7

Bangladesh’s rice yield is close to the world average. Rice yield per hectare in Bangladesh is not very low in comparison to the world, whereas rice yield per hectare in India is much lower than that of the world. The position of eastern Indian states is similar to India’s position compared to the world average. Low rice yield in the four eastern Indian states is not a new phenomenon; it was very low even in the 1970s.

Certain portion of the total seed used in the country is replaced every year by quality seed through organised supply. The percentage of this replaced portion against total seed use is called Seed Replacement Rate (SRR). The country with higher seed replacement rate will be experiencing higher yield than that of the others.

Table 2: Seed Replacement Rate in Bangladesh and Eastern Indian States8

Year Bangladesh IndiaOdisha West Bengal Bihar Jharkhand

2001 - 9.59 22.00 6.33 -2002 - 5.57 23.00 6.87 -2003 - 6.13 25.00 6.8 -2004 - 4.73 25.30 10 -2005 - 6.83 25.50 12 -2006 24.70 6.4 26 12 -2007 38.6 12.04 26.5 15 -2008 39 14.8 28 19 14.252009 - - - - -2010 47.39 - - - -- indicates that data is unavailable.

7 CUTS International, Dynamics of Rice Seed Trade: Need for Cooperation between India and Bangladesh, Jaipur, 2013; United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, 2012-13; Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, 2012-13; and Ministry of Agriculture, Government of Bangladesh, 2012-13. Conversion rate for milled to un-milled rice was used as 1kg of un-milled produces 0.6 kg of milled.8 Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India; Ministry of Agriculture, Government of Bangladesh; Bangladesh Seed Grower, Dealer and Merchants’ Association (BSGDMA) 2007 for 2005/06 and Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC) 2011 for 2007/08.

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2.4 Bangladesh’s Hybrid Rice Seeds Trade with India and China

Bangladesh is a net rice seed importer with an estimated import market size of US$5.9 million in 2010-11. It imports 90 per cent of its total imports of hybrid rice seeds from China, though importing it from India would cost the country far less. However, the country imports fruits, maize and vegetables seeds from India. China meets more than 90 per cent of rice seed orders from Bangladesh. India’s exports to Bangladesh remain negligible, accounting for less than 3 per cent of its total exports.

Bi-directional informal seed flows between Bangladesh and India are evident. Formal trade can lead to win-win situation for both countries. Bangladesh has around 65 varieties of HYV rice, of these BR11, BRRI Dhan-28 and BRRI Dhan-29 are found to be quite popular in Indian states. Assam Agricultural University has requested BRRI to provide seed of BR-29 as this variety is suitable for cultivation in Assam. Recently, Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC) has exported 40 kg of SL-8H hybrid seed to India which will be cultivated experimentally.

There is also scope for introducing submergence, salt and stress tolerant varieties in both the countries. Indian varieties Miniket, Swarna, Sampa and Parija are found popular in border and other regions of Bangladesh. Although India is a net seed exporting country, Bihar, Odisha, Jharkhand and West Bengal are seed deficit and are characterised by lower level of SRR compared to that of Bangladesh. States like Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra are major sources of HYV rice seeds to these states.

9 Trade Map Database, International Trade Centre, 2013, available at www.trademap.org/Index.aspx, accessed on 19 December 2013.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

China’s Export to BangladeshIndia’s Export to Bangladesh

Figure 3: Bangladesh’s Hybrid Rice Seed Imports from India and China9

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2.5 Demand and Supply

Shortage is found in rice seed even after private sector involvement. According to BADC (2011), 39 per cent of demand was met in 2010-11. Of this supply BADC provided 40 per cent, DAE 44 per cent and private sector accounted for 16 per cent. Supply of seed, although lower than required amount, is close to demand in Boro season. The deficit is staggering in Aus and Aman seasons when only 13 and 24 per cent of demand could be met, respectively for 2009-10. The total deficit stood at 180,890 M. Ton in 2009-10.10

Import of hybrid seeds by private sector was far less than governments permitted amount in 2010-11 (3,945 tons versus permitted 8530 tons) while private sector production has been growing. Recently, some companies received permission to export more than 500 MT of hybrid rice seeds to Vietnam, Indonesia and Pakistan. BADC has long term strategy regarding rice seed production and supply targeting to provide 62 per cent of rice seed requirement by 2021. Still there is scope for private sector involvement.

Aus constitutes of small amount of rice production while Boro makes up overwhelming majority of rice production. Greater access to foundation/certified seed can significantly increase yield and production. By no means is the potential increase in countrywide production small considering the portion of farmers’ preserved seed usage.

On the other hand, Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha and West Bengal had 425,723 quintals of excess certified paddy seed in 2013 kharif season. Despite surplus availability of rice seed varieties in the four eastern Indian states, none of the four states are self-sufficient with regard to local production except Bihar. In Jharkhand, Odisha and West Bengal, only 17, 73 and 83 per cent demand is met, respectively. Jharkhand and Odisha have no private sector involvement in rice seed.

HYV and hybrid seeds are the dominant varieties. Hybrid seeds generally entail higher production cost along with higher yield compared with HYV. However, the unit value of cost of seeds import from China is around five times of that from India. It is perceived that bilateral seed trade between Bangladesh and India can create win-win situation for both countries.

Bangladesh does not allow direct import of HYV seeds. There is mechanism for importing parent seed and distributing it through replicating in Bangladesh for enterprises. Bangladesh’s current seed market is of US$261 million. While 64 per cent of this belongs to HYV, the rest is hybrid.11 There is a paucity of data regarding seed import of different varieties and seasons.10 Hemant Pullabhotla and A. Ganesh Kumar, “Review of Input and Output Policies for Cereal Production in Bangladesh”, Discussion Paper 01199, Washington, D. C.: IFPRI, July 2012. 11 CUTS International, op. cit.

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2.6 Policy, Regulations and Regulatory Bodies

Seed law is the principal legal instrument of seed flow and trade in Bangladesh. The Seed Act 2013 has been drafted and will be enforced in near future to replace the Seeds Ordinance 1977 which has recently been cancelled through a Supreme Court verdict. There is a national seed policy effective from 2003. Seed Certification Agency (SCA) was established through SCA Establishment Gazette, 1974. Seed import is also subject to Plant Quarantine Act, 2010 and Destructive Insects and Pests Act, 1914. Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) measures are used rarely in Bangladesh.

Importing seeds to Bangladesh requires an import permit which is issued by the Plant Protection Wing of the DAE under the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and a phyto-sanitary certificate provided by the exporting country is required. Quality certificate from the seed certification authority of the exporting country is also needed. In addition, imported varieties of the five notified crops (rice, wheat, potato, jute and sugarcane) must be listed on the Official National List of Varieties and comply with the crop-specific standards.

National Seed Board (NSB) is the apex body regulating seed flow of Bangladesh. It is a multi-disciplinary body with representatives from government agricultural departments, SCA, seed producers association, seed traders association, finance ministry, academicians and experts. Registration of NSB is mandatory for all types of seed used for commercial purpose in Bangladesh. SCA plays the role of quality assurance, certification and testing. Any seeds, other than those preserved by farmers, have to go through NSB for approval for commercial purpose.

Indian seed sector is regulated by Seeds Act 1966, Seeds (Control) Order 1983, New Policy on Seed Development 1988, Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmer’s Right Act 2001, National Seed Policy 2002 and Seeds Bill 2004 (Waiting for Approval). The last two include provision of seed export and import including rice though import of rice seeds remained zero during 2007-2011. It is found that import of seeds will require permit from Plant Protection Advisor to government. Seeds and planting material import will be allowed subject to EXIM policy guidelines and Plants, Fruits and Seeds (Regulation of Import into India) Order 1989. Some of the authorities concerned with seeds are Central Seed Committee (CSC), Central Seed Certification Board (CSCB), Seed Certification Authority of India (SCAI), Central Seed Testing Laboratory (CSTL) and State Seed Testing Laboratories (SSTL). According to proposed Seed Bill 2004, all varieties of seed for sale need to be registered and seed container should be labelled with specific information. It also included provision for farmers’ compensation.

3. Informal Rice Seed Trade between Bangladesh and India

The literature on cross-border informal seed trade is meagre. However, formalising this trade on one hand will take agricultural cooperation to the next level

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and will ensure quality input at farmer level on the other. Anecdotal evidences suggest that there is informal rice seeds trade occurring at the border points between India and Bangladesh. The main points of such trade are district centres of Jiban Nagar, Jessore district, Benapole, Kushtia, Pragpur, Khulna, Darshana, Rajshahi, Godagiri, Dinajpur, Lalmonirhat, Burimari, Nawabganj, Sonamasjid, and also some other points. Informal traders in a group of 3-10 on an average participate in such trade. Evidences also suggest that the items generally traded by these illicit networks range from rice seed to rice, pulses, etc.12

There is presently no data or estimate on the current status of informal rice seeds trade between India and Bangladesh. The study tries to comprehend this scenario in some selected bordering areas of Bangladesh. Such information or estimate is primarily based on implementation of field work during 2013. Indian varieties are primarily cultivated in Aman season because of shorter maturity cycle which allows farmers greater option for next crop and unavailability of substitutable varieties. But in Boro (irrigated) cost of production is also higher than Aman.

3.1 Field Findings

Field visits have been conducted in three bordering districts of Bangladesh which are adjacent to the selected eastern Indian states to understand the rice seeds supply channel in Bangladesh and informal trade with India. Also, stakeholders including seed traders, government officials and researchers have been interviewed. The structure of field investigation has been described below.

Field visit was conducted at Sonamasjid area of Chapai Nawabganj district. A number of meetings were conducted with important officials and traders, which include the officials of DAE, Upazila Agricultural Officer, Seed Dealer; Sales Promotion Officer of Syngenta (Seed Trading) and journalists. An FGD was conducted with farmers at Chadlai, Ward No. 14, Char Jotpratap of Chapai Nawabganj.

12 For details, see, S. Pohit and N. Taneja, “India’s Informal Trade with Bangladesh: A Qualitative Assessment”, The World Economy, Vol. 26, No. 8, 2003, pp. 1187-1214; and M. Chakraborty, “Indo-Bangladesh Informal Trade Nexus: India’s Security Predicament”, Asia Pacific Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2009, pp. 19-34.

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Map: Areas of Field Investigation

= land port area and upazila level meetings

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Field visit to Hili land port (Hakimpur upazila), Dinajpur. The study team had discussion with local journalists, seed dealers, farmers, government officials from DAE, BADC and plant quarantine office at district and upazila level.

The project team visited Benapole land port (Sharsha upazila) area in Jessore district in order to get better understanding of informal rice seed trade dynamics from 21-24 September 2013. Meetings were held with seed dealers, traders, producers, government officials, and plant quarantine office at district and upazila level. Also, the team conducted FGD with local farmers.

Several one to one meetings were held in Dhaka with policymakers, businessmen, civil society leaders to validate the field findings and gather additional information.

The major field findings have been summarised in Table 3. It reveals that informal trade is in general not frequently occurring across Bangladesh.

Table 3: Major Findings from the Field13

Jessore Dinajpur Chapai Nawabganj

Informal rice seeds trade varieties

Swarna (Lal Swarna, Guti, Miniket (Zira Miniket)

Swarna, Swampa, Parija, Mamun

Swarna (Guti and Sada), Parija, Somsor

Certified seeds of Indian HYV

Certified seed of 30kg bag are available

Certified seeds are unavailable but farmers produce locally

Certified seeds are not available but farmers produce locally

Germination problemof Indian HYV

Germination problem is not found

Germination problem for Indian HYV is lower than that of local HYV

Parija variety has germination problem

Production per bigha 20/22 mounds 18/20 mounds 18/20 mounds

Informal trade frequency

Frequent informal trade across borders

Occasional trade between borders and farmers produce locally after taking from Indian neighbour

Informal trade is not regularly occurring

Trend of hybrid rice production

Hybrid seed is exhibiting decreasing trend

Use of hybrid seeds is falling

Use of hybrid seeds is falling

Last five years production of Indian HYV

Swarna, Miniket Swarna, Swampa Swarna, Parija

Functionality of quarantine office

Quarantine office is fully functional

Quarantine office is fully functional Not visited

Seeds generationFarmers are concerned about seeds generation

Farmers are not concerned about seeds generation

Generation related information on seed is not available in case of farmers preserved seed

13 Based on field survey during July to September 2013.

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From extensive field research, it is observed that at Chapai Nawabganj in Aman season, out of 48,000 hectare land, Swarna was cultivated in 33,000 hectare land. Farmers meet most of their seed demand from their preserved seed. BADC sells seed at 10 kg package while private companies sell seed at 1, 5 and 10 kg packages. It costs Tk. 360 in 10 kg from BADC and around Tk. 200-250 of 10 kg package from private companies.

Informal trade is not occurring regularly in Chapai Nawabganj and Lalmonirhat districts. Based on relationship, some farmers received seeds of Indian varieties through their relatives or other farmers living on other side of the border. These seeds were further replicated by farmers of Bangladesh. Rice seeds of Indian variety are produced locally. Same applies to seed flow from Bangladesh to India.

Miniket and Swarna seeds are coming informally in Bangladesh at Benapole area of Jessore district with 30 kg package. These are certified seeds from Indian authority, which is sold in the informal market at Tk. 60 per kg.

Farmers prefer not to buy seeds from any source but use own preserved seeds. Buying seeds from external sources poses uncertainty regarding availability and price. Farmers argued that it is preferable to use own preserved seeds albeit of lower yield than facing uncertainty.

Discussion with seed dealers revealed that 7-8 years back farmers used their preserved seeds only. After long advocacy farmers are now gradually buying seeds from dealers, but still in very low amount.

Currently, hybrid seeds are imported, but not HYV seeds. However, hybrid seeds are showing a declining trend. Generation related information on seed is not available in case of farmers' preserved seed. This is particularly true for informally traded Indian varieties. Usage of certified seed can significantly increase production of rice.

Field visit in Dinajpur revealed the fact that in Aman season, 53 per cent is Swarna among the cultivated varieties. At Hakimpur upazila of Dinajpur, total area under rice production is 7,196 hectare in Boro season. Of this area 5,646 hectare is under HYV of 3 Indian and 4 Bangladeshi varieties. 1,550 hectare is under hybrid which was previously much greater. BRRI-28, BRRI-29, Miniket and BR-49 are responsible for 17, 23, 14 and 12 per cent, respectively.

Nine Indian varieties are farmed in about 5,390 hectare out of 8,170 hectare in Aman season. Guti Swarna, Mamun, BRRI Dhan-34, Swarna-5

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and Ranjit contributed 20, 17, 16, 15 and 5 per cent respectively to total Aman production.

Seed dealers are found to have been sold unpackaged seed collected from farmers and from Joypurhat district because of high demand. There is scope for selling certified Indian popular varieties due to high demand.

Yields of Indian varieties are decreasing as certified seed is not available and quality of seeds preserved by farmers deteriorates after 4-5 seasons.

Discussion with farmers revealed that they are eager to buy quality input and adapt to modern production techniques.

Table 4: Cultivation of Indian and Local HYV14

Season Local HYV % Indian HYV %

Chapai NawabganjAman BRRI Dhan-34 1 Swarna 87.37

BR-11 1Boro BR-28 25.79 Parija 35.97

BR-29 14.22 Somsu 3.53

JessoreAman Bina-7 11.46 Swarna (Guti, Kolamocha, Bulet) 33.53

BR-39 12.84Boro BRRI Dhan-50 24 Miniket 27.90

BRRI Dhan-28 21.23BR-26 24.73

Aus BR-28 14.48 Miniket 28.30

DinajpurAman BRRI Dhan-34 13.8 Swarna 53

BRRI Dhan-50 20BRRI Dhan-11 2

Boro BR-28 33

BR-29 27.5

Indian varieties are dominant in the region. After getting expected amount of production, farmers preserve it for their next cultivation time. In the Jessore border area, the team found that foundation seeds and certified bags of rice seeds are smuggled from India and cultivated for production. Farmers informed the study team that they have no faith on the publicly supplied seeds as adulterations are common phenomena.

14 Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE), District Offices, Ministry of Agriculture, Bangladesh.

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There is scope for importing Aman and Aus varieties from India to Bangladesh and Boro varieties from Bangladesh to India. Strong political commitment is required in agricultural cooperation between the two countries so that there are long-term, sustainable solutions to food security challenges faced by both.

4. Barriers of Rice Seed Trade

Analysis of current policies shows that nothing can deter import of rice seed and its replication in Bangladesh for commercial purposes. The registration process is standard for all countries and applicable even for public companies. It can be assumed that generalised trade barriers and trade facilitation recommendations for Bangladesh-India are applicable for rice seed trade also. Bangladesh imports fruit, maize and vegetables seed from India, and does not impose any customs or import duty on seeds.

The regulatory framework partly explains why there exists informal seed trade between Bangladesh and India. Farmers, through their networks, might be interested in a particular variety from other side of border. In absence of institutional framework required for supply of seed and easy availability or widespread smuggling can make these seeds available. Therefore, informal trade takes place between the two countries. India also places regulations and policies that regulate rice seed import. It is neither possible nor efficient for a small, medium or large farmer to complete the processes required for importing seed legally.

One aspect of the policy framework is that policies treat all kinds of seed universally in terms of approval. All notified crop seed like rice has to undergo two seasons of field testing whether it is certified by country of origin, international bodies or not certified at all. This provision, while safeguards farmers’ interest, also makes the registration process quite lengthy. Enabling Agricultural Trade (EAT), a project funded by USAID, found that it takes 860 days to register a proprietary staple grain variety through five procedures.15

4.1 Opinion of Experts and Stakeholders

Trading barriers are more rigid and greater in number from Indian side. Bangladesh imports a wide array of products from India through formal and informal process. From Bangladesh side there are minimal trade barriers. But in case of India, due to their federal government system, facilitating trade requires much longer time and many forms of documents, authorisation and certification from a number of bodies.

15 USAID, Agribusiness Regulation and Institutions (Agri) Index Pilot Report, Enabling Agricultural Trade, Dhaka, 2012.

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An exercise trying to export some quantity of seed from Bangladesh to India would reveal all the trade barriers pertaining in this sector. They emphasised repeatedly on this exercise as it would be very effective and helpful for this study. NSB is aware of the informal rice seed trade between the two countries. There was also discussion of the issue in a meeting of NSB. However, no consensus was reached despite some members’ interests to formalise this type of trade. Formal trade is expected to bridge the demand supply gaps. More seeds will be available to farmers and quality production of rice will take place because farmers will be able to use the certified seeds and foundation seeds. Tariff and non-tariff barriers, customs duties and transportation cost will be issues of concern if trade is formalised.

There are government level initiatives to bring out bilateral and multilateral cooperation between Bangladesh and India and other SAARC countries in rice seeds trade. SAARC Seed Bank Agreement for multilateral seed trade facilitation was signed in 2009 and Bangladesh government is trying to accelerate the speed of seed trade among the SAARC nations for ensuring the quality production of rice in the South Asian region. One of the most fundamental barriers is the rice seed standards of the two countries. They are trying to accelerate the speed of cooperation for harmonising the standards of the two countries. Formal trade of HYV seeds is very important because certified HYV rice seeds of India and Bangladesh will be helpful for quality production of rice for these countries.

To meet the shortage and to cease the informal trade of rice seeds between Bangladesh and India, the following measures are needed:

Enhanced bilateral cooperation

Harmonisation of policy standards

Eliminating the discrepancy of the system and procedure of the Quarantine Office of the concerned countries

Eliminating Indian non-tariff barriers to seed import

4.2 Non-Tariff and Para-Tariff Barriers

Some barriers that are currently affecting the flow of Bangladesh’s exports to India include

Classification

Laboratory testing and chemical testing

Labelling requirements

Registration

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Quarantine requirements

Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) requirements

For primary agricultural products, India requires bio-security, SPS and import permits, which Bangladeshi exporters consider complex. While importing all kinds of food products, India sends the samples of export consignments to testing laboratories located at places far from the customs points, which causes delay in the export process and results in undesirable demurrage.

Export to India would not increase much unless the non-tariff and para-tariff barriers are removed. Both Bangladesh and India would obtain greater and more secure economic benefits by giving priority to unilateral trade liberalisation on a multilateral basis, rather than by pursuing free trade arrangements. It does not mean that other trade-related cooperative endeavours should be neglected. In particular there would be substantial benefits from coordinated improvements in transport, storage and administrative infrastructures at and adjoining the Bangladesh-India land borders, as well as in harmonisation and cooperation in customs administration and banking relationships. Bilateral trade facilitation and its cost reduction would help reduce black economy activities in both countries associated with both the “bootleg” and “technical” smuggling routes, and improve fiscal resources, especially in Bangladesh.

4.3 Seed and Field Standards of Paddy

Table 5: Standard Requirements for Bangladesh16

Factors Seed Standard Breeder Foundation Certified/TLS(A) Seed Standard1 Pure seed (minimum per cent by wt.) 99.00 97.00 96.002 Inert matter (max. per cent by wt.) 1.00 2.00 3.003 Other seed (maximum per cent by wt.) Trace 1.00 1.00 a. Other crop seed (maximum no. in to-

tal; whole sample will be tested)2/kg 5/kg 10/kg

b. Total weed seed (max. no. in total; whole sample will be tested)

2/kg 8/kg 10/kg

4 Germination (minimum per cent ) 80.00 80.0 80.05 Moisture content (maximum per cent ) 12.00 12.00 12.00(B) Field Standard1 Isolation distance (in metre) 3.00 3.00 3.002 Other crop plants (maximum per cent

by no.)0.00 0.10 0.20

16 Ministry of Agriculture, Government of Bangladesh.

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3 Other varieties (maximum per cent by no.)

0.00 0.10 0.50

4 Weed plants (obnoxious max. per cent by no.)a. Wild rice/red rice b. Barnyard glass

0.0 0.03 0.05

5 Plants infected by seed borne disease (max. per cent of infected plants)

5.00 10.00 20.00

General condition of crop: If the field crop is severely damaged or lodged and irregularly flowered that makes crop assessment difficult to judge the trueness of variety and varietal purity, it will be rejected.

For India

Application and Amplification of General Seed Certification Standards

The General Seed Certification Standards are basic and, together with the following specific standards, constitute the standards for certification of paddy seed.

Land to be used for seed production of paddy shall be free of volunteer plants.

A minimum of two inspections shall be made from the time the crop approaches flowering until it is ready for harvesting.

Field standards include general requirements and isolation.

Paddy seed fields shall be isolated from the contaminants shown in column 1 of the Table below by the distances specified in columns 2 and 3:

Table 6: Specific Requirements17

Contaminants Minimum distance (metres)Foundation Certified

Fields of other varieties 3 3Fields of the same variety not conform-ing to varietal purity requirements for certification

3 3

Factors Maximum permitted (per cent)*Foundation Certified

Off-types 0.050 0.20Objectionable weed plants 0.010 0.020Standards for off-types and objectionable weeds shall be met at the final inspection.Objectionable weed shall be: Wild rice

17 Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India.

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Seed Standards

There are some significant differences in standard of paddy seeds between two countries. Harmonisation of the standards will create the opportunities for importing and exporting of HYV seeds between two countries.

Table 7: Seed Standards18

Factor Standards for each classFoundation Certified

Pure seed (minimum) 98.0 per cent 98.0 per centInert matter (maximum) 2.0 per cent 2.0 per centHuskless seeds (maximum) 2.0 per cent 2.0 per centOther crop seeds (maximum) 10/kg 20/kgOther distinguishable varieties (maximum) 10/kg 20/kgTotal weed seeds (maximum) 10/kg 20/kg*Objectionable weed seeds (maximum) 2/kg 5/kgSeeds infected by paddy bunt (Neovossiahorrida (Tak.) Padwick & Azmatulla Khan (maximum)

0.10 per cent(by number)

0.50 per cent(by number)

Germination (minimum) 80 per cent 80 per centMoisture (maximum) 13.0 per cent 13.0 per centFor vapour-proof containers (maximum) 8.0 per cent 8.0 per cent

*Objectionable weed is the same as shown in Table 6.

Time Schedule for Clearance

A minimum of 8-10 days or more is required in exports for certification of seed consignments. Conversely, perishable commodities such as nursery plants, tissue cultures, fresh fruits, cut flowers, etc. are certified within a maximum period of 24-48 hours and consignments that require fumigation are certified within 3 days.

The period of quarantine clearance for seeds imports is 30-35 days and perishable plant materials such as cuttings/saplings/bud wood, etc. are cleared within 12-24 hours. However, plant materials for consumption are cleared within a day or two except those requiring fumigation after 3 days. The tissue cultures and mushroom spawn cultures as well as cut flowers and fresh fruits are cleared within 4-6 hours.

5. Conclusion and Way Forward

This paper tries to explore farmers’ perspectives, seed marketing feasibilities, supply chain and rice seed entrepreneurship opportunities to look for loopholes in trade barriers and seed sectors, e.g., policy initiatives, seed production system, the role of public and private sectors, variety registration procedure, varietal protection 18 Ministry of Agriculture, Government of Bangladesh.

