law and economics-charles w. upton mergers. other issues predatory pricing refusal to deal tie-in...
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Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton
Mergers
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Mergers
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Mergers
Other Issues
• Predatory Pricing
• Refusal to Deal
• Tie-in
• Mergers
• Cartels
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Mergers
The Economics of Mergers
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Mergers
The Economics of Mergers
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If firms A and B merge, they can
create a monopoly. Thus mergers are of interest to anti-trust economists
and lawyers.
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Mergers
The Economics of Mergers
q*b q*a
MCb MCa
ACb
ACa
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If firms A and B merge, they can create a monopoly. Thus mergers are of interest to anti-trust economists and lawyers.
Mergers can also promote economic
efficiency.
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Mergers
The Economics of Mergers
q*b q*a
MCb MCa
ACb
ACa
p*
If firms A and B merge, they can create a monopoly. Thus mergers are of interest to anti-trust economists and lawyers.
Mergers can also promote economic
efficiency.
Initially courts adopted the “big is bad” rule and looked askance at most
monopolies. Modern economic theory argues
that there can be economic advantages to
a merger.
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Mergers
Two Types of Mergers
• Horizontal Mergers
• Vertical Mergers
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Mergers
Horizontal Mergers
• Two firms producing the same product merge to achieve economies of scale.
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Mergers
Horizontal Mergers
• Two firms producing the same product merge to achieve economies of scale.– Bank A has a huge back office function to clear
checks. It can just as easily handle another 500,000 customers.
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Mergers
Horizontal Mergers
• Two firms producing the same product merge to achieve economies of scale.
• The right size can change over time
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Mergers
Horizontal Mergers
• Two firms producing the same product merge to achieve economies of scale.
• The right size can change over time– McDonald and Douglas aircraft corporations
initially merged to compete with Boeing. – Boeing and McDonald-Douglas merge to
compete with AirBus.
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Mergers
Vertical Mergers
• A firm in industry A sells its output to industry B.
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Mergers
Vertical Mergers
• A firm in industry A sells its output to industry B.
• Two firms merge to integrate their production.
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Mergers
Vertical Mergers
• A firm in industry A sells its output to industry B.
• Two firms merge to integrate their production. Seed and
Fertilizer Companies
Grain Farms
Cereal Companies
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Mergers
Vertical Mergers
• A firm in industry A sells its output to industry B.
• Two firms merge to integrate their production. Seed and
Fertilizer Companies
Grain Farms
Cereal Companies
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Mergers
Vertical Mergers
• A firm in industry A sells its output to industry B.
• Two firms merge to integrate their production. Seed and
Fertilizer Companies
Grain Farms
Cereal CompaniesBasic Theorem: you cannot
create monopoly power by a vertical integration. If one industry is monopolized, it
does not increase its monopoly power by vertical
integration into a competitive industry.
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Mergers
Reasons for Vertical Integration
• Economies of Scope
– A bank that now sells insurance can have one salesman selling both products to the same person.
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Mergers
Reasons for Vertical Integration
• Economies of Scope– A bank that now sells insurance can have
one salesman selling both products to the same person.
• Economies of Control– A gas company that buys a pipeline does
not have to worry about negotiations with the pipeline company.
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Mergers
American vs. European Theory
• Most large mergers require approval from both the Federal Trade Commission and the Monopolies Commission of the European Union.
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Mergers
American vs. European Theory
• Most large mergers require approval from both the Federal Trade Commission and the Monopolies Commission of the European Union.
• US: Is consumer and producer surplus created? If so, approve merger.
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Mergers
American vs. European Theory
• Most large mergers require approval from both the Federal Trade Commission and the Monopolies Commission of the European Union.
• EU test: does this reduce competition? That is, the number of firms selling a product.
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Mergers
General Electric/Allied Signal
• Companies in different markets. US saw economies of scope, integration and control.
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Mergers
General Electric/Allied Signal
• Companies in different markets. US saw economies of scope, integration and control.
• EU saw loss of competition. GE would be buying more from Allied Signal and less from other companies.
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Mergers
General Electric/Allied Signal
• Companies in different markets. US saw economies of scope, integration and control.
• EU Saw loss of competition. GE would be buying more from Allied Signal and less from other companies.
US approved merger, EU did not,
and merger died.
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Mergers
General Electric/Allied Signal
• Companies in different markets. US saw economies of scope, integration and control.
• EU Saw loss of competition. GE would be buying more from Allied Signal and less from other companies.
US approved merger, EU did not,
and merger died.
Who was right?
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Mergers
End
©2004 Charles W. Upton