LAUGHING BUDDIES: Finding Parallels Between Stand-Up Comedy and Friendship

Melissa Eng

Bucknell University May 2016

INTRODUCTION Friendship is arguably a central component to living a happy human life. Friendship can

be understood as a mutual commitment between people and can exist in various degrees of

intensity. In its most ideal form, friendship holds value in itself rather than for the sake of mere

self-interest. Friends are responsible for observing and evaluating each other’s characters to

make them the best they can be. However, it is not quite obvious how such friendships are

formed. Perhaps one component is a shared sense of humor. Laughter is a form of

communication that expresses affirmation of similar values and interests. Stand-up comedy is

one mechanism for laughter that brings a random group of people together via joke performance.

Stand-up uses laughter as a form of communication between the comedian and the audience. The

comedian delivers jokes and the audience evaluates them with responses of laughter or silence.

In this paper, I claim that various elements of friendship are illuminated in the comedian-

audience relationship of stand-up comedy. I will first provide general definitions of friendship

and stand-up comedy according to existing literature. I conceptualize stand-up comedy as a

unique conversational form of performance art and offer ideal conditions regarding the comedian,

the audience, the venue, and social and ethical value. I then attempt to construct an image of

complete friendship. I reference the three traditional Aristotelian types of friendship but adopt

the mutual drawing view of friendship as a conceptual model.

In connecting stand-up comedy to friendship, I discuss the value of humor in friendship.

Humor and laughter are necessary components in the establishment of intimacy and emotional

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connection, both of which are integral to friendship and stand-up. I propose that the two similarly

depend on mutuality, intimacy, and moral guidance. I address possible objections but ultimately

conclude that the parallel is incredibly valuable. Conceptualizing friendship and stand-up

comedy together allows us to understand both more deeply. Stand-up comedy embodies various

features of friendship, and friendship contains aspects of artistry. With this, it is apparent that

friendship and stand-up comedy are emotionally fulfilling and intellectually provoking and

therefore, hold great value for both the individual and the collective whole.

DEFINING STAND-UP COMEDY

Generally, stand-up comedy is a performance art involving a comedian and an audience.

Stand-up is conventionally but not necessarily associated with a microphone. Ian Brodie

advocates for the importance of the microphone because it projects the human voice at its natural

register. This creates a more conversational, intimate atmosphere (Brodie, 2014). One of the

most unique aspects of stand-up comedy is the balance between planning and spontaneity, which

gives the impression that stand-up is completely improvised (Quirk, 2015). In actuality, the

comedian performs based on prepared material that is usually influenced by personal experiences.

Oliver Double states that stand-up comedy is constituted by three factors: personality,

direct communication, and present tense (2013). Firstly, the comedian has a unique personality,

which is expressed through performance and public display. Secondly, the show is an immediate

conversation between the comedian and the audience. Thirdly, in its original form, the show is

live and takes place in the present tense (Double, 2013). Of course, the comedian’s main goal is

to make the audience laugh. Sophie Quirk claims that the comedian also enacts a sort of

manipulation in doing so (2015). The comedian utilizes various techniques to get the audience on

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their side of the joke. The audience either supports or rejects the comedian’s jokes based on the

presence, nature, and extent of the laughter.

Jokes are a form of self-expression and therefore, present a persona that can vary greatly

or minimally from the comedian’s offstage personality. Oftentimes, the stand-up persona is an

exaggeration of the semi-authentic or actual “naked self” (Double, 2013). Regardless, the

comedian’s persona offers the audience something to identify with. We are inclined to like

comedians and see something of ourselves in them. In a sense, they are an idealized version of

ourselves because they express themselves in such a vivid way (Double, 2013). In this way, the

comedian also shows us something about our own humor and values. Lastly, persona

distinguishes the individual comedian as unique and memorable. A distinct persona is what

draws people back to a comedian to establish a following. Related to this, image is the residual

memory of the performer after the show end (Quirk, 2015). Both persona and image are

fabricated features of the performance.

The venue in which the show takes place is crucial to the comedian’s performance.

Various features of the venue can either hinder or facilitate the comedy process. Stand-up

comedy succeeds best in small venues that are dark, serve alcohol, and require people to be

together in close quarters. Quirk quotes Peter Brook: “Nothing is so unimportant as comfort;

comfort in fact often devitalizes the experience” (2015, 70). Small spaces allow for more

“uncontrolled” laughter (Quirk, 2015). While a certain degree of physical discomfort is required,

people need to feel just comfortable enough to laugh with a room of strangers. According to

Quirk, alcohol easily accomplishes this; alcohol lowers inhibitions and encourages

responsiveness, both integral contributors to the success of a show (2015).

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A “good room” does not challenge the performer’s authority, but instead ensures it, by

minimizing other distractions and directing attention at the comedian (Quirk, 2015). While some

argue that recordings of stand-up comedy achieve this degree of focused attention, recordings

lack to the necessary physicality of a live show. Ideally, the venue should enhance the flow of

energy throughout the room to foster intimacy between the comedian and the audience as well as

within the audience. Recordings lack the immediacy of the live show. The comedian’s jokes can

still successfully incite laughter, but the show does not achieve the intimacy that is so unique to

live stand-up. Recall Double’s third quality of stand-up as occurring in the present tense (2013).

Thus, technology creates a sort of barrier to the energy exchange.

Stand-up offers a safe space for the comedian and audience to question social and

political boundaries. The sense of community created by laughing together in close proximity

allows for more intimate conversation. According to Carroll, comic amusement often violates

ethical norms in the “manner of vice” (2014, 241). However, these violations are not necessarily

immoral. In fact, violations can act as invitations for open discussion. The productivity of such

discussion depends heavily on the context of the performance. Who tells the joke, where they tell

it, and the intentions with which it is told are integral to the value of the joke. Carroll explains

context in terms of “joke-tokens.” The specific instance of a joke being delivered is called a

joke-token. Carroll states that jokes in themselves cannot be immoral; immorality depends on the

specific performance of the joke (2014). Therefore, comedy runs the risk of being emotionally

and ethically harmful. However, comedy—specifically, stand-up—has the potential to be

socially progressive and morally valuable.

The stand-up comedian has the potential to “influence” the audience; that is, to initiate an

ongoing alteration of the audience’s beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors (Quirk, 2015). Stand-up is

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not just about the comedian’s experiences; it is also about the social groups that the comedian

identifies with. When we laugh at a joke, we also reflect on our own identity. If we laugh at

something that is morally problematic, hopefully it will motivate us to question and reevaluate

our views. The comedian is responsible for targeting uncomfortable emotions and directing the

audience to express them (Quirk, 2015). In addition to identifying problematic topics, stand-up

also suggests how things might be different (Double, 2013).

DEFINING FRIENDSHIP

Friendship is a mutual relationship that sustains over time and across change. Friendship

is founded on honesty, loyalty, similar interests, time spent together voluntarily, and the like. For

our purposes, we will focus on friendship as a relationship between two people. Aristotle

distinguishes between three basic types of friendship: utility, pleasure, and unity. In utility

friendship, one or both friends are committed to the relationship for the sake of an external goal

or purpose; the friend is merely a means to an end. Pleasure friendship is a relationship based on

the pleasure-seeking of one or both individuals. The friendship contains pleasure but the

friendship is not enjoyed on its own terms or in itself.

In contrast, unity friendship is the most true and complete type of friendship for Aristotle.

Unity friends are not in a relationship for any external goal or purpose but rather for the sake of

the friendship itself. Even though the friends may obtain benefits of utility or pleasure from the

friendship, these are merely extraneous perks. The friendship is complete in that its value is

encompassed in itself. Logistically, complete friendship requires both people to be in the same

space and time. Alexander Nehamas says that friendship is founded largely on the basis of

coincidence and contingency (2008). We must first be in the same space or circumstance as the

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other person for a friendship to ensue. The traditional Aristotelian view requires friends to

physically spend lots of time together.

Within complete friendship, Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett discuss three possible

models: the mirror view, the secrets view, and the mutual drawing view (1998). The mirror view

proposes that we choose friends based on mutual recognition of each other’s virtue. The friend is

another self. On this view, “Friendship is based on self-love; as such our choice of friend is

based on an appreciation of the similarity of the other to oneself” (Cocking & Kennett, 1998,

506). The mirror view incorporates the human tendency toward homophily or “love of the same.”

We tend to befriend those who are similar in social identity across a variety of social settings

(Lintott, 2015). However, Cocking and Kennett propose that friendship is more complex than

merely finding people who are like us. There must be a reason why we say “opposites attract.”

Secondly, the secrets view suggests that friendship is founded on a bond of mutual trust.

This view necessitates self-disclosure; the friend has the privilege of receiving information not

available to the public. Cocking and Kennett reference Laurence Thomas: “The disclosure of

secrets, therefore, is of the utmost importance in friendship; indeed, Thomas goes so far as to

suggest that those who are public about virtually everything in their lives have disqualified

themselves from friendship since they are without the resources necessary for conveying trust

and establishing intimacy” (1998, 515). However, it does not seem unreasonable for even a very

close friend to not know every single thing about the other.

Therefore, Cocking and Kennett propose a third view of friendship that involves the self-

reflection of the mirror view as well as the intimacy of the secrets view. This view is coined the

mutual drawing view because it involves receptivity, interpretation, and direction of a friend’s

character and interests. The drawing view introduces a complementary aspect of friendship, in

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which friends depend on each other for both of their sakes. A friend sees things in you that you

cannot see yourself. In this way, the friend brings something invaluable and otherwise

inaccessible to your attention. Each friend is responsible for shaping the other.

In contrast to the secrets view, this model does not always require one friend to feed

information to the other; the friend is receptive enough to take notice on their own. Cocking and

Kennett distinguish the drawing view: “The mirror view and the secrets view of friendship imply

that the self is a discrete and rather static thing that may be disclosed to the friend or found

reflected in the friend. On a drawing account the self is conceived as a relational thing that is, in

part, developed or molded through the friendship, and this process of mutual drawing seems to

us central to the establishment and maintenance of the intimacy of companion friendship” (1998,

505). The mutual drawing view accounts for character development.

Each friend is responsible for evaluating the other’s ideas, views, and character. Although

the friendship may presuppose some similarity in values, the friend has the authority to comment

on the other’s views. However, we are also inclined to adopt our friends’ beliefs. We care more

about our friends than we do strangers. Therefore, we also tend to favor our friends’ moral

stances and behavior. Sarah Stroud offers a case for epistemic partiality: “If friendship

necessarily involves such partiality, then there is a tension, at least, between the constitutive

elements and dispositions of friendship and those of morality: they seem to pull in opposite

directions” (2006, 498). Morally, we should treat everyone the same in terms of evaluating their

behavior. However, this is an unrealistic expectation. Friends mean more to us than strangers.

Stroud argues that friendship places demands on our beliefs and actually necessitates

epistemic partiality. A good friend is expected to defend their friend’s beliefs and motives albeit

potentially immoral ones. For friends, “[W]e tend to devote more energy to defeating or

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minimizing the impact of unfavorable data than we otherwise would” (Stroud, 2006, 505). We

like to think that our friends make the right decisions. We know them well and have certain

expectations of them. Stroud concludes: “And at the end of the day we are simply less likely to

conclude that our friend acted disreputably, or that he is a bad person, than we would be in the

case of a nonfriend. Friendship seems to alter not just the procedures we use to process new

information but the conclusions we end up drawing” (2006, 506). We are reluctant to believe that

our friend is in the wrong, perhaps because it would imply that we chose our friend poorly or that

we would act immorally ourselves.

However, epistemic partiality does not indicate complete stubbornness to believe that our

friend is in the wrong. We simply give more leeway to our friends when hearing their motives.

The action of a friend is interpreted within the context of their other actions and values. In short,

friendship is a serious commitment that actually pervades our process of belief-formation.

Friendship necessarily involves a “slowness to update her belief in the light of new data” (Stroud,

2006, 514).

HUMOR & FRIENDSHIP: People Who Laugh Together, Stay Together

Morreall’s account of the social value of humor implies that laughing is a very effective

means by which to develop intimacy with another person. He writes:

To laugh with another person for whatever reason, even if only at a piece of absurdity, is to get closer to that person. Indeed, humor can even be directed at the laughers themselves, and still have this unifying effect. Getting stuck in an elevator between floors with people, or running into people at the bank door on a bank holiday, often makes us laugh at our common predicament, and this laughter brings us together (1983, 115).

Something as menial as sharing a random incongruous experience is enough to get strangers to

laugh together and connect on a basic level. Hence, it is difficult to imagine friends who do not

laugh together. Mordechai Gordon refers to Ted Cohen’s account of humor, in which jokes

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create intimacy between two people by highlighting common beliefs and feelings. Jokes provide

proof that what one person finds finny is similarly recognized by the friend (Gordon, 2014, 63).

DeSousa says that laughter is a “great revealer of character” (Morreall, 1987). Taste in art—in

this case, a sense of humor—is not randomly related to our taste in friends (Carroll, 1947).

Carroll writes:

But though art may not be the only way or the unique way in which we explore each other, initiating this sort of exploration of each other’s sensibility, temperament, and taste is one of the central functions of art, and probably not only in our time and culture. Art, in short, is, among other things, a vehicle by which we may discover and construct an intimate community—by which we cultivate (a pregnant metaphor here) a circle of friends (Carroll, 1947).

Considering humor a type of taste, a shared sense of humor is a way to get to know someone.

Sharing a sense of humor with someone is finding a deep commonality in sensibility (Carroll,

1947). Morreall agrees that laughter is integral to friendship by claiming that when two people

fight, one of the first things they do is stop laughing together (1983, 115). When a friendship

begins to deteriorate, our friend’s sense of humor seems increasingly peculiar to us (Carroll,

1947). Thus, laughter serves as a sort of marker of the health of a friendship.

Gordon claims that humor enhances intimacy in friendship in at least three ways. Firstly,

humor increases pleasure among friends. Secondly, humor exposes identities and makes us

vulnerable. Thirdly, humor helps people view things from a different perspective (Gordon, 2014).

These loosely correlate with the various aforementioned views of friendship, culminating in the

unity view. Pleasure, self-disclosure, and directing are all aspects of friendship. Therefore,

Gordon’s argument implies that humor has a natural and necessary place in friendship. He refers

to Bennett Helm’s assertion that intimacy implies that we are receptive to having our friends

direct and interpret us and change our interests (Gordon, 2014). Helm’s impression of intimacy

aligns with Cocking and Kennett’s mutual drawing view of friendship in that friends contribute

to the shaping of your character.

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Therefore, a friend’s interests have a great impact on our own interests. We are more

open to adopting our friend’s interests because we value them on other grounds. Helm says: “To

be directed by your friend is to allow her interests, values, etc. to shape your own; thus, your

friend may suggest that you go to the opera together, and you may agree to go, even though you

have no antecedent interest in opera. Through this interest, enthusiasm and suggestion…, you

may be moved directly by him to acquire an interest in opera only because he’s your friend”

(Gordon, 2014, 62). We can foreseeably apply the same concept to humor and stand-up comedy.

We choose friends based on their sense of humor but also develop our sense of humor based on

our friend’s.

Cohen argues that we have a longing to share jokes with others; we want those we care

about to appreciate the same jokes as us. By acknowledging a shared sense of humor through

laughter, we establish intimacy with the other person. In fact, Cohen claims that jokes illuminate

our connection to humanity: “When we laugh at the same thing, that is a very special occasion. It

is already noteworthy that we laugh at all, at anything, and that we laugh all alone. That we do it

together is the satisfaction of a deep human longing, the realization of a desperate hope. It is the

hope that we are enough like one another to sense one another, to be able to live together”

(Cohen, 2008, 29). Laughter in itself connects us and satisfies human desires. On Bergson’s

account, laughter is a social gesture used to make fun of people who are being inflexible or

ridiculous (Morreall, 1986). In this way, humor is a way to overcome problems in friendship;

humor facilitates the move to a more comfortable place in friendship (Gordon, 2014).

In turn, I propose that humor plays a similar role in creating intimacy in stand-up comedy.

Even within the short duration of a stand-up show, a successful set fosters a unique connection

between the comedian and the audience as well as within the audience. Perhaps a comedian’s

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jokes can provide the basis for friendship. I argue that stand-up naturally mirrors at least three of

the same features or values of friendship: mutuality, intimacy, and moral guidance. The

comedian and the audience must both participate for a successful stand-up show. For shows with

paid admission, of course the comedian and the audience both choose to be present. For shows

without tickets or that take place at more casual, smaller venues, the comedian must earn the

attention of the audience.

Similarly in friendship, each person must convince the other that their first meeting earns

future contact. We meet countless people during our lifetime, but we only choose a select few to

be our friends. Although comedians cannot completely choose their audiences, they do make an

impression. The first show someone sees by a certain comedian will determine whether the

person is interested in future shows. Morreall implies a connection between friendship and

comedy, in which humor is inherently friendly in nature: “Sharing humor with others, then, is a

friendly social gesture. It shows our acceptance of them and our desire to please them” (Morreall,

1983, 115). Sharing humor assumes that both people acknowledge each other and are in

agreement. This positive first experience implies a willingness to continue the relationship.

With this, friendship and stand-up comedy share reliance on coincidence or circumstance.

Alexander Nehamas claims that friendship is largely based on circumstances over which we may

not have complete control (2015). For example, our parents often decide the town, school, and

religion that we are part of during childhood. Within this pool of people, we then choose our

friends. Thus, there are physical and geographical limits to our possible friendships. At smaller

shows, the audience is often introduced to the comedian for the first time upon arrival at the

venue. In a sense, the comedian and the audience are brought together by circumstance. The

mutuality lies in each side’s willingness to be receptive to the other during the show.

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Secondly, I argue that both friendship and stand-up comedy strive for intimacy. Intimacy

implies that we are receptive to having our friends direct and interpret us (Gordon, 2014, 62).

Generally, intimacy is the establishment of trust, comfort, and personal connection in a

relationship. Aristotle and Montaigne agree that such intimacy requires two friends to spend

considerable time together. In this way, intimacy has a physical as well as emotional connotation.

Consequently, I suspect that intimacy can be either facilitated or hindered by physical

surroundings.

Self-disclosure is another major factor in developing trust and intimacy. Cocking and

Kennett write: “The sharing of information about ourselves that we are not willing to share with

most others is the way in which we convey our intimate trust in each other” (1998, 515). Self-

disclosure makes the person sharing the information vulnerable and communicates deep trust in

the other. The intimacy of self-disclosure lies in the fact that we choose to share that which we

personally hold high value in as private information. The intimacy of friendship also depends on

each friend’s willingness to be interpreted and directed by the other.

Morreall implies that the person with a sense of humor is more willing to be shaped by a

friend. The person with a sense of humor is more “imaginative and flexible in his general

outlook, and so is less likely to get obsessed with any particular issue or approach to an issue”

(1983, 116). Humor is thus advantageous in handling life’s problems. Morreall continues: “Such

a person will be more open to suggestions from others, and so will be more approachable. The

fact that a sense of humor keeps one from getting too self-centered or defensive about his ego

also helps in this regard” (1983, 116). The person with a sense of humor is a more desirable

candidate for friendship because they are willing to shape and be shaped by friends.

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Intimacy is one of the main indicators of a successful stand-up show. This intimacy is

created largely by the flow of energy between the audience and the comedian. Doubles explains

this exchange: “The audience is energized and bonded into a group by the comedy that flows

from the performer, and the performer is filled with the energy that he or she gets from the

audience’s responses” (2013, 188). Energy flow cultivates the feeling of a personal relationship

with the comedian and also bonds the audience into a wholesome group all receiving the same

jokes. A skilled comedian is also able to use the venue to circulate energy and convince the

audience that they should laugh. Quirk refers to the space of stand-up comedy as abstract, in

which “jokers can operate outside of the restrictions which govern most regular interaction”

(2015, 36).

In order to illuminate the intimacy that can be achieved in smaller venues via energy

exchange, Lockyer contrasts arena comedy. Ultimately, arena shows lack the unique intimacy of

smaller stand-up shows (Lockyer, 2015). While some version of comedy can be performed in an

arena setting, the grand atmosphere poses limitations. Due to the size and layout of the arena, the

pace of jokes must be faster, the comedian must be more physically active in their performance,

and the material must be more broadly appealing (Lockyer, 2015). Arena comedy does not allow

for as much of a conversation and in turn, makes the energy exchange more difficult. Interaction

between the comedian and the audience is minimal (Lockyer, 2015, 593). Consequently, this

limitation “can result in a dilution or negation of more obtuse or challenging comic material”

(Lockyer, 2015, 593). The less conversational atmosphere and corresponding lack of intimacy

are not conducive to the discussion of problematic social norms.

On the other hand, Michael McIntyre and Robert Stebbins claim that that bigger venues

and crowds encourage the contagious spread of laughter. They insinuate that arena comedy is

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productive for controversial or taboo topics if even a small portion of the audience responds

positively with laughter (Lockyer, 2015). It makes sense that a larger audience yields a higher

change for a particular joke to get laughs. However, the risk involved in telling a taboo joke in

small, intimate venues foreseeably increases the weight of that commentary. Even without laughs,

the joke is more difficult to ignore or disregard because of the intimacy between the comedian

and the audience and within the audience.

Arena comedy leaves room for the audience to get away with getting distracted and pay

selective attention to the comedian. Recall Quirk’s definition of a “god room” as one that ensures

the authority of the comedian by minimizing extraneous distractions and drawing attention to the

performer (2015). Jo Brand criticizes the lack of interaction with the audience in arena comedy:

“[I]t doesn’t seem like you have a relationship with them really because you can’t go, hey, you in

the third row, what’s your name and what do you do” (Lockyer, 2015, 597). The ability to

converse with individual audience members gives stand-up much of its uniqueness as a

performance art.

Lastly, I propose that friendship and stand-up comedy both function as mechanisms for

moral guidance. Firstly, I claim that both involve a degree of partiality. As aforementioned, the

drawing view of friendship asserts that each friend interprets and directs the interests and

character of the other. On the one hand, Sheila Lintott argues that the common homogeneity of

friendship “undermines me and curtails my moral growth” (2015, 14). However, this problem is

only a partial concern because not all friendships rely on the homogeneity of the mirror view.

Nevertheless, Lintott’s consideration of the influence of friendship on moral development is

helpful in illustrating a more accurate albeit complex picture of friendship.

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Lintott explains: “The extent to which a friend can assist me in this manner depends in

part on how much we differ” (Lintott, 2015, 14). Therefore, although positive moral guidance in

friendship cannot be fully guaranteed, friendship has the potential to alter problematic moral

attitudes and beliefs. Marilyn Friedman suggests that friends who are extremely similar will

merely reinforce the existing values that the friends share rather than transform each person’s

problematic views. (Lintott, 2015). I agree that friendship can reinforce shared views, but I also

propose that similar friends can hold views that are neither completely synonymous nor static.

Consequently, I attribute high value to more diverse friendships, which offer more

variable perspectives. Homogenous friendships should not be completely discounted, but I do

advocate more passionately for more diverse friendships. Of course, these friendships are more

difficult to initiate and cultivate, but they are certainly not impossible. Friendships between

people who differ allow for more daring but beneficial interpretation and direction. Because of

the epistemic partiality in friendship, friends can identify and hold us accountable for morally

problematic beliefs. Just as friendship demands that we favor our friend over a stranger,

friendship also seems to demand that we call our friend out on their flaws. Complete friendship

demands honest assertions and accordingly, is even able to survive those that target sensitive

topics or insecurities.

Stand-up comedy involves similar moral guidance in the nature of its content and

delivery. Of course, comedy has the potential to be immoral, offensive, and harmful. Just as

friendship between similar people can reinforce shared values, violent, immoral comedy can

foreseeably perpetuate violent, immoral views. Michael Billig discusses the damage inflicted by

violent racist jokes, in which he confronts the debate about whether jokes can ever be “just jokes”

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or whether they actually validate prejudices. Christie Davies argues that ethnic jokes are based

on stereotyping and are thus humorous rather than serious (Billig, 2005).

The risk of comedy is that it can be misinterpreted as supporting violent, immoral humor:

“The joking context creates a temporary situation which seems to permit laughter at

exaggeratedly stereotyped unreal members of the outgroup, as jokers celebrate the funniness of

their joking and deny their own racism” (Billig, 2005, 7). Yet, not all jokes relating to race affirm

racist perspectives. The appropriate context for such jokes is constituted by factors such as the

comedian, the audience, and the space in which the comedy takes place. Another term used to

describe the context of a joke is the “joke-work,” the technical properties and devices that the

joke utilizes to produce a humorous effect (Billig, 2005). There is no way to dissolve

responsibility for the delivery of a joke because there is no such thing as “just a joke.”

Billig explains: “Context does not necessarily refer to the immediate person-to-person

context in which a joke is told. It can also refer to a more general ideological or political context

that can affect the meaning and understanding of a joke” (2005, 7). The context of the joke

encompasses the delivery as well as the impact or influence of the joke beyond the spatio-

temporal bounds of the show. Therefore, violent racist jokes differ from ethnic jokes based on

stereotypes because the former are presented aggressively and with hopes that they are taken

seriously. Violent racist jokes are based on supposed “fact” rather than the acknowledgement

that stereotypes are social constructs. Violent racist jokes can be characterized by four basic

features: the joke has victims who are identified by race or identity, the joke does not involve

stereotyping, the victim is a passive recipient, and violence is the purpose of the joke (Billig,

2005). Of course, it is not always easy to distinguish between a violent racist joke and a joke

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based on stereotypes, but Billig insists that we must. Otherwise, we run the risk of supporting

racist views that misuse the comedy label.

In contrast, jokes delivered within the proper context can spark productive dialogues that

address social oppression and inequality. Cynthia and Julie Willett discuss comedy’s potential

for moral guidance: “Racist jokes and other popular sources of ridicule can amplify social

climates of prejudice and fear…But it is also true that humor and ridicule can convert phobia into

a more hospitable climate. For these audiences the contagion of laughter may well loosen the

hold of stereotypes” (2013, 93). Humor offers an outlet through which to introduce serious

matters in an approachable way.

Techniques such as satire can effectively prod at the stereotypes inflicted by dominant

culture (Willett & Willett, 2013, 98). Punching up at the hypocrisies of dominant groups situates

minorities as the unjustly oppressed. Applying experiences of the latter to the former illuminates

the absurdity of these social relations. Willett and Willett explain:

Ever undermining ethnic hierarchies in America, Daily Show’s Mandvi reminds us of the hypocrisy of our immigrant country as he quips that ‘it wasn’t easy for OUR European immigrant ancestors.’ After all, ‘They had a long arduous journey just to get here and then they had to go out and kill a continents worth of squatters, while still suffering from boat lag.’ In fact, he continues ‘I think these new immigrant have it easy. Give me a choice bewteen wiping out a nation of indigenous people and busing tables, it’s no contest—better tips!’ (2013, 98).

This joke juxtaposes historical European and current minority immigration stories and illustrates

the continuing dominance of the idyllic white European. To be white is to experience a certain

degree of privilege. By utilizing sarcasm and identifying the dominant party’s hypocrisy, Mandvi

exposes the flawed “logic” of ethnic hierarchies and racism in America.

Humor therefore, is a productive outlet through which to discuss more challenging topics

such as ethnic hierarchies. Whereas he serious person perceives incongruities as “disturbances in

the practical order of things—something isn’t working as it should,” the humorous person has

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the “capacity for distancing himself from the practical aspects of most situations, and simply

enjoying the many incongruities he experiences or thinks up” (Morreall, 1983, 122).

Furthermore: “Having a sense of humor, then, involves a flexibility and openness to experience

which a fundamentally serious person lacks. In part this flexibility comes from the realization

that what is important is relative to the situation someone is in and to his point of view”

(Morreall, 1983, 123). Having a sense of humor allows us to sympathize with others. Even

though humor involves maintaining a certain distance from the problem, it also involves the

understanding that all people should be respected and heard. Therefore, humor does not discount

the seriousness of life’s problems. If anything, humor voncinces us to pay closer attention.

Morreall clearly advocates for laughter as the preferred lens for life: “Less often

acknowledged is the fact that comedy, too, is about life’s problems. It is not about people doing

well, but about people struggling in a world of conflict and confusion. Like tragedy, it deals with

the disparity between the way things are and the way we think they should be” (2014, 126).

Critics of the philosophy of humor argue that life is serious, so we should not waste time on

humor. However, Morreall indicates that just because humor is associated with joking and

laughter, we cannot assume that comedy should not be taken seriously. Producer Jamil Abu-

Wardeh continues that while we do need to take our responsibilities seriously, we do not need to

take ourselves seriously (Willett & Willett, 2013, 93).

As Cocking and Kennett suggest, our characters are not static; we are capable—and

perhaps responsible—for maturing and changing. Just as friendship shapes our character, stand-

up seems to some of the same work: “Stand-up comedy is an individual talking to a community.

A lot of it is about defining who the individual is, who the community is and how one relates to

the other” (Double, 2013, 239). The comedian guides us in our exploration of self-identity.

Eng 19

Comedians expose our beliefs to us and call us out on those that are morally problematic just like

friends do.

I acknowledge that one could pose several objections to the parallel of friendship and

stand-up comedy. Firstly, the model of friendship that we have been working with involves only

two friends. We could hypothetically apply the mutual drawing view of friendship to multiple

people, but the completeness of friendship begins to disintegrate as the number of people

increases. Stand-up comedy is a one-to-many relationship between the comedian and the

audience so the closeness of the friendship is limited. Yet, I argue that stand-up comedy could

also foster a relationship between the comedian and an audience member or between audience

members, which more closely mirrors an actual one-to-one relationship. The potential for this to

occur is based on the energy exchange and degree of intimacy established during the show.

Another possible objection is the somewhat unidirectional aspect of stand-up comedy in

that the comedian delivers their material to the audience as a performer. Although stand-up is

unique in its conversational style, audience responses are limited to laughter, silence, and

occasionally, heckling. This seems to challenge the claim that friendship and stand-up are based

on mutuality. However, stand-up comedy could still produce a high degree of mutuality with

regard to emotion or comfort even though verbal communication is not completely equal. Of

course, there are also various types of laughter and silence. For instance, even in silence, we can

sense discomfort, confusion, disapproval, or the like.

Furthermore, stand-up comedy is spatio-temporally limited. The live show has a distinct

beginning and end in terms of when and where it takes place. Therefore, direct contact between

the comedian and the audience is defined and bounded so the relationship is more difficult to

sustain. However, the challenge of sustaining a friendship is not completely unlike this;

Eng 20

friendship requires effort. In both conventional friendship and the comedian-audience

relationship, it is possible that geography threatens the continuation of contact.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, I argue that stand-up comedy is a unique form of performance art in part

because of its similarity to friendship. I build a connection between friendship and stand-up

comedy by introducing the role of humor in friendship. Humor serves as a binding mechanism

between friends and assumes some degree of understanding of the other. The presence of humor

through laughter indicates the healthiness and success of a friendship. Similarly, the success of a

stand-up show is largely defined by the ability of the comedian to bring cross-sections of the

audience together in laugher. In order to be comfortable enough to laugh with others, some

degree of comfort and intimacy must be established. Laughing with someone indicates some

degree of trust and reveals something of oneself to the other.

In conclusion, I believe that constructing the aforementioned parallel between friendship

and stand-up comedy not only demonstrates their respective value, but it also deepens our

understanding of both concepts. Stand-up comedy reflects several of the central features of

friendship and friendship possesses aspects of artistry that often go unnoticed. Both are special

types within their broader categories of interpersonal relationships and performance art. In

closing, I hope to have successfully demonstrated the need for a fuller understanding of the

interconnected relationship between friendship and stand-up comedy as crucial mechanisms in

living healthier and more enjoyable lives.

Eng 21

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