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and the likes. It would also allow analysing issues of non-tariff and para-tariff barriers that hinder Bangladesh-India rice seed trade. This includes delving into spaces where tariff barriers and standard testing risk being the biggest impediments in the growth of bilateral trade between the two countries. The paper tried to identify such trade barriers and attempt to formulate solutions towards a “win-win-situation” on HYV rice seed trade ties with the neighbouring country. This would subsequently help achieve food security and economic advancement.

Given this backdrop, there is a clear need for improving availability and accessibility to modern variety of rice seeds in both Bangladesh and India. As both the countries experience resource and technical constraints, cooperation is probably the best way out. Some of the avenues to enhance bilateral cooperation between Bangladesh and India rice seed trade can be to harmonise standards, certification process and quarantine laws; develop regional/bilateral seed bank; establish joint body for research and development in agriculture; allow seed trade in Border Haat and share genes of existing varieties at government level so that each country can release the varieties of the other.

i Trade Formalisation

To formalise this type of trade there is scope for private sector involvement. Private enterprises by following the present regulation of going through NSB can make seeds available to domestic market. If prices and packaging are kept at competitive level then trade could be formalised.

ii SAARC Seed Bank and Scope for Bilateral Cooperation

To form collective self-reliance in agriculture with respect to attaining seed security and also contributing to harmonised seed testing, certification and seed trade, the main objectives of the SAARC Seed Bank are:

Provide regional support to national seed security efforts

Strengthen cooperation in increasing Seed Replacement Rate (SRR)

Act as a regional seed security reserve

Strengthen the role of farmers/farming communities and protection of their rights

Provide farmers with quality seeds in the SAARC region

In view of the similar agro-climatic conditions and commonalities in terms of agricultural practices, requirements and associated problems in the region, there are substantial opportunities to extend cooperation for development and

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maintenance of harmonised seed system of the SAARC countries. This could help in making available seeds of improved varieties of such crops suitable for every agro-climatic zone/condition, which is released by any country in the region.19 This may be particularly useful in meeting the seed shortages caused by natural calamities. Regional cooperation is no doubt a prime need to develop seed sector in terms of quality seed production, varietal exchange, seed trade and to mitigate different crisis in agricultural sector.20 There is also scope for exchanging varieties at government level to formalise the unregistered seed variety cultivation occurring in Bangladesh and India so that farmers are ensured with quality input.

iii Research and Release of New Varieties Regionally

The HYV seeds can be introduced/released through international research institutes in different countries. If IRRI introduces the HYV varieties for Bangladesh and India with different names as Swarna Sub-1 in India and BRRI Dhan-51 in Bangladesh, the poor farmers will be benefitted and more quality seeds will be available which are required for high yield. Although in Bangladesh private sector produces foundation seed of HYV varieties the varietal development is primarily focused on hybrid, while public sector is generally responsible for developing HYV varieties. In this case, joint research by Bangladesh and India can ensure sufficient investment in sustainable development of HYV varieties.

iv Harmonisation of Standards, Certification and Registration Procedures

The initiatives to harmonise standards, certification and registration process need to be accelerated to promote greater private sector participation and enhanced regional cooperation.

v Increasing Quality Seed Usage at Farmer Level

The gap between demand and supply of seed is met primarily through farmers-preserved seeds. Usage of foundation and certified seed can significantly increase production. Due to unavailability of seeds, uncertainty regarding price, availability and quality of seeds, farmers have relied on preserved seed after harvest. At present availability, quality and uncertainty aspects are improved and farmers are gradually buying seeds. Still preserved seed dominates seed usage. Ensuring quality seed usage at farmer level is therefore another useful point of intervention.21

19 Seed Wing, SAARC Seed Congress Fair 2011, Ministry of Agriculture, Bangladesh and Bangladesh Seed Association, SAARC Agriculture Centre, Dhaka.20 M. K. Bashar, A. Salahuddin and P. van Mele, “Building a Rice Seed Network”, in P. van Mele, A. Salahuddin and N. P. Magor (eds.), Innovations in Rural Extension: Case Studies from Bangladesh, Wallingford: CABI Publishing, 2005.21 M. Kabir, S. P. Singh and A. R. Khan, “Rice Seed Production and Use in Bangladesh and India: Need for Bilateral Cooperation”, Souvenir of AGM of Bangladesh Seed Association Meeting, 27 September 2013, Dhaka.

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vi Cooperation in Modern Variety (MV) Rice Seed

Having a similar agro-climatic conditions and food habits, technical knowledge and infrastructure available in the two countries can be mutually used for improving food security scenario. For greater collaboration and cooperation in MV rice seed, the following measures should be adopted by the governments of Bangladesh and India:

Given the sensitivity of MV rice seeds, there should be attempts in both countries to gather, estimate informal flow of rice seeds to understand demand for Bangladeshi/Indian varieties in each other.

Seed policies of Bangladesh and India do not put any restriction on import/export of MV rice seeds. It needs to be explored why trade in MV rice seed does not exist despite seeds of other crops being traded.

There is need for rice research institutions in the two countries to cooperate and collaborate in development of MV rice seeds and its use.

Considering that demand for MV rice seed is more than supply in both the countries, governments should encourage and facilitate active participation of private sector in seed development. Given the low level of awareness with regard to MV rice seed, both the governments should launch campaign to encourage greater acceptability of MV rice seeds.

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Monzima Haque

THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN INDIA AND INDIA’S NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY: CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?

Abstract

Maintaining harmony and peace in South Asia has been a crucial intent not only of India but also of its South Asian neighbours. Nevertheless, sustaining stable relationships among New Delhi and its South Asian neighbours have had remained a formidable challenge. Following May 2014 national election, a new government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) assumed office in India. The new Prime Minister Narendra Modi, a Hindu nationalist, renowned for his impressive management of Gujarat’s economy as Chief Minister is now the leader of the one billion plus population. New developments, especially inviting all South Asian leaders in Indian Prime Minister’s oath-taking ceremony and choosing South Asian Himalayan countries for opening foreign visits, have stirred up euphoria regarding possibilities of re-energising the flagging discourse of South Asian neighbourhood. Building on these evolving scenarios, this paper looks into India’s South Asian neighbourhood discourse in the context of new government’s accession to power in India. Taking up the early days conducts of the new Prime Minister into consideration, the paper reveals that although the style of the new government to deal with neighbours may reflect changes, the overall objective management of India’s regional relations is unlikely to deviate much.

1. Introduction

The euphoria with which accession to power of the 15th Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, was observed by all South Asian countries is remarkable as well as of critical importance. Both famed and defamed for his contributions in Gujarat, the new Prime Minister (PM) attracted global attention through the historic victory of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the May 2014 national election. The margin with which BJP has achieved the right to lead the Indian nation is colossal; earning the party a straight majority in parliament in course of thirty years of history.1 Immediately after being entrusted with the right to be the Indian spearhead, even before assuming the office formally, the new PM had set a new example in the political history of South Asia. Invitation to attend the oath-taking ceremony at the Presidential Palace was sent to all South Asian leaders.

Monzima Haque is Research Officer at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), Dhaka. Her e-mail address is: [email protected]

© Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2014.

1 Dean Nelson, “Narendra Modi wins India election with landslide victory”, The Telegraph, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/10835229/Narendra-Modi-wins-India-election-with-landslide-victory.html, accessed on 21 September 2014.


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Such bold step was seen as a breakthrough in the flagging discourse of South Asian neighbourhood politics. It presented the new government of India a chance to know the neighbours and their concerns while taking over the office as well as to create an atmosphere of reliance aimed to move beyond the histories of mistrust by offering an early gesture of interaction. The initiative of new Indian government received positive responses from the South Asian political leaders in neighbouring countries who responded to the invitation warmly. This shows the eagerness of countries in this region towards cooperation.

In continuation to the opening surprises, PM Modi selected Bhutan and Nepal for his maiden foreign visits. Hence, the new Government displayed a fairly notable approach in its conduct with neighbours in the initial days. Headed by Narendra Modi, the new government of rising India stirred up excitement by displaying intentions to create a ‘peaceful neighbourhood’ and let join the neighbours in its agenda to move forward. It heightened both expectations and trepidations over how the new government is going to deal with its neighbours. The uneasiness, however, resulted from the fear of escalation in communal violence and the probability of adoption of a hawkish policy by the new government.

Building on this context, the questions that emerge are, does this euphoria created by the early conducts reflect change in the neighbourhood policy of India? How the new government will treat its immediate neighbours? And, what are the ramifications of this change of leadership in the South Asian political landscape in the coming days? This paper tries to analyse the early indications of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and finds out the new government’s policy priorities in the neighbourhood. Geographically, India’s neighbourhood comprises of the countries with which it shares borders: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. However, analysis in this paper limits its focus within India’s South Asian neighbours and excludes analysis of India’s policy towards China and Myanmar. But, in course of the discussion, references to China and Myanmar have been made for comparative analysis.

The paper is based predominantly on secondary sources and proceeds as follows. Dynamics of India’s South Asian neighbourhood along with policies under various regimes are discussed in the second section. Recent developments followed by the accession of the new government in India are outlined in the third section. The fourth section presents ramifications for South Asia. Section five is the conclusion of the paper.

2. Understanding India’s South Asian ‘Neighbourhood’

To fathom the complex political landscape of South Asian neighbourhood and realise the aims and objectives of the new Indian leadership in South Asia, at first

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INDIA’S NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

it is necessary to understand how the region has been perceived by India. Therefore, this section looks into the dynamics of India’s South Asian neighbourhood and the history of conduct and key elements of India’s neighbourhood policy under different administration.

2.1 What is Neighbourhood Policy?

The concept of promoting well defined relations with neighbours is not new. The root of any neighbourhood policy is that a country cannot "choose its neighbours"2; therefore, it has to adjust with the surrounding environment and adopt a suitable approach. Frontiers with neighbours are where domestic concerns intersect with external relationships and therefore, the first area of attention of any foreign policy is the neighbourhood.3 Good neighbour policy has been campaigned even in the earlier tradition of international relations of sovereign states. Franklin D. Roosevelt advocated a new direction in foreign affairs by his well known ‘Good Neighbour Policy’4. Attempt to build up an accommodating neighbourhood has been observed in the European Union as well. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is hitherto a pioneer of its kind in the neighbourhood policy discourse which aims to avoid dividing lines with its neighbours.5

Defining neighbourhood is critical because it not only rests on geographical or political factors but it also has social and cultural underpinnings. As a term, ‘neighbour’, which is of West Germanic origin, combines two words, ‘near’ and ‘dweller’6, i.e., someone who dwells nearby. In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, the term ‘neighbour’ is measured as a fellow, an associate or a beneficiary. This gives a positive connotation of the expression. However, in some other, like post-communist spaces where Slavic mores dominate, ‘neighbour’ is explained as a stranger or foreigner. The Russian word for ‘neighbour’ entails a person who enters another’s private space without legitimate authority. Thereby, it has a negative connotation of the same expression. There emerges the inherent ambiguity of ‘neighbour’ as put forward by

2 S. D. Muni, “Problem Areas in India’s Neighbourhood Policy”, South Asian Survey, New Delhi, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003, p. 185.3 Pratip Chattopadhay, “The Politics of India’s Neigbhourhood Policy in South Asia”, South Asian Survey, New Delhi, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2011, p. 93.4 While attending the Pan American Conference in 1936 in Buenos Aires, Argentina, Franklin D. Roosevelt showed that the United States was willing to stop dominating weaker nations by its adherence to the Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation, and that the Latin American countries would be treated as equals. For more see, Henry J. Brajkovic, “The Foreign Policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Entry into World War II”, available at http://yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1978/3/78.03.05.x.html, accessed on 10 November 2014.5 The objective of developing ENP in 2004 was to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged European Union and its neighbours and instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all. The ENP is chiefly a bilateral policy between the EU and each partner country. For more see, Official Website of the European Union, available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm, accessed on 02 November 2014.6 Gabriel Meloni, “Who’s my neighbor?”, European Political Economy Review, Summer 2007, No. 07, p. 25.

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Chattopadhay, “the neighbourhood is a space lodged in between the safe inside of friends and the threatening outside of enemies”7. Thus, a neighbourhood is not limited to territory only; it is also about ‘numerous and diverse individuals’ and their ‘social constructions’ who are neither well-known nor a total stranger.8 This understanding of neighbourhood is critical to figure out the dynamics of South Asian region.

2.2 Dynamics of India’s South Asian ‘Neighbourhood’

To comprehend South Asian neighbourhood, especially with regard to Indian strategic perceptions, one may fall back to the Kautilyan Mandala theory (circle of States) of foreign policy. The political realist argued that immediate neighbours are considered to be natural enemy and neighbour’s neighbour is the friend.9 This perception articulates that India’s immediate neighbourhood is perceived by her more as an enemy than a friend. Nevertheless, like any other aspirant country, India too hopes to be surrounded by a ‘band of allies’. There emerges the necessity of a policy to mould the surroundings for its best.

Although the term is used quite often, India does not have officially declared neighbourhood policy. It is merely a part of India’s broader foreign policy.10 The term Indian Neighbourhood Policy hence could be used to refer to various policy statements as well as policy propositions of different Indian leadership time to time regarding India’s immediate neighbours providing expression of the neighbourhood policy. Various observers as well as leaders have reiterated the significance of India’s South Asian neighbourhood. S. D. Muni, a former Indian ambassador, noted that “achieving the objective of becoming one of the principal powers of Asia will depend entirely on India’s ability to manage its own immediate neighbourhood”.11 C. Raja Mohan, a leading Indian scholar, observed that without enduring primacy in one’s own neighbourhood, no nation can become a credible power on the global stage.12 Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee also acknowledged that friends can change but not neighbours who have to live together.13 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2010 noted that “we cannot realise our growth ambitions unless we ensure peace and stability in South Asia”.14 Such statements substantiate the prominence of South Asian region in India’s policy planning.

7 Pratip Chattopadhay, op. cit. 8 Claudia Coulton, “Defining Neighbourhoods for Research and Policy”, Cityscape, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2012, p. 236.9 “Manu and Kautilya’s Ideas on Inter-state Relations and Diplomacy”, available at http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/4285/10/11_chapter%204.pdf, accessed on 21 November 2014.10 Smruti S. Pattanaik, “India’s Neighbourhood Policy: Perceptions from Bangladesh”, Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, Vol. 35, No. 1, January 2011, p. 72.11 S. D. Muni, op. cit. ; see also, David Malone, Does the Elephant Dance?: Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 22.12 C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of Indian Foreign Policy, India: Penguin Books, 2003, p. 242.13 David Malone, op. cit.14 “India needs US for its growth”, The Deccan Herald, available at http://www.deccanherald.com/content/96305/india-needs-us-its-growth.html, accessed on 21 September 2014.

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Even though this region has been so significant, relations between India and her neighbours never reached the desired stature of affability. Since independence in 1947, India’s principal challenges have been dealing with its troubled relations with its neighbours. With regard to her global strategy, India has oscillated between nonalignment to realism. But in the case of South Asia, it seems India has fallen short of a coherently developed strategy. Several factors have contributed to the creation of the complex dynamics in this neighbourhood. The primary factor being the disparity of power among neighbours; India has the preponderance of power in the region in all aspects. She occupies 72 per cent of the land surfaces and is responsible for a large per cent of regional economic output.15 This offers India a natural advantage of leadership, but at the same time creates the fundamental security problem within the regional framework.16 As a consequence of power differences, India is characterised as ‘hegemon’ by smaller nations of the region; always afraid to being subjugated in pursuit of their national interests. Indian policies with regard to the liberation movement in Bangladesh in 1971, the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka in 1987 and the attempted military coup in Maldives in 1988 are cited as illustrations of India’s hegemonic authority in the region.17 Image as a rival and competitor in the eyes of Pakistan also makes the region a complicated gain for India.

On the contrary, due to the power differences, India also worries that the smaller countries will ‘free ride’ on its resources in the name of cooperative relationship. Delhi suspects that its neighbours are or have been involved in receiving, sheltering, overlooking or tolerating terrorist activities from their soil directed against India.18 The issue of extra-regional powers is another factor that adds hurdle to this complex security landscape. Since smaller countries of South Asia perceive threats from its big neighbour; they attempt to address their ‘smaller state complex’ by adopting power balancing approach through building closer relations with extra-regional powers in order to counterbalance India’s influence.19 This appears to India as attempts of smaller neighbours to gang up against the larger neighbour.

Other factors include apprehensions about India’s desire to reinstall an Akhand Bharat (unified India), where South Asian countries will form a single unit and India would be in charge of their security and development.20 India’s insistence on bilateralism is also viewed by smaller neighbours as a coercive approach to weaken their bargaining power since they are more comfortable to tackle India through multilateral structure which allows them to voice up their arguments without being

15 Madhabi Bhasin, “India’s Role in South Asia-Perceived Hegemony or Reluctant Leadership”, 2008, available at http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/MadhaviBhasin.pdf, accessed on 10 November 2014.16 Bhumitra Chakma, “Liberalism and South Asian Security”, available at www.wiscnetwork.org/porto2011/getpaper.php?id=755, accessed on 17 November 2014.17 Ibid.18 Address of Kanwal Sibal, the then Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, to French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), Paris on 17 December 2002.19 Bhumitra Chakma, op. cit. 20 M. B. I. Munshi, The India Doctrine (1947-2007), Dhaka: Bangladesh Defence Journal Publishing, 2008, p. 10.

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felt insubstantial. Therefore, the interplay of big power and small power psychosis, unbalanced perspectives and predisposed perceptions of each other loom large on the relations of the neighbourhood. Consequently, thus far, India has not been able to win hearts and minds of its neighbours as a ‘natural leader’ in the region.21

Due to this complex dynamics, countries of South Asia networks in their own neighbourhood with suspicion and caution. For India, the crucial challenge is to get over the anti-Indian sentiment prevailing in its strategic neighbourhood. For the neighbouring countries, the challenge is to keep Indian ‘hegemony’ to a minimum. This dynamics of South Asia lies at the heart of the complexity of the region.

2.3 India’s Neighbourhood Policy: A Historical Perspective

Indian nationalist leaders articulated an Asianist ideology in the early 19th century based on the historical, political and the geopolitical interests of Greater India. Since then, Asia remains by and large a part of India’s global strategy because India has a geo-strategic centrality in Asia. As a consequence of the Cold War, Indian attempts to build a cooperative Asian neighbourhood came to an abrupt halt since Asia was starting to divide along ideological lines with some countries getting more focused in world politics.22 Subsequently, focus of India began to divide along various sub-regions of Asia like South Asia as the immediate neighbourhood and South East Asia as the extended neighbourhood.

Being the immediate neighbourhood, South Asia has always been the ‘first circle’ of India’s foreign policy.23 Jawaharlal Nehru, the chief architect of independent India’s foreign policy, “stressed on the importance of keeping foreign powers out of Asia”24 making the subcontinent as an exclusive sphere of influence of India. He believed, as the relatively secure power in South Asia, India needs to give more to its neighbours with a vision of ‘strategic altruism’.25

During years of Indira Gandhi, a turn towards realistic Indo-centric orientation was observed.26 Delhi continued its denial for role of external powers in the region and maintained preference for bilateral resolution of disputes.27 Notably, Indian insistence for multilateralism at global level and preference for bilateralism at regional level contributed to trust deficit among its neighbours. Moreover, the assertive policies of

21 Madhabi Bhasin, op. cit.22 S. D. Muni and Girijesh Pant, India’s Search for Energy Security, New Delhi: Rupa Co. and the Observer Research Foundation, 2005, pp. 6-7.23 Arvind Gupta, Ashok K Behuria and Smruti Pattanaik, “Does India have a Neighbourhood Policy?”, Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, Vol. 36, No. 2, March 2012, p. 231; see also, Sandy Gordon, India’s Rise as an Asian Power: Nation, Neighbourhood and Region, Washington D.C: The Georgetown University Press, 2014, p. 181.24 C. Raja Mohan, op. cit., p. 239.25 Sandy Gordon, op. cit., p. 182.26 Pratip Chattopadhay, op. cit., p. 96.27 Arvind Gupta, op. cit.

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Indira Gandhi provoked more fear than respect among neighbours which was evident in Indian actions seeking to influence events in Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh.28 India’s goal was to remain the uncontested ‘regional hegemon’ in South Asia.29

In the face of growing accusations of Indian intervention in domestic affairs of smaller neighbours during the 1990s and the deepening crisis evoked a new approach from the new Prime Minister Narashima Rao. Under the tensed circumstances, he preferred the policy of benign neglect with regard to Pakistan and adopted a ‘hands-off’ approach in relation to other South Asian neighbours that neither escalated any problem nor resolved any concern.30

The handling of neighbourhood issues by successive governments, especially by I. K. Gujral, popularly known as Gujral doctrine, generated some trust among neighbours and significantly impacted on the neighbourhood policy. Gujral’s ‘non-reciprocal solution’ to problems had a marked impression since India’s South Asia policy started to shift from an exclusive hard power strategy of military and diplomatic interventions to a soft power approach that emphasised on intergovernmental cooperation.31 It seemed like an attempt to induce bandwagoning with the strategic altruistic approach.32 Five principles of the doctrine were: firstly, with neighbours like Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and Sri Lanka, India does not ask for reciprocity but gives all it can in good faith and trust. Secondly, no South Asian country will allow its territory to be used against the interest of another country in the region. Thirdly, none will interfere in the internal affairs of another. Fourth, South Asian countries must respect each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. And finally, they will settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations. 33 Interestingly, I. K. Gujral did not include Pakistan in his list for non-reciprocal approach. Although criticised by some analysts as too friendly towards neighbours, he attempted to bring new dimensions to the regional policy. In the recently enunciated Non Alignment 2.0, the propositions enshrined in the Gujral doctrine are reiterated that India must constantly go the extra mile to reassure its neighbours and be prepared for unilateral concessions rather than insist on reciprocity.34

The Janata government led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee did not deviate much from the Gujral doctrine and planned to work towards a South Asia ‘bound together in collective pursuit of peace and prosperity’. However, in contrast to the Gujral doctrine, this government put a great deal of effort to bring relations with Pakistan on track and

28 Ibid.; see also Pratip Chattopadhay, op. cit.29 Pratip Chattopadhay, op. cit.30 C. Raja Mohan, op. cit., p. 241; see also, Ashok K Behuria, op. cit.31 Pratip Chattopadhay, op. cit., p. 100.32 Sandy Gordon. op. cit.33 C. Raja Mohan, op. cit.; see also, Ashok K Behuria, op. cit., p. 238.34 Satish Chandra, “India’s Neighbourhood Policy”, available at http://www.vifindia.org/article/2012/june/27/india-s-neighbourhood-policy, accessed on 21 November 2014.

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took a number of measures to lower India’s dominant power profile.35 His famous ‘bus diplomacy’ to improve relations with Pakistan, however, faced an abrupt end with the Kargil War of 1999 and terrorist attacks on Indian parliament in 2001. Vajpayee deviated from Nehru’s vision of non-proliferation and adhered to pro-nuclearisation strategy ordering series of nuclear tests in 1998. Thus, the then BJP government adopted a strategy based on both power and peace (Shakti and Shanti).36

The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) regime that took power in 2004 also sought to deepen relations with neighbours. The Manmohan Doctrine, as termed by some observers, emphasised on economic development as drivers of India’s and its neighbours’ foreign policy.37 During its ten years of governance, UPA continued the policy of inviting neighbours to share the economic prosperity and building mutually beneficial relations with neighbours. However, the coalition politics did block some of its attempts to strengthen relations with neighbours and it could not live up to the promise of neighbours.

It can be noted that India’s relations with its immediate neighbours fluctuated quite a bit since its independence. In contrast, in the 21st century, India has taken a more pragmatic approach in its foreign policy. In the post 9/11 phase, relations appears to be more or less steady with minor tactical shifts. Irrespective of policies and actions adopted by different administrations to manage relations with South Asian neighbours, regional relations never reached the desired warmth. Some scholars accord this as resulting from India’s ad hoc management of relations.38 Against this historical context, it can be noted that the new Prime Minister Modi is in the critical juncture to carry forward India’s neighbourhood policy in this new millennium.

3. New Government in Power: Recent Developments

In a landslide victory in the national election of 2014, India’s National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), assumed office in India. With this unprecedented success in the much-hyped election, Narendra Modi sworn in as the 15th Prime Minister of India. BJP, as a political party, is ideologically inspired by cultural nationalism centering on concepts like ‘Hindutva’.39 BJP traces its roots to Bharatiya Jana Sangh, established in 1951. That is why, prior to the election, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was largely in discussion due to his Hindu nationalist ideology and role as alleged ‘mastermind’ of 2002 communal

35 Pratip Chattopadhay, op. cit., p. 97.36Sanjeev Miglani, “If Modi Wins Election, Neighbours Can Expect a More Muscular India”, The Reuters, (Indian Edition), 30 March 2014.37 Prakash Nanda, “Indian Foreign Policy Under Modi”, available at www.aii.unimelb.edu.au, accessed on 21 November 2014.38 Ashok K Behuria, op. cit.39 Sreeram S. Chaulia, “BJP, India’s Foreign Policy and the ‘Realist Alternative’ to the Nehruvian Tradition”, International Politics, 39, June 2002, p. 220.

