jungyimbaek objectives - connecting repositories · 2017-02-09 ·...

GlobalRetailingandWithdrawalofGlobalRetailersinKorea

-IssuesfromtheCaseofCarrefourandWa1 -Mart一

JungyimBaek

Objectives

Thispaperreviewstheglobalretailers'internationalisationprocessin

theI(oreanmarket,andthemainobjectiveofthispaperistoanalyseaglobal

retailer'swithdrawalactivitiesfromsornemarketsasoneofitsmethodsinthe

internationalisatiollprocess.Thisanalysisisnotchallengingthefindingsof

previouspapers,butitisdesignedtoelaborateanddetailwhatprevious

findingshavealreadyestablished.Muchhasbeenwrittenaboutaglobal

retailer'swithdrawalfromsomemarkets,whichhasbeenevaluatednotonly

inanegative,butalsoinapositiveway.Suchliteraturemaybeseenasa

runningcommentaryontheinternationalisationofretailsofar.

Whetherperceivednegativelyorpositively,aretailer'swithdrawalfrom

aspecificmarketcouldbeperceivedasacontinuumoftheinternationalisation

processoftheretailindustry.Theeffectsofwithdrawingfromonemarket

mayleadtoafurtherinternationalisationofthatretailer,whomaybelooking

formarketsthataremorepro丘table.Thatis,issuesregardillgaglobalretailer's

withdrawalfromonemarketarefarmoreconvolutedthantheyinitially

appeaL

Inourconclusion,wewillunderstandtherealsigr亘ficanceofglobalretailers'

withdrawingfromsomemarketsinordertofurthertheirinternationalisation

bybuyingintonewmarkets,andthismayclarifytheeffectawithdrawa1

〔131〕

ヱ32 商学討究第57巻第2・3号

hasonthecompany'soverallglobalcompetitiveadvantage.Ultimatelyall

issuesregardingaglobalretailer'swithdrawalfromaparticularmarketfind

theiroriginintheretailer'smodeof"entry."

メ竃わstract

CarrefourandWal-Mart,thedominantcompaniesofaworldwideretail

empire,decidedtowithdrawfromtheKoreanmarket,closelyfollowingthe

withdrawalofCarrefourfromJapaninthepreviousyear.Usually,the

withdrawalfromtheforeignretailmarketsisconsideredafailureinglobal

retailing.Researchonglobalretailirlgisoftendescribedintermsofalmost

twokeywords:successorfailure.Thesetermsaretypicallyidentifiedwith

standardisation-adaptationresearchinglobalretailing.

Boardmemberswhohaveadoptedastandardisedmodeljudgethe

performanceoftheirbranchesinforeigncountriesbythestandardsthey

haveappliedintheirowncountry,andthisleadsthemtoascertainthesuccess

orfailureoftheirforeignbranches.Itshouldbeobviousthatadaptation

strategieswouldleadtofargreatersuccessinglobalretailing.

Whilstacompany'swithdrawalfromoneofitsforeignbranchesmaybe

seenasafailure,thelessonslearntfromsuchanexperiencemaybenefitthe

companysettingupfutureoperationsinotherforeigncountries,furthering

theinternationalisationprocess.Consequently,failingontheonehandcan

bringaboutapositivecontributiontotheglobalisationofbusinesses.

Inthispaper,therecentphenomenonofCarrefour'sandWa1-Mart's

withdrawalfromtheKoreanmarketcouldbeseentoachievethisobjective.

Thefindingsshowthatageneralexplanationofglobalretailers'withdrawals

fromaspecficmarketcoUldbeexpressedasafailuretoadapttospechicmarket

conditions,butitcanalsobeseenasoneoftheretailer'sinternationalisation

GlobalRetailingandWithdrawalofGlobalRetailersinKoreaヱ33

strategiesleadingtoasuccessfulentryintonewmarkets.Finally,wewill

demonstrateaframeworkforananalysisofwithdrawalactivitiesintheretail

internationalisationprocessofglobalretailers.

κeyWords

910balreta且ing,withdrawa1,CarrefburKoreaWa1-MartKorearetailinternationali-

sationprocess,Koreanmarket

TheκOreanreta〃ma〃(et`OVerV'e吻

TheKoreanretailmarketintermsofsaleshascontinuedtogrowatan

averageannualgrowthrateofabout8%since1999.Whilstmoretraditiona1,

smalltomediumretailersstillexistinKorea,irlnovativelarge-scaleretailers,

includingdepartmentstoresanddiscountstores-suchasSupercentres,

Hypermarkets,SuperstoresandWholesaleClubs-aregainingmoremarket

share.Infact,thedrivingforcebehindtherapidゴdevelopmentoftheKorean

retailindustryisthelargeretailer,whohasacceleratedanintensecompetition.

Sillce1996,whentheliberalisationoftheKoreanretailmarketoccurred,

companies,includingCarrefour,Wal-Mart,Tescoandtheretailersassociated

withCostcowholesalebusiness,haveenteredthemarket.Thesemajorglobal

retailerscompetemoreintenselywithlocalretailers,operatingmainlywithin

theformatofdiscountstoresintheKoreanmarket.TheKoreandiscount

storemarket,intermsofsaleshascontinuedtogrowatanaverageannual

rateofproximately30%andithasalreadyattractedmanyKoreanconsumers

awayfromthedepartmentstoremarket,perhapsaidedbythemini-recession

thataffectedThailand,Indonesia,Koreaandsoon.Thisfast-growingretail

industryislednotonlybytheKoreandiscountstores,butalsobyconvenience


storesandothernewshoppingoutlets,suchasinternetshoppingmallsand

TVhomeshopping.Since1989,whentheformatofconveniencestoreswas

firstintroducedinKorea,itshowedsustainablegrowth.However,thisformat

wassubstantiallybasedontheJapanesemodel,whichhadoriginallybeen

developedtomeettheJapaneseconsumers'needs.

Ontheotherhand,TVhomeshoppingoutlets,ofwhichfiveare

licensedandwhollyownedbylocalcompanies,arenowcompetingfora

shareoftheconsumermarkets.Twooftheoutlets,LGshopPingandCJ

shopping,haveamajorshareoftheTVhomeshoppingmarket.

InKorea,beforetheformatofdiscountstoreswasintroduced,the

classdicationoflarge-scaleretailingjustreferredtodepartmentstores.E-Mart,

(thesecondlargestdepartmentstorechainillKoreaownedbyShinsegae)

openedKorea'sfirstdiscountstoreinSeoulinl993,beforeglobalretailers

enteredtheKoreanretailmarket.AsaresultofthegrowthofE-Mart,

whichatpresent(May,2006)has86storesinKoreaandChina,ithasnow

establishedmarketdominanceinKorea.

Theglobalretailershaveplayedanimportantroleinthedevelopment

oftheKoreanretailingindustry.BeforetheirentryintotheKoreanr耳arket

in1996,localdepartmentstores,small-sizefamilyretailersandtraditional

markets,haveexistedWithlittletochallengetheirmodusoperandi.Thegradual

dismantlingofprotectionisminKoreafrom19890nwardsuntilthetotalmarket

liberalisationinl996,ledtoremarkabledevelopmentsintheretailindustry.

Inparticular,theentryofglobalretailersintheKoreanretailmarketspurred

thelocalretailerstodevelopanewretailformat,namelytheKoreandiscount

store.Thisinnovativeformatbroughtaboutcompetitionbetweenglobal

retailersandlocalretailers,whichhasledtoalargegrowthintheKorean

retailindustry.ThisinturnproducedafavourableresponsefromtheKoreall

consumers,whochangedtheirlife-10ngconsumerpracticeofbeingpersonally

GlobalRetailingandWithdrawalofGlobalRetailersinKorea

servedbystafftoselectingtheirownproductsinself-servicestores.

135

TheκOreandiSCOUntStOremarket

OfthefivemalorretailcompaniesintheKoreandiscountstoresmarket,

toentertheKoreandiscountstoresmarketweretwolocalcompanies,namely

Shisegae'sE-MartandLotteShopping'sLotteMart,andthreeforeignretail

companies-Carrefour,Samsung-Tesco'sHomePlus(whichis89%ownedby

Tescoandl1%ownedbythelocalretailer,Samsung),andWal-Mart.Carrefour

wasthesecondretailerthatenteredtheKoreanmarket,andthethirdwas

LotteMart.Wal-Martenteredthemarketnext,andthefinalonewas

Samsung-Tesco.

WhileSamsung-Tescowasthelastforeigncompanytoenterthemarket,

ithasincreaseditsmarketshareoveritsothercompetitors,withthesecond

largestsalesintheKoreanmarket.WhileShinsegae'sE-Marthasremained

inanunassailedfirstpositioninthemarket,thecompetitionforsecondplace

hasmarkedlyincreasedamongsttheothers.CarrefourandWal-Mart,which

Iostmarket,shareinthefiercecompetition,finallyendedupwithdrawing

fromtheKoreanmarket.

TheKoreanlarge-scaleretailing-including,aspreviouslymentioned,

departmentstoresanddiscountstores-wasownedbyfinancialinvestment

corlg正omerates(calledChabolsinKorea).Shinsegae'sfinancialinvestment

group,whichspecialisedintheretailsectordeclareditsindependencefrom

theSamsunggroupofinvestorstocreateanew`Chabor.TheShinsgae

group,whichconsistsofaseventy-yearhistoryintheKoreanretailindustry,

developeddepartmentstoresanddiscountstoresforthefirsttimeinthe

Koreanmarket.Inparticular,ShinsegaegeneratedtheKoreanstylediscount

store`Harinstore'thatsupplieshighserviceandlowpricecommoditiesin


markedcontrasttotheconceptoftheoriginaldiscountstore.TheKorean

discountstore,thatis,thelarge-scale`Harinstore',hasbeendevelopedquite

differentlyfrombothofthese.Generally,thesellingoflow-costcommodities

ismadepossiblebyreducingexpenses,particularlyintheareaofcustomer

service.Thehigherthecustomerservice,thehigherthesellingpriceof

commodities.

Table1.Retailers'performanceintheKoreanmarket(2005)

E-Mart HomePlus LotteMart Carrefour Wa正一Mart

Sales*8,100billionwon

($8.526billion)

4,600bi11ionwon

($4.842billion)

3,300bmionwon

($3.473billion)

2,600bimonwon

($2.736billion)

728billionwon

($767million)

Marketshare 34% 14% 19% 9% 4%

Operadng

Profit*

530billionwon

($557mnlion)

112bilHonwon

($117million)

90binionwon

($94million)

24billionwon

($25million)

一9,900million

(一$10.4milhon)

Stores** 79(86)*** 42 45 32 16

Salesper*

store

102billionwon

($107mi11ion)

109billionwon

($114milHon)

76billionwon

($80million)

64binionwon

($67million)

50biUionwon

($52million)

Notes:*TheunitofmoneyinKorea(=won),$1US需approximately950won**N

umbersofstoresinMay2006***Numbersofstoresinc正uding7storesintheChinesemarket

Source:DongaEconomicZ)aめノ,May23,2006.

TheLOCa/iSatiOnρrOCeSSintheκOreanmarket

Thecompetitionbetweenglobalretailersandlocalretailersresultedin

E-mart,thebiggestlocalretailerinKorea,toirlitiatelargediscounts,which

resultedinE-martacquiringalargemarketshareintheKoreanretailindustry.

E-marthassuccessfullyadaptedanewideathatcamefromoverseas,and

changedtheretailpatterninaonceconservativeretailmarket.

且owdidShinsegaemake`low-price/high-service'possible?Expecting

thediscountstoreretailbusinesstogrowsteadily,Shinsegaemanagedthe

increaseofexpensesthroughtheexpansionofsales.Atthesametime,the

Shinsegaegroupachievedamoreefficientproductprocurementthroughthe

networkoftheSamsunggroup,towhichitbelonged.Althoughitwasdifficult

GlobalRetailingandWithdrawalofGlobalRetailersinKorea ヱ37

toobtainprQfitsfortheretailcompaniesatthebeginning,Samsung's

demandforagreatervolumeofproductsfromitssubsidiariesenabledthe

lattertoreducetheunitcostofproductionprincipallybecauseofcost

reductionsperunitirlshipmentcostsandothermanufacturingefficiencies.

Furthermore,sinceShinsegaecouldmakeuseofthesemanufacturers'dispatch

systems,itwaspossibletoreducepersonnelcosts,whichaccountforhalfof

theretailer'sexpenses.Consequently,E-Martisconsideredtobemoresuitable

totheKoreanconsumers,whodemandlow-pricesandhigh-services.

However,facingmoreintensecompetitionwithlocalretailers,allmembers

ofglobalretailing,exceptTesco,hadmuchmoredif且cultyinadaptingtothe

Koreanretailenvironment.GlobalretailerssuchasCarrefourandWal-Mart

didnotreallyunderstandthedomesticmarket,whichcentredonwhatthe

Koreancustomersessentiallyexpectedfromtheirretailstores.Itwasnot

easyfortheseglobalcompaniestomodifytheiroriginalretailformat,because

theKoreanconceptsofsatisfyingcustomers'needssignificantlydiffered

fromtheiroriginaldiscountstoreconceptsof`low-priceandlow-service'.The

maincharacteristicofcustomerserviceintheKoreanstylediscountstoreis

upgradingthequalityofproducts,personalserviceinthefreshfoodoutlets

andtheestablishmentofaculturecentre,whichprovidesamultitudeof

servicesforthecustomer,suchasshorteducationalcoursesandarangeof

culturalactivities.Furthermore,these`culturalcentres'withintheshopping

complexbroughtinfreepick-upbusservices,which,inturn,attracted

additionalcustomers.InBundang,aSeoulsuburbwithapopulatioIIofabout

400,000inMarch,1999,threedepartmentstoresandsevendiscountstores

rananestimated200freebusservices,whichfurtherincreasedtheirsales.

However,theprovisionoffreebusserviceswasprohibitedafterarevision

oftrafficregulationsbythecentralKoreangovernmentinJuly2001.During

thetimethefreebusservicesoperated,CarrefourandWa1-Martdidnot


availthemselvesofthismethodofattractingcustomers,sincebothcompanies

sawsuchserviceastooexpensive.Notf6110wingtheleadofsuchaninnovative

wayofincreasingthecustomerbasecanbeidentifiedasoneofthereasons

whyCarrefourandWal-Martfailedtogainthecompetitiveedgeoverthe

lOCalretailerS.

However,Carrefourhadattainedsecondplaceinthe`Harinstore'sector

(theKoreanstylediscountstore)withintwoyearsofitsentryintotheKorean

market.Carrefourseemedtohavesteadilydevelopeditsproliferationof

storesintheKoreanmarket,itsKoreanbranchout-performinganyotherof

itsforeignbranches.Nevertheless,thesalesfromanysingleCarrefourstore,

comparedwithanyonestoreownedbyE-MartorHomePlus,showed

disastrousresults.Carrefour'sperformanceinthisregardwasgoingfrom

badtoworse.Ithadslippedintofourthplaceinregardstothenumberof

storesandsalesintheKoreanmarket.

Asaresultoftheslumpinsales,thenewstoresthatCarrefour

commissionedtobebuiltfrom20030nwardswereincreasinglyavant-garde

inappearanceinanattempttoattractcustomers.Inaddition,thealready

establishedstores,aswellasthenewones,begantoprovideamultitudeof

servicesforthecustomer,suchasincorporating`culturalcentres'inthe

shoppingcomplex,imitatingthepracticeofitsKoreancompetitors.

Althoughthehypermarketconceptinthecompany'shostcountryisquite

differentfromitshomecountry,Carrefourwasmakingchangesinresponse

tothedemandsoftheKoreanconsumers,whopreferredqualityserviceas

wellaslow-pricecommodities.Inthisway,Carrefourmadesomeeffortto

adapttothetypicalbehaviouroftheKoreanconsumer,althoughCarrefour's

effortinthisregardmerelyrepresentedacontinuedprocessoftrialand

error.

AsevidentinthecaseofitswithdrawalfromtheJapanesemarket,


Carrefourdidnotformagoodrelationshipwithlocalsuppliers,whowere

notfamiliarwiththecompany'sdemandsregardingprices,promotions,

returns,andothertradepractices.InKorea,wheredistributionsystemsare

stillnotfullydeveloped,Carrefourattemptedtotakethehighgroundin

pricenegotiations.Itissaid,thatCarrefourtriedtopressurelocalsupPliers

toreducetheirprices.LikeDupuisandPrime(1996)suggested,mutual

collaborationwithlocalsuppliersmaybecrucialforretailformats,suchas

hypermarkets,whenenteringforeigncountrieswheresignificantenvironmental

differencesexist.Inparticular,thelackofagoodrelationshipbetweenglobal

retailerandlocalsuppliersisoneofthereasonswhytwooftheworld'smost

powerfulretailerslaggedbehindtheircompetitorsintheKoreanmarket.

ThefutureoftheKoreanretailmarkethasbeenputinthespotlight,

particularlyinregardstohowithasbeenaffectedbythewithdrawalofthe

twobiggestglobalretailers.AnalystspredictthatE-Martwillconsolidateits

primepositioninthemarketandleaveallothercompetitorsfarbehind,

particularinthefuture`Harinstore'market.

Inthefinalanalysis,CarrefourgaveupitsretailbusinessintheKorean

marketbasedollitspoorfinancialperformance.Coupledwithitsownpoor

financialsituationinthehomecountry,thewithdrawalfromtheKorean

marketwasinevitable.EventhoughCarrefourrushedintotheAsianmarket

fromthemid1990'sonwards,itsshareoftheAsianmarketamountstoonly

about7%ofitsoverallglobalholdings.Carrefburintendstoutilisetheproceeds

ofthesaleofitsKoreanholdingstorestructureitsbusinessinFrance(its

owncountry)andtoinvestmoreheavilyinthehuge,expandingChinese

market,andtofacilitateitsentryintotheIndianmarket.

Ontheotherhand,howdidWal-Martgoaboutitslocalisationprocessin

theKoreanmarket?AlthoughWal-Mart'slocalisationprocessissimilarto

Carrefour's,itwaspredictedthatWal-Martwouldbelessaggressiveand

140 商学討究第57巻第2・3号

lesspositivethanCarrefour.AfterWal-Mart'spushintotheChinesemarket,

thecompanypurchased4storesfromtheDutchcompany,MakroKorea,in

1998,representingitssecondforayintoanAsianmarket.Developing

another12storesoverthenextfewyears,Wal-Martnowhadatotalofjust

16storesinKorea,employing3,356people.AlthoughWal-Martistheworld's

biggestretailer,ithasremainedapoorperformerintheKoreanmarket,

occupyingfifthplace.Lastyear(2005),Wal-Martwasintheredtothetune

of9,900,000,000won(approximately$10.421millionUS).

Wal-Marthadintroduceditskeyconceptof`EveryDayLowPrice'in

themarket,inthesamewaythatitoperatesintheUS.Ithadjudgedthat

theKoreanconsumerswouldbesatisfiedwithIow-price,low-quality

commoditiesandthattheKoreanconsumerswouldignorepooraccessto

stores.However,theKoreanconsumersdemandedboth,qualityandlow-price

commodities,andaccessthatismoreconvenient.

777eρrocesso'910ba'reta〃ers」vvit力draw'η9

fromt力eκoreaηmarket

ApartfromWal-Mart'spoorperformanceinKorea,Wal-Martcan

concentrateitsmanagementresourcesonthehugeIndianandChinesemarket,

perhapsanotherreasonwhythecompanydecidedtoleavetheKoreanmarket.

InMay2006,Wal-Mart's16KoreanstoresweresoldtoE-Mart,whosetotal

numberofstoresincreasedto95inthedomesticmarket.

E-mart'ssalesfiguresreachedtwicethoseofitsnearestcompetitor.

HomePlus,withits42stores,registeredthesecondbiggestsalesfiguresfor

theyear,andLotteMart,withits45stores,occupiesthirdposition.Itisdif丘cult

toseethattheothertwocompaniescandisplaceE-Mart,principallybecause

therearefewgoodlocationstodevelop,andthe`Harinstore'marketis

GlobalRetailingandWithdrawalofGlobalRetailersinKorea141

alreadyclosetosaturation.

AnalystsalsopredictthatShinsegae,whichregisteredthesecondhighest

salesfiguresinthedepartmentstoredivision,willsurpassLotteShopping.

Currently,LotteShoppingistheleaderintotalsales,whichincludesboth

theHarinanddepartmentstoredivisions,butShinsegae'spurchaseofWal-Mart

(Korea)mayenablethecompanytosurpassLotteShoppingintotalsalesin

thefuture.Lastyear(2005),LotteShopping'stotalsalesregisteredtothe

tuneof8,963,200,000,000won(approximately,$9.434billionUS),whereas

Shinsegae'stotalamountedto8,624,000,000,000won(approximately,$9.077

billionUS),whichincludesWal-Mart'ssalesintheKoreanmarket,which

amountedto9,352,700,000,000won(approximately,$9.844billionUS)(Donga

Dai!y,March27,2006).

Table2.LotteShopPingversusShinsegae(2005)

LotteshoPPing Shinsegae

8,963,200,000,000won($9.434billionUS) Sales

8,624,000,000,000won($9.077billionUS)

19 DepartmentStores 7

43 HarinStores 79

Source:1)ongaDai!y,March27,2006.

WhenthenewsofCarrefour'swithdrawalfromtheJapanesemarket

wasreportedinMarch2005,Carrefour'sAsiandirectordeclaredthat

althoughwithdrawinghiscompany'soperationsfromtheJapanesemarket,it

couldnowfocusonextendingoperationsintheKoreanandChinesemarkets,

andgenerallyexpandsthecompany'sinvolvementinotherAsianmarkets.

且owever,afterjustoneyear,Carrefourannouncedthatitwasalsowith-

drawingitsoperationsfromtheKoreanmarketanditwasrumouredthat

Carrefourwasgoingtosellitsshareofthemarkettoamajorlocalretailer,

suchasLotteShopping.Consequently,inApril2006,Carrefour(Korea)


announcedthesaleofitsKoreanbusiness,whichwassubsequentlypurchased

byE↓and,muchtothesurpriseoftherestofthemarketwhich,untilrecently,

sawE-Landasasmallstakeholderinretail.Onemonthlater,Wal-Mart

announceditswithdrawalfromtheKoreanmarket,anditssharewaspurchased

byE-mart,officiallyKorea'sbiggestdiscountretailer.

ItisnotsurprisingthatCarrefbur,thesecondlargestglobalretailer,and

Wal-Mart,theIargestglobalretailer,havewithdrawntheiroperationsfrom

Korea.Intensecompetitionandexpansionbylocallyspawnedretailerscreated

farlessprofitabilitythantheparentcompanieshadanticipated,perhaps

underscoredbythepatriotismofthelocalconsumers,whosupportedKorean,

ratherthanforeignbusinesses.Infact,Carrefouronlymanagedtooccupy

9%ofthemarket,whereasWa1-Mart'ssharewasameagre4%.Thiswas

altogetheraverypoorperformanceforthegiantglobalretailersduring

2005,particularlyinviewoftheperformanceofKorea'slargestretailer,

Emart,whosemarketshareroseto34%ofalldiscountretailsales(Dong'a

Econo〃zicl)α 吻,May23,2006).

Ayearago,speculationswererifethatCarrefourmaywithdrawfrom

theJapaneseandtheKoreanmarketbecauseofitssluggishperformance,

withlittleprospectofgrowth,giventhefiercecompetitionofIocalretailers.

SuchspeculationshavebeenvindicatedbyCarrefour'sactualwithdrawal

frombothmarkets.

Carrefour'sboardwasfacingaseriousdilemmainregardstothe

performanceofitshypermarketdivision,particularlyinrespecttoitsretail

formatthatoccupies59%oftotalsalesin25countriesglobally(Carrefour,

Annualf～epoアt,2003).Recently,thefiercelow-pricecompetitioninitsmajor

retaildivision,thehypermarket,inFrance,wasmakingitsfinancialsituation

worse.ComparedwithCarrefour,whichalreadyderivesasigni丘cantproportion

ofitssalesfrominternationaloperations,Wa1-Martstillhasarelativelylow

GlobalRetailingandWithdrawalofGlobalRetailersinKoreaヱ43

internationalmarketshare.Thatis,Wa1-Marthas1,288unitsinitsinternational

division,whichgeneratesnomorethan16.7%(netsales(A),$244,524millions;

internationalsales(B),$41,000millions;B/A=16.7%)ofitsannualsales(Wal-Mart,

。4nnual1～eport,2003),whereasCarrefour'sinternationaldivisionhasalmost

50%ofmarketsharewith6,067storesin25countries(Carrefour,Annual

1～ePort,2003).

Table3.Consolidatedsalesincludingtaxesbyregionandformatin2003

inemillion Hypermarket SupermarketHard

discount

Otherformats

Tota1

France 21,360 7,976 2,013 8,610 39,959

Europe* 15,814 5,188 3,494 3,913 28,409

LatinAmerica 4,059 1,139 238 5 5,441

Asia 5,033 4 5,037

Group 46,266 14,302 5,750 12,529 78,848

Note:*excludingFrance

Source:Carrefour,ノ1〃〃ualノ～ejウoアち'Fina〃cial五～eport,2003,P.123.

ThemarketshareinKoreabetweellthesetwocompaniesissimilarly

disproportionate.Wal-Mart(Korea)had16storescomparedwithCarrefour's

32stores.KnowingthatWal-Mart'smainentrymodeispurchasingthehost

country'slocalretailcompanies,peopleanticipatedthatWal-Mart(Korea)

wouldacquirethedeclininglocalretailertorealizescalemerit.Itsentry

pricesintotheKoreanmarketwerenoexception(bypurchasingMakroin

theKoreanmarket).Shortlyafterwards,Wal-Martrealisedthatitsproposed

modelcouldnotbesuccessfullyintroducedandthereforechangedit(the

adaptationmodel)byreformingtheestablishedstoresdesignedtosuitthe

Iocalconsumers.Wal-Martbelievedthatitssourceofcompetitiveadvantages

wouldleadtosuccess.Contrarytoexpectations,Wa1-Mart'soperationsin

Korearesultedinlossesthatledtoitswithdrawa1.Thelessonslearntfrom

itseffortinI(oreamayimproveitsglobalcompetitivenessbyfocusingits


operationsonbigger,seeminglymoreviablemarkets,suchasChinaandIndia.

Shinsegae'sstockpurchasenegotiationforWal-Mart(Korea)startedin

March2006,inTokyo,reachinganagreementwherebyWal-Mart(Korea)

wouldassignallitsstockholdingsforthesumof825,000,000,000won

(approximately,$868.421millionUS).ItissaidthatWal-Mart(US)onlymade

aprofitof10,000,000,000won(approximately,$10.526millionUS)fromthis

sale.Wal-Mart,ontheotherhand,securedanundertakingfromShinsegae

forthecontinuedemploymentofitsformeremployeesandmaintainingthe

relationshipwithitsformertradingpartners.Regardingthetotalcostof

purchasingWal-Mart(Korea),aShinsegae'sexecutivereportedlysaid:"The

purchasepriceofanyoneexistingstoreissimilartoopeninganewstore."

ThepriceofpurchasingCarrefour(Korea)wasmarkedlydifferent.

AlthoughCarrefour(Korea)hadattemptedtoadaptitsoperationtoKorean

conditions,itdecidedtowithdrawfromKoreaafter10yearsofoperations.

CarrefourchoseE↓andasitsstockpurchaser,whichboughtCarrefour's

Koreanbusinessfor1,750,000,000,000won(approximately,$1.842billionUS)

(loongAngl)α め,May23,2006).ContrarytoWal-Mart'smethodofsellingits

Koreanshare(offeringitsKoreanholdingsonlytoShinsegae),Carrefour

offereditsI(oreanholdingstofourprospectivebuyers(LotteShopping,

E-Land,ShinsegaeandSamsung-Tesco),inanattempttomaximiseitsprofit

fromthesale,despitethefactthatithadalreadysecretlydecidedthebuyer.

Thosepeople,whowereengagedinthenegotiationsforCarrefour'sKorean

holdingspointoutthatthe`Carrefoursellingtechnique'nearlydoubledthe

costforitsstock,ignoringtheusualbusinessetiquette.Eventhoughthesale

ofCarrefour(Korea)wasdecidedinthisenvironment,itsfinalpurchaser

wouldhavetoinvestbillionsofadditionalwontore-modelalreadyestablished

stores.Inthisregard,manyviewedthisdealinanegativeway.

ItcameasnosurprisethatE-Land,investigatingthehealthofitsfinances

GlobalRetailingandWithdrawalofGlobalRetailersinKorea 145

immediatelyfollowingitspurchaseofCarrefour(Korea),f6unditsmanagement

expenseshadmarkedlyincreased.Initsinvestigations,E-Landdiscovered

Carrefour's(Korea)profitof6,800,000,000won(approximately,$7.157million

US)during2005,0vershadowedbyitspaymentofbrandloyalty,etc.,to

Carrefour(France)oftheprincelysumof9,000,000,000won(approxirnately,

$9.473millionUS).Eliminatingthepreviouspaymentsforbrandloyalty,etc.,

andreducing,thebudgetthatwasallocatedtothef6rmerCarrefburexecutives,

whichwasexcessive(aboutlO,000,000,000won,approximately,$10.516million

US),aswellasrationalisillgthePOSsystem,wouldtranslateintoE-Land's

continuedgrowthandviability(KoreaEconomicDai!y,July10,2006).

Aspreviouslymentioned,Shinsegae,whichpurchasedWal-Mart(Korea),

isKorea'sbiggestretailinggroup,withaseventy-yearhistoryinretailing,

andE-LandispositioningitselftochallengeShinsegae'spre-erninencein

Korea.E-Land,whichpurchasedCarrefour'schainofKoreanstores(amuch

largersliceoftheretailmarketcomparedtoWal-Mart'sKoreanholdings),is

lessspecialisedinthelarge-sizegrocerystoredivisionthanShinsegae,because

ithasmainlyretailednon-perishables,concentratingonretailingclothing

duringitsfirsttwenty-fiveyears.TheE-Landgrouphasexpandeditsretailing

businessthroughM&Asince2003。ItstypicalM&Aintheretailingdivision

isrepresentedbyitsacquisitionof`NewCoreDepartmentStore',which

includes`Kim'sClub'(awholesaleclub)(MailBusinessNewsPaper,August

20,2004),and`Haetae'(asupermarket)inDecember2005,(Z)ongaDaily,

March24,2006).AlthoughE-Landhasrapidlydevelopedinashorttime,itis

clearthatthepurchasepriceforCarrefour(Korea)isahugecost

(1,750,000,000,000won,approximately,$1.842billionUS)toE-Land,eventaking

itstotalsales(2,713,000,000,000won,approximately,$2.855billionUS)oflast

year(2005)intoconsideration.E-Landreactedtothefearsofhaving

overstretcheditsresourcesandabilitiesbystatingthatthestoresitbought


fromCarrefour(Korea)wouldspecialiseinthenewstyleof`Harinstore'mixed

withfashionoutletsinordertowinagreatermarketshareandtheintense

competitionsamongst`Harinstores'(KoreaEconomicDai!y,July10,2006).

Aspointedoutearlier,theKoreanretailersareattemptingtoachieve

betterefficienciesinresponsetothechangesintheKoreanretailmarket's

environment,thatis,inresponsetotheglobalretailers'withdrawal,the

concentrationatthetopofmajorretailers,thesaturationofthe`Harinstore'

sector,andthegovernment'strendtorestricttheopeningoflarge-scale

storesinthefaceofgrowingoPpositionfromsmallertomediumsizeretailers.

ItisevidentthatWal-MartandCarrefourwereslowtoexpandtheir

businessinKorea,mainlybecausetheyhadgeneratedrelativelypoorrevenue

comparedwithothercompetitors.Althoughinthelong-termtheyexpected

tosucceedinthecompetitionforalargesliceoftheKoreanretailmarket

andtoplayamuchbiggerrole,eventuallytheywithdrew,notutilisingtheir

abilitiesinglobalsourcingofproductsandmanagerialexperiences.A

participantofCarrefour(Korea)said:"WeleavetheKoreanmarketnotbecause

ofhavingfailed,butbecauseofourinternationalisationstrategies."

Whentheseretailerswithaglobalnetworkentertheretailmarketsof

ChinaandIndiaasaspringboardtootherAsianmarkets,willtheybeable

toregaintheirprominerlceinanotherforeignretailmarketinviewoftheir

Koreanexperience?

777eFramework'or〃7e`w1〃7drawa'」ao〃 γκyaηa'ysls

'η 痂ere'a"internatiOna"Saが0η ρrOOeSS

W .hydoweseethewithdrawalfromtheKoreanmarketofCarrefour

andWal-Martasfailure?Whatarethegroundsforsuchajudgment?Apart

fromcommentsonthewithdrawalactivitiesasevidenceoffailure,wedonot


refertotheirinternationalisationactivitiesassuch,atleast,becausethe

experienceofaretailer'swithdrawalcouldbeanimportantstepforthe

internationalisationstrategyofthatretailer(AlexanderandQuinn,2002;Palmer,

2004;Jacksonetal.,2004;Toba,2006,etc.).

Furthermore,theretailersthatwithdrewfromaforeigncountrycould

reducetheriskoffailureindoingbusinessinanother,similarforeigncountry,

providedtheyhavelearnedfromtheirmistakes.Inthissense,thewithdrawal

activitiesintheinternationalisationofretailingmaybeconsideredasa

ratheropportunisticactivityofaretailcompany'sstrategies.AsBurteta1.,

(2002)noted:`ltisnecessarytodecidewhetherthefocusofstudyoffailureis

atthefirm,outlet,oractivityleve1,(orallofthese?)'.

However,inthelightoftheobjectivesofthispaper,ourdiscussionis

focusedatthelevelofthecompanies.Itisnecessarytobeclearwhen

discussing`failure'or`success,'thatitmaybeextendedtoincludeanyone

foreignbranchofaretailcompany,andtheretailcompanyasawhole,

includingitsheadquartersinthehomecountryandallitsforeignbranches.

Inotherwords,thewithdrawalofCarrefourandWal-MartinKoreamay

indicatethefailureataforeignbranchlevel,butthisdoesnotnecessarily

implyafailedirlternationalisationstrategyofretailingasawhole.Hence,the

withdrawalofaretailerfromanyindividualforeigncountrymaybecome

thevehiclethroughwhichanotherfutureforeignmarketmaybesuccessfully

developed,simplybecausetheretailinternationalisationprocessofoneretailer

isultimatelyhighlycomplex,butinter-relatedwithallofitsbranches.

Theglobalretailerhastoundertaketheinternationalisationprocessof

itsownretailformatinordertooperateitsstoresinforeignmarketsaswell

asathome.Itcannotbeviewedassuccessfulunlessaworkablelocaltypeof

modelisestablishedinthehostcountry,beforetheglobalretailercanclaim

successinitsforeignstrategies.


Generally,globalretailersadoptstandardisationstrategiesintheearly

stagesofsettingupbusinessinforeigncountriesasanintegralpartoftheir

overallinternationalisationofretailing.Theglobalretailer,whoentersanew

marketbyreplicatingtheparticularlysuccessfulformatdevelopedinthe

homecountry,thenaimstoadaptitsimportedmodeltolocalconditionssoon

afterentry.Asaresultofrefiningalocaltypemodel,thecompanyexpects

toexpanditsoperationsbasedontheperceivedinitialsuccessofitsadaptation

totheprevailingenvironment,withafurtheraimofusingthenewmodelto

enterotherforeignmarkets.

Baek(2004)statesthatthesuccessoftheinternationalisationofretailing

dependsonwhetherornottheadoptedstrategiesaremodifiedaccordingto

theparticularenvironmentswhichglobalretailersfaceinforeignmarkets.

Onemustkeepinmindthatgeneralisations,suchas`Asianmarkets'are

inappropriate.Intheearlystagesofentry,mostglobalretailersintroduce

theirretailformatwithoutanymodification,because,sothethinkinggoes,it

couldbeperceivedasinnovativeintheprevailingenvironmentofthehost

country.且owever,atthestagewhereothercompetitors,includinglocal

retailers,changegradually,itisnecessarytomodifysomeofthestrategies

takingintheearlystageofentry.Ifasuitableprototypehasbeendeveloped

forthehostcountryafterareviewofvariousexistingstrategies,itwould

thenbeconceivabletoexpandtomultiplestores.

CarrefourintheKoreanmarkettriedtodevelopachainofstores(32

stores,twiceasmanystoresasWal-MartdevelopedinKorea),andtoimplement

aparticularformatdeemedsuitablefortheKoreanconsumer,whichwas

fundamentallyatoddsWiththeenvironmentofthehostcountry.Itsmulti-stores

developmentendedinfailure,becauseitsstrategicreactionwasdifferent

fromthe`StrategyActionClarifiedbyStages,'whichBaek(2004)indicated.

Carrefourrecognizedthatitwasnecessarytomodifysomeofthestrategies


takenintheearlystagesofentry,butitshouldhavedevelopeditsmulti-stores

afterrefiningalocaltypemodel,whereasthemulti-storesweredeveloped

withoutcompletingasuitableprototypeintheKoreanmarket.Carrefour

waswaitingforanappropriatetimetowithdrawwithoutattaining`economies

ofscale'basedontheprincipleofchainstoreoperations(Carrefour's32

storeswerenotstandardised).

ThecaseofWal-Mart(Korea)issimilartoCarrefour's(Korea).Although

Wal-Martundertookacontinualtrialanderrorapproachinordertofinda

successfulpattern,itdidnotfindalocaltypemodeluntilopeningits16

stores,Wal-MartdevelopeditsoperationsinKoreamuchslower.Besides,

Wa1-Mart'sadaptationtotheKoreanmarketwaslessaggressivethanCarre-

four'sadaptation;thereforethesuccessofWal-Martwaslesspromisingthan

Carrefour's.Atthisstage,Wa1-Mart'swithdrawalfromKoreacouldalready

bepredicted.Afterall,theyannouncedtheirwithdrawalfromtheKorean

marketatalmostthesametimeasCarrefour,eachcitingapoorperformallce

insales.

Onemightsaythatbothcasesdemonstrateanobviousfailureinthe

Koreanmarket,yettheirexperienceoffailedoperationsmayleadtosuccess

inanotherforeignmarket,providedthattheyarecognizantofwhythey

failed.

Ontheotherhand,thereareexamplesofglobalretailer'swithdrawing

fromaforeignrnarketonlytore-enterthesamemarketafterathorough

marketresearch,asintheexampleofIKEA(Japan),whichre-entered,and

openeditsfirststoreinApril2006.ThefirsttimeIKEAellteredthe

Japanesemarketin1974,ithadnotdevelopeditsinnovativeretailformatof

furnitureぐCategoryKiller').Atthatstage,IKEA'sinitialentryintothe

Japanesemarketmayhavebeenadress-rehearsalforafullyfledgedassault

ontheJapanesemarket,itsapPrenticeshipPeriodservingasaninvestigation


oftheconditionsassociatedwithretailinginJapan.Asaresultoftheinitial

poorperformance,IKEAdecidedtowithdrawfromthemarketin1986,and

then,aftercarefulmarketresearchfor20yearsandmanyother'experiences

ininternationalisingitsretail,itre-enteredtheattractiveJapanesemarketin

earnest.Thedifferencebetweenitsinitialentryandsubsequentre-entrylies

inthefactthatIKEAadaptedtotheJapanesemarketbychangingitsretail

format,aswellasproliferatingitsstores.ItisdifficulttoseeIKEA'sinitial

entry,thenwithdrawal,asafailure;rather,itswithdrawalfromtheJapanese

marketforashorttime(from1974to1986),servedtofacilitateitsre-entry

onamuchmoresuitablebasis(lnnovationsinSales,March/May,2006).

TherearehighexpectationsthatIKEA'ssecondentryintotheJapanese

market,whichisbasedonlessonsfromtheinitialentry-withdrawalconduct

andacarefulmarketresearch,willleadanexcellentperformanceinthe

market.

Muchliteratureaboundsregardingglobalretailers'withdrawalfrom

foreignmarkets.Analystsemphasizethecomplexityofretailing;nevertheless

these`exitstrategiesofglobalretailersismanifestlyunder-researched,par-

ticularlygiventhediversityoftheretailinternationalisationprocess.Some

analystsoftheretailinternationalisationprocesssuggestthatwithdrawing

fromamarketcouldbeconsiderednotonlyasfailure,butalsoasanoppor-

tunityforsuccessinanotherforeignmarket.

Thereisageneralconsensusbetweentheaboveopinionsandthose

expressedthispaper.However,farmorecomprehensiveworkonmarket

withdrawalsisneededtodetailtheparticularsoftheinternationalisingprocess

oftheretailindustryinordertoreachadefinitiveconclusion.]日[ere,theglobal

retailers'withdrawalactivitiesareunderstoodinthecontextoftheconcept

of`StrategyActionClarifiedbyStages'(Baek,2004).Investigatingthe

adaptationstrategiesoftheglobalretailersinJapan,wefoundthattheretailers

GlobalRetailingandWithdrawalofGlobalRetailersinKorea151

tendtomodifytheirinitialformatatthetimeofentryandafterentry,and

Baek(2004)calledit`StrategyActionClarifiedbyStages'inregardsto

theoriesaboutthelocalisationprocess.WhilstBaek's(2004)conceptislimited

toexploringthebehaviourofglobalretailerswithinthenarrowscopeof

localisedmarkets,thispapertakesamuchbroaderapproach,namelyhow(or

when)theglobalretailerenters,withdraws,andpossiblyre-entersthesame

marketinthecontextofacompany'soverallattemptofinter-nationalisi1ユg

itsretailing.

ChangeofenVironmen七(Progressoftime)

[コ[===コ

匡nnova七ivefbrmatl⇒[亘artialmodiflcationoffbrmatconcept「 ⇒ILocalmode螺 ⇒IChainstorel

▲standardization▲ ▲adaptation▲ ▲s七andardiza七ion▲

S七rategicreaction

Source:Baek,2004.

Figure1」mageof`StrategyActionClarifiedbyStages'

Arevisionoftheinitialconceptinregardstotheinternationalisation

processofretailingentailsamoredetailedinvestigationofpre-entryandthe

withdrawalstage.Generally,aglobalretailerconductsmarketresearch,

whoseresultsdeterminetheformatchosellbef6reenteringanyforeignmarket.

Afterenteringthemarket,globalretailersworktowardsadaptingtheirfbrmat

tolocalconditions,andwhentheyattainasuccessfulchainstoreoperation

inanoverseasmarket,itissaidthattheretailerhassuccessfullyadaptedto

thelocalenvirorlmentofthatmarket.Theproblemof`Standardisation-

Adaptation'intheearlystagesofentrydependsonwhetherornottheinitially

introducedformatisseenasinnovativeinaforeigncountry.Ifitsretailformat

152 商学討究第57巻第2・3号

isacompletelynewoneinahostcountry,aglobalretailerwillmostlikely

utiliseastandardisationstrategy.If,ontheotherhand,theintroducedformat

issimilartothatalreadyexistinginthemarket,(therefore,itcannotbe

seenasinnovative)aglobalretailermuststrivetodevelopaformatthatwill

distinguishitfromthatofitscompetitors.Forexample,thehypermarket

formatthatCarrefour(Japan)usedwasaretailformatalreadyintroduced

byalocalretailer(Daiei),butitcornprisedonlyoftwostores,inthedomestic

rnarket.Carrefour,therefore,couldnotbeconsideredthatformat'sinnovator.

Also,theJapaneseformatofa`generalmerchandisestore'continuedtohave

acompetitiveadvantageinthedomesticretailindustry;itsformatalmost

similartothehypermarketformat.

Carrefourshouldhavedifferentiateditsformatfromthe`general

merchandisestore,'whichhadbeenestablishedasaJapallesetypeofretail

formatforover40years.AlthoughCarrefourtriedtoadaptitsformattothe

Japanesemarketintheearlystageafterentry,itsadaptationstrategyrelied

heavilyonitsexperienceinotherAsianmarkets,whichitthentriedto

directlyapPlytotheJapanesemarket.Carrefour's(Japan)adaptation

strategywasonlyanevolutionaryformatbasedontheAsiantypemodel,

whereasJapanisquintessentiallydifferentfromotherAsiancountries.

Carrefour(Japan)didnotreachthethirdstageoftakingstrategicactionsin

thelocalisationprocess,andwithdrewfromthemarket.Accordingtothe

model(Baek,2004),`StrategyActionClarifiedbyStages,'Carrefourfailedto

localiseitsoperationintheJapanesemarketwithoututilisingchainstore

operations,thelatternotincludedinestablishingasuccessfulformatillthe

localmarket.AlthoughCarrefour(Japan)failedinestablishingasuccessful

IocalformatinJapan,thetimewhenaglobalretailerWithdrawsfromaspecific

nationalmarketcouldalsobeseenasthepre-entrystageofpreparingtoenter

anothercountryintheinternationalisationcycleofretailing.

GlobalRetailingandWithdrawalofGlobalRetailersinKoreaZ53

1nsomeinstances,wherecompanieswithdrawfromamarket,theirinitial

enterpriseinthatmarketcouldbeconsideredafailure(CarrefourKorea,

CarrefourJapan),yetotherinstancesofwithdrawingfromamarketcannot

beviewedinthesamelight,suchasIKEAJapan(thefirstwithdrawal).It

mustbeemphasizedthatthepost-withdrawalstageisimportantintheretail

internationalisationcycle,andonemustclearlydistinguishbetweenthetwo

typesofwithdrawalactivitiesinordertounderstandthemechanismofthe

retailinternationalisationprocess.

Pre・entry(MarketResearch)

lpost-entry(LocalisationProcess)

匡・・alm・d・到⇒ ご

ミド

斗蒔:

に=コ[====コ1

Changeofenvironmen七(Progressoftime)

巨nn・v・tiv・f・rma司 ⇒ 臣・・ti・1m・面・ati・n・f飴・m・t・・ncepト【Cha血st・re【

ation▲

…

▲standardisation▲ ▲adaptation▲i評iii 「

▲standard…

七7

Strategicreaction

邑ノヅ(1)Y(2) y(3)(4)

Withdrawal(failure)1

「

(5)

Successl

灘溶撚撒黛轄

甜薄鐸蒙咲聾蒙

麺瑛臓璽饗藁譲

醸選璽騨確箋

蝉.馨

魚鈴毒,単嚢

導麺鍔藤藝

無輕痒壷華

癌魏葬藻

罫螺齢翻撫繍蝋撒灘

鮒醗灘

　ご

典

・・昭

"

、

e㎝就血㎞ゆ

▲…

nO・-ta受

誤額

r

)5(

SSeCCUS

の動

Figure2.ThelnternationalisationProcess

Conclusion

Investigatingglobalretailers'withdrawalfromtheKoreanmarketand

fromsomeothercountries,wefoundthatwithdrawalactivitiesareimportant

stagesintheretailinternationalisationprocess.Foraglobalcompany,the


processofexpandingandinternationalisingitsretailingmayincludewith-

drawingfromaspecificmarket,itswithdrawalactivitieshoweverassuming

adualrole:onewhichadmitsoutrightfailureinthatmarket,andtheother

iswhethersuch`failure'enablesittodeviseabetterformatthatpromotesa

successfulre-entry,orentryintoanotherforeignmarket.Theactivity,

wherewithdrawalleadstoare-assessmentofacompany'soperations,

includingre-enteringthesamemarket,cannotbeviewedasafailure.

Thispaperhasattemptedtodemonstratetheframeworkforananalysis

ofwithdrawalactivitieswithintheretailinternationalisationprocess.A

potentialIimitationofthispaperisananalysisofretailers'entrystrategies

intonewmarkets(orre-entryintothesamemarket)andforeignstrategies

afteraglobalretailers'withdrawal.Moredetailedempiricalresearchutilising

theframework(Figure2)wouldhelptoenhancetheunderstandingofthe

mechanismunderlyingtheretailinternationalisationprocess.


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Palmer,M.(2004),"lnternationalretailrestructuringanddivestment:theexperience

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1%〃ovations勿Sales,、ifarch,2006.

乃¢〃o"α'ゴo%ε 勿Sα1θs,、1吻ッ,2006.

〈Korean>

DongaEono〃zicDail:ソ,variOuSiSSUeS.

DongaDail:ソ,variOUSiSSUeS.

Econo〃zist,VariOuSiSSueS.

Hankyoreh2,Z,variousissues.

ノ∂0%9α 〃gE60〃0〃zic・1)ail:ソ,VariOUSiSSUeS.

ノbongangZ)ail:ソ,variOuSiSSueS.

KOreaEOO〃0〃ZiCDail:ソ,VariOUSiSSUeS.

KOreaWeek!y,VariOUSiSSUeS.

ノlfailBUSine∬1>6zo∫ 」Paper,VariOUSiSSUeS.

SiSaノ ∂Z〃'nal,VariOUSiSSUeS.

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