joint doctrine for campaign planning - bits02).pdf · campaign planning process discusses the...

25 January 2002

Joint Doctrinefor

Campaign Planning

Joint Publication 5-00.1

PREFACE

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1. Scope

This publication provides overarchingguidance and principles governing theplanning of campaigns at the combatantcommand and subordinate joint force levels.It focuses on the methodology for translatingnational and theater strategy into planningactions required to design and synchronize acampaign plan. It describes joint campaignplanning across the full range of militaryoperations at the strategic and operationallevels of war. It discusses campaign planningwithin the context of the Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System and guidesplanners to necessary planning references.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to governthe joint activities and performance of theArmed Forces of the United States in jointoperations and provides the doctrinal basisfor US military involvement in multinationaland interagency operations. It providesmilitary guidance for the exercise of authorityby combatant commanders and other jointforce commanders (JFCs) and prescribesdoctrine for joint operations and training. Itprovides military guidance for use by theArmed Forces in preparing their appropriateplans. It is not the intent of this publication torestrict the authority of the JFC fromorganizing the force and executing the missionin a manner the JFC deems most appropriateto ensure unity of effort in the accomplishmentof the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, and subordinatecomponents of these commands. Theseprinciples and guidance also may apply whensignificant forces of one Service are attachedto forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine will befollowed except when, in the judgment of thecommander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable andconsistent with US law, regulations, anddoctrine.

JOHN P. ABIZAIDLieutenant General, USADirector, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION TO CAMPAIGN PLANNING

• Campaign Planning ................................................................................................... I-1• Fundamentals ............................................................................................................ I-1• Strategic Guidance .................................................................................................... I-4• National Strategic Planning ....................................................................................... I-4• Regional Strategic Planning ...................................................................................... I-4• Functional Strategic Planning .................................................................................... I-5• Support Strategic Planning ........................................................................................ I-5• Campaign Planning ................................................................................................... I-5• Campaign Planning for Military Operations Other Than War .................................... I-6

CHAPTER IICAMPAIGN PLAN DESIGN

• General .................................................................................................................... II-1• Strategic Guidance ................................................................................................... II-1• Identifying Critical Factors ....................................................................................... II-6• Operational Concept .............................................................................................. II-11

CHAPTER IIIDELIBERATE PLANNING DURING CAMPAIGN PLAN DEVELOPMENT

SECTION A. DELIBERATE PLANNING PRINCIPLES ........................................ III-1• Strategic Direction ................................................................................................. III-1• Strategic Plans ....................................................................................................... III-1• Combatant Command Guidance ............................................................................. III-2

SECTION B. DELIBERATE PLANNING ............................................................... III-3• General .................................................................................................................. III-3• Deliberate Planning Process for OPLANs .............................................................. III-4• Initiation (Phase I) .................................................................................................. III-4• Concept Development (Phase II) ............................................................................ III-4• Plan Development (Phase III) ................................................................................ III-14• Final Plan Review (Phase IV) ............................................................................... III-15• Supporting Plans (Phase V) ................................................................................... III-17

SECTION C. MULTINATIONAL PLANNING ...................................................... III-18• Multinational Integration ....................................................................................... III-18• Strategic Integration of Campaign Plans ................................................................ III-18

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• Theater Integration ................................................................................................ III-19• Bilateral Campaign Planning ................................................................................. III-20

SECTION D. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION ................................................ III-20• Interagency Coordination ...................................................................................... III-20

CHAPTER IVCRISIS ACTION PLANNING DURING CAMPAIGN PLAN DEVELOPMENT

• General .................................................................................................................. IV-1• Crisis Action Procedures ........................................................................................ IV-3• Crisis Action Planning Phases ................................................................................ IV-4

APPENDIX

A Flexible Deterrent Options .................................................................................. A-1B Lines of Operations ............................................................................................. B-1C Theater Campaign Plan Format ............................................................................ C-1D References ......................................................................................................... D-1E Administrative Instructions ................................................................................. E-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions .............................................................................. GL-3

FIGURE

I-1 Campaign Planning Purpose ............................................................................ I-2I-2 Fundamentals of Campaign Plans .................................................................... I-3II-1 Role of Strategic Guidance ............................................................................. II-2II-2 Characteristics of the Adversary’s Centers of Gravity ..................................... II-7II-3 Direct vs. Indirect ......................................................................................... II-13II-4 Phases — Joint Campaign ............................................................................ II-16II-5 Culminating Point .......................................................................................... II-18

III-1 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan ..................................................................... III-2III-2 Types of Deliberate Plans .............................................................................. III-3III-3 Deliberate Planning Phases ............................................................................ III-5III-4 Concept Development Steps ......................................................................... III-6III-5 Combatant Commander’s Strategic Concept ................................................. III-13III-6 Plan Development Steps ............................................................................... III-16III-7 Multinational Planning ................................................................................. III-19IV-1 Crisis Action Planning Documents ................................................................ IV-5IV-2 Crisis Action Planning Phase I ....................................................................... IV-6IV-3 Crisis Action Planning Phase II ...................................................................... IV-8IV-4 Crisis Action Planning Phase III ................................................................... IV-11IV-5 Crisis Action Planning Phase IV ................................................................... IV-15

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IV-6 Crisis Action Planning Phase V ..................................................................... IV-17IV-7 Crisis Action Planning Phase VI ................................................................... IV-21A-1 Examples of Requested Political Flexible Deterrent Options ............................. A-3A-2 Examples of Requested Informational Flexible Deterrent Options .................... A-3A-3 Examples of Requested Economic Flexible Deterrent Options .......................... A-4A-4 Examples of Requested Military Flexible Deterrent Options ............................. A-4

B-1 Operational Reach ........................................................................................... B-2

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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Campaigns are theoperational extension ofthe commander’s strategy.

Campaigns are inherentlyjoint, and phasing is theprimary differencebetween a campaign andplans for majoroperations.

Military campaigns areconducted in concert withthe other instruments ofnational power.

Above all, operational artrequires the joint forcecommander to focus onstrategic objectives.

General

Provides an Overview of Joint Campaigns and the JointCampaign Planning Process

Discusses the Elements of Campaign Plan Design

Describes Campaign Planning in the Context of Deliberateand Crisis Action Planning

Campaign plans are the operational extension of acommander’s strategy. Campaigns may vary drastically inscale, from a large major theater war campaign conceived andcontrolled at the combatant command or even NationalCommand Authorities (NCA) level, down to smaller scalecampaigns conducted by joint force commanders (JFCs)subordinate to the combatant commander.

Campaign plans are joint in nature. Campaign planning isaimed at developing the operational direction needed to resolvea particular situation deemed vital to national interests. Withinthe context of campaign planning, operation plans (OPLANs)are developed in support of operational objectives.

Guidance from civilian and military policymakers is aprerequisite for developing a military campaign plan. Militarycampaigns are not conducted in isolation of other governmentefforts to achieve national strategic objectives. Military poweris used in conjunction with other instruments of national power— diplomatic, economic, and informational — to achievestrategic objectives.

Operational art requires the JFC to focus on strategicobjectives that may be several operational steps removed fromcurrent activities. Joint operation planning can be describedin terms of its contribution to a larger purpose. Campaignplanning takes a comprehensive view of the combatantcommander’s theater and defines the framework in which anOPLAN fits. Campaign planning offers purpose and a commonobjective to a series of OPLANs. Existing OPLANs, operation

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Campaign planning isused for combatoperations, but also hasapplication in militaryoperations other than war(MOOTW).

Campaign plan design islinked to operational artand provides theconceptual linkage ofends, ways, and means.

plans in concept format (CONPLANs), or functional plansmay also provide the basis for development of campaign plans.

Campaign planning generally applies to the conduct of combatoperations, but can also be used in situations other than war.Combatant commanders and other JFCs may develop campaignplans for peacetime, conflict, or war.

Multinational planning consists of five basic elements. (1)multinational integration; (2) strategic integration of campaignplans; (3) theater integration; (4) bilateral campaign planning;and (5) interagency coordination. The term “multinationaloperations” describes joint military actions conducted by forcesof two or more nations. Planning for such operations isaccomplished through national and international channels, andcollective security goals, strategies, and treaties are taken intoconsideration in each phase of the planning procedures.Multinational integration involves planning for multinationaloperations accomplished in national and international channels.Collective security goals, strategies, and combined OPLANsare developed in accordance with individual treaty or allianceprocedures. Strategic integration pertains to the hierarchicalorganization of bilateral or multilateral bodies established todefine objectives and strategy. Theater integration occurswhen joint operation planning is integrated with alliance orcoalition planning at the theater or operational level by thecommander of US national forces. Bilateral planning involvesthe preparation of combined, mutually developed and approvedplans governing the employment of forces of two nations for acommon contingency. Interagency coordination occursbetween elements of the Department of Defense and engagedUS Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, andregional and international organizations for the purpose ofaccomplishing an objective.

Because theater-level campaign planning is mostly art, it isinextricably linked with operational art, most notably in thedesign of the operational concept for the campaign. This isprimarily an intellectual exercise based on experience andjudgment. The result of this process should be an operationaldesign that provides the conceptual linkage of ends, ways, andmeans.

Campaign Plan Design

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Executive Summary

Operational designessentially involvesunderstanding strategicguidance, identifying theadversary’s critical factors,and developing anoperational concept toachieve strategicobjectives.

Strategic guidance definesthe role of military forcesin the context of nationalstrategic objectives.

Campaign planners mustdetermine what set ofmilitary conditions willlead the opponent tocapitulate or change itsactions. The key is todetermine adversarycritical factors, i.e., thecritical strengths andweaknesses. The mostimportant of these aspectsis the adversary centers ofgravity (COGs).

To that end, the elements of an operational design are a tool toaid the combatant commander and planners in visualizing whatthe campaign should look like and shaping the commander’sintent. The key to operational design essentially involves (1)understanding the strategic guidance (determining the desiredend state and military objective(s)); (2) identifying the criticalfactors (both principal adversary strengths, including thestrategic centers of gravity (COGs), and weaknesses); and(3) developing an operational concept that will achieve thestrategic objective(s).

While deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation offuture events, there are always situations arising in the presentthat might require US military response. Campaign plandesign begins with strategic guidance in the form of militarystrategic aims or objectives that define the role of militaryforces in the larger context of national strategic objectives.The thread of continuity that ties the strategic objectives tothe operational and tactical levels is commonly referred to asthe desired “end state.” The desired end state should beclearly described by the NCA before Armed Forces of theUnited States are committed to an action; they should addressboth the desired political and military conditions after the militarystrategic objectives are attained. Although it has often beenthe case in past military operations other than war (MOOTW)situations that end state and supporting military conditionsdefining success were ill-defined or even absent, it isimperative to have a clearly defined end state here as well.

The campaign planner must go through a process of distillingstrategic guidance into military objectives. This entailsdetermining what set of conditions must exist for theopponent to capitulate or change its behavior to meet thepolitical aims. As part of that analysis, the planner mustunderstand both the sources of the adversary’s strength andthe key points of vulnerability. One of the most importanttasks in this process is identifying the adversary’s criticalfactors, i.e., principal strengths and weaknesses. Criticalstrengths include those adversary capabilities consideredcrucial for the accomplishment of the adversary’s assumedobjective(s). The most important among those capabilities arethe COGs, those aspects of the adversary’s overall capabilitythat, theoretically, if attacked and neutralized or destroyedwill lead either to the adversary’s inevitable defeat or forceopponents to abandon aims or change behavior.

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Critical vulnerabilities areadversary capabilities thatare vulnerable to attack.

Campaign planners mustalso identify and protectfriendly COGs.

The campaign planincludes an operationalscheme and describeswhen, where, and underwhat conditions thecombatant commanderintends to give or refusebattle.

The operational conceptaddresses the defeatmechanism, application offorces and capabilities,sequencing,synchronization, andoperational functions.

The adversary COG maybe attacked directly orindirectly.

Critical vulnerabilities are those aspects or components ofthe adversary’s capabilities that are deficient or vulnerable toneutralization, interdiction, or attack in a manner achievingdecisive or significant results, disproportionate to the militaryresources applied. Without this critical analysis of theadversary, it will be very difficult to develop realistic coursesof action (COAs), especially those involving a deception planor ruse.

Just as the planner decides how to attack the adversary’sCOG(s), so too must the critical vulnerabilities of friendlyforces and assets be identified and analyzed. If, in a givenoperation, US power projection capability was identified as afriendly COG, then long sea and air lines of communicationsfrom the continental United States might be considered afriendly critical vulnerability.

A campaign plan normally consists of an overall operationalscheme for the entire campaign, while subordinate componentcommanders will draw operational schemes for their respectivecomponents. The concept should also contain in general termsa scheme of when, where, and under what conditions thecombatant commander intends to give or refuse battle, ifrequired. The concept must explicitly state that the focus is onthe destruction or neutralization of the adversary’s COG(s).

Because each campaign is context specific, there is nocommonly agreed-upon checklist of prescriptive elements foran operational concept. At a minimum, the concept shouldaddress the method of defeating the opponent (defeatmechanism), application of forces and capabilities, sequencing,synchronization, and operational functions.

To attack the adversary’s COG(s), there are essentially twoapproaches: either direct or indirect. Direct approaches areused when the adversary’s COG is comparatively weaker thanthe force friendly forces can apply to destroy, overwhelm,neutralize, or defeat it. Conversely, indirect approaches areused when the adversary’s COG is not readily assailable, highlyprotected, or ill-defined. In MOOTW, the adversary’s COG(s)are usually difficult to identify and attack directly. Becausethe adversary’s COG will most likely be heavily defended, theindirect approach may offer the most viable method to exploitadversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses by attacking themalong decisive points. While decisive points are not COGs,they are essential in attacking COGs.

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Executive Summary

Application of forces andcapabilities entailsdetermining main andsecondary efforts.

Sequencing involvesphases, branches, sequels,and operational pauses.

Phases are a logical way toorganize the variousactivities in a campaign.

Operational pauses helpcommanders avoidculmination.

Synchronization isfacilitated by commandrelations and taskorganization.

Strategic guidance drivesthe deliberate planningprocess.

After the decisive points have been identified and vetted, thecampaign planner should consider several aspects regardingthe application of forces and capabilities. Specifically, theplanner must determine where the main and secondary effortswill be.

Sequencing operations to achieve the overall objective, i.e.,the destruction or neutralization of the adversary COG(s),involves several key factors. Sequencing includes thedetermination of phases required (assuming objectivescannot be accomplished in one major operation) as well asplans for branches, sequels, and operational pauses.

Phases are a logical way of organizing the diverse, extended,and dispersed activities of the campaign. Because each phaseinvolves one or more decision points, the planner must thinkthrough as far as practicable the possible branches or optionsresulting from each decision or action. Branches and sequelsare primarily used for changing deployments or directionof movement and accepting or declining combat.

Because military operations cannot always be conductedcontinuously, there may be a need to plan for periodic pauses.Operational pauses may be required when a major operationhas temporarily reached the end of its sustainability.Operational pauses help commanders avoid culmination.

Campaign plans synchronize and integrate operations byestablishing proper command relationships amongsubordinate commands, by clearly describing the concept ofoperations, by assigning realistic tasks and objectives, and byeffectively task-organizing assigned forces.

Deliberate planning is driven by strategic guidance. TheJoint Strategic Capabilities Plan provides guidance to thecombatant commanders and Service Chiefs to accomplish tasksand missions based on current military capabilities. Militaryplans developed through the deliberate planning process alsoconsider and incorporate the diplomatic, economic, andinformational instruments of national power.

Deliberate Planning During CampaignPlan Development

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Campaign planning takes a comprehensive view of thecombatant commander’s theater and defines the framework inwhich an OPLAN fits. In deliberate planning, the combatantcommander plans for a broad range of potential contingencies.Deliberate planning generally applies to the conduct of combatoperations, but can also apply to MOOTW and include theaterengagement planning in order to accomplish theater strategicobjectives.

An OPLAN is a complete and detailed joint plan and includesa full description of the concept of operations, all annexesapplicable to the plan, and time-phased force and deploymentdata. Deliberate planning is designed as a cyclic process andprovides the joint planning and execution community with anopportunity to develop and refine plans to be used in wartime.In its basic form, deliberate planning has five phases: initiation,concept development, plan development, plan review, andsupporting plans.

In the initiation phase (Phase I), the combatant commanderreceives the task assignment. Phase II, the conceptdevelopment phase, can be seen as an orderly series of sixsteps: (1) mission analysis; (2) planning guidance; (3) staffestimates; (4) commander’s estimate; (5) combatantcommander’s strategic concept; and (6) Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff concept review. In Phase III, plandevelopment, the basic OPLAN or CONPLAN and supportingannexes are prepared. Plan review, assessment, and validationby the Joint Staff and Services takes place during Phase IV.In the final phase (Phase V), all required supporting plans arecompleted and reviewed by the supported commander.

While deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation offuture events, there are always situations arising in thepresent that might require US military response. Crisisaction planning (CAP) procedures provide for thetransition from peacetime operations to MOOTW or war.Deliberate planning supports CAP by anticipating potentialcrises and operations and developing contingency plans thatfacilitate the rapid development and selection of COAs andexecution planning during crises.

Deliberate planningaddresses potentialcontingencies in war andMOOTW.

Deliberate planning hasfive phases: initiation,concept development, plandevelopment, plan review,and supporting plans.

Crisis action planning(CAP) addresses militaryresponses to current eventsand the transition to waror MOOTW.

Crisis Action Planning During CampaignPlan Development

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Executive Summary

CAP is fluid; therefore, planning procedures are inherentlyflexible. Even so, there are certain key activities or phases thattake place during the six phases of CAP.

During Phase I, “Situation Development,” an event withpossible national security implications occurs, isrecognized, and is reported through a variety of means tothe National Military Command Center. In Phase II,“Crisis Assessment,” the diplomatic, military, economic,and political implications of the crisis are weighed. Adecision is made on a possible requirement for military force,and current strategy and OPLANs are reviewed. During“COA Development” (Phase III), one or more combatantcommanders are tasked to develop recommended COAs, orthe NCA may even develop a COA. “COA Selection”occurs during Phase IV, and the necessary detailed planningis performed to execute the NCA-approved COA in PhaseV, “Execution Planning.” The decision by the NCA todeploy or employ US forces is implemented in Phase VI,“Execution.”

This publication provides overarching guidance and principlesgoverning the planning of campaigns at the combatantcommand and subordinate joint force levels. It focuses on themethodology for translating national and theater strategy intoplanning actions required to design, synchronize, and integratea campaign plan. It describes joint campaign planning acrossthe full range of military operations at the strategic andoperational levels of war. It includes concepts pertaining tocampaign plan design, deliberate campaign plan development,and campaign plan development. It discusses campaignplanning within the context of the Joint Operation Planningand Execution System and guides planners to necessaryplanning references.

CONCLUSION

CAP is flexible, butnormally follows sixphases: situationdevelopment, crisisassessment, course ofaction (COA)development, COAselection, executionplanning, and execution.

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“campaign planning. The processwhereby combatant commanders andsubordinate joint force commanderstranslate national or theater strategyinto operational concepts through thedevelopment of campaign plans.Campaign planning may begin duringdeliberate planning when the actualthreat, national guidance, andavailable resources become evident,but is normally not completed untilafter National Command Authoritiesselect the course of action during crisisaction planning. Campaign planningis conducted when contemplatedmilitary operations exceed the scopeof a single major joint operation.”

JP 1-02, Department of DefenseDictionary of Military and

Associated Terms

“campaign plan. A plan for a series ofrelated military operations aimed ataccomplishing a strategic oroperational objective within a giventime and space.”

JP 1-02, Department of DefenseDictionary of Military and

Associated Terms

2. Fundamentals

a. General. Campaign planning is the gluethat binds component, supporting, and

CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION TO CAMPAIGN PLANNING

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1. Campaign Planning

a. General. Combatant commanderstranslate national and theater strategy intostrategic and operational concepts throughthe development of theater campaign plans.The campaign plan embodies the combatantcommander’s strategic vision of thearrangement of related operations necessaryto attain theater strategic objectives.

b. Purpose. Campaign planning providesa method for joint force commanders (JFCs)to achieve their strategic military objective. Acampaign is planned, prepared, and executedby a JFC. Campaign planning encompassesboth the deliberate and crisis action planningprocesses. If the scope of contemplatedoperations requires it, campaign planningbegins with or during deliberate planning. Itcontinues through crisis action planning, thusunifying both planning processes. Thecampaign plan is the JFC’s vision ofaccomplishing the ultimate strategic objectivethrough a series of intermediate-operationalobjectives. Campaign planning is aimed atdeveloping the operational direction neededto resolve a particular situation deemed vitalto national interests. Within the context ofcampaign planning, operation plans(OPLANs) are developed in support ofoperational objectives. Figure I-1 provideskey aspects on the purpose of campaignplanning.

“A prince or a general can best demonstrate his genius by managing acampaign exactly to suit his objectives and resources doing neither too muchnor too little. But the effects of genius show not so much in novel forms ofaction as in the ultimate success of the whole. What we should admire isthe accurate fulfillment of the unspoken assumptions, the smooth harmonyof the whole activity, which only becomes evident in final success.”

Carl von ClausewitzOn War, 1832

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interagency operations together at theoperational level. The coordinated functioningof component and supporting elements canbe achieved through the interactive processof building plans and communicating theintent of those plans to the higherheadquarters, Service and/or functionalcomponent commanders, supportingcommanders, and other government andnongovernment agencies. Fundamentals ofa campaign plan are shown on Figure I-2.

b. Characteristics. Characteristics of acampaign plan include the following.

• It is the way that the JFC coordinates,employs, and sustains over time theavailable resources.

• It is a phased series of major operationsto bring about decisive results from themajor operations or battles.

• The synergy of these phased majoroperations creates an operationaladvantage that degrades or eliminatesadversary centers of gravity (COGs).

• A key characteristic of a campaign is theJFC’s authoritative synchronization andintegration of air, land, sea, space, andspecial operations efforts along withdeployment and sustainment to attain thestrategic or operational objectives.

• Information operations must beintegrated into the normal campaignplanning and execution process.

Figure I-1. Campaign Planning Purpose

CAMPAIGN PLANNING PURPOSE

The Campaign Plan

Functional and Servicecomponents conduct subordinateand supporting operations -- notindependent campaigns

The goal is to increase the totaleffectiveness of the joint force, notnecessarily to involve all forces orto involve all forces equally

Functional and Servicecomponents conduct subordinateand supporting operations -- notindependent campaigns

The goal is to increase the totaleffectiveness of the joint force, notnecessarily to involve all forces orto involve all forces equally

Incorporates the commander’s intent -- conciseexpression of the purpose of the operation and thedesired end state

Often contains the concept of operations -- the what,where, and how the joint force will affect the adversary orsituation -- provides sufficient detail for the staff andsubordinate commanders to understand what they are todo without further instructions

Incorporates the commander’s intent -- conciseexpression of the purpose of the operation and thedesired end state

Often contains the concept of operations -- the what,where, and how the joint force will affect the adversary orsituation -- provides sufficient detail for the staff andsubordinate commanders to understand what they are todo without further instructions

Synchronize andIntegrate Actions

LAND

JFC

through

SEA

Accomplish Objectives

SOFSPACE

AIRJoint Campaigns and Operations

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Introduction to Campaign Planning

• A campaign plan translates strategicguidance into operational direction forsubordinates. It provides broad conceptsfor operations and sustainment to achievestrategic or operational objectives.

c. Considerations. The considerations fordeveloping a campaign plan include thefollowing.

• What military or related political and socialconditions (objectives) must be producedin the operational area to achieve thestrategic goal? (Ends)

• What sequence of actions is most likelyto produce that condition? (Ways)

Figure I-2. Fundamentals of Campaign Plans

FUNDAMENTALS OF CAMPAIGN PLANS

Provide broad strategic concepts of operations and sustainmentfor achieving multinational, national, and theater-strategicobjectives.

Provide an orderly schedule of decisions.

Achieve unity of effort with air, land, sea, space, and specialoperations forces, in conjunction with interagency, multinational,nongovernmental, or United Nations forces, as required.

Incorporate the combatant commander's strategic intent andoperational focus.

Identify any forces or capabilities that the adversary has in thearea.

Identify the adversary strategic and operational centers of gravityand provide guidance for defeating them.

Identify the friendly strategic and operational centers of gravityand provide guidance to subordinates for protecting them.

If required, sequence a series of related major joint operationsconducted simultaneously throughout the area of responsibilityor joint operations area.

Establish the organization of subordinate forces and designatecommand relationships.

Serve as the basis for subordinate planning.

Clearly define what constitutes success, including conflicttermination objectives and potential post hostilities activities.

Provide strategic direction, operational focus, and major tasks,objectives, and concepts to subordinates.

Provide direction for the employment of nuclear weapons asrequired and authorized by the National Command Authorities.

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• How should resources of the joint forcebe applied to accomplish that sequenceof actions? (Means)

• What is the likely cost or risk to the jointforce in performing a particular sequenceof actions? (Considered during courseof action (COA) analysis).

3. Strategic Guidance

Guidance from civilian and militarypolicymakers is a prerequisite for developinga military campaign plan. Campaigns are notisolated from other government efforts toachieve national strategic objectives. Militarypower is used in conjunction with otherinstruments of national power — diplomatic,economic, and informational — to achievestrategic objectives. Depending on the natureof the operation, a military campaign may bethe main effort, or it may be used to supportdiplomatic or economic efforts. A campaignmust be coordinated with nonmilitary effortsto ensure that all actions work in harmony toachieve the ends of policy. An understandingof the strategic and operational objectives isessential for campaign planning.