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riot in Gujarat. Of course, the contribution to the economic development of Gujarat added credibility to his identity. As evident from the unexpected and unparalleled victory, despite his communal ideology, it was Narendra Modi’s strategy of economic development in Gujarat that appealed the Indians most. However, towards its South Asian neighbours, his posture has been quite appealing as well.

To understand the policy priorities of the new Prime Minister of India, first, it is necessary to look into the indications of election manifesto of BJP. The election manifesto outlined an economy-driven foreign policy with the aim to strengthen India’s economy, thereby, boosting its bargaining power with other countries. Although the election manifesto falls short of clearly articulating the foreign policy vision of BJP government, the admiration of the incumbent government for former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and other post election developments indicate that Narendra Modi would preferably follow the path set by the former BJP government obviously with minor tactical shifts. BJP remarked in its election manifesto, “We will engage proactively on our own with countries in the neighbourhood and beyond and create a web of allies to mutually further our interests”. The manifesto of BJP also made pledges to reinforce regional forum like South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and insisted on regional cooperation and connectivity. This can be considered as a portent of the new government’s reverence for neighbouring countries’ contemplations.40 The Prime Minister also reiterated his government’s commitment to work closely for economic development of neighbouring countries in his Independence Day Address delivered on 15 August 2014. Counting regional neighbours as ‘partners’ and opening scope for ‘mutual benefit’ are surely indicative of advancement in economic and political relations. It was also visible in the oath-taking ceremony and visits to Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Afghanistan by representatives of the new government of India.

The swearing-in ceremony of Narendra Modi was a crucial indication of the Indian government’s intentions to bolster relations with countries of South Asian region. It was a signal that India is willing to look towards its immediate neighbours through a new lens in order to bring it back on track. By inviting leaders from all South Asian countries, the Prime Minister has given an ample clue to the global community of his priorities of neighbourhood. On the other side, acceptance of invitation is another cogent signal of what the South Asian neighbours expect from India, i.e., a more responsible role and a break away from its hegemonic attitude. Narendra Modi had maintained the momentum of ‘swearing-in diplomacy’ by follow up visits that reconfirmed the determination of commitment. In June 2014, Indian External Affairs Minister had also chaired a meeting of India’s top envoys from neighbouring countries to maintain the momentum and strengthen bilateral ties.41

40Arun Sahgal, “India’s Security Policies Under Modi”, The Diplomat, available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/indias-security-under-modi/, accessed on 21 November 2014.41 “Narendra Modi government’s neighbourhood priority policy: Sushma Swaraj to visit Nepal”, The Economic Times, available at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-06-29/news/50946793_1_nepal-bilateral-ties-export-promotion-centre, accessed on 15 September 2014.

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In the first three weeks of assuming office, the new PM made the maiden visit to Bhutan. Describing Bhutan as a natural choice for his first visit abroad, the new PM emphasised on ‘special relationship’ between Bhutan and India. During the tour, there was discussion on hydropower cooperation, expanding bilateral trade and increasing scholarship for the Bhutanese students. Both countries also reaffirmed their commitment to extensive development cooperation.42

The second visit of the PM was to Nepal which was first by any Indian Prime Minister in seventeen years since 1997. The visit was termed as a ‘historic’ one where cooperation, connectivity, culture and constitution were discussed.43 Narendra Modi offered the Himalayan neighbour US$ 1 billion in concessional loans to help build power plants and roads. On the political front, Prime Minister delivered a speech in the Nepal Parliament and also met groups of opposition members. He also conducted a special puja (prayer) at the Pashupatinath temple that demonstrated his prudence to uphold the cultural bonds sharing both countries.44 It must also be noted that the new PM’s celebration of the religio-cultural affinity between the two nations was a smart move aimed to win the hearts and minds of Nepali people.

The next South Asian country visited by the incumbent government was Bangladesh which was attended by Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj as her first bilateral visit. The External Affairs Minister had meetings with representatives from government as well as opposition parties. This visit to Dhaka assumes great importance in the overall dynamics of neighbourhood policy since the Minister well communicated the Bangladeshi people about the new Indian government’s vision. Dhaka was conveyed messages of deepening cooperation and increased connectivity.45

In the midst of mounting worries of the recurrence of the Taliban insurgency, especially after the attack on Indian Consulate in Herat province and the mid-2014 election crisis, a trip to Kabul was made by Sushma Swaraj in September. With the trip to Afghanistan during political transition, India reaffirmed its commitment to its unstable neighbour.46 This visit at the crucial juncture implied that stability in Kabul 42 “Ten Key Points of PM Narendra Modi’s Bhutan Visit”, Times of India, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/10-key-points-of-PM-Narendra-Modis-Bhutan-visit/articleshow/36663977.cms, accessed on 15 September 2014.43 “Modi concludes historic visit to Nepal”, Times of India, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Modi-concludes-historic-visit-to-Nepal/articleshow/39628843.cms, accessed on 17 September 2014.44 “Modi concludes historic visit to Nepal”, The Hindu, available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/south-asia/modi-concludes-historic-visit-to-nepal/article6280753.ece, accessed on 17 September 2014.45 “India-Bangladesh Relations: A Framework of Cooperation”, an Address by Shrimati Sushma Swaraj, the External Affairs Minister of India, at Eminent Persons' Lecture organised by Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), Dhaka on 26 June 2014.46 Ankit Panda, “What Role Can India Play in Defusing Afghanistan’s Election Crisis?”, The Diplomat, available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/what-role-can-india-play-in-defusing-afghanistans-election-crisis/, accessed on 12 November 2014.

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would be in the priority list of Delhi. Although the envoy discussed routine matters by avoiding not to have chosen any one side in the political dispute, she kept the door open for both the candidates to deepen relations and also avoided unwarranted discussion of interference.

The new government was very strategic to select the two Himalayan neighbours for maiden visits. For long, these two countries were dispossessed of Heads of States visits even though bilateral relations had been quite close historically. Thus, beginning the journey to woo neighbours with these two countries could not be more productive. Choosing any other neighbour could have added to already held apprehension by other smaller neighbours in the region. The visit to Bangladesh was essential to propel the sentiment that close rapport of Dhaka with the UPA government would not come in way of the new government’s priority. Attending Kabul demonstrated that Delhi would not let standalone its strategic partner Kabul during this transition period. All these developments are decisive to understand the willingness of the incumbent government to put flesh to the electoral promises and to fathom the implications of the new leadership in India for South Asian neighbours.

4. Ramifications for South Asia: Continuity or Change?

A number of factors have affected India’s relations with its neighbours in the past years. Problem with Pakistan roots in the difference of opinion with regard to the two- nation theory, insurgency issues and Kashmir crisis. Relations with Himalayan neighbours like Nepal and Bhutan, in spite of the cultural and religious traditions are affected by the fear of political domination. Interference in domestic affairs had severely affected relations with Sri Lanka. With regard to Bangladesh, even though India played a crucial role in Bangladesh’s War of Liberation, the latter could never avoid the psychological fear of being dominated by the larger neighbour. Dealing with this psychological distance is necessary as it can fade any real prospect of progress among neighbours.

With regard to the environment in South Asia, compared to UPA government, the new leadership is fortunate to experience ‘relative’ stability in the region. Nepal and Bangladesh have stable governments; political transition in Afghanistan is almost complete; although Pakistan’s Nawaz Sharif has the Pakistan Army and raging insurgencies to contend with, the current government at least came to power through a democratic process.47 In addition, fractured electoral mandates did stop many initiatives of UPA government which is unlikely for current administration due to the unanimous support Narendra Modi, as candidate of Prime Ministerial position, had from his party.48 Building on the South Asian perceptions and early days of conduct 47 “Modi works for a neighbourhood that embraces India”, The Hindustan Times, available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/comment/pm-s-neighbourhood-policy-symbolism-persistence-need-to-go-together/article1-1247288.aspx, accessed on 12 November 2014. 48 Aprameya Rao, “Modi and India’s Policy Towards its Immediate Neighbours-Trade and Commerce over Politics”, Science and Technology Security Forum, available at http://stsfor.org/content/modi-and-indias-policy-towards-its-immediate-neighbours-trade-and-commerce-over-politics, accessed on 10 October 2014.

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of Indian leadership, what can be expected from the new government in its relations with neighbours has been analysed in the following discussion.

4.1 Relations with Afghanistan: Forwarding Partnership

India has already been deeply invested in preventing Afghanistan from becoming a failed state and a launching pad for terrorism in the neighbourhood.49 India is the largest regional investor in Afghanistan and has already contributed to capacity building of its security personnel. The country has to date disbursed US$ 2 billion worth of effective assistance to Afghanistan. Back in 2011, the two governments inked a Strategic Partnership Agreement first of its kind between any South Asian neighbours.50 Under the Agreement, both countries agreed to hold regular Strategic Dialogues “to provide a framework for cooperation in the area of national security”.51 With the US-NATO forces withdrawal from the country, India would have to take up additional responsibilities as the rising player in the region. An unstable Afghanistan is not desired since it would further destabilise Pakistan whose Pashtun dominated areas would become more restive and lawless upsetting India’s Pakistan policy and neighbourhood objectives in the whole52.

Since this is the first time Kabul has changed power through a democratic process, and with Ashraf Ghani coming to power, India is likely to get closer with the country based on the dictum that ‘democracies do not fight each other’. The Prime Minister of India pledged to stand beside the new government in Afghanistan ‘at every step’ as ‘friend and partner’. On the other side, the new Afghanistan President also termed relations with India as “foundation of Afghanistan’s diplomacy and economic strategy”.53

India is concerned about its stakes in maintaining peaceful environment in the neighbouring country. On the same line, Pakistan too is displeased about the possibility of being a ‘buffer state’ between New Delhi and Kabul resulting from intensified engagement of India in the neighbouring country. Islamabad is worried of a possible shift in the balance of power in the region towards Indo-Afghan

49 Adam B. Lerner, “Who’s Afraid of Narendra Modi: Why the Indian Prime Minister could be good news for Washington”, available at http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/09/whos-afraid-of-narendra-modi-111364_Page3.html#.VH_4lmfwCSo, accessed on 21 October 2014.50 M. Ashraf Haidari, “Afghanistan-India: A Renewed Partnership”, The Diplomat, available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/afghanistan-india-a-renewed-partnership/, accessed on 25 October 2014.51 Niharika Betkerur, “India Stepping Up to the Plate in Afghanistan”, The Diplomat, available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/india-stepping-up-to-the-plate-in-afghanistan/, accessed on 20 November 2014.52 R. Dahiya and A. Behuria (eds.), India’s Neighbourhood: Challenges in the Next Two Decades, New Delhi: IDSA and Pentagon Security International, 2012, p. 22.53 “PM Narendra Modi Pledges Support to new Afghan President Ashraf Ghani”, Times of India, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/PM-Narendra-Modi-pledges-support-to-new-Afghan-President-Ashraf-Ghani/articleshow/44831468.cms, accessed on 02 November 2014.

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collaboration in lieu of Af-Pak alliance. This would further weaken Pakistan’s regional stand in South Asia. Closer relations of India and Afghanistan would tilt the balance of power in the region largely opening up chances of further boom in ‘all weather friendship’ of Pakistan and China. An insecure, left-alone Pakistan would certainly resort to violent actions; consequence of which would fall upon the whole region. Nevertheless, Kabul seems to understand its advantages and so is considering both the opportunities of extending warm hands to Delhi and Islamabad as evident in the words of the new leadership. It seems to be well aware that strained ties with Pakistan are likely to increase chances of insurgency outbreak in the country in post US-NATO withdrawal period.54

To advance the new government’s objective of connectivity, Afghanistan is crucial since India’s policy of greater connectivity with Central Asia envisions Afghanistan as a regional trade hub crossed by energy pipelines as well as air, rail and road links that would promote resource sharing and people-to-people contacts between the two regions.55 India has frequently expressed a desire to see the emergence of a strong, stable and independent Afghanistan. Any economic assistance provided by India to Afghanistan would be stripped of meaning if the latter is not strong enough to defend the products of the assistance. Moreover, India needs Afghanistan to be able to defend the former’s business investments there. This is one of the main reasons that the new leadership is keeping in touch with Kabul. Cooperation could also be furthered along the lines of intelligence sharing, recruitment, communication and logistics, which would help Afghan forces in covert operations. The posture of the new leadership reflects that Delhi would continue to assist Kabul’s reconstructions needs but would not step in such a way that causes it to mire in the Kabul’s crisis.

4.2 Relations with Pakistan: Continuing Contest

As regards India’s relations with Pakistan, both countries have been in ‘two minds’ about each other. Consequently, the relationship oscillated between psychological hostility to armed conflict ever since 1947. It has been the most intractable neighbour of India.56 Successive governments in both countries have attempted to negotiate numerous times yet achievements remain minimal. Change of government in Pakistan and India in 2013 and 2014 respectively, ensconced hopes of revitalisation in their bilateral relations. Both countries now have new democratic governments coming to power with majority votes and their business friendly postures

54 Hasib Danish Alikozai, “Analysts Look for Clues in Narendra Modi’s Foreign Policy”, Voice of America, available at http://www.voanews.com/content/analysts-look-for-clues-in-narendra-modis-foreign-policy/1926457.html, accessed on 02 November 2014.55 Edward Schwarck, “Can China and India Cooperate in Afghanistan?”, The Diplomat, available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/can-china-and-india-cooperate-in-afghanistan/, accessed on 20 November 2014.56 David Malone, op. cit.

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have added to the anticipation of development in bilateral relations. It appeared that since both are eyeing the economic fruits of peace are apparently ready to deal with one another.57 But all hopes were shattered with the escalation of border tensions.

Although the Prime Minister of India invited his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif in his oath-taking ceremony and there was much hype over this as a fresh start; current situation hints at more disquieting future. Nawaz Sharif also confirmed his readiness by responding genially to India’s call and gestured with discharging 151 Indian fishermen to kick-start conciliation. Nevertheless, immediately after Narendra Modi’s election, there was demonstration in Pakistan to unsettle Nawaz Sharif. The protests significantly reduced the power of the civilian government and relations grew more unstable. When it was time to improve bilateral ties, PM Sharif was mired in domestic politics. Involvement of multiple actors in the domestic politics of Pakistan adds to the complexity. As opined by Shashi Tharoor, “In Pakistan, agreements are concluded with authorities who do not themselves possess the power to implement what they have undertaken”.58 In addition, Pakistan Army, the quarter of Pakistan’s political power play that is fervently anti-Indian, allegedly was not happy with Nawaz Sharif’s attempts to build rapport with the new administration in India. Farahnaz Ispahani, a former member of Pakistan’s parliament noted, “Sharif’s moves towards better ties between India and Pakistan angered the military and may have resulted in the renewed clashes on the Line of Control”.59

Thus, the flashpoint is the Kashmir issue. It would not be an overestimation to say that if Kashmir issue is resolved, Indo-Pak problem would cease to exist and therefore, the rest of South Asia would be in peace. Unfortunately, recent fighting across the disputed Kashmir is the most serious artillery exchanges since 2003 ceasefire and has threatened the newfound hopes. From Delhi’s side, the cancellation of talks at the foreign secretary level in retaliation for Pakistani meetings with Kashmiri separatist organisations was an aggressive move. Visiting the Siachen glacier, an area that is claimed by both India and Pakistan was also a hint of Modi’s assertiveness and ‘non-compromising position’ with regard to Kashmir.60 As expected, the nationalistic leader is less tolerant and has already blamed Pakistan for its engagement in ‘the proxy war of terrorism’ and for violating cease-fire agreements in Kashmir. This also provoked reaction by Pakistan government as ‘urging New Delhi to adopt a more constructive approach’. By allowing armed forces full operational autonomy to retort

57 “Kashmir Violence Tests Modi’s Promise of ‘Muscular’ Foreign Policy”, The Voice of America, available at http://www.voanews.com/content/kashmir-line-of-control-violence-tests-modi-foreign-policy/2480050.html, accessed on 21 November 2014.58 Shashi Tharoor, “Modi’s Message to Pakistan at SAARC”, available at http://www.ndtv.com/article/opinion/modi-s-message-to-pakistan-at-saarc-626788, accessed on 28 November 2014.59 Harsh V Pant, “Out With Non-Alignment, In With a Modi Doctrine”, The Diplomat, available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/out-with-non-alignment-in-with-a-modi-doctrine/, accessed on 21 November 2014.60 “Media See Modi’s Visit to Kashmir as Message to Pakistan”, BBC News, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-29751900, accessed on 07 November 2014.

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to the increase of ceasefire violations by Pakistan forces, Modi has hinted his offensive approach. He would be less willing to make concessions and would increase India’s military strength to deter Pakistan.61

However, both the countries have managed to cooperate on non-securitised softer issues like disaster response and energy issue. While India assisted the earthquake devastated Pakistan with relief in 2010, Pakistan reciprocated after recent floods in Indian administered Kashmir. Discussion over information sharing of common rivers to develop an early warning flood system also took place. To encourage energy sharing, India and Pakistan also inked a gas sharing agreement through the proposed TAPI pipeline which would run through Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan.62 Nevertheless, trade relation has to overcome a major hurdle and the issue of Non-Discriminatory Market Access (NDMA) is yet to be resolved.63

The escalated tensions can put up further pressure on India.64 India seems to be pursuing a ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy, in which it is willing to cooperate if Pakistan shows the willingness, but would respond to aggression with aggression. It would do great damage to the new leadership’s credibility if his government is forced to talk to Pakistan in case situation deteriorates.65 Thus, there seems to be a mixed message towards Islamabad; on one side, PM Modi extended hands of cooperation in softer issues; on the other, he reacted quite aggressively with regard to harder issues like insurgencies and terrorism. Nonetheless, while terrorism in Pakistan remains a problem, Delhi should be careful enough to craft policies for Pakistan since there always remains the risk of nuclear war. Talks with the Pakistan army are a must if the new government of India wants to walk miles with all neighbours. Leaving Islamabad behind would only hinder the prospects of cooperation. Political will should be expressed by Pakistan as well. Nevertheless, it is already evident that relations between the larger neighbours would continue to disquiet the region.

4.3 Relations with Bangladesh: Addressing Mutual Concerns

Bangladesh is a strategic country in the policy propositions of India. There are innumerable issues continuously opening up from the Pandora’s Box of Bangladesh-India relations. Security and development of North-East India is directly linked with Bangladesh, so is the success of India’s ‘Look East’ and connectivity policies. With the visit of Sushma Swaraj, it was evident that Bangladesh figures prominently in the foreign policy agenda of the new government. The new Prime Minister is also expected to pay a visit to the country in near future.

61 Prakash Nanda, op. cit.62 Ibid.63 Smruti Pattanaik, op. cit.64 Ibid.65 Harsh V Pant, op. cit.

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The crucial concerns with regard to the bilateral relations in recent times are the land boundary agreement issue and water sharing agreements. In the initial days of PM Modi assuming power, there were apprehensions among Bangladeshi political community that relations with India may be strained due to the close rapport of the current administration of Dhaka with the immediate past administration in New Delhi. In addition, in his election speeches, Narendra Modi has been heating up debate on the issues of Bangladeshi ‘infiltrators’ calling for tighter border controls and denunciating Bangladeshi Muslim migrants.66 Days before the election, the West Bengal and Assam unit of BJP heatedly opposed the Land Boundary Agreement and its implementation when it was scheduled for ratification in Lok Shabha. PM Modi also threatened to expel the illegal settlers from India and further alleged that a large number of illegal migrants were being accommodated by the state government to benefit from vote bank politics.

However, the post election posture has been cautious. The easy going approach of India regarding maritime boundary verdict in Hague and the consultation External Affairs Minister had with West Bengal Chief Minister on land exchanges related to boundary agreement can be considered as positive signals. To add to the positivity, the current government in India has now been screening keenness over the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) mentioning its necessity to curb ‘infiltrators’; parliamentary standing committee has been set up that submitted unanimous report recommending passage of the long-held bill to implement the Land Boundary issue. The West Bengal unit has also changed their stance, possibly due to its trapped state followed by Burdwan bombing. This has re-generated hopes over the prospect of completion of the implementation of the deal even before the expected visit of the new Prime Minister to Bangladesh. But to note, the Assam unit is still furious over the present stance of the new Government.67 PM Modi, who previously objected to the bill mentioning the loss of land, has now made a turn to favour the deal remarking that the LBA is a short term loss for Assam to gain over the long run, i.e., closing way for infiltrators. The long run gain would simplify management of cross border issues and would ultimately clear up settling of its longest border dispute with Bangladesh. If implemented, the serpentine Bangladesh-India border would be redrawn and made much straighter for better management with each country transferring area under adverse possession.68

66 Deepal Jayasekera, “India: Modi reiterates pledge to expel “Bangladeshi” Muslims in wake of communal massacre”, available at http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/05/08/asam-m08.html, accessed on 02 October 2014.67 “Assam group angry over PM Narendra Modi stand on Bangla Land Swap”, The Indian Express, available at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/assam-groups-angry-over-modi-stand-on-bangla-land-swap/, accessed on 01 December 2014.68 Pallab Bhattacharya, “Mamata Melting”, The Daily Star, available at http://www.thedailystar.net/mamata-melting-53470, accessed on 05 December 2014.; see also, “Bangladesh is hopeful about implementation of LBA”, BBC Bangla, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/bengali/news/2014/12/141205_qk_bd_president_visit_india, accessed on 05 December 2014.

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The crisis for administration in Dhaka is that it cannot afford to go forward on the transit issue without showing positive results on the Land Boundary Agreement and the Teesta River accord. Lack of infrastructure and non-settlement of transit fees have also held back progress on the transit related issues.69 In such a scenario, the new Indian government is expected to show some readiness to deal with these issues so that consensus can be created within Bangladesh. India needs to attach greater importance to the regional and sub-regional role of Bangladesh. Since Bangladesh has been very forthcoming to address issues like extremism, terrorism and connectivity hand in hand with India, it is time that India come up to add to the confidence of this strategic neighbour. The promised US$ 1 billion credit line from India has also been caught up in bureaucratic red tape.70 India’s Border Security Force (BSF) is still regularly shooting Bangladeshi nationals, while Bangladeshi exports to India face a multitude of non-tariff barriers. Talks over Teesta Accord are still stalled and no discussion over this took place during the meeting of PM Sheikh Hasina and Narendra Modi in Kathmandu, though assurance has been provided to sign the water-sharing treaty soon. However, as evident in the land boundary agreement, bringing all the actors on board is the posture of the new leadership. But no discussion has taken place over this with the West Bengal unit. Another crucial actor in the discussion would be Sikkim who is still not on board in the discussion. Therefore, relations between Bangladesh and India would maintain its momentum but implementation of mutual concerns might take a long time.

4.4 Relations with Sri Lanka: Putting Back on Track?

New Delhi’s relations with Colombo in the recent past experienced abrasion over two issues: debate of intrusion in internal affairs of Sri Lanka and the Tamil crisis. A course changing turn in policies appeared in early 2014 when the then Indian government decided to abstain from its hitherto voting prototypes in the United Nations Human Rights Council with resolution related to Sri Lankan government’s involvement in human right abuses against Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This idea of the central government was not taken well by the domestic force of Tamil leaders in India who pushed for stronger stance by the government.

Given Tamil Nadu’s influence in Indian foreign policy with the neighbouring state and Modi government’s insistence on ‘Team India’, it would be too optimistic to say an independent, stable course would or could be chosen by the new government. Inviting Sri Lankan President in the oath taking ceremony, in spite of objection from Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, may lead to excitement about India’s new leadership; a major shift in India’s stance on the Tamil issue is unlikely. Although the coalition 69 Shahab Enam Khan and Parvez Karin Abbasi, “Modi-fying Bangladesh-India Relations”, The Dhaka Tribune, available at http://www.dhakatribune.com/long-form/2014/apr/01/modi-fying-bangladesh-india-relations, accessed on 02 October 2014.70Zahedul Amin, “The India-Bangladesh Power Trap”, The Diplomat, available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/the-india-bangladesh-power-trap/, accessed on 21 November 2014.

