lee woodward - social revolution in guatemala

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SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN GUATEMALA

THE CARRERA REVOLT

RALPH LEE WOODWARD, JR.

j-7(j

MIDDLE AMERICAN RESEARCH INSTITUTETULANE UNIVERSITY

NEW ORLEANS1971

PUBLISHED WITH THE AID OF A GRANT FROM

THE FORD FOUNDATION

MARGARET A. L. HARRISON

ROBERT WAUCHOPE

Editors

Publication 23

APPLIED ENLIGHTENMENT: 19TH CENTURY LIBERALISM

Number 3

SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN GUATEMALA

THE CARRERA REVOLT

RALPH LEE WOODWARD, JR.

Issued in 1971

Coleccion Luis Lujan MunozUniversidad Francisco Marroquin

www.ufm.edu - Guatemala

Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2011 with funding from

Universidad Francisco Marroquin

http://www.archive.org/details/socialrevOOIeewguat

C PARED A STRUGGLE FOR INDEPEN-dence, Central Americans engaged in

heated debate and bloody strife throughout

the early years of the 19th century over a

variety of other issues. They came to blows

over church-state relations, fiscal policies, of-

ficeholding, economic planning, trade policy,

and general philosophy of government, but

few issues arose after independence that had

not already been raised during the turbulent

years from 1808 to 1823. 1 In fact, the Central

American political struggle after 1823 may be

viewed as an extension of Spanish politics

from 1808 to 1826. The Conservatives pleaded

for moderation, order and stability of tradi-

tional, familiar institutions. The Liberals

argued for continuation of the Enlightenment

reforms already begun under the Spanish

Bourbons. The latter sought to make Central

America a modern, progressive state, casting

off the burden of Iberian heritage, and to ab-

sorb eagerly innovative republican ideas from

France, England, and the United States.

These Liberals gained the upper hand,

adopted a Constitution in 1824 and elected a

government in 1825. Their victory was by the

barest of margins, yet they embarked on a

bold revolutionary program that terrified their

opponents and led to civil war within a year.

Only after a destructive, three-year blood-

letting did the Liberals once more gain con-

trol of the governments of the State of Gua-

temala and the Federation.

Following their victory in 1829, the Lib-

erals dealt vindictively with the vanquished.

Principal Conservative leaders they impris-

oned or exiled, and the Guatemalan legisla-

ture granted the government extraordinary

powers to deal with those who opposed the

I. See Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., "Economic and

Origins of the Guatemalan Political Parties (1773-1823)," Hispanic American Historical Review, XLV(Nov., 1965), 556-66.

government.2 In the years following, Fed-

eral President Francisco Morazan used the

full powers of his office—and more—to at-

tain order and stability in the Republic. In

this he was generally a failure, as disturb-

ances and anarchy continued in El Salvador,

Honduras, and Nicaragua, while Costa Rica

virtually ignored the federal establishment.

In Guatemala, however, Governor Mariano

Galvez approached the problem with more

success through conciliation. His provisional

predecessors in the executive office, Pedro

Molina (1829-30) and Antonio Rivera Ca-

bezas (1830-31), had dealt harshly with the

hated serviles, but Galvez restored some mea-

sure of harmony to Guatemalan society.3

While he launched a program of radical

economic and social reform, Galvez at the

same time courted certain conservative groups

in the capital, gaining him a broader base of

support. 4 An ambitious program to increase

2. Lorenzo Montufar, Resena historica de Centro-

America, 7 vols. (Guatemala, 1878-87), I, 153-60.

3. Ibid., 126-249; Alejandro Marure, Efemerides de

los hechos notables acaecidos en la Republica deCentro-America desde el ano de 1821 hasta el de

1842, 2d ed. (Guatemala, 1895), pp. 50-84; Miguel

Garcia Granados, Memorias del General Miguel Gar-

cia Granados, 2 vols. (Guatemala, 1893), II, 95-114;

Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Central America,

3 vols. (San Francisco, 1883-87), III, 97-117; MaryP. Holleran, Church and State in Guatemala (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1949), pp. 104-5;

Adam Szaszdi, Nicolas Raoul y la Republica Federal

de Centro-America (Madrid: Universidad de Madrid,

Seminario de Estudios Americanistas, 1958), pp.

