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2010 14: 336 originally published online 7 June 2010Homicide StudiesEdward S. Shihadeh and Raymond E. Barranco

Differences in the Effect of Linguistic IsolationLatino Immigration, Economic Deprivation, and Violence: Regional

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Homicide Studies14(3) 336 –355

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DOI: 10.1177/1088767910371190http://hs.sagepub.com

Latino Immigration, Economic Deprivation, and Violence: Regional Differences in the Effect of Linguistic Isolation

Edward S. Shihadeh1 andRaymond E. Barranco1

Abstract

One of the many contributions of Land, McCall, and Cohen’s landmark study was the confirmation of a long-held view in criminology—that deprivation raises homicide. Yet recent literature finds that although Latino immigrant communities are often poor, paradoxically they have low levels of crime. Unfortunately, this seemingly contradictory evidence is based on studies of long-established, well-organized, traditional immigrant communities where Spanish is a modal form of communication. However, recent Latino migrants opted for new destinations that are unprotected by a shell of common culture and language, making Latinos in these areas more vulnerable to serious violence. In acknowledging these critical differences between old and new Latino communities, we observe four interrelated findings: (a) The widely held view that Latinos generally live in safe places is true only for those in traditional destinations; (b) Latinos in new destinations are murdered at an exceedingly high rate; (c) This elevated risk is linked to English nonfluency among Latinos in new destinations only; and (d) In these areas, linguistic isolation increases homicide not just directly but indirectly as well by first increasing Latino economic deprivation. Thus, once differences in place are considered, there is no “paradox” about Latino immigration and crime. Our results uphold the benchmark assessment of Land, McCall and Cohen, that deprivation is linked to homicide—even in Latino communities.

1Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge

Corresponding Author:Edward S. Shihadeh, Department of Sociology, Louisiana State University, 126 Stubbs Hall, Baton Rouge, LA 70808Email: [email protected]

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Shihadeh and Barranco 337

Keywords

homicide, Latinos, immigration, language, social disorganization

About a century ago, Chicago School thinkers set forth the idea that immigration can disorganize communities and raise the rates of crime. The theoretical construct was meant to reconcile why Eastern European immigrant communities were beset with disorder, poverty, poor housing, and crime (Moehling & Piehl, 2007; Shaw & McKay, 1942; Taylor, 1931; Thomas & Znaniecki, 1958). Although this launched an old and venerable school of thought in criminology, a crises of faith emerged recently when crime was found to be unrelated to Latino immigration and to other major factors like poverty (e.g., Dugan & Apel, 2003; Lee, Martinez, & Rosenfeld, 2001; Martinez, 1996; Nielsen, Lee, & Martinez, 2005; Nielsen, Martinez, & Lee, 2005). This runs counter to a large body of evidence, confirmed in the landmark assessment by Land, McCall, and Cohen (1990), that resource deprivation (broadly construed) is linked to crime.

However, the belief that Latinos are immune from the standard predictors of crime may be an artifact of research design. For instance, some research examines Latino communities as one, undifferentiated mass (Shihadeh & Barranco, 2010c; Stowell et al., 2009). Although the work is informative, it risks construing Latino communities too broadly given how the settlement pattern of Latinos has changed over the last two decades. Early on, Latino migrants opted to settle in large immi-grant enclaves where they were protected by a shell of a common culture and lan-guage. However, more recent Latino migrants ventured deeper into the country (Durand, Massey, & Capoferro, 2005; Durand, Massey, & Charvet, 2000) to settle in small, vulnerable communities that are isolated from the surrounding area. The differences between traditional and new destinations are masked when Latinos are combined into one analysis.

At the other extreme, some research examines only traditional areas like in Cali-fornia (Feldmeyer & Steffensmeier, 2009), Florida (Nielsen & Martinez, 2009; Olson, Laurikkala, Huff-Corzine, & Corzine, 2009; Stowell & Martinez, 2009), Illinois-Chicago (Chavez & Griffiths, 2009; Graif & Sampson, 2009; Velez, 2009) and Texas (Akins, Rumbault, & Stansfield, 2009; Valdez, Cepeda, & Kaplan, 2009). This only narrows the discussion to old, safe, and relatively well-organized places. In the meantime, the unique experience of new migrant communities is left out of the equation, leading to conclusions about Latinos that sit athwart a century of theoretical criminology, using evidence that overlooks a basic Chicago School premise—that place matters.

