learning in the spanish conquest: changing beliefs about native rationality in yucatan during the...

7/27/2019 Learning in the Spanish Conquest: Changing Beliefs about Native Rationality in Yucatan during the Expeditions of

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Learning in the Spanish Conquest:

Changing Beliefs about Native Rationality in Yucatan during the Expeditions of Grijalva, Crdoba, and Corts

By Daniel Dufour

History 101

Stephanie Ballenger

Spring 2009

University of California, Berkeley


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Table of Contents

Introduction

Argument 4Definitions 4

Primary Sources 6

Methodology 8

Expedition under Hernndez de Crdoba

Introduction

10 Cape Catoche (Great Cairo)

10

Campeche (San Lazaro)

12

Champoton (The Coast of the Disastrous Battle)

16Florida

18Conclusion

20

Expedition under Juan de Grijalva

Introduction

21

Cozumel (Santa Cruz)

21


27

Grijalva River (Tabasco River)


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34

San Juan

36

Champoton (The Coast of the Disastrous Battle)

38


40

Conclusion

41

Expedition under Hernando Corts

Introduction

43Cozumel (Santa Cruz)

43Champoton (The Coast of the Disastrous Battle)

45

Grijalva River (Tabasco River)

46

San Juan

49

Conclusion

51

Conclusion

52

Works Cited

54

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Argument

In early March, 1517, a group of adventurous Spaniards led by Francisco Hernndez de

Crdoba discovered Yucatan. They held the belief that natives were irrational. In mid July,

1519, the Municipal Council of Vera Cruz, the hastily-made council established by Corts on his

way to Mexico, sent Emperor Charles V a letter updating him on the status of their conquest of

the new world. This letter reveals that Corts believed that natives could be rational and that

some in fact were. The difference in the beliefs of Corts and Crdoba was not accidental but

the result of the Spanish experience in Yucatan from March 1517 to July 1519. Both Corts and

Crdoba based their beliefs on their experiences with natives and also what they learned about

the experiences of other Spaniards. The purpose of this paper is to show how such a remarkable

transformation happened over the course of three successive expeditions led by Francisco

Hernndez de Crdoba, Juan de Grijalva, and Hernn Corts.1

Definitions

Several words in this paper have strict definitions that must be understood.

A rationalactormakes the best decision, knowing what she knows, through logic. A

rational decision is a decision made through logic and because only rational actors use logic,

only rational actors can make rationaldecisions. An irrationalactor does not use logic to make

decisions and therefore usually chooses unwisely.

Actors with a mostbasic rationality are rationalwith regards to making almost

instinctual decisions, such as whether to run from danger, but are irrational when it comes to

more complicated matters like war and diplomacy. Actors with sophisticated rationality are

1Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 14;

Hernn Corts, First Letter, Letters from Mexico, trans. Anthony Pagden (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,

1986), 3.

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rational in making all decisions, including those in war and diplomacy, and can develop and

execute strategies, such as tricking someone into an ambush.

Irrational inconsistency is the changing of decisions without any reason to do so, the

product of irrationality.

Rational-like is a decision that appears rational to an onlooker, considering the onlookers

specific set of beliefs about what are rational and irrational decisions. Rational actors almost

always make rational-like decisions. Irrational actors only make rational-likedecisions by

chance and therefore less frequently than rationalactors.

Irrational-like is a decision that appears irrationalto an onlooker. Rational actors never

make irrational-likedecisions unless a factor unknown to the onlooker affects the decision-

making process. Irrational actorsalwaysmakeirrational-like decisions unless by chance they

make a rational-likeone.

I have chosen to define rationality very simply because racionalidad, the Spanish

equivalent of rationality, as defined by 16 th century Spaniards is simply unworkable for several

reasons. First, the 16th century definition was contested because it entered the debate over race,

religion, and civilization. Second, this paper is more geared toward the idea of rationality and

less the word itself and does not want to get bogged down in modern debates on definition.

Third, this papers version of rationality is defined only by what the Spaniards agreed on during

the exploration of Yucatan. For example, the Spaniards agreed that it was irrational for the

natives to attack them considering their military superiority

Paradox adopts William Taylors definition, a seemingly contradictory set of beliefs that

upon further inspection are not contradictory, and reveal a set of related truths. 2

I have chosen not define the Spaniards in this paper for a number of reasons, but some

2 William Taylor, History 8A Class (UC Berkeley, Fall 2007).

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explanation of its usage is required. The primary source accounts of the expeditions frequently

use we, they, the Spaniards to describe a group of Spaniards specifying which Spaniards

are in the group. This usage obscures the differences of opinion among Spaniards, which we

only get rare glimpses of. Bound by the limit of the sources, this paper generally uses the

Spaniards to mean the majority. This paper looks at what the Spaniards as a group learned and

not as individuals. When the Spaniards decided to do something, the reader need not know

which Spaniards agreed with this decision, but only infer that it must have been a good number

of them because if not, then that decision would not have been made.

Primary Sources

This paper uses translations of five primary sources, Bernal Dazs Historia Verdadera

de la Conquista de la Nueva Espaa, Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedos Historia de las Indias, two

versions of Juan DazsItinerario de Grijalva, andPrimera Relacin.

ForHistoria Verdadera, this paper uses Alfred Maudslays 1908 translation titled The

True History of the Conquest of New Spain because it is the most complete scholarly translation

to date. Bernal Daz finished his work in 1568, decades after the conquest of Mexico, in

response to Francisco Lopez de GomarasHistoria General de las Indias written around 1550.

In old age Bernal Daz had fallen on hard times and had nothing left but the memory of his valor

and historical significance, which Gomara had questioned in his story. Daz wrote his own

version of the conquest story in order to illustrate the bravery, intelligence, and significance of

the Spanish conquerors of Mexico of which he was a part. True History has been consulted for

the analysis of the Crdoba and Corts expedition. It has not been consulted for the analysis of

the Grijalva Expedition, because there is significant doubt over whether that Bernal Daz ever

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went on the second expedition as he claims in True History. Bernal Dazs account of the second

expedition has been put to good use, though, in demonstrating what the Spaniards of the third

expedition thoughthappened during the second expedition.3

ForHistoria de las Indias,this paper usesHenry Wagners 1942 translation of the 1535

version, titledFernndez de Oviedos Accountin Wagners The Discovery of New Spain in 1518

by Juan de Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts. Oviedo was an accomplished royal

official who on coming to Cuba in 1523 set out to discover what had happened on the Grijalva

Expedition asking participants and those that had been in Cuba at the time of the expedition. It is

likely that the pilot of the expedition, Antn de Alaminos wrote the account, but Oviedo surely

sought corroboration on certain facts. As the title of Wagners book suggests, Oviedos Account

will only be used in the analysis of the Grijalva expedition.4

ForItinerario de Grijalva, this paper uses translations of two versions, a 1522 Italian

edition titledItinerario and a 1519 Latin edition titledProvinciae, both of which appear

translated in Henry Wagners The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan de Grijalva: A

Translation of the Original Texts.5 Juan Daz, the Grijalva Expeditions priest, wrote a now-lost

account in Spanish which was translated into these two versions. It is not clear why Juan Daz

wrote his account: possibly for fame, royal rewards, or to tarnish the reputation of Juan de

Grijalva who Daz portrays as reluctant to take any risks. Provinciae andItinerario are

3 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), xxxviii

xli; For an argument for why Bernal Dazs participation in the second expedition is doubtful see Henry Wagner,Summary of the Accounts, The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the

Original Texts (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 18-21.4 Henry Wagner, Summary of the Accounts, The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A

Translation of the Original Texts (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 11-13.5 Wagner translated the Italian version and Dr. H. E. Robbins translated the Latin version. Wagner titled the Latin

editionProvinciae asan abridgment forProvinciae sive regions in India Occidentali noviter repertae in ultima

navigatione or in English,Provinces or districts recently discovered in the West-Indies.