4. National Strategic Planning

a. It is at the national strategic level wherea nation, often as a member of a group ofnations, determines national or multinationalsecurity objectives. The National CommandAuthorities (NCA) provide guidance andnational resources to accomplish militaryobjectives. Activities at this level include:

• Establish national and multinationalmilitary objectives;

• Sequence initiatives;

• Define limits, synchronize the efforts, andassess the risks, costs, and consequences

of specific actions and operations of allthe instruments of national power; and

• Develop global strategies to achievethese objectives.

b. Strategic planning is done primarily atthe NCA level. Decision makers look at theentire world situation as it affects, or is affectedby, the use of US military forces.

5. Regional Strategic Planning

a. In regional planning, geographiccombatant commanders focus on their specificregions as defined in the Unified CommandPlan (UCP). Today, geographic combatantcommanders, and their subordinate JFCs areprimarily responsible for campaign planning.Campaign planning can be conducted anytimeby the combatant commander in response toassignments from the NCA or as establishedin the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).The commander may also determine that aneed exists to prepare plans to covercontingencies not assigned by the JSCP.

b. Geographic combatant commanders andtheir subordinate JFCs primarily accomplishtheater strategic and operational levelplanning. It is at this level where campaignsand major operations are planned, conducted,and sustained to accomplish strategicobjectives within their operational areas.Activities at this level link tactics and strategyby:

• Establishing operational objectivesneeded to accomplish strategicobjectives;

• Sequencing events to achieve theoperational objectives;

• Initiating actions; and

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• Applying resources to bring about andsustain these events.

6. Functional Strategic Planning

Functional plans (FUNCPLANs) involvethe conduct of military operations in apeacetime or nonhostile environment.Examples include plans for disaster relief,nation assistance, logistics, communications,surveillance, protection of US citizens,nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation,humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peaceenforcement, and continuity operations.

7. Support Strategic Planning

Combatant commanders with functionalresponsibilities, i.e., US Space Command(USSPACECOM), US Strategic Command(USSTRATCOM), US Special OperationsCommand, and US Transportation Command(USTRANSCOM) and their componentcommanders may conduct planning. Theyview their planning problem as unconstrainedby geography. The command perspectiveshapes both the choices of the COA and the

resources provided for planning. Strategicplanning for possible sequential or concurrentexecution of more than one operationoutweighs the regional perspective of anysingle commander. Likewise, planning issubordinate to each supported combatantcommander’s concept for the particular theaterin order to support that concept.

8. Campaign Planning

a. Joint operation planning can bedescribed in terms of its contribution to alarger purpose. Campaign plans are jointplans. Campaign planning takes acomprehensive view of the combatantcommander’s theater and defines theframework in which an OPLAN fits. Campaignplanning offers purpose and a commonobjective to a series of OPLANs. ExistingOPLANs, operation plans in concept format(CONPLANs), or FUNCPLANs may alsoprovide the basis for development of campaignplans.

b. Through theater and subordinatecampaign plans, strategic and operational

The combatant commanders are responsible for the development and productionof joint operation plans. During war, they plan and conduct campaigns and militaryoperations to accomplish assigned missions.

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planners synchronize national and theaterends, ways, and means to attain nationalstrategic, supporting theater strategic, andoperational level objectives.

c. Several US combatant commanders havedeveloped campaign plans in varying degreesand under a variety of names. In the Pacific,the geographic combatant commander for USPacific Command establishes a campaign planboth in warfighting strategy and in war plansdeveloped in response to tasking from theNCA in the JSCP. The combatantcommander’s planning tasks are not limited tothose specified by higher authority. Thecommander of the Combined ForcesCommand in Korea also sets forth a campaignfor the defense of the peninsula in a JointChiefs of Staff (JCS)-approved war plan. InUS Central Command (USCENTCOM), thecombatant commander has established aseries of plans that fulfill the requirements of acampaign plan.

d. Preparation of campaign plans involvesmore than just the JFC’s staff. Campaignplanning is commonly accomplished incoordination with:

• Higher military headquarters;

• Subordinate component headquarters;

• Military allies or coalition partners;

• Other government agencies; and

• International organizations.

e. Service or functional componentcommanders, such as the joint force landcomponent commander, joint force maritimecomponent commander, or joint force aircomponent commander, prepare majorOPLANs that implement the concept of theJFC’s campaign plan as it affects theirrespective component forces.

9. Campaign Planning forMilitary Operations OtherThan War

a. Campaign planning has its greatestapplication in the conduct of a major theaterwar (MTW). However, campaign planning isan effective methodology for situations otherthan war. Combatant commanders and other

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmits to the commanders ofcombatant commands the orders given by the NCA and, as directed by theSecretary of Defense, also oversees the activities of those commands.

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JFCs may develop campaign plans forpeacetime, conflict, or war. While intendedprimarily to guide the use of military power,campaign plans must integrate all instrumentsof national power — political, economic,informational, and military — to attain nationalstrategic objectives. This is particularlyrelevant for campaigns involving militaryoperations other than war (MOOTW).

b. Unity of Effort. Gaining andmaintaining unity of effort in interagencyenvironments requires constant attention.Commanders remain aware of the goals andobjectives of the various participants. Theyrecognize that control of national forces andnonmilitary partners by their political leadersmay affect mission accomplishment.Commanders constantly work to sustainpolitical consensus among the leaders, nations,and organizations involved in the operation.MOOTW campaign planning considerationsinclude the following:

• Statement of the national problem.

• Relevant national interests.

• Stated or perceived military mission.

• Nature of physical environment(geography, climate, access from US andUS bases, etc.).

• Nature of society (e.g., population anddemographics, history, general culture,economy, politics, infrastructure, militaryand security forces, potential destabilizingfactors, insurgencies, etc.).

• Nature of external forces, including othernations, international, and transnationalforces.

• Nature of the crisis, to includeidentification of critical events, economicproblems, natural disaster, governmentreaction, recent military defeat, religiousinfluences, or ethnic conflict.

• Impact of time as it affects theenvironment and key players. Anycritical upcoming events that can beinfluenced.

MOOTW are more sensitive to political considerations, and often themilitary may not be the primary player.

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• Host-nation support (HNS) agreementsexist that can support this operation; howlocal, regional, national or internationallaws affect the operations in theoperational area. (Laws of war apply tothis operation and the impact on supportin the operational area.)

• S ign i f i can t log i s t i c suppor tconsiderations: geography, supply,facilities, transportation, maintenance,labor resources, health service support,personnel service support, field services,and field sanitation, etc.

• General types of US support actions thatshould be contemplated, the resourcesthat they will require and how the actionsof other than US forces and their supportresources may be coordinated for theoperation.

• Legal status of US personnel in theoperational area (i.e., combatant vs.expert on mission, prisoner of war vs.illegal detainee, etc.).

c. Subordinate Plans. Subordinate JFCsdevelop subordinate campaign plans toaccomplish tasks required to executeMOOTW. These may include transitionoperations between MOOTW and war. Forexample, a flexible deterrent option (FDO)such as a show of force, coupled with publicstatements of concern, to demonstrate USnational resolve could be designed as the firstphase of a campaign. The second phase couldbe a well-publicized selected mobilization ofReserve forces. If these actions do not deteran aggressor, then the remaining phases of thecampaign could be initiated and likely carriedout to conclusion.

For additional guidance on MOOTW, referto Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Doctrine forJoint Operations, and JP 3-07, Joint Doctrinefor Military Operations Other Than War. SeeAppendix A, “Flexible Deterrent Options,”for additional information on FDOs.

CHAPTER IICAMPAIGN PLAN DESIGN

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1. General

a. Theater-level campaign planning ismostly art. It is inextricably linked withoperational art, most notably in the design ofthe operational concept for the campaign.While facilitated by such procedures as theJoint Operation Planning and ExecutionSystem (JOPES) and commonly acceptedmilitary decisionmaking models, theoperational design process is primarily anintellectual exercise based on experienceand judgment. The result of this processshould provide the conceptual linkage ofends, ways, and means for the campaign.

b. The elements of operational design area tool to help combatant commanders and theirplanners visualize what the campaignshould look like and to shape thecommander’s intent. The emphasis on thespecific elements of an operational design mayvary depending on the strategic objectives ina particular theater. Not only does the theaterstrategic environment affect operationaldesign, other factors such as the availabilityof HNS, the allocation of strategic mobilityassets, the state of the theaterinfrastructure, and forces made availablefor planning all have an impact on theoperational design. In the final analysis, thegoal of a sound operational design is to ensurea clear focus on the ultimate strategicobjective and corresponding strategic COG,and provide for sound sequencing,

“War plans cover every aspect of a war, and weave them all into a singleoperation that must have a single, ultimate objective in which all particularaims are reconciled. No one starts a war or rather, no one ought to do sowithout first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that warand how he intends to conduct it.”


synchronization, and integration of allavailable military and nonmilitary sources ofpower to that end. The key elements ofoperational design are: (1) understandingthe strategic guidance (determining thedesired end state and military objectives(s));(2) identifying the critical factors (principaladversary strengths, including the strategicCOGs, and weaknesses); and (3) developingan operational concept or scheme that willachieve the strategic objective(s).

2. Strategic Guidance

a. The NCA or the combatant commanderpromulgate strategic guidance (see FigureII-1). In general, this guidance provides long-term as well as intermediate or ancillaryobjectives. It should define what constitutes“victory,” or success (ends), describe themethod of employing military force (ways),and allocate adequate forces and assets(means) to achieve strategic objectives. Assuch, strategic guidance normally contains thefollowing:

• Strategic end state (definition of victoryor success).

• Resources (forces, to includemultinational, time, space).

• Restraints (prohibitions and restrictions,e.g., geographical, weapons, methods,rules of engagement (ROE)).

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• Constraints (obligatory or must do,logistics, ROE).

• Strategic assumptions.

Note: When conditions imposed by strategicguidance are so prescriptive as to prevent theattainment of the established objectives, thecombatant commander must requestrelaxation of either the limitations or thestrategic objectives themselves.

• Campaign plan design begins withstrategic guidance in the form ofmilitary strategic objectives that definethe role of military forces in the largercontext of national strategic objectives.

This focus on the military strategicobjective is one of the most importantconsiderations in operational design.The nature of the political aim, taken inbalance with the sources of nationalstrength and vulnerabilities, must becompared with the stakes, strengths, andvulnerabilities of the opponent in orderto arrive at reasonably attainable nationalmilitary objectives. The strategicguidance must establish whether thecombatant commander is to pursue alimited or unlimited strategic(political) objective. This distinction isabsolutely essential to ensure the rightmatch between political and militaryobjectives.

Figure II-1. Role of Strategic Guidance

ROLE OF STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

Before forces are committed, the combatant commandermust know how the National Command Authorities intend toterminate the operation and ensure that its outcomesendure, and then determine how to implement that strategicdesign at the operational level

Leverage toPrevent Renewed

Activities

RedeployForces

UnderlyingCause of War

Attainment ofStrategic Ends

Terminationof Hostilities

Control Overthe adversaryControl Overthe adversary

End of CombatOperations

Resolution ofConflict

Achieve and SustainPolitical Objectives

Achieve and SustainPolitical Objectives

Secure TermsFavorable to

the United States

Secure TermsFavorable to

the United States

PostconflictActivities

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b. Desired End State. The thread ofcontinuity that ties the strategic objectivesto the operational and tactical levels is thedesired “end state.” A strategic end statesimply means the required conditions thatachieve the strategic objectives. Normallythis constitutes crisis resolution and thedisengagement of the military instrument ofnational power from the contingency. TheNCA should clearly describe the desiredend state before committing the ArmedForces of the United States to an action.The desired end state should include both thedesired political and military conditions afterthe military strategic objectives are attained.The desired end state is usually determinedat the national-strategic level, preferablywith input from the supported combatantcommander. Although the combatantcommander could define the end state, itwould have to be formally approved by theNCA.

• In multinational settings, militarycommittee directives provide thestrategic direction for campaignplanning. But these are normally broad,generalized documents that normallylack the details of a plan for employing

and sustaining large forces. It isespecially important in multinationalsituations, therefore, that the combatantcommander and planners clearlyunderstand the conditions that thecountry’s (and/or alliance or coalition)political leadership wants the militaryinstrument to establish in terms of theinternal and external balance of power,regional security, geopolitics, and soforth. When objectives are unclear orambiguous, the combatant commanderor subordinate JFC must seekclarification and convey the impact,positive or negative, of continuedambiguity to the NCA. The interagencycoordination process can assist thecombatant commander in this effort.

See JP 3-08, Interagency CoordinationDuring Joint Operations, Volume I, forinformation on the interagencycoordination process as it relates tocampaign planning.

Note: Although they are related, the term“end state” should not be confused with“commander’s intent.” Commanders atall echelons issue a commander’s intent,

United Nations Security Council resolutions may also provide the basisfor the conduct of military operations.

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but their intent does not specify thepolitical conditions that must exist aftermilitary objectives have been achieved.To enhance clarity and promote unity ofeffort, it is useful to reiterate the end statein conjunction with the commander’sintent in the campaign plan.

See example campaign plan format inAppendix B, “Theater Campaign PlanFormat.”

• Although it has often been the case inpast MOOTW situations that end stateand supporting military conditionsdefining success were ill-defined or evenabsent, it is imperative to have a clearlydefined end state here as well. In thatevent, the combatant commander andplanners will have to solicit additionalguidance from the NCA and through theinteragency process to ensure that theintent is clear and an end state is clearlydefined. And while there may not be anarmed adversary to confront in aMOOTW situation, the combatantcommander still has to think in terms ofcauses and effects that will lead tosuccess. Examples of a military conditionthat would have to be achieved to supportthe strategic end state might besomething like “restoration of basicservices;” “formation of a professionalanti-drug force;” or “mitigation of theconsequences of a nuclear accident.”While these examples are probably moretypical of a major operation with jointforces in a supporting role, they serve toillustrate the link between military andstrategic objectives.

• Defining the end state — which maychange as the operation progresses —and ensuring that it supports theachievement of national objectives arecritical early steps in the operationaldesign process. Aside from its obviousrole in accomplishing the strategic

objective(s), clearly defining the endstate promotes unity of effort,facilitates synchronization, and helpsclarify (and may reduce) the riskassociated with the campaign.

c. Conflict Termination. Every campaignand every strategic effort is directed toward agoal, and at some point military actioneventually ends. Just as the combatantcommander must clearly understand thedesired end state, so too must the terminationcriteria for the campaign be understood. Ifthe NCA do not adequately articulate thetermination criteria, the combatant commandershould request further guidance orclarification, as appropriate. The decision asto when and under what circumstances tosuspend or terminate combat operations is apolitical decision. Even so, it is essential thatthe combatant commander play a major role inthe decisionmaking process. The combatantcommander should ensure that politicalleaders understand the current political-military situation and the implications, bothimmediate and long term, of a suspension ofhostilities at any point in the conflict.

• Campaign planners must plan forconflict termination from the outset ofthe planning process and update theseplans as the campaign evolves. Tomaintain the proper perspective, theymust know what constitutes anacceptable political-military end state;i.e., what military conditions must existto justify a cessation of combatoperations. In examining the proposednational strategic end state, the combatantcommander and the staff must considerwhether it has reasonable assurance ofending the fundamental problem orunderlying conditions that instigated theconflict in the first place.

• When addressing conflict termination,campaign planners must consider a widevariety of operational issues, to include

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disengagement, force protection,transition to postconflict operations, andreconstitution and redeployment.Planners must also anticipate the natureof postconflict operations, where thefocus will likely shift to MOOTW; forexample, peace operations, foreignhumanitarian assistance, or enforcementof exclusion zones.

• In formulating the theater campaign plan,the combatant commander and staffshould ensure the following:

•• Conflict termination is a key aspectof the campaign planning process.

•• Emphasizing backward planning;decision makers should not take the firststep toward hostilities or war withoutconsidering the last step.

•• Defining the conditions of thetermination phase. The militaryobjectives must support the political aims— the campaign’s conflict terminationprocess is a part of a larger implicitbargaining process, even while hostilitiescontinue. The military contribution can

significantly affect the political leverageavailable to influence that process.

•• Considering how efforts to eliminateor degrade an opponent’s command andcontrol (C2) may affect, positively ornegatively, efforts to achieve thetermination objectives. Will opponentsbe able to affect a cease-fire or otherwisecontrol the actions of their forces?

•• Interagency coordination plays amajor role in the termination phase. Viewconflict termination not just as the endof hostilities, but as the transition to anew posthostilities phase characterizedby both civil and military problems.

d. Military Conditions. Strategic(political) objectives describe in broadterms where the United States wants to go.Military objectives describe what has to beaccomplished militarily in order to getthere. In other words, the combatantcommander has to delineate the militaryconditions that must exist in order toaccomplish the strategic objectives, and mustascertain what political effect military forcesmust achieve in the operational area to that

In a MOOTW environment, defining military objectives presentsunique challenges for military planners.

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end; what sequence of actions is most likelyto produce that condition; and how militaryresources will be applied to accomplish thatsequence of actions.

This requires a clear understanding of whenmilitary force is the main effort and when it isacting in support of some other instrument ofnational power. This relationship is not asobvious as it may seem. In an MTW, militaryoperations can usually proceed in astraightforward manner. However, it isincreasingly common that militaryoperations are so closely integrated withother government activities that thesenonmilitary actions have to be consideredan integral part of the campaign. Thecomplex political-diplomatic environment inmany MOOTW scenarios, where it may bedifficult to distinguish between enemies,bystanders, and interagency players, onlyserves to underscore the importance of clearlyfocusing on the strategic objective(s).

3. Identifying Critical Factors

“The first task . . . in planning for war isto identify the enemy’s centers ofgravity, and if possible, trace them backto a single one.”


a. Once the combatant commander and theplanners have determined what set of militaryconditions must exist for the opponent tosubmit to US will (the strategic objective),the focus now shifts to how they will achievethat objective. The most important taskconfronting campaign planners in this processis being able to properly identify theadversary’s strategic COGs, i.e., the sourcesof strength, power, and resistence. Campaignplanners must first understand both thesources of the adversary’s strength and thekey points of vulnerability; these are referredto as the adversary’s critical factors.

• The COG concept is useful as ananalytical tool, while designingcampaigns and major operations to assistJFCs and their staffs in analyzing friendlyand adversary sources of strength as wellas weaknesses and vulnerabilities.Analysis of COGs, both friendly andadversary, is a continuous processthroughout a major operation orcampaign. This process cannot be takenlightly, though; a faulty conclusion as tothe adversary COGs because of a pooror hasty analysis can have very seriousconsequences; specifically, the inabilityto achieve the military objectives at anacceptable cost and the unconscionableexpenditure of lives, time, and materielin efforts that do not produce decisivestrategic or operational results.Accordingly, a great deal of thought andanalysis must take place before thecombatant commander and staff candetermine proper COGs with anyconfidence.

• Before attempting to identify theadversary COGs, planners must firstunderstand the complementaryrelationship of the adversary’s COGs tothe other critical factors. These areimportant distinctions, because

KEY TERM

Centers of gravity arethose characteristics,capabilities, or sources ofpower from which amilitary force derives itsfreedom of action,physical strength, or willto fight.

Centers Of Gravity

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understanding the relationship among thecritical factors (and COGs in particular)not only permits but compels greaterprecision in thought and expression indesigning the campaign.

• Critical capabilities are those adversarycapabilities that are considered crucialenablers for the adversary’s COG tofunction as such, and are essential to theaccomplishment of the adversary’sassumed objective(s). Criticalrequirements are those essentialconditions, resources, and means for acritical capability to be fully operational.Critical vulnerabilities, on the other

hand, are those aspects or componentsof the adversary’s critical capabilities (orcomponents thereof), which are deficient,or vulnerable to neutralization,interdiction, or attack in a mannerachieving decisive or significant results,disproportionate to the military resourcesapplied. In general, friendly forces mustpossess sufficient range (i.e., operationalreach) and combat power to takeadvantage of the adversary’s criticalvulnerabilities; otherwise, theseweaknesses cannot be targeted asphysical objectives that are key tomission accomplishment (see FigureII-2).

Figure II-2. Characteristics of the Adversary’s Centers of Gravity

CHARACTERISTICS OF THEADVERSARY’S CENTERS OF GRAVITY

Can physicallyendanger one’s

own COGs

Closely linked tothe derived (orreal) objective

CENTEROF

GRAVITY

Located where theadversary’s mass isconcentrated most

densely

COGs in militaryoperations other thanwar are normally more

intangible in nature

Source ofleverage

Allows or enhancesfreedom of action

In a major operation,can shift as its phase

is changed

Can shiftover time

At the national-strategic level,contains many

intangible elements

Predominately physicalat the operationaland tactical levels

Exists at eachlevel of war

Heavily dependenton factor of time

and space

Transitoryin nature

CENTEROF

GRAVITY(COG)

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• In general, the higher the level of war is,the fewer potential COGs there will be(ideally, planners can identify the COG)and they will tend to be more intangiblein nature. At the strategic level, a COGmight include an alliance or coalition,national will or public support, or thenational leadership’s will to fight.Identification of the adversary’s strategicCOG is usually a difficult and challengingtask because of the large number ofintangible elements involved. Anoperational COG, on the other hand, isnormally more tangible — for example, apowerful element of the adversary’sarmed forces. It is that concentration ofthe adversary’s military power that is mostdangerous to friendly forces or the onethat stands between those forces and theaccomplishment of their strategicobjective.

b. The importance of identifying theproper COGs cannot be overstated.Determining the adversary’s strategic COGand critical vulnerabilities is absolutelyessential to establish clarity of purpose, tofocus efforts and, ultimately, to generatesynergistic results in the employment ofone’s forces. In fact, detailed operationalplanning should not begin until the adversary’sCOGs have been identified. IdentifyingCOGs is an analytical process that involvesboth art and science. A proper analysis mustbe based on a detailed knowledge of howopponents organize, fight, make decisions,and their physical and psychologicalstrengths and weaknesses. The key to thisprocess is intelligence that anticipates thecommander’s intelligence needs and is timely,objective, usable, available, complete,accurate, and relevant.

• From a procedural perspective, theanalysis of the adversary’s COGs is a keystep in the joint intelligence preparationof the battlespace (JIPB) process. Inthe third of four steps in the JIPB process,

joint force intelligence analysts identifyadversary COGs. The analysis isconducted after an understanding of thebroad operational environment has beenobtained and before a detailed study ofthe adversary’s forces occurs. Theanalysis addresses the adversaryleadership, fielded forces, resources,infrastructure, population, transportationsystems, and internal and externalrelationships of the adversary. Thegoal is to determine from which elementsthe adversary derives freedom of action,physical strength (means), or the will tofight. A determination is then made tosee if the tentative or candidate COGsare truly critical to the adversary’sstrategy. This analysis is a linchpin inthe planning effort, since the essence ofoperational art lies in being able to masseffects against the adversary’s criticalvulnerabilities in order to destroy orneutralize them, employing both kineticand non-kinetic means of attack.

See JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Joint IntelligencePreparation of the Battlespace, fordetailed information on the JIPB processas it relates to campaign planning.

• The most effective method for plannersto conduct an analysis of the adversary’sCOGs to identify its criticalvulnerabilities is to visualize the COGsin terms of a system i.e., what are itsfunctional components (criticalrequirements) and how do they relate toone another? What elements within this“system” protect, sustain, or integrateits various elements or components?Once a detailed systemic analysis iscompleted, the planners should then tryto identify the critical vulnerabilitieswithin that system. For example, assumethat the JFC’s staff have determined thatthe adversary’s integrated air defensesystem (IADS) is a critical requirement

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for the derived adversary operationalCOG. Upon conducting their systemicanalysis, they determine that the IADSprimary weakness is, among others, itsradar network. Since the radar sites areespecially vulnerable to high-speed anti-radiation missiles when turned on, theplanners deduce that the radar networkconstitutes a critical vulnerability. Theplanners can then devise a method ofattack to destroy this derivedvulnerability which will ultimatelyneutralize the derived operational COG.

• Within the context of pitting friendlystrengths against adversary weaknesses,the combatant commander willunderstandably want to focus effortsagainst those critical vulnerabilitiesidentified within the criticalrequirements (enabling objects orfunctions) that will do the most decisivedamage to the adversary’s COGs.However, in selecting those criticalvulnerabilities, planners must alsocompare their degree of criticality withtheir degree of vulnerability,recuperability, and redundancy, and tobalance those factors against friendly

capabilities. The combatant commander’sgoal is to now aggressively seekopportunities to apply asymmetricalforce against an adversary in asvulnerable an aspect as possible, and inas many dimensions as possible. In otherwords, the combatant commander usesforce strength to undermine theadversary’s strength by exploitingadversary weaknesses.

• Another major element of properlyidentifying the adversary’s COGs andunderlying critical vulnerabilities ishaving a thorough understanding of theadversary and how it thinks. This is notas simple as it sounds; not only mustintelligence analysts and plannersdevelop an understanding of theadversary’s capabilities and vulnerabilities,they must take into account the way thatfriendly forces and actions appear fromthe adversary’s viewpoint. Otherwise,planners may fall into the trap ofascribing to the adversary particularattitudes, values, and reactions that“mirror image” US actions in the samesituation, or by assuming that theadversary will respond or act in a

At the operational level of war, the adversary’s COG is usually an elementof the adversary’s armed forces.

