Hugo Chavez, President of Venezuela:

Analysis of the Events Leading Up to the 2009 Referendum

Sarah McGuire

PA 762 Leadership for the Public and Nonprofit Sector

Final Case Study Paper

Dr. Shea

May 18, 2010

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I. Introduction

Venezuela has a history of conflicting political ideologies as well as economic and social

disparities. For example, Venezuela has integrated democratic practices but military coups are

still a common practice; an increase in economic growth has lead to unequal distribution of

wealth; and lastly, Venezuela is made up of a wealthy minority and an underprivileged majority

(Venezuela Country Profile, 2008). At the peak of Venezuela’s despair, Hugo Chavez presented

himself as the embodiment the country’s painful past and introduced a socialist solution for the

future. During the twelve years Chavez has served as president, Venezuela has changed. The

event that marked a turning point in the country’s future, as well as Chavez’s role as leader, was

the approval of the 2009 referendum, which eliminated term limits for all elected officials in

Venezuela (Timeline: Venezuela, 2010).

By identifying the significant historical political, social, economic and technological

events leading up to the 2009 referendum, I will show how Venezuela, as a result of Chavez’s

role as president, has been transformed since the early 1990’s. Additionally, with the power that

Chavez has accumulated over the years and his influence in all matters of the state leads me to

question how truly democratic is Venezuela? With this question in the background, I will use a

variety of different leadership theories, including a comparison between transactional and

transformational, the charismatic leader, the legitimate power approach and Chemers' integrative

theory, to show how the environmental context and Chavez’s leadership effectiveness resulted in

the 2009 referendum approval.

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II. Scenario Context

Context: Political Factors

Hugo Chavez’s political career began amidst an economic depression, social uprisings

and political turmoil. In 1992, as an attempt to shift power, Colonel Chavez along with six

military officers lead a coup against President Carlos Andres Perez of the Democratic Action

Party (AD) (Timeline: Venezuela, 2010). After one night Chavez surrenders and becomes “the

voice [and face] of the young military generation,” promising on live television to the country

that “Por Ahora” (“For Now”) the military would give up their arms; the Bolivarian revolution,

in reference to 19th century revolutionary leader Simon Bolivar, would be established using

alternative democratic means (The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008). In 1998, Chavez runs as the

“non-politician” president candidate during a time when politicians are distrusted by the masses

of poor Venezuelans, and wins (The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008).

Within the first year of his presidency, Chavez aims to dramatically change the political

structure of Venezuela. In 1999, Chavez rewrites the constitution to reflect a more decentralized

system of government (Country Profile, 2008, 5). Most notably, authoritative power in addition

to funding for social programs, such as healthcare and primary education, are redirected from the

central government to regional and local authority (Hidalgo, 2009, 86). Once the constitution is

approved, a new round of elections are held whereby Chavez wins and is given “a new six year

mandate with the possibility of re-election for six new years” (Timeline: Hugo Chavez, 2010).

As president under the new constitution, Chavez requests the newly modified unicameral

legislative branch (i.e. the National Assembly) pass an “Enabling Law” (Country Profile, 2008,

5). In light of his popularity and an economic downturn, the National Assembly grants Chavez

the power “to decree laws in areas ranging from banking to petroleum to land reform […]

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without legislative debate or approval” (Garcia-Serra, 2001, 265-266). Ultimately, the approval

of the “Enabling Law” begins the deterioration of the balance of power between executive and

legislative bodies (Garcia-Serra, 2001, 266). In 2001, Chavez presents 49 new decrees that

mainly focus on the redistribution of the nation’s wealth via land and oil reforms (Timeline:

Venezuela, 2010).

The new decrees, and Chavez’s heightened role in economic affairs, cause social disorder

occurs throughout the country. Likewise, after 2002, new opposition groups are formed—in

addition to being opposed by the historically dominant political parties, now student-based

groups and Chavistas-lites, former supporters of Chavez, publicly oppose him (Country Profile,

2008, 11-12). After months of violent opposition protests, a military coup ousts Chavez for three

days before he is returned to power (The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008). Realizing the opposition

groups cannot physically remove Chavez from power, they gather over two and half a million

signatures in support of a recall election (Timeline: Venezuela, 2010). In August 2004, Chavez

wins the majority of the referendum votes, confirming his remaining two and a half year tenure

(Country Profile, 2008, 8).