153-54.

4. Archivo General de Centro-America, Guatemala

(hereinafter cited as AGCA), leg. 191, exp. 4137;

leg. 3479, exp. 79472, fol. 4; Szaszdi, Raoul, pp. 141-

42; Holleran, Church and State, pp. 100-02; Robert

Sidney Smith, "Financing the Central American Fed-

eration, 1821-1838," Hispanic American Historical

Review, XLIII (Nov., 1963), 490-507; Robert A.

Naylor, "British Commercial Relations with Central

America, 1821-1851" (unpublished doctoral disser-

tation, Tulane University, New Orleans, 1958), p.

85, 154; Pedro Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, 2d ed.

(Guatemala: Biblioteca de Cultura Popular, vol. 30,

Ministerio de Education Publica, 1959), p. 48.

45

46 Social Revolution in Guatemala

production, expand transportation, and col-

onize the lowland areas of the Caribbean

coast, for example, promised tangible benefits

to the merchant class.5 Although political

passions still ran high, relative peace in the

state and mild prosperity resulting from the

expanding cochineal production contributed

to a lessening of political tensions. In the

well-to-do classes—the only ones who had par-

ticipated in politics—by 1834 there was once

more social intercourse among those of dif-

ferent political persuasions. Miguel Garcia

Granados noted that at a grand ball given by

the governor on Independence Day of that

year, "for the first time since before 1829,

all those belonging to 'the aristocracy' came

together." An impartial observer, Garcia Gra-

nados added, would have noticed the har-

mony that reigned among the notables at the

governor's house that night, and would have

believed that a period of peace and prosperity

lay ahead for the state. He would have held

no suspicion that "we were on a volcano, and

on the eve of entering a terrible crisis of im-

mense consequence for our future."

In retrospect, Galvez' first administration

does appear as a calm before the storm. While

the so-called "aristocrats" to which Garcia

Granados referred might have reached a de-

gree of concord, their congeniality did not

reflect the society as a whole, and Guatemala

was soon to be bathed once more in blood.

Governing most aspects of Guatemalan life

were the Europeanized residents of the ca-

pital, a city of no more than 40,000 by 1835. 7

5. See, for example, AGCA, leg. 160, exp. 3375, fols.

17-19; leg. 168, exp. 3545, fols. 11-13; leg. 176, exp.

3765; leg. 177, exp. 3788, fol. 3; leg. 178, exp. 3790,

fol. 11, and exp. 3809; leg. 182, exps. 3972, 3974;

leg. 183, exp. 3989, fol. 15; leg. 1167, exps. 27731-

43; leg. 4126, exp. 92812; Boletin Oficial (Guate-

mala), segunda parte, no. 34 (May 26, 1833), p. 375.

6. Garcia Granados, Memorias, II, 180.

7. Estimates of the Guatemalan population vary

rather considerably for this period. For Guatemala

as a whole, Juan Galindo's figures, quoted byEphraim G. Squier in his Notes on Central America;

Particularly the States of Honduras and San Salvador:

Their Geography, Topography, Climate, Population,

Resources, Production, etc., etc., and the proposed

Honduras Inter-oceanic Railway (New York, 1855),

p. 52, would appear to be reasonable, although

Squier believed the number of whites to be less than

Since the late 18th century, the extended fam-

ily of the House of Aycinena had dominated

the society. Creoles for the most part, it in-

cluded a few Spaniards, among whom the

most notable had been the first Marques de

Aycinena. They had come to be known in

the 19th century variously as "the nobles,"

"the aristocracy," or simply as "the family,"

although by strict European definitions the

terms were inaccurate.8 The political and

economic disturbances that began during the

administration of Captain-General Jose de

Bustamante (1811-18), the decline of indigo

exports, and the disintegration of the old

Kingdom of Guatemala following indepen-

dence all contributed to an erosion of the

collective importance of this white elite. Con-

trary to popular opinion, they were not united

politically, leaders of both parties coming

from their ranks—although it is true that by

the 1830s most were Conservatives.