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compulsion appears to be lesser in this term compared to the Congress government; one must not forget that Narendra Modi is a Chief Minister turned Prime Minister who holds reverence for role of state governments and it lends credence to the view that Tamil Nadu’s political realities is not going to be ignored. In addition, Prime Minister Modi has a large majority in the Lok Sabha which moderates his dependence on Tamil Nadu compared to the previous Congress administration; however, the support of Tamil Nadu in the Rajya Sabha, the Indian parliament’s upper chamber, where BJP holds only 57 seats, could play a critical role.71

Greater Indian aid flows and trade ties between Sri Lanka and India, especially in education, can be expected. Within weeks of election, India signed a memorandum with Sri Lanka to open a cultural centre in Jaffna. This would help to bridge the trust gap. Boosting up infrastructural development cooperation is crucial since through this sort of engagements bulk of Chinese aid flows into the region. Sri Lanka’s President first approached India when seeking to construct a sea port in southern Sri Lanka, which was not pursued by India and later was accepted by China.72 Therefore, the interests of the new government would be best served by undertaking a balanced approach aimed to avoid the overt interventionist tactics. Ultimately, strategic expansion of socioeconomic cooperation and pressure to implement the Thirteenth Amendment and devolution of power needs to go hand in hand to put the relationship back on track.73

4.5 Relations with Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives: Fostering Economic Engagements

The new leadership would pay precise attention to develop relations with smaller neighbours, like Nepal and Bhutan, by offering economic incentives. Not only because economic development of these countries are crucial for India’s own growth. Improved ties with these countries may help to counter Chinese influence in South Asia. The Prime Minister’s visit to Bhutan, just ahead of China-Bhutan boundary talks, is indicative that the new government is not willing to lose one of its strongest partners in the region. India’s promises of economic assistance to Nepal come at a moment when China has overtaken India as the biggest foreign investor in Nepal in the first six months of 2014. China’s aid-driven entry in the region must have impacted Delhi’s priorities. The impression of ‘equal partners’ as offered by PM Modi was certainly attempted to entice the Himalayan neighbours.74

71 Daniel Alphonsus, “Modi’s Sweet and Spicy Sri Lanka Strategy”, The Diplomat, available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/modis-sweet-and-spicy-sri-lanka-strategy/, accessed on 20 November 2014.72 Ved Singh, “India in a South Asian Context: Modi’s Engagement with South Asian Neighbours”, The National Bureau of Asian Research, available at http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=480, accessed on 21 November 2014.73 Ibid.74 Yuba Nath Lamsal, “Beginning of new optimism in Nepal-India relations”, The Weekly Mirror, Nepal, 29 September 2014.

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In addition, the river resources that has been a mark of mistrust rather than means for mutuality, runs through Modi’s agenda. In Bhutan, he laid the foundation for a 600 megawatt hydroelectric power station and in Nepal discussed a number of hydropower pacts. Nevertheless, with regard to Nepal, considering the link between assumption of power by a “rightwing” BJP-led government and support to the Hindu Right wing forces in Nepal in a post monarch state, explicit religiosity as demonstrated during the first Nepal visit could send some unwanted signal especially in light of declaration of secular Nepal and debate of its identity as ‘Hindu Rastra’. To put in words of C. Raja Mohan, “The potential danger is about India crossing the line between celebrating the shared religious heritage and blundering into Nepal’s domestic debate on the role of Hinduism in the construction of the post-monarchical state”.75 Such a debate can destabilise Nepal adding to the volatility of South Asia.

With regard to Maldives, under the Modi Government, there would be attempts to mend ties with Maldives that happens to have close ties with China. The Indian Prime Minister expressed his interest to provide higher education opportunities in India for Maldivian students. Both countries also discussed about increasing people-to-people connectivity through tourism since, in 2013 Indian tourists visiting Maldives increased by 20 per cent. India would likely heed the request made by Maldivian President Abdulla Yameen Gayoom for help in constructing a naval base off the main island of Male.76

4.6 Regional Mechanism to Expand?

The only regional institution to address the mutual problems of South Asian countries is SAARC. So far the organisation has achieved far less from what has been expected. The new leadership in India, however, hinted its willingness to move out of the shadows of India-Pakistan spat and carry it forward. The election manifesto of BJP had also unwrapped desire to reinforce regional organisations. In line with its renewed commitment to the region, the government of India had called for a new regional bank, a SAARC bank, to support infrastructure financing for trade facilitation and development. The bank is expected to boost economic development of South Asia substantially and provide capital for intra-South Asian projects like energy management, i.e., hydropower. This appears to be an attempt to bring back India as a central player within South Asia.

With this declaration, there was an expectation of rebalancing in the regional economic landscape. In addition, the declaration to introduce business visa during

75 C. Raja Mohan, “The political pilgrim”, The Indian Express, available at http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/the-political-pilgrim/99/, accessed on 24 September 2014.76 Balaji Chandramohan, “India’s Regional Security Strategy under Modi Government”, available at http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/indian-ocean/1756-india-s-regional-security-strategy-under-the-modi-government.html, accessed on 06 November 2014.

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the 18th SAARC Summit in Kathmandu was another step to boost regional trade.77 Desires were also expressed to look into increased coordination of issues like health and education which is vital to turn the greatest resource of South Asia, i.e., manpower, into real dividend. Nevertheless, the 18th SAARC summit also lost its way in the Indo-Pak confrontation. Before the summit, there were three ministerial meetings of energy ministers, home ministers and cultural ministers which the Pakistani counterparts did not attend. The summit could not produce intended result since Islamabad did not endorse two of three agreements for increased road, rail and energy links put forth by India78, making the expected integration a nightmare. Only the agreement on energy has been signed. No significant move on fighting terrorism was observed. Narendra Modi is likely to lead the infrastructural connectivity in SAARC to reduce China’s influence. Understandably, from Pakistan’s perspective this is a big no-no and that’s why China’s all-weather friend is opposing seamless travel plans in SAARC.79 All these echoes that attempts to expand SAARC would remain complicated unless problems between the two larger neighbours are resolved.

4.7 Continuity or Change?

Scholars of South Asia have often been looking forward to a Europe Union like engagement in this part of the world. For long there has been desire for common markets, development of common currency and trade management regimes. However, considering the strategic thoughts that prevail in the region, the colonial history, post-colonial state practices and the ever-hostile relations between the two larger neighbours, people of South Asia has not been fortunate to experience such a transformation. There seems to be the realisation that an integrated South Asia is necessary in this interdependent world but there is lack of initiatives to translate the theory into practice. Irrespective of common stakes there is diverse perception of threats and security that haunts any efforts to even envision an integrated South Asia.

Undoubtedly, the new government in India made a fresh start no matter whatever said during the election time. While it seems that there has been a shift in the posture of India in recent times especially with the euphoric swearing-in ceremony and follow-up actions, it may not reflect a change in the traditional policies toward the region. Cooperation with Pakistan is still limited to softer issues and red-line being drawn with regard to insurgencies and terrorism. Though it is expected that soft cooperation will act as catalyst to resolve harder disputes, it is often the case that harder issues are hampering cooperation on other fronts like connectivity, trade and tourism. The mango diplomacy, shawl diplomacy as well as cricket diplomacy has not

77 Rishi Iyengar, “Indian PM Modi Announces New Business Visas for SAARC Nations”, Time, available at http://time.com/3607012/indian-pm-modi-announces-new-business-visas-for-saarc-nations/, accessed on 26 November 2014.78 Ibid.79 “SAARC Diplomacy”, India Today, available at http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/saarc-pm-narendra-modi-india-nepal-pakistan/1/403967.html, accessed on 02 December 2014.

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been able to instill the desire for peace between the larger neighbours. In the post draw-down phase of NATO forces, Afghanistan may get increasingly unstable and mere help in reconstruction and economic assistance would not do much. Attempts to develop a forthcoming Bangladesh-India relation has also been slow with only a limited sign of activism as observed in the land boundary issue. Considering the potential benefits of improved relationship between Bangladesh and India in terms of connectivity, economic cooperation and containing insurgent and terrorist forces, it is time that the new government play proactive role in resolving the long-held disputes. Sri Lanka, however, is witnessing a bit of alteration in the traditionally overt interventionist tactics of India that need to be buttressed with extension of socio-economic cooperation. The realisation of Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives strategic significance has been reflected in the incumbent government’s priorities.

In addition, continuity rather than change would also result from the fact that Narendra Modi has carefully chosen his panel of advisers and ministers based on his personal preferences. Hence, it is difficult to expect that Modi’s pool of advisors and bureaucrats would be able to break away from conservative instincts. While BJP plans to include Chief Ministers and other functionaries as equal partners in the decision-making structure propagating the concept of ‘Team India’, it should also be noted that how state actors can sometimes unreasonably complicate relations with neighbours. For PM Modi and his government, as noted by Harsh V Pant, the biggest challenge would remain to move away from an overly personalised foreign policy towards a more institutionalised foreign policy and national security decision-making, a weakness that previous governments have failed to overcome.

Having noted this, it is also pertinent to bear in mind that every government has its own flavour, and subtle changes in traditional policy emphasis are inevitable.80 The leadership in India has adopted a new approach to pursue the old objectives. The newer approach is confirmed by the way attention and precedence is delivered to the smaller nations; the emphasis is projected through exercise of soft power emphasising historical ties with countries in areas of religion, culture and prioritising geo-economics in conduct by offering assistance to improve economic linkages. The policy of the new government appears to be to woo the neighbouring countries through revival of civilisational ties, penetrating the countries with economic diplomatic efforts in line with their developmental needs to strengthen their desire and adaptability to democratic forms of governments and then form a belt in South Asia where there will be no fight among the democracies.

At the core of the new government’s strategy of deepening ties with other South Asian countries is the strategic objective of a stable and peaceful neighbourhood to further its global aspirations. In fact, a peaceful neighbourhood is a sine qua non for the realisation of its growth ambitions.81 The creation of ‘web of allies’

80 Daniel Alphonsus, op. cit.81 Satish Chandra, “India’s Neighbourhood Policy”, available at http://www.vifindia.org/article/2012/

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as propagated in the BJP manifesto, is aimed to limit diplomatic dominance of China in its backyard. Thus, under the new government, both economic interdependence and realism would be hallmarks of Indian foreign policy.82 Attempts are designed to turn India’s image from regional hegemon to regional leader. Consequently, the present dynamics offers South Asian smaller countries with opportunity to extract benefits from both India and China following the similar non-alignment posture that India has played for long.

5. Conclusion

Post-independence India’s foreign policy has been defined more by continuity than by change. Contemporary Indian foreign policy is focused largely on the promotion of economic interests, India’s progression to the high table of international relations and enhancing its security within immediate neighbourhood.83 With regard to South Asia, India’s immediate strategic backyard, the ‘Modi doctrine’, if one may say so, seems no different. The Prime Minister has already hinted on undertaking a vigorous policy centred on greater economic engagement and people-to-people contacts. The Modi government seems to tie up the loosened connectivity at people’s level to remind of the cultural bonds of South Asia which is crucial for growing realisation of shared prosperity.

The sense of shared prosperity is also central to enhance the security and promote political reconciliation. Through the promotion of geo-economic advantages, Indian leadership plans to protect geo-strategic objectives. The swearing in diplomacy was like creating a brand of India; a brand away from hegemonistic image and to demonstrate acceptance of India within the region. It was to convince that India has a strong leadership and can take care of its strategic backyard without external powers’ presence. It was part of New Delhi’s realisation that further flexibility is required of India to accommodate neighbours.

What the neighbours had been expecting from India is generosity and magnanimity. Mingling with smaller neighbours is the first step of ‘renounce the path of violence and take the path of brotherhood’. Nevertheless, the relations are still in its honeymoon period. It must not be forgotten that Narendra Modi is a nationalist and pro-business leader. These short term tactical shifts to bring countries of South Asia in its radar with carrot of economic development and sweetness of ‘equal partnership’ might also unleash as ‘sugar coated hegemony’. Envisioning a better integrated South Asia may seem lustrous but it is never to forget that the region has always been hard to characterise and complex to predict.

june/27/india-s-neighbourhood-policy, accessed on 23 November 2014.82 Ashok Sharma, “What will India’s foreign policy look like under Modi”, available at http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2014/05/17/comment-what-will-indias-foreign-policy-look-under-modi, accessed on 23 November 2014.83 David M. Malone, op. cit.

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Abul Kalam AzadMd. Fazlul Halim

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: FINDING OUT ITS HUMAN SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

Abstract

Humanitarian intervention based on the idea called ‘The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’ leaves little room for controversy because such intervention is meant to save populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In effect, the R2P is a step by step process for dealing with an internal conflict with significant security implications. It is a composite whole of three elements and each of which tries to deal with an internal conflict with due consideration to security at three levels, i.e., human security at the national level, regional security and international security. In view of the fact that contemporary world witnesses, till to date, many internal conflicts of various nature, intervention in such cases, henceforth, should be guided by the spirit of R2P. This would enable the conflicts to find their respective end in a peaceful and non-violent manner in consonance with international laws and norms. The paper attempts to study the various elements of R2P from a comprehensive security perspective with recommendation for its application in all future internal conflicts including the current one in Syria.

1. Introduction

Humanitarian intervention as a political phenomenon has been a controversial issue whether it is implemented or not. Much of the controversy, however, seems to have faded away when humanitarian intervention has been looked upon as a mechanism in conjunction with the idea called ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’, initiated by the Canadian government in September 2000. Efforts towards promulgation of such an idea were rendered in response to international community’s failure to save populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. All such heinous acts were perpetrated in several conflict-ridden countries, in particular during the post-Cold War period. In view of the fact that most of these conflicts were intra-state in nature, the normal procedure for resolving international conflict as enshrined in the UN Charter was not applicable in these cases. As a result,


Abul Kalam Azad, PhD, is Professor at the Department of International Relations, Jahangirnagar University, Savar, Dhaka. His e-mail address is: [email protected]. Fazlul Halim is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Jahangirnagar University, Savar, Dhaka. His e-mail address is: [email protected]. Currently, he is pursuing his Master’s degree in Mass Media and Politics at the University of Liverpool, UK.


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ways and means were to be devised to respond to various intra-state conflicts or, in other words, what is called internal conflicts.

A dispassionate analysis of various internal conflicts quite clearly reveals the fact that it is the total failure in maintaining internal human security conditions of the people that lies at the base of all internal conflicts. Since deterioration in human security conditions causes adverse effects on regional and international security, internal conflicts are, therefore, deemed to be detrimental to security system at three levels, i.e., national, regional and international. It is with this consideration in view that humanitarian intervention has been crafted to forestall the degradation of three-tier security system through certain measures. All such measures are incorporated in the concept of R2P. It should be mentioned that the R2P is preventive in nature. It takes cognizance of the fact that if a conflict arises due to the failure in human security system, it is better to rectify the wrongs committed in the affected countries before actually taking any punitive step against them. R2P, in effect, creates conditions for a conflict-ridden country to look forward to the future, not only from its internal human security, but also from regional and international security perspective.

In view of the above, the paper seeks to study that R2P driven humanitarian intervention tries to deal with internal conflict through a comprehensive security approach. As mentioned earlier, security, in this connection is at three levels, i.e., human security at national level, regional security and international security. The paper is divided into five sections including introduction and conclusion. The second section is an attempt to explain as to why humanitarian intervention is needed to address the problems associated with an internal conflict. The third section seeks to find out the measures and procedures through which humanitarian intervention seeks to address the security complexities as generated by an internal conflict. The fourth section attempts to prognosticate the future of humanitarian intervention for meeting the challenges as posed by the internal conflicts of various nature. Finally, the paper ends with a conclusion.

The paper is based on empirical and analytical understanding of various facets of security and their linkages with R2P based humanitarian intervention. Research materials such as books, journals, newspapers, electronic media, etc. have been utilised for undertaking the research.

2. Internal Conflict and the Raison d’être of Humanitarian Intervention

At the outset, it should be mentioned that it is the internal conflict rather than international conflict that invites humanitarian intervention due to few peculiarities that the former type of conflict exhibits. Although the presence of internal conflicts has been observed since the very inception of the modern state system, nonetheless, their occurrence in great number with fierce intensity is mostly observed in the post-

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Cold War period. With the end of the Cold War, a great expectation that peace dividend would be enjoyed by the international community in perpetuity somewhat became a chimera when various internal conflicts took place with their destabilising effects on national, regional and international security. In terms of origin and their resulting effects, internal conflicts perplexed the international community to the extent that new measures are needed in order to respond to such conflicts. Towards this end, the naissance of humanitarian intervention was found to be the most logical answer. This section of the paper attempts to deal with the nature and characteristics of an internal conflict in order to examine the ground that they create for inviting humanitarian intervention. A brief description of humanitarian intervention will also find its place in the paper.

In the post-Cold War period, internal conflict has been baptised as such like intra-state conflict, new wars, non-international conflict, wars in the post-Cold War era and ethnic conflicts. For the purpose of the paper, internal conflict or intra-state conflict would be used interchangeably. The concept of internal conflict has been defined in various ways. The paper prefers to cite the opinions of two distinguished authors in the field, one by Michael E. Brown and the other by Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz. Michael E. Brown defines an internal conflict as, “By “internal conflict”, we mean violent or potentially violent political disputes whose origins can be traced primarily to domestic rather than systemic factors, and where armed violence takes place or threatens to take place primarily within the borders of a single state”.1 In a similar vein, Muzaffar Ercan Yilmaz defines an internal conflict in the following words, “A non-international (internal) armed conflict refers to a situation of violence involving protracted armed confrontations between government forces and one or more organized armed groups, or between such groups themselves, arising on the territory of a state”.2 Examples of internal conflict include violent power struggles involving civilian or military leaders, armed ethnic conflicts and secessionist campaigns, challenges by criminal organisations to state sovereignty, armed ideological struggles, and revolutions.3 “The level of violence can range from low-level terrorist campaigns to sustained guerrilla insurgencies to all-out war or genocide. In most cases, the key actors are governments and rebel groups, but when state structures are weak or non-existent, groups of various kinds fight among themselves in a Hobbesian universe of their own”.4

It is, therefore, evident that an internal conflict differs from an international conflict not only in spatial and conflict parties terms, it has, rather, other problematic characteristics unseen in case of an international conflict. These characteristics

1 Michael E. Brown, “Introduction” in Michael E. Brown (ed.), The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Center for Science and International Affairs, Cambridge, 1996, p. 1. 2 Muzzafar Ercan Yilmaz, "Intra-state Conflicts in the Post-Cold War", International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 24, No. 4, December 2007. 3 Michael E. Brown, op. cit.4 Harry Eckstein, “Introduction: Toward the Theoretical Study of Internal War” in Harry Eckstein (ed.), Internal War: Problems and Approaches, New York: Free Press, 1964.

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ultimately drive an intra-state conflict towards a course that defies, in most cases, all peaceful means of conflict management and conflict resolution. It is, thus, pertinent to delve into such characteristics in a manner as brief as possible.

First, the occurrence of an internal conflict is very abrupt and erratic. Such type of conflict normally does not have precise beginning and ending. It does not start with a declaration of war. The spatial coverage of an internal conflict is not fixed, and as a result it is devoid of definitive battlefields. An internal conflict lacks decisive campaigns and formal endings.5

Second, it is difficult to draw a time framework of an intra-state conflict. Normally, it is protracted in nature and can last for decades. During the period of conflict, episodes of fierce fighting may alternate with times of relative peace. This makes the boundary between war and peace quite blurry both in time and across space.6

Third, there are differences in modes of warfare in case of an internal conflict. It is fought by loosely knit groups of ‘regulars’ and ‘irregulars’, soldiers, rebels and civilians, local warlords, cadres and paramilitaries and not by two (or more) conventional clear-cut national armies.7

Fourth, an internal conflict is generally supported by outside sources. The support may come from overseas diaspora, lobby groups or foreign mercenaries. Such type of conflict is sustained by global networks of trade, outside emergency assistance and the parallel economy.8

Fifth, an internal conflict has, in all likelihood, the possibility of getting itself transformed into either a regional conflict or an international one for the following reasons: (a) the flow of refugees across borders;9 (b) the use of the territory of neighbouring states for shipment of arms and supplies; (c) posing a threat to the interests of distant powers and international organisations; (d) excessive dependence on diaspora for financial and political support; and finally (e) threatening and undermining international law, international norms of behaviour and international order.

5 Jole Demmers, Theories of Violent Conflict: An Introduction, New York: Routledge, 2012.6 Ibid.7 Ibid.8 Ibid.9 Refugees, for example, often flee across international borders in larger numbers: at the height of the genocidal slaughter in Rwanda in 1994, 250,000 Rwandans fled into Tanzania in a single day. Over the course of just a few months, an estimated 2 million people fled from Rwanda to Tanzania, Zaire, and Burundi; none of these countries was in a position to provide adequately for a sudden influx of needy people. At a minimum, refugees impose heavy economic burdens on host states, and they can pose political and security problems as well. Cited in Michael E. Brown, op. cit., p. 6-7.

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Finally, an inter-state conflict causes tremendous suffering in terms of loss of life and property. This is because violence with which an internal conflict is associated is normally intense due to the involvement of various rebel groups, ethnic factions, guerillas, insurgents and the like. All these groups fight among themselves, as stated earlier, in a ‘Hobbesian world of their own’.10

The last point that evokes humanitarian question is relevant for the paper. Needless to mention, the atrocities and crimes committed in case of an internal conflict have been found to surpass even those of an international conflict of conventional nature. As Michael E. Brown aptly remarks, “In most internal conflicts, the stakes are high and fighting is vicious. Internal conflict often involves direct, deliberate attacks on civilians. Conflicts over control of territory frequently escalate into military campaigns designed to drive out or kill civilians from rival groups. Intimidation, assassination, rape, forced expulsion, and systematic slaughter are commonly employed instruments. The numbers of people displaced or killed in such conflicts are often counted in tens and hundreds of thousands, and sometimes even in millions. In the most extreme cases – in Bosnia since 1992 and in Rwanda in 1994, for example – genocide is carried out”.11 Perhaps, more ominous is the fact that killing/massacre or other atrocious acts are not only committed by the non-state actors but as well by the state authority that itself perpetrates such acts against its own citizens. As David Dykes observes, “… in the 20th century alone 262 million people were killed by their own governments: six times more than the number of people killed in battle with foreign governments”.12

A report published by the UN under the title ‘Human Rights and Conflicts: A UN Priority’ depicts a more agonising picture of humanitarian crisis as observed in case of intra-state conflicts. It says, “The number of conflict-ridden deaths is only a small indication of the tremendous amount of suffering, displacement and devastation caused by conflicts. Assaults on the fundamental right to life are widespread – massacre, indiscriminate attacks on civilians, execution of prisoners and starvation of entire populations. Torture is common in internal conflicts, as are measures restricting people’s freedom of movement – forcible relocations, mass expulsions, denial of the right to seek asylum or the right to return to one’s home. Women and girls are raped by soldiers and forced into prostitution, and civilians are abducted to serve as soldiers. Tens of thousands of people detained in connection with conflicts ‘disappear’ each year, normally killed or buried in secret, leaving their families with the torment of not knowing their fate. Thousands of others are arbitrarily imprisoned and never brought to trial or if they are, are subject to grossly unfair procedures. Homes, schools and hospitals are deliberately destroyed. Relief convoys, which try to assist civilians by providing humanitarian aid are attacked”.13

10 Harry Eckstein, op. cit. 11 Michael E. Brown, op. cit., p. 3.12 David Dykes, "In the post 9/11 era is the ‘Responsibility to Protect' irrelevant?", available at http://www.e-ir.info?p=2109, accessed on 20 October 2013. 13 "Human Rights and Conflicts: A UN Priority", available at www.un.org//rights/HR Today/hr.conflict.htm, accessed on 12 August 2013.

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Beginning from the early nineties, the atrocities and war crimes as observed in various internal conflicts, in particular in the continent of Africa, took the entire international community by surprise. Soon a concern for human rights and its promotion heightened at the international level, propelled further by globalisation and rapid advancement in information and communication technology. Meanwhile, rapid changes in international relations following the end of the Cold War led many quarters to think about direct military intervention in the newly erupted intra-state conflicts with or without the UN Security Council authorisation. Eventually, there arose a heated debate over the issue of humanitarian intervention with respect to its legality and practicality. Finally, the debate subsided with the emergence of the concept of R2P in successive phases. Thus, one notices, following the end of the 1991 Gulf War, French Foreign Minister Ronald Dumas opined about direct intervention in the following words, “The international community had a right to intervene to alleviate human suffering caused by repression, civil disorder, inter-state conflict or natural disasters”.14 The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in his address to the 54th session of the UN General Assembly in 1999, cited the failures of the UN Security Council to act promptly in Rwanda and Kosovo and invoked the member states of the UN to “find common ground in upholding the principles of the Charter, and acting in defense of our common humanity”. He warned that “if the collective conscience of humanity cannot find in the United Nations its greatest tribune, there is a grave danger that it will look elsewhere for peace and for justice”.15 A year later, he in his Millennium Report to the General Assembly expressed his dilemma in the following words, “if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how would we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”.16

A solution to the dilemma faced by the UN authority was given in a report published by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000 under the initiative of the Canadian government. The report incorporated a new idea called ‘the Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) rather than the ‘right to intervene’.17 The R2P redefines humanitarian intervention as a responsibility (first, of the state concerned, and failing that, of the international community), and not a right (of outsiders, however, may they represent the international community at large).18 The report considers the phrase ‘right to intervene’ unhelpful, because it stresses ‘the claims, rights and prerogatives of the potentially intervening states’ over ‘the urgent needs of the potential beneficiaries of action’, and because it fails

14 Thomas G. Weiss and Kurt Campbell, “Military Humanitarianism”, Survival, Vol. 33, No. 5, September-October, 1991, p. 452. 15 "The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty", ICISS Report, Ottawa, International Development Center, December 2001. 16 Ibid.17 The Responsibility to Protect, available at http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp, accessed on 06 July 2013. 18 Amitav Acharya, “Refining the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2002, p. 374-74, cited in Mohammad Ismail Hossain, “State Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention : Does One Negate the Other?”, BIISS Papers 22, September 2006, p. 89.