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particular manner. Likewise, what mightbe a critical requirement for friendly forcesmight be less so, or not even importantto the adversary. This means that thosefactors that might influence theadversary to abandon or change itsstrategic objectives must be fullyunderstood by campaign planners. Notonly is this analysis key to determininghow to attack the adversary’s criticalvulnerabilities, it would be very difficultto derive realistic adversary COAs ordevelop effective deception plans orruses without it.

c. Validity Testing. Before solidifyingCOGs into the campaign plan, planners shouldanalyze their validity. The destruction,neutralization, or substantial weakening of avalid COG will result in changing anadversary COA or denying its strategicobjectives. If a COG does not meet this criteria,then planners must review the previouslyidentified critical factors, look for other criticalvulnerabilities, or reassess how to attack thepreviously identified critical vulnerabilities withadditional resources. The conclusions, whilecritically important to the campaign planningprocess itself, must be tempered with

continuous evaluations and reassessments,because derived COGs and criticalvulnerabilities are subject to change at anytime during the campaign or major operation.Accordingly, JFCs and their subordinatesshould be alert to circumstances duringexecution of the campaign that may causederived COGs and critical vulnerabilities tochange and adjust friendly plans andoperations accordingly.

d. Protection of Own Center(s) ofGravity. Just as the combatant commanderplans to attack the adversary’s COGs, so toomust critical vulnerabilities of friendlyforces and assets be identified andanalyzed. Long sea and air lines ofcommunications (LOCs) from the continentalUnited States or supporting theaters could bea critical vulnerability for a friendly COG. Afriendly COG could also be something moreintangible in nature. During the Gulf War,for example, USCENTCOM identified thecoalition itself as a friendly strategic COG andtook appropriate measures to protect it.

In conducting the analysis of friendlyvulnerabilities, the combatant commandermust decide how, when, where, and why

The JIPB process plays a key role in identifying adversary COG(s).

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his or her forces are (or might become)vulnerable to hostile actions, and then planaccordingly. This planning goes well beyondforce protection. The combatant commandermust achieve a balance between prosecutingthe main effort and providing operationalprotection. In providing operationalprotection, the combatant commander shouldfocus attention on and assign adequate forcesand assets to the most essential elements inthe theater to protect friendly COGs.

4. Operational Concept

a. General. Even at this stage of theoperational design development process, it isstill very much an intellectual exercise. Thecombatant commander has to assimilate manyvariables under conditions of uncertainty toform a vision for the requisite militaryconditions, sequence of actions, andapplication of forces and capabilities toachieve strategic objectives. Campaignplanners should never lose sight of the factthat strategic objectives must dominate thecampaign planning process at everyjuncture. If operational objectives are not

linked to strategic objectives, the inherentlinkage or “nesting” is broken and eventuallytactical considerations can begin to drive theoverall strategy at cross purposes.

• The thought process that ultimately leadsto the development of a COA shouldcapture the essence of operational art andprovide the foundation for the campaignplan. It expresses in clear, concise,conceptual language a broad vision ofwhat the combatant commander plans toaccomplish and how it will be done usingavailable resources. The commander’sintent, clearly and explicitly stated, is anintegral component of the concept.Normally, a campaign plan consists ofan overall operational scheme for theentire campaign, while subordinatecomponent commanders will drawoperational schemes for their respectivecomponents.

• The concept should also contain ingeneral terms a scheme of when, where,and under what conditions thecombatant commander intends to give or

During the Gulf War, USCENTCOM identified the coalition itself asa friendly COG and took measures to protect it.

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refuse battle, if required. Above all, theconcept must make explicitly clear thatthe focus is on the destruction orneutralization of the adversary’s COGs.The concept should exhibit creativity andavoid discernible conventions andpatterns, should make full use ofambiguity and deception, and shouldprovide for speed of execution. Theconcept should also be grounded in theelements of operational art to helpvisualize the campaign in terms of theforces and functions involved. How thecommander applies operational art willvary with the nature of operationalconditions, the nature of the strategicobjectives, the time and space availablein the theater, and the number and typesof forces involved.

JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations,contains a detailed discussion on all thefacets of operational art; as such,Chapter III, “Planning JointOperations,” in JP 3-0 should be usedin conjunction with this publication, aswell as the supporting appendices in thispublication.

• Because each campaign plan is context-specific, there is no commonly agreedupon checklist of prescriptive elementsfor an operational concept. However,at a minimum, the concept (scheme)should address the method of defeatingthe opponent (defeat mechanism),application of forces and capabilities,sequencing, synchronization andintegration of forces and capabilities,and operational functions.

b. Defeat Mechanism. At the strategiclevel, the combatant commander has todetermine what set of political-militaryconditions will achieve the requiredstrategic aims. In most situations, all thecomplementary instruments of national power

will come into play, but military action mayend up being the main effort at the strategiclevel. In that case, the theater design shouldfocus on the adversary’s critical vulnerabilitiesthat lead to the destruction or neutralizationof the adversary’s strategic and operationalCOGs as previously described.

• The essence of operational art lies inconcentrating (in some way) US militaryresources against the adversary’s COGsto achieve US strategic and operationalobjectives. There are two approaches toaccomplish this, so campaign plannerswill have to decide between the twomethods, given the theater circumstances.The decision facing the planners iswhether to attack the COG directly orindirectly (see Figure II-3). JP 3-0,Doctrine for Joint Operations, states that“To the extent possible, JFCs attackadversary centers of gravity directly.”In theory, direct attacks against adversaryCOGs resulting in their destruction orneutralization are the most direct path tovictory. This is accomplished throughthe direct application of a major part ofone’s own and friendly forces and assets(by air, missile, special operations, andother deep ranging capabilities) againstthe adversary’s critical vulnerabilities.

• In some situations, the direct approachmay entail an attack focused on the bulkof the adversary’s forces with the explicitaim of destroying or annihilating thoseforces in the shortest possible time.When one’s own combat power isoverwhelming, or the adversary force isdeemed particularly vulnerable, a directapproach can sometimes be the mostpractical and effective way to decisivelyattack the adversary’s COGs. However,this approach is often situationallydependent. In MOOTW, for example,the adversary’s COGs may be difficultto identify and attack directly.

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• Another planning consideration is thatthe adversary’s COGs may not beopen to direct attack because of itsinherent strength, its key elements arewell protected or obscure, or because itis by nature abstract or intangible. Thelatter is especially true at the national-strategic level. There is a finite rangebeyond which the joint force might notbe able to operate or maintain effectiveoperations, i.e., its operational reach.Operational reach challenges can beaddressed in campaign plans. And last,constraints or restraints, political orotherwise (e.g., ROE on the employmentof US forces), may preclude a directattack on the adversary’s COGs.

• Another consideration is when a directattack against an adversary COG meansattacking into an opponent’s strength,then the JFC should seek an indirectapproach until conditions are establishedthat permit successful direct attacks. Inthis manner, the adversary’s derivedcritical vulnerabilities can offer indirectpathways to gain leverage over its COGs.For this same reason, it follows that anadversary vulnerability is not worthattacking unless it contributes to theelimination or serious degradation of theadversary’s COGs.

• At the strategic level of war, indirectmethods of defeating the adversary’s

Figure II-3. Direct vs. Indirect

DIRECT vs. INDIRECT

To the extent possible, joint force commanders (JFCs)attack adversary centers of gravity directly. Wheredirect attack means attacking into an opponent’sstrength, JFCs should seek an indirect approach.

DIRECT

INDIRECT

DefensiveCapabilityDefensiveCapability

Lines ofCommunications

Lines ofCommunications

Primary Center ofGravity

Primary Center ofGravity

Command and ControlCommand and Control

JOINTFORCES

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COG could include depriving theadversary of allies or friends, weakeningthe national will to fight by underminingthe public support for war, and breakingup cohesion of adversary alliances orcoalitions.

• At the operational and tactical levels ofwar, the most often used method toweaken or neutralize the selected COGsindirectly is through a series of attacksagainst selected aspects of the adversary’scombat power (For example, bysequencing combat actions to force theopponent to divide its forces in theater,destroying the adversary’s reserves orelements of adversary base of operations,or preventing or hindering thedeployment of the adversary’s majorforces or reinforcements into the theater).Indirect methods of attacking theadversary’s COGs (through criticalvulnerabilities) could entail reducing theadversary’s operational reach, isolatingthe force from its C2, and destroying orsuppressing key protection functionssuch as air defense.

“Every point of the theater . . . is ofmilitary importance, whether from itsposition as a center of communicationor from presence of militaryestablishments or fortifications. . . .Others [decisive points] have a valuefrom the relations they bear to thepositions of the masses of the hostiletroops and to the enterprises likely tobe directed against them. . .The decisive point of a battlefield canbe determined by:1. Features on the ground.2. Relation of the local features to theultimate strategic aim.3. Positions occupied by therespective forces.”

Lieutenant General Antoine-Baronde Jomini, Summary of the

Art of War, 1838

• There may often be cases where thecombatant commander will haveinsufficient combat power to obtainleverage against the adversary’s COGswith a single blow. In this situation, theJFC must be selective in where to focusefforts, and the indirect approach mayoffer the most viable method to exploitadversary critical vulnerabilitiesthrough the identification of decisivepoints. Decisive points may be ageographic place, specific key event,or enabling system that allowscommanders to gain a marked advantageover an adversary and greatly influencethe outcome of an operation. Decisivepoints are not COGs; they are the keysto attacking or protecting them.Although most theaters of operation mayhave numerous decisive points, only afew will truly have operational or evenstrategic significance relative to thederived adversary COGs. The art ofidentifying decisive points is a criticalpart of the work cut out for campaignplanners. Normally, there are far moredecisive points in a given operationalarea than can feasibly be seized,retained, or controlled with forces andassets available. Accordingly, theplanning staff should study and analyzepotential decisive points and determinewhich of them offer the best

KEY TERM

Decisive Point

A geographic place,specific key event, criticalsystem, or function thatallows commanders togain a marked advantageover an adversary andgreatly influence theoutcome of an attack.

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opportunity to indirectly attack theadversary’s COGs, extend friendlyrelative operational reach, or enable theapplication of friendly forces andcapabilities. Afterward, the combatantcommander should assign sufficientforces and assets for attacking, seizing,or controlling these decisive points.

c. Application of Forces and Capabilities.After the decisive points have been identifiedand vetted, campaign planners shouldconsider several principles regarding forceapplication. First, an operational plan shouldnot be completely constrained by the strategicplan’s force allocation or apportionment. Acampaign plan should be designed toaccomplish the assigned theater objectives.Second, campaign planning is inherently aniterative process, with forces being requestedand approved for certain early phases, whilestill more forces may be needed for the laterphases.

• In addition to requesting and distributingforces and assets, the campaign plannermust also consider withholding somecapability as an operational reserve. Indesigning a campaign, the operationalcommander should decide early onwhich area (or function) of the theaterwill be the main effort and which willcomprise secondary efforts. This actionis necessary for the sound application ofeconomy of effort and allocatingdisparate forces, to include multinationalforces.

• Designation of the main effort can beaddressed in geographical (area) orfunctional terms. In developing theoperational concept, planners determinethose tasks essential to the accomplishmentof the military objectives and assign themto subordinate commanders either as area(geographic) responsibilities or asfunctional responsibilities. Area tasks

and responsibilities focus on a specificarea to control or conduct operations.Functional tasks and responsibilitiesfocus on the performance of continuingefforts that involve two or more MilitaryDepartments operating in the samedimension or medium, or where there isa need to accomplish a distinct aspect ofthe assigned mission. In either case,designating the main effort will establishwhere or how a major part of one’s ownforces and assets are employed to attainthe primary objective of a major operationor campaign.

• The designation of the main effortfacilitates the synchronized andintegrated employment of all combatelements while leaving the greatestpossible scope for the initiative ofsubordinate commanders. The operationalcommander must provide adequatesupport to ensure the quickest possibleaccomplishment of the tasks assigned tothe forces operating in the sector of maineffort. As such, the concept ofoperations must clearly specify thenature of the main effort.

• During a major operation, forcesdeployed or employed as the main effortare sustained with supporting forces andassets. If conditions change and successof the overall mission can be obtained atless cost or more quickly through anotherapproach, the operational commandershould shift the main effort to the newapproach. When this occurs, prioritiesof support must be changed to ensurethe success of actions in the newlydesignated main effort. Secondaryefforts, as the term implies, are subsidiaryor ancillary to the main effort. They arecharacterized by a lack of operationaldepth, assignment of forces with fewercapabilities, smaller reserves, andmore limited objectives.

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d. Sequencing of Operations. Sequencingis the chronological arrangement of eventswithin a major operation or campaign in theorder most likely to achieve the overallobjectives. It is a subset of the concept forarranging operations (see Figure II-4). Propersequencing helps the combatant commanderdetermine which operational objectives haveto be achieved and by when in order toestablish the conditions for subsequentoperations. Sequencing includes thedetermination of phases within operations,as well as plans for branches, sequels, andoperational pauses.

• Even though sequencing addschronological structure to the concept,the sequence of events necessary toachieve the desired operationalconditions cannot be rigidly established.In fact, during execution, thecombatant commander should be

prepared to change or adjust thesequence for accomplishing principaltasks to exploit vulnerabilities(branches), adjust tempo, or adapt tooutcomes (sequels).

• Phasing. Phasing is a basic tenant ofcampaign plan design. Phasing assistscommanders and staffs to visualize andthink through the entire operation orcampaign and to define requirements interms of forces, resources, time, space,and purpose. Since a campaign isrequired whenever pursuit of a strategicobjective is not attainable through asingle major operation, the theateroperational design includes provisionfor related phases that may or may notbe executed and can, in some cases,overlap with activities occurring eithersimultaneously or in sequence. Phasesare a logical way of chronologically

Figure II-4. Phases — Joint Campaign

PHASES - JOINT CAMPAIGN

Actions to AssureFull Spectrum Dominance

DETER/ENGAGE

CRISIS

DEFINED

SEIZEINITIATIVE

SEIZE INITIATIVE/

ASSURE FRIENDLY

FREEDOM OF ACTION/

ACCESS THEATER

INFRASTRUCTURE

DECISIVEOPERATIONS

ESTABLISH DOMINANT

FORCE CAPABILITIES/

ACHIEVE FULL

SPECTRUM DOMINANCE

TRANSITION

ESTABLISH CIVIL

CONTROL AND RULE

OF LAW

REDEPLOY

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organizing the diverse, extended, anddispersed activities involved in thecampaign. Also, a campaign plan designmay also have several aspects, each tobe executed by different forces or differentkinds of forces. The campaign planner’stask is to devise a combination of actionsover time that most effectively andquickly achieve the strategic objective.While each phase may be distinguishablefrom the others as an identifiable episode,each is necessarily linked to the othersand gains significance only in the largercontext of the campaign. The manner ofdistinction may be separation in time,space, or a difference in aim or of forcesassigned. Each phase should representa natural subdivision of thecampaign’s objectives, e.g., “establishdimensional superiority.” As such, it isimperative that the campaign not bebroken down into numerous arbitrarychunks that may inhibit tempo and leadto a plodding, incremental approach.

JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations,contains a detailed discussion of thephasing model.

“These phases of a plan do notcomprise rigid instructions, they aremerely guideposts. . . . Rigidityinevitably defeats itself, and theanalysts who point to a changed detailas evidence of a plan’s weakness arecompletely unaware of thecharacteristics of the battlefield.”

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

• In conceptualizing the campaign plandesign, each phase should be viewed asan essential component in a string ofevents that are related in cause and effect.Like a chess player, the planner mustlearn to think beyond the next move,to look ahead several moves, andconsider the long-term results of thosemoves and how to exploit them.

Likewise, every move by the joint forcemust take into consideration theadversary’s reactions or anticipations.

• The actual process of developing thesequence of phases in a campaignoperates in two directions simultaneously,i.e., forward and backward. Campaignplanning begins with both the currentsituation and the desired end state in mind— recognizing, of course, that the endstate may change as the situationunfolds. Forward planning proceedsfrom the current conditions at the outsetof the campaign, focusing on near termobjectives while envisioning thesequence of mutually supporting phases.The combined results of this process setthe stage for the eventual decisive actionthat achieves the campaign’s objectives.

• At the same time, however, and as a checkon the plan developed to this point,planners have to envision a reasonableset of phases backward in time (andevent) from the desired end statetoward the present, a process called“backward” or “reverse” planning.Theoretically, for the plan to succeed, thetwo sets of opposed but sequenced phaseshave to mesh. From a more practicalperspective, forward planning providesplanners with a better idea of what isfeasible in the near term, while reverseplanning provides better focus over thelong term.

• As a general rule, the phasing of thecampaign should be conceived in event-driven terms rather than time-driven.However, resource availability depends inlarge part on a time schedule — such assustainment or deployment rates — ratherthan the events of war. The challenge forplanners, then, is to reconcile the reality oftime-oriented deployment of forces andsustainment with the event-driven phasingof operations.

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• Taking the long view, the combatantcommander and planners must ensurethat forces and assets arrive at the righttimes and places to support thecampaign and that sufficient resourceswill be available when needed in the laterstages of the campaign. This is a keypoint, because sustainment is asignificant aspect of the campaign.Specifically, effective phasing mustaddress how the joint force will avoidreaching a culminating point (see FigureII-5). If resources are insufficientto sustain the force until theaccomplishment of the strategicobjective, considerations may demandthat the campaign be phased. Each ofthese phases must be supportable in turn,and allow those portions of the joint forcerequiring it, to be reconstituted in the

course of the campaign. In some cases,sustainment logistic requirements andpolitical factors may even dictate thepurpose of certain phases as well as thesequence of those phases. For example,phases may shift the main effort amongService and functional components tomaintain momentum while onecomponent is being resupplied.

• Branches and Sequels. Since no plancan be accurately projected withconfidence much beyond the initialstages of the operation, flexibility mustbe built into not just the campaign planitself, but the execution of it as well.Accordingly, branches and sequels arefundamental considerations for eachphase. They are primarily used forchanging deployments or direction of

Figure II-5. Culminating Point

CULMINATING POINT

InitialOffensiveForce

CULMINATION

OFFENSE

DEFENSIVECULMINATION

DEFENSE

OFFENSIVE

The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continueits form of operations, offense or defense. For the offense, thepoint at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and theforce must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attemptingan operational pause. For the defense, the point at whichcounteroffensive action is no longer possible.

II-19


movement and accepting or decliningcombat. Branches are often decisive forthe outcome of a major operation orcampaign, because they allow theoperational commander to act faster thanthe opponent to exploit emergingoperational situations. A branch isessentially a different path to the sameend state of the ongoing operation.Sequels, on the other hand, anticipatesubsequent actions or majoroperations contingent upon theoutcome of ongoing operations. Forevery action or major operation that doesnot accomplish a strategic objective,there has to be a sequel for eachpossible outcome, i.e., “win, lose, draw,or win big.”

• Once the planners have thoughtthrough as far as practicable thepossible branches and sequels withineach phase, they must now determinewhat or where the decision points (notto be confused with decisive points)should be. Such decision points are oftenrepresented by battles or engagementswhich, despite everything being done toanticipate their outcome, can be eitherlost or won. Each branch from adecision point will require differentactions and each action demandsvarious follow-up actions, i.e., sequelsor potential sequels.

“To be practical, any plan must takeaccount of the enemy’s power tofrustrate it; the best chance ofovercoming such obstruction is to havea plan that can be easily varied to fitthe circumstances met; to keep suchadaptability, while still keeping theinitiative, the best way to operate isalong a line which offers alternativeobjectives.”

B.H. Liddell Hart

For more information on the role ofbranches and sequels in the planningprocess, see Chapter III, “Planning JointOperations,” in JP 3-0, Doctrine for JointOperations.

• Operational Pauses. The JFC shouldaggressively conduct operations toobtain and maintain the initiative.However, there may be certaincircumstances when this is not feasibledue to logistic constraints, forceshortfalls, or political considerations.Therefore, operational pauses may berequired when a major operation may bereaching the end of its sustainability. Assuch, operational pauses can provide asafety valve to avoid potentialculmination, while the JFC retains theinitiative in other ways. However, if anoperational pause is properly executedin relation to one’s own culminationpoint, the opponent will not havesufficient combat power to threaten thejoint force or regain the initiative duringthe pause.

• Operational pauses are also a usefultool for obtaining the propersynchronization of sustainment andoperations. Normally, operationalpauses are planned to regenerate combatpower or augment sustainment and forcesfor the next phase, although this willresult in extending the duration of a majoroperation or campaign. Moreover,operational pauses properly plannedand sequenced will ensure that the JFChas sufficient forces and assets at hisor her disposal to accomplish theultimate goal of the major operationor campaign. However, planners mustguard against cutting the margin ofsustainment and combat effectiveness toothin. Executing a pause well before it isactually an operationally mandatory

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action provides for flexibility in the timingof the pause and allows for its earlytermination under urgent conditionswithout unduly endangering the futureeffectiveness of the unit.

• The primary drawback to operationalpauses is that they obviously reduceoperational tempo and risk forfeiture ofstrategic or operational initiative. It istherefore incumbent upon the JFC to planon as few operational pauses as possibleif any and, consistent with the conceptof operations, to alternate pauses andtempo between components of the force.In this manner, a major portion of the JFC’sforces can maintain pressure on theopponent through offensive actionswhile other components pause.

e. Synchronization is another key aspectfor designing a major operation or campaign.In contrast to sequencing, synchronization isdefined as “the arrangement of militaryactions in time, space, and purpose to

produce maximum relative combat power at adecisive place and time.” Clarity of operationalintent is critical to ensure synchronization ofeffort by all forces, especially so inmultinational operations. Synchronization ofjoint forces and assets should, among otherthings, focus on defeating the adversary’sCOGs by maximizing relative combat powerat the decisive time and place. All the keyfunctions and elements of the joint forceshould be fully integrated to that end.Campaign plans synchronize and integrateoperations by establishing propercommand relationships amongsubordinate commands, by clearlydescribing the concept of operations, byassigning realistic tasks and objectives, andby effectively task-organizing assignedforces. Ideally, synchronization should beevent- rather than time-driven. Finallysynchronization, although distinct fromsequencing, must still allow for flexibility byproviding decision points and a series ofbranches and sequels (discussed above).

See JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning JointOperations.

Strategic direction consists of threeelements:

Chairman’s Guidance (CG). The CGprovides a common set ofassumptions, priorities, intent, andcritical planning factors required todevelop future strategies and plans.

Joint Vision (JV) 20xx. The JVdocument provides a long-range visionand a common focal point for futureplanning.

National Military Strategy. TheNational Military Strategy defines thenational military objectives, establishesthe strategy to accomplish theseobjectives, and addresses the militarycapabilities required to execute thestrategy.

CJCS Instruction 3100.01A, JointStrategic Planning System

2. Strategic Plans

a. The JSCP (see Figure III-1) providesguidance to the combatant commanders andService Chiefs to accomplish tasks andmissions based on current militarycapabilities. The JSCP integrates thedeliberate operation and engagement planningactivities of the entire Joint Planning and

CHAPTER IIIDELIBERATE PLANNING DURING CAMPAIGN

PLAN DEVELOPMENT

III-1

SECTION A. DELIBERATEPLANNING PRINCIPLES

1. Strategic Direction

a. Strategic direction is transmitted throughhierarchical levels of strategy: nationalsecurity strategy (NSS), national militarystrategy (NMS), and theater strategy.Strategic direction is the common thread thatintegrates and synchronizes the activities ofthe Joint Staff, combatant commands, andServices. Consistent with the strategicguidance contained in the President’s NSS andupon NCA direction, the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) develops theNMS, which serves as CJCS advice to theNCA on how to employ the military in supportof national objectives.

b. These strategies integrate nationalpolicies, objectives, and resources with theatermilitary objectives and concepts. After theNational Security Strategy is published, theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff translatesthe worldwide military strategy into specificplanning requirements. These nationalsecurity and military strategies providestrategic direction for the combatantcommander and, in combination with thetheater strategy, provide guidance for planningof campaigns and major operations within thearea of responsibility (AOR).

“In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything theenemy may do, and be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it.Plans of the campaign may be modified ad infinitum according to thecircumstances, the genius of the general, the character of the troops, andthe features of the country.”

Napoleon IMaxims of War, 1831

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Execution Community (JPEC) with a coherentand focused framework. Military action is notthe only possible response to situations thatthreaten US national interests. All instrumentsof national power — military, economic,diplomatic, and informational — areconsidered in the formulation of nationalpolicy.

b. Military plans developed through thedeliberate planning process also consider andincorporate the diplomatic, economic, andinformational instruments of national power.Specifically, combatant commanders mustexplicitly relate military FDOs to the FDOsunder the other instruments of national power

as they develop OPLANs according toadaptive planning principles.

See Appendix A, “Flexible DeterrentOptions,” for more details on FDOs.

3. Combatant CommandGuidance

a. Combatant command strategic planningprovides the framework for employing forcesin peacetime and in response to crises.Campaign planning will provide theoperational direction to the detaileddevelopment of OPLANs and CONPLANs.

Figure III-1. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN

Chairmanof the Joint

Chiefsof Staff

Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan

Joint StrategicPlanning System

Apportionment ofMajor CombatForces and Lift

PlanningTasks

Assumptions

Combatant Commander

Deliberate Plans

III-3

Deliberate Planning During Campaign Plan Development

b. Combatant command planners developpeacetime assessments that ease transitionto crisis or war as well as to postconflict.Peacetime intelligence and logisticassessments, for example, are essential forforce projection operations and transition tocombat operations.

SECTION B. DELIBERATEPLANNING

4. General

a. In deliberate planning, the combatantcommander plans for a broad range ofpotential contingencies. Deliberate planningmost often applies to the conduct of combat

operations, but can also apply to MOOTW.Deliberate planning can also include theaterengagement planning in order to accomplishtheater strategic objectives. The uses ofdeliberate plans include providing a usefulbase for addressing contingencies notpreviously envisioned or planned for.

b. The types of deliberate plans are (seeFigure III-2):

• OPLANs;

• CONPLANs with or without time-phased force and deployment data(TPFDD); and

• FUNCPLANs.

Figure III-2. Types of Deliberate Plans

TYPES OF DELIBERATE PLANS

Deliberate plans are prepared under joint procedures and inprescribed formats as either an operation plan (OPLAN), operationplan in concept format (CONPLAN) with or without time-phasedforce and deployment data (TPFDD), or functional plan (FUNCPLAN).