Henry Wagner, Summary of the Accounts, The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A

Translation of the Original Texts (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 5-6.

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consulted for the Grijalva expedition.6

ForPrimera Relacin, this paper uses Anthony Pagdens 1986 translation titledFirst

Letterin PagdensLetters from Mexico. First Letterwas a letter sent by the town council of

Vera Cruz in July of 1519, ostensibly meant to update the crown on the progress being made in

the conquest. Corts had broken the expeditions contract and demonstrated disloyalty to the

Governor of Cuba, Diego Velsquez, and by implication the King by founding the city of Villa

Rica de la Vera Cruz. Corts heavily influenced the writing of this letter to the king if he did not

write it himself, in order to make himself look like both a skilled conqueror and a humble and

loyal servant of the crown. First Letteris consulted for the Corts expedition and for

understanding what the Spaniards of the Corts expedition thought happened during the Grijalva

expedition.7

Methodology

In order to create a complete and credible picture of changes in Spanish beliefs, we must look at

not only what the sources said they believed but also what they did. Passages in the sources that

describe Spanish behavior and beliefs can be misleading for a number of possible reasons. First,

the sources are intentionally dishonest about what the Spaniards believed and did. For example,

theFirst Letterfails to mention Corts blunders. Second, the Spaniards had developed a legal

tradition whereby a military conquest of natives was only just if the natives were treated like

rational actors and given the opportunity to surrender beforehand. Thus, Spaniards often spoke

as if natives were rational contrary to their beliefs in their irrationality. Third, in the words of a

popular psychology textbook, people tend to recall their past attitudes and beliefs as being

6 Henry Wagner, Summary of the Accounts, The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A

Translation of the Original Texts (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 5- 9.7Letters from Mexico, trans. Anthony Pagden (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), xi-lx.

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consistent with their current attitudes and beliefs, often revising their memories when they have a

change in attitude.8 Therefore, sources might be unintentionally dishonest about Spanish beliefs

or actions. For example, Bernal Daz participated in both the Crdoba and Corts expedition and

learned along the way just like any other Spaniard. However, he probably understated the extent

to which his beliefs changed because of this psychological tendency.

8 Michael Gazzaniga and Tod Heatherton,Psychological Science, ed. John Durbin, 2nd edition (New York: WW

Norton and Company, 2006), 285-286.

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Expedition under Francisco Hernndez de Crdoba

Introduction

On February 8, 1517, an expedition led by Francisco Hernndez de Crdoba left Cuba

and steered towards the setting sun and the Yucatan, although they did not know it at the time.

The expedition consisted of a little more than a hundred men and three ships. The adventurers

had staked what little wealth they had on the success of this expedition of discovery, having paid

for almost all the supplies themselves, with a little help from the Governor of Cuba, Diego

Velsquez.

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Cape Catoche (Great Cairo)10

After three weeks and a brutal storm, the expedition spotted land and a large town, which

they named Great Cairo. Curiosity, as well as hunger and thirst, compelled the expedition to

anchor there and quickly discover what this land held. They did not have to wait long, as the

local natives spotted the Spaniards and approached in their canoes. The Spaniards, without a

translator, did their best to welcome the natives to their ships. Apparently they succeed as the

natives boarded the flagship, including one native whom the Spaniards thought to be the cacique.

On deck the Spaniards gave some green beads to the natives who were inspecting their ship, but

the natives did not reciprocate.11 Before the natives left, the cacique gestured that he would be

9 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 11-14.10 Bernal Daz writes that it was given the name Cape Catoche. Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the

Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 18.11 Bernal Daz mentions no reciprocal gift-giving by the natives. This absence is nearly certain. First of all, Bernal

Daz, although old in age when he wrote about these events, probably remembered this encounter in great detail

because of its importance as being his first encounter with natives. Second, Bernal Daz had no apparent motive to

misrepresent the truth at this time. Third, the rest of this encounter will show that the cacique did not want to give a

gift to the Spanish and thus this absence fits in well with the rest of the story.

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back with transport to land.12 The following day the cacique returned with several canoes to the

ships. The Spaniards interpreted the caciques gestures as offering to bring them to his town and

feed them there.13 The cacique offered his canoes, but some Spaniards opted for their own boats

instead. All the Spaniards coordinated a simultaneous landing so that if there was an ambush

they could defend themselves in unison.14 The Spaniards were eager to visit the town but also

careful because they believed that the cacique was irrationally inconsistentand thus could

quickly and without reason change his mind and attack the Spaniards. The Spaniards believed

that the decision to welcome them was rational-like, but not necessarily rational.

Once on shore, the cacique gestured that he wanted to lead the Spaniards to his town.

Crdoba and his men came to a consensus to follow the cacique, but to also take all their

weapons. The cacique led the Spaniards into a hilly area with a lot of brush for hiding where

they were ambushed. The Spaniards fought back well, killing several natives and forcing a

retreat. All the Spaniards survived the attack, but many were wounded. The Spaniards then

happily reaped the spoils of war, plundering nearby temples of their low-quality gold. The

Spaniards left Cape Catoche to continue their discovery as soon as they had loaded their plunder

and cared for their wounded.15

The encounter near Great Cairo presents a paradox. One the one hand, the Spaniards

believed that a native ambush was possible and thus prepared for one by bring their arms. One

the other hand, the Spaniards were gullible and walked right into an ambush.16 The Spaniards

12 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 14-15.13

We should reserve a little bit of skepticism about whether the cacique actually promised food because the Spanishwere without a doubt hungry, although not famished, after weeks of being at sea and it was probably that they infer

from any offer to bring them to a caciques town an implicit offer of food, too. Whether or not the cacique explicitlyor implicitly offered food is not the central concern of this analysis, however.14 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 15-16.15 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 16-17.16 There are two alternate factors to consider here, the superiority of Spanish arms and hunger, but both fail to fully

explain the Spaniards decision to follow the cacique.

First, the Spaniards could afford to be ambushed because of their superior military power. While it is

unclear that the Spaniards believed this prior to this battle, the resulting victory certainly supported this conclusion.