Less wealthy than these "aristocrats," but

still part of the creole ruling class, was a

larger group of people who, since the reforms

inaugurated by the Cortes of Cadiz, had

played an important role in the country's

politics and economy. It was from this "mid-

dle sector" (another inaccurate term, for they

were really near the top) that many of the

leaders of the Liberal Party and the Galvez

administration came.

The production and commerce of the state

was in the hands of these two groups, and al-

though there was considerable political gain

to be made by branding individuals as "aris-

tocrats" between 1821 and 1839, in all prob-

ability the line between these classes was

never clearly defined and became blurred

with the political differences between Liberal

and Conservative. Changing circumstances

had reduced the favorable economic position

that the Aycinena "family" had held at the

Galindo indicated: 450,000 Indians, 100,000 whites,

and 150,000 ladinos (mestizos).

8. Woodward, "Economic and Social," pp. 545-46.

An excellent investigation of the Guatemalan elite

in the Federation period is the work of Susan Emily

Strobeck, "The Political Activities of Some Membersof the Aristocratic Families of Guatemala, 1821-

1839" (unpublished master's thesis, Tulane Univer-

sity, New Orleans, 1958).

Social Revolution in Guatemala 47

close of the reign of Carlos IV, but this elite

was still the most durable element of the

Guatemalan upper class in the transition from

colony to republic. A comparison of the ma-triculas of the merchant guild, comprised of

the leading merchants and landholders of

Guatemala, for the years 1799, 1823, and 1839,

reveals 168 different family names, but only

twelve of the names are common to all three

lists.9 This startling statistic suggests that ec-

onomic survival during the forty years wasdifficult. Among the twelve families were im-

portant participants on both the Liberal and

Conservative sides, as well as several whotook no active part in the political activity,

but all were major houses. On the other

hand, the high rate of attrition among other

merchants and landholders illustrates that the

period witnessed considerable dislocation.

Many of the Spaniards left the country at the

time of independence. There is a notable de-

crease in the number of Basque names onthe 1823 list. The civil disorders and wars of

the 1820s and 1830s further disrupted the

economy. Meanwhile, there was a small flow

of newcomers to enlarge the European

resident class in the capital. 10

9. Arrivillaga, Asturias, Aycinena, Barrundia, Batres,

Cambronero, Najera, Pavon, Pinol, Tejada, Urruela,

and Valdez. Six others names—Benitez, Gorris, Roma,Rubio, Taboada, and Vidaurre-appear on the 1799and 1839 lists, but not on the 1823 list. Eighty-six

individuals, representing 70 different family names,appeared on the 1799 list; 115 individuals, represent-

ing 79 family names, appeared on the 1823 list; and119 individuals, representing 81 family names, ap-

peared on the 1839 list. Twenty-one of the family

names appear on both the 1799 and 1823 lists, and36 on both the 1829 and 1839 lists. There are 44different family names that appear only on the 1799lists; 34 appear only on the 1823 list; and 42 appearonly on the 1839 list. AGCA, Lista de Comerciantes

y Hacendados de esta Capital, June 12, 1799, leg. 6,

exp. 110, fols. 8-9; Lista de los Yndividuos Comer-ciantes y Hazendados que componen el gremio con-

sular, Dec. 22, 1823, leg. 1391, exp. 32111; Lista delos comerciantes y hacendados que a juicio de los

que suscriben pueden ser nombrados por el SupremoGobierno para efectuar la reorganization del Con-sulado Mercantil, Aug. 25, 1839, leg. 214, exp. 4941,fols. 200-06.