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to capture the broader tasks of prevention and follow-up peace building that must accompany intervention”.19

One of the most prominent features of the report is its assertion that humanitarian intervention is to be ‘an exceptional and extraordinary’ measure. As stated in the basic principles of the ICISS, “Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect”.20 The report considers two kinds of event for conducting intervention: “where there is a large-scale loss of life – with or without genocide intent – that results from deliberate state action or the massive failure of state structures; and where there is a large-scale ethnic cleansing carried out by means of killing, rape, torture, or mass expulsion.”21

Intense diplomatic efforts were needed to recognise the R2P as a new political concept. It is after six years that the idea was duly endorsed by the UN Security Council Resolution 1674 in 2006. Earlier in 2005, the issue was placed in the UN sponsored World Summit before the representatives of nearly 170 countries who consented to the idea almost unconditionally. In 2008, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon appointed Assistant Secretary-General Edward Luck as his Special Adviser for R2P. Finally, in 2009, the UN General Assembly renewed its commitment to R2P through a resolution titled ‘Responsibility to Protect’, the first resolution on R2P formalising international commitment to the concept.

3. Humanitarian Intervention: Facing the Security Challenges

Since the end of World War II, few instruments like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the Geneva Conventions (1949) sought to bring a halt to further genocide, war crimes and all sorts of crimes against humanity across the globe. In most cases, such promises were, however, not fulfilled to the expectation of the international community. As observed, during the period of the Cold War, the two superpowers supported, in an almost unbridled manner, various protracted conflicts in the Third World to preserve their respective geo-strategic, security and economic interests. The end of the Cold War witnessed even more serious conflicts, for example in Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, East Timor, Congo etc. As a result, as Ilicole-Ann Hardwick remarks, “ In the late 1990s, debates about crisis prevention and response increasingly began to concentrate on the security of the individual and the community, rather than merely the state – human security. It was in this context that the ICISS first presented its report on the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in 2001. The traditional, narrow perception of security leaves out the most elementary and legitimate concerns of

19 Ibid.20 ICISS Report, op. cit.21 Ibid.

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ordinary people regarding security in their daily lives. The ICISS focused on what it perceived as new security challenges in 21st century, including international terrorism, international conflicts, weak state structures and increased vulnerability of civilians”.22

It is, therefore, the paradigmatic shift in the concept of security from a traditional one to a comprehensive one that lies at the epicentre of the R2P doctrine. In this connection, R2P seeks to address the security deficit that creates and sustains a conflict with all its perverse effects on human security and consequently on national, regional and international security. This section of the paper, therefore, purports to study the three basic elements of R2P and then examine how they are related to security in general and to human security in particular. The three elements are: (i) the responsibility to prevent; (II) the responsibility to react and (iii) the responsibility to rebuild.

3.1 The Responsibility to Prevent

The responsibility to prevent is a human security driven concept. As indicated earlier, the R2P envisages that a conflict is caused mainly due to human security deficit in a particular country, in other words, due to malfunctioning of a state in its political, economic, social and cultural spheres. As a result, the R2P suggests certain political, economic, social, cultural, legal and military reforms for a conflict-ridden country to redress the wrongs committed in the past and to forestall the repetition of the conflict in the future. As one scholar puts it, “Effective prevention must address the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risks”.23 Before actually taking the measures, the R2P suggests an early warning system through which the causes and effects of a conflict need to be brought to attention. For effective prevention, ‘there has to be knowledge of the fragility of the situation and the risks associated with it – so called early warning.’ Early warning demands a continuous rigorous programme of research and analysis on the conflict to be dealt with. What then are wrongs committed and how do they impinge on human security? The answer to the question needs an enquiry into the real causes of an internal conflict with their consequences for human security.

Volumes of literature exist on the theme called ‘human security’. All existing ideas and viewpoints with respect to human security unequivocally indicate that the concept has emerged out of the paradigmatic shift from traditional security to a comprehensive one. While the former relates to an excessive state-centric notion of territorial security from military-defense angle, the latter includes within its fold a wide range of issues related to the wellbeing and safety of the people. Towards this 22 "Can the doctrine of the R2P make the world more secure?", available at www.e.-ir.info/2012/0815/can-the-doctrine-of-the-R2P-make -the-world- more-secure, accessed on 15 July 2013. 23 Ijaz Khan, “Humanitarian and Military Intervention and the Role of the United Nations: The Responsibility to Protect" in Naveed Ahmed Tahir (ed.), Humanitarian, Preventive, Punitive and Political Intervention and State Sovereignty: Varying Political, Moral and Legal Standpoints, University of Karachi: B.C.C. & T Press, 2010, p. 16.

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end, human security, in comprehensive sense, includes protection of human being not only from traditional military threats but also from a variety of economic, social, ethnic, epidemiological and environment threats.24 A plethora of definitions with respect to human security can be cited to show how the concept is being broadened day by day to include a variety of issues that many feel should come within the province of human security. The paper, however, does not intend to deal with them other than focusing on the definition as given by Mahbub-ul-Huq in the widely known United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Report of 1994 where he defines human security as: (a) safety from chronic threats to humans such as hunger, diseases and repression; and (b) protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in people’s lives – whether in jobs, homes or communities.25 In other words, the key premises of human security are ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’. There is no gainsaying that while attempts at conceptualisation and theorisation of security continues to remain in vogue, the two above stated premises of human security are universally accepted by now. The UNDP report identified seven dimensions of human security and the emerging threats posed to them. They are: (i) Economic Security (poverty, homelessness); (ii) Food Security (hunger); (iii) Health Security (inadequate health care, diseases); (iv) Environmental Security (degradation, pollution, natural disasters); (v) Personal Security (physical violence, crime, traffic accidents); (vi) Community Security (oppression, disintegration and discrimination); (vii) Political Security (repression, torture, disappearance, human rights violations).26

The ‘fear factor’ in symbiosis with the ‘want factor’ of a number of conflict-ridden countries goes to depict negative human security scenarios in most of these countries. The ‘fear factor’ is created by the inability of a state authority to keep its citizens free from state repression, discriminatory policies, breakdown of law and order situation, diseases, natural disasters etc., whereas the ‘want factor’ is created by hunger, poverty, homelessness, unemployment, inaccessibility to resources etc. In this connection, it is relevant to touch upon certain causes of an internal conflict that bring about the above stated distresses in a given polity. By looking through few of post-Cold War internal conflicts, Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz reaches the conclusion that "such conflicts are correlated with, but not limited to, the desire to express cultural identity, discrimination, anti-democratic political system, economic underdevelopment and unjust distribution of national wealth, unresolved past traumas, as well as external support".27 A very exhaustive and succinct explanation of the causes of an internal conflict has been provided by Michael E. Brown. He cited the causes in the following manner:

24 Human Security, Center for Global Partnership, available at http://w.w.w.cgp.org/cgplink/programs/security priorities.html, accessed on 04 April 2002.25 Manzoor Ahmed. “Human Security: The Perspective of Children and Women in South Asia” in Ramesh Thakur and Oddny Wiggen (eds), South Asia: Problems Solving Perspectives on Security, Sustainable Development, and Good Governance, New York: UN University Press, 2004, p. 296.26 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1994, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 24-25.27 Muzaffar Ercan Yilmaz, op. cit.

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Intra-stateSecurity Concerns

Inter-groupPolitics

DiscriminatoryEconomicSystems

ProblematicGroup Histories

Weak States

EthnicGeography

DiscriminatoryPolitical

InstitutionsExclusionary

National Ideologies

Elite Politics

EconomicProblems

Modernisation

Patterns ofCultural

Discrimination

Structural Factors Political Factors Economic/ SocialFactors

Cultural/Perceptional Factors

Underlying Causes of an Internal Con�ict

Michael E. Brown, however, opines that weak state structures are the starting point for many analyses of internal conflict. He remarks, “Some states are born weak. Many of the states that were carved out of colonial empires in Africa and Southeast Asia, for example, were artificial constructs. They lacked legitimacy, politically sensible borders, and political institutions capable of exercising meaningful control over the territory placed under their nominal supervision. The same can be said of many states created out of the rubble of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The vast majority of these new entities came into existence with only the most rudimentary political institutions in place”.28 In consequence, the leadership in most of these post-colonial states has been marked by failure to develop their political, social, economic, cultural and environmental systems in an effective and sustainable manner. Certain conditions like disorganisation, lawlessness, dislocation, insecurity of the minority religious and ethnic community, decomposition, breakdowns, anarchy, regression etc. began to prevail in all such realms. In the circumstances, the fragile policies of the leaders in power were simply found incapable of constructing a stable, enduring and sustainable state systems in order to deliver few human security goods to the citizens, i.e., personal security, economic opportunity, education, health services, environmental surveillance, a legal framework of order, judicial system, fundamental infra-structural requirements etc. As Robert I. Rothberg remarks, "such states honoured these obligations in the breach".29 Eventually, in such polities, the pockets of dissension were caused mainly by the aggrieved sentiment of an overall deprivation in the daily national life. In many cases, these states turned out to be what many authors term as collapsed states, weak states, failed states, disruptive states, quasi states etc.

From the security perspective, the states with distresses and deplorable order have been found to affect regional security, and hence international security. In almost all cases, it has been found that (i) there has been the disruption of legitimate commerce and rise of illegal one, best referred to as ‘black market and gray economy’. 28 Michael E. Brown, op. cit., pp. 13-14.29 Robert I. Rothberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure”, The Washington Quarterly, Summer, 2002, p. 90.

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This form of economic disengagement has not only undercut the state but has also very adversely affected the economies of neighbouring countries; (ii) refugees in neighbouring countries constituted a security threat in the asylum state and served as recruiting grounds for armed rebels and militias who further escalated threats to regional security; (iii) coupled with the rise of illegitimate commerce and the refugee situation is the emergence of warlords politics for determining the distribution of wealth, control of illegal commerce, the forging of alliance among fellow warlords, the control of activities either to threaten regional security or to invite external intervention; (iv) the emergence of warlords and their control over illegitimate commerce has led to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons which further escalated armed violence in existing and new forms of conflict; (v) the condition of vulnerability to internal and external disruption has been openly exposed. This is best observed in case of Colombia where the state failing has been exploited by the criminal elements; (vi) there has been outright challenge to human rights regimes due to its egregious violation in case of women and children.30

3.2 The Responsibility to React

The responsibility to react envisages measures against a target state short of military intervention. This aspect of R2P may be viewed as a cautionary approach towards conflict and peace. In a series of episodes beginning from the early 1990s, there has been a serious circumscription of sovereignty in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Cambodia, Liberia and elsewhere on the pretext of restoring human rights. Some of the episodes involved military action called ‘humanitarian intervention’ endorsed by the UN or another international organisation but without the consent of the government of the target state. More menacing were the so-called humanitarian interventions in some sovereign countries without the UN Security Council’s endorsement. The US bombing of Iraq in 1999, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo also in 1999 and the unilateral US attack on Iraq (2003) are cases in point. In particular, the US aggression in Iraq (2003) evoked the fear worldwide that any state could be targeted by the US, if it was in the latter’s interest to do so.31

Various hard-core measures like preemptive attack, unilateral intervention, direct intervention without a UN Security Council mandate could do very little either to arrest a conflict or guarantee peace after the end of the conflict. Instead, R2P suggests certain soft measures like arms embargo, economic sanctions, severing of diplomatic relations and travel restriction. This step is somewhat akin to the idea as enshrined in Article 41 of the UN Charter where it has been stated that the Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the

30 Abul Kalam Azad, “Collapsed State in Contemporary International Politics”, BIISS Journal, Vol. 24, No. 1, January 2003, pp.1-48. 31 Abul Kalam Azad, “The Impact of Post 9/11 International Developments on State Sovereignty: A Bangladesh Perspective”, in Naveed Ahmed Tahir (ed.), op. cit., p. 140.

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“United Nations” to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

This soft approach has its impact on the target state and as well as on the international community. As far as the target state is concerned, due to various international pressures, it may be compelled to control the intensity of conflict and find out possible means for restoring peace. If the state itself is the repressive agent, then the task often becomes easy, whereas in case of a conflict where several actors are involved, such international pressure may have a sobering effect on them. In particular, the warring factions may become uncertain about future flow of arms or any other assistance to their hand from the sources, both regional and international. For the international community, the cautionary approach as envisaged by the R2P has some of its positive implications. That the conflict is not encountered through any outright show of force creates a scope for peace and stability in the region where the conflict is in occurrence. Moreover, the step is in conformity with international law where the conflicting parties are given an opportunity to cease their conflict under international pressure.

If the punitive measures, short of military intervention do not work, the R2P then allows prompt use by the Secretary General of his authority under Article 99 of the UN Charter to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. Such stance by the Secretary General, in all likelihood, transmits a message to the target state that its failure to resolve the conflict would ultimately lead to external intervention of military nature.

In effect, the R2P looks upon military intervention with caution as such action sometimes goes to aggravate a conflict situation with dire consequences for national, regional and international security. As per the R2P, military intervention for human protection purposes must be regarded as an exceptional and extraordinary measure. It is only justifiable when undertaken for halting or averting large scale killing or expulsion of human beings, either through deliberate state action, state neglect or inability of the state to act. Failed states are particularly prone to such situations.

In order that a military intervention does not engage itself in ‘excesses’, R2P has certain prescriptions in the greater interest of peace and security. Thus, in case of a military intervention, the intervening state or organisation must consider the following:

a. Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention must be to halt or avert human suffering. Sincerity of intention is better assured in collective or multilateral operations, supported by regional opinion, as well as the victims.

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b. Last resort: All non-military options for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis must first be explored and exhausted.

c. Proportional means: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be in proportion to the situation.

d. Reasonable prospects: It should be weighed whether the consequences of the action are likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction, in which case the idea of taking action should be dropped.

e. Right authority: The authorisation of the Security Council should be sought prior to any military intervention. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security Council work better.32

3.3 The Responsibility to Rebuild

The R2P has been invested with the element called ‘the responsibility to rebuild’ mainly for the purpose of peace and security. After having experienced the traumas of an internal conflict, a target state may, indeed, feel insecure even after the end of conflict. In other words, there is no guarantee that sudden end of a conflict would usher in permanent peace and security in the future. This concern evokes the question of peace building from the sole perspective of security.

The UN Secretary General’s Policy Committee defines peace building as: “peace building involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peace building strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced and therefore, relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives”33

Sustainable peace and development, as envisaged by peace building essentially emphasise on developing a security system that would prevent societies from falling back into violent struggle again. Such a security system entails restoring human security at the forefront which is to be realised through an all round development and reconstruction. As Johan Galtung remarks, "peace building should address the practical implementation of peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction and development".34 Development should be such that both

32 Ijaz Khan, op. cit., pp.18-19.33 Peace building and the UN, The UN Peace Building Support Office, UN. 34 Cited in Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999, p. 187.

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the want and fear factors of human security disappear in a manner so as not to allow insecurity prevail among the general masses long affected by conflict. Peace building, thus, suggests measures like disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in order to reinstate a feeling of security among the conflict affected people.

In effect, sustainability of peace as advocated through peace building is conditional upon certain elements like:

3.3.1 Restoration of Human Rights

If security is considered the prerequisite for post-conflict peace building, then restoration of human rights is the fundamental factor to catapult it. All victims of conflict must be ensured their respective human rights as per international standard. This means providing people with food, health, education, housing, protection of the family, democracy, participation, the rule of law, protection against enslavement, torture, cruelty, inhumane treatment or punishment. It should be mentioned that there is an inevitable correlation between restoration of human rights and human security as human dignity and welfare is a fundamental point in both the cases. Both human security and human rights establish a link among individual, national and international security. In case of human security: individual security, national security and international security are interlinked. In case of human rights, the same is corroborated by clause 28 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) which states "everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights recognized in the Declaration can be realized".

3.3.2 Justice and Social Cohesion

The people in a post-conflict situation should be guaranteed justice in all walks of their life. The judicial system should be effective and operational one with well functioning court and police systems. "There is a direct relationship between violence and state collapse and injustice. It is vital to rebuild institutions and societies on a just basis and to reject the argument that justice is a luxury that can be stalled until the return of full peace and harmony".35 If people are given the opportunity to live in a just society, then reconciliation would automatically prevail among different groups, ethnic communities, tribes and clans. This would ultimately bring cohesion in the society thereby allowing the people to enjoy community and group rights as demanded by human security.

35 Ijaz Khan, op. cit., p. 19.

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3.3.3 Rule of Law

The rule of law is prescribed by R2P through peace building. It means undertaking framework of rules and rights that make prosperous and fair societies possible. It is a system in which no one, including government, is above the law; where laws protect fundamental rights, and where justice is accessible to all. The rule of law is, in fact, a composite package containing the elements that securitise an individual in the society. These elements are: limited governmental powers, absence of corruption, maintenance of order and security, fundamental rights, open government, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, criminal justice, informal justice etc.

4. Humanitarian Intervention: What lies Ahead?

Humanitarian intervention, on the basis of R2P, does not lead to an infringement of sovereignty of a target state as many would understand. Rather, the R2P entrusts the responsibility of safeguarding the population of a conflict inflicted country from all sorts of criminal acts on the international community. This is because the target country fails to protect its people from want and fear.

As mentioned in previous discussion, the R2P is a step by step process for dealing with a conflict. It does not prescribe outright military intervention in the first place. Military intervention enters the scene when all possible peaceful means of resolving a conflict are exhausted. The relevant question now is: what then is the political future of R2P? This section of the paper is an attempt to delve into this question.

It should be mentioned that ever since the time, the concept of R2P has been floated, it has not remained above controversy on few counts, for instance, (i) the developing countries have looked upon it as a rationalisation for unwanted interference in their internal affairs. It has evoked the feeling among the developing countries that they have been relegated to the role of norm-seekers, while the five permanent members of the Security Council (P5) would continue as norm enforces. As historical records suggest, most of these powers have interventionist tendencies, and they look for pretexts, whether strong or lame, for intervening in the affairs of the poor and underdeveloped countries. As Stephen Krasner argues, “the recent upsurge in intervention is nothing new – great powers have always acted in concert and taken an interest … in the internal affairs of weaker states … The international community lacks resources for doing so effectively”36; (ii) a number of interventions in both pre and post 9/11 periods do not clearly show the humanitarian intent involved. The majority of such interventions have been driven by the interests of the intervening state rather than by a desire to help suffering humanity; (iii) there has been a great deal of

36 "Beyond Westphalia: State Sovereignty and International Intervention", available at http//d3.zeso.com/jsc/d3/ff3/ff2.html?n;C=9/4/1;s=13;w=728;h=90, accessed on 02 February 2013.

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disagreement over the degree of responsibility states have to prevent humanitarian crises in other states, and to what extent would sovereignty be conditional.37

Despite controversy or reservation with respect to R2P, the fact remains that R2P which has been designed to respond to internal conflicts will continue to have its validity in the days to come. Some of the factors in support of this assertion are as follows:

First, many Third World states are still fragile and groaning under political, economic and social instability and unrest. These states need administrative structure with infrastructural power to acquire their respective state capacity. In contemporary world, state weakness cannot continue to remain a permanent phenomenon as it ultimately leads to conflict with serious implications for peace and stability in the geographical segment where it takes place. Needless to mention, there are still many conflict spots around the globe, many of which are half-resolved or are still awaiting resolution sooner or later. In the continent of Africa, many peacekeeping operations are currently being undertaken with the sole intent of ending various internal conflicts. This goes to demonstrate that internal conflicts are still present in the world and that there is no guarantee about their absence in the future. Taking the example of Syria, one notices that a country which anticipated itself to be immune from the ‘Tunisia effect’ got entangled in a state of civil war and that any prospect of recovery seems to be highly unlikely within a short period of time. For the last 30 months, the world witnessed rising death toll, displacement of millions and the fading prospect of ‘Damascus Spring’ in Syria. The situation got further complex when the international community observed the use of chemical weapons upon Syrian civilians thereby further heightening the worldwide apprehension about the future course of conflict in the country. Many circles believe that if R2P can be applied in case of Syria, the conflict, perhaps, can go near to a solution.

Second, the current international system marked by unipolarity, structural conflict between the North and the South, increasing pace of globalisation in favour of the richer nations, the West’s craving for resources located in the Third World, marginalisation of the poor and underdeveloped nations in international trade and commerce etc. do not favour the weaker or those nations that are on the way of development. More frustrating is the fact that their hope and aspiration for world peace and stability under the aegis of the UN have been shaken to a great extent following the US invasion of Iraq without any UN mandate. The credibility that the world body attained in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis seems to have eroded by now, and the Third World remains increasingly doubtful and skeptical about the prospects for conflict management or resolution either through any regional organisation or the UN.38 In the circumstances, the viability of R2P is well recognised as it provides an 37 Abul Kalam Azad, "The Impact of Post 9/11 International Developments on State Sovereignty: A Bangladesh Perspective", in Naveed Ahmad Tahir (ed.), op. cit., pp. 141-142. 38 Abul Kalam Azad, "Collapsed State in Contemporary International Relations", op. cit., pp. 47-48.

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opportunity for the weak states to act on their own politically, economically, socially, culturally and morally. The R2P is a security oriented concept and its application in case of a conflict may not necessarily need military intervention as discussed earlier.

Third, despite the fact that the primary responsibility for responding to internal conflicts lies within the affected states, nonetheless, there are few factors that dictate that outsiders are inevitably involved in internal conflicts and that they play a vital role in such cases. First, the sources of many internal conflicts lie outside as inside the state. "The international community in its various guises is often responsible for the conflict in the first place".39 Second, due to increasing interdependence internal conflicts affect the interests of regional neighbours and beyond. Third, in case of internal conflicts, the magnitude of human suffering is very large and that media transparency makes it difficult for outside governments to watch and see such events without doing nothing. Fourth, nearly all studies agree that many protracted conflicts can only be resolved when outside resources are brought to bear.40 This externality of a conflict can best be managed through the mechanism of R2P.

5. Conclusion

In contemporary world, the resurgence of internal conflicts as a possibility can not be ruled out for a number of reasons taken up for discussion above. As a result, the R2P retains its relevance in the future. Any human intervention based on a philosophy of R2P leaves no room for doubt and suspicion as the R2P does not advocate outright military intervention or any kind of physical interference in the first place. As has been discussed, the R2P looks at the entire conflict spectrum from the angle of security. Its three broad elements try to restore the internal security conditions on a solid basis so as not to allow any internal conflict to take place with its dire consequences for national, regional and international security. What the R2P wants is to pave the way for a state to be strong enough to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity on the one hand, and develop an all round security structure, on the other.

Meanwhile, all states with weak political, economic, social and cultural structures must develop themselves in a sustainable manner so that human security conditions of the general masses are satisfactorily guaranteed. Any failure in maintaining a viable human security at home sows the seeds of conflict and all types of violent acts. The current crisis in Syria is a reminder of the fact that an internal crisis when it is factional in nature is difficult to solve internally. So Syria can be a laboratory where the international community can test the effectiveness of R2P in order to prevent the civilians from want and fear. Moreover, the very use of chemical weapons on the civilians by the Syrian authority amounts to some kind of genocide to which the R2P, as many opine, could have been a practical response.

39 Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 33.40 Ibid.

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Mohammad Atique Rahman

TRIPS-PLUS AS A TOOL FOR ENFORCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Abstract

An enormous proliferation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) has been explicitly evident in recent years especially due to a reaction to the slow and disruptive process of trade negotiations in the multilateral forum i.e., the World Trade Organization (WTO). These FTAs now adopt Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)-Plus provisions that include new areas of Intellectual Property (IP) rights protection and implementation of more extensive levels of IP standards beyond WTO TRIPS’s requirements, particularly in terms of elimination of options and flexibilities available under the WTO TRIPS. TRIPS-Plus provisions are conceived as stringent IP provisions aiming to harmonise global IP standards and enforce IP rights. Given the disparities and lack of progress regarding the implementation of IP protection, developed and industrial countries have pursued for stronger IP protections through entering into bilateral FTAs with the developing countries. In exchange of stronger IP protections, developed nations bilaterally offer greater market access for developing ones while the FTAs demand extensive adoption, amendment and invocation of intellectual property rights laws, institutions and enforcement mechanism. In this context, this paper attempts to analyse factors behind the adoption of TRIPS-Plus agreements and their impact on developing countries. The central research questions of this paper are: why does world community need TRIPS-Plus agreement? Does TRIPS-Plus agreement help to enforce Intellectual Property rights? Obviously opportunities like greater market access are lucrative from the developing country perspective; however, implementation of TRIPS-Plus provisions is squeezing TRIPS flexibilities available for them. Therefore, developing countries should adopt cautious measures during the negotiation phase with developed nations in order to continue to enjoy WTO TRIPS flexibilities particularly in the fields of pharmaceuticals and agriculture.