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decided to follow a cacique whom they had just recently met into the unknown because they

must have thought it was very unlikely that natives would ambush them at that time. If they had

appreciated the risks greater, they would have returned to their ships or asked for a real

demonstration of friendship, such as a gift, before advancing. The Spaniards believed that the

cacique was irrational and thus incapable of developing and following through on a sophisticated

plan of persuasively lying about their intentions and then orchestrating an ambush.17 The

Spaniards believed that if an ambush were to happen it would be the result of the natives

irrationally changing their minds.18

Campeche (San Lzaro)

The Spaniards sailed on for a couple weeks before spotting another town, which they

named San Lzaro. The Spaniards were in much need of fresh water and landed to fill up their

casks, assuming that the town must have a local fresh water source. Bernal Daz wrote that the

Spaniards had not forgotten about Cape Catoche: In order that we could all of us land at the

same time, we agreed to approach the shore in the smallest of the vessels, and in the three boats,

The Spaniards cared whether they were ambushed, but their military capabilities afforded them the opportunity to

take risks that they would likely not have taken if they had been in a weaker position. However, this cannot be a

primary causal mechanism because military superiority did not actually force the Spaniards to take risks. [no, but

plunder could be a causal factor, given that the Spanish were technologically superior]Second, the Spaniards were often in need of supplies. Although Bernal Daz does not refer to the gravity of

this need at Cape Catoche, the Spaniards certainly desiredfree food if for no reason more than the fact that supplies

were limited and more supplies would allow the Spaniards to extend their expedition. This cannot fully explain the

Spaniards behavior however as hunger could support a wide range of actions, from automatically looting for food

to begging for food. This cannot explain by itself the particular set of decisions.

17 Inga Clendinnen suggests that the natives may not have intended to trickor ambush the Spaniards at all. The

natives may have thought that the Spaniards preparation of their arms was a tacit acceptance of a challenge tobattle. In any regard, as Clendinnen points out, the Spaniards were effectively ambushed.

Inga Clendinnen, Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1520, 2nd edition (New

York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 7-8.18 I am not saying that the Spaniards would not have prepared for an ambush if they had believed that the cacique

war rational. In reality, both a belief in native irrationality and rationality would have caused the Spaniards to

prepare for an ambush either by chance or plan, but as my focus is on explaining the effects of a belief in native

irrationality I do not discuss this in the body of the paper.

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with all our arms ready, so as not to be caught as we had been at Cape Catoche.19 The

Spaniards learned to be more prepared for an ambush, including while landing, because they had

learned from their experience at Cape Catoche that the natives were more dangerous and the

costs of an ambush higher than they had first thought.

The Spaniards landed as planned, discovered a fresh water pool used by the local natives

and filled all their casks without seeing anyone. On their way out, about fifty natives clad in

cotton mantles presumed to be caciques approached the Spaniards. The Spaniards gestured that

they only came for water and were on their way out. Much like the previous encounter at Cape

Catoche, the Spaniards interpreted the caciques gestures as offering to lead them to their town.

The Spaniards decided to follow the caciques because of their curiosity and the possibility of

food and riches (but not water as they had already filled up). The Spaniards prepared for an

ambush both mentally by keeping well on the alert and physically by maintaining good

formation.20 Although they could have left content with their full water-casks, the Spaniards

decided to follow the cacique while also preparing for an ambush because of three beliefs. This

decision can be explained by three beliefs as follows.

First, the Spaniards had learned from the ambush at Cape Catoche that they should

always be very prepared for an ambush, watchful and in tight formation, even when following a

cacique.21

19

Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 18.20 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 18-19.

Quote from Page 19.21 InAmbivalent Conquests IngaClendinnen writes From that time forward [sometime at sea after Cape Catoche

and before Campeche] decisions as to where to make landfall were dictated not by calculations of security, but by

the coercive need for water. The reader would be wrong to generalize this statement to incorporate all the

Spaniards decisions, however, because as it happened at Campeche, the Spaniards had no need of water when they

decided to follow the caciques.


York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 9.

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Second, the Spaniards did not consider, much to their detriment, that watercouldbe a

decisive factor in triggering native animosity. Fresh water, not only a precious resource to the

thirsty, was also very rare in the nearly riverless Yucatan where sinkholes were the only fresh

water source. Foreigners taking of water from these natural wells usually meant war.22 The

Spaniards did not need to know this in order to wisely choose to leave as soon as meeting the

natives, but only had to consider that watercouldbe a cause of war.

Third, Cape Catoche had done nothing to change the Spaniards belief that it was

impossible for the natives to develop and follow though on a sophisticated plan to deceive the

Spaniards and then lead them into an ambush.

23

The caciques led some of the Spaniards into a temple. While they were inside, native

warriors assembled outside and encircled them. The Spaniards were then afraid that they had

been ambushed, but the natives did not attack. Instead, a native lit some incense outside the

temple and gestured that they would attack if the Spaniards were not gone when the incense

burned out.24 Bernal Daz writes that the Spaniards decided to leave and the reasons he offers are

illuminating:

When we perceived their menacing appearance and saw great squadrons of Indians bearing down on us we

remembered that we had not yet recovered from the wounds received at Cape Catoche, and had been

obliged to throw overboard the bodies of two soldiers who had died, and fear fell on us, so we determined

to retreat to the coast in good order.25

The Spaniards attention to formation, learned from their encounter at Cape Catoche,

22

Inga Clendinnen, Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1520, 2nd

edition (New York:Cambridge University Press, 2003), 9, 17-28.23 Inga Clendinnen inAmbivalent Conquests submits that the Spaniards really had no choice because they believedthat a refusal would reveal their fear and lead to another brutal attack, like at Cape Catoche. (9) This interpretation

only takes into account half of the decision-making process. It ignores the risks of following the caciques, which the

Spaniards certainly evaluated, even if only subconsciously.


York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 9.24 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 19-20.25 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 20.

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strengthened their position and increased the cost to the natives of attacking them. This may

have convinced the natives here to see if they could get the Spaniards to leave some other way.

The Spaniards continued to believe that an ambush was unlikely until they were encircled and

completely vulnerable. At that point it no longer mattered if they predicted an ambush because

the Spaniards could do to little to remove themselves from that vulnerable situation.26

After the Spaniards had used the opportunity to leave, Bernal Daz writes that they feared

that the natives would change their minds and attack them: We had not dared to embark near

the town where we had landed, on account of the great press of Indians, for we felt sure they

would attack us as we tried to get in the boats.