Life for new Latino migrants may be more complicated and dangerous without the benefit of a large Spanish-speaking enclave. Although other immigrant groups have struggled with the language shift to English, for Latinos that shift is much more gradual (Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). Even now, about a quarter of all U.S. Latinos still have little or no facility in English (Census 2000). This can lower economic prospects




338 Homicide Studies 14(3)

(Bellante & Kogut, 1998; Bleakley & Chin, 2002; Kim, 2003; Kossodji, 1988; Park, 1999; Potocky-Tripoli, 2004), which in turn increases crime rates. In a more direct sense, non-English speakers can draw hostility—or worse—in an English-only environ-ment. They became vulnerable due to the inability to understand the often subtle cues that differentiate safe situations from dangerous ones. Using 2000 Census and mortality data, we examine the relationship between English nonfluency and homicide victimiza-tion among Latinos in traditional and new destinations. We do this in two ways. We first examine a direct relationship between English nonfluency and homicide victimization among Latinos, and then we probe for an indirect effect whereby English nonfluency among Latinos reduces their economic prospects which in turn increases their levels of homicide victimization. We then discuss the implications of our findings.

BackgroundImmigration and the Rise of the U.S. Latino Population

Latinos are the largest minority in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau News, 2008), surpassing the population of Blacks by a margin of 8.3 million in 2008 (American Community Survey, 2008). Although Latino growth now stems mainly from high birth rates, heretofore the growth was due mainly to migration (Johnson & Lichter, 2008). Latino migration began as a trickle in the early 20th century and only later snowballed into the transformative event that now dominates public discourse. Prior to the mid-1980s, Latino immigration was typically a circular process; migrants came to the United States temporarily to meet a financial need back home, such as the purchase of a car, a house, or a business (Durand & Massey, 2006). After they earned enough, they returned back to their country of origin only to repeat the trip some time later.

However, a rise in U.S. nativism during the 1980s led to calls to restrict—and even halt—the inflow of Latino migrants. These calls led to major immigration reform in 1986 and a virtual militarization of the U.S.–Mexico border using specialized equip-ment, personnel, and eventually a fence (Cornelius, 2001). Crossing the border became more difficult, expensive, and exceedingly dangerous (Massey & Capoferro, 2009). However, despite this increased adversity, intensified border control seems to have backfired. Ironically, rather than discouraging Latino migrants from entering the United States, increased border enforcement simply discouraged migrants in the United States from ever leaving for fear that they could never return. So those who came to the United States now stayed, ending the age of circular migration and usher-ing in a new age of permanent settlement and a massive rise in Latino population growth (Massey & Capoferro, 2009). Indeed, in the two centuries from 1790 to 1980, the U.S. population of Latinos grew to about 14 million. Yet in the 28 years since, their population more than tripled to about 47 million (American Community Survey, 2008; Census Bureau, 2002).

As the Latino population grew, criminologists turned their attention to Latino com-munities, fully expecting a rise in crime. This expectation was forged a century earlier





when Eastern European immigrants settled mainly in low-income areas beset by high rates of crime (Shaw & McKay, 1942). At first, the migrants were feared and loathed by those who used a late-Victorian Darwinian logic to adjudicate the immigrants as culturally and biologically inferior (Coser, 1977). However, this view was later brushed aside by an emerging Chicago School and the rise of the oldest and most venerable framework in criminology: social disorganization theory. The theory envisions the community as a web of formal and informal ties that connect people and institutions to each other. This web of “connectedness” helps steer the well-organized community, like a gyroscope, along the path to conformity (Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974). In addi-tion, like a gyroscope, this internal mechanism of self-balance is at once resistant to small change and yet vulnerable to big change, especially over a short period of time (Kornhauser, 1978). Change can occur, for instance, when migrants pour in and tempo-rarily disrupt a community’s capacity for social control (Bankston, 1998).

However, the grand old theory seems not to apply to Latino immigration. In con-trast to earlier findings, the assumption that Latino immigration disorganizes commu-nities and raises crime seems widely disconfirmed (Desmond & Kubrin, 2009; Martinez, Nielsen, & Lee, 2003; Martinez & Lee, 1998; Stowell & Martinez, 2007, 2009). So although the Chicago School applied to the concerns of the age, perhaps geographic mobility is not always suitably framed as a source of instability (Shihadeh & Barranco, 2010c). Fueling this doubt, Sampson (2006, 2008) suggests that contrary to expectations, Latino immigration actually drives crime rates down, not up. In widely noted commentaries, he points to the natural experiment that unfolded during the 1990s, when crime rates plummeted while Latino immigrants poured into the country, and when immigration rates finally leveled off, so too did crime rates (Sampson, 2006). Others too openly doubted whether Latino immigrant communities could be adequately understood using the 100-year-old center-piece of Chicago School think-ing which requires that a “do-not-disturb” sign hang at the community gates for crime rates to be low. This raised further talk of a so-called “Latino paradox”; that even though many Latino communities are irrefutably poor, they are at low risk for crime (Sampson, 2008)—which collided with an even more deeply etched idea in criminol-ogy and confirmed in the landmark study by Land et al. (1990) that economic depriva-tion causes crime.