1. Introduction

The adoption of Trade Related Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) by the World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries in 1994 was an important tool of ensuring minimum standards of Intellectual Property (IP) protections. However, recent trend shows that, countries are moving ahead in the pursuit of stronger IP protections. The notion of stronger IP protections is now mainly promoted by the industrialised and

Mohammad Atique Rahman is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka. His e-mail address is: [email protected]



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TRIPS-PLUS AS A TOOL

developed countries through entering into bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the developing ones. While entering into bilateral FTAs, developing countries have to recognise and include more IP subject matters viz., broader and extensive coverage, increased harmonisation of IP laws, stronger enforcement mechanisms, and stepping away from using flexibilities and special and differential treatments which have been granted by the WTO TRIPS agreement. As these measures under the FTAs are seeking higher standards of IP protections beyond TRIPS, these are widely known as TRIPS-Plus provisions.1 Developing countries, which are still lagging behind in the implementation of their obligations under the TRIPS, are now compelled to implement higher standards of IP protections under bilateral FTAs with developed countries.

The issue of TRIPS-Plus has surfaced in international trade negotiations since 2000, followed by the slow progress of multilateral trade negotiations under WTO framework. From developed countries’ perspective achieving extensive coverage of IP subject matters and their stringent implementation mechanisms are difficult to achieve in developing countries through multilateral negotiations in WTO. Developed countries, therefore, have initiated bilateral trade negotiations with developing nations outside the multilateral forum of WTO. Through FTAs developed nations offer concessions to developing countries in core trade areas of agriculture, textile and other market access preferences.2 In return, developing countries are asked to implement labour standards, environmental protection measures and also IP provisions to the extent of TRIPS-Plus standards. The costs and benefits of TRIPs-Plus for developing countries are always an issue of controversy. In general, entering into a TRIPS-Plus agreement can bring benefits for developing countries as this will increase their international trade volume and foreign direct investment. This agreement can also establish IP standards in developing countries beyond measures which have been adopted in TRIPS and other international intellectual property agreements. TRIPS-Plus agreement seeks to strengthen laws and procedures to enforce IP rights and provides credible deterrent measures against IP infringements.

The opposite view is that TRIPS-Plus generates social and economic costs for developing countries and shrinks their abilities to use TRIPS related flexibilities in dealing with intellectual properties granted under WTO. TRIPS-Plus for them is creating policy constraints at national level i.e., protecting interests of local companies and sectors like public health, agriculture and education.

In this context, this paper attempts to analyse factors behind the adoption of TRIPS-Plus agreements and its impact on developing countries. The central research

1 Bryan Mercurio, “TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends”, in Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino (eds.), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 215-237, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=947767, accessed on 21 October 2013. 2 Jakkrit Kuanpoth, “TRIPS-PLUS Rules under Free Trade Agreements: An Asian Perspective”, in C. Heath & A. Kamperman Sanders (eds.), Intellectual Property & Free Trade Agreements, United Kingdom: Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 28.

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questions of this paper are: why does world community need TRIPS-Plus agreement? Do TRIPS-Plus provisions help to enforce IP rights? The paper will also look at the impacts of TRIPS-Plus provisions on the developing countries and what they can do in minimising the impacts i.e., the way forward. The paper is divided into six sections including introduction and conclusion. Section two analyses the factors behind the adoption of TRIPS-Plus agreement. Roles of TRIPS-Plus in enforcing IPs are discussed in section three. Section four focuses on the impacts of TRIPS-Plus on developing countries especially in the pharmaceuticals and agricultural sectors and, section five highlights the way forward for the developing countries. Section six concludes the paper.

2. Factors behind the Adoption of TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs

Many factors contributed to the adoption of TRIPS-Plus provisions in bilateral FTAs between developed and developing countries. The recent rise of bilateralism in international trade negotiations is an important factor giving rise to TRIPS-Plus provisions in FTAs. The changing nature of the multilateral forum in terms of developing countries gaining prominence as well as creating hurdles for the developed ones to pursue their IP related agenda at the multilateral level are also significant contributors. Moreover, ratcheting up of IP protections in developing countries is also highlighted by the developed ones as a rationale behind adoption of TRIPS-Plus provisions in bilateral FTAs.

2.1 Bilateralism and TRIPS-Plus Agreement

The history of intellectual property rights protection under international trade has always been revolving around the cycles of bilateralism, regionalism and multilateralism. Nations have been swinging between bilateralism and multilateralism according to their own interests. Before international agreements on trade and intellectual property rights, nations have granted trade concessions and sought IP protections at their national levels according to their own needs and performed in discriminatory manners to protect and promote their local industries and export volumes.

This system was inefficient as the IP protection was highly dependent on the discretionary power of the sovereign state some of which incurred trade imbalances. Realising this inefficiency, nations wanted to develop multilateral framework and adopted the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and National Treatment (NT) principles. Countries had agreed upon multilateral treaties in order to develop general principles for IP protections and appropriate trade concessions. Notably in the 18th century, several multilateral treaties were adopted by the nation states viz., the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883) (covering patents,

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trademarks, and industrial designs) and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886) (covering the issue of copyright). According to these multilateral agreements, countries had agreed to provide minimum protection to intellectual properties and developed general principles and mechanisms applicable for all member countries. Following the Second World War (WWII), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was adopted and subsequently, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) was established. The decolonisation process after the WWII heralded the inclusion of newly independent developing countries in the multilateral socio-economic and political organisations which created imbalance of power between developed and developing countries. Developing countries had only agreed to implement minimum standards of IP protection through international agreements and treaties. Moreover, they differed widely in a number of important areas of IP protections.3

GATT and other United Nations’ (UN) bodies, however, emerged as developing countries’ platform where developed nations were becoming incapable of pushing through for stronger IP protections. Therefore, GATT and other trade related forum became less acceptable to the developed countries. These countries realised that they had already gained comparative advantages on IP related trade of goods and services over developing countries. Again there have been massive IP infringements, counterfeiting and imitations undergoing in developing countries. In such context, developed nations started to initiate bilateral talks with developing ones in which they included IP protection measures as one of the components of international trade negotiations. Therefore, bilateral and unilateral approaches have been adopted in the beginning of 1980s. For instance, the United States (US) adopted a process of naming transgressor developing countries and designating them under priority watch list in the annual Unites States Trade Representative (USTR) National Trade Estimates Report to put pressure on them. The United States also granted Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) to the developing countries to allow preferential access to US market on the ground that they should pay respect to IP protections. The most important initiative was the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 in which the US successfully linked intellectual property protection measures with the treaty provisions that were obligatory for all signatory countries to follow.

On the other hand, the existing GATT system lacked significant enforcement mechanism for all its member countries as far as IP protections were concerned. A large scale IP counterfeiting had been going on despite GATT. Therefore, developed countries wanted to develop a uniform system and notion of IP. The uniform system is aimed at providing more protections along with effective dispute settlement mechanism to resolve dispute between nation states on IP counterfeiting and infringements. Developed countries also wanted to extend the coverage of intellectual property. Therefore, the treaty of TRIPS signed in 1994 included several subject matters

3 Bryan Mercurio, “TRIPS, Patents and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the Developing World”, Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2004, p. 216.

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of IP i.e., copyright and related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout-designs of integrated circuits, and protection of undisclosed information. TRIPS agreement is also based on MFN and NT principles.

According to NT principle of TRIPS, member states are obliged to accord to the nationals of other member’s treatment no less favourable than it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property. 4 On the other hand, the MFN of TRIPS stipulated that, “with regard to the protection of intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by member of the nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to nationals of all other members”.5 Based on this principle when a developing country as member state of the WTO agrees to a higher standard of intellectual property protection under FTA, then it is also obliged to extend those standards ‘immediately and unconditionally’ to the nationals of other WTO members. TRIPS also established minimum levels of protection that each member must provide and grant to other nations. Importantly, members can also seek policies for higher level of IP protection given that the principles of MFN and NT are respected.

Facing continuous pressure and unilateral action of withdrawing trade concessions and foreign aid by developed countries, developing countries have agreed to the inclusion of IPs in the TRIPS agreement. However, they have negotiated to agree upon such inclusion in exchange for concessions in other areas i.e. agriculture and textile. Developing countries also succeeded in the inclusion of several flexibilities into TRIPS. Notable among these are gaining time-bar for implementing TRIPS obligations. Developing countries also succeeded in Doha round of WTO Ministerial Conference in 2000 to include more flexibilities under TRIPS i.e. public health and access to medicine. Article 4 of the Doha declaration confirmed that “the TRIPS agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all”. Doha declaration thus confirmed parallel importation and compulsory licensing for medicines in developing countries for the purpose of protection of public health. The most concerning issue in this declaration for developed nations was that it also allowed third parties to exploit a patented medicine without patentee’s authorisation. Frustrations grew among developed nations as they failed to ensure strong IP protections because of the constant resistances from the group of developing countries. Multilateral trade negotiations thus gained very little for them in the face of large number of varied opinions and interests from the group of developing countries. Achieving consensus was very difficult in WTO where every member can use the veto power in the consensus based decision-making process to derail entire negotiation process. In such a situation, the interests of a developed nation or lobbyist of industries like pharmaceuticals and computer hardware and

4 Article No. 3 of TRIPS, WIPO, “Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1994”, 2012, p. 17.5 Article No. 4 of TRIPS, ibid., p. 18.

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software have been difficult to maximise in WTO. Therefore, the United States and other developed countries have again shifted its negotiation focus and sought to use bilateralism to increase IP protections in collaborations with FTA partners through: (a) inclusion of new areas of IP rights protection; (b) implementation of more extensive levels or standards of IP protections beyond TRIPS; and (c) elimination of options or flexibilities available under TRIPS.6

2.2 Changing Forum and Number of Counterparts

An important reason of policy shift to bilateralism is to change the forum composition and numbers of adversaries which usually exist in multilateral trade negotiations. Granting trade concessions to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and developing countries in bilateral agreements can secure allies within the forum of LDCs and developing countries. In the process, developed countries gain supports from the group of LDCs and take advantageous position in bargaining with regard to IP negotiations. Followed by the emergence of Group of 20 this idea has been floated among the developed countries’ policy makers. G20 emerged particularly to the opposition of developed countries in the Cancun Ministerial Conference. G20, dominated by Brazil, China, South Africa and India has been conceived by the developed world as new power house within the WTO multilateral trade negotiations. In response to such development, developed nations started to increase their bilateral FTAs with developing countries in order to dismantle their alliance. The objective is to bypass one-country veto power under WTO multilateral trade negotiation framework. They used combination of unilateral pressure and bilateral trade negotiation agreements to pressurise developing countries to distance themselves from the G20 agenda. Shortly after Cancun, several Latin American countries including Costa Rica, Colombia and Peru, announced they were no longer members of this group.7 One reason was that the United States has refused to include Costa Rica and Guatemala in the US-CAFTA (Central America Free Trade Agreement) negotiations unless they back out of their support for the group of G20.

Moreover, there is a difference in the league of developing countries. Bigger developing countries like Brazil and Argentina do not agree to FTA provisions. The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the US-Andean FTA, and the US-SACU (Southern African Customs Union) FTA are currently at a standstill because of their resistance. On the other hand, middle power countries like Australia and ASEAN leaders like Singapore tactically supported bilateral trade negotiations and FTAs to project incentives to the weaker developing countries to follow them.

6 Bryan Mercurio, “TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends”, op. cit., p. 219.7 Ruth Mayne, “Regionalism, Bilateralism, and ‘TRIPS Plus’ Agreements: The Threat to Developing Countries”, Human Development Report Office, 2005, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2005/papers/HDR2005_Mayne_Ruth_18.pdf, accessed on 23 October 2013, p. 5.

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From Table 1, it is apparent that the strategy of developed countries encompasses ‘dividing’ developing country coalitions and negotiating with those nations willing to compromise to implement stringent IP protections. It needs to be noted that many developing countries do not hesitate to trade-off IPs in exchange for market access.8 In fact, some of them believe that bilateral agreement offers real gains instead of symbolic victories under multilateral trade negotiations.

Table 1: List of Developing Countries' Membership with G20 and US’s FTADeveloping country G20 Ex-G20 Cairns

GroupFTA with

USAArgentina Y YBolivia Y Y ProposedBrazil Y YChile Y Y YChina YColombia Y Y ProposedCosta Rica Y Y Y( CAFTA)Cuba YEcuador Y ProposedEgypt YEl-Salvador Y Y (CAFTA)Guatemala Y Y Y (CAFTA)Honduras Y (CAFTA)India YIndonesia Y YMalaysia Y ProposedMexico Y Y (NAFTA)Nicaragua Y Y (CAFTA)Nigeria YParaguay Y YPakistan YPeru Y ProposedPhilippines Y YSouth Africa Y Y Y (SACU)Tanzania YThailand Y Y YUruguay YVenezuela YZimbabwe Y

Source: Peter Drahos, Thomas Faunce, Martyn Goddard, and David Henry, The FTA and the PBS, A submission to the Senate Select Committee on the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement, 2004, available at https://www.anu.edu.au/fellows/pdrahos/reports/pdfs/2004ftapbssubmission.pdf, accessed on 25 October 2013.

8 C. Freund, “Reciprocity in Free Trade Agreements”, World Bank, 2003, available at econ.worldbank.org/files/26994 wps3061.pdf, accessed on 25 October 2013.

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2.3 Ratcheting up IP Standards by Using International Standards

TRIPS-Plus under bilateral FTAs is also aimed for scaling up international standards through bilateralism. Bilateral FTAs are also based on MFN principle like TRIPS. To illustrate, if a developed and a developing country member negotiate an FTA, MFN will force the developing nation to make the same IP standards it accepted in the FTA, available to all nations. This provision clearly serves the objective of developed nations to ‘ratchet up’ international IP protection mechanisms. Therefore, when any FTA contains TRIPS-Plus provisions then these provisions will essentially become the new minimum standards of intellectual property rights. These new standards then are the start-up point for any future WTO trade negotiation. At this point, therefore, it is important to discuss how far TRIPS-Plus provisions under FTAs are contributing in promoting IP rights standards.

3. Role of TRIPS-Plus in Promoting Intellectual Property Rights Standards

The NAFTA concluded in 1994 is considered as the first free trade agreement which contains extensive IP provisions for its signatory countries. In the same year, under the aegis of the US, the European Union (EU) and Switzerland, the GATT members, for the first time, also agreed upon concluding an agreement called TRIPS which links IP norm setting to international trade disciplines. However, developed states have been constantly pursuing greater IP coverage and extensive IP protection through their bilateral trade agreements. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to provide an in-depth discussion about the role of TRIPS-Plus for promoting IP rights protection globally.

3.1 TRIPS-Plus as Tool of Seeking Higher IP Standards

The proponents of TRIPS-Plus wanted to pursue strict policy guidelines to push for higher standards of IP in their partner countries. The purpose is to make developing countries comply with extended coverage and higher levels of IP standards and also to limit the use of TRIPS flexibilities. The following table clearly reflects the fact that under bilateral free trade agreement, developing countries are obliged to implement extended coverage as well as higher standards of IP protections in their own jurisdiction in comparison to WTO TRIPS requirements.

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Table 2: TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs and their Comparison with WTO TRIPSIn US-Peru FTA In US, Peru and Colombia

FTAsWTO TRIPS Provisions

Seeking Adherence to International Intellectual Property Treaties and AgreementsRatification of various WIPO9 treaties and UPOV10 signed in 1991

Ratification of various WIPO treaties

Developing countries under FTA oblige to join a specific international agreement/ treaty on IP which is not part of TRIPS to meet additional demands of developed na-tions for IP protections be-yond TRIPS.

Geographical Indications (GIs) and TrademarksNo visual perceptibility re-quirement for trademark reg-istration

May adopt visual perceptibil-ity requirement for trademark registration

Under TRIPS (Art. 1.1) mem-bers including LDCs and developing countries have flexibilities to adhere and im-plement provisions of TRIPS and other international trea-ties related to IP within their own legal system and prac-tice.

Provisions on GI application procedures

Definition of GIs and list of es-tablished GIs

GI protection refusal: when likely to cause confusion with a trademark

Protection Refusal: when like-ly to mislead in light of a well-known trademark

CopyrightSeek WCT11 and WPPT12 stand-ards in national IP policies

Seek WCT and WPPT stand-ards in national IP policies

Technological Protection Measures (TPM)-circumven-tion is allowed under TRIPS but developing countries can enjoy flexibility under TRIPS to exempt from adopting cir-cumvention measures in their national copyright law.

Seek protection of Encrypted Satellite Signals

Seek protection of Encrypted Satellite Signals

Limitations of liabilities of in-ternet service providers

-

Not less than 70 years of pro-tection

70 years of protection Not less than 50 years.

9 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). 10 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants originally adopted on 02 December 1961, and later raised at Geneva in 1972, 1978 and 1991.

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Patents and Undisclosed InformationStandards on novelty and grace period, inventiveness and industrial application -

TRIPS (Art. 27.3) provides patent exceptions for (a) di-agnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods; and (b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms.

Article 30, provides for limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent.

Article 39(3) of TRIPS provides protection for test data but no time limit is specified.

Amendment of patent appli-cation -

Extend terms of patent, other than pharmaceutical patent

May provide for patent term extension for pharmaceutical patents

10 years for agricultural test data exclusivity

10 years for agricultural test data exclusivity

Normally 5 years for pharma-ceutical test data

Normally 5 years for pharma-ceutical test data

EnforcementDamage, discovery and evi-dence

Damage, discovery (right of information) and evidence

TRIPS (Art. 41.2) stipulates that procedures of enforce-ment of IP rights shall be fair and equitable. They shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreason-able time-limits or unwar-ranted delays.

Ex officio border measures with respect to goods in tran-sit

Border measures by both right holders and ex officio authority to include goods in transit

Source: UNCTAD and ICTSD, 2011.

As is evident from Table 2, developed countries tend to use bilateral FTAs as leverage for motivating developing countries to adopt stricter IP policies at their national levels. They also use FTA bindings to ensure effective enforcement mechanism in the developing countries for IP rights protections. Without the prospect of implementing and enforcing IP rights at the domestic level, it would be difficult to bring any positive change in intellectual property rights enforcements. FTA provisions, therefore, also cover domestic enforcement mechanisms to protect internationally traded goods and services.

3.2 Opportunity of Adopting Different Implementation Strategy

An important objective of TRIPS-Plus is to secure the implementation of IP standards and to seek compliance from the developing countries. TRIPS-Plus provisions under FTA offer more opportunities to develop new implementation strategies for the

11 WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996. 12 WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty in 1996.

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developing countries which are difficult to achieve through multilateral agreement. The notion of ‘one-size fits for all’ system in multilateral agreement does not consider country specific context and realities. Contrary to that, FTA offers prospects for further negotiations between the developed and developing countries for durable amendments of rules and regulations for enforcements of Intellectual Property rights provisions.

3.3 Expanding Coverage of Intellectual Property Rights

TRIPS-Plus provisions in the FTA also provide leverage to extend coverage of IP rights. Many countries now try to implement their own regulatory preferences in their partner countries. A clear example is the case of Geographical Indication (GI). The issue of extending GI has been basically patronised by the EU, as EU conceived it as a means of promoting sustainability of small farming and rural communities. GI protections preserve the income-profit of small firms as well as promoting rural economy. EU had been successful to include inclusion of wines and spirits under GI protection in TRIPS agreement. Article 23 of the TRIPS agreement stipulates for recognising wines and spirit as GI product which all member countries had agreed upon. Moreover, Article 24 and Article 23 reveal exception; the member states can negotiate to increase the protection of individual geographical indication. In light of this, EU and many developing countries opted for ongoing negotiation within the TRIPS council in seeking additional protection of GI. They promoted multilateral registration systems to other products under the purview of the concept of additional protection of GI which is one of the essential elements of the TRIPS agreement. They have been advocating for extending GI protection on agricultural products, food stuff, and handicrafts which have originated in a specific place and possess qualities, reputation, traditional know-how or other characteristics that are essentially attributable to that place of origin. For example, during December 1998 TRIPS council meeting, both developed and developing countries submitted many of their products for inclusion under GI, some of which are noted below13:

Table 3: List of Products Submitted in TRIPS Council for GI Protection Name of Country GI ProductsBulgaria Bulgarian yoghurt, Traminer from Khan Kroum (wine),

Merlou from Sakar (wine)Canada Canadian Rye Whisky, Canadian Whisky, Fraser Valley,

Okanagan Valley, Similkameen Valley, Vancouver IslandCzech Republic Pilsen and Budweis (beers), Various Wines, Liqueurs,

Saaz hops, Auscha hops, Jablonec Jewellery, Bohemia Crystal, Vamberk Lace

13 WTO News, available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news98_e/pu_e.htm#Top, accessed on 25 October 2013.

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14 Daniele Giovannucci, Tim Josling, William Kerr, Bernard O’Connor, and May T. Yeung, Guide to Geographical Indications: Linking Products and Their Origins, Geneva: International Trade Centre, 2009, available at www.intracen.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=37595, accessed on 26 October 2013, p. 2.

European Communities Champagne, Sherry, Porto, Chianti, Samos, Rheinhes-sen, Moselle Luxembourgeoise, Mittleburgenland (all wines); Cognac, Brandy de Jerez, Grappa di Barolo, Ber-liner Kümmel, Genièvre Flandres Artois, Scotch Whisky, Irish Whiskey, Tsikoudia (from Crete) (all spirits); and a range of other products, such as Newcastle brown ale, Scottish beef, Orkney beef, Orkney lamb, Jersey Royal potatoes, Cornish Clotted Cream, Cabrales, Roquefort, Gorgonzola, Aziete de Moura, Olive de Kalamata, Op-perdoezer Ronde, Wachauer Marille, Danablu, Lübecker Marzipan, Svecia, Queijo do Pico, Coquille Saint Jacques des Côtes-d’Amour, Jamón de Huelva, Lamme jordsgulerod

Hungary Eger (wine), Szatrademarkar (plum)Liechtenstein Malbuner (meat products), Balzer (Hi-tech products)Slovak Republic Korytnická minerálna voda (mineral water), Karpatská

perla (wine), Modranská majolica (hand-painted pot-tery), Piešt’anské bahno (healing mud)

United States Idaho (potatoes and onions), Real California Cheese, Napa Valley Reserve (still and sparkling wines), Pride of New York (agricultural products), Ohio River Valley (viticulture area)

This proposal was opposed by the members led by the United States. Interestingly, some developing countries also supported the United States. The negotiation derailed in TRIPS council and also later in Doha Ministerial Conference in 2000. Clause 2 of the Doha instrument only recognised the need for all peoples to benefit from the increased opportunities and welfare gains that the multilateral trading system generates. This statement in fact justified that the industry-specific TRIPS protection is untenable for developing countries.

Given this deadlock situation in TRIPS council and no ready solution for further harmonisation of ‘global notion’ of GI, EU in 2005 submitted a radical TRIPS-Plus proposal to amend the TRIPS agreement in favour of mandatory multilateral system for all products. They advocated that this proposal would also meet the need of developing countries as they have successfully established their rights on agricultural products. The following table shows some examples of GI products in developing countries.14

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Table 4: Most Prominent GI Products in Developing CountriesName of Country Name of GI Products Guatemala Antigua Coffee India Darjeeling Tea Mongolia Gobi Desert Camel Wool Jamaica Blue Mountain Coffee Hawaii Kona Coffee Mexico Mezcal and Tequila Colombia Café Naino

EU as the leading proponent of GI has adopted two different TRIPS-Plus initiatives i.e., specific Stand Alone Agreement on GIs as for example with China and, secondly, entering into a Free Trade Agreement.15 The EU has concluded a series of FTAs which contain important levels of protection for GI. For example, EU and Chile concluded an association agreement in 2000 which included an FTA that entered into force in 2003. In this agreement both sides mutually agreed to extend protection of GI of their products.16 In October 2009, EU and South Korea signed FTA agreement, according to which both countries agreed to offer high levels of protection of GI products including protection for EU GIs such as Champagne, Feta Cheese, and Scotch Whiskey.17

Like many developing countries, Bangladesh also supports the initiative to extend GI protection for food items under TRIPS. The country can benefit from extending GI protection to food items. GI extends protection which is relatively impersonal that means the protected subject matter is related to the product itself and is therefore not dependent on a specific right holder. Therefore, GI offers protections and opportunities for local communities to control the productions, branding and marketing of their products. Bangladesh has diverse agricultural products and is also rich in crafts, cultural heritage, and traditional knowledge and so on. Bangladesh has enacted Geographical Indication (Registration and Protection) Act in November 2013. So far, Bangladesh included 73 products under GI in which 52 are food products and remaining 21 are

15 European Commission (EC), Geographical Indication, Directorate General for Trade, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/intellectual-property/geographical-indications/, accessed on 26 October 2013.16 Raymond J. Ahearn, Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications, Congressional Research Service, R41143, 2011, available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41143.pdf, accessed on 26 October 2013, p. 11.17 “USTR Releases Preliminary Analysis of Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement”, Press Release by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), 21 October 2009, available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press office/press-releases/2009/october/ustr-releases-preliminary-analysis-korea-eu-free-t, accessed on 01 November 2013.