An important aspect to consider as to why the opposition was able to collect 2.5 million

signatures only to lose the 2004 recall election may have to do with the creation of a “black list”

(The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008). With the approval of the National Electoral Council (CNE),

the “Tascón List,” named after “the Chavista parliamentarian who developed it and published it

on his website,” compiled personal information about the 2.5 million voters who initially signed

the recall petition (Hidalgo, 2009, 83). Created “supposedly to help prevent fraud,” fear, arm-

twisting and blackmail spreads throughout the country (Hidalgo, 2009, 83). Despite ongoing

political protests through 2004 into 2005, Chavez ran and won his third presidential term in 2006

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(Timeline: Venezuela, 2010). With his political popularity at a high, Chavez goes on a

nationalism spree.

In early 2007, the National Assembly grants Chavez rule by decree for a second time

(Timeline: Venezuela, 2010). With his new legislative power, Chavez nationalizes key energy

companies (see Economic Factors) and refuses to renew the contract of major

telecommunications company RCTV, which Chavez views as his main political opponent (The

Hugo Chavez Show, 2008). Consequentially, Chavitas and opposition groups alike protest the

closure of RCTV, as it was their main source of entertainment (The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008).

In December 2007, Chavez sets out to reform the 1999 constitution by presenting “a set of

far-reaching proposals, including the abolition of term limits for the president and the weakening

of private property rights” (Country Profile, 2008, 7). Though the National Assembly approves

the 2007 reform bill, voters reject it (Timeline: Venezuela, 2010). This is Chavez’s first political

loss. Chavez takes the loss personally and promises again to the people “Por Ahora” (“For

Now”) the government will accept the failed reform election results (The Hugo Chavez Show,

2008).

Though the 1999 Constitution states "a revised constitutional reform initiative may not be

submitted during the same constitutional term of office of the National Assembly," a shift in

political power forces him to change his mind (Morgan & Dallen, 2008). In the 2008 regional

elections, the opposition parties win several high-profile mayor and local elected positions

(Hidalgo, 2009, 87). Creating a loophole so as to comply with the 1999 Constitution, Chavez

suggests his allies launch a new referendum in 2009 (Timeline: Venezuela, 2010). Voters

approve the referendum, which would eliminate term limits for all elected officials, by 55% of

the vote (Boykoff, 2009, 1). Thus, Chavez and all Chavista elected officials are now free to run

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for office as soon as 2012 and forever after.

Context: Economic Factors

Simply put, Venezuela is rich in oil. Traditionally, the country has had a “high growth oil

export economy,” which supports their political and social programs (Garcia-Serra, 2001, 267).

When Chavez becomes president, he adopts “an economy suffering an unemployment rate of

11%, a budget deficit that reached 9.5% of GDP and a price of oil that had fallen to $8.43US”

(Garcia-Serra, 2001, 274). As part of his political campaign, Chavez “promises to boost state

control over the oil industry and increase revenues from its operation” (Ellsworth, 2009). These

factors greatly influenced the National Assembly’s decision to grant him presidential decree

from 2000 through 2001.

Through precise strategic moves, Chavez slowly gains control over the country’s oil

industry. First, in 2001, one of Chavez’s decree is a new law that required the state oil company,

“PDVSA [to] hold a majority in all upstream oil projects” (Ellsworth, 2009). In February 2002,

Chavez fires the Board of Directors, replaces them with leftist loyalists leading to trade union

and the Fedecamaras business association strikes and a brief military coup (Timeline: Venezuela,

2010). Unsatisfied by Chavez’s return to power, PDVSA leaders and workers strike for nearly

two months practically paralyzing the economy (Ellsworth, 2009). With the help of a private

businessman, Chavez brokers a deal that restores PDVSA into the hands of the government (The

Hugo Chavez Show, 2008). Now in complete control of the oil company, Chavez fires 20,000

employees and “quickly begins using it to finance social programs” (Ellsworth, 2009).

In 2007, Chavez obtains control over four multi-billion dollar Orinoco oil projects

(Ellsworth, 2009). Requiring PDVSA have majority in all oil projects, ExxonMobil’s and

ConocoPhillips’ refusal to hand over majority control in the Orinoco Belt leads Chavez to expel

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or seize their assets (Timeline: Venezuela, 2010; The Economic Meltdown, 2010). Though the

number of exported oil barrels falls throughout 2007, oil prices reached $150 per barrel, allowing

Chavez to further PDVSA’s funding of social programs until the US financial crisis caused oil

prices to decrease in 2009 (Ellsworth, 2009).