To explain the Latino paradox, Sampson shies away from economic explanations and the old disorganization model to instead highlight the advantages of concentrated immigrant communities. According to Portes and Jensen (1992), such areas are “a network of small enterprises that offer employment comparable to those of the main-stream economy . . . [and] this network creates new entrepreneurial opportunities for newcomers—opportunities that are absent elsewhere” (p. 420). In the classic sense, they offer a complex web of interdependence developed no doubt over generations, one that is instrumental in absorbing newcomers. It is a culturally and linguistically familiar environment that serves as staging area for migrants to assimilate into the host society. So it stands to reason that Latino migrants will likewise derive these benefits—as long as they continue to settle in these concentrated immigrant areas.





New Destinations in Latino Migration

Whereas the sheer volume of Latino migration is well known, less known is how that migrant flow changed. Before the current phase of border enforcement, 90% of migrants entering from Mexico settled in just three states, namely, Texas, California, and Illinois (Massey & Capoferro, 2009). However, by 2000, that number dropped to less than 50%, as migrants sought new destinations as an alternative to the old and well-established Latino communities in the Southwest. This was when Latino migra-tion transitioned from a local event, primarily in the Southwest, to a national phenomenon (Durand et al., 2000).

Massey and Capoferro (2009) outline several reasons why Latino migration diver-sified to other parts of the country. First, the physical blockades of the border were selective, concentrated in the main entry points El Paso and San Diego (known as Operation Blockade and Operation Gatekeeper, respectively). However, rather than stemming the flow, the blockades simply redirected migrants away from traditional settlement states toward other parts of the country. They found alternative routes, through Arizona and New Mexico, and then moved deeper into the country (Massey & Capoferro, 2009). Second, the mass legalizations resulting from immigration reform flooded local labor markets, especially in California which accounted for 54% of all legalizations. The resulting oversupply of labor reduced California’s economic appeal as a destination for migrants. Mass legalizations also freed previously undocumented Latino labor in California to leave the recession-hit area and try their luck deeper in country (Massey & Capoferro, 2009). Third, the California recession of the early 1990s prompted then-Governor Pete Wilson to blame the State’s economic problems on its immigrant population. His message resonated with voters who then passed Proposition 187 which (a) stopped undocumented migrants from using social services, (b) required state and local authorities to report suspected illegal aliens, and (c) made the sale or use of false citizenship documents a felony offense (Calavita, 1996). Although most of its provisions were later declared unconstitutional, the message to migrants was clear: you are invaders and are no longer welcome in California. Fourth, whereas California’s economy sputtered, other state economies across the country grew robustly. This lured young, male, foreign-born Latino migrants away from tradi-tional destinations in search of better opportunities elsewhere, especially the Old South, but communities from New England to the Pacific Northwest also witnessed a surge in Latino labor (Suro & Singer, 2002). Regardless of the reasons, it is clear that Latino migrants have extended far beyond traditional areas to settle in new, less estab-lished communities (Durand et al., 2000).

English Nonproficiency and the New MigrationThe arrival of Latino migrants in new destinations had a major impact. In rural areas alone, about 200 counties would have declined in population between 2000 and 2005 were it not for the immigration of Latinos (Lichter & Johnson, 2006). The influx of so





many Latino workers shifted the ethnic composition of low-skill labor markets. The shift displaced Black workers in urban areas, resulting in a rise in Black violence (Shihadeh & Barranco, 2010a). Likewise, in rural areas, the influx of Latinos dis-placed White workers, leading to a corresponding rise in White violence (Shihadeh & Barranco, 2010b).

The migrants themselves, many of them Spanish monolingual, must have faced a profound isolation surrounded by English-only speakers. While nearly one fourth of all Latinos in the U.S. speak English poorly or not at all (U.S. Census, 2000a, 2000b), the penalties for English nonfluency may vary by region. In traditional areas, migrants may feel less pressure to learn English because of sheer size and density of the established Spanish-speaking population (Lazear, 1999; Massey & Denton, 1988; McManus, 1990). However, in new destinations, Latino migrants did not fall into the arms of a well-established and Spanish-speaking enclave. To the contrary, they arrived in places that had never seen a significant Latino population and whose English-speaking residents were ardently monolingual and often resentful of the new arrivals.