10. Robert Glasgow Dunlop, Travels in Central

America, being a Journal of nearly Three Years' Resi-

dence in the Country, together with a Sketch of the

History of the Republic, and an Account of its Cli-

mate, Production, Commerce, etc. (London, 1847).

pp. 317, 334-35.

This class of Europeans, born on either side

of the Atlantic, dominated in the capital thepolitics of the era. The majority of the popula-tion had little voice. Although there was someclass mobility, largely along economic-cul-tural lines, the remainder of the populationin the 1830s can be divided into racial classes:

first, the mestizos, or ladinos as they arc

called in Guatemala, and second, the Indians.

There were also some Negroes, mulattos, andzambos on the north coast and in the Amati-tlan region, but they were not a significant

percentage of the total.

The ladinos were the most volatile groupin the society. As they were denied deeproots in either the European or Indian com-munities, their fortunes depended to a greater

extent on their own initiative and abilities andthey therefore often acted more aggressively

than the class above or below them. Mostnumerous in the major towns and in the east-

ern mountain region, they had been severely

hurt by the economic disruption since in-

dependence. The line between the more suc-

cessful of this class and the lower echelons

of the European community was not clearly

drawn, and the ladino class was certainly onesource of newcomers into the Creole class. 11

The Indians, the majority of the population,

were more isolated and generally less in-

volved with the European community than

were the ladinos. Many did not speak Span-

ish. They continued in their traditional wayof life, little aware of or interested in the pos-

sibilities of modern economic and social ad-

11. Detailed information on this middle class for this

period is scanty, but some useful descriptions andobservations are found in: ibid., pp. 335-37; RamonA. Salazar, Historia de veintiun anos (Guatemala:Tipografia Nacional, 1928); Henry Dunn, Guatimala,

or, the Republic of Central America, in 1827-8; being

Sketches and Memorandum made during a TwelveMonths' Residence (London, 1829), pp. 219-20;

Frederick Crowe, The Gosjiel in Central America;

Containing a Sketch of the Country, Physical andGeographical—Historical and Political—Moral and Re-

ligious: A History of the Baptist Mission in British

Honduras and of the Introduction of the Bible into

the Spanish American Republic of Guatemala (Lon-don, 1850), pp. 252-53; see also Jacques Lambert,

Latin America: Social Structures and Political Insti-

tutions (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of

California Press, 1967), p. 81.


vance. Providing the labor force for rural

Guatemala since before the Spanish Conquest,

the Indians of Guatemala have still not been

brought into the life of the nation, and, as

a recent participant in the Guatemalan guer-

rilla warfare has put it, "Barriers of distrust

confront any proposal for change."12 For the

Indians and probably for many of the rural

ladinos, Jacques Lambert's recent statement

that "most Spaniards lived in the cities during

the colonial period, while most of the Indians

and mestizos lived in isolation in the country-

side," would seem to apply to Guatemala as

independence began. "Instead of being sub-

jected to the authority of Spanish adminis-

trators," Lambert continued, "they were con-

trolled by their Creole masters or, in some

cases, by their Indian chiefs."13

The Galvez administration looked optimis-

tically at its progress and the restoration of

order in the state. The indigo decline that

had begun around 1800 because of foreign

competition had continued, but that was more

of a problem for El Salvador than for Gua-

temala, although the Guatemalan merchants

were involved. Meanwhile, production of

cochineal had grown steadily since its rein-

troduction into the country in 1811. 14 The

12. Eduardo Galeano, Guatemala, Occupied Coun-

try, trans, by Cedric Belfrage (New York and Lon-

don: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 45. Anthro-

pologists have dealt with various Indian communi-

ties in Guatemala and with some aspects of the In-

dian throughout the country, but there is a remark-

able lack of writing on the Indians as a social class

or force. Perhaps this is because of the difficulty

in ascertaining that they played any role at all. Someinteresting observations on the problems that the

Galvez government faced in trying to westernize the

Indians are presented by Miriam Williford, Las

Luces y La Civilization: The Social Reforms of Mari-

ano Galvez (New Orleans: Middle American Re-

search Institute, Tulane University, 1969), pp. 35-

40.