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18 FAO, “Rural Development and Agri-food Product Quality Linked to Geographical Origin in Asia”, Proceedings from the Technical Consultation, 8−10 June 2009, Bangkok, available at http://www.foodqualityorigin.org/Bangkok/programme.html, accessed on 23 March 2014, p. 43.

non-food products. Food products include three fish items, 12 fruits, 15 processed foods and sweets, 14 agricultural products and eight types of vegetables.18

3.4 Limiting Free Riding and Extending Bargaining Trade-off

The TRIPS-Plus provisions under bilateral FTAs reduce the possibility of free-riding of countries available under the multilateral agreement. These provisions are targeted to amend local policies and regulations in exchange of access to the markets of the developed nations. TRIPS-Plus seems more effective as it shows credible retaliation measures other than withdrawing trade concessions and imposing trade barriers. For example, the unilateral action of withdrawing trade concession under the GSP or the Special Act no. 301 of US is not effective. In many instances it has been proved that the Special Act no. 301 measures have not deterred countries from counterfeiting of IP. On the other hand, from the developing country perspectives, TRIPS-Plus under FTA provides them bargaining opportunities to cover the liberalisation of goods and service sectors, trading concessions and greater market access. Most importantly, developing countries can also use TRIPS-Plus as a bargaining chip for gaining technical assistance from the developed countries.

3.5 TRIPS-Plus as Capacity Development Tool

TRIPS-Plus provisions in FTA also offer non-binding measures for the developing countries. The purpose of this is to develop mechanism in the developing countries which can contribute to the implementation and enforcement of IP in future. In this regard, the central focus is on capacity building of the institutions and regulatory cooperation between agreeing parties. Such capacity building activities develop effective and credible mechanism for enforcing IP by exchanging information, notifying partner members about the progress of new regulations adoptions, monitoring of enforcement, arranging consultations and provisions for amendment of regulations and laws regarding IP rights.

3.6 Accelerating Harmonisation of IP Standards

TRIPS-Plus provisions also accelerate the process of harmonising IP standards in many developing countries. In this regard, adoption or modification of laws and adherence to international IP conventions are discussed as follows:

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3.6.1 Adoption or Modification of Laws

Empirical evidence shows that developing countries which agreed upon TRIPS-Plus have modified their laws to harmonise IP standards with the developed world. For example, under CAFTA, Costa Rica amended several major domestic IP laws i.e., the laws on patents, designs, industrial designs and utility models, trademarks and other distinctive signs, copyright and related rights, undisclosed information, and enforcement laws. In March 2006, Nicaragua approved laws reforming the protection of copyright and related rights, programme-carrying satellite signals, patents, utility models and industrial designs, and trademarks and other distinctive signs. Chile and Morocco introduced a number of important changes to their IP legislative frameworks in order to comply with their Preferential Trade Agreement with the US, signed in 2003 and 2004 respectively. Therefore, TRIPS-Plus triggered extensive domestic legislative reforms for the protection of IP in developing countries. The European Union has agreement on the protection of GIs with Chile, Mexico and South Africa. Under the TRIPS- Plus provision of bilateral FTAs, these countries have to phase out or de-register trademarks that conflict with terms describing European GIs, in exchange for tariff free export to the EU market.

3.6.2 Adherence to the International IP Conventions and Treaties

An important aspect of TRIPS-Plus FTA is the promotion of adherence to second generation multilateral treaties developed at WIPO. Under FTA, the developing countries are invited to ratify international IP conventions, particularly WIPO treaties and the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 1991 (UPOV 1991). For example, under US-Chile FTA, Chile has to undertake efforts to ratify or accede to Patent Law Treaty (PLT, 2000), the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs (Hague Agreement, 1999) and the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks (Madrid Protocol, 1989) in a manner consistent with its domestic law. Chile is also encouraged to classify goods and services according to the classification of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks (Nice Agreement, 1979). On the other hand, Nicaragua and Panama are obliged to accede to UPOV 1991 under their FTA with the United States.

4. Impacts of TRIPS-Plus on Developing Countries

The proliferation of FTA has been increasing in number since 2000. Developed nations have been eager to conclude FTA agreement with the developing countries to achieve gains in trade in goods and services which appeared difficult to gain under the WTO framework. The purpose of this section is to explore impacts of TRIPS-Plus on developing countries. To this end, this section focuses on the effects of TRIPS-Plus in pharmaceutical and agricultural sectors of developing countries.

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4.1 Impacts on Access to Medicine

There has been growing concerns among the world leading medicine manufacturing companies regarding the absence of patent protection in the developing countries. TRIPS agreement provides minimum patent protection mechanism which all member countries of WTO should oblige. Developing countries as member of WTO adhered to the international principles of intellectual property protection. But given the exclusivity of patent, developing countries raised the issue of granting patents to medicines and drugs which may cause high prices of medicines. Bangladesh as a developing country will face challenges to ensure public access to medicines after the expiry of TRIPS extension. TRIPS-Plus provisions erode TRIPS extension and under the new term patent extension on pharmaceuticals for developing and LDCs will expire by 2016. Therefore, Bangladesh will have to provide protection to the foreign pharmaceutical companies which may raise the cost of patented drugs. Bangladeshi companies will not be allowed to produce generic drugs at all in future.

The experience regarding access to patented drugs in South Africa, Brazil, and Thailand led to the adoption of Doha declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.19 The Doha declaration affirms the right of WTO member countries to protect public health especially in those least and underdeveloped countries which are adversely affected by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other critical epidemics. In this context, member countries have been given rights to use TRIPS flexibilities with regard to granting patents to medicines and drugs. Member countries can use Article 31(f ) and (h) of the TRIPS agreement to grant compulsory licensing for production in return for adequate remuneration to the patent holder. The Doha deceleration also adopted the following options for the developing countries to use TRIPS flexibilities. These are:

– Adoption of the principle of the international exhaustion of rights so as to facilitate parallel importation of cheaper drugs. The issue is left to the TRIPS member countries to decide upon the level of exhaustion of patent rights in Article 6 of TRIPS.

– Exclusion of certain biotechnology inventions, as well as medical methods for the treatment of humans and animals. This option has been confirmed on the basis of patentable subject matter of patented goods stipulated in Article 27 of TRIPS.

– Providing limited exceptions to the developing countries to use patented medicines for limited experimentation, and prior user’s rights etc. The provision of limited exception has been articulated in Article 30 of TRIPS.

19 WTO Ministerial Conference, 4th Session, Doha, 9-14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/Dec/2, 20 November 2001.

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– Providing rights to developing countries to use compulsory licenses for making available patented drugs.

The TRIPS-Plus initiatives by the developed countries can be seen as an attempt to circumvent the flexibilities and options granted by TRIPS and Doha declaration. Following discussion reveals how TRIPS-Plus can reduce a developing country’s options for using TRIPS flexibilities especially in the public health sector.

4.1.1 Patentable Subject Matter

Some TRIPS-Plus provisions in bilateral FTAs require that effective and adequate protection must be given to inventions in all technological fields including plants and animals that are under the TRIPS Article 27.3 can be excluded from patentability. TRIPS also restricts member countries to grant patent on medical practices such as diagnostics, therapy and surgery of human or animal body on the ground of morality and ethics to prevent monopoly privileges in the public health sector. However, in many FTAs, attempt has been made to seek compliance from developing countries to avoid these flexibilities. For example, under the FTA with the United States, Thailand has to grant patents to the plants and animals as well as diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical procedures for the treatments of humans and animals. TRIPS-Plus provision in FTA also demands granting patent to the second use of invention. On the contrary, TRIPS does not require its members granting patent to second use invention. Second use of invention is very common in pharmaceutical sector. For example, an agro-chemical substance can be used as a pharmaceutical product or a well known drug can be used as new therapeutic application. Such second use may be claimed for patent by the patent holding companies. The second use of patent invention limits the freedom of developing countries to determine what should be protected under product and process patents as provided by TRIPS. Medicines that are no longer patented as products can be patented as a second use, new dosages of existing drugs, or new combinations of existing drugs. Patents for subsequent use of a known drug would thereby unnecessarily prolong the monopoly and deprive consumers of essential drugs.

4.1.2 Compulsory Licensing

Compulsory licensing is a TRIPS provided flexibility which allows a country to override patent right temporarily and issues third party to perform acts covered by the patent exclusive rights i.e. manufacturing, selling, or importing patented medicines. Compulsory license also authorise the production of generic version of patented products.20 The experiences in many countries including US, Canada,

20 For more on compulsory licensing, see C. Correa, “Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for Developing Countries”, South Centre Working Paper No. 5, 1999, available at http://www.iatp.org/files/Intellectual_Property_Rights_and_the_Use_of_Co.pdf, accessed on 01 November 2013.

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Brazil21 and South Africa have shown that compulsory licensing is an effective mechanism to limit abusive practices of the patent holder and help to force prices down. Brazil has the 9th largest market of pharmaceutical in the world in 2007 with the sale totalling US$ 5.7 billion.22 There are four main actors of Brazilian pharmaceutical sector. These are foreign based companies (controls 70 per cent of total production), government funded lab (18 in number), local private companies producing generic medicines and local pharma-chemical companies producing raw materials. Brazil was the first country to use TRIPS flexibilities after the enactment of Patent law in 1996. Brazil based on its new patent law started to issue compulsory licensing to drive down the price of medicines. By allowing other producers to enter the market, the legal device allows state to remove exclusivity right of patent holder to set monopoly prices.23 The compulsory license provision in the patent law of Brazil gives local pharmaceutical companies opportunities to produce generic versions of eight of twelve drugs that compose the AIDS cocktail at a cost that is 70 per cent lower than the current market price. The Brazilian government practises this right by asserting to Article 30 of the TRIPS agreement which allows countries to issue compulsory license during the time of national emergency. In this regard, the issue of limiting the right of the country to use compulsory licensing is one of the main TRIPS-Plus objectives of bilateral FTAs. TRIPS-Plus agreement tries to impose more stringent conditions than TRIPS to grant compulsory license and override patent rights. In many bilateral FTAs, compulsory license can only be granted as remedy to anti-competitive practices, in the case of public non-commercial use and only in the situation of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency. Therefore, issuing a compulsory license on the ground of non-working or insufficient working of patent which is included in Brazilian patent act is thereby usually prohibited under bilateral FTAs. Some FTAs also adopt provisions of restricting the transferring of undisclosed information or the disclosure of know-how through issuing compulsory licensing to the third party for producing generic medicines. The restriction of know-how under the TRIPS-Plus is pursued because know-how enables the compulsory license to make efficient use of the patent. Without access to ‘know how’, the commercial value of access to a patent is less worthy than licensee. Therefore, TRIPS-Plus provision attempts to limit compulsory licensing to certain situations and make the procedures for issuing licensee intricate and prolonged. Obviously, such activity imposes constraints on developing countries to pursue affordable drugs and access to medicines.

21 Under the Brazilian patent law, patent protection is provided on condition that the patent holder produces at least part of the patented goods within Brazil. If the patentee fails to satisfy this ‘local working’ requirement, its patent rights may be subject to a compulsory license, which may be an issue to Brazilian pharmaceutical companies so that they may produce generic copies of the drugs to supply to the local market. See Naomi A Bass, “Implications of the TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries: Pharmaceutical Patent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Century”, George Washington International Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2002, p. 191.22 IMS Health, 2008, available at www.imshealth.com, accessed on 04 November 2013.23 Kenneth C. Shadlen, Samira Guennif, Alenka Guzmán, and N. Lalitha (eds.), Intellectual Property, Pharmaceutical and Public Health: Access to Drugs in Developing Countries, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2011, p. 149.

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4.1.3 Limiting Parallel Importation

Parallel Importation is a situation when the patent holder sells a product to a buyer who exports the product to a second buyer in another country.24 Such situation arises when the price of imported medicine or good is lower than the price of the same product or medicine legally made or imported into that country. This is possible under the TRIPS provision of exhaustion of rights. Intellectual property rights are exhausted once a product is sold or once placed in a market anywhere in the world. Therefore, the initial sale ends the IP holders’ rights and control over what can be done with that product. Article 6 of TRIPS states that member countries are free to choose any system of exhaustion of IP rights. Currently, three kinds of exhaustion are available i.e., national, regional and international. If any country adopts international exhaustion of patent rights then a right owner cannot use IP rights to prevent this country from importing patented goods from anywhere in the world, where the patent holder placed patented product for commercial use. Therefore, there is no such measure to prevent importing nation that can acquire pharmaceuticals at reduced prices from any place in the world. In this context, in many FTAs, TRIPS-Plus provision requires to adopt only the national exhaustion and prohibiting international exhaustion. For example, the US’ FTAs with Morocco (Article 15(9) (4)25) and Australia (Article 17(9) (4)26) prohibit parallel importation. From the developing countries perspectives, prohibition of international exhaustion and parallel importation can block opportunities to import cheap medicines and other goods from outside the national market.

4.1.4 Extending Patent Term Protection

Patent term protection is always a critical issue as it grants monopoly exclusive right to the patent holder. In the TRIPS agreement of 1994, the minimum term of protection has been set at 20 years. But some products such as pharmaceuticals and agro-chemicals require lengthy period of test and regulatory approval. This requires lots of time just to get entry into the market of the country. Therefore, TRIPS-Plus provisions include a proposal to extend the term of protection to these products to provide compensation for unreasonable delays in issuing the patents. The main rationale behind the proposal of extending patent protection is that patent holders can secure their economic benefits which are not possible to obtain during the period of testing and gaining approval from the regulatory authorities. In the Central

24 For more information, see "Health Care and Intellectual Property: Parallel Imports”, available at www.cptech.org/ip/fsd/health-pi.html, accessed on 10 November 2013.25 Each Party shall provide that the exclusive right of the patent owner to prevent importation of a patented product, or a product that results from patented process, without the consent of the patent owner shall not be limited by the sale or distribution of that product outside its territory. Available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/morocco/asset_upload_file797_3849.pdf, accessed on 09 November 2013.26 Ibid.

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27 Bryan Mercurio, “TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends”, op. cit., p. 230.28 M Heller and R. Eisenberg, “Can Patent Deter Innovation?: The Anti-commons in Biomedical Research”, 1998, available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/280/5364/698.full, accessed on 12 November 2013, pp. 698-701.

American Free Trade Agreement-CAFTA-DR, extension of patent term protection has been made. Article 15 (9) (6) of the CAFTA-DR states that:27

Each party, at the request of the patent owner, shall adjust the term of a patent to compensate for unreasonable delays that occur in granting the patent. For the purposes of this paragraph, an unreasonable delay shall at least include a delay in the issuance of the patent of more than five years from the date of filing of the application in the Party, or three years after a request for examination of the application has been made, whichever is later.

Critics have argued that the TRIPS-Plus provision regarding extension of patent term would allow multinational pharmaceutical companies to practice monopoly for a longer period of time. Extension of patent term delays the potential introduction of affordable generic medicines and therefore, patent holding company could gain benefits from charging higher price.

4.2 Impacts on Agriculture

Countries still differ about the patentability of biological materials and methods. Different countries have different rules in this regard. For example, patent laws of EU still exclude some form of biotechnological inventions i.e., plant and animal varieties from patent protection. In many bilateral FTAs, there has been increasing demand for granting patent to all kinds of life forms including plants, animals, biological processes, the by-product of generic engineering and biotechnological methods, genes and gene sequences. If patenting of life was granted through FTA, then there would be considerable effects on the agricultural sector of developing countries. If developing countries grant patents to genes it will cause a power shift in agriculture towards large biotechnological companies. It will then disrupt the access to essential products such as seeds or foodstuffs. The patent on genes would give monopoly power to the companies to control over production chain of crops and foods. Some argued that gene patenting would have detrimental effect on the research environment and prevent innovation process. As pointed out by Heller and Eisenberg, the patenting of biological products and processes is regarded as ‘anti-commons’, in which individual put fences around the people’s private property and destroys the commons. This could impede discovery and innovation in the fastest-growing field of technology.28

For protection of plant varieties (genes), article 27.3 of TRIPS gives member states options to protect plant varieties by patents or by an effective sui-generis

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system. The term effective sui-generis system in TRIPS is a bit ambiguous which allows developing countries to avoid developing full intellectual property law covering plant varieties. For example, India and Thailand have flexibly implemented the TRIPS provisions by incorporating the farmer’s right29 and Access and Benefit Sharing System (ABS) under the convention on Biological Diversity into their national legislation. But patent protection of plant varieties under TRIPS-Plus provisions can act as barrier to the access to agricultural product and transfer of technology to the developing countries. Multinational bio-tech companies will have opportunity to dominate farming sector as well as exploit abundant biological processes of the developing countries.

5. The Way Forward

Preceding discussion demonstrates that TRIPS-Plus provisions can impose strict mechanisms for implementing intellectual property rights in developing countries. Therefore, measures can be taken beyond the strict implementation of the provisions of bilateral FTAs. Two of such measures are as follows:

5.1 Issuance of Side Letter

In order to ensure freedom of developing countries to take appropriate measures recognised by the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public health, TRIPS-Plus provisions under FTA should issue side-letter to recognise this safeguard mechanism for developing countries. This kind of side letter has been issuing in many FTAs. As for example, in the US-CAFTA-DR FTA,30 the side letter recognises that the obligations set forth in the FTA do not affect the ability of either party to take necessary measures to protect public health by promoting access to medicines for all. Measures to protect public health thus cannot be prevented in FTAs in special cases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, as well as circumstances of extreme urgency or national emergency. Therefore, by gaining side letter developing countries can create compatible environment between TRIPS safeguard and TRIPS-Plus obligations.

5.2 Inclusion of Provision of Capacity Building and Technical Assistance

Developing countries can negotiate for introducing provisions for capacity building and technical assistance under the TRIPS-Plus FTA. This is highly important for developing countries to develop administrative, institutional and technical capacities to administer and enforce IP rights. Some developing countries have already

29 The concept of Farmer’s Right adopted by the Food and Agriculture Organizations (FAO) for the aim of compensating farmers who have been conserving plant genetic resources for the past centuries thereby have contributed to the development of plant varieties. Available at http://www.fao.org/righttofood/our-work/current-projects/rtf-global-regional-level/itpgrfa/en/, accessed on 12 November 2013.30 The United States-Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement.

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succeeded to include this kind of provision in their FTAs with the developed nations. For example, in the US-Chile FTA, Article 17.1 (14) defines means by which the parties will cooperate in order to strengthen the development and protection of IP, including through education and dissemination projects and training courses31. Under CAFTA developing countries secure commitments from their developed partners to support capacity building in trade. The FTA under EU also includes the provision of providing technical cooperation with respect to IPs. These are providing legislative advice, capacity building training and supporting building up institutional structures.

6. Conclusion

This paper begins by pointing out the importance of TRIPS agreement to implement global standards of intellectual property rights. It is considered to be one of the most successful multilateral agreements which is legally binding for all the signatory countries. However, the IP implementation landscape is not as smooth as it was conceived by the drafters of TRIPS. There has been significant gap between a country’s international commitment and actual domestic implementation with regard to intellectual property rights. TRIPS flexibilities subject to national interpretations caused problems for harmonising IP standards at the global level. Countries are also very much indifferent to accede to the international treaties covering various areas of IP rights.

The inclusion of TRIPS-Plus provisions in Free Trade Agreements, therefore, can be seen as a reaction to the prevailing disparities and as an attempt to limit TRIPS related flexibilities. TRIPS-Plus thus is a process of recalculating the IP standards bilaterally with the developing countries. The paper also shows that developing countries have been constrained under TRIPS-Plus provisions to enjoy flexibilities in certain sectors. The pharmaceutical and agricultural sectors of developing countries are going to be affected the most by TRIPS-Plus IP provisions. However, developing countries still have opportunity to bargain with their developed counterparts to ensure their rights of using flexibilities in certain sectors. It cannot be denied that despite some criticism, the TRIPS-Plus initiatives are clearly crucial drivers of significant reforms in developing countries towards harmonising intellectual property standards all over the world.

31 Ermias Tekeste Biadgleng and Jean-Christophe Maur, “The Influence of Preferential Trade Agreements on the Implementation of Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries: A First Look”, ICTSD Issue Paper No. 33, 2011, available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteipc2011d01_en.pdf, accessed on 14 November 2013, p. 24.

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Riad Khan Anas KhanMohammad Mohabbat KhanMohammad Habibur Rahman

SKILLED LABOUR MIGRATION FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

Abstract

Skilled labour migration from developing countries to the developed world has increased exponentially in recent years. The pattern of immigration has changed enormously over the course of time in some particular cases. Developing countries experienced group migration in the form of indentured labourers from 19th century to the First World War. Free migration commenced after this period. The causes of immigration from the developing countries have been attributed to the push and pull factors which are related to economic, political, cultural and the environmental issues. Today, migration has become a social and political phenomenon of major concern to political leaders and policy makers in these countries. Advancements in technology, information and transportation have contributed to the enhanced rate and pace of immigration. This paper examines the impact of skilled labour migration from the developing countries which often played a vital role in supplying labour to the developed world and this is expected to continue. It shows that this phenomenon has social and political impact in sending countries including loss of leadership and educated people, impacting the political process of registering candidature for national elections. The paper, taking up the example of Fiji, argues that the return of migrants with enhanced human capital and technology, remittances, loss of educated people, poor quality of candidates standing for elections and increased indigenous Fijian dominance are some of the social and political impacts of immigration in this particular case.

1. Introduction

Migration is one of the most talked about subjects these days. Whether it is the most renowned academic, politician or the community at large, everyone seems to have a view on its merits. Immigration, a particular variant of migration, is essentially the act of leaving one place for another for any length of time. The time

Riad Khan is Freelance Consultant in Fiji. His e-mail address is: [email protected]; Anas Khan is Freelance Consultant in New Zealand. His e-mail address is: [email protected]; Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, Ph.D is former Professor of Public Administration, University of Dhaka and Member, University Grants Commission, Bangladesh. His e-mail address is: [email protected]; Mohammad Habibur Rahman, Ph.D is Associate Professor at Mohammad Bin Rashid School of Government, Dubai, UAE. His e-mail address is: [email protected]



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SKILLED LABOUR MIGRATION FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

does not have to be specified but the intention is to relocate from one place to another. Immigration of skilled persons from the developing to developed countries has increased over time. It is one of the most pressing issues in the modern globalised world. The United Nations estimates that over 175 million people, or roughly 3 per cent of the world’s total population, now reside in a country where they were not born.1 Throughout history, humans have migrated widely. The movement of people across the international boundaries has continued both as voluntary migration within one’s region or further and involuntary migration such as slave trade and mass exodus due to ethnic or racial cleansing. In order to understand the causes and consequences of such migration, this paper takes up the example of Fiji – a country which has long been an important player in the supply of almost all categories of qualified and experienced personnel.

There has been a huge change in the patterns of migration from the developing countries over the past century. In the early days, migration involved permanent rupture, because people did not have the technology to be able to keep in touch with their homeland. It was essentially a permanent migration. However, there has been a movement away from that kind of a permanent rupture to trans-migration, which has enabled people who lived overseas to have business or social connections back home. Thus, immigration has now become a much more fluid process. The assimilationist ideology which required one to completely assimilate oneself in the overseas lifestyle to be considered as a true overseas citizen has gone. People are much more at home displaying dual loyalties without necessarily being accused of being disloyal or unfaithful to the country of residence. This has increased as a result of the explosive growth in information and communications technology (ICT). Since the world is getting smaller with advanced technologies, finding required labour around the globe has become much easier than ever before.2 Distance is now really an imaginary phenomenon rather than a physical one.

The aim of the paper is to study the impact of skilled labour immigration from the developing countries to the developed ones, taking up the example of Fiji as a case study. The paper is organised into six sections. After the introduction, the second section examines the patterns and nature of immigration in Fiji from historical perspective. The third reviews the causes of immigration and the fourth section discusses the impacts of skilled labour immigration from Fiji. Future trends are identified in section five. Section six draws conclusion.

1 United Nations, International Migration, New York: Population Division, Department of Economics and Social Affairs, 2000. 2 J. R H. Choi, Woods and S. K. Murrmann, “International Labor Markets and the Migration of Labor Forces as an Alternative Solution for Labor Shortages in the Hospitality Sector”, International Journal of Contemporary Management, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2000, pp. 61-66.