OPLANCONPLAN

(WithoutTPFDD)

FUNCPLANCONPLAN(With

TPFDD)

An OPLAN is a complete anddetailed operation plan containing

a full description of theconcept of operations.It identifies:

A CONPLAN with TPFDD is a planthat requires more detailed planningfor phased deployment of forces.

A CONPLAN without TPFDD is anoperation plan in an abbreviated

format that would requireconsiderable expansionor alteration to convert itinto an OPLAN, campaignplan, or operation order.It contains:

A FUNCPLAN involvesthe conduct of militaryoperations in apeacetime or permissiveenvironment.

Force AllocationFunctional SupportDeployment SequenceResources required to

execute the planClosure estimates

This planning may berequired to support acontingency of compellinginterest but not likely tooccur in the near term. Thedetailed plan may also berequired where the primarypurpose is force movementplanning in support ofalliances.

Combatant Commander’sStrategic Concepts

Appropriate annexes

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See JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning JointOperations, and Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01A,Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).

5. Deliberate Planning Processfor OPLANs

a. An OPLAN is a complete and detailedjoint plan and includes a full description ofthe concept of operations and all annexesapplicable to the plan as well as the TPFDD.It identifies the specific forces, functionalsupport, and resources required to execute theplan and provides estimates for theirmovement into a theater. OPLANs can bequickly developed into an operation order(OPORD). OPLANs are normally preparedwhen:

• The contingency is critical to nationalsecurity and requires detailed priorplanning;

• Detailed planning will contribute todeterrence by demonstrating readinessthrough planning; and/or

• Detailed planning is required to supportalliance or combined planning. OPLANsfacilitate the transition to war and,through the development of supportingplans by both supporting commands andDefense combat support agencies,establish the feasibility of the plan’sconcept of operations.

b. Deliberate planning is designed as acyclic process and provides the JPEC with anopportunity to develop and refine plans to beused in wartime. In its basic form, deliberateplanning has five phases (see Figure III-3):initiation, concept development, plandevelopment, plan review, and supportingplans.

See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffManual (CJCSM) 3122.01, Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System Vol I:(Planning, Policies, and Procedures), and JP5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.

6. Initiation (Phase I)

a. During this phase, peacetime deliberateplanning tasks are transmitted (primarily viathe JSCP), forces and resources areapportioned, and planning guidance is issuedto the supported combatant commander.During deliberate planning, combatantcommanders prepare plans, includingcampaign plans, primarily in direct responseto taskings in the JSCP.

b. Strategic requirements or tasking for theplanning of major contingencies may requirethe preparation of several alternative plans forthe same requirement using different sets offorces and resources in order to preserveflexibility. For these reasons, campaign plansare based on reasonable assumptions.Deliberate plans may include the elements ofcampaign planning discussed in Chapter II,“Campaign Plan Design.”

7. Concept Development(Phase II)

a. After the combatant commander hasreceived the task assignment, the staffanalyzes the mission and develops tentativeCOAs to accomplish the mission. Theconcept development phase has six steps asshown in Figure III-4.

b. Step 1 — Mission Analysis. The firststep in the development of a military conceptof operations begins with a careful analysisof the task assignment. The combatantcommander or subordinate JFC mustdetermine the military objective, review whatresources are available for use in developingthe plan, analyze the adversary and the

III-5


physical conditions that affect the task, andreview the guidelines that have been givenby the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

• The primary focus of the planners duringthis stage is as follows:

•• Determine specified, implied, andessential tasks in order to develop aconcise mission statement. Specified andimplied strategic tasks are derived fromspecific NCA guidance, national (ormultinational) planning guidancedocuments such as the JSCP, the UCP,or from combatant commanderinitiatives. The national militaryobjectives form the basis of thecampaign’s mission statement.

•• Consider the forces that have beenapportioned for planning, the capabilitiesof the adversary, the terrain, geographicfeatures that support friendly andadversary forces, and climate.

•• Incorporate controlling factors leviedby others that will influence the militaryoperation, such as diplomatic agreements,economic conditions in the host countryor countries, and host-nation issues, toinclude support agreements, etc.

•• Gather facts and develop assumptionswhere appropriate.

•• Conduct a p r e l i m i n a r y r i s kassessment. This entails determining

Figure III-3. Deliberate Planning Phases

DELIBERATE PLANNING PHASES

Deliberate planning is conducted primarily in peacetime andprepares for possible contingencies based upon the best availableinformation, using forces and resources apportioned for deliberateplanning. These plans rely on assumptions regarding political andmilitary circumstances that are likely to exist upon implementationof the plan.

Joint OperationPlanning and

Execution System

Joint OperationPlanning and

Execution System

First PhaseINITIATION

Planning tasksare assigned tosupportedcommanders

Forces andresources areapportioned

Planningguidance isissued

Mission analysis

Planningguidancedevelopment

Staff estimates

Commander’sestimate

Combatantcommander’sstrategic concept

CJCS conceptreview

CJCS-approvedconcept ofoperations isexpanded into acompleteOPLAN bydesignatedsupportedcommander

CJCS conductsfinal review ofOPLANssubmitted bysupportedcommander.This includes aformal processthat evaluatesthe entire plan.

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffOperation PlanOPLAN

The supportedcommanderdirects thecompletion andsubmission ofsupportingplans to theCJCS approvedplan.

Second PhaseCONCEPT

DEVELOPMENT

Third PhasePLAN

DEVELOPMENT

Fourth PhasePLAN REVIEW

Fifth PhaseSUPPORTING

PLANS

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what obstacles or actions may precludemission accomplishment.

•• Determine the end state (see ChapterII, “Campaign Plan Design”).

•• Determine adversary and friendlyCOGs (see Chapter II, “Campaign PlanDesign”).

• The primary product of this first step isthe tentative mission statement. The

mission statement carries throughout theplanning process and is included in theplanning guidance, the planningdirective, staff estimates, the strategicconcept, and the completed plan.

• The focus on writing the missionstatement is on brevity and clarity. Themission statement is a clear and concisestatement of the objective to beaccomplished and the purpose.

Figure III-4. Concept Development Steps

CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT STEPS

CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

STEP 1

STEP 4

STEP 2

STEP 5

STEP 3

STEP 6

MISSION ANALYSIS

COMMANDER’SESTIMATE

PLANNING GUIDANCEDEVELOPMENT

COMBATANTCOMMANDER’S

STRATEGIC CONCEPT

STAFF ESTIMATES

CHAIRMAN JOINTCHIEFS OF STAFFCONCEPT REVIEW

III-7


• The mission statement forms the basisfor COA development, staff estimates,and the commander’s estimate.

c. Step 2 — Planning GuidanceDevelopment. This step has two primaryobjectives. The first objective is to providesufficient planning guidance to the combatantcommander’s (CINC’s) staff to permit themto develop COAs and staff estimates. Thesecond objective is to communicate planningguidance to the subordinate commanders.

• Initial Guidance. The commanderfocuses the staff’s planning efforts byproviding a framework that includes thefollowing:

•• Mission Statement. The restatedmission statement developed in step 1.

•• Assumptions. Assumptions thataddress gaps in knowledge are critical forthe planning process to continue. Thecommander considers assumptionshanded down from higher echelons asfacts. When dealing with an assumption,changes to the plan may need to bedeveloped should the assumption proveto be incorrect. Because of theirinfluence on planning, the fewestpossible assumptions are included in aplan. A valid assumption has threecharacteristics: it is logical, realistic, andessential for the planning to continue.Assumptions are made for both friendlyand adversary situations. The plannershould assume that the adversary woulduse every capability at his disposal (i.e.,nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC),asymmetric approach, etc.) and operatein the most efficient manner possible.Planners should never assume anadversary has less capability thananticipated, nor assume that key friendlyforces have more capability than has beendemonstrated.

• Nuclear, Biological, and ChemicalWarfare. This is an especially sensitivearea since adversary use of NBCweapons has the potential to significantlyaffect US operations. The adversary’sNBC capability presents major defensiveproblems and requires in-depth study anddetailed planning.

Guidance for NBC defense operationsis found in Appendix 2 to Annex C inCJCSM 3122.03A, Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System Vol II:(Planning and Execution Formats andGuidance), and in JP 3-11, Joint Doctrinefor Operations in Nuclear, Biological, andChemical (NBC) Environments.

•• Nuclear planning considers thepossibility that nuclear weapons may beused in combat. Planners must assess theimpact that will have on their operations.Because the use of nuclear weapons inany military operation would be soinfluential, the joint planner mustrealistically appreciate both thepossibility of the employment of nuclearweapons and the fact that the combatantcommander does not effectively controlthe decision to use them.

•• Nuclear planning guidance issued atthe unified or combined command levelis usually based on political policies. Itstems from national-level considerations,but is influenced by the military mission.USSTRATCOM conducts nuclearplanning in coordination with thegeographic combatant commanders andcertain allied commanders.

Guidance for documenting the planningfor nuclear operations is found in the JP3-12 series of joint doctrine.

• Political Considerations. Planning forthe use of military forces includes a

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discussion of the political implicationsof their transportation, staging, andemployment. The combatant commander’spolitical advisor is a valuable asset inadvising the combatant commander andstaff on issues crucial to the planningprocess, such as overflight and transitrights for deploying forces, basing, andsupport agreements.

• Tentative Courses of Action. Thecombatant commander gives the staff hisor her preliminary thoughts on possibleand acceptable military actions early inthe planning process to provide focus totheir efforts, allowing them to concentrateon developing COAs that are the mostappropriate.

• Planning Schedule. The commanderusually issues a planning schedule withthe initial guidance, although this practicevaries between commands. The chief ofstaff normally draws up the schedule thatsets milestones or deadlines forcompleting staff estimates, and forcompleting and distributing variouselements of the plan.

• Initial Staff Briefings. Initial briefingsinclude such subjects as terrain, climate,demographics, adversary capabilities, thelegal environment, and other relevantplanning factors. These briefings assistthe Plans Directorate (J-5) staff toformulate additional tentative COAs andfocus the joint staff divisions as theyanalyze tentative COAs and developrecommendations for the combatantcommander.

• Initial Commander’s Intent. Thecommander’s intent describes whatsituation or “landscape” the commanderwants to see after the military mission isaccomplished. It deals only with themilitary aspects of the situation. It iswritten in a free form and is broader than

a mission statement, but shorter than astrategic concept. It may includesequence of actions by the commander’sforce elements and their posture for futureoperations. It may also include thecommander’s assessment of theadversary commander’s intent.

•• CINCs begin to form their intent asthey analyze their mission, and theensuing result provides the initial impetusfor the entire planning process.

•• The commander considers staffestimates and the commander’s estimate,refining the intent. The commander’sintent clearly states the combatantcommander’s decision and summarizesthe combatant commander’s rationale forthat decision.

•• The commander’s intent becomes atool to communicate valuable guidancefrom the combatant commander to thestaff and subordinate commanders. Itmay also contain an assessment of whereand how the commander will accept riskduring the operation. It provides focusand helps subordinates pursue the desiredend state without further orders, evenwhen operations do not unfold asplanned.

• Commander’s Critical InformationRequirements (CCIRs). These are acomprehensive list of informationrequirements identified by thecommander as being critical infacilitating timely informationmanagement and the decisionmakingprocess that affects successful missionaccomplishment. The two keysubcomponents are critical informationand priority intelligence requirements.

• Course of Action Development. Todevelop COAs, the staff must focus onkey information necessary. This helps

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to focus staff efforts and concentratevaluable resources on developingfeasible COAs that have a high likelihoodof contributing to mission success.

•• A COA consists of the followinginformation: what type of action; whenthe action begins; where the actiontakes place; why (commander’s intent);and how (method of employment offorces).

•• A valid COA must be: (1) Suitable— It can accomplish the mission andcomply with the commander’s guidance.A COA must also be consistent withapproved joint doctrine. (2) Feasible —It must be able to accomplish the missionwithin the established time, space, andresource constraints. (3) Acceptable —It must balance cost with advantagegained by executing a particular COA.(4) Distinguishable — Each COA mustbe significantly different from the others.(5) Complete — It must incorporatemajor operations and tasks to beaccomplished, to include forces required,concept for sustainment, deployment,employment, time estimates for reachingtermination objectives, reserve forceconcept, and desired end state.

• Planning Directive. The combatantcommander normally communicatesinitial planning guidance to the staff,subordinate commanders, and supportingcommanders by publishing a planningdirective to ensure that everyoneunderstands the commander’s intent andto achieve unity of effort. Generally, theJ-5 coordinates staff action for deliberateplanning. The J-5 staff receives thecombatant commander’s initial guidanceand combines it with the informationgained from the initial staff assessments.The combatant commander, through theJ-5, may convene a preliminary planningconference for members of the JPEC who

will be involved with the plan. This is theopportunity for representatives to meetface-to-face. At the conference, thecombatant commander and selectedmembers of the staff brief the attendeeson important aspects of the plan and maysolicit their initial reactions. Manypotential conflicts can be avoided by thisearly exchange of information.

d. Step 3 — Staff Estimates. Staffestimates are the foundation for the combatantcommander’s selection of a COA. In this step,the staff divisions analyze and refine eachCOA to determine its supportability. Notevery situation will require an extensive andlengthy planning effort. It is conceivable thata commander could review the assigned task,receive oral briefings, make a quick decision,and direct writing of the plan commence. Thiswould complete the process and might besuitable if the task were simple andstraightforward.

• Most combatant commanders, however,are more likely to demand a thorough,well-coordinated plan that requires acomplex staff estimate process. Althoughwritten staff estimates are not mandatory,most will be carefully prepared,coordinated, and fully documented.

• The combatant commander’s entire staffis deeply involved in the deliberateplanning effort. Most major joint staffdivisions prepare staff estimates; inaddition, input may be solicited from thecombatant commander’s special staff onspecialized or technical matters. The J-5gathers information, proposes, andrevises tentative COAs.

• The purpose of the staff estimates is todetermine whether the mission can beaccomplished and to determine whichCOA can best be supported. This,together with the supporting discussion,gives the combatant commander the best

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possible information to select a COA.Each staff division:

•• Reviews the mission and situationfrom its own staff functional perspective;

•• Examines the factors and assumptionsfor which it is the responsible staff;

•• Analyzes each COA from its stafffunctional perspective; and

•• Concludes whether the mission can besupported and which COA can be bestsupported from its particular stafffunctional perspective.

• Because of the unique talents of each jointstaff division, involvement of all is vital.Each staff estimate takes on a differentfocus that identifies certain assumptions,detailed aspects of the COAs, andpotential deficiencies that are simply notknown at any other level, but neverthelessmust be considered. Such a detailedstudy of the COAs involves thecorresponding staffs of subordinate andsupporting commands.

• The form and the number of COAs underconsideration change during this step.These changes result in refined COAs.

• The product of this step is the sum totalof the individual efforts of the staffdivisions. Complete, fully documentedstaff estimates are extremely useful to theJ-5 staff, which extracts information fromthem for the commander’s estimate. Theestimates are also valuable to plannersin subordinate and supporting commandsas they prepare supporting plans.Although documenting the staff estimatescan be delayed until after the preparation ofthe commander’s estimate, they should besent to subordinate and supportingcommanders in time to help them prepareannexes for their supporting plans.

• The principal elements of the staffestimates normally include mission,situation and considerations, analysisof opposing COAs, comparison offriendly COAs, and conclusions. Thedetails in each basic category vary withthe staff performing the analysis. Theprincipal staff divisions have a similarperspective — they focus on friendlyCOAs and their supportability. However,the Intelligence Directorate (J-2) estimateson intelligence (provided at the beginningof the process) concentrate on theadversary: adversary situation, includingstrengths and weaknesses, adversarycapabilities and an analysis of thosecapabilities, and conclusions drawn fromthat analysis. The analysis of adversarycapabilities includes an analysis of thevarious COAs available to the adversaryaccording to its capabilities, which includeattacking, withdrawing, defending,delaying, etc. The J-2’s conclusion willindicate the adversary’s most likely COAand identify adversary COGs.

CJCSM 3122.01, Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System Vol I:(Planning, Policies, and Procedures),Enclosure S, contains sample formats forstaff estimates.

• In many cases the steps in the conceptdevelopment phase are not separate anddistinct, as the evolution of the refinedCOA illustrates.

• During planning guidance and early inthe staff estimates, the initial COAs mayhave been developed from initialimpressions and based on limited staffsupport. But as concept developmentprogresses, COAs are refined and evolveto include many of the followingconsiderations.

•• What military operations areconsidered?

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•• Where they will be performed?

•• Who will conduct the operation?

•• When is the operation planned tooccur?

•• How will the operation be conducted?

• An iterative process of modifying, addingto, and deleting from the original tentativelist is used to develop these refinedCOAs. The staff continually evaluatesthe situation as the planning processcontinues. Early staff estimates arefrequently given as oral briefings to therest of the staff. In the beginning, theytend to emphasize information collectionmore than analysis. It is only in the laterstages of the process that the staffestimates are expected to indicate whichCOAs can be best supported.

e. Step 4 — Commander’s Estimate.The combatant commander’s study of thesituation, coupled with a review of the existingtheater strategy and strategic estimate, is acontinuous process from which strategicconcepts are formulated and COAs arederived to become the basis of the theatercampaign plan.

• COA Analysis. Analysis of theproposed COAs provides the staff withthe following:

•• Potential decision points;

•• Task organization adjustments;

•• Data for use in a synchronizationmatrix or other decisionmaking tool;

•• Identification of plan branches andsequels;

•• Identification of high value targets;

•• Recommended CCIRs;

•• Wargaming. The planning staffshould also determine the wargamingmethodology for the COAs. Wargamingis a key analytical tool because itrepresents a conscious attempt tovisualize the flow of the campaign ormajor operation, given the joint forcestrengths and dispositions, adversaryassets and possible COAs, and the theateror joint operations area. Each methodwithin a proposed COA should bewargamed based upon time availableusing the action, reaction, andcounteraction method of friendly and/oradversary force interaction.

For a detailed discussion on thewargaming process, refer to JP 5-00.2,Joint Task Force Planning Guidance andProcedures.

• COA Comparison. COAs are notcompared to each other in the wargamingprocess. The COAs are individuallyevaluated against the criteria establishedby the staff. A detailed analysis withthe entire staff (and with components, ifpossible) must be conducted to determinethe recommended COA. The planningstaff then quantifies each COA byranking them according to each criterion.An alternative method to the points-baseddecision matrix is to construct anadvantages and disadvantages matrix.Computer-assisted modeling andsimulations can also be used, if available,to compare the outcomes of each scenarioto the desired outcomes.

• COA Selection. Using a decisionsupport template, points-based decisionmatrix, or other types of decisionmakingtools , a COA is selected forrecommendation to the JFC. All COAresults from wargaming, synchronization

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matrices, and other decision supporttools are briefed to the JFC. Regardlessof the decision-support tool used, the JFCmakes an informed decision based uponhis or her staff’s recommendations andtempered by the JFC’s intuitive judgmentand experience. The purpose of thisphase is to formally compare COAs forthe combatant commander to develop thestrategic concept.

•• In del iberate planning, thecommander’s estimate is the documentthat clearly states the combatantcommander’s decision and summarizesthe combatant commander’s rationale forthat decision. The commander’s estimatebecomes a tool to communicate valuableguidance from the combatant commanderto the staff and subordinate commanders.As such, it is a valuable planning tool forthe staff and subordinate commanders.

•• Generally, after receiving directionfrom the combatant commander anddrawing from the information in the staffestimates, the J-5 assembles the staffestimates and drafts the documentationfor the commander’s estimate. It isprepared for the combatant commanderto describe the chosen COA. Indeliberate planning, the commander’sestimate is a planning document used bythe command.

CJCSM 3122.01, Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System Vol I:(Planning, Policies, and Procedures),Enclosure J, contains a sample formatfor a Commander’s Estimate.

f. Step 5 — Combatant Commander’sStrategic Concept. The combatantcommander’s strategic concept, formerlycalled the “concept of operations,” is used asthe vehicle to distribute the combatantcommander’s decision and planning guidancefor accomplishing JSCP or other CJCS

taskings. CJCS approval of the strategicconcept becomes the basis of the plan fordevelopment into an OPLAN or CONPLAN.It is an expanded version of the COA selectedin the commander’s estimate prepared duringStep 4. The strategic concept is a narrativestatement of how the combatant commanderexpects to conduct operations to accomplishthe mission. It serves two primarypurposes. It clarifies the intent of thecommander in the deployment,employment, and support of apportionedforces, and it identifies major objectives andtarget dates for their attainment.

The combatant commander’s strategicconcept is written in sufficient detail to imparta clear understanding of the combatantcommander’s overall view of how thecampaign or major operation will be conducted.The elements of information that are includedin the combatant commander’s strategicconcept are depicted in Figure III-5.

See CJCSM 3122.01, Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System Vol I:(Planning, Policies, and Procedures), andCJCSM 3122.03, Joint Operation Planningand Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formatsand Guidance), for details and formats.

g. Step 6 — CJCS Concept Review.Once the combatant commander’s strategicconcept is prepared, it is briefed and forwardedto the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Stafffor review and approval. The process is thesame for OPLANs, CONPLANs, andFUNCPLANs, whether they are new plansor existing plans for which the concept haschanged. Reviews should be completed within60 days of referral; however, the Director, JointStaff, may extend the review period ifnecessary. With CJCS approval, thecombatant commander’s strategic conceptbecomes the concept of operations for theplan. It will be used in paragraph 3(Execution) of the Basic Plan and describedin detail in Annex C of the OPLAN.

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• Initiation of Review. The Joint Staffconducts the review for the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff. When the JointS t a f f r e c e i v e s t h e c o m b a t a n tcommander’s strategic concept, itdetermines whether the concept is in theproper format, conforms with JSCPguidance, is consistent with joint doctrine,and is therefore ready for review. If not, thesubmitting headquarters is notified bymemorandum or message.

• Review Responsibilities. The Joint Staff,Services, and designated defense

agencies (National Security Agency,Defense Intelligence Agency, DefenseThreat Reduction Agency, NationalImagery and Mapping Agency, DefenseLogistics Agency, and DefenseInformation Systems Agency) conductindependent reviews and submitcomments within 30 days of referral.Comments by Joint Staff directoratesand defense agencies are submitted tothe Joint Staff Operational Plans andJoint Force Development Directorate(J-7), which has primary staffresponsibility for conducting reviews.

Figure III-5. Combatant Commander’s Strategic Concept

COMBATANT COMMANDER’SSTRATEGIC CONCEPT

1. SITUATION

probable preconditions for implementation of the plan

deterrent options included in the plan

adversary forces

general tasks of friendly forces

expected operations of other friendly commands that will influence the plan

assumptions, including level of mobilization

legal considerations

who will be employed

where forces will be employed

when forces are to be phased into the theater

general description of how forces are to be employed

conventional, nuclear, and other supporting operations

deception

necessary deployment of forces

tasks of each subordinate and supporting command

required supporting plans

concept of logistic support

mutual allies’ support requirements and inter-Service support

stockage levels, pre-positioned war reserve stocks,

consumption levels

command relationships

command and control requirements

succession to command

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The Services submit comments to theSecretary, Joint Staff.

• Review Criteria. The purpose of theconcept review is to:

•• Determine whether the scope andconcept of operations satisfy the taskingand will accomplish the assigned task;

•• Assess the validity of the assumptions(they must be reasonable and consistentwith strategic guidance);

•• Evaluate compliance with CJCSguidance and joint doctrine; and

•• Evaluate acceptability with regard toexpec ted cos t s and po l i t i ca lsupportability. Acceptable plans areproportional and worth the anticipatedcost.

• Review Comments. Comments back tothe combatant commander concerningthe concept are classified as “execution-c r i t i c a l , ” “ s u b s t a n t i v e , ” or“administrative.”

•• Execution-critical comments describemajor deficiencies that negatively affectthe capability of the plan to meet theJSCP objective and may preventexecution of the plan as written.Examples of such deficiencies includefailure to meet assigned tasks, deviationsfrom joint policy, and major logisticshortfalls.

•• Substantive comments pertain to lesscritical deficiencies such as deviationfrom CJCS guidance or JOPESformatting. These deficiencies would notprevent execution of the plan.

•• Administrative comments are offeredfor clarity, accuracy, and consistency.They include such items as outdated

references, improper terminology, andother minor errors.

• Review Results. Results of the revieware forwarded to the supportedcommander by memorandum or messagestating that the concept is either approvedfor further plan development ordisapproved and requires significantchanges before resubmission.

• Post-review Actions. The supportedcommander incorporates changesrequired by the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. A formal changeincorporating all execution-criticalcomments is submitted to the Chairmanwithin 30 days of receipt of the reviewresults. Substantive comments must beincorporated when the plan is submittedfor review in its entirety in the planreview phase of the deliberate planningprocess.