13. Lambert, Latin America, p. 131.

14. Shirley Lucas McAfee, "A Study of Agricultural

Labor in Guatemala, 1821-1871" (unpublished

master's thesis, Tulane University, New Orleans,

1955), pp. 5-7, 23-24, 41, 55; Dunn, Guatimala,

p. 212; Woodward, "Economic and Social," p. 559;

Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., Class Privilege and Eco-

nomic Development: The Consulado de Comercio of

Guatemala, 1793-1871 (Chapel Hill: The University

of North Carolina Press, 1966), pp. 39-44; Gazeta

de Guatemala, XV, no. 218 (May 16, 1811), 209-10.

The report of the Real Consulado de Comercio

very depressed state of the economy in the

1820s 15 had been mitigated by peace and

growing trade, largely owing to the British

promotion of Belize as the major entrepot for

Central American exports of indigo, cochineal,

and mahogany. 10 To protect the native textile

industry higher tariffs had been adopted, 17

and although this had not restored prosper-

ity to the weavers, it was a positive step in

that direction. A serious debt, shortage of

currency, and accompanying high interest

rates still plagued the economy, 18 but there

were signs of improvement. 10 Most signif-

icantly, cochineal production and exports rose

dramatically in the 1830's, providing a real

sense of prosperity among producers in Ama-

titlan, Antigua, and the Verapaz, as well as

among merchants of the capital.20

The Carrera revolt of 1837 shattered this

delicate atmosphere of conciliation, prosper-

ity, and calm. Unlike earlier civil wars, this

one arose not from differences among the

Creoles, but erupted among the peasants of

the eastern mountains, the region in Guate-

mala known as la montana. It was not an-

other quarrel between Liberals and Conserva-

tives for control of the government, but rather

a popular rebellion engendered by a growing

list of grievances against the Galvez govern-

of Guatemala of Apr. 15, 1817, AGCA, leg. 51, exp.

1273, fols. 3-7, provides a detailed description of

the causes of the decline of indigo and of the prob-

lems facing the Guatemalan economy on the eve of

independence. The best description of cochineal pro-

duction is in Dunlop, Travels, pp. 123-35.

15. Rafael Heliodoro Valle, La anexion de Centro

America a Mexico, 6 vols. (Mexico, 1924-36), II,

198; Valentin Solorzano Fernandez, Historia de la

evolution economica de Guatemala (Mexico, 1947),

pp. 220-30.

16. Naylor, "British Commercial."

17. Smith, "Financing," pp. 506-07.

18. Miguel Garcia Granados noted that as of about

1832, although there was much poverty in Guate-

mala, the cost of living was relatively low, and that

the only thing expensive was money, interest on

which ranged from 2 per cent to 3 per cent monthlywith good collateral. Memorias, II, 55.

19. Thomas L. Karnes, The Failure of Union: Cen-

tral America, 1824-1860 (Chapel Hill: University of

North Carolina Press, 1961), p. 62.

20. Chester Lloyd Jones, Guatemala, Past and Pres-

ent (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,

1940), p. 385; Semanario de Guatemala, no. 3 (May


ment and triggered by a catastrophic epid-

emic of cholera.