In this new environment, the migrants’ nonproficiency in English would be highly conspicuous and potentially restricting. English nonfluency limits wages (e.g., Bellante & Kogut, 1998; Bleakley & Chin, 2002; Kim, 2003; Kossodji, 1988; Park, 1999; Potocky-Tripoli, 2004) and diminishes the benefits of education on labor mar-ket outcomes (Park, 1999). Among Latinos in particular, Kossodji (1988) observes that they “are disproportionately penalized in the labor market when they do not speak English well” (p. 218), earning perhaps as much as 20% to 30% less than others. Poor English proficiency increases the odds that Latino homes will be foreclosed because borrowers cannot understand the complex verbal and written documentation involved in the home loan process (Mueller, Singer, & Carranza, 2006). In a broader sense, learning the language of the host society is the very cornerstone of cultural assimila-tion (Espinosa & Massey, 1997; Hwang, Seanz, & Aguirre, 1997; Linton, 2004). It is a critical component in the broad set of human capital necessary to function in the host society (Chiswick, 1991).

When English nonfluency is widespread, it may also increase the levels of Latino violence victimization for a number of reasons. First, migrants who are linguisti-cally isolated are less able to grasp important cultural subtleties critical for their per-sonal safety, like the cues that differentiate good areas from bad. A myriad of such cues are learned through verbal and written communication over the course of one’s socialization—a lengthy and complex process even for native English speakers. Second, because non-English speakers are less able to engage the formal economy, they carry large sums of cash instead, making them “walking ATMs” and easy prey for would-be robbers (Bauer, 2009). Third, the robbers themselves are further emboldened because Latino immigrants are reluctant to report the crime to formal authorities (Bauer, 2009). Fourth, the arrival of so many Spanish-only speakers may generate hostility among the local, English-only constituency. Fifth, English nonfluency may increase the levels of Latino victimization indirectly by first harming economic prospects.1





In sum, the U.S. Latino population is not only growing dramatically but also now settling in new destinations, well outside the well-established immigrant communi-ties. Without the social control benefits that traditional immigrant communities pro-vide, the limitations of English nonfluency may be especially acute and may provoke serious outcomes like lethal violence. We examine the question more closely in the analysis below.

MethodThe unit of analysis is the county, and the sample consists of the 755 counties with at least 2,500 Latinos, for which there was ethnically disaggregated homicide data avail-able for 2000. County-level socioeconomic indicators are from the Summary Files 3 and 4 from the U.S. Census for 2000.

Homicide data are typically obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uni-form Crime Reports, or from the Supplementary Homicide Reports. Unfortunately, these sources do not provide information on Latino offending or victimization.2 Instead, we obtain Latino homicide victimization counts from the National Vital Statistics Sys-tem’s Multiple Cause-of-Death mortality detail file. These data come from death certifi-cates filed to the Center for Disease Control by local coroners and include a wide variety of causes of death, including homicide.3 These data are suitable for three reasons. First, these data do not suffer from serious missing data problems as in the Supplementary Homicide Reports. Second, Arias and Tejada-Vera (2008) find that race and Hispanic ethnicity reporting on death certificates is not subject to serious problems of misclassifi-cation. Third, as victimization data, they suit our question well as we are concerned with whether English nonfluency makes Latinos more vulnerable to serious violence. How-ever, these data may also be suitable proxies for Latino offending, though more evidence is needed to confirm this. Nevertheless, victims and offenders are known to be of similar race/ethnicity (Boland, 1976; O’Brien, 1987), which helps explain why Supplementary Homicide Reports (offending) and Vital Statistics homicide data (victimization) are highly correlated across geographic units (Wiersema, Loftin, & McDowall, 2000).

As homicide is a statistically rare event, homicide counts are averaged over a 3-year period (1999, 2000, 2001) to account for year-to-year fluctuations (Shihadeh & Flynn, 1996; Shihadeh & Steffensmeier, 1994). This rarity also means that many units have zero or near-zero counts, giving it a Poisson-like distribution and making OLS inap-propriate as an estimation method (Osgood, 2000; Osgood & Chambers, 2000). Thus, following current convention, we use negative binomial regression analysis to predict the pooled 3-year homicide counts.

Independent VariablesThe main substantive variable in the analysis is a measure of English-speaking abil-ity. We examine this in two ways. First, we consider the degree of linguistic isolation





experienced in Latino households. Specifically, it is the proportion of Latino house-holds in the county in which all members 14 years old and above have at least some difficulty with English (Census 2000). The alternative variable is English nonfluency, which is the proportion of all Latinos in the county who speak English “not well” or “not at all.” This is from a self-assessment question on the census meant for respon-dents who indicated they spoke a language other than English. As the results were substantively identical either way, we only report the results using linguistic isolation.

There are several control variables in the analysis. Because of the potential for multicollinearity from the combined use of macro-level disadvantage measures, we employ a principal components factor analysis to derive Latino economic deprivation. The variables comprising this index are the proportion of Latinos that are (a) unem-ployed, (b) below the poverty line, (c) in single-headed households, and (d) without a high school diploma. We also include the proportion of the population that has moved in the past 5 years (moved) and the proportion of all housing units that are vacant (vacant houses). Both are often used as controls for residential instability and social disorganization. Proportion Jobs Low-Skilled controls for the effect of low-skill jobs on violence (Shihadeh & Ousey, 1998) and the strong presence of Latinos in low-skill jobs.4 We also include Latino median age, proportion Latino, and the proportion Black. We include total population of the county as an exposure variable in the nega-tive binomial analysis. Given the potential differences between urban and rural areas, we control for whether the county is metropolitan (metro = 1). Also, because high population density may increase the opportunity for homicide, we include the propor-tion of housing units that are in clusters of five or more (housing density).

Throughout the analysis, we estimate models for three groups of counties. The first is the full sample of counties that meet our population criteria above. The second is a sample of counties that are in traditional destination states for Latinos. These include counties in California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois, Arizona, and New Mexico (based on their 1990 Latino population). The third group are counties in new destina-tion states, those states that exhibited a 50% or greater increase in the Latino population from 1990 to 2000—North Carolina, Arkansas, Georgia, Tennessee, South Carolina, Nevada, Alabama, Minnesota, Kentucky, Nebraska, Iowa, Mississippi, Oregon, Dela-ware, Utah, Indiana, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Virginia, Kansas, and Rhode Island.

ResultsThe descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1. The substantive variables are further disaggregated by region (traditional vs. new destinations). Findings reveal few regional differences in the overall level of socioeconomic deprivation in Latino com-munities. For instance, in both traditional and new destinations, about half of the Latino population (.48) lacks a high school degree. Likewise, the Latino unemploy-ment rate is identical in both areas (.053), as is the rate of single-parent households (.14), though traditional areas seem to have slightly more Latino poverty (.25) than do new destinations (.21). However, the regional similarities evaporate when examining





linguistic isolation. Across all counties in the sample, about 24% of Latinos are lin-guistically isolated from English. However, that number masks important regional differences. In traditional destinations, nearly one in five (.22) have no fluent English speaker in their household, whereas in new destinations it is nearly one in three (.31).

While Latinos in new destinations are linguistically isolated, they are also more vulnerable to violence than their counterparts in traditional areas. According to the results, the homicide rate for Latinos across all counties is 7.08 per 100,000, placing it closer to the (non-Latino) White rate (4.77) than the (non-Latino) Black rate (13.43). This is consistent with the story line in prior research (cf. Phillips, 2002) that despite the economic pressures, Latino communities are unexpectedly safe from seri-ous crime—the so-called “Latino Paradox.” However, such claims conceal important

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of County-level Variables for Latinos in 755 U.S. Counties

M SD

Proportion Latino 0.17 0.19Moved 0.21 0.08Housing density 0.19 0.09Vacant houses 0.10 0.07Proportion jobs low-skilled 0.57 0.07Latino median age 24.96 2.98Proportion Black 0.09 0.11Metropolitan (1 = metro) 0.66 0.47Latino homicide victimization ratea 7.08 8.31 Traditional destinations 6.30 6.08 New destinations 9.06 11.44White homicide victimization rate 4.77 3.53Black homicide victimization rate 13.43 25.17Latino economic deprivation Poverty 0.23 0.08

Traditional destinations 0.25 0.08New destinations 0.21 0.07

No high school diploma 0.46 0.16Traditional destinations 0.48 0.14New destinations 0.48 0.18

Unemployment 0.06 0.02Traditional destinations 0.05 0.02New destinations 0.05 0.02

Single-headed households 0.15 0.05Traditional destinations 0.14 0.04New destinations 0.14 0.04

Linguistic isolation 0.24 0.12 Traditional destinations 0.22 0.08 New destinations 0.31 0.14

a. Expressed as a rate in the descriptive table, but counts are used in the negative binomial regression.





differences in Latino homicide by region. In traditional areas, the Latino homicide rate drops to 6.30, putting just above the White rate of 4.77. In new destinations, the Latino homicide rate is much higher (9.06), nearly 50% higher than the rate for Latinos in traditional areas—that is, also about double the White rate (4.77) and nearly three quarters as high as the Black rate (13.43). So contrary to the paradox narrative, new Latino communities cannot be characterized as safe.

Multivariate AnalysisTable 2 shows the result of the negative binomial regressions predicting Latino homicide victimization (see also the zero-order correlations matrix in the Appendix). We estimate models for all counties (Model 1), for traditional destinations (Model 2), and for new destinations (Model 3). Model 1 predicts victimization for all counties (n = 755). The analysis shows that linguistic isolation is positively related to victimization (0.88), meaning that when Latinos are isolated from English-speakers in their household, this is linked to higher rates of homicide victimization. To put this in a more comprehensible metric, we convert selected coefficients to a percentage analog using (eb*s – 1)*100, where b is the coefficient (0.88 for Model 1) and s is the standard deviation of language isolation (0.12 from Table 1). As (e0.88*.12 – 1)*100 = 11.1, then a one-standard-deviation rise in Latino linguistic isolation is associated with a 11% rise in their victimization.

Table 2. Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Latino Homicide Victimization in U.S. Counties, 2000

1 2 3

All counties Traditional counties New destination counties

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Proportion Latino 4.78*** (1.32) 3.94*** (0.33) 8.43*** (0.97)Moved 1.32** (0.56) 0.34 (0.83) -1.53 (0.97)Housing density 0.90** (0.46) 1.73*** (0.60) 1.13 (0.93)Vacant houses -0.93 (0.76) -0.82 (1.00) 0.33 (1.72)Proportion jobs low-skilled 1.25* (0.74) 2.57*** (1.01) 0.78 (1.18)Latino median age 0.03 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.06)Proportion Black 1.62*** (0.36) 1.52* (0.83) 2.78*** (0.47)Metropolitan -0.04 (0.11) -0.10 (0.15) 0.06 (0.19)Latino economic deprivation 0.33*** (0.06) 0.14 (0.09) 0.33*** (0.11)Linguistic isolation 0.88** (0.42) -1.48** (0.79) 1.43** (0.68)Exposure (Total population) R2 .14 .12 .15 N 755 332 232

Note: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.*p ≤ .1. **p ≤ .05. ***p ≤ .01.





The next two models estimate Latino victimization separately by region. In tradi-tional destinations (Model 2), linguistic isolation has a negative effect (–1.48, converts to –11.2%), meaning that more linguistic isolation is linked with less homicide in these more established areas. Although seemingly counterintuitive, the negative relationship may be reflecting the protective benefit of established immigrant areas. We visit this in more detail in the discussion section. In contrast to the negative effect in traditional areas, linguistic isolation has a positive effect on Latino homicide in new destinations (1.43). Converting this to a percentage, (e1.43*.14 – 1)*100 = 22.1, implies that a one-standard-deviation rise in the linguistic isolation will increase Latino violence by nearly one quarter. Furthermore, these results—both the positive and negative effect—are mir-rored when replacing linguistic isolation in the household with English nonfluency of Latino individuals (not reported in tabular form). Regardless of the measure, in counties where Latinos are unprotected by an established community, their unfamiliarity with the host language is linked to higher levels of homicide victimization in their communities.

The Mediating Effects of Economic DeprivationThe results reveal important regional differences in the effect of economic depriva-tion. Despite the long-standing relationship between poverty and crime, the level of Latino poverty in traditional areas has no demonstrable effect on homicide (see Model 2). New destinations, in contrast, provide no such protective benefit. In these areas, eco-nomic hardship significantly increases the level of Latino homicide victimization (0.33, Model 3). The converted parameter, (e0.33*.95 – 1)*100 = 36.7, of 36.7% indi-cates a very strong association between economic hardship and the levels of Latino violence, an association that does not exist in the protected environment of traditional areas. Simply put, when Latino poverty rates are high, so too are the levels of serious violence directed against Latinos, but only in new destinations.

This raises the possibility of an indirect causal mechanism in new destinations. Specifically, we know thus far that both linguistic isolation and deprivation raise Latino homicide in these areas. We also know from prior research that linguistic isola-tion harms economic prospects by reducing wages and harming employment pros-pects. Thus, a potential indirect mechanism exists whereby linguistic isolation increases homicide by first intensifying economic deprivation. We test this possibility in Table 3 by predicting Latino economic deprivation using linguistic isolation (OLS model). Evidence points to a strong relationship between these two variables in new destinations (4.27). The standardized beta coefficient of .62 (unreported) suggests that a one-standard-deviation rise in linguistic isolation is linked to a two-thirds rise in Latino economic deprivation. This supports the ample literature demonstrating how unfamiliarity with the host language harms economic prospects. In turn, economic deprivation significantly raises Latino homicide (0.33, Model 2), thus supporting the possibility of an indirect effect. However, despite the indirect effect, there are multiple pathways by which linguistic isolation raises violence. After all, even after controlling for the indirect effect, there remains a direct effect of linguistic isolation on homicide,





independent of economic hardship. Thus, there are at least two paths between linguis-tic isolation and homicide among Latinos; one is direct and the other is indirect via economic hardship, and both exist only in new destinations.

Discussion and ConclusionThis analysis intertwines two major factors that influence violence in Latino commu-nities. The first is the geographic dispersion of Latino migrants away from traditional areas and toward new destinations throughout the country and, second, the disadvan-tages that arise when Latinos are not fluent in English. Specifically, we observe four interrelated findings: (a) The widely held view that Latinos generally live in safe places is true only for those in traditional destinations; (b) Latinos who settled in new destinations are murdered at an exceedingly high rate; (c) This elevated risk is linked to the high levels of English nonfluency among Latinos in new destinations; and (d) In these nascent communities, the linguistic isolation of Latinos increases homicide in two ways: directly and indirectly by first increasing Latino economic deprivation. We draw several implications from these findings.

First, it is misleading to characterize Latino communities as one, undifferentiated group, despite the practice in prior research. On the contrary, they are bifurcated into two distinct communities. One is established in traditional immigrant areas, well-organized safe havens, where Spanish is the modal form of communication in business, social, and

Table 3. Indirect Effects Models Predicting Latino Economic Deprivation and Latino Homicide Victimization in New Destination Counties, 2000

1 2

Latino economic deprivation Latino homicide victimization

Model 1 Model 2

Proportion Latino 1.19** (0.60) 8.43*** (0.97)Moved -3.22*** (0.50) -1.53 (0.97)Housing density 0.57 (0.57) 1.13 (0.93)Vacant houses 3.15*** (0.93) 0.33 (1.72)Proportion jobs low-skilled -2.00*** (0.74) 0.78 (1.18)Latino median age -0.23*** (0.03) 0.01 (0.06)Proportion Black -0.10 (0.30) 2.78*** (0.47)Metropolitan -0.18* (0.10) 0.06 (0.19)Latino economic deprivation — 0.33*** (0.11)Linguistic isolation 4.27*** (0.30) 1.43** (0.68)Exposure (Total population) R2 .71 .15 N 232 232

Note: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.*p ≤ .1. **p ≤ .05. ***p ≤ .01.





religious life. Here, Latino newcomers could thrive under a comparatively safe umbrella of social control without being penalized for not knowing English. However, when Lati-nos dispersed to new parts of the county, their linguistic isolation could not be offset by an established and organized community network. The Spanish monolingualism that worked well in traditional areas was now a major liability, resulting in at least two major penalties; it lowered the odds of economic success and raised the levels of violence against Latinos. Thus, even though old and new Latino communities share many cultural traits, in terms of their macro-social contexts, they are a world apart.

Second, acknowledging this duality in the Latino migrant experience takes the puzzle out of the “Latino paradox”—the idea that Latino communities are often poor and yet have little crime. It only seems like a paradox because prior literature neglects the new Latino settlements scattered throughout the country. Bringing this population back into the equation reconciles the link between resource deprivation and crime, confirmed by Land et al. (1990) and upheld in a subsequent assessment (McCall, Land, & Parker, 2010 [this issue]). Likewise, this also vindicates social disorganiza-tion theory which itself was born out of a need to explain crime-ridden immigrant communities a century ago. When recent research failed to link Latino immigration to crime, the theory’s predictive power was thrown into doubt. However, that doubt now seems misplaced when we expand our variance and consider the rest of the Latino population, not just those favored in prior studies. When weighed against the disorder of some new Latino areas, old and long-established Latino communities seem orga-nized and stable. Their low rates of crime are not adverse to social disorganization theory; Just the opposite—they are the example that proves the rule. By the same token, the greater violence in new Latino areas ratifies the basic Chicago School edict, that disorganized places have high rates of crime.