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2. Brief History of Immigration in Developing Countries: The Case of Fiji

Fiji is a multi-ethnic nation of 8,27,900 population according to the 2007 population census. Fiji became a British Crown Colony in 1874 and an independent nation in 1970. Generally, labour migration in Fiji could be classified in three phases: mass immigration from 1879-1919 and 1920-1936, permanent labour migration from 1970 onwards, and temporary labour migration and modern immigration since early 1990s. The history of migration in Fiji, from the late 19th century to the First World War, saw the migration of Indian immigrants, called ‘girmitiyas’, who came to Fiji in 1879 to work on sugarcane plantations. Between 1879 and 1916, 60,000 Indian migrants arrived in Fiji and their work helped create the foundations of Fiji’s sugar-based economy.3 This was a form of group migration known as the indentured migration. People were contracted for a period of service, employed by the Colonial Sugar Refining (CSR) Company or the government or other employers. At the end of their term of service, the immigrants could go back to India after five years paying their own fare or after ten years without paying for transportation. Eventually about 24,000 went back to India. The majority stayed on. As these labourers were illiterate, and left India in sorry circumstances and did not have enough money due to settlement costs in Fiji with their families, physical contact with India decreased. They also lost contact with their families and had no precise knowledge of where their forefathers had come from. They only kept in touch with India vicariously, through movies, newspapers and periodic visits by missionaries from India. Thus, in these cases the rupture was fairly complete. The system of indentured labourer formally came to an end in 1920. Their descendants constitute the bulk of the present Indo-Fijian population, the rest being descendants of Gujarati traders and Punjabi agriculturalists who arrived in Fiji in the 1920s.4

The end of the First World War saw the beginning of free migration with the arrival of Gujarati migrants in 1904. The first Chinese settlement was recorded in Levuka (the old capital of Fiji) in the 1870s, its occupants being gold miners from Victoria, Australia who came to Fiji when the mines were depleted.5 However, a ‘large-scale’ migration took place in the 1920s throughout the 1960s where free migrants were coming from Gujarat, principally from Surat and Navsari districts and Punjab, principally from Jalundar and Hoshyarpur districts. They were mostly farmers, traders and merchants from India. Their arrival, together with the Asians, saw the growth of businesses and trade in Fiji. They were mostly individual migrants who kept in touch with their families and even brought them to Fiji after a certain period or went back home to get their children married. Thus, the frequency and intensity of contact was far greater than with the case of indentured migrants. This also caused controversy locally about the commitments of these free migrants who had come to Fiji. The Europeans also exploited this. There were also some conflicts between free

3 B. V. Lal, "Fiji Islands: From Immigration to Emigration", Washington D.C: Migration Policy Institute, 2003. 4 Ibid. 5 S. J. Yee, The Chinese in the Pacific, Suva, Fiji: The South Pacific Social Sciences in Association with the United Nations Development Programme, 1974.

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migrants and the descendants of the “girmitiyas”. But whether people who came to Fiji as free migrants or indentured migrants, they all saw Fiji as their home, established themselves there and developed businesses. It did not seem that there was a sense at that time to immigrate elsewhere using Fiji as a stopover.

This began to change in the 1960s when small numbers of people started going to the United Kingdom and Australia. However, there were restrictions in the case of Australia because of the White Australia Policy. There were also attempts by the then Governor of Fiji, Sir Derek Jakeway, to stop the outward migration of Indians due to the loss of skills from Fiji. This attempt was futile as it was seen as interfering with persons’ freewill and infringement of human rights. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the pace of immigration increased and bulk of migrants went to Canada and the US. A process of permanent emigration started during and after independence in 1970 and it has been building momentum since then. In the immediate post-independent years, Indo-Fijians were beginning to feel insecure and excluded from power. In the 1970s, there was a sense of anxiety, exclusion and uncertainty in their minds about their future in that country. With the advent of discriminatory legislations in affirmative action, education and so forth, people were beginning to feel apprehensive. In the early 1980s, about 60 per cent of the Fiji emigrants went to Canada and the west coast of the United States, and the bulk of the rest to Australia and New Zealand.6

People, especially Indo-Fijians, began immigrating in smaller numbers but the trickle turned into torrent after 1987. Table 1 shows a huge increase in emigration from 1986 onwards. Interestingly, the move was to Canada, Australia and particularly New Zealand due to the then Prime Minister David Lange’s more positive response to the plight of Indo-Fijians (see, Figure 1). The total official outflow from Fiji was over 91,000 between 1987 and 2004.7 In the 1990s, about two-thirds of the population who left Fiji went to Australia which became the preferred destination for the important reason of physical proximity compared to Canada or the US. Other factors included demand for skills, family reunion and better opportunities. All four destinations now remain very popular for immigration. Despite the loss of skilled people, immigration has been a desirable means by which people can expand opportunities and gain experience in a wider global setting.

6 B. V. Lal, op. cit.7 Paper presented by M. Mohanty on “Globalisation, New Labour Migration and Development in Fiji Islands”, in the Conference on Globalisation, Governance and the Pacific Islands, 2005, Canberra.

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Table 1: Fiji Citizen ImmigrationYear Total Departure1986 27991987 51181988 54961999 55101990 56501991 54321992 46211993 41071994 41551995 49311996 50301997 44931998 48291999 48372000 52752001 63162002 54802003 5771

Source: Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics8

Figure 1: The Direction of Movement of Fiji Emigrants – 2003

NZ35%

USA18%

Australia31%

UK3%Canada

9%

ContinentalEurope

0% Paci�c Islands

1% Others3%

3. The Causes of Immigration

The usual process of migration from the developing to the developed countries reveals that most people move for economic reasons in general to take

8 Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, Fiji Tourism and Migration Statistics (various issues), Suva, Fiji.

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better-paying jobs or to search for jobs in new areas.9 Whatever the reasons, migrants move to seek better lives for themselves and their children. For each individual, there is a net gain wherever the benefits of life in the destination country exceed those in the country of origin and the difference between the two is not swallowed up by the costs of moving.10 Industrialisation and globalisation has also influenced migration by significantly improving transportation techniques.

As for Fiji, Indo-Fijians make up most of the emigrants from Fiji. According to Mohanty11, the permanent emigration process is dominated by Indo-Fijians (88-89 per cent). However, the number of indigenous Fijian emigrants has also increased recently. Some estimate that as much as 10 per cent of the migrants from Fiji are indigenous Fijians, members of an improving and increasing middle class seeking better opportunities for themselves and their children.12 This indicates that Fiji’s push and international pull factors have an impact on numerous sections of the community. Therefore, the causes of immigration in Fiji could be attributed to the push and pull factors. Push and pull factors are those that either forcefully push people to immigrate or attracts them and are related to economic, political, cultural and environmental causes. Push factors which relate to Fiji in this case include essentially the political upheaval and fear, the sense of exclusion from power, the sense of persecution, the glass ceiling in the public service, corruption, mismanagement and racial discrimination in the public sector, poor medical and public services, diminishing employment opportunities, mistreatment, rise in criminal activities, tensions in society between majorities and minorities followed by local struggles, racism and racial discrimination. The consequences of Fiji’s military coups since 1987 have been deep and irreversible causing massive brain drain from the country. Notably, the level of out-migration doubles from around 2,400 each year to over 5,000.13 Non-renewal of land leases and the deteriorating state of the sugar industry are also uprooting people and have created the mindset for them to emigrate. Since 1987, thousands of Indo-Fijian farmers’ land leases under Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act have not been renewed mainly due to political ploys by indigenous Fijian leaders. Fiji has also lost economic growth potential of more than 5 per cent since 1987.14

Pull factors which relate to overseas countries include better and fairer opportunities, better living standards, education, enjoyment, better medical care and public services, equal rights, stability, security and family links. Pull factors could also be looked at a manner in which people have adapted themselves. Migrants from Fiji have adapted well to foreign lands. They are talented and culturally well equipped to participate in the foreign workforce. They are hard-working, understand the basics of

9 World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC), Travel and Tourism: Progress and Priorities, 1995. 10 N. Hall, “Brain Drains and Brain Gains: Causes, Consequences, Policy”, International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 32, No. 11, 2005, pp. 939-950.11 M. Mohanty, op. cit.12 B. V. Lal, Turnings: Fiji Factions, Lautoka, Fiji: Fiji Institute of Applied Sciences, 2008a.13 V. Naidu, “Social Consequence of the Coups”, in B Lal, G Chand and V Naidu (eds.), 1987 Fiji Twenty Years On, Lautoka, Fiji: Fiji Institute of Applied Science, 2008. 14 B. V. Lal, “The Loss of Innocence”, in ibid.

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western culture and have the skills and knowledge and do well overall. What sometimes is not seen is the hardship that people have to endure in the process of adapting because they carry with them the ethos and values which are appropriate in indigenous context but not necessarily in a foreign context. Thus, the pain, hardships and suffering they encounter are beneath the surface. Citizens from Fiji also have communities in overseas countries, establish networks, have cultural institutions, and they do not feel like completely new migrants or in an unfamiliar community. Most immigrants also visit Fiji on regular basis; thus, they are acquainted with their home country as well.

4. Political and Social Impacts of Immigration

Given the magnitude and importance of immigration, one cannot ignore its impact on the developing countries. It will be fair to say that the best and the brightest Fijians have either left, or are leaving or will leave sooner or later. Fiji has lost over 3,800 professionals, technical and related workers since the coup in 2000.15 This represents over half of Fiji’s stock of middle to high level workers.16 The Fiji National Provident Fund processed 741 applications for migration purposes which amounted to US$ 6.28 million in the first quarter of 2008 and for the period January to December 2007, withdrawal for migration purposes was US$ 19.74 million. What is left behind are mostly the desperate or the desperately poor that have inadequate skills to immigrate. Lal commented that there was hardly a single Indo-Fijian family in Fiji which did not have at least one member abroad.17 This phenomenon is remarkable and is certainly true in the case of Fiji. The gravity of focus is now shifted to either ‘I will go one day or I want my children to be there’. Most migrants tend to be young adults who are often educated and more ambitious and in this sense there is a loss of educated leadership, skills and young productive people at village level. Families also tend to be socially and culturally rooted in their country of birth which may be difficult to overcome.

Immigration also has demographic consequences such as changes in population distribution and demographic crises such as aging population due to the loss of the young and productive group. This drain of skill and talent of professionals such as doctors, nurses, teachers, accountants and others has been deeply felt by people affecting their well being. Together with their families, these people 1,30,000 to 1,50,000, accounted for 10-12 per cent of the country’s population in 2000.18 Most of these migrants also represent the reproductive ages; thus, there is a chance of continued decline in population in the future. This in turn can be followed by economic problems. It is estimated that Fiji has been losing US$ 19.35 million annually since 1987.19 These people have taken their skills, their earning and taxpaying capacities,

15 M. Mohanty, op. cit. 16 Government of Fiji, Annual Reports – 2000 and 2001, Suva, Fiji: Immigration Department, 2002a. 17 B. V. Lal, 2008a, op. cit.18 V. Naidu, op. cit.19 Ibid.

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their life savings and their purchasing power to Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States.20 Many local investors have also moved their savings abroad to prevent any risks. Several sectors of the economy also lack quality and efficient services due to the emigration of professional people. There is also a visible decline in population of Indo-Fijian settlements in Fiji. Many farms are deserted and settlements abandoned constituting a major socio-cultural rupture. It is said that over the last 20 years the largest town in Vavua Levu has lost is dynamism and is heading to becoming a ‘ghost town’.

Institutionalised racism has also become widespread in the public sector due to the continuous migration of Indo-Fijians causing social divide and further segregation of people in Fiji. With no regard to ethnic balance, merits or proper credentials, indigenous Fijians were recruited and promoted in virtually all top government positions. Virtually all top public service positions have been held by indigenous Fijians and they hold nearly 70 per cent of the remainder.21

On the other hand, people who migrate also have attachments with their communities. There is transfer of technology, return of migrants who have learned new technologies and managerial techniques and enhanced human capital to the home country by boosting productivity and economic development. They also contribute through remittances; assist in family or community-based projects or cash and kind during natural disasters which are quite significant. Thus, the flow on effect is continued. People also see migration as a multinational activity as they may select someone to emigrate in the expectation that overtime that person would contribute and help their families in Fiji.

Remittances particularly are amongst the major positive impacts of migration. There has been a rapid increase in remittances from people living abroad. When money is received locally, remittances play a crucial role in supplementing the national savings rate in many developing countries around the world. Remittances also assist in reducing poverty if they are effectively utilised by the locals. In the early 1990s, the amount of remittances in Fiji was very low. However, this significantly increased since 2000 as depicted in Table 2. Between 1993-1999, remittances had a low growth of only 38.4 per cent with an annual average rate of US$ 23.81 million per year. This increased to 218.3 per cent during 2000-2004 with an annual average rate of US$ 99.07 million a year. There was a remarkable rise in the flow of personal remittances which amounted to over a billion Fijian dollars during the period 2000-2004. According to Mohanty,22 this dramatic rise was mainly due to the remittances generated through the salaries and allowances by the peacekeeping forces abroad and forces working in the United Kingdom.

20 M Reddy, M. Mohanty and V. Naidu, “Economic Cost of Human Capital Loss from Fiji: Implications for Sustainable Development”, International Migration Review, 2004. 21 V. Naidu, op. cit.22 M. Mohanty, op. cit.

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Table 2: Trends in Personal Remittances in Fiji, 1993-2004Period Total Personal Remittance

(US$ million)Annual Average Rate (US$ million)

% Change

1993-1999 166.64 (F$ 344.32) 23.81 (F$ 49.2) +38.42000-2004 495.36 (F$ 1, 023.50) 99.07 (F$ 204.7) +218.31993-2004 662.01 (F$ 1, 367.82) 55.17 (F$ 114.0) +726.2

Source: Reserve Bank of Fiji.23

There is also debate over the extent to which remittances actually improve the economy since they are mostly used for consumption purposes that do little to boost domestic production, employment or exports rather than investment. Macmillan outlines some of the negative consequences if remittances are used in this way.24 These include an increase in the price level and imports, an overvalued exchange rate and a dependence on remittances which may delay long-term economic policies, especially if they cannot be guaranteed due to economic fluctuations. There may also be cases of unknown or unreported remittances; thus, its actual contribution is not known.

Fiji’s recent political turbulence sets the context for understanding the complex dynamics of its citizen’s emigration. Since the coups, emigration from Fiji has exhibited two main characteristics. The first is the dynamic increase in emigration since the coups of 1987. Between 1978 and 1986, 20,703 Fijian citizens emigrated at an annual average rate of 2,300. Between 1987 and 1996, the number increased to 50,050 at an annual average rate of 5,005. Between 1997 and 2000 alone, 16,825 people migrated. And the numbers are increasing daily. The second characteristic is that the bulk of the emigrants – about 90 per cent – have been Indo-Fijians.25

Political instability is a major cause of migration from Fiji, making this demographic transition enormously important politically. The Reserve Bank of Fiji Quarterly Review noted “it is quite clear that the political instability generated by events of 1987 and 2000 gave greater impetus to the emigration process.”26 In the 1970s and 1980s and even before, there was a powerful emotion in the indigenous community that unless Fijians were united against Indo-Fijians, Indians would take their land or future away. These comments seem to be a political tool to keep the country divided for personal gains. Land laws cannot be changed unless Fijians themselves want to change them. It is very solidly entrenched in the constitution. It is essential to keep politics out of land issues, as land is a huge economic resource which will benefit landowners, farmers and Fiji as a whole. Apparently, no land has

23 Reserve Bank of Fiji, Statistics on Personal Remittances, Economics Department, Reserve Bank of Fiji, Suva, Fiji, 2005.24 M. Macmillen, "The Economic Effects of International Migration", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 20, 1982, pp. 245-267.25 B.V. Lal, 2003, op. cit.26 Government of Fiji, "Impact of Brain Drain in Fiji", RBF Quarterly Review, Suva, Fiji, December, 2002b pp. 40-45.

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ever been taken away by the Indian community over the last 129 years since the two communities have been living in Fiji. The fact that indigenous Fijians make up little over 57 per cent of the total population, the fear that Indo-Fijians might dispose them of their heritage or the fear of Indo-Fijian dominance has diminished. Migration has a big role to play in this, allaying Fijian fears. With this fear gone, there is now more room for debate and discussion among indigenous Fijians. Numerous political parties in the 1990s came up to the fore partly as a result of the absence of this fear. Indigenous Fijian concerns and issues will acquire a more prominent place in the public discourse than was the case in the past.

There is also the loss of educated people through migration who perhaps had a more genuine and vested interest in the long-term future in this country. This is of immense concern as good quality of people is the key building block for any country. For instance, the drain of talent and experience is one problem plaguing the civil service. Another is its collapsing morale.27 Those who are left behind are gullible, desperate and open to manipulation by political leaders. They have given up and there seems a sense of resignation.

The cost of emigration in Fiji is also high. According to Lal,28 Fiji is estimated to lose, on average, US$ 21.53 million annually due to emigration, mainly through loss of skill, re-training new appointees and delayed appointments. The figure is much higher – US$ 133 million – if account is taken of the output lost if the emigrant’s work is not carried out by a replacement. Another study by Reddy, Mohanty and Naidu29 estimates the country lost directly and indirectly about US$ 21.77 million annually through its human capital loss.

The other manifestation of this lack of educated commitment in Fiji is in the calibre of candidates who stand for elections. In the past two decades, there has been a significant change in the quality Indo-Fijian parliamentarians compared to their Fijian counterparts.30 There was a time when highly educated and respected people used to contest the general elections and they showed commitment to and passion for politics. This has essentially vanished. The people who contest for elections now are retired and low-level civil servants, faded faces, disgruntled and defeated politicians and some political retreads hoping for a second career to enjoy a last moment of glory and to make the most of the opportunity while it lasts for personal gains before the candle blows out. They do not really have anything to contribute or they may not be particularly well educated for the job. The educated class of the society remain non- participative as they have either made up their minds to immigrate, fear travel bans and other international sanctions and unfavourable policies or simply do not want to get involved with the messiness of local politics. Also the sense and fear of coup

27 B. V. Lal, “Aftermath of the 2006 Coup”, Fijian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2007, pp. 89-123. 28 B.V. Lal, 2003, op. cit.29 M. Reddy, M. Mohanty and V. Naidu, op. cit.30 B. V. Lal, 2008b, op. cit.

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culture recurring and the culture of racial patronage is a very effective deterrent for people to participate: ‘why sacrifice when there will be another coup?’ Coups do not solve problems, they compound them.

On the other side, it can now be seen that the calibre of Fijians in politics is far better or higher because they see a future in politics whereas Indo-Fijians do not. This demographic transition has huge ethnic and political implications. People have not sufficiently appreciated the magnitude of the change that has occurred. Many people who emigrate feel deeply embittered about the coups, upheavals and other problems. They sometimes exercise ‘soft power’, that is they create an awareness of their parties or their community’s predicaments in an overseas country. Many write from overseas in support for particular political parties or sometimes become the milking cow for political parties as they do fundraising and other activities in support of them.

It may also be worthy to mention here that race-based politics has hobbled Fiji’s future. Despite the potential and opportunities, Fiji has been struggling over the past two decades with adversities that are both complex and deep rooted. In the wake of consecutive coups since 1987, Fiji has lost enormously as a result of bad political and economic governance. Deeply divisive race based politics and the loss of development opportunities have been immense. From 1970, Fiji started its journey as a nation with a race-based political climate. Fiji’s politics and overall governance have been conquered and mired in divisive, race-based policies and institutions for decades. This has caused severe ruptures in Fiji’s developments resulting in the hampering of developmental progress and prosperity. Fiji has suffered years of lost development opportunities. This has had a huge impact on Fiji as a whole and has contributed largely to the significant loss of skilled and talented people. The coups and their impact have heightened and magnified the dominance of race-based politics and governance resulting in a huge flight of trained and talented people, mainly Indo-Fijians, going abroad.

Racial politics will have no future in Fiji particularly in the minority communities. The 19 reserved seats for the Indo-Fijian community are also not in proportion with the severe decline in the Indo-Fijian population size. Initially, there was proportionality when the number of seats was tiered to the population size. It is also irrational to have racial-based seats for the indigenous Fijian community which makes up little over 57 per cent of the total population. Another implication of this demographic transition is that minority group leaders will have to integrate themselves politically with Fijians. Fiji’s future does not lie in ethnic separation, in separate seats but in forging political alliances with the indigenous community. It is suggested that all the ethnically reserved seats should eventually be taken away so that Fiji can have a political culture which is non-racial. Fijian citizens should move away from the obsession that only their own ethnic candidate can look after their interests to one which they

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can trust whomever they elect to represent their interests. Leaders also have a huge responsibility towards this by being fair to all communities. Fiji-born immigrants have no problem in voting for candidates from diverse ethnicities in overseas countries. The smallest minority in society is an individual and if individual’s rights are protected then everyone’s rights are also protected. The communal system and the ethnicity question in Fiji are fundamental issues that have contributed towards agitation, race-based affirmative action policies, racial divide and the coups. Getting rid of this will be a major step towards moving away from the politics of race to the politics of non-racialism. The biggest challenges would be to deal with the coup culture, function and place of traditional Fijian institutions in modern 21st century politics, non-renewal of expiring land leases under Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act and the country’s obsession with racial politics. Political leaders will have to deal with these problems now through dedication, commitment and effective visionary leadership and not pass it on to the next generation.

Fiji has also inherited a political culture of distrust and suspicion because at every turn people are reminded of their race. For instance, one has to indicate one’s race when applying for jobs or filling out certain documents. Thus, public memory is racially archived and people cannot think outside the box. This has also fragmented Fiji by keeping people divided. People see each other through the prism of prejudice and racial stereotyping as there was never a non-racial system of politics in Fiji. The present system provides all the incentives for ethnic chauvinism, not racial or political moderation. Fiji residents have different cultural heritages but they are all citizens of one country. Gradually, this has to change and eventually abolished altogether as racial seats seem a big hindrance to nation building. There should be politics based on ideology not primordial affections. Politicians will adapt to any incentive in this system.

5. Future Trends

As it is evident in many developing countries, the international mobility of skilled workers including from Fiji is likely to increase in the future. Amongst other factors mentioned, technological advancements have predestined an upward trend. Most of the immigrants from Fiji have been Indo-Fijians and their magnitude of migration has been remarkable. At one stage, Indo-Fijians were 51 per cent of the population. By the end of World War II, Indo-Fijians outnumbered the indigenous Fijians in the total population.31 In an interview on 03 January 2008, Professor Brij Lal mentioned that at one stage Indo-Fijians were 51 per cent of the population, in 1987 they were about 49 per cent of the population, in 1996 they were about 45 per cent of the population, now it is just over 37 per cent of the population. This is a substantial drop in numbers. Based on this trend, Indo-Fijian numbers will go down even further with time. Scholars may come to Fiji and have difficulty in believing that there was a time in Fiji’s history when 50 per cent of the population was Indo-Fijians.

31 B. V. Lal, 2003, op. cit.

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Certainly, Indo-Fijians feel uprooted and unwanted and given the chance, they would all go. Emotionally, they are now preparing for migration due to the continuous instability and conflicts over constitution, land and politics. There may be some who cannot migrate due to the love for the local lifestyle and jobs that they may be doing but this may be very small in number. Indo-Fijians are a minority community and they feel that they are being victimised by the majority community. Lal states that the political culture of racial patronage and coups spawned effectively marginalised the community.32 They see their future as very unstable given the problems from the past decades. They also see the lifestyles of their own kinsmen who have gone overseas and established themselves well. Their children are also pursuing courses at tertiary institutions that would accumulate points for them to emigrate. Many believe that people emigrating from Fiji should not be blamed as one should look at the reasons why people immigrate, mainly due to diminishing opportunities, unequal rights and political instability.

There is a creation of a Fiji diaspora mainly in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the US. People may come back and live in Fiji but not necessarily as citizens. However, no one seems to really care that so many of Fiji’s best and brightest are leaving. Some Fijian nationalists actually want the country emptied of Indo-Fijians.33 The response to the Indo-Fijian emigration has been varied. On the one side, it seems regrettable that there is enormous amount of brain-drain of skilled and talented people from Fiji. At another, there is a feeling of relief to have everything amongst the indigenous community. Fijian nationalists applaud their departure as a necessary first step in the “Fijianisation” of their country, a price the country “must” pay to reclaim its indigenous soul.34 The ones who have left are regarded as disloyal or unfaithful to Fiji, yet by staying back they are regarded as second-class citizens by Fijian nationalists. Whatever the views, Indo-Fijians have contributed significantly since the colonial economy to bring Fiji to where it is today. It is now really up to the government of the day to try and see how they can harness the resources of the diaspora for Fiji’s development. Lot of people who emigrated still consider Fiji as part of them at least for the first generation. However, large number of Fiji emigrants may never have any desire to ever come back to Fiji to live.

It is also important to mention that the development of a Fijian middle class which is well educated and trained will increase over time. Indo-Fijians had the feeling that they are the educated ones only but this has certainly changed. The gap would be filled by people with skills and talent from the indigenous community. Indo-Fijians departure will certainly make an impact in the short run but not necessarily in the long run.

32 Ibid.33 B. V. Lal, 2008a, op. cit.34 B. V. Lal, 2003, op. cit.

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6. Conclusion

This paper examined the impact of skilled labour migration from the developing countries exploring the case of Fiji. Fiji has played a vital role in supplying labour to the developed countries and this is expected to continue. Advancements in technology, information and transportation have contributed to the enhanced rate and pace of immigration from Fiji. Labour demand and supply has now become more globally accessible, with individuals and organisations fulfilling their needs more effectively and efficiently.

The causes of immigration from any developing country could be attributed to the push and pull factors which are related to economic, political, cultural and environmental causes. These factors also have huge social and political impacts, some of which are positive while others remain negative or undesirable. Higher remittances and return of immigrants with technology and human capital are some of the positive outcomes, while in some cases, the loss of leadership and educated people emerge as undesirable results. If the trend continues, some developing countries including Fiji will be left with a large pool of poorly educated, unskilled workforce with disastrous consequences on social and economic infrastructure and levels of investment adversely affecting industries, standard of education and health services, and efficiency of civil service. It can be suggested that developing countries should address their governance problems and take initiatives for democratic consolidation for nation-building process. The divisive forces in the society need to be eradicated and better opportunities have to be created through economic advancement that will in turn make immigration to a foreign country less attractive, thereby benefitting the developing countries in their development efforts.

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