At the heart of the difficulty lay the Gal-

vez reform program, the rational extension of

changes inspired by Enlightenment philoso-

phers, initiated by Bourbon ministers, ac-

celerated by liberal Spaniards in Napoleonic

times, and continued by Creoles after inde-

pendence. The last group added a new di-

mension, however, in their conscious effort

to imitate the rapidly advancing English-

speaking world. Direct contact with English

and North American merchants and diplomats

in Central America accounted for part of this,

but probably more important were the read-

ings and travels of Central Americans. Both

Morazan and Galvez believed that Central

America could become a modern, progressive

republic through enlightened legislation. Con-

vinced that Spanish colonialism was respons-

ible for their nation's underdevelopment, they

sought to destroy Hispanic institutions and

to construct new institutions and laws based

on the successful experience of Great Britain

and the United States.21 In practice, however,

although Galvez made substantial headway in

gaining acceptance of his program from the

elite, he found the changes unwelcome amongthe lower classes of the country. From Gal-

vez' point of view, he promoted a carefully

planned program to improve the country's ec-

onomy, its judicial system, bureaucracy, edu-

cational opportunities, communications, and

general welfare. But the Liberals displayed

exceptional ineptitude in attracting the popu-

lace to their program. In spite of all their

stated good intentions, as a Conservative

21, 1836), p. 14; Ernesto Chinchilla Aguilar, His-

toria y tradiciones de la Ciudad de Amatitldn (Guate-

mala: Biblioteca Guatemalteca de Cultura Popular,

vol. 47, Ministerio de Education Publica, 1961), p.

80.

21. Galvez said in 1830 that "Our civilization andprosperity depend on our drawing closer to the At-

lantic." William J. Griffith, Empires in the Wilder-

ness; Foreign Colonization and Development in Gua-temala, 1834-1844 (Chapel Hill: University of North

Carolina Press, 1965), pp. 8-9, citing Mariano Gal-

vez, Informe que presento al Congreso Federal, el

Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de Hacienda,

al dar cuenta del negocio relativo a la apertura del

canal de Nicaragua en la sesion publica ordinaria del

sdbado 24 de fulio de 1830 ([Guatemala], n.d.), p. 5.

Guatemalan historian has put it, "neither the

Liberals, nor the aristocrats, nor the high

clergy succeeded in interesting the people in

the enterprise of their emancipation. Thepeople were not," he added, "discontent un-

der the Spanish regime, which was very pa-

ternal, very benevolent."22

Although Galvez' program claimed to pro-

mote a prosperous economy, many remained

understandably unconvinced. The dislocation

occasioned by the shift to cochineal produc-

tion could not easily be absorbed. Galvez'

tariff policy was more favorable to native

weavers, but heavy imports of British textiles

had already substantially ruined them and

they continued to be apprehensive of the

Liberals' talk of economic freedom. Galvez'

tariff adjustment was too little, too late.23

More directly responsible for popular re-

action was the establishment of a direct head

tax, reminiscent of the tribute collected by

the Spaniards and abolished immediately

after independence. Wealthy citizens had

been forced to supply loans to the new gov-

ernment after 1829, but this was insufficient

to provide for the ambitious program of the

government.24 Galvez established the tax at

two pesos per capita, an amount sufficient

to harass the Guatemalan peasant of the

1830s.25 In El Salvador such a tax resulted

in widespread popular rebellion, forcing sus-

pension of the levy there, but Galvez main-

tained the tax in Guatemala.26

The Galvez plans for an extensive network

of roads and ports resulted in heavy demands

for peasant labor. The government frequent-

ly reminded local officials of the obligation

of all residents to work on the roads three

days out of every month. One could evade

22. Manuel Cobos Batres, Carrera (Guatemala,

n.d.), p. 81.

23. Naylor, "British Commercial," p. 154; Smith,

"Financing," pp. 506-07; Tobar Cruz, Los mon-

taneses, p. 48.

24. Strobeck, "Political Activities," pp. 85-86.

25. Clemente Marroquin Bojas, Francisco Morazan

y Rafael Carrera (Guatemala, 1965), p. 116; Ignacio

Solis, ed., Memorias del General Carrera, 1837 a

1840 (Guatemala, 1906), pp. 15, 24.