27

The Spaniards believed that the natives could

change their minds and still attack the Spaniards. If the natives had wanted to attack they would

have done so when they had the advantage outside the temple. The natives had no rational

reason to change their minds as the Spaniards left. All that had changed was that the Spaniards

were leaving and were no longer encircled, but the Spaniards thought the natives were irrational

and irrationally inconsistent and thus kept fearing an attack as they left.28

26 Tzvetan Todorov writes that During the first contacts, the Spaniards are not at all concerned with the impression

their behavior makes on those they encounter: if they are threatened, they flee without hesitation, thereby showing

they are vulnerable. Without citing specific cases, it seems that Todorov means that the Spaniards did not care

about their general reputation within the land, something Todorov says Corts changes. This seems to contrast with

Inga Clendinnens argument that the Spaniards were very aware of not making themselves look vulnerable, which is

why they followed the cacique at Cape Catoche. There is a way to reconcile these two arguments with an

understanding about the Spaniards belief in native irrational inconsistency. The Spaniards feared that they could docertain things during encounters, which might cause the natives to attack, but generally speaking, the Spaniards did

not think that general reputation was not an element of the natives irrational decision-making process that only

responded to only tangible factors, if any at all.

Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other, trans. Richard Howard (Norman,

OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 99.

27 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 20.28 A counter-argument supporting the Spaniards continual fear of an attack is that they believed that the nativeswere testing the Spaniards fear and by implication their strength with the burning reeds and that the Spaniards

believed that, upon the natives seeing them retreat, the natives would attack. This argument has a whole though. If

the natives were to attack they would have attacked immediately when the Spaniards were still surrounded and not

have waited till the Spaniards reached the beach. It is the Spaniards belief in native irrational inconsistency that

underlies their fear of an attack even as they are leaving. The counter-argument has similarities to Inga

Clendinnens argument about why the Spaniards followed the caciques in the first place described in Footnote Error:

Reference source not found.

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The Spaniards believed that native irrationality prohibited the natives from tricking them

into an ambush as much as it meant that natives could change their minds quickly and without

reason. Native behavior certainly appearedrandom and unpredictable to the Spaniards who

were ignorant of the importance of certain factors, like water, in the natives decision-making

process. The Spaniards took this one step further, taking the appearance of irrationality as

reality. In other words, the Spaniards believed that the world was as they saw it. In an attempt

to understand confusing native behavior, they simplified it. In reality, Spaniards had already

simplified native behavior before the Grijalva expedition, but because this history is outside the

scope of this paper, the reader only needs to know that it had happened. This simplification had

helped the Spaniards to prepare for the ambush at Cape Catoche and possibly prevented one at

Campeche, but it also made it more difficult for the Spaniards to recognize their own mistakes.

Champoton (Coast of the Disastrous Battle)

From Campeche the expedition sailed for a couple weeks and experienced the same

storms, hunger and thirst as before, but found fresh water sources often enough without native

interference. After these couple weeks, the Spaniards arrived near a river and an unknown town

(Champoton) and followed their now standard procedure of preparing for battle, coordinating

their landing, posting guards, and filling up on water.29 Their experience at Champoton would

not be the standard, however, as their current set of beliefs and procedures would fail them.

While the Spaniards were filling up their water-casks, some natives approached in

silence, which the Spaniards interpreted as a sign of peace. Little was effectively communicated

except for the natives question whether the Spaniards came from the east, which the Spaniards

promptly confirmed. After some time, the natives ended the conversation and left peacefully.

29 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 20-21.

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However, the Spaniards were skeptical of the local natives intentions because natives had begun

to assemble around the Spaniards camp. The Spaniards posted watchmen in case of a nighttime

attack. 30 The Spaniards had learned from their experiences at Cape Catoche and Campeche that

an ambush was very costly, so took turns standing guard.

That night, the Spaniards were encircled by hundreds of native warriors. Luckily for the

Spaniards, their watchmen prove their worth and alerted the rest of the men. The encirclement

had surprised the Spaniards however (much as it had at Campeche) and meant that they could no

longer avoid a difficult battle if the natives wanted to attack. There was some diversity in the

camp about what to do next; attack preemptively, escape immediately, or hold for the night. The

Spaniards decided to hold in their camp for the night and act during the day. The rising sun

revealed that the Spaniards were completely surrounded and hopelessly outnumbered. Unlike at

Campeche, the natives exploited their advantage and attacked the Spaniards. The Spaniards

could not possibly win, so they desperately fought to their boats and sailed away. The Spaniards

suffered gravely. The water-casks and about half of their expedition, a little over fifty men, had

been left behind; fittingly, the survivors dubbed this place the Coast of the Disastrous Battle.

The prospects for a successful discovery at that point were dim, considering the shortage of men

and supplies, so they decided to return to Cuba.31

Standard Spanish combat preparation, so successful in preventing a disaster at Cape

Catoche and possibly at Campeche, was not enough at Champoton. The Spaniards made two

crucial mistakes: taking on water after being approached by natives and sleeping on the shore.

Compelled by their thirst, the Spaniards needed to get fresh water, but they did not need to

continue in that endeavor after they had been caught doing so and certainly did not have to camp

30 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 22-23.31 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 23-26.

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out on land. They could have loaded what water they had attained, slept on their ships, and

returned the following day. The Spaniards chose not to because they did not realize that they

had angered the natives.32 The specific failure to consider that water could be a cause of war was

a result of the interaction of the Spaniards beliefs and the circumstances they found themselves

in, specifically at Campeche. The Spaniards had not recognized the connection between their

taking of water and the natives decision to threaten the Spaniards, because their belief in native

irrationality dismissed looking for a logical connection in the first place.

Florida

On their way back to Cuba, the Spaniards made their last important stop at Florida to

refill their water-casks. The Pilot Alaminos recognized this place and warned that the last

Spaniards to visit here were attacked. But there was no choice, as even Captain Crdoba, was

dying of thirst. The twenty most able Spaniards, those least affected by the damages of war

and sea, landed on shore to fill up what containers they still had with water from the mouth of a

nearby river. They generally followed standard procedure of preparing for an ambush, except for

the fact that they only placed two watchmen. They were so overcome with joy at having

discovered fresh water that they spent too much time filling up: so overjoyed were we that what

with satiating our thirst, and washing our clothes with which to bind our wounds, we must have

stayed there an hour.33 The Spaniards low numbers and exuberance at having discovered water

32 InAmbivalent Conquests, Inga Clendinnen writes They had landed soon after midday, but by the time the casks

had been filled and the parley with the warriors was over the sudden dusk of those latitudes had fallen. IngaClendinnen seems to imply, whether she meant to or not, that the Spaniards really did not have an option to return to

their ships during the day, similar to her argument about the Spaniards following of the cacique at Cape Catoche.

The Spaniards had only reached the point where a daytime withdrawal to their ships was no longer possible, because

they decided to continue filling up on water and communicating with the natives, rather than leave.


York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 11.33 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 28.

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seems had greatly mitigated their preparation for an ambush.

While the Spaniards were filling up, Berrio, one of the watchmen, went off alone to cut

down a tree. While he was chopping, natives ambushed and killed him and then proceeded after

the other watchman. The other watchman ran from the natives to the Spaniards and warned them

with practically no time to prepare. The Spaniards defeated the native warriors, killing twenty,

but several Spaniards were wounded. After loading all the water onboard, the Spaniards left

Florida for Cuba.34 Berrios behavior is a clear demonstration of how the Spaniards beliefs

affected their actions. After being warned by Alaminos that there were potentially hostile

natives in this land, Berrio did something which probably antagonized the local natives. We do

not know what factors caused the natives to attack. Was it Berrios attempt to cut down a tree,

the other Spaniards taking of fresh water, or the Spaniards trespassing, something else entirely,

or a mix of these? The point is that Berrio did not knoweither. If he had recognized any of

these actions as possible factors in natives decisions to attack, he would not have moved to an

extremely vulnerable position to cut down a tree. His actions reveal that he believed that he

could notpossiblycause an attack.

The beliefs of the Spaniards as a whole, and Berrio, in particular remained unchanged

from Champoton to Florida. Specifically, the Spaniards continued to believe that the natives

acted without reason and that they could to do nothing to prevent an ambush except stay vigilant.

From the encounter at Champoton, the Spaniards could not but learn that the cost of

failure was higher than they previously thought. The Spaniards were saved to the extent they

were by what little they did learn, which was to post watchmen. All that was clear to the

Spaniards was that their belief in the dangerous irrationality of natives saved them and therefore

sought no reason to change this. Punishment, in the form of ambushes, for the Spaniards

34 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 29-30.

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mistaken belief in native irrationality did not cause the Spaniards to change their beliefs if they

did not understand what their mistake was.

Conclusion

The Crdoba Expedition, or what was left of it, made it back to Cuba. The Spaniards still

held to their initial erroneous belief that natives made irrational decisions. This belief affected

what lessons the Spaniards did learn, specifically those about their strategies. Their new found

regard for native warriors coupled with their belief in native irrationality resulted in them

learning to be more prepared for ambushes, tighten their formation and clean their weapons, and

to be prepared all the time, including when they disembark, embark, and follow a cacique.

The Spaniards failed to consider that coming close to a town, taking fresh water, or

cutting down trees couldcause war. They also failed to learn that natives had the capacity to

trick them into an ambush. This learning was not the result of unintelligence but rather a result

of the interaction between their beliefs and what actually happened. The Spaniards also quite

naturally generalized and made assumptions about natives. In a dangerous situation and in the

absence of specific information about natives, the Spaniards predicted that all the natives they

encountered in the future would be as irrational the ones they had encountered in the past. The

Spaniards seemed to have over-generalized and this hampered their ability to discern connections

between their own and natives behavior. Information about specific natives encountered was

accessible to the next expedition and thus the next expedition would not have to generalize as

much.

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Expedition under Juan de Grijalva

Introduction

On February 1518, shortly after Crdobas return, another expedition left Cuba for the

Yucatan under the command of Juan de Grijalva. The expedition left with 4 ships, about 200

men, one interpreter.35 Besides having twice as many men, an additional ship, and an interpreter,

the second expedition had two more advantages over the first. First, they had an undeveloped

idea that natives could be rational to a small degree. Second, they had the experiences of a

previous expedition off of which to base their beliefs and decisions.

Cozumel (Santa Cruz)

On May 3, 1518 the expedition discovered the island of Cozumel, which they named Santa

Cruz, and anchored there. It is unclear exactly how much communication the Spaniards had with

the natives during the following couple days. At the least the Spaniards only saw some native

canoes and at the most they and the natives met and exchanged pleasantries and gifts with the

natives promising that their cacique would visit the Spaniards soon.36 Although all three sources

disagree about what happened from this point up through the Spaniards ritual taking possession

of Cozumel, the Spaniards belief that the natives of Cozumel lacked a sophisticated rationality

appears in all of them.

InFernndez de Oviedos Accountthe cacique came in a canoe to the Spaniards ships

35Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 89-90.36 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:

A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 89-91; Juan Daz,

Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts,

trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 58; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New

Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val

Trefz Press, 1942), 69.

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while Grijalva was exploring the coastline in the smaller boats. The Spaniards onboard

entertained the cacique until Grijalva returned. After Grijalva and the cacique exchanged gifts,

the cacique promised to guide the Spaniards to his town that day. The cacique returned to his

town and never went to meet the Spaniards again, implying that he had taken back his promise.

The Spaniards, on their own, tried and failed to find a way to his town through the swamp that

bordered it. The following day, the Spaniards again requested and received permission to visit

the town from some natives in a canoe that was passing by. The Spaniards landed soon

thereafter.37 The Spaniards wanted a welcome, but did not require one, to visit the caciques

town. The Spaniards requested a welcome a second time because, as much as the cacique did

not stick to his promise, they believed that the natives would not stick to the caciques new

decision, a manifestation of irrational inconsistency.

Itinerario agrees with Oviedos Accountabout the meeting with the cacique, but does not

mention the caciques failure to follow through on his offer or the Spaniards second request for

a welcome. Itinerario says that, following the meeting with the cacique, the Spaniards landed

battle-ready because they expected native hostility in spite of the welcome they had received.38

In the story ofItinerario, the Spaniards clearly believed that the caciques welcome did not

guarantee a peaceful landing, because the cacique could be irrationally inconsistent and thus he

could change his mind with reason and attack.

Provinciae mentions no meeting with the cacique or requests to visit his town, but simply

that the Spaniards landed.39Provinciae andItinerario were based on the same account by Juan

Daz, so that the lack in theProvinciae is the result of a translator or editor who felt that the

37 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:

A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 91-93.38 Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the

Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 69-70.39 Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the

Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 58.

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initial welcome was not important enough to include in this version. The belief in the natives

irrationality meant that a welcome was peripheral to a story that was more about deeds than

words, especially the words of the natives which could never be trusted.

A Spanish belief that the natives of Cozumel were irrationally inconsistent runs through

all three sources. Like the Spaniards at Cape Catoche during the first expedition, these Spaniards

believed that the rational-like decision to welcome the Spaniards was not necessarily rational.40

Upon land, the Spaniards performed an act of possession at a nearby temple without any

native resistance. A native priest, under whose care the temple apparently rested, approached the

Spaniards and gave them pipes, which the Spaniards interpreted as a sign of peace. The

Spaniards then celebrated mass in the temple. After that, Grijalva ordered that only he was to

have direct communication and trade with the natives: this order did not go over well with the

rest of the Spaniards.41 Grijalva did not believe that the natives would necessarily make the

rational-like decision to run away from marauding Spaniards; rather, he believed that they could

posses the most basic rationality to makethat decision.

After these new rules were introduced, Grijalva and the natives began an exchange. The

natives gave some food to the Spaniards, but the Spaniards had their eyes set on something else.

Grijalva told the natives that they only wanted gold. At this point,Itinerario andProvinciae

drop off the description of this exchange, but Oviedo carries it on. Oviedo said that the natives

40 A counter-argument could be made that, as Oviedo tells it, the Spaniards asked the natives for permission to land

simply for show, so that they had a legal reason to land. I argue that although the Spaniards may have desired a

welcome, as it gave more legality to their actions, this was not the only reason. The Spaniards had already asked

once and once would have been enough to satisfy a legal requirement. The fact that the Spaniards asked permissionto land at least twice reveals a desire to have more than just a superficial welcome.41 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:

A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 93-95; Juan Daz,

Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans.

Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 70-71; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New

Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val

Trefz Press, 1942), 58. All three sources mention these new rules, but only Oviedo explicitly names these rules. I

have also adopted the timeline of the giving of new rules from the Provinciae and the Itinerario because Oviedo is

ambiguous and unclear on this matter.

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brought some low-quality gold, saying that that was all they had.42 The absence inItinerario and

Provinciae of a description of the actual trading reveals that Juan Daz did not consider that

establishing a friendly diplomatic relationship through trade was important because Juan Daz

believed that the natives were irrationally inconsistentand their friendship could never be

trusted.

All three sources agree that the Spaniards then went to the caciques town, presumably

with a native guide as they had tried and failed to reach it previously. The sources of Juan Daz

and Oviedos Accountdiffer in what they tell happened in the town and what caused the

Spaniards to leave, but the Spaniards belief in the natives lack of sophisticated rationality

appears in all three.

Oviedo says that in town Grijalva held two hopes, to trade for significant quantities of

gold and to visit the cacique. Both turned out unfulfilled. Apparently unconvinced that the

natives did not have high-quality gold, Grijalva asked to trade again and got the same results.

Grijalva asked to see the cacique, but was told by his interpreter that the cacique had decided to

go on a trading mission elsewhere rather than meet the Spaniards. Disappointed Grijalva and the

Spaniards left.43 Grijalva believed that the natives may have lied about how much gold they had

the first time and could change their mind and give up their gold to trade if he only asked again

because they were irrationally inconsistent. Furthermore, the caciques failure to follow through

on his promise surely reinforced Grijalvas belief that the natives were irrational inconsistency.

Ironically, because he believed in irrational inconsistency, he asked to see the cacique a second

42 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 94; Juan Daz,


Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 71; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain

in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz

Press, 1942), 59.43 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:

A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 94-95.

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time, much like he had asked twice for a welcome. The caciques inconsistency meant that he

could irrationally change his mind and make the rational-like choice to meet the Spaniards.44

Provinciae andItinerario do not mention Grijalvas request for trade, but add an episode

about the Spaniards going to dinner. The natives of the town led Grijalva and about ten other

Spaniards, presumably consisting of the Spaniards captains, into a building for dinner. While

they were eating or soon there after, the towns inhabitants surprised the Spaniards by leaving the

town and hiding from them.45 The Provinciae says it most eloquently:

Then after a dinner had been prepared, being courteously invited by them, we were led into a stone building but

suddenly changing their mind, they departed, leaving their huts, so that we saw not one of them after the third

hour.46

With no natives around to talk and trade with, the Spaniards soon left. The Spaniards being led

into a stone building is eerily reminiscent of Cordoba being led into an ambush at Cape Catoche

and a possible ambush at Campeche. Fortunately for the Spaniards this quick change resulted in

the natives hiding, rather than ambushing the Spaniards. The natives inconsistency of trading

then fleeing must have appeared irrational to the Spaniards.

47

By this point in their time at

Cozumel, the Spaniards must have believed that the natives lacked a sophisticated rationality and

44 A counter-argument could be made that Grijalva was in a tactically more threatening position as they were in thetown and that the natives might give up more gold if they have any because of increased fear of the Spaniards

reprisal if they dont. I do not find this argument as persuasive as the one outlined in the paper, because there is no

evidence that Grijalva recognized the change in his tactical position and the affect this could have on the natives. At

the least, Grijalvas behavior does not challenge the argument that he believed that the natives were irrational. The

argument for the Spaniards belief in native irrationality can stand without this episode, however, so this behavior

should not be a focal point of too much controversy.45 Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the

Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 71; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in TheDiscovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins

(Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 59.46 Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the

Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 59.47 It could be argued that the Spaniards walked into this ambush spot because they did not consider it an ambush

spot. This leads us back to the fact that the Spaniards could not perceive of it as an ambush spot, although clearly it

was, because of certain beliefs.

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thus could not orchestrate an ambush.48

While the stories of Oviedo and Juan Daz differ, the Spaniards beliefs in these stories

do not. Both stories describe Spanish behavior that demonstrate a belief that the natives lacked a

sophisticated rationality and were irrationally inconsistent.

While Grijalva landed at Cozumel believing that the natives of Cozumel couldposses a

sophisticated rationality, by the time he left he had given up all hope that they did. Their

encounter got off to a bad start with the cacique failure to meet the Spaniards when they landed

and guide them to his town. This one decision by the cacique to go back on a promise or what

the Spaniards had thought was a promise doomed the rest of the interaction. All actions by

natives would be interpreted under the belief that they did not have a sophisticated rationality.

Even if the cacique had decided later to meet the Spaniards, this would have been too late and

would have appeared as a result of his irrational inconsistencyand not rationality.

Based on what sources we have, it is a little uncertain if Grijalva believed that these

natives possessed a most basic rationality to run away from danger. What is certain is that he

believed that they couldpossess it, which in itself is a significant departure from the beliefs of

Crdoba.

Grijalva believed what he did because of what he had learned from the Crdoba

48 One could argue that hunger and thirst could explain Spaniards decisions to make risky decisions. Factors such

as hunger and thirst, however, can not explain Spaniards decision to go to dinner this time, like they may have been

able to account for some riskySpanish behavior during the Crdoba expedition. The Spanish had left Cuba about 2

weeks ago and the three sources record not troubles with storms or leaky water casks that were in found in the

Crdoba expedition. Furthermore, if Oviedos account is to believed, Grijalva offered the cacique some of theirfood during their meeting although the cacique declined that offer. This is hardly a smart decision if they are

running low on food! A counter-argument could be that the Spanish offered some of their food in the hopes thatthey would be supported by the cacique in greater quantities. I find this answer unpersuasive though because the

Spanish had many alternative things to offer other than food and specifically brought some things other than food to

be traded.

Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De

Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942),

92.

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expedition, although it had only ended months if not weeks before he left. Grijalva must have

been surprised to learn about the alarming frequency of ambushes during the Crdoba

Expedition. One or two ambushes taken separately could easily be attributed to bad luck, an

irrational decision by the natives to attack at coincidentally the same moment when the Spaniards

were most vulnerable, but all three ambushes taken as a whole with the almost-ambush at Cape

Catoche could not be explained as random chance. Grijalva must have wondered if some of the

natives encountered by Crdoba had a most basic rationality if not a sophisticated rationality. He

did not believe that all the natives he encountered would necessarily be rational, but that some

could be and he should always be on the look out for those that were.

49


On May 7, the Spaniards sailed away from Cozumel. For more than two weeks, they

were unable to find fresh water and were forced to drink wine for hydration. It is in this

condition that they arrived at Campeche on May 25.50

The encounter at Campeche would be the first encounter in which the natives had had

previous contact with Spaniards, those of the Crdoba Expedition. The Spaniards believed,

somewhat incorrectly, that the cacique Lazaro of Campeche and Francisco Fernndez de

Crdoba had been friends. As the hour was late at the time of their arrival, the Spaniards held

off landing till the next day. During the night, the Spaniards witnessed from their ships the

natives banging drums and yelling and believed that the natives had seen their ships and were

preparing for battle. Grijalva decided to secretly land combat-ready Spaniards before the dawn

49 Crdoba may have thought it possible that natives had a basic form of rationality, but he certainly thought it less

probable than Grijalva did because Crdoba enacted no policies to demonstrate it, unlike Grijalva.50 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:

A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 99; Timeline is

from Henry Wagner, Itinerary of Grijalva according to Oviedo, The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De

Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 47.

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broke, so that the Spaniards were not vulnerable while landing.51 The Spaniards believed that

Lazaro had been a friend, but they still were very cautious and prepared for combat anyway

because they believed that Lazaro likely lacked a sophisticated rationality and could irrationally

decide to break his friendship with Spaniards.

The Spaniards landing went without incident, but as the sun rose the Spaniards

discovered native warriors had gathered to meet them. Both the Spaniards and natives decided to

put off battle for the moment and communicate through Julin, the Spaniards interpreter who

was probably from Campeche. The Spaniards told some natives who stepped forward as

representatives that they only came to peacefully trade for water, and may have also included

wood and food.52 The word choice in the Provinciae for the description of Grijalvas orders to

Julian highlights the issue of rationality:

Since, however, the number of the inhabitants was large, and in order that there might be no motive to

attack, the captain ordered them to be advised through an interpreter that we had not come there with

hostile intent or for any harm but to obtain water, wood, and article of food and after receiving this we

would withdraw straightaway.53

Grijalva communicated to the natives as if they were rational in order to test their rationality. If

the natives chose the rational-like decision to let the Spaniards supply themselves, then Grijalva

51 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 99; Juan Daz,




Trefz Press, 1942), 72-73. The Provinciae goes as far as saying that Crdoba and cacique Lzaro agreed to a treaty,

the terms of which are not stated.52 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:

A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 100-101; JuanDaz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original

Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 61; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of

New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA:

Val Trefz Press, 1942), 73. Both the Provinciae and Itinerario include wood in the Spanish request. The Provinciae

also includes food.53 Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the

Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 61.

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would be more persuaded of their rationality while also leaving room for the exception that they

were irrational and this was by chance. But if they reject the Spaniards, then they were certainly

irrational.54

The sources are more ambiguous about the native response. Oviedos Accountsays that

the natives answered first that the Spanish must turn back immediately then changed their minds

and allowed the Spanish to get only water. TheProvinciae says that the natives consistently told

the Spanish to go away. Both theProvinciae andItinerario tell that the Spaniards believed that

the natives rejection of their requests was the fault of the translator Julin and not the natives

lack of rationality. The Provinciae specifically adds that Julin told the natives that the

Spaniards were their enemy and would attack them.55 The central question here is did Grijalva

and the Spaniards actually believe that the tense relations were solely because of Julin? Before

answering we must first understand what an answer to this question might mean. First of all, we

have no reason to believe that the Spaniards had learned that competition over resources of

water, wood, and food, could rationally cause war, especially considering that they tell the

natives directly their desire to take resources. Therefore, the Spaniards were left with two

possible answers for the question, why did the natives, seemingly irrationally, demand that the

Spaniards leave? One is that the natives were irrational. The other is that Julin is spreading

false information about the Spaniards. With no credible incentive for the sources to misrepresent

the truth, it is almost certain that the Spaniards chose the second answer. The Spaniards believed

54 A possible factor in deciding to address the natives as rational is that Grijalva may have been trying to lend

himself the veneer of legality and defend himself from later charges of aggression, much like his reading of theRequirement would do.55 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:

A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 101; Juan Daz,




Trefz Press, 1942), 73.

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that the natives couldposses a sophisticated rationality, but Julins lies made it impossible for

the Spaniards to distinguish between a solely irrational-like decision and an irrational decision.56

Although the Spaniards thought Julin was treacherous, they still used him, indicating that they

did not have another option for translator and that they believed that the natives probably would

have made the wrong decision even if Julin had not lied. While the Spaniards believe that the

natives of Campeche couldhave a sophisticated rationality, they considered it unlikely.

Instead of immediately getting water, the Spaniards celebrated mass. After this, the

Spaniards advanced in formation to a well that they believed was used during the previous

expedition and began to fill up their casks. The natives repeated their demand that the Spaniards

leave immediately and brought their warriors into clear view of the Spaniards. Grijalva insisted,

through Julin, that they would stay until the following day to fill up on water.57

Relations between the Spaniards and natives took an upturn when Grijalva asked to trade

and meet Lazaro. The natives responded ambiguously, as it appears in the three sources, that

Lazaro would visit the Spaniards and also that the Spaniards must leave immediately after filling

up. But native behavior changed significantly, as they began to trade their food and gold for the

Spaniards green beads, probably after the Spaniards insistence on trade. The Spaniards stopped

the exchange soon after it had begun, however, because the natives gilded objects were of little

56 It is as if the native rolled a dice, albeit in their heads, and if it landed on one they made the rational-like decision,

but Julin prevented the natives from ever rolling this dice.57

Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 101-102; Juan

Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the OriginalTexts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 61; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of


Val Trefz Press, 1942) 73. Although Grijalvas behavior here might at first look seem unresponsive, we cannot

determine this because the incentive to keep filling up on water were too high. The Spaniards were desperate for

water prior to this encounter and this well did not yield much water. The Spaniards must have been scared of what

would lie ahead of them if they did not fill up on water when they had the chance. Therefore, the Spaniards

insistence on staying does not necessarily reveal a belief in native irrationality.

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worth. Lazaro never came.58 The cost of trading for the Spaniards was extremely low. The

green beads they had were very inexpensive for the Spaniards, but highly valued by the natives.

The Spaniards ended this exchange as soon as they realized that they were not making a very big

profit. The Spaniards did not even consider that this exchange could help develop friendly

relations between the Spaniards and natives. If they had, they would have at least continued

trading a little longer to see if the natives would become friends and change their minds. The

Spaniards believed that peace could notbe bought from these natives. The natives were just as

likely to act irrationally and change their minds whether or not the Spaniards gave them green

beads. From the time that they blamed Julin to the time they ended the exchange, the Spaniards

had lost all hope that the natives of Campeche had a sophisticated rationality. This change was

the result of the natives demonstration of their irrational inconsistency. The natives decision to

trade actually showed that they were irrational because if they were rational they would either

traded in the first place or never trade at all. The Spaniards believed that the natives response to

their presence was inconsistent because of their irrationality. Like at Cozumel, the caciques

failure to appear after it had been promised he would appear, demonstrated to the Spaniards the

natives irrational inconsistency. The Spaniards failed to blame Julin anymore because the

examples of native irrationality were too numerous to be all Julins fault.

Later that day, the situation took a turn for the worse. The natives insisted again that the

Spaniards leave immediately and then escalated the situation by rallying their warriors in front of

the Spaniards. Oviedos Accountalone adds that the natives then tried to unsuccessfully defeat


A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 102-104; Juan

Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original

Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942) 61; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of


Val Trefz Press, 1942), 73. Only Oviedo explicitly states that the Spaniards cut off the trade, but the Provinciae and

Itinerario suggest it in their telling of the Spaniards belief in the low-quality of the natives goods.

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the Spaniards, but we cannot be certain that this happened because such an attack is not

mentioned inItinerario andProvinciae. Regardless, Oviedos description of the Spaniards

attitudinal response to the natives rally and attack is highly informative: The captains and

soldiers said that it was not proper that they should suffer such knavery and insolence from that

bestial people.59 The word choice of knavery, insolence, and bestialsuggest that the

Spaniards believed that the natives could only possess the most basic rationality because of their

animal-like nature.

Tensions remained high during the night as the natives kept watch on the Spaniards while

the Spaniards did the same to them. The next day, the natives repeated their request that the

Spaniards leave and the Spaniards repeated their response that they would leave once they were

completely filled up on water. Much like during the Crdoba expedition, a native began burning

some incense in view of the Spaniards, threatening an attack if the Spaniards were not gone

when it burnt out. The Spaniards said that they would not leave immediately but soon. Some

natives gave the Spaniards some turkeys. When the incense burned out, the natives followed

through on their threat, attacking the Spaniards. The Spaniards held from counter-attacking at

first so that Grijalva could have it taken down in writing that he was defending himself because

those barbarous people were about to attack him without cause. The Spaniards then fought

back and eventually the natives fled after wounding forty Spaniards and killing one. Having

beaten back the natives, the Spaniards continued to fill up on water as they remained vigilant and

prepared for another attack. They actually fired a cannon at some native warriors who were

trying to sneak up on the Spaniards, which scared them away.60


A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 104; Juan Daz,


Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 74.60 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:


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Grijalva decision to disregard the native threat is likely a result of his beliefs formed after

a days interaction with the natives of Campeche. He had already formed the belief that the

natives of Campeche lacked a sophisticated irrationality and succumbed to irrational

inconsistency. Grijalva believed that the natives would probably not follow through on their

threat because they were prone to changing their mind often. At which point, they would return

to their irrational vacillation of responses.

The Spaniards vigilantly posted guards throughout this encounter even after beating

back native attacks because they believed that the natives lack a sophisticated rationality and

could irrationally attack anytime. This belief turned out to be fortunate for the Spaniards because

the natives made what the Spaniards thought was the irrational decision to maintain hostilities.

The Spaniards thought a decision to attack was irrational and to surrender was rational although

it was probably quite the opposite.

All three sources agree that the natives then sued for peace and brought gifts of food and

gold for the Spaniards, but only Oviedo describes in detail what follows till the Spaniards

departure. Oviedo says that Grijalva sent a few messengers to the cacique to see what they

wanted. The cacique promised to come, as the messengers relayed, and bring much gold and

food to the Spaniards. The cacique failed to appear and so the Spaniards left as soon as they

finished getting water, in battle-ready formation.61 Much like the Spaniards of the Crdoba

expedition, the Spaniards of the Grijalva expedition feared being attacked as they left Campeche.

Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts,trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 74; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New

Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: ValTrefz Press, 1942), 61. The quote is from page 106 of Oviedo.61 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:

A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 106-108. Juan

Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original

Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 62; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of


Val Trefz Press, 1942), 74. Quote is from page 107.

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Although they had thoroughly defeated the natives, the Spaniards feared an attack as they left

because they believed that the natives lacked were irrationally inconsistent and could suddenly

decide to attack without cause.

Tabasco River (Grijalva River)

From Campeche, the Spaniards explored the coastline for a couple weeks, finding a good

supply of fresh water and fish on the coastline, before reaching a large river they named Grijalva

River. The rivers strong current prevented the Spaniards from sailing very far upstream, if at

all, but it also meant that fresh water, pushed by the river, could be found out at sea. It is likely

that the Spaniards were greeted by natives firing arrows at their ships from onshore whom they

scared off with cannon fire.62 In spite of this clear indication that they were not welcome, the

Spaniards refused to leave.63 The natives had demonstrated their lack of sophisticated rationality

by attacking the Spaniards, but the Spaniards still believed that peace for a short time was

possible. They would not have stayed if they believed that they would be caught in perpetual

war. The Spaniards believed that if the natives did not change their minds by chance and make

the rational-like decision to seek peace, they could use their military strength to scare the natives

into peace, appealing to the most basic rationality. The Spaniards thought that a peace was sure

not to last forever, but just long enough for the Spaniards to acquire water, food, gold, or

whatever other resources they wanted.64

62

The Provinciae and Itinerario, but not Oviedo, mention this hostile greeting.63 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:

A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 110; Juan Daz,Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans.

Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942) 75; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain

in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz

Press, 1942) 62; Henry Wagner, Itinerary of Grijalva according to Oviedo, The Discovery of New Spain in 1518

by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 47.64 Because the Spaniards were well supplied with water and food at this point, it is clear that a decision to stay was

not the result of a need to acquire supplies from the natives or their land.

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The situation looked grim as the native warriors returned to their positions along the

shore the next day, but through the use of a few captured natives as translators the Spaniards and

natives agreed to trade, instead of war. The Spaniards were right to believe that the natives

would change their minds although they thought incorrectly about the reasons. The exchange

was profitable for the Spaniards and lasted a couple days.65 Oviedos Accountand Juan Dazs

two sources tell different stories about the Spaniards departure from the River Grijalva.

Oviedo simply says that the Spaniards left once they realized beyond a doubt that the

rivers current would not allow them to explore upstream.66

Itinerario andProvinciae say that the local cacique offered a very large ransom of a

mans weight in gold for a native that the Spaniards had captured along the coast a few days

earlier and now used as translator and source of information. Grijalva decided to leave that land,

much to the dismay of the other Spaniards, before the cacique returned to the ships with the

promised ransom.67 If Juan Dazs story is to be believed, then Grijalva must have decided to

leave because he did not believe that the cacique would return with a large ransom if he returned

at all. It is hard to believe the value of this native as a translator and informant outweighed this

enormous offer of gold. Grijalva did not trust the cacique at his word and thus left, possibly

forsaking an opportunity at much wealth, because he believed that the natives at River Grijalva

did not posses the sophisticated rationality to have kept the gold hidden from him throughout



Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the OriginalTexts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 63; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of

New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA:Val Trefz Press, 1942) 75-76.66 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:

A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 112.67 Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the

Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 63; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The

Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner

(Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 76.

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their extensive trade prior to the ransom offer.

San Juan

For about three weeks the Spaniards explored the coastline and participated in a few

minor encounters, before happening upon a relatively wealthy group of natives. On June 19,

while exploring an island off the mainland, the Spaniards saw some natives on the mainland

beckoning to the Spaniards with their white banners. Grijalva decided to send Montejo to

investigate. The natives had a very friendly manner and gave the Spaniards some mantles while

promising to bring gold in the future. The following

learning in the spanish conquest: changing beliefs about native rationality in yucatan during the...

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