8. Plan Development (Phase III)

a. Once the combatant commander’sstrategic concept is approved by the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it becomes theconcept of operations for plan developmentand subsequent phases of the deliberateplanning process. In the plan developmentphase, the staff expands and formallydocuments the concept of operations in theappropriate OPLAN format. The process isthe same for OPLANs, CONPLANs, andFUNCPLANs. CONPLANs and FUNCPLANsare not as fully developed as OPLANs.

b. CONPLANs do not require the level ofdetailed planning in support, sustainment, ortransportation that OPLANs do. Unless thesupported commander requires it, annexes andappendices are not required to be as fullydeveloped as in an OPLAN, and generallyTPFDD development is not required.Therefore, CONPLANs present a lesscomplicated plan development problem than

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OPLANs. Because OPLAN developmentrequires all the procedures for the plandevelopment phase to be accomplished andCONPLAN development does not,subsequent discussion of the plandevelopment phase will focus on planningprocedures for OPLANs.

c. During the initial steps of Phase III, thefocus moves to the component commanders.Planners on the staffs of the componentcommands begin developing the total packageof forces required for the operation. Theystart with the major combat forces selectedfrom those apportioned for planning in theoriginal task-assigning document andincluded in the combatant commander’sconcept of operations. Working closely withthe staffs of Service headquarters, othersupporting commands, and combat supportagencies, they identify requirements forsupport forces and sustainment.

d. The supported commander consolidateseach component’s forces and supplies, andphases their movement into the theater ofoperations. The resources are proposed forarrival in-theater and at the final destinationusing apportioned intertheater transportation,combatant commander-controlled theatertransportation, and transportation organic tothe subordinate command. The strategicmovement is simulated in a computer model,which provides reasonable assurances to thecombatant commander that the operation istransportation feasible.

e. The later steps of the phase fill the plan’shypothetical (notional) units with actual unitsand those supply entries that can be replaced.In the refinement step, movement of theseunits is again computer-simulated, andUSTRANSCOM develops movement tables.The f i n a l d o c u m e n t a t i o n f o r thetransportation-feasible OPLAN is prepared.The plan development phase is depicted inthe eight sequential steps shown in FigureIII-6. These steps may overlap, be

accomplished simultaneously, or repeat. Thesame flexibility displayed in the COArefinement process of the preceding phase isseen again here, as shortfalls are discoveredand eliminated. Computer support withinJOPES makes the timely development of arealistic flow of manpower and suppliespossible.

See JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning JointOperations, and CJCSM 3122.01, JointOperation Planning and Execution System VolI: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures),Enclosure C.

f. Automated Data Processing (ADP)Support. The plan development phaseproduces huge amounts of information aboutthe forces, the equipment and materiel supportto those forces, and the time-phasedmovement of personnel and materiel to theoperational area. To manage this mountainof information, planners need ADP support.The JOPES provides ADP support to OPLANdevelopment. JOPES is accessed by plannersand throughout the JPEC through the GlobalCommand and Control System (GCCS).Planners use specialized application programsin JOPES and interface with other applicationprograms through JOPES to create a TPFDDcomputer file. The TPFDD is created byentering and relating data supplied by sourcesthroughout the JPEC and generated by JOPESand JOPES-related applications.

9. Final Plan Review (Phase IV)

a. In this phase, the Joint Staff performs orcoordinates a final review of OPLANssubmitted by the combatant commanders. Itis a formal review of the entire plan, includingTPFDD, updated medical working file, andappropriate civil engineering support planningfiles, if applicable. When an OPLAN isapproved, it is effective for execution whendirected. Approval of the plan is the signal tosubordinate and supporting commands todevelop their plans in support of the combatant

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commander’s concept. The supportingcommanders don’t wait until the plan isapproved before beginning to develop theirsupporting plans; they have been involved indoing this while the combatant commanderhas been building the plan.

b. Approval of the OPLAN during finalreview depends on whether it satisfies theCJCS task assignment and demonstrates theeffective use of apportioned resources. Thisis summarized as adequacy and feasibility.In addition, OPLANs are reviewed forconsistency with joint doctrine andacceptability.

• The review for adequacy determineswhether the scope and concept of plannedoperations are capable of satisfying thetask assigned in the JSCP. The reviewassesses the validity of the assumptionsand compliance with CJCS guidance.

• The review for feasibility determineswhether the assigned tasks could beaccomplished using availableresources. The pr imary fac torsconsidered are whether the resourcesappor t ioned to the comba tan tcommander for planning by the JSCP andService planning documents are beingused effectively or whether the planexceeds the apportioned resources.

• OPLANs incorporate appropriate jointdoctrine from publications in the JointDoctr ine Publicat ion System.Incorporating appropriate joint doctrinewhen preparing OPLANs speeds up theadaptation of OPLANs to specific crisesduring crisis action planning.Incorporating appropriate joint doctrinealso facilitates execution of operationsduring all phases of operations for crisisresolution.

• The review for acceptability ensures thatplans are proportional and worth theexpected costs. It joins with the criterionof feasibility in ensuring that the missioncan be accomplished with availableresources and adds the dimension that theplan can be accomplished withoutincurring excessive losses in personnel,equipment, materiel, time, or position.

Figure III-6. Plan Development Steps

PLAN DEVELOPMENTSTEPS

STEP 1FORCE PLANNING

STEP 2SUPPORT PLANNING

STEP 3NUCLEAR PLANNING

STEP 8DOCUMENTATION

STEP 4TRANSPORTATION

PLANNING

STEP 6TRANSPORTATION

FEASIBILITYANALYSIS

STEP 5SHORTFALL

IDENTIFICATION

STEP 7TPFDD REFINEMENT

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Using this criterion, the plans are alsoreviewed to ensure that they arecons i s t en t w i th domes t i c andinternational law, including the law ofwar, and are militarily and politicallysupportable.

c. OPLANs submitted to the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff for review are referredto the J-7, which conducts and coordinatesthe final plan review. Other Joint Staffdirectorates, the Services, and defenseagencies are consulted as required. Reviewcomments are categorized as discussed inReview Comments in paragraph 7 of thischapter.

d. The review should be completed within60 days of referral. The Director, Joint Staff,may extend the review period if circumstanceswarrant. Review results are forwarded to thesupported commander by memorandum (ormessage) stating that the plan is given one ofthe following dispositions: (1) Approved(effective for execution, when directed) —any critical shortfalls within plans that cannotbe resolved by the supported commander willbe outlined within the review comments andthe approval memorandum; or (2)Disapproved — within 30 days of receipt ofthe CJCS review results memorandum, thesupported commander sends a message to theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, statinghis or her intentions concerning incorporatingall execution-critical comments. A formalchange incorporating CJCS execution-criticalcomments to correct resolvable items must besubmitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff within 60 days of receipt of the reviewresults. Substantive comments must beincorporated into the first change to theOPLAN or by the next CJCS review. Within15 days of receipt of the CJCS review resultsmemorandum, the supported commandersends a message to the component commandsnotifying them of:

• OPLAN approval status;

• OPLANs replaced, deleted, or changedas a result of CJCS review; and

• Component commands’ responsibilitiesto notify supporting commands andagencies of OPLAN effectiveness andtasks.

Within 15 days of receipt of the supportedcommand’s OPLAN review notificationmessage, component commanders send amessage to all supporting commands andService agencies who are assigned taskswithin the plan, relaying OPLAN status andeffectiveness. When a formal change isreceived, the Joint Staff reviews it to verifyincorporation of CJCS comments. The scopeof the review is determined case by case. Thesupported commander normally reviews andapproves supporting plans prepared bysubordinate and supporting commanders andother agencies. Supported commandersadvise the Joint Staff when issues from thesereviews cannot be resolved between thecommanders concerned.

10. Supporting Plans (Phase V)

a. During this final phase of the deliberateplanning process, the supported commanderdirects the preparation and submission ofsupporting plans. These deal withmobilization, deployment, and employment.Paragraph 3 of the OPLAN and paragraph 3of the plan summary clearly documents thetask assignments. As required by thecombatant commander’s task assignment,component commanders, joint task force(JTF) commanders, supporting commanders,or other agencies develop supporting plans.Many of the supporting commanders in turnassign their subordinates the task of preparingadditional supporting plans. As an extremeexample, a local unit-recall roster ordering anindividual Service member to report for dutyin case of a contingency can be considered asupporting plan.

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b. CJCSM 3122.01, Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System Vol I:(Planning, Policies, and Procedures),contains specific instructions for assigningdiscrete plan identification numbers (PIDs) toevery OPLAN entered into the JOPES system.Supporting plans are assigned a PID identicalto that of the supported plan. In some cases,however, a command is required to performessentially the same actions to support two ormore supported commander’s plans. In thesesituations, the supporting commander mayprepare a single, omnibus plan rather thanmultiple supporting plans that restate identicalmaterial. The supporting plan summary liststhe plans it supports, and the supporting planPID is assigned without regard to the PIDs ofthe plans it supports.

c. Employment plans normally are theresponsibility of the commander who willdirect the forces when the plan is convertedinto an OPORD and executed. In many cases,however, the politico-military situation cannotbe clearly predicted, so detailed employmentplanning may be delayed until circumstancesrequire it.

d. Supporting plans, when required by thesupported commander, are submitted by thesupporting command or agency within 60days after CJCS approval of the supportedplan. Information in the supported plan neednot be repeated in the supporting plan unlessthe supported commander so directs. In theabsence of Joint Staff instructions to thecontrary, the supported commander willreview and approve supporting plans. TheChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may beasked to resolve issues that arise during thereview of supporting plans, and the Joint Staff,on behalf of the Chairman, may review anysupporting plan.

SECTION C.MULTINATIONAL PLANNING

11. Multinational Integration

a. Planning for multinational operations isaccomplished in national and internationalchannels. Collective security goals, strategies,and combined OPLANs are developed inaccordance with individual treaty or allianceprocedures. Deliberate joint operationplanning for multinational operations isperformed through national channels, inaccordance with US doctrine and procedures.Therefore, much of the information andguidance provided for joint operations isconceptually applicable to alliance andcoalition multinational problems as well. Thefundamental issues are much the same for bothsituations (see Figure III-7).

b. Through national planning channels,HNS and contingency mutual supportagreements are developed to facilitate jointoperations. Coordination of these separateplanning channels is accomplished at thenational level through established coalitionbodies, and at the theater and operationallevels by combatant commanders or othersubordinate joint US commands, who arecharged within both channels for operationalplanning matters.

12. Strategic Integration ofCampaign Plans

a. In support of each treaty or alliance, ahierarchical organization of bilateral ormultilateral bodies is established to defineobjectives and strategy and to coordinatestrategic direction for planning and executingmultinational operations. Generally, thisorganization parallels the US organization fornational security, and the NCA and their seniormilitary and civilian staffs participate inappropriate bodies of the alliance or treatyorganization.

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b. Through dual involvement in thenational and international security processes,US leadership provides the means to integratenational and theater strategic planning withthat of the treaty or alliance organizations.Within the alliance or treaty structure, USparticipants ensure that objectives and strategycomplement US interests and are compatiblewith US capabilities. Within the US nationalstructure, US participants ensure that allianceor treaty commitments are reflected in NMSand are adequately addressed in strategicdirection for joint operation planning.

Figure III-7. Multinational Planning

13. Theater Integration

a. Joint operation planning is integratedwith alliance or coalition planning at the theateror operational level by the commander of USnational forces dedicated to the alliance orcoalition military organization. Normally, thiswill be the combatant commander or thecommander of the subunified command orJTF responsible for the geographic area withinwhich multinational operations are plannedand executed. These commanders functionwithin the US chain of command and that ofmultinational organizations. Within alliance

The term multinational operations describes joint militaryactions conducted by forces of two or more nations. Planningfor such operations is accomplished through national andinternational channels, and collective security goals, strategies,and treaties are taken into consideration in each phase of theplanning procedures.

A hierarchicalorganization ofbilateral ormultilateral bodiesis established todefine objectivesand strategy.

Joint operation planningis integrated with allianceor coalition planning atthe theater or operationallevel by the commander ofUS national forces.

Involves the preparation ofcombined, mutuallydeveloped and approvedplans governing theemployment of forces oftwo nations for a commoncontingency.

MULTINATIONAL PLANNING

OBJECTIVE

Theater Integration

Strategic Integration

Bilateral Planning

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or coalition organizations, they command orsupport the designated commander ofmultinational forces and plan, as appropriate,for multinational employment in accordancewith strategic direction and guidanceemanating from treaty or alliance leadership.Within the US chain of command, theycommand joint US forces and prepare jointOPLANs in response to taskings from theNCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff.

b. Taskings include developing jointOPLANs to support each treaty or alliancecommitment within the operational area andplanning for unilateral US contingencieswithin the same area. In this dual capacitywithin the US and alliance or coalition chainsof command, the US commander coordinatesalliance or coalition planning with jointoperation planning.

14. Bilateral CampaignPlanning

When directed by the NCA through theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,designated US commanders participatedirectly with the armed forces of other nationsin preparing bilateral plans. Bilateraloperation planning involves the preparationof combined, mutually developed andapproved plans governing the employmentof forces of two nations for a commoncontingency. Bilateral planning may beaccomplished within the framework of a treatyor alliance or in the absence of such formalities.The NCA and Chairman provide guidance forbilateral planning.

For additional information on multinationalplanning, see JP 5-0, Doctrine for PlanningJoint Operations, Chapter II.

SECTION D. INTERAGENCYCOORDINATION

15. Interagency Coordination

Campaign plans should lay out to thegreatest degree possible what the combatantcommander desires as the entry and exitconditions for the other United StatesGovernment (USG) agencies during theoperation. It should be noted that interagencyparticipation could be involved at the earliestphases of the operation starting with FDOs.Linking the interagency actions with thephases of the operation would help in thescheduling and coordination of effort.Crucially important to the plan is the orderlyflow of operations to the desired end state andan efficient end of direct US militaryinvolvement. During deliberate interagencyplanning, heavy combatant commanderinvolvement, participation, and coordinationwill be a key to success.

For additional information on interagencycoordination, see Chapter II of JP 3-08, Vol1, Interagency Coordination During JointOperations, and CJCSM 3122.03A, JointOperation Planning and Execution System VolII: (Planning and Execution Formats andGuidance), Annex V, “InteragencyCoordination.”

CHAPTER IVCRISIS ACTION PLANNING DURING CAMPAIGN

PLAN DEVELOPMENT

IV-1

1. General

a. While deliberate planning is conductedin anticipation of future events, there arealways situations arising in the present thatmight require US military response. Suchsituations may approximate those previouslyplanned for in deliberate planning, though itis unlikely they would be identical, andsometimes they will be completelyunanticipated. Usually, the time available toplan responses to such real-time events isshort. In as little as a few days, a feasibleCOA must be developed and approved, andtimely identification of resourcesaccomplished to ready forces, scheduletransportation, and prepare supplies formovement and employment of US militaryforce.

“Campaign planning can begin before or during deliberate planning, but isnot completed until crisis action planning.”

JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

b. Within the context of joint operationplanning and execution, a crisis is an incidentor situation involving a threat to the UnitedStates, its territories, citizens, military forces,and possessions or vital interests. It developsrapidly and creates a condition of suchdiplomatic, economic, political, or militaryimportance that commitment of US militaryforces and resources is contemplated toachieve national objectives.

c. Crisis Action Planning (CAP)Overview. In such crisis or time-sensitivesituations, the JPEC uses CAP procedures,prescribed in CJCSM 3122.01, Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System Vol I:(Planning, Policies, and Procedures), andCJCSM 3122.02A, Crisis Action Time-PhasedForce and Deployment Data Developmentand Deployment Execution, Volume III.

US forces evacuate American citizens from Freetown, Sierra Leone (1996).

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• In a crisis, the situation is dynamic, withthe body of knowledge growing hour byhour from the latest intelligence reports.An adequate and feasible militaryresponse in a crisis demands flexibleprocedures keyed to the time available,to communications that are rapid andeffective, and to the use of previousplanning, whenever possible. Theprincipal players need to know whatothers are doing. All players need toknow what is expected of them.

• CAP procedures are used by the JPECto plan for and execute deployment andemployment of US military forces intime-sensitive situations. This ensures:

•• Logical procedures are followed, fromrecognizing the problem, to preparingand executing the OPORD;

•• Exchange of information about thesituation, its analysis, and alternativemilitary responses is rapid and effective;

•• Military COAs are prepared forconsideration by the NCA in a timelyfashion; and

•• Decisions of the NCA are rapidlyrelayed to the combatant commander.

• The system is divided into six separatephases.

•• The procedures begin when thesituation develops. The geographiccombatant commander recognizes thepotential significance of the situation andprovides an assessment report to theNational Military Command Center(NMCC).

•• The NCA assess the diplomatic,economic, informational, and militaryimplications of the situation. When

warranted, the NCA may decide that apossible military response should beprepared.

•• Upon receipt of a Warning Order, thecombatant commander develops COAsin response to the situation. TheC o m m a n d e r ’s E s t i m a t e w i t hrecommended COA is transmitted to theNCA.

•• The NCA select the COA, released bythe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffas an Alert Order.

•• The combatant commander preparesthe detailed OPORD to support theselected COA.

•• At the direction of the NCA, thecombatant commander executes theOPORD.

• The CAP process permits the steps to bedone sequentially or in parallel. Theexact flow of the procedures is largelydetermined by the time available tocomplete the planning and by thesignificance of the crisis.

d. Military Option. Military plannersfacing time-sensitive planning requirementsmust understand that the NCA are consideringdiplomatic, informational, economic, andmilitary options. The military option mayinitially be the least desirable option, and adecision to execute it may be made only afterother, less severe options have been judgedunsuitable. In reaching a decision to developa military solution, the NCA may considerthe possible range of FDOs, to include militaryFDOs. Ultimate responsibility and authorityin a crisis rest with the NCA, who mustapprove a COA and authorize the majoractions to be taken, including the deployment,employment, or redeployment of forces.

IV-3

Crisis Action Planning During Campaign Plan Development

See Appendix A, “Flexible DeterrentOptions,” for a detailed discussion on FDOs.

e. Characteristics. Several characteristicsof a crisis can be given. It may occur with littleor no warning. It is fast breaking and requiresaccelerated decisionmaking, and sometimes asingle crisis may spawn another crisiselsewhere. Whatever the nature or perceivedmagnitude of the situation, a commitment ofassets and US military forces is beingconsidered as a solution. In the US defenseestablishment, the use of military forcerequires a decision by the NCA.

f. Available Guidelines. The proceduresin CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planningand Execution System Vol I: (Planning,Policies, and Procedures), are used to outlinea military response in a crisis. The six phasesof CAP follow a logical sequence of eventsthat lead to the timely preparation of a COAfor a military response. The proceduresdescribe the flow of information from thecombatant commander, and the integration ofCJCS military advice in the analysis ofmilitary options. Additionally, it addressesthe decisionmaking process by which the

NCA begin detailed military planning, changedeployment posture of the identified force,and execute the military option. It also outlinesthe mechanisms for monitoring the executionof the eventual OPORD.

2. Crisis Action Procedures

a. Since each crisis is unique, it is notreasonable to expect to use a rigid set of rulesin response to every situation. However, CAPentails a coordinated process that includespeople, procedures, communications, andADP hardware and software, and thatproduces a detailed plan to best accomplishthe military mission to meet national securityobjectives.

b. CAP procedures give the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatantcommanders a process for getting vitaldecisionmaking information up the chain ofcommand to the NCA. CAP allows the NCAto communicate their decisions accuratelythrough the Chairman down the chain ofcommand to the combatant commander,subordinate and supporting commanders, theServices, and supporting defense agencies.

CAP procedures give the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and thecombatant commanders a process for getting vital decisionmaking informationup the chain of command to the NCA.

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Furthermore, it permits the key players in theJPEC to exchange essential deployment datarapidly and accurately.

• CAP provides an ability to develop anadequate and transportation-feasiblemilitary response during a time-constrained planning period.

• JOPES ADP offers the JPEC thecapability to monitor strategic movementduring execution of the plan.

• CAP accommodates the need fordifferent degrees of detail, given thedifferent amounts of time available forplanning among the various commandlevels.

• It describes actions to be performed bythe JPEC from the beginning of a crisiseither through the commitment of USmilitary forces or to the point where theneed for military force ends and militaryactivity is canceled.

3. Crisis Action Planning Phases

a. General. CAP procedures arecategorized into six phases (see Figure IV-1)— situation development, crisis assessment,course of action development, course ofaction selection, execution planning, andexecution. Each phase of CAP begins withan event, such as the receipt of a report ororder, and ends with a decision or resolutionof the crisis. When the process moves into anew phase, the primary responsibility fortaking action shifts between the NCA and thesupported combatant commander.

• Before beginning a full examination ofCAP, it is important to understand thatthe time-sensitivity of certain criticalsituations may require such a rapidresponse that the normal proceduralsequence may be significantly altered,i.e., CAP phases may be compressed,

repeated, carried out concurrently, oreven eliminated. While there are detailedprocedures to be followed in the process,circumstances may dictate that they beabbreviated; that is, decisions may bereached in conference and initiallycommunicated orally.

• The amount of time spent in each phaseis not fixed and depends on the tasks tobe done and the time available. Withinthe CAP sequence of events, there areseveral points where decisions must bemade for planning to continue, furtheractions are placed on “hold,” or planningreverts to a previous phase. Followingeach major decision reached by the NCA,the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffissues a formal order implementing thatdecision.

b. Phase I — Situation Development (seeFigure IV-2). As a matter of routine,organizations of the USG monitor the worldsituation. In the course of that monitoring, anevent may occur that has possible securityimplications for the United States or itsinterests. Monitoring organizations or thesupported combatant commander mayrecognize the event, analyze it to determinewhether US interests are threatened, andreport it to the NMCC.

• Initiation. CAP procedures generallybegin once the event is reported to theNMCC. The situation developmentphase contains four related activities —the day-to-day situation is monitored; anevent occurs; the event is recognized asa problem; and the event is reported.

•• Situation monitoring is the continuousreview and analysis of events occurringworldwide. Many available resources areused, ranging from strategic intelligencesources to routine observations by amember of the military attaché staff, totelevision news broadcasts. So diverse

IV-5

Crisis A

ction Planning During C

ampaign Plan D

evelopmentFigure IV-1. Crisis Action Planning Documents

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING DOCUMENTS

ISituation

Development

JTF

IICrisis

Assessment

IIICOA

Development

IVCOA

Selection

VExecutionPlanning

VIExecution

CombatantCommander

NCACJCS

CombatantCommander'sAssessment

Commander'sEstimate

CombatantCommander

WarningOrder

CombatantCommander

Planning

CombatantCommanderDeployment

Or AlertOrder

Or ExecuteOrder

JTF PLANNING

CJCSCOAJTF

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCourse of ActionJoint Task Force

NCAOPORD

National Command AuthoritiesOperation Order

CJCSWarning

Order

CJCSPlanning

CJCSDeployment

OPORDCommander'sEstimate

Or AlertOrder

Or AlertOrder

Or ExecuteOrder

Or ExecuteOrder

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are the sources of observation that thereport could come up through the chainof command from observer to supervisor,to senior military officer, to componentcommand, to unified command watchofficer.

•• An event is an occurrence assessed asout of the ordinary and viewed aspotentially having an adverse impact onUS national interests and nationalsecurity.

•• The recognition of the event as aproblem or potential problem followsfrom the observation.

• Regardless of the source, the focal pointfor reporting information crucial to thenational security is the NMCC. Eventsmay be reported initially to the NMCCby any means available, but the two mostcommon means are the criticalinformation message (CRITIC) and theoperational report (OPREP)-3 PINNACLE.Receipt of an OPREP-3 PINNACLE(reporting an event or incident of possiblenational interest) at the NMCC from acombatant commander is a likely way forCAP to be initiated.

• Actions Taken During SituationDevelopment. In Phase I, the focus is

Figure IV-2. Crisis Action Planning Phase I

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PHASE I

Situation Development

Monitor worldsituation

Problemrecognition

CombatantCommander'sAssessment

IV-7


generally on the combatant commanderwho is responsible for the US militaryaction that may be taken within a theater.The major occurrences in the combatantcommand include the following:

•• Observation of an event with potentialnational security implications;

•• An assessment by the combatantcommander that the potential implicationsof the situation warrant higher-echelonawareness;

•• Report to the NMCC by CRITIC orOPREP-3 PINNACLE;

•• By the publication of the OPREP-3PINNACLE or a combatant commander’sassessment, the combatant commanderprovides the NCA with an assessment ofaction being considered or actionsalready taken. This is an important stepand would be crucial to the combatantcommander’s influencing futuredecisions in a fast-breaking crisis.

• The Joint Staff monitors the situation,requests a report from the supportedcombatant commander, evaluates thecombatant commander’s actions beingtaken under the ROE, orders additionalintelligence gathering, if necessary, andadvises the NCA as the situationdevelops.

• If possible, other members of the JPECcollect information on the situation anddevelop an accurate picture of the crisis.

• Exchange of Reports During Phase I.The initial report of the event, which anyindividual can make, must be timely andaccurate. The CRITIC report orOPREP-3 PINNACLE are normallyused. They can be issued orally with arecord copy to follow. Any commandermay issue OPREP-3 PINNACLE

(general) to report any incident or eventwhere national-level interest is indicated.A combatant commander may issueOPREP-3 PINNACLE or a combatantcommander’s assessment to report adeveloping or potential crisis. If thecombatant commander does not make theinitial report of an event, the NMCC willmake every effort to establishcommunications with the combatantcommander and request a report. In thisinstance, the combatant commander willnormally send an OPREP-3 PINNACLEor a combatant commander’s assessmentthat includes the following:

•• Information on the current situation;

•• Action being taken within theconstraints of the current ROE;

•• Forces readily available;

•• Expected time for earliestcommitment of forces;

•• Major constraints on the employmentof forces;

•• Succinct discussion of various COAsunder consideration or recommended bythe commander on how to resolve thesituation, as appropriate.

• ADP Support. During this phase thecombatant commander’s staff reviewsapplicable contingency plans. TheJOPES database holds all the files forcurrent complete plans, and thecombatant commander reviews plansthrough access to GCCS. If circumstanceswarrant, a GCCS teleconference (TLCF)may be established to allow a rapidexchange of information.

• Conclusion of Phase I. The situationdevelopment phase ends when theevent is reported and the combatant

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commander’s assessment is submitted tothe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffand NCA through the NMCC.

c. Phase II — Crisis Assessment (seeFigure IV-3).

• The NCA and JCS analyze the situationto determine whether a military optionshould be prepared to deal with theevolving problem. Increased informationgathering and review of available optionsby the NCA characterize this phase.

• This phase begins with the receipt of thecombatant commander’s report andassessment of the event. The commanderhas categorized the event as a problemof potential national concern. The detailand frequency of reporting increases inorder to give the JCS information that isneeded to evaluate developments andallows them to offer sound militaryadvice to the NCA.

• Actions Taken During CrisisAssessment. The focus of Phase II is onthe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

in coordination with the other membersof the JCS and the NCA.

•• The NCA identify the nationalinterests at stake; the national objectivesrelated to those interests; and possiblediplomatic, political, economic, andmilitary options to achieve the objectives.

•• The NCA decide that a crisis existsand that the supported combatantcommander will develop military COAsto resolve the crisis.

•• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff assesses the situation from themilitary point of view includingopera t ions , l og i s t i c s , and C2implications, and reviews current strategyand existing OPLAN data in JOPES.

•• The Joint Staff reviews and evaluatesreports from the combatant commander.The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffmay recommend to the NCA that ordersbe published to prepare to deploy or todeploy forces, and may establish or directthe establishment of a crisis GCCS TLCF

Figure IV-3. Crisis Action Planning Phase II

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PHASE II

Crisis Assessment

Increased reporting

Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff (CJCS) and/or NationalCommand Authorities (NCA)evaluation

NCA crisis decision

Increased reporting

Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff (CJCS) and/or NationalCommand Authorities (NCA)evaluation

NCA crisis decision

NCA

CJCS

IV-9


if the combatant commander has notalready done so.

•• Having reported the event and offeredan assessment of the situation in Phase I,the commander continues to issue statusreports, assesses the disposition ofassigned and available forces, and takesappropriate military action under currentROE.

•• The other members of the JPECcontinue to monitor the situation.

•• The Services may improve readinessand sustainability of forces that could beused and identify possible Reservecomponents; USTRANSCOM improvesthe disposition and readiness of strategiclift assets, etc.

• Because crisis action procedures areflexible, the NCA and the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff have the latitudeto either remain in this phase, increasereporting, and gather additionalinformation for study; return to Phase Iand continue to monitor the situationwithout further planning action; orprogress to the next phase of CAP.

• Crisis Response Organizations. Duringthe crisis assessment phase, specialteams are assembled at all levels wherethe problem and its resolution are beingdeveloped. These teams vary in size andcomposition, as well as in name. Theymay be called crisis action teams, crisisresponse cells, battle staffs, emergencyresponse teams, operations actiongroups, or operation planning groups.Specially constituted crisis actionorganizations generally includerepresentatives from all command staffdivisions and may include representativesfrom a wide range of involvedorganizations.

• Exchange of Reports During Phase II.At any time during CAP, the NCA mayfind it desirable to prepare selected unitsfor possible military action. Theyincrease unit readiness by designatingalert conditions or ordering a specifieddeployability posture to reduce theresponse time of selected forces.Increased readiness actions may be takenduring any phase. Deploymentpreparation orders and deploymentorders are used to increase or decreasedeployability posture, deploy or redeploy

The focus during Phase II of CAP is on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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forces, establish or disestablish JTFs andtheir headquarters, or signal US intent toundertake or terminate action. Changingthe deployment posture of a unit is astrong statement that the United States isbeginning action to conduct militaryoperations. This is but one example of apossible FDO. Both orders are issuedby the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff and specifically authorized by theSecretary of Defense (SecDef). The stageof a unit’s readiness is defined by thedeployability posture.

• The deployment preparation order andthe deployment order are addressed to allcombatant commanders and the NationalSecurity Agency/Central SecurityService. The Secretary of State, theWhite House Situation Room, andappropriate others receive copies.

• The format for both of these orders is inCJCSM 3122.01, Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System Vol I:(Planning, Policies, and Procedures),Enclosure M, and they include allnecessary information to deploy theforces, if it is not already given in otherplanning guidance documents from theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.The order takes the following overalloutline.

•• Clear statement that it is a deploymentpreparation or deployment order issuedunder the authorization of the Secretaryof Defense.

•• Situation.

•• Mission.

•• Execution.

•• Administration and logistics.

•• Command and signal.

• Note that, while these orders are designedto increase deployability posture,positioning forces or taking preparatoryactions may signal US intent to conductmilitary operations. This may not be thedesired message. The Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff and NCA mayconsider the requirements for operationssecurity and surprise, and balance themagainst the need to notify selected ArmedForces for possible action.

• ADP Support. A GCCS TLCF should beestablished between crisis participants.

• Conclusion of Phase II. The crisisassessment phase ends with the decisionby the NCA to have military optionsdeveloped for their consideration. Theseare added to the full range of possibleUS response options. The NCA decisionmay also include specific guidance onCOAs to be developed. For this reason,the combatant commander’s initialassessment has great influence. Thatassessment is an early, professionalrecommendation from the scene; lack oftime may make the commander’sassessment the only alternativeconsidered. If not provided by the NCA,the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffshould query the NCA regardingtermination criteria so that NCAtermination guidance can be provided inthe warning order to facilitate thesupported combatant commander’sbackward-planning process.

d. Phase III — Course of ActionDevelopment (see Figure IV-4).

• Following the decision of the NCA todevelop military options, the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff publishes a

IV-11


warning order directing the developmentof COAs in response to the situation.The COA development phase shiftsemphasis to the supported combatantcommander, who develops andsubmits recommended COAs to theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffand the NCA. The combatantcommander includes the COAs in thecommander’s estimate, an abbreviatedversion of the type of information in thecommander’s estimate prepared duringthe concept development phase ofdeliberate planning.

• Phase III technically begins when theNCA decide to develop possible militarysolutions to the crisis. The militaryresponse may be only one of many

available options open to the NCA. Infact, the initial reluctance to use militaryforces may substantially alter the situationand thus limit the available militaryoptions when a decision to use militaryforce is finally made.

• Actions Taken During COADevelopment

•• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff publishes a warning order to giveinitial guidance to the JPEC and requeststhat the combatant commander respondwith a recommended COA to meet thesituation.

•• The supported commander developsCOAs; this involves the subordinate and

Figure IV-4. Crisis Action Planning Phase III

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PHASE III

Course of Action (COA) Development

Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff

Warning Order


Warning Order

Commander'sEstimate

Commander'sEstimate

Joint task force establishmentCOAs developed and evaluatedJoint Operation Planning and Execution Systemdatabase established

Joint task force establishmentCOAs developed and evaluatedJoint Operation Planning and Execution Systemdatabase established

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supporting commanders. With theevaluation request message, thecombatant commander assigns thosecommands the task of identifying theforces and resources for the COAs beingconsidered. If time and securityconsiderations permit, subordinateevaluation of tentative COAs is valuable.Existing OPLANs and CONPLANs mayprove useful in the rapid development ofthe COAs. The databases that outlinethe flow of forces and sustainment canbe made available to the JPEC by thesupported commander.

•• The subordinate and supportingcommanders respond to the combatantcommander with an evaluation responsemessage. Alternative COAs areevaluated and forces are identified tosupport the operation. Existing plans inthe JOPES database can be used. A forcelist for this operation can be created inthe JOPES database. Sustainmentplanning begins with coordinationbetween the Service headquarters andthe theater components. To that end,COA development should also addressthe availability of logistic support andthe physical infrastructure, includingHNS and inter-Service support

agreement in the operational area. TheServices monitor deployment planningand force readiness.

•• Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOMreviews the proposed COAs forsupportability and prepares deploymentestimates for each COA to send to thesupported commander. As time permits,and as directed by the supportedcommander, JOPES data are used todevelop a preliminary force deploymentestimate and closure profile.

• Exchange of Reports During Phase III.Several orders or messages may bepublished during this phase. Followingthe decision of the NCA to plan a militaryresponse, the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff normally authorizes therelease of a warning order. If it containsforce deployment preparation ordeployment orders, SecDef approval isrequired. The warning order is equatedto a planning directive in the deliberateplanning process; an example isillustrated in CJCSM 3122.01, JointOperation Planning and ExecutionSystem Vol I: (Planning, Policies, andProcedures), Enclosure I. This messageshould:

During Phase III, the focus of CAP shifts to the supported combatant commander.

IV-13


•• Describe the situation;

•• Establish command relationships;

•• State mission, objectives, andassumptions;

•• Refer to applicable OPLANs andCONPLANs;

•• Allocate forces and transportationassets or request that the combatantc o m m a n d e r i d e n t i f y r e s o u r c erequirements;

•• Establish a tentative unnamed day onwhich a deployment operation begins(C-day) and the specific hour on C-dayat which a deployment operationcommences or is to commence (L-hour)or solicit the combatant commander’srecommendation;

•• Identify the anticipated unnamed dayon which operations commence or arescheduled to commence (D-day) forplanning purposes; and

•• Discuss guidance for administrative,logistic, public affairs, civil affairs, andcommand, control, and communicationssubjects.

• The warning order will stipulate that thecombatant commander develop COAsfor review and approval by the NCA. Ina quickly evolving crisis, the initialwarning order could be communicatedby a telephone conference with a follow-on record copy to ensure that the JPECis kept advised. Messages referring tothis initial order transmit additionalinformation and guidance. The ordermay also discuss and focus thecombatant commander’s attentiontoward COAs that have already beenidentified or considered by the JCSand NCA. However, the combatant

commander has flexibility and authorityto determine how to carry out theassigned tasks. If the NCA have alreadyselected a COA, they may issuedirection to begin execution planning(Phase V).

• The basic OPREP-1 describes the formatsof four messages exchanged in thisphase: commander’s evaluation request,subo rd ina t e and /o r suppor t i ngcommanders’ evaluation response,USTRANSCOM’s deployment estimate,and the commander’s estimate. Therecommended format is flexible; listedsections can be omitted or otherparagraphs can be added to meet thesituation.

• If time permits, the combatant commanderissues a commander’s evaluation requestin OPREP-1 format to subordinate andsupport ing commanders . Thiscommunicates necessary planningguidance and assigns to members of theJPEC the task of evaluating the proposedCOA, submitting force and supportrequirements, or supporting thecombatant commander’s recommendedCOA. This communication includes thefollowing:

•• Operation description — citesreference;

•• Narrative — describes mission task,situation, factors affecting possibleCOAs, adversary capabilities, concept ofoperations, operational constraints;

•• Objective — amplifies guidance fordeveloping COA evaluations;

•• Remarks — describe the OPLAN file usedand its location in the JOPES database.

• The subordinate and supportingcommanders reply with a component’s

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COA evaluation response message. Theformat is similar to the OPREP-1 reportsalready discussed: description, narrative,objective, and remarks.

• In addit ion, i f t ime permits ,USTRANSCOM sends the preliminarydeployment estimate to the supportedcommander. It is in OPREP-1 format andmay include the following:

•• Operation description;

•• Narrative — description of the closureestimate in days or hours for each COA;

•• Remarks — identification of planningfactors used in the simulation.

• The final product of Phase III is thecommander’s estimate prepared by thecombatant commander. Its purpose isto give the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff information for theNCA to consider in their selection of amilitary COA. It is the commander’sanalysis of the COAs that wereconsidered. Message content variesdepending on the situation, butessentially it is an abbreviation of thecombatant commander’s total staff workand may have been developed in a matterof hours. The format is located inCJCSM 3122.01, Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System Vol I:(Planning, Policies, and Procedures),Enclosure J; it should contain thefollowing:

•• Operation description — citereferences, description of militaryoperations;

•• Narrative — five paragraphsdescribed in CJCSM 3122.01, JointOperation Planning and ExecutionSystem Vol I: (Planning, Policies, andProcedures): mission, situation and

COAs, analysis of opposing COAs(adversary capabilities), comparison ofown COAs, and recommendation;

•• Objective — identify operationalobjective, object of reporting theinformation;

•• Remarks — planning factors, filewithin JOPES where force list may befound, etc.

• ADP Support. The time available to thecombatant commander is a most criticalresource during Phase III. Large volumesof planning data must be transferredaccurately and rapidly among JPECparticipants. The GCCS and the JOPESdeployment database maintained by theJoint Staff are the primary means forexchanging detailed planning information.The planning tasks to develop tentativeCOAs, evaluate the adequacy of eachCOA, create force lists and supportpackages, estimate transportationfeasibility of each COA, and begin toprepare deployment estimates for therecommended COA, require much time.Fortunately, there is ADP support to helpthe crisis action planner take advantageof previous planning efforts that arealready in the JOPES database, or torapidly develop a plan from scratch.

•• Develop Tentative COAs. Anexisting OPLAN may have beendeveloped that can be modified to fit thesituation. An existing CONPLAN maybe available that can be fully developedbeyond the stage of an approved conceptof operations. Both of these formats arestored in the JOPES database and areavailable for planner review. Forsituations that have not been consideredby prior planning, a no operation planavailable or prepared (NOPLAN)situation is said to exist; timely creationof a concept of operations and the time-

IV-15


phasing of forces and support arerequired.

•• Determine Adequacy of EachProposed COA. An objective,comprehensive evaluation of proposedCOAs is difficult even without timeconstraints. See previous discussion inChapter III, “Deliberate Campaign PlanDevelopment,” on methods to evaluateCOAs. Some combatant commands aredeveloping computer simulations toassist in measuring sensitivity of COAsto key parameters.

•• Develop Force Lists and SupportPackages. Using the force modules inJOPES, the planner can rapidly build aneffective combat force, add supportforces, and calculate sustainment. Usingforce modules from current OPLANsreduces the planning time, because theseforce modules are already “sourced” with

actual Army and Air Force units and someSea Service units.

•• Prepare Deployment Estimates.The USTRANSCOM components beginto build the deployment estimates frominformation exchanged through theGCCS. USTRANSCOM integrates thedeployment estimates and furnishes aconsolidated deployment estimate to theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff andthe combatant commander via GCCS andOPREP-1 message.

• Conclusion of Phase III. COAdevelopment concludes with the releaseof the combatant commander’s estimate.Emphasis once again shifts to theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffand the NCA for the selection of a COA.

e. Phase IV — Course of ActionSelection (see Figure IV-5).

Figure IV-5. Crisis Action Planning Phase IV

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PHASE IV

Course of Action (COA) Selection

CJCS Alert orPlanning OrderCJCS Alert or

Planning Order

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(CJCS) presents refined and/or prioritizedCOAs to the National CommandAuthorities (NCA)

NCA select COA

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(CJCS) presents refined and/or prioritizedCOAs to the National CommandAuthorities (NCA)

NCA select COA

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• General. In this phase the Chairman, inconsultation with the other members ofthe JCS, reviews and analyzes thecommander’s estimate and deploymentestimates and, ultimately, presents COAsin order of priority to the NCA for theirdecision.

• Phase IV of CAP begins when therecommended COAs are presented to theNCA. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff has received the commander’sestimate from the combatant commander.The Joint Staff has evaluated therecommendation; the COAs may havebeen refined or revised, or new COAsmay have been developed in light of achanging situation. In fact, when thereis no clearly superior COA, a ranked listof recommendations may have to begiven to the NCA.

• Actions Taken During COA Selection.The focus of activity is with the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NCA.

•• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff serves as principal military advisorto the NCA, evaluating the COAsrecommended by the combatantcommander in consultation with the othermembers of the JCS. Depending on therecommendation to the NCA, theChairman may choose to issue guidanceto the combatant commander and theJPEC with a planning order; this is usedto speed up the execution planning anddoes not replace formal NCA approvalof a COA.

•• The NCA select a COA and direct thatexecution planning begin. On receipt ofan NCA decision, the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff issues an alert orderto the supported combatant commanderadvising the commander of the selectedCOA and reconfirmed termination criteria.

With the authority of the Secretary ofDefense, the Chairman may issue adeployment preparation order ordeployment order.

•• The combatant commander and theother members of the JPEC are continuingdeployment and employment planningwith the knowledge they have of thepending decision.

• Exchange of Reports During Phase IV.Depending on the situation, either of twocommunications may be exchanged inthis phase. The Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff issues the planning orderbefore the NCA make a decision. Theintent is to expedite execution planningand permit flexibility in responding tofast-breaking events as the crisisdevelops. It may be issued orally, byGCCS intercomputer message, or byDefense Message System (DMS) to thecombatant commander with copies to allmembers of the JPEC. It is conceivablethat the planning order could be thefirst record communication betweenthe Chairman and the JPEC on thecrisis. In this situation, vital planninginformation would be exchanged now.However, it is desirable to use thismessage merely to update CJCSguidance that has been given earlier. Thecontents of the planning order may varydepending on the situation, but it should:

•• Identify forces and resources forplanning;

•• Define the objective, tasks,constraints, and termination criteria;

•• Contain further planning guidance bythe JCS; and

•• Establish a deadline for submitting theOPORD.

IV-17


• CJCSM 3122.01, Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System Vol I:(Planning, Policies, and Procedures)outlines an example of a planning orderthat illustrates a standardized formatpatterned after the OPREP-1 message.The example includes a multi-sectionnarrative detailing situation, mission,details about the COA to be executed,resources allocated, and guidance foradministration, logistics, psychologicaloperations (PSYOP), public affairs, etc.

• On receiving the NCA decision on theCOA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff publishes an alert order. Theorder is a record communication thatthe NCA have approved the detaileddevelopment of a military solution tothe crisis. The contents of an alert ordermay vary, and sections may be deleted ifthe information has already beenpublished, but it should always containthe termination criteria established by theNCA. The contents are similar in formatto the planning order, except that theoperation description clearly states that

the message is an alert order, andexecution planning, based on theselected COA, has been authorized bythe Secretary of Defense.

• Conclusion of Phase IV. This phaseends with the NCA selection of a COAand the decision to begin executionplanning. The alert order promulgatesthat decision.

f. Phase V — Execution Planning (seeFigure IV-6).

• In the execution-planning phase, thesupported combatant commandertransforms the NCA-selected COA intoan OPORD. Phase V is similar infunction to the plan developmentphase of the deliberate planning process.In this phase, the necessary detailedplanning is performed to execute theapproved COA when directed by theNCA. The actual forces, sustainment,and strategic transportation resourcesare identified, and the concept ofoperations is described in OPORD format.

Figure IV-6. Crisis Action Planning Phase V

Combatant commander and/orcommander, joint task force operationorder developed

Time-phased force and deployment datarefined

Force preparation

Combatant commander and/orcommander, joint task force operationorder developed

Time-phased force and deployment datarefined

Force preparation

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PHASE V

Execution Planning

IV-18

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JP 5-00.1

• The NCA select the military COA thatwill be further developed. Executionplanning begins when the combatantcommander and members of the JPECreceive the planning order or the alertorder. The execution planning stageencompasses three major tasks: executionplanning, force preparation, anddeployability posture reporting.

•• Execution Planning. The OPORDis developed by modifying an existingOPLAN, expanding an existingCONPLAN, or developing an OPORDfrom scratch when a NOPLAN situationexists. Understandably, the speed ofcompletion is greatly affected by theamount of prior planning. JPEC actionsare the same whether an alert order orplanning order initiates executionplanning.

•• Force preparation focuses on theactual units designated to participatein the planned operation and theirreadiness for deployment. Thedeployability posture categories includethe status of troops and equipment, theunit availability to deploy, positioning ofunits on strategic lift, and the positioningof transportation support units atintermediate and debarkation ports, etc.The deployment posture is changed bySecDef direction.

•• Deployability Posture Reporting.After receiving the CJCS alert order,commanders issue situation reports toreport early attainment of, or deviationsfrom, a specified deployability posture.Newly identified forces report the timethat they anticipate attaining the directeddeployability posture.

• Emphasis during this phase,particularly during the task of executionplanning, rests with the combatantcommander and subordinate and

supporting commanders. They reviewthe planning or alert order to get the latestguidance on forces, timing, constraints,etc. In particular, the combatantcommander reevaluates the COAselected by the NCA in terms of thereconfirmed termination criteria. Theyupdate and adjust planning done in PhaseIII, “COA Development,” for any newforce and sustainment requirements andsource forces and lift resources. Allmembers of the JPEC act to identify andresolve shortfalls and limitations.

• The combatant commander shouldbring any shortfalls or operationallimitations to the attention of theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffand NCA before entering the nextphase. The Services and the combatantcommander’s component commandersare sourcing the forces identified forplanning. Planning concentrates on theearliest deploying units. Executionplanning results in the preparation ofthe OPORD by the combatantcommander. The subordinate andsupporting commanders preparesupporting OPORDs.

• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff monitors the development of thecombatant commander’s OPORD inJOPES and resolves shortfalls that arepresented. The Chairman also reviewsthe final product for adequacy andfeasibility and gives military advice to theNCA on the status of the situation.

• USTRANSCOM furnishes effective air,land, and sea transportation to supportthe approved COA or OPORD byapplying transportation assets againstthe transportation requirementsidentified by the supported commander.Air and sea channels for movement ofnon-unit sustainment and personnel areestablished, and schedules for air and

IV-19


sea are created. Concentration is on theinitial increment of movements, i.e., 7 daysby air- and 30 days by sea-lift.

• Exchange of Reports During Phase V.The planning and/or alert order is sent tothe combatant commander as actionaddressee and also forwarded tosubordinate commanders for theirplanning guidance. In addition, twoimportant communications are exchangedin this phase.

•• The supported commander publishesa TPFDD letter of instruction (LOI) thatfurnishes procedures for deployment,replacement, and redeployment of forces.The LOI gives instructions and directionto the components, supportingcommands, and other members of theJPEC concerning lift allocation, reportingand validation requirements, andmanagement of TPFDD data in general.

CJCSM 3122.02A, Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment DataDevelopment and Deployment Execution,Volume III, contains details on preparinga TPFDD LOI.

•• The OPORD is the product of theexecution-planning phase. Thesupported commander’s OPORD ispublished with a major force list,instructions for the conduct ofoperations in the objective area, and thelogistic and administrative plans forsupport of the operation. All members ofthe JPEC enter movement data andschedules into the JOPES database foraccess. Subordinate and supportingcommands develop supporting OPORDsas required by the combatant commander.They transmit copies of their completedOPORDs to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff to review for adequacyand feasibility. If an OPORD is contraryto the guidance contained in the CJCSalert order, or if circumstances changerequiring an adjustment in the OPORD,the Chairman informs the combatantcommander of the differences.

• ADP Support. GCCS and JOPES ADPtake on greater significance during thisphase of the crisis. JPEC participantscontinue to use GCCS for communicatingamong themselves; GCCS allows rapid,accurate, and secure data transfer and

USTRANSCOM furnishes effective air, land, and sea transportationto support the approved COA.

IV-20

Chapter IV

JP 5-00.1

offers access for file updating. The JPECuses JOPES procedures and guidancefurnished in the TPFDD LOI to build andrefine the TPFDD. When planningparticipants do not have access to theJOPES computer files, they can use securevoice systems, SECRET Internet ProtocolR o u t e r N e t w o r k , o r D M Scommunications to exchange essentialforce and deployment data.

• Conclusion of Phase V. The phase endswhen the NCA decide to execute theOPORD, place it on hold, or cancel itpending resolution by some other means.

• Phase Timing. The procedures in thepreceding discussion have beendescribed as occurring sequentially.During a crisis they may, in fact, beconducted concurrently or eveneliminated, depending on prevailingconditions. For example, the combatantcommander’s assessment in Phase I mayserve as the recommended COA in thecommander’s estimate that is normallydeveloped in Phase III. In somesituations, no formal CJCS warning orderis issued, and the first recordcommunication that the supportedcombatant commander receives is theCJCS planning order or alert ordercontaining the COA to be used forexecution planning. It is also possiblethat an NCA decision to commit forcesmay be made shortly after an eventoccurs, thereby significantlycompressing Phases II through V. Nodefinitive length of time can be associatedwith any particular phase. Severe timeconstraints may require crisisparticipants to pass information orally,including the decision to commit forces.In actual practice, much coordination isdone over secure telephone throughoutthe JPEC during the entire CAP process.

g. Phase VI — Execution (see Figure IV-7).

• The execution phase starts with the NCAdecision to choose the military option torespond to the crisis and execute theOPORD. The Secretary of Defense willauthorize the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff to issue an execute order thatdirects the supported combatantcommander to carry out the OPORD. Thecommander then executes the OPORDand directs subordinate and supportingcommanders to execute their supportingOPORDs.

• Execute Order. The execute order is arecord communication that mayinclude further guidance, instructions,or amplifying orders. Duringexecution, the supported and supportingcommanders, Services, and defenseagencies update information in theJOPES deployment database.USTRANSCOM monitors andcoordinates the deployment per thesupported commander’s force andsustainment priorities. Members of theJPEC report movement of forces in thedeployment database.

• Actions Taken During the ExecutionPhase. During the execution phase,changes to the original plan may benecessary because of tactical andintelligence considerations, force andnon-unit cargo availability, availabilityof strategic lift assets, and port ofembarkation and port of debarkation(POD) capabilities. Therefore, ongoingrefinement and adjustment of deploymentrequirements and schedules and closecoordination and monitoring ofdeployment activities are required. TheJOPES deployment database containsthe following information, at a minimum,at the time of OPORD execution.

IV-21


•• Sourced combat, combat support, andcombat service support requirements forassigned and augmentation forces.

•• Integrated critical resupplyrequirements identified by supplycategory, POD, and latest arrival date atPOD.

•• Integrated non-unit personnel fillerand casualty replacements by numbersand day.

• Practical considerations require thatplanning concentrate on the first 7 daysof air movement and the first 30 days ofsurface movement. Major changes todeployment plans with effective datesmore than about 7 days or so in the futurewill have very little impact on the

scheduling process; however, changeswith effective dates of 7 days or less mayadversely affect the timely developmentof the airlift flow schedule. Addingrequirements within those managementwindows may cause delays in otherscheduled movements.

•• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff publishes the CJCS execute orderthat defines D-day and the resourceallocation and directs execution of theOPORD. Throughout execution, the staffmoni tors movements , assessesachievement of tasks, and resolvesshortfalls as necessary. The Chairmanshould monitor the situation for potentialchanges in the applicability of currenttermination criteria and communicatethem to all concerned parties.

Figure IV-7. Crisis Action Planning Phase VI

CombatantCommander

Combatant commander and/orcommander, joint task force executeoperation order

Begin redeployment planningCrisis resolved and/or redeploy forces


CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PHASE VI

Execution

IV-22

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JP 5-00.1

•• The combatant commander executesthe order and transmits his or her ownguidance to subordinates and supportingcommanders. The combatant commanderalso monitors, assesses, and reportsachievement of objectives; ensures thatdata are updated in the JOPES database;and re-plans, re-deploys, or terminatesoperations as necessary, in compliancewith NCA-directed termination criteria.

•• The subordinate and supportingcommanders execute their combatantcommander-di rec ted OPORDs,revalidate the sourcing and schedulingof units, report movement of organic lift,and report deployment movements on theJOPES database. These commandersconduct the operation as directed andfulfill their responsibilities to sustain theirService forces in the combat theater.USTRANSCOM components validatetransportation movement planned for thefirst increment, adjust deployment flowand reschedule as required, and continueto develop transportation schedules forsubsequent increments. Both statuses ofmovements and future movementschedules are entered in the JOPESdatabase.

• Exchange of Reports During Phase VI.Two communications are exchanged inthis phase: (1) the CJCS execute order,addressed to the supported combatantcommander with copies to the othermembers of the JPEC; and (2) thecommander’s execute order, addressedto subordinates and supportingcommanders.

• The CJCS execute order is theauthorization by the NCA to executethe military operation, i.e., the NCA-selected COA detailed in the supportedcombatant commander’s OPORD.Ideally, the execution will follow theprocedures outlined in the preceding

phases of CAP. Information will havebeen exchanged in OPREP-1 supportedcombatant commander assessmentreports and estimates. Guidance willhave been received via the CJCS-published warning and planning orders,preparation will have been permittedusing the deployment preparation and/or deployment orders, and formal NCAdirection will have been received in theSecDef-authorized alert order. Followingthese procedures, the most currentguidance will have been given, periodicupdates will have been received, andmodifications reflecting changingconditions will have been issued asnecessary. This is the preferred exchangeof information.

• In a fast-developing crisis the CJCSexecute order may be the first recordcommunication generated by theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.The record communication may bepreceded by a voice announcement. Theissuance of the execute order is time-sensitive. The format may differdepending on the amount of previousrecord correspondence and applicabilityof prior guidance. Annex N to CJCSM3122.01, Joint Operation Planning andExecution System Vol I: (Planning,Policies, and Procedures) contains theformat for the CJCS execute order.Information already communicated in thewarning, planning, or alert orders is notrepeated. Under these conditions, theexecute order need only contain theauthority to execute the operation andany additional essential guidance, suchas the date and time for execution. Thebroad outline of information that hasalready passed to the JPEC in thepreceding warning, planning, or alertorders includes the following:

•• Authority;

IV-23


•• Situation;

•• Mission — a refined statement of tasksand purpose;

•• Execution — COA, allocation ofcombat forces, coordinating instructions,C-day and D-day, expected duration,PSYOP guidance, deployability status,operations security, deception guidance,etc;

•• Administration and logistics —allocation of strategic lift, load planning,logistics factors, public affairs guidance,etc;

•• Command and signal —communications guidance, commandrelationships, and signal.

• The supported combatant commander’sexecute order follows the receipt of theCJCS message. It may give the detailed

The supported commander’s execute order follows the receiptof the CJCS message.

planning guidance resulting from updatedor amplifying orders, instructions, orguidance that the CJCS execute orderdoes not cover.

The recommended format for thisexecute order to subordinates andsupporting commanders is in CJCSM3122.01, Joint Operation Planning andExecution System Vol I: (Planning,Policies, and Procedures).

• ADP Support. During execution therapid exchange of information isnecessary to allow a timely response tochanging situations. GCCS permitscommunication of deployment schedulesand rapid information update, and givesthe JPEC the ability to monitor and reportresource movement.

• Conclusion of Phase VI. The executionphase continues until the operation iscompleted or canceled.

IV-24

Chapter IV

JP 5-00.1

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX AFLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS

A-1

1. General

FDOs are intended to facilitate earlydecision by laying out a wide range ofinterrelated response paths that begin withdeterrent-oriented options carefullytailored to send the right signal during acrisis. These options should include limitedmilitary forces and preplanned requests foreconomic, political, and informational actionsgauged to particular military actions. FDOsuse all instruments of national power toinfluence another nations’ actions.

2. Description of DeterrentActions

Deterrence can be described as theprevention of action by fear of theconsequences. As such, FDOs aredeterrent-oriented response options that arerequested and may be initiated based onevaluation of indicators of heightened regionaltensions. FDOs serve two basic purposes.First, they assist in bringing an issue toearly resolution before armed conflict bysending an appropriate message tobelligerent parties. Second, they positionUS forces in a manner that facilitatesimplementation of campaign plans in theevent that hostilities are unavoidable. Theyalso facilitate an early decision by laying outa wide range of interrelated response pathsthat are carefully tailored to avoid the classicresponse of too much, too soon, or too little,too late. They are initiated before and afterunambiguous warning. Although they are

“Efforts to deter an adversary — be it an aggressor nation, terrorist group orcriminal organization — can become the leading edge of crisis response . . .Deterrence in crisis generally involves demonstrating the United States’commitment to a particular country or interest by enhancing our warfightingcapability in the theater.”

A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, December 2000

intended to not place US forces in jeopardy ifdeterrence fails, it goes without saying thatrisk analysis should be an inherent step indetermining which FDO to use, and how andwhen that FDO should be used. FDOs havethe advantage of rapid de-escalation if thesituation precipitating the FDO changes.Implementation of a particular FDO isdirected by the NCA and there are no hardand fast rules regarding implementationindicators. The use of FDOs is consistentwith US national security strategy, i.e., theinstruments of national power are normallyused in combination with one another. Theycan be used individually, in packages,sequentially, or concurrently. FDOs areprimarily designed to be used in groupsthat maximize integrated results from allthe political, informational, economic, andmilitary instruments of national power. Itis imperative that extensive, continuouscoordination occurs with interagency andmultinational partners in order to maximizethe impact of FDOs.

3. Value of FDOs and TheirObjectives

a. The value of an FDO is subjectivelymeasured by its ability to influence events,especially adversary decisionmaking, and toprepare for future operations shouldadversaries remain undeterred. Keyobjectives are as follows:

• Deter aggression through communicationof strength of US commitment to treaty

A-2

Appendix A

JP 5-00.1

obligations and peace and stability in thecombatant commander’s AOR.

• Confront the adversary withunacceptable costs of their possibleaggression.

• Isolate the adversary from regionalneighbors and attempt to split theadversary coalition.

• Rapidly improve the military balanceof power in the AOR, especially in termsof early warning, intelligence gathering,logistic infrastructure, air and maritimeforces, PSYOP, and force protectionassets without precipitating armedresponse from the adversary.

b. FDOs underscore the importance ofearly response to a crisis. Military FDOs areintended to be used in concert with political,economic, and informational options to givethe NCA a wide array of deterrent optionsintegrating all instruments of national power.All regional OPLANs have FDOs, andcombatant commanders are tasked by theJSCP to plan requests for appropriatepolitical, economic, and informationaloptions. Examples of FDOs from all fourinstruments of national power are listed at theend of this appendix in Figures A-1 throughA-4.

Increasing exercise activities is one example of a military flexible deterrentoption available to a combatant commander.

A-3

Flexible Deterrent Options

Figure A-1. Examples of Requested Political Flexible Deterrent Options

Figure A-2. Examples of Requested Informational Flexible Deterrent Options

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JP 5-00.1

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APPENDIX BLINES OF OPERATIONS

B-1

1. Lines of Operations.

Lines of operations define the directionalorientation of the joint force in time and spacein relation to the adversary. They connectthe force with its base of operations and itsobjectives. In geographic terms, lines ofoperations connect a series of decisive pointsthat lead ultimately to control of the objectiveor defeat of an adversary force.

a. A campaign or major operation mayhave single or multiple lines of operations.A single line of operations has the advantageof concentrating forces and simplifyingplanning. Multiple lines of operations, on theother hand, increase flexibility and createopportunities for success. Multiple lines ofoperations also make it difficult for anopponent to determine the objectives of thecampaign or major operation, forcing theadversary to disperse resources to defendagainst multiple threats. The decision tooperate on multiple lines will depend to a greatextent on the availability of resources.

b. Lines of operations may be eitherinterior or exterior. In campaign planning,the relevance of interior and exterior linesdepends on the relationship of time anddistance between the opposing forces.Although an adversary force may have interiorlines with respect to the friendly force, thatadvantage disappears if the friendly force ismore agile and operates at a higher operational

“If the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisive point of thetheater of operations the greatest possible force, the choice of lines ofoperations (as the primary means of attaining this end) may be regarded asfundamental in devision a good plan for a campaign.”

Lieutenant General Antoine-Henri Baron de JominiSummary of the Art of War, 1838

tempo. Conversely, if a smaller forcemaneuvers to a position between larger butless agile adversary forces, the friendly forcemay be able to defeat them in detail beforethey can react effectively.

2. Operational Reach.

The concept of operational reach, definedas the distance and duration across which aunit can successfully employ militarycapabilities, is inexorably tied to the conceptof lines of operations (see Figure B-1). Thegeography surrounding and separating theopponents influences reach. Locating forces,reserves, bases, pre-positioned equipmentsets, and logistics forward extends operationalreach. Additionally, it is also affected byincreasing the range of weapons, and byimproving transportation availability and theeffectiveness of LOCs and throughputcapability. Some combat capabilities, such asspace and information operations, are notnecessarily limited by operational reach.Nevertheless, for any given campaign ormajor operation, there is a finite rangebeyond which predominant elements of thejoint force can not prudently operate ormaintain effective operations.

3. Basing Considerations.

a. Basing in the broadest sense is anindispensable part of operational art, since itis tied to the concept of lines of operations

B-2

Appendix B

JP 5-00.1

and directly affects operational reach. It alsodirectly influences the combat power that thejoint force is capable of generating becauseof its impact on such critical factors as sortieor resupply rates. In particular, thearrangement and successive positioning ofadvanced bases (often in austere, rapidlyemplaced configurations) underwrites theprogressive ability of the joint force to shieldits components from adversary action anddeliver symmetric and asymmetric blows withever increasing power and ferocity.

b. Basing is often directly affected bypolitical and diplomatic considerations and,

considerations interact. US force basingoptions span the spectrum from permanentlybased forces to temporary sea basing duringcrisis response in littoral areas of instability.Bases (including the flexible and responsivecapability of sea basing) are typically selectedto be within operational reach of the opponent.To that end, theater assessments mustdetermine whether sufficient infrastructureis in place or can be fabricated to support theoperational and sustaining requirements ofdeployed forces, and where they can beassured of some degree of security fromadversary attacks. Determining where tolocate bases poses certain challenges forcampaign planners. Recognizing the criticalrole basing plays during force projection,

OPERATIONAL REACH

Operational reach is the distance and durationacross which a unit can successfully employmilitary capabilities.

Improves transportationavailability andeffectiveness of lines ofcommunications

Improves transportationavailability andeffectiveness of lines ofcommunications

Increased range ofweapons systemsIncreased range ofweapons systems

TARGETOBJECTIVE

TARGETOBJECTIVE

FORWARDBASE

FORWARDBASE

MAINBASEMAINBASE

Figure B-1. Operational Reach

as such, can become a critical junction wherestrategic, operational, and tactical

B-3

Lines of Operation

potential opponents may try to developstrategies designed to prevent the build upand sustainment of forces in theater, a so-called “anti-access strategy.” The campaign

planner must determine how to mitigate theefforts of the opponent to deny access to thetheater and its infrastructure.

Access to the theater infrastructure must be addressed in campaign plans.

B-4

Appendix B

JP 5-00.1

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX CTHEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN FORMAT

C-1

NOTE: JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, pages I-10 to I-20 and II-18 toII-21, describe how campaign logic and principles fit into OPLAN format and the JOPESprocess. CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I:(Planning, Policies, and Procedures), further explains the process including models ofplanning messages and estimates, and CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning andExecution System Vol II: (Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance), provides theformats for OPLANs and CONPLANs.

Key Aspects of a Campaign Plan

Clear, concise articulation of key aspects of a campaign plan is essential toensure that all applicable parties are aware of needed information. The followingformat may be useful for briefing the campaign plan to selected individuals.

• Mission

• Strategic and military end states

• Assumptions

• Friendly strategic and operational COGs

• Friendly vulnerabilities

• Adversary strategic and operational COGs

• Adversary capabilities and COAs

• Strategic concept (tasks and objectives by phase)

• Component tasks by phase

• Theater geographic organization

• Command relationships

• Sustainment concept

• Issues for the NCA

C-2

Appendix C

JP 5-00.1

Copy No. ______________________

Issuing Headquarters

Place of Issue

Effective Date/Time Group

THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN: (Number or Code Name)

USXXXXCOM OPERATIONS TO . . .

( ) References: (List any maps, charts, and other relevant documents deemed essential tocomprehension of the plan).

1. ( ) Situation. (This section briefly describes the composite conditions, circumstances,and influences of the theater strategic situation that the plan addresses (see national intelligenceestimate, any allied sources, and strategic and commanders’ estimates)).

a. ( ) General. (This section describes the general politico-military environment thatwould establish the probable preconditions for execution of the campaign plan. It shouldsummarize the competing political goals that could lead to conflict. Identify primary antagonists.State US policy goals and the estimated goals of other parties. Outline political decisionsneeded from other countries to achieve US policy goals and conduct effective US militaryoperations to attain US military objectives. Specific items can be listed separately for clarity asdepicted below.)

(1) ( ) Environment of Conflict. (Provides a summary of the national and/ormultinational strategic context (JSCP, UCP).)

(2) ( ) Policy Goals. (This section relates the strategic guidance, end state, andtermination objectives to the theater situation and requirements in its global, regional, and spacedimensions, interests, intentions/criteria for termination.)

(a) ( ) US/Multinational Policy Goals. (Identifies the national security,multinational or military objectives and strategic tasks assigned to or coordinated by the combatantcommand.)

(b) ( ) Desired End State. (Describe the desired strategic end state and relatethe military end state to the strategic end state.)

(3) ( ) Non-US National Political Decisions.

(4) ( ) Constraints/Restraints/Limitations. (List actions that are prohibited orrequired by higher or multinational authority (ROE, law of armed conflict, termination criteria,etc.))

b. ( ) Area of Concern.

C-3

Theater Campaign Plan Format

(1) ( ) Area of Responsibility. (Describe the combatant commander’s area ofresponsibility. A map may be used as an attachment to graphically depict the area.)

(2) ( ) Area of Interest. (Describe the general area of interest covered by thecombatant commander’s Strategic Concept and/or Basic Plan. This description should addressall air, ground, and sea areas that directly affect the campaign.)

(3) ( ) Joint Operations Area. (Describe the specific areas covered in each optioncontained in the combatant commander’s Strategic or basic plan. Maps or overlays may beincluded as an attachment.)

c. ( ) Deterrent Options. (Delineate FDOs desired to include those categories specifiedin the current JSCP. Specific units and resources must be prioritized in terms of LAD relative toC-day. Include possible diplomatic, informational, or economic deterrent options accomplishedby non-DOD agencies that would support US mission accomplishment.

See Appendix C for examples of FDOs.

d. ( ) Risk.

e. ( ) Adversary Forces. (Identify the opposing forces expected upon execution andappraise their general capabilities. Refer readers to Annex B (Intelligence) for details. However,this section should provide the information essential to a clear understanding of the magnitudeof the hostile threat. In a campaign plan, it is imperative to identify the adversary’s strategic andoperational centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities as depicted below.)

(1) Centers of Gravity.

(a) Strategic.

(b) Operational.

(2) Adversary strategic and operational critical vulnerabilities.

(3) Adversary Courses of Action.

(a) General.

(b) Adversary’s Desired End State.

(c) Adversary’s Strategic Objectives.

(d) Adversary’s Operational Objectives.

(e) Adversary Concept of Operations.

(4) Adversary Logistics and Sustainment.

C-4

Appendix C

JP 5-00.1

(5) Other Adversary Forces/Capabilities.

(6) Adversary Reserve Mobilization.

f. Friendly Forces.

(1) Centers of Gravity. (This section should identify friendly centers of gravity, bothstrategic and operational; this provides focus to force protection efforts.)

(a) Strategic.

(b) Operational.

(2) Multinational Forces.

(3) Supporting Commands and Agencies. (Describe the operations of unassignedforces, other than those tasked to support this campaign plan, that could have a direct andsignificant influence on the operations in the campaign plan. Also list the specific tasks offriendly forces, commands, or government agencies that would directly support execution ofthe campaign plan. For example, USTRANSCOM, USSPACECOM, Defense IntelligenceAgency, and so forth.)

g. Assumptions. (List all reasonable assumptions for all participants contained in theJSCP or other tasking on which the campaign plan is based. State expected conditions overwhich the combatant commander has no control. Include assumptions that are directly relevantto the development of the plan and supporting plans, and assumptions to the plan as a whole.Include both specified and implied assumptions that, if they do not occur as expected, wouldinvalidate the plan or its concept of operations. Specify the mobility (air and sea lift), the degreeof mobilization assumed, i.e., total, full, partial, selective, or none.)

(1) ( ) Threat Warning/Timeline.

(2) ( ) Pre-positioning and Regional Access.

(a) ( ) International Support and Assistance.

(3) ( ) In-Place Forces.

(4) ( ) Strategic Assumptions.

(a) ( ) Nuclear Weapons Employment.

(5) ( ) Legal Considerations. (List those significant legal considerations on whichthe campaign plan is based.)

(a) ( ) International Law.

C-5


(b) ( ) US Domestic Law.

(c) ( ) Law of Armed Conflict.

2. ( ) Mission. (State concisely the key strategic task(s) the combatant commander has toaccomplish. This statement should address: who, what, when, where, and why. )

3. ( ) Execution. Annex C (Operations)

a. Concept of Operations. (The appropriate strategic concept(s) can be taken from thetheater strategy and developed into a strategic concept of operation for the theater campaignplan. The concept should be stated in terms of who, what, where and how. It also contains thecombatant commander’s strategic vision, intent and design in the strategic concept of operationfor force projection operations, including mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainmentand redeployment of all participating forces, activities and agencies.)

(1) ( ) Commander’s Intent. (This should describe the combatant commander’soverall intent, and intent by phase. It may also include how the posture of forces at the end statefacilitates transition to future operations. It may also include the combatant commander’sassessment of the adversary commander’s intent. The commander’s intent, though, is not asummary of the concept of the operations.)

(a) ( ) End State. (See Chapter II for details on determining the end state.)

(b) ( ) Campaign Objectives.

(2) ( ) General. (Base the concept of operations on the commander’s estimate ofthe situation. The estimate states how the commander plans to accomplish the mission, includingthe forces involved; the phasing of operations; the general nature and purpose of operations tobe conducted; and the interrelated or cross-Service support. The commander’s estimate shouldinclude a statement concerning the perceived need for Reserve force mobilization based onplan force deployment timing and Reserve force size requirements. The concept of operationsshould be sufficiently developed to include an estimate of the level and duration of conflict toprovide supporting and subordinate commanders a basis for preparing adequate supportingplans. To the extent possible, the campaign plan concept should incorporate the followingoperational concepts:

Combatant commander’s strategic intent and operational focus.

Orientation on the adversary’s strategic and operational centers of gravity.

Protection of friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity.

Phasing of operations, to include the commander’s intent for each phase.)

(a) Phase I:

C-6

Appendix C

JP 5-00.1

1. Combatant Commander’s Intent.

2. Timing.

3. Objectives.

4. Risk.

5. Execution.

6. Employment.

a. Land Forces.

b. Air Forces.

c. Naval Forces.

d. Marine Corps Forces.

e. Space Forces.

f. Special Operations Forces.

(a) Joint PSYOP task force (JPOTF).

7. Operational Fires

(b) Phases II (last). (Cite information as stated in subparagraph 3b above foreach subsequent phase based on expected sequencing, changes, or new opportunities.)

b. ( ) Tasks. (List the tasks assigned to each element of the supported and supportingcommands in separate subparagraphs. Each task should be a concise statement of a mission tobe performed either in future planning for the operation or on execution of the OPORD. Thetask assignment should encompass all key actions that subordinate and supporting elementsmust perform to fulfill the concept of operations, including operational and tactical deception. Ifthe actions cannot stand alone without exposing the deception, they must be published separatelyto receive special handling.)

COMUSARXXXX.

COMUSNAVXXXX.

COMUSMARXXXX.

COMUSXXXAF.

COMSOCXXXX.

C-7


Commander, JPOTF

c. ( ) Coordinating Instructions. (List instructions applicable to the entire commandor two or more elements of the command that are required for proper coordination of thecampaign’s phases. Explain terms pertaining to the timing of execution and deployments. )

4. ( ) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. ( ) Concept of Support. (This should provide broad guidance for the theater strategicsustainment concept for the campaign with information and instructions applicable to thecampaign broken down by phases. It should cover functional areas of logistics, personnelpolicies, and administration.)

b. ( ) Logistics. (This paragraph should address sustainment priorities and resources;base development and other civil engineering requirement; HNS; and inter-Serviceresponsibilities. Identify the priority and movement of major logistic items for each option andphase of the concept. Note: Logistic phases must complement the campaign’s operationalphases. Identify strategic and theater ports for resupply. Outline transportation policies, guidance,and procedures for all options and phases.)

c. ( ) General Guidance.

d. ( ) Personnel. (Identify detailed planning requirements and subordinate taskings.Assign tasks for establishing and operating joint personnel facilities, managing accurate andtimely personnel accountability and strength reporting, and making provisions for staffing them.Discuss the administrative management of participating personnel, the reconstitution of forces,command replacement and rotation policies, and required individual augmentation to commandheadquarters and other operational requirements.)

e. ( ) Public Affairs. Refer to Annex F.

f. ( ) Civil Affairs. Refer to Annex G.

g. ( ) Meteorological and Oceanographic Services. Refer to Annex H.

h. ( ) Geospatial Information and Services. Refer to Annex M.

i. ( ) Medical Services. Refer to Annex Q. (Identify planning requirements andsubordinate taskings for hospitalization and evacuation. Address critical medical supplies andresources. Assign tasks for establishing joint medical assumptions and include them in asubparagraph.)

5. ( ) COMMAND AND CONTROL

a. ( ) Command.

C-8

Appendix C

JP 5-00.1

(1) ( ) Command Relationships. (State the organizational structure expected toexist during campaign plan implementation. Indicate any changes to major command andcontrol organizations and the time of expected shift. Identify all command arrangementagreements and memorandums of understanding used and those that require development.)

(2) ( ) Command Posts. (List the designations and locations of each majorheadquarters involved in execution of the campaign. When headquarters are to be deployed orthe plan provides for the relocation of headquarters to an alternate command post, indicate thelocation and time of opening and closing each headquarters.)

(3) ( ) Succession to Command. (Designate in order of succession the commandersresponsible for assuming command of the operation in specific applicable circumstances.)

b. ( ) Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems. (Provide ageneral statement concerning the scope of C4 systems and procedures required to support thecampaign. Highlight any C4 systems or procedures requiring special emphasis.) Refer toAnnex K.

s/t/Rank/ServiceCommander in Chief

Annexes: As per CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II:(Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance)

A — Task OrganizationB — IntelligenceC — OperationsD — LogisticsE — PersonnelF — Public AffairsG — Civil AffairsH — Meteorological and Oceanographic OperationsJ — Command RelationshipsK — Command, Control, Communications, and Computer SystemsL — Environmental ConsiderationsM — Geospatial Information and ServicesN — Space OperationsP — Host-Nation SupportQ — Medical ServicesR — ReportsS — Special Technical OperationsT — Consequence ManagementU — Notional Campaign Plan Decision GuideV — Interagency CoordinationX — Execution ChecklistZ — Distribution

APPENDIX DREFERENCES

D -1

The development of JP 5-00.1 is based upon the following primary references.

1. DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.

2. JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.

3. JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

4. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

5. JP 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

6. JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation ofthe Battlespace.

7. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

8. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

9. JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.

10. JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I.

11. JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.

12. JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.

13. JP 3-56.1, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations.

14. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.

15. JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.

16. JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

17. JP 6-0, Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations.

18. CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies,and Procedures).

19. CJCSM 3122.02A, Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Developmentand Deployment Execution, Volume III.

D-2

Appendix D

JP 5-00.1

20. CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning andExecution Formats and Guidance).

21. Users Guide for Joint Operational Planning.

22. AFSC Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide.

23. AFDD 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Forces.

24. AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare.

25. AFDD 2-1.2, Strategic Attack.

26. FMFM 1-1, Campaigning.

27. FM 100-5, Operations.

28. FM 100-7, Decisive-Force: The Army in Theater Operations.

29. FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations.

30. MCDP 1-1, Strategy.

31. MCDP 5, Planning.

32. NDP 1, Naval Warfare.

APPENDIX EADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

E -1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100,116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should addresscontent (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is HQ Department of the Army (DAMO-SSP). TheJoint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operational Plans andJoint Force Development (J-7).

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CSA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-SSP//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDETD//

USCINCJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JW100//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and JointForce Development (J-7), JDETD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC20318-7000, with info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

E-2

Appendix E

JP 5-00.1

4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters listed below (initial contact) or the USJFCOM JWFC in the event that the jointpublication is not available from the Service.

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outsidethe combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified jointpublication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through thelocal embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, PO-FL,Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL1655 Woodson RoadAttn: Joint PublicationsSt. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Commander (Attn: Publications)814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321Albany, GA 31704-0321

Coast Guard: Commandant Coast Guard (G-OPD), US Coast Guard2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, DC 20593-0001

CommanderUSJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution)116 Lake View ParkwaySuffolk, VA 23435-2697

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, InformationSecurity Program.

GLOSSARYPART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

ADP automated data processingAOR area of responsibility

C2 command and controlC4 command, control, communications, and computersCAP crisis action planningCCIR commander’s critical information requirementC-day unnamed day on which a deployment operation beginsCINC combatant commanderCJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ManualCOA course of actionCOG center of gravityCONPLAN operation plan in concept formatCRITIC critical intelligence communication

D-day unnamed day on which operations commence or are scheduledto commence

DMS Defense Message System

FDO flexible deterrent optionFUNCPLAN functional plan

GCCS Global Command and Control System

HNS host-nation support

IADS integrated air defense system

J-2 Intelligence Directorate of a joint staffJ-5 Plans Directorate of a joint staffJ-7 Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint StaffJCS Joint Chiefs of StaffJFC joint force commanderJIPB joint intelligence preparation of the battlespaceJOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution SystemJP joint publicationJPEC Joint Planning and Execution CommunityJPOTF joint psychological operations task forceJSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities PlanJTF joint task force

LOC line of communicationsLOI letter of instruction

MOOTW military operations other than warMTW major theater war

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemicalNCA National Command AuthoritiesNMCC National Military Command CenterNMS national military strategyNOPLAN no operation plan available or preparedNSS national security strategy

OPLAN operation planOPORD operation orderOPREP operational report

PID plan identification numberPOD port of debarkationPSYOP psychological operations

ROE rules of engagement

SecDef Secretary of Defense

TLCF teleconference (WIN)TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data

UCP Unified Command PlanUSCENTCOM United States Central CommandUSG United States GovernmentUSSPACECOM United States Space CommandUSSTRATCOM United States Strategic CommandUSTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

GL-2

Glossary

JP 5-00.1

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-3

campaign. A series of related militaryoperations aimed at accomplishing astrategic or operational objective within agiven time and space. (JP 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of relatedmilitary operations aimed at accomplishinga strategic or operational objective within agiven time and space. (JP 1-02)

campaign planning. The process wherebycombatant commanders and subordinatejoint force commanders translate nationalor theater strategy into operational conceptsthrough the development of campaignplans. Campaign planning may beginduring deliberate planning when the actualthreat, national guidance, and availableresources become evident, but is normallynot completed until after the NationalCommand Authorities select the course ofaction during crisis action planning.Campaign planning is conducted whencontemplated military operations exceed thescope of a single major joint operation. Seealso campaign; campaign plan (JP 1-02)

centers of gravity. Those characteristics,capabilities, or sources of power from whicha military force derives its freedom of action,physical strength, or will to fight. Alsocalled COGs. (JP 1-02)

CINC’s Strategic Concept. Final documentproduced in step 5 of the conceptdevelopment phase of the deliberateplanning process. The CINC’s strategicconcept is used as the vehicle to distributethe CINC’s decision and planningguidance for accomplishing JointStrategic Capabilities Plan or otherChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(CJCS) taskings. CJCS approval of thestrategic concept becomes the basis ofthe plan for development into anoperation plan or operation plan in

concept format. Also called CSC. (JP1-02)

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement betweentwo or more nations for common action.(JP 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specifiedcommand with a broad continuing missionunder a single commander established andso designated by the President, through theSecretary of Defense and with the adviceand assistance of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. Combatant commandstypically have geographic or functionalresponsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority).Nontransferable command authorityestablished by title 10 (“Armed Forces”),United States Code, section 164, exercisedonly by commanders of unified or specifiedcombatant commands unless otherwisedirected by the President or the Secretaryof Defense. Combatant command(command authority) cannot be delegatedand is the authority of a combatantcommander to perform those functions ofcommand over assigned forces involvingorganizing and employing commands andforces, assigning tasks, designatingobjectives, and giving authoritativedirection over all aspects of militaryoperations, joint training, and logisticsnecessary to accomplish the missionsassigned to the command. Combatantcommand (command authority) should beexercised through the commanders ofsubordinate organizations. Normally thisauthority is exercised through subordinatejoint force commanders and Service and/orfunctional component commanders.Combatant command (command authority)provides full authority to organize andemploy commands and forces as thecombatant commander considers

GL-4

Glossary

JP 5-00.1

necessary to accomplish assignedmissions. Operational control is inherent incombatant command (command authority).Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander inchief of one of the unified or specifiedcombatant commands established by thePresident. See also combatant command.Also called CINC. (JP 1-02)

combined. Between two or more forces oragencies of two or more allies. (When allallies or services are not involved, theparticipating nations and services shall beidentified, e.g., combined navies.) See alsojoint. (JP 1-02)

command and control. The exercise ofauthority and direction by a properlydesignated commander over assigned andattached forces in the accomplishment ofthe mission. Command and controlfunctions are performed through anarrangement of personnel, equipment,communications, facilities, and proceduresemployed by a commander in planning,directing, coordinating, and controllingforces and operations in theaccomplishment of the mission. Also calledC2. (JP 1-02)

commander’s estimate of the situation. Alogical process of reasoning by which acommander considers all the circumstancesaffecting the military situation and arrivesat a decision as to a course of action to betaken in order to accomplish the mission.A commander’s estimate that considers amilitary situation so far in the future as torequire major assumptions is called acommander’s long-range estimate of thesituation. (JP 1-02)

commander’s intent. A concise expressionof the purpose of the operation and thedesired end state that serves as the initialimpetus for the planning process. It may

also include the commander’s assessmentof the adversary commander’s intent andan assessment of where and how much riskis acceptable during the operation. (Thisterm and its definition are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

concept plan. An operation plan in conceptformat. Also called CONPLAN. (JP 1-02)

contingency plan. A plan for majorcontingencies that can reasonably beanticipated in the principal geographicsubareas of the command. See also jointoperation planning. (JP 1-02)

course of action. 1. Any sequence ofactivities that an individual or unit mayfollow. 2. A possible plan open to anindividual or commander that wouldaccomplish, or is related to theaccomplishment of the mission. 3. Thescheme adopted to accomplish a job ormission. 4. A line of conduct in anengagement. 5. A product of the JointOperation Planning and Execution Systemconcept development phase. Also calledCOA. (JP 1-02)

course of action development. The phase ofthe Joint Operation Planning and ExecutionSystem within the crisis action planningprocess that provides for the developmentof military responses and includes, withinthe limits of the time allowed: establishingforce and sustainment requirements withactual units; evaluating force, logistic, andtransportation feasibility; identifying andr e s o l v i n g r e s o u r c e s h o r t f a l l s ;recommending resource allocations; andproducing a course of action via acommander’s estimate that contains aconcept of operations, employmentconcept, risk assessments, prioritizedcourses of action, and supporting databases. See also course of action; crisisaction planning. (JP 1-02)

GL-5

Glossary

crisis action planning. 1. The Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System processinvolving the time-sensitive developmentof joint operation plans and orders inresponse to an imminent crisis. Crisis actionplanning follows prescribed crisis actionprocedures to formulate and implement aneffective response within the time framepermitted by the crisis. 2. The time-sensitiveplanning for the deployment, employment,and sustainment of assigned and allocatedforces and resources that occurs inresponse to a situation that may result inactual military operations. Crisis actionplanners base their plan on thecircumstances that exist at the time planningoccurs. Also called CAP. See also JointOperation Planning and Execution System.(JP 1-02)

culminating point. The point at which a forceno longer has the capability to continue itsform of operations, offense or defense. a.In the offense, the point at which continuingthe attack is no longer possible and theforce must consider reverting to a defensiveposture or attempting an operational pause.b. In the defense, the point at whichcounteroffensive action is no longerpossible. (JP 1-02)

decisive point. A geographic place, specifickey event, critical system, or function thatallows commanders to gain a markedadvantage over an enemy and greatlyinfluence the outcome of an attack. (JP 1-02)

deliberate planning. 1. The Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System processinvolving the development of jointoperation plans for contingencies identifiedin joint strategic planning documents.Deliberate planning is accomplished inprescribed cycles that complement otherDepartment of Defense planning cycles inaccordance with the formally establishedJoint Strategic Planning System. 2. A

planning process for the deployment andemployment of apportioned forces andresources that occurs in response to ahypothetical situation. Deliberate plannersrely heavily on assumptions regarding thecircumstances that will exist when the planis executed. See also Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System. (Uponapproval of this publication, this term andits definition will modify the existing termand its definition and will be included in JP1-02.)

deterrent options. A course of action,developed on the best economic,diplomatic, political, and military judgment,designed to dissuade an adversary from acurrent course of action or contemplatedoperations. (In constructing an operationplan, a range of options should be presentedto effect deterrence. Each option requiringdeployment of forces should be a separateforce module.) (JP 1-02)

end state. The set of required conditions thatdefines achievement of the commander'sobjectives. (JP 1-02)

estimate. 1. An analysis of a foreign situation,development, or trend that identifies itsmajor elements, interprets the significance,and appraises the future possibilities andthe prospective results of the variousactions that might be taken. 2. An appraisalof the capabilities, vulnerabilities, andpotential courses of action of a foreignnation or combination of nations inconsequence of a specific national plan,policy, decision, or contemplated course ofaction. 3. An analysis of an actual orcontemplated clandestine operation inrelation to the situation in which it is orwould be conducted in order to identifyand appraise such factors as available andneeded assets and potential obstacles,accomplishments, and consequences. (JP1-02)

GL-6

Glossary

JP 5-00.1

execute order. 1. An order issued by theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by theauthority and at the direction of theSecretary of Defense, to implement aNational Command Authorities decision toinitiate military operations. 2. An order toinitiate military operations as directed. Alsocalled EXORD. (JP 1-02)

execution planning. The phase of the JointOperation Planning and Execution Systemcrisis action planning process that providesfor the translation of an approved courseof action into an executable plan of actionthrough the preparation of a completeoperation plan or operation order.Execution planning is detailed planning forthe commitment of specified forces andresources. During crisis action planning,an approved operation plan or otherNational Command Authorities-approvedcourse of action is adjusted, refined, andtranslated into an operation order.Execution planning can proceed on thebasis of prior deliberate planning, or it cantake place in the absence of prior planning.See also Joint Operation Planning andExecution System. Also called EP. (JP1-02)

final plan. A plan for which drafts have beencoordinated and approved and which hasbeen signed by or on behalf of a competentauthority. See also operation plan. (JP1-02)

functional plans. Plans involving the conductof military operations in a peacetime orpermissive environment developed bycombatant commanders to addressrequirements such as disaster relief, nationassistance, logistics, communications,surveillance, protection of US citizens,nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation,and continuity of operations, or similardiscrete tasks. They may be developed inresponse to the requirements of the JointStrategic Capabilities Plan, at the initiative

of the combatant commander (CINC), or astasked by the supported combatantcommander, Joint Staff, Service, or Defenseagency. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff review of CINC-initiated plans is notnormally required. (JP 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or militaryassistance rendered by a nation to foreignforces within its territory during peacetime,crises or emergencies, or war based onagreements mutually concluded betweennations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02)

information operations. Actions taken toaffect adversary information andinformation systems while defending one’sown information and information systems.Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

information warfare. Informationoperations conducted during time of crisisor conflict to achieve or promote specificobjectives over a specific adversary oradversaries. Also called IW. See alsoinformation operations; operation. (JP1-02)

initial draft plan. A plan which has beendrafted and coordinated by the originatingheadquarters, and is ready for externalcoordination with other militaryheadquarters. It cannot be directlyimplemented by the issuing commander,but it may form the basis for an operationorder issued by the commander in the eventof an emergency. See also final plan;operation plan. (JP 1-02)

interagency coordination. Within thecontext of Department of Defenseinvolvement, the coordination that occursbetween elements of the Department ofDefense and engaged US Governmentagencies, nongovernmental organizations,and regional and international organizationsfor the purpose of accomplishing anobjective. (JP 1-02)

GL-7

Glossary

interdiction. An action to divert, disrupt,delay, or destroy the enemy’s surfacemilitary potential before it can be usedeffectively against friendly forces. (JP1-02)

joint. Connotes activities, operations,organizations, etc., in which elements of twoor more Military Departments participate.(JP 1-02)

joint operation planning. Planning forcontingencies that can reasonably beanticipated in an area of responsibility orjoint operations area of the command.Planning activities exclusively associatedwith the preparation of operation plans,operation plans in concept format,campaign plans, and operation orders (otherthan the Single Integrated Operational Plan)for the conduct of military operations bythe combatant commanders in response torequirements established by the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint operationplanning is coordinated at the national levelto support Secretary of DefenseContingency Planning Guidance, strategicrequirements in the National MilitaryStrategy, and emerging crises. As such,joint operation planning includesmobilization planning, deploymentplanning, employment planning,sustainment planning, and redeploymentplanning procedures. Joint operationplanning is performed in accordance withformally established planning andexecution procedures. See also contingencyplan; execution planning; Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System. (JP 1-02)

Joint Operation Planning and ExecutionSystem. A system that provides thefoundation for conventional command andcontrol by national- and combatantcommand-level commanders and theirstaffs. It is designed to satisfy theirinformation needs in the conduct of jointplanning and operations. Joint Operation

Planning and Execution System (JOPES)includes joint operation planning policies,procedures, and reporting structuressupported by communications andautomated data processing systems. JOPESis used to monitor, plan, and executemobilization, deployment, employment,sustainment, and redeployment activitiesassociated with joint operations. Also calledJOPES. See also joint operation planning.(This term and its definition modify theexisting term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

joint planning and execution community.Those headquarters, commands, andagencies involved in the training,preparation, movement, reception,employment, support, and sustainment ofmilitary forces assigned or committed to atheater of operations or objective area. Itusually consists of the Joint Staff, Services,Service major commands (including theService wholesale logistics commands),unified commands (and their certain Servicecomponent commands), subunifiedcommands, transportation componentcommands, joint task forces (as applicable),Defense Logistics Agency, and otherDefense agencies (e.g., DefenseIntelligence Agency) as may be appropriateto a given scenario. Also called JPEC. (JP1-02)

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The JointStrategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) providesguidance to the combatant commanders andthe Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish taskand missions based on current militarycapabilities. It apportions resources tocombatant commanders, based on militarycapabilities resulting from completedprogram and budget actions andintelligence assessments. The JSCPprovides a coherent framework forcapabilities-based military advice providedto the National Command Authorities. Also

GL-8

Glossary

JP 5-00.1

called JSCP. See also combatantcommander; joint. (JP 1-02)

Joint Strategic Planning System. Theprimary means by which the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultationwith the other members of the Joint Chiefsof Staff and the combatant commanders,carries out the statutory responsibilities toassist the President and Secretary ofDefense in providing strategic direction tothe Armed Forces; prepares strategic plans;prepares and reviews contingency plans;advises the President and Secretary ofDefense on requirements, programs, andbudgets; and provides net assessment on thecapabilities of the Armed Forces of theUnited States and its allies as compared withthose of their potential adversaries. Alsocalled JSPS. (JP 1-02)

line of communications. A route, either land,water, and/or air, that connects an operatingmilitary force with a base of operations andalong which supplies and military forcesmove. Also called LOC. (JP 1-02)

lines of operations. Lines that define thedirectional orientation of the force in timeand space in relation to the enemy. Theyconnect the force with its base of operationsand its objectives. (JP 1-02)

major operation. A series of tactical actions(battles, engagements, strikes)conducted by various combat forces of asingle or several Services, coordinated intime and place, to accomplish operationaland, sometimes, strategic objectives in anoperational area. These actions areconducted simultaneously orsequentially in accordance with acommon plan and are controlled by asingle commander. (JP 1-02)

maneuver. 1. A movement to place ships,aircraft, or land forces in a position ofadvantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical

exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on theground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3.The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle,to cause it to perform desired movements.4. Employment of forces on the battlespacethrough movement in combination withfires to achieve a position of advantage inrespect to the enemy in order to accomplishthe mission. (JP 1-02)

military objective. A derived set of militaryactions to be taken to implement NationalCommand Authorities guidance in supportof national objectives. A military objectivedefines the results to be achieved by themilitary and assigns tasks to commanders.See also national objectives. (JP 1-02)

multinational operations. A collective termto describe military actions conducted byforces of two or more nations, usuallyundertaken within the structure of acoalition or alliance. See also coalition. (JP1-02)

national military strategy. The art andscience of distributing and applying militarypower to attain national objectives in peaceand war. Also called NMS. (JP 1-02)

national objectives. The aims, derived fromnational goals and interests, toward whicha national policy or strategy is directed andefforts and resources of the nation areapplied. See also military objective. (JP1-02)

national policy. A broad course of action orstatements of guidance adopted by thegovernment at the national level in pursuitof national objectives. (JP 1-02)

national security strategy. The art andscience of developing, applying, andcoordinating the instruments of nationalpower (diplomatic, economic, military, andinformational) to achieve objectives thatcontribute to national security. Also

GL-9

Glossary

called national strategy or grand strategy.(JP 1-02)

operation. 1. A military action or the carryingout of a strategic, tactical, service, training,or administrative military mission. 2. Theprocess of carrying on combat, includingmovement, supply, attack, defense andmaneuvers needed to gain the objectivesof any battle or campaign. (JP 1-02)

operational art. The employment of militaryforces to attain strategic and/or operationalobjectives through the design, organization,integration, and conduct of strategies,campaigns, major operations, and battles.Operational art translates the joint forcecommander’s strategy into operationaldesign, and, ultimately, tactical action, byintegrating the key activities at all levels ofwar. (JP 1-02)

operational design. The key considerationsused as a framework in the course ofplanning for a campaign or majoroperation. (This term and its definitionare approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

operational level of war. The level of war atwhich campaigns and major operations areplanned, conducted, and sustained toaccomplish strategic objectives withintheaters or other operational areas.Activities at this level link tactics andstrategy by establishing operationalobjectives needed to accomplish thestrategic objectives, sequencing events toachieve the operational objectives, initiatingactions, and applying resources to bringabout and sustain these events. Theseactivities imply a broader dimension of timeor space than do tactics; they ensure thelogistic and administrative support oftactical forces, and provide the means bywhich tactical successes are exploited toachieve strategic objectives. See also

strategic level of war, tactical level of war.(JP 1-02)

operational reach. The distance and durationacross which a unit can successfullyemploy military capabilities. (JP 1-02)

operation order. A directive issued by acommander to subordinate commanders forthe purpose of effecting the coordinatedexecution of an operation. Also calledOPORD. (JP 1-02)

operation plan. Any plan, except for the SingleIntegrated Operational Plan, for the conductof military operations. Plans are preparedby combatant commanders in response torequirements established by the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff and bycommanders of subordinate commands inresponse to requirements tasked by theestablishing unified commander. Operationplans are prepared in either a completeformat (OPLAN) or as a concept plan(CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can bepublished with or without a time-phasedforce and deployment data (TPFDD) file.a. OPLAN— An operation plan for theconduct of joint operations that can be usedas a basis for development of an operationorder (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies theforces and supplies required to execute theCINC’s Strategic Concept and a movementschedule of these resources to the theaterof operations. The forces and supplies areidentified in TPFDD files. OPLANs willinclude all phases of the tasked operation.The plan is prepared with the appropriateannexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files asdescribed in the Joint Operation Planningand Execution System manuals containingplanning policies, procedures, and formats.Also called OPLAN. b. CONPLAN — Anoperation plan in an abbreviated format thatwould require considerable expansion oralteration to convert it into an OPLAN orOPORD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC’s

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Glossary

JP 5-00.1

Strategic Concept and those annexes andappendixes deemed necessary by thecombatant commander to completeplanning. Generally, detailed supportrequirements are not calculated and TPFDDfiles are not prepared. c. CONPLAN withTPFDD — A CONPLAN with TPFDD isthe same as a CONPLAN except that itrequires more detailed planning for phaseddeployment of forces. Also calledCONPLAN. See also operation order. (JP1-02)

operations security. A process of identifyingcritical information and subsequentlyanalyzing friendly actions attendant tomilitary operations and other activities to:a. identify those actions that can be observedby adversary intelligence systems; b.determine indicators hostile intelligencesystems might obtain that could beinterpreted or pieced together to derivecritical information in time to be useful toadversaries; and c. select and executemeasures that eliminate or reduce to anacceptable level the vulnerabilities offriendly actions to adversary exploitation.Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations. Plannedoperations to convey selected informationand indicators to foreign audiences toinfluence their emotions, motives, objectivereasoning, and ultimately the behavior offoreign governments, organizations,groups, and individuals. The purpose ofpsychological operations is to induce orreinforce foreign attitudes and behaviorfavorable to the originator’s objectives.Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

rules of engagement. Directives issued bycompetent military authority that delineatethe circumstances and limitations underwhich United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with otherforces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP1-02)

specified command. A command that has abroad, continuing mission, normallyfunctional, and is established and sodesignated by the President through theSecretary of Defense with the advice andassistance of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It normally is composed offorces from a single Military Department.Also called specified combatant command.(JP 1-02)

strategic concept. The course of actionaccepted as the result of the estimate of thestrategic situation. It is a statement of whatis to be done in broad terms sufficientlyflexible to permit its use in framing themi l i t a ry, d ip lomat ic , economic ,informational, and other measures whichstem from it. (JP 1-02)

strategic level of war. The level of war atwhich a nation, often as a member of agroup of nations, determines national ormultinational (alliance or coalition) securityobjectives and guidance, and develops anduses national resources to accomplish theseobjectives. Activities at this level establishnational and multinational militaryobjectives; sequence initiatives; definelimits and assess risks for the use of militaryand other instruments of national power;develop global plans or theater war plansto achieve these objectives; and provideforces and other capabilities in accordancewith strategic plans. See also operationallevel of war; tactical level of war. (JP 1-02)

supported commander. 1. The commanderhaving primary responsibility for all aspectsof a task assigned by the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan or other joint operationplanning authority. In the context of jointoperation planning, this term refers to thecommander who prepares operation plansor operation orders in response torequirements of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a supportcommand relationship, the commander who

GL-11

Glossary

receives assistance from anothercommander’s force or capabilities, and whois responsible for ensuring that thesupporting commander understands theassistance required. See also joint operationplanning. (JP 1-02)

supporting commander. 1. A commander whoprovides augmentation forces or othersupport to a supported commander or whodevelops a supporting plan. Includes thedesignated combatant commands andDefense agencies as appropriate. 2. In thecontext of a support command relationship,the commander who aids, protects,complements, or sustains anothercommander’s force, and who is responsiblefor providing the assistance required by thesupported commander. See also supportedcommander; supporting plan. (JP 1-02)

tactical level of war. The level of war at whichbattles and engagements are planned andexecuted to accomplish military objectivesassigned to tactical units or task forces.Activities at this level focus on the orderedarrangement and maneuver of combatelements in relation to each other and to theenemy to achieve combat objectives. Seealso operational level of war; strategic levelof war. (JP 1-02)

theater. The geographical area outside thecontinental United States for which acommander of a combatant command hasbeen assigned responsibility. (JP 1-02)

theater of operations. A subarea within atheater of war defined by the geographiccombatant commander required to conductor support specific combat operations.Different theaters of operations within thesame theater of war will normally begeographically separate and focused ondifferent enemy forces. Theaters ofoperations are usually of significant size,allowing for operations over extended

periods of time. Also called TO. See alsotheater of war. (JP 1-02)

theater of war. Defined by the NationalCommand Authorities or the geographiccombatant commander, the area of air, land,and water that is, or may become, directlyinvolved in the conduct of the war. Atheater of war does not normally encompassthe geographic combatant commander’sentire area of responsibility and may containmore than one theater of operations. Seealso theater of operations. (JP 1-02)

theater strategic environment. A compositeof the conditions, circumstances, andinfluences in the theater that describes thediplomatic-military situation, affect theemployment of military forces, and affectthe decisions of the operational chain ofcommand. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

theater strategy. The art and science ofdeveloping integrated strategic conceptsand courses of action directed towardsecuring the objectives of national andalliance or coalition security policy andstrategy by the use of force, threatened useof force, or operations not involving the useof force within a theater. See also nationalmilitary strategy; national security strategy.(JP 1-02)

unified command. A command with a broadcontinuing mission under a singlecommander and composed of significantassigned components of two or moreMilitary Departments, that is establishedand so designated by the President throughthe Secretary of Defense with the adviceand assistance of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. Also called unifiedcombatant command. (JP 1-02)

warning order. 1. A preliminary notice of anorder or action which is to follow. 2. A crisis

GL-12

Glossary

JP 5-00.1

action planning directive issued by theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thatinitiates the development and evaluationof courses of action by a supportedcommander and requests that acommander’s estimate be submitted. 3. A

planning directive that describes thesituation, allocates forces and resources,establishes command relationships,provides other initial planning guidance,and initiates subordinate unit missionplanning. (JP 1-02)

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCs

Includes scope ofproject, references,milestones, and who willdevelop drafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

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The CINCs receive the JP andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director, J-7,will solicit a written report fromthe combatant commands andServices on the utility andquality of each JP and theneed for any urgent changes orearlier-than-scheduledrevisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each JP isrevised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

�

ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, CINCs, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy asshown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications.The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Publication (JP) 5 Plans

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHYJOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

LOGISTICSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to JointStaff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCs

Joint Staff conducts formal staffing forapproval as a JP

STEP #4CJCS Approval

� Lead Agent selects Primary ReviewAuthority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCs,Services, and Joint Staff

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STEP #3Two Drafts

JP 1

JOINTWARFARE

JP 0-2

UNAAF

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