26. Marure, Efemerides, pp. 73-74; Garcia Grana-

dos, Memorias, II, 93-95.


this labor by payment of the low daily wage,

but for the masses it meant forced labor,

which could not have been welcomed. The

practice was not new with Galvez, but it was

now enforced more rigorously than earlier.27

Another aspect of the Liberal economic

program contributing to rural unrest was the

land policy of the government, which since

1825 had promoted private acquisition of pub-

He land as a means of increasing production.

After 1829 these efforts were accelerated. It

seems likely that the real result of this re-

form was to allow those with some capital to

acquire Indian communal lands and to in-

crease, rather than decrease, latifundism. In-

dividual ownership did not have great appeal

for the Indians. Galvez apparently believed

it should be encouraged as a civilizing force,

and in the end lands which were formerly

used in common by local inhabitants mayhave passed into the hands of latifundistas.

Also, a number of large grants to foreigners

caused considerable unrest in eastern Guate-

mala.28

An integral part of Galvez' vision of a

prosperous state was his program of foreign

colonization in the more sparsely inhabited

reaches as a means of bringing about their

development and attracting a more indus-

trious type of citizen into the state. Such

plans date back to the 18th century, but

the Galvez emphasis on northern European

immigration was new. The growing com-

mercial activity of the British from their set-

tlement at Belize had intensified the tradi-

tional suspicion of foreigners by many resi-

dents. Spanish colonial administration had

dealt harshly with foreign interlopers, but

since independence the Liberal policy had

27. For example, see AGCA, leg. 1191, exps. 28983,28991.

28. Robert A. Naylor, "Guatemala: Indian Attitudes

toward Land Tenure," Journal of Inter-American

Studies, IX (Oct., 1967), 626-29, 634; Manuel Pi-

neda de Mont, comp., Recopilacion de las leues deGuatemala, 3 vols. (Guatemala, 1869-72), I, 658-86; William J. Griffith, "Juan Galindo, Central

American Chauvinist," Hispanic American Historical

Review, XL (Feb., 1960), 28-31; Ignacio Solis, "LaCasa de Moneda" (unpublished manuscript in the

Biblioteca de la Sociedad de Geografia e Historia deGuatemala), p. 70.

welcomed them, and this caused apprehen-

sion among those who believed themselves

to be the victims of foreign competition. For-

eign influence was evident in many aspects

of the Galvez program, but the concessions

made to mahogany loggers and the projects

to colonize the northern and eastern portions

of the country with Englishmen particularly

aroused the residents of those regions. Theycame to regard the Galvez government as

more favorable to foreign than to national in-

terests. In their eyes, Galvez was giving awaywhat they believed to be their own resources.

As the British hold on Belize, the Mosquito

Coast, and the Bay Islands tightened, and as

Anglo-American colonizers in Texas threw off

Mexican rule, the wisdom of Galvez' coloni-

zation plan became increasingly dubious to

these people.29 Between March and August,

1834, the Guatemalan government ceded

nearly all its public land to foreign coloniza-

tion companies, an area equal to nearly three-

fourths of the total area of the state.30

The Galvez government ignored or sup-

pressed petitions against these contracts from

residents of the region and the anti-foreign

resentment spread. Galvez and his reformers

considered ridiculous the idea that they were

betraying their country to Europeans and

they attributed entirely to the self-interest of

native woodcutters the opposition from Chi-

quimula and other eastern towns. A revolt

29. The most complete work on the Liberals' en-

couragement of foreign colonization is Griffith, Em-pires. See also David Vela, Barrundia ante el espejo

de su tiempo, 2 vols. (Guatemala: Editorial Uni-

versitaria, 1956-57), I, 229; Naylor, "British Com-mercial," pp. 4-7, 13-15, 25, 90-96, 159-61, 183;

Robert A. Naylor, "The British Role in Central

America Prior to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of

1850," Hispanic American Historical Review, XL(Aug., 1960), 364-67; John A. Burdon, ed., Archives

of British Honduras, 3 vols. (London, 1931-35), II.