In addition to increasing his influence in the oil industry, Chavez has gained control over

Venezuelan telecommunications and a key utility company. During Chavez’s nationalism drive

of 2007, the “government bought controlling stakes in two large private companies, CANTV

(Venezuela’s largest telecom company) and Electricidad de Caracas (EDC)” (Country Profile,

2008, 7). With the nationalizing of CANTV and the closure of RCTV, the Venezuelan people

now only receive government-controlled television stations.

Context: Social Factors

Venezuela is home to a polarized society. Its people are split politically (The Opposition

vs. Chavistas), economically (“mansions overlooking shacks,” The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008)

and socially (the elite minority vs. the poor masses). For twenty years, the politicians ignore

poor Venezuelans; Chavez “rescued their hidden pain and put it on the table” (The Hugo Chavez

Show, 2008). When he first ran for president, Chavez appealed to the masses using a populist

message—identifying with their struggles and promising economic and social justice (The Hugo

Chavez Show, 2008). After becoming president, “in contrast to his predecessors, Chavez has

made the welfare of the Venezuelan poor his top priority” (Rodriguez, 2008, 1).

Chavez created social welfare programs called “missions” aimed at improving healthcare,

education, employment levels and housing opportunities (The Hugo Chaves Show, 2008).

Ironically, the greatest increase in funding came in 2003, after the take over of PDVSA and

before the recall election (Hidalgo, 2009, 81). Still, the government has turned them into “fast

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and flexible instruments for funneling resources to the lowest social classes in a classically

clientelistic fashion, made easier by managing the programs outside the framework of traditional

public administration and budgeting” (Penfold-Becerra, 2007).

Though social “missions” have been started and money has been pumped into them, none

of them ever appear to be finished or produce the intended results. Textile mills are a classic

example of failed intentions. The “missions” train textile workers how to sew but not how to run

the business; all orders come from the government; and as a result, workers remain stuck in the

slums (The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008). Though it is reported that money is being allocated for

social programs, the government has no auditing system in place—no one has any idea of what is

being produced or how much money is being spent (The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008).

Prior to 1998, Venezuela suffered from a shortage of basic goods including food, housing,

utilities, adequate jobs and schooling, etc. Since Chavez has become president, the country has

continued to suffer. Lack of adequate police forces has caused Caracas, the capital, to attain one

of the highest per capita murder rates in the world (The Chavez Meltdown, 2010) and there are

thousands of robbery and kidnappings that occur throughout Venezuela on a yearly basis (The

Hugo Chavez Show, 2008).

The reliance on political campaigns and voting, in addition to protests, petitions and

recalls, suggests Venezuela is a truly democratic society. In fact, Boykoff (2009) notes

Venezuela’s “extensive democratic culture […] for the moment, presents a serious obstacle to

the president’s vaguely defined ideological project of driving Venezuela toward what he calls

“twenty-first-century” or “Bolivarian” Socialism” (1). Though Venezuelans continue to rely on

democratic practices, Chavez’s ability to single-handedly reform the government (see Political

Factors) suggests democracy is on its way out.

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Context: Technological Factors

As the “World’s First Virtual President,” Hugo Chavez has changed the way mass media is

used for political purposes (The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008). Every Sunday at eleven o’clock up

to fifteen million people tune in to watch Chavez hosts his weekly television show, Aló

Presidente (Guillermoprieto, 2006). As mentioned on “The Hugo Chavez Show” (2008), he

obeys “none of the normal ground rules for what is expected for the head of state or, for that

matter, a public official on TV.” His show is an insight into his “radicalized view of society, in

which the rich are evil, the poor are sainted, and those who disagree with [him] are enemies”

(Guillermoprieto, 2006). Every week ministers are required to be part of his audience,

sometimes they are called on to answer questions or report on a project—his TV show portrays

how political decisions are made (The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008).

In general, mass media in Venezuela has dramatically changed since Chavez became

president. Venezuelan’s access to diverse information via television channels or newspapers has

been significantly narrowed (i.e. the closure of RCTV, government-controlled CANTV).

Chavez’s control over the media raises questions regarding whether the government is censoring

information to its citizens and whether or not people have the right to express themselves freely.

For example, in 2006, the “new reform mandates up to five years in jail for crimes by the media

that range from disrespecting the president to inciting panic--offenses that could at whim include

unflattering photographs, nasty political cartoons, and vaudeville sketches” (Guillermoprieto,

2006).

Looking at Venezuela and Chavez from an outsider’s perspective, however, the question of

mass-media framing arises. “Through framing, communicators seek to establish a dominant

definition or construction of an issue. In a way, issue framing is issue categorization: a

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declaration of what a policy dispute is really all about, and what it has nothing to do with”

(Boykoff, 2009, 25). The United States and the United Kingdom have a tendency to report

Chavez in these four frames: “the Dictator Frame, Castro Disciple Frame, Declining Economy

Frame, and the Meddler-in-the-Region Frame [which] send clear “implications” to readers: the

Venezuelan president is a demagogic dictator reminiscent of Fidel Castro who has inept

political-economic policies and can’t keep his mitts out of other people’s business” (Boykoff,

2009, 25). These frames are an interesting aspect to consider when questioning how democratic

a society Venezuela is, especially when the media indicates Chavez retains ultimate power over

the country’s politics, economy and society.

II. Analysis of the Scenario

In searching for the appropriate leadership theories to use in the analysis of Hugo Chavez

and the 2009 referendum scenario, I focused on theories that incorporate how extreme

personality traits can influence a broader context. In this analysis, I will explore both

transactional and transformational leadership styles, the charismatic leader and power approach

and Chemers’ integrative leadership theory to show how Hugo Chavez, a charismatic, legitimate

power-wielding authority, contributed to the 2009 referendum approval.

Analysis: Transactional vs. Transformational

In Montgomery Van Wart’s (2005) book, “The Dynamics of Leadership in Public Service:

Theory and Practice,” transactional leaders are described to generally be middle-level managers

using direct influence or legitimate power in a stable environment making decisions based on the

“rational interest of their followers” (Chapter 10, 305-333). Transformational leaders on the

other hand hold positions high in command, have referent power and use indirect power to make

decisions in a highly unstable environment with “followers motivated by symbolic processes”

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(Van Wart, 2005, 334-338). Based on these two descriptions, Chavez is less of a transactional

leader and more of a transformational leader. Chavez has gradually transformed the nation from

a democracy into a socialist state. For example, the Venezuelan government’s control of the

economy and influence and funding of social programs. Despite the fact that democratic

practices are still used in Venezuela, Chavez directly changed most of the economic and social

aspects of the country during his legislative power sprees (i.e. 2000-2001 “Enabling Law” decree

and 2007 decree). Therefore, Chavez’s use of referent power influences the approval of the 2009

referendum. As a result, this change to the Venezuelan Constitution could be seen as

transformational, as it will most likely have a significant affect on the future of the country’s

democratic standing.

Analysis: A Charismatic Leader

When comparing transactional and transformational leadership styles, Chavez is more the

latter but when contrasting transformational with a charismatic leadership style, Chavez

outshines as a charismatic leader. As Van Wart (2005) explains, a charismatic leader is

descriptive, focuses on his/her own personality and traits, is concerned about follower problems

and evaluates great leaders and their behaviors (338-345). In addition to being charismatic,

Chavez also uses an inspirational leadership style. Thus, he is able to successfully gain and

maintain supporters through articulating his vision for the country in a mesmerizing show of

emotion. Although he sometimes rants and rambles for hours about various political, economic

or social topics on his TV show, he always returns to the main issue or ideology

(Guillermoprieto, 2006). Furthermore, his constant appearance in the limelight allows him to

overtly display his three main character traits: high self-confidence, resilience and mass amounts

of energy (Van Wart, 2005, 93-102).

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Though many charismatic leaders are servant leaders, such as John F. Kennedy or Gandhi,

Chavez’s charisma appears to be more of a self-serving aspect of his leadership style. For

example, he uses his inspirational leadership style to attract “followers [who] are enthusiastic

sheep” (Van Wart, 2005, 296). He links symbolic references, such as Simon Bolivar and the

Bolivarian revolution, to appeal to his followers’ emotions ensuring their allegiance. For the past

twelve years, he has relied on the Chavistas to support him as president and accept any and all

changes that he makes in the name of the Bolivarian revolution. In return, Chavez pushes money

through to social programs and continues to makes promises for social justice (i.e. redistribution

of wealth, land reforms, etc).

Though Chavez is not an extreme charismatic, there are more negative than positive

aspects to his charismatic personality. As Van Wart (2005) explains, a charismatic leader can

sometimes have difficulties admitting to problems, inhibits criticism, expresses excessive

confidence and is extremely optimistic (296). In reference to Venezuela’s chaotic context,

Chavez does not appear to be admitting to any past mistakes he has made as president; Chavez

inhibits criticism not from the opposition parties but from his supports—he makes it very clear

that you are either with him or against him, there is no gray area (The Hugo Chavez Show,

2008). As mentioned earlier, Chavez is exceptionally confident and optimistic not only

personally but also professionally; it is as if Chavez is the physical embodiment of Venezuela, at

least according to him. His charismatic personality and inspirational leadership style have both

contributed to his ability to obtain and maintain power for the past twelve years.

Analysis: Power Approach

The combination of Chavez’s leadership styles (transformational, charismatic and

influential), vastly contribute to his ability to acquire power. Chavez has been able to

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accumulate power based on the fact he has exceptional communication, social and influential

skills (Van Wart, 2005, 129-141). First, Chavez is an excellent verbal and nonverbal

communicator—as mentioned earlier, he has been described as the “World’s First Virtual

President.” As expressed in “The Hugo Chavez Show” (2008), Aló Presidente is more of a

variety show than a presidential address—he sings, dances, conducts interviews, broadcasts from

locations across the country, from inside a studio to a seaside sidewalk. Furthermore, he fully

expresses his feelings while on the air: he yells and flails his arms when he is mad and uses soft,

gentle tones and facial expressions when he is being sincere.

Second, his communication skills further boast his social skills. Overall, he is responsive

to the people who were ignored for twenty years by politicians; is optimistic about his socialist

state; and as previously discussed, is charismatic. Also, Chavez is socially perceptive, meaning

he has “an honest understanding of [his] own motives, values, drives, and preferences” (Van

Wart, 2005,134). Throughout Chavez’s political career, from the 1992 failed military coup to

the approval of the 2009 referendum, he has strategically adjusted the country to reflect his own

vision of “21st century socialism” (Ten Mostly Wasted Years, 2009). The approval of the 2009

referendum is an indication that when he says he is going to do something, he will find a way to

get it done, whether it means rallying up his supporters or suppressing his opposition.

Third, “influence skills are defined as the actual use of sources of power through concrete

behavioral strategies” (Van Wart, 2005, 136). In this scenario, Hugo Chavez has both positional

and personal power. As President of Venezuela, Chavez has executive power stemming from

being elected president and for two short periods of time had legislative power, which allowed

him to “control the environment” by creating new economic and social decrees (Van Wart, 2005,

136). As previously discussed, his personal power comes from his charismatic and influential

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personality and as a result, his control over his supporters. In general, Chavez uses a wide

variety of power styles to influence his followers but it is his use of legitimate power that has had

the most crippling effect on the political status of Venezuela.

The accumulation of legitimate power has essentially resulted in the corruption of Chavez

as Venezuela’s leader. In the beginning, Chavez used legitimate power to make citizens “aware

of their commitments and responsibilities” to the Bolivarian revolution—he achieved this by

using “accepted values, agreed-upon norms, or customary symbols to effect member compliance

and commitment” (French and Raven, 1995, as mentioned in Van Wart, 2005, 375). Later on,

particularly before the 2004 recall election and then after the rejection of the 2007 referendum,

Chavez resorts to pressure tactics (i.e. the “black list” and “Por Ahora”) to ensure compliance

among Venezuelans. Likewise, he now retains control over the state oil company, which is the

country’s main source of income, as well as major utility and telecommunications companies

meaning Chavez influences nearly every part of a citizens’ day. The 2009 referendum is his

ticket to ultimate power; he is now free to run for president indefinitely. Thus, how true and free

is Venezuela when opposition parties are being threatened, freedom of speech is being censored

and the president is dictating the country’s economic and social programs.

Analysis: Chemers’ Integrative Theory

The combination of a leader’s characteristics and the environmental context come together

to create Chemers’ integrative theory. The successful match up “states that the outcomes of

leader and follower behavior are determined by the degree of fit between the behavior and

demands of the surrounding environment” (Chemers 1997, 163 as mentioned in Van Wart, 2005,

389). In Chemers’ theory, there are three leadership styles: structuring, consideration, and

prominence (Van Wart, 2005, 389). Based on the historical background of Chavez as president,

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it is appropriate to say that he has a prominence leadership style. As defined by Chemers (1997),

“leaders sometimes act simply to increase their own ego satisfaction by drawing attention to

themselves and their contributions without true regard for goal attainment” (as mentioned in Van

Wart, 2005, 389). Chavez is a huge political and public figure in Venezuela; essentially, he has

been described as a “myth in progress,” probably because his persona is larger than life (The

Hugo Chavez Show, 2008). As a means to bypass the fact Venezuela has no auditing system,

lacks transparency and accountability, he draws attention to himself, his rivals or future plans for

the country. In general, the prominence leadership style applies to Chavez’s performance but in

regards to the 2009 referendum scenario, Chavez follows a more structuring (“focusing on

objectives”) leadership style (Van Wart, 2005, 389). The goal is for voters to approve the 2009

referendum, and it succeeds.

Applying Chemers’ three zones of leadership analysis to this scenario will identify how the

right combination of leadership characteristics (intrapersonal), his/his followers (interpersonal)

and an intended outcome (situational) will create productive variables. First, the “zone of self-

deployment” states, “individuals must assess their personal characteristics and the situational

demands” (Van Wart, 2005, 389). Reaching back to the 1992 failed military coup and then the

1998 presidential election, Chavez used the media to successful thrust himself into the public as

a “non-politician” with a populist message. During his time as president, he has only become

more comfortable, confident and persistent about staying in power (Van Wart, 2005, 389). His

successful claim to power and the increase of his legitimate power over time is a direct result of

his relationship with his people.

The second zone of Chemers’ integrative theory is “transactional relationship,” which

describes the “socially constructed reality between leaders and followers [as] central” (Van Wart,

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2005, 389). From the very beginning, Chavez has played off the emotions of Venezuelans. He

constantly reminds the people that their struggle is his struggle; the Bolivarian revolution is his

solution to amending the problems of the past. Additional variables that play into the

transactional relationship zone are the “behavioral intentions of leaders and the reactions of

followers” and “cultural ideals and social norms” (Van Wart, 2005, 389-390). The referendums

and elections in a sense represent Chavez’s intentions, while voting and ongoing political support

represent his followers’ reactions. Though not intended, the military coup against him in 2002

failed only as a result of his followers rallying for his release—they marched and held protests

for three days before he was freed.

The “zone of team deployment” is the third part of Chemers’ integrative theory; it relies on

the fact that “leaders’ effectiveness is enhanced by sustained team efforts, persistence, and

member contributions despite obstacles and setbacks” (Van Wart, 2005, 390). The Chavistas,

representing elected officials and his followers, make up Chavez’s team. On the other side are

the opposition parties. Though loosely aligned, they lack leadership and a political platform

(Hidalgo, 2009, 89). Despite the fact that they have overpowered Chavez a few times (i.e.

protests, oil strikes, recall election, 2007 referendum refusal), Chavez supporters continue to

upend them (i.e. 1999 Constitution approval, Chavez return to power in 2002, 2009 referendum

approval).

The last part of the Chemers’ integrative theory identifies performance variables as

“productivity, efficiency and effectiveness” (Van Wart, 2005, 390). Due to the fact that

Venezuela has minimum production levels, and the government is inefficient and ineffective

(The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008), I will use the approval of the 2009 referendum as a successful

performance variable in Chavez’s political career. Thus, the main characters in this analysis are

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Chavez, his followers and the situational context of Venezuela. Based on the three levels of

interaction, it is because of the relationships Chavez has internally (with himself) and externally

(with his people) that affect the outcome of the 2009 referendum. Essentially, the historical

trend of Chavez’s leadership style is to create a law or write a referendum that he says is for the

good of the country and his loyal followers approve it. The 2009 referendum is no different in

this regard, except for the fact that he has been corrupted by power and this bill serves to satisfy

his ego—in his mind, the approval signifies that the will of his people is to continue ruling as

president.

III. Conclusion

A leader’s rise to power sometimes is the result of his/her characteristics, the context of a

situation or both. In the case of Hugo Chavez, it is both. Chavez presented himself as a

visionary in a country riddled with political, economic and social problems. Though seeking to

change Venezuela for the better, Chavez’s inexperience as a politician or inability to follow

through with intended goals, has kept Venezuela in the same position, if not created an even

worse environment, than before he became president.

As this paper discusses, Chavez’s charismatic, legitimate power leadership style in addition

to his relationship with his followers and the opposition parties’ lack of unity significantly

influenced the outcome of the 2009 referendum. In contrast to leader’s who seek to do good and

positively influence their followers, Chavez’s actions suggests he performs to increase his own

political power and continue sway over his followers, at least according to the US and UK news

authorities. Whether or not Chavez intentionally set out to become the leader is he today, the

approval of the 2009 referendum allows him the opportunity to remain present and powerful in

Venezuela until he is elected out of office or finds a way to become president forever.

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