Third, the shift from mother tongue to English is an old topic in immigration/linguistic research. However, while other immigrant groups have made that transition, studying Latino communities can offer new insights. Compared to other immigrant groups, Lati-nos have been more resistant to learning English (Lopez, 1982), perhaps because their massive and concentrated population created a rich and self-contained environment in which there is little urgency to learn English. However, new Latino migrants have no such luxury and may be compelled to acquire English more rapidly and in greater numbers—or face resentment from an increasingly nativist population who view dropping of the mother tongue as the litmus test of Americanization. Add to this, our economic uncer-tainties and the pressures on Latinos to acculturate can become regrettably subtractive, requiring them to learn English and drop Spanish entirely. We wonder how American culture is any richer when newcomers are forced to forget their knowledge.

As the new migrants adjust, hopefully their communities will cultivate the structures that dampen violence. Unfortunately, a tough recession has amplified anti-immigration sentiments into a full-blown rage, focused squarely on Latino immi-grants. There are calls for even more restrictions on health care, education, and other basic services to immigrants. If these drumbeats continue, another outcome is entirely possible, one where Latinos in new destinations become the underclass of an ethnic group that by 2050 will be one in four.




349

App

endi

xZ

ero-

Ord

er C

orre

latio

n M

atrix

1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 9

10

11

12

13

14

(1)

Pro

port

ion

Latin

o

(2)

Hou

sing

den

sity

-.

189

(3)

Vac

ant

hous

es

.318

-.

361

(

4) M

oved

-.

216

.004

.0

26

(5)

Pro

port

ion

jobs

low

-ski

lled

.061

-.

503

.212

-.

141

(

6) L

atin

o m

edia

n ag

e .3

43

.065

.2

86 -.

004

-.28

7

(

7) P

ropo

rtio

n Bl

ack

-.26

4 .3

38 -.

125

-.03

5 -.

237

.060

(8)

Lat

ino

hom

icid

e

-.05

7 .0

50 -.

012

-.10

6 .0

28 -.

022

.324

vi

ctim

izat

ion

rate

(9)

Pov

erty

.3

61 -.

190

.322

-.

291

.169

-.

170

-.01

8 .1

86

(1

0) U

nem

ploy

men

t .1

65 -.

017

.025

-.

293

.092

-.

313

-.13

2 .0

15

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(1

1) S

ingl

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aded

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lds

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7 .1

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037

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117

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-.

268

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316

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56

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20

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-.

069

-.10

0 .3

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251

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.1

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028

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(14)

Met

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litan

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348

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510

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391

-.04

7 .2

53

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343

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144





Author’s Note

An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology, Philadelphia, in November 2009.

Acknowledgment

The authors wish to thank the reviewers for their comments.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article.

Notes

1. A wide-ranging study by Wadsworth and Kubrin (2007) hints that English nonfluency actu-ally lowers Latino suicide. However, the independent effect of language proficiency cannot be identified as it was merged in a five-variable index measuring culture.

2. In 1980, the Federal Bureau of Investigation attempted to add Latinos to Supplemen-tary Homicide Reports (SHR) forms, but it was so unsuccessful that they abandoned the attempt by middecade (Fox, 2005).

3. Multiple cause-of-death data include 456 different causes of death. Assault (homicide) is coded as number 432 and encapsulates all other homicide subcategories (such as discharge of firearm, strangulation, blunt object, etc.).

4. Following recent research (Shihadeh & Barranco, 2010a, 2010b), we define low-skilled industries as those where 50% or more of the workers in that sector have no high school diploma. Using the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Career Guide to Industries (2006), I find the following industries to be low-skilled: agriculture, forestry, and fishing; mining; construc-tion; manufacturing; transportation; retail trade; accommodation and food services; other ser-vices; and waste management.

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Bios

Edward S. Shihadeh is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology at the Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge. Currently, his main interest is Latino immigration and crime. His criminological research also focuses on race as well as on the Southern subculture of vio-lence. He has several forthcoming articles in Social Forces, Deviant Behavior, and elsewhere.

Raymond E. Barranco is a doctoral candidate in sociology with a concentration in criminol-ogy at Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge. His main area of interest is race/ethnicity and crime. He has several forthcoming articles in Social Forces and Deviant Behavior examining the link between Latinos and crime.




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