150, 179-80, 184-88, 209-14, 224, 239, 255, 259,

266-75, 282; Wayne M. Clegern, British Honduras,

Colonial Dead End, 1859-1900 (Baton Rouge: Lou-

isiana State University Press, 1967), pp. 7-9, 167-

68; Virgilio Rodriguez Beteta, La politico inglesa en

Centroamerica durante el sigh XIX (Guatemala: Cen-

tro Editorial "Jose de Pineda Ibarra," Ministerio dc

Education Publica, 1963), pp. 15-18, 22, 48; George

Alexander Thompson, Narrative of an Official Visit

to Guatemala from Mexico (London, 1829), pp. 71-

72, 419-21; Szaszdi, Raoul, p. 54.

30. Griffith, Empires, pp. 32-52.


in Chiquimula in the fall of 1835, possibly

linked to the uprising in El Salvador against

Morazan's federal government, focused on the

foreign issue, as anti-English propaganda in-

flamed the residents of the eastern region.

Government troops suppressed this rebellion,

but the practice of imposing levies on the

towns that had revolted to pay for the mili-

tary's expenses could only have increased the

resentment.31 Concern over the popular re-

action against the contracts caused the fed-

eral government to pressure Galvez into issu-

ing a conciliatory decree guaranteeing Guate-

malan citizens full rights, but this failed to

pacify the inhabitants.32 The arrival of a

shipload of British colonists in mid-1836 ag-

gravated the resentment, which must be con-

sidered a major factor in inflaming the popu-

lace against the Galvez government.33

Central to the Liberal program was the

removal of the clergy from its traditional role

in politics, economy, and education. As with

other issues, the roots of this are in the Bour-

bon reforms of the 18th century, but after

independence the attack on clerical privilege

accelerated. Anti-clericalism ran particularly

high after the Church backed the Conserva-

tive regime in 1826-29. Liberal victory in

1829 brought swift retaliation, as earlier re-

forms were not implemented. Far from sepa-

rating Church and State, the government in-

stituted close control over the Church. The

federal government, with President Morazan

taking the lead, began a systematic removal

of anti-Liberal clergymen, including the arch-

bishop.34 Following suppression of monastic

orders, the exile of conservative leaders in

the clergy, and establishment of religious lib-

erty in the Republic, the federal government

prevailed on state governments to continue

the assault on clerical privilege. From 1829

to 1831 the Guatemalan government censored

ecclesiastical correspondence, seized Church

funds, and confiscated monastic property.35

Governor Galvez went further. The govern-

ment suppressed collection of the tithe in

1832, ended many religious holidays, confis-

cated more Church property, decreed the

right of the clergy to write their wills as they

wished, and legitimized the inheritance of

parents' property by children of the clergy.

In 1837 the Guatemalan legislature author-

ized civil marriage and legalized divorce.36

Many priests did not take lightly such chal-

lenges to the traditional authority of the

Church, especially in the countryside, where

their parishioners were already disenchanted

with the Galvez government on other grounds.

In the Indian and ladino villages, the priests

were more than just spiritual leaders. As en-

voy from the United States, John Lloyd

Stephens described a typical representative

of the rural clergy in 1839

:

37

Besides officiating in all the services of the

church, visiting the sick, and burying the

dead, my worthy host was looked up to byevery Indian in the village as a counselor,

friend, and father. The door of the conventwas always open, and Indians were constant-

ly resorting to him: A man who had quar-

reled with his neighbor; a wife who had beenbadly treated by her husband; a father whoseson had been carried off as a soldier; a younggirl deserted by her lover — all who were in

trouble or affliction came to him for advice

and consolation, and none went away with-

out it. And, besides this he was principal di-

rector of all the public business of the town,

the right hand of the alcalde.

Given this position, village curates could in-

flame their parishioners against a government

that attacked their sacred institution, brought

Protestant foreigners into the country, and

threatened the very bases of society. These

village priests were in the vanguard of the up-

risings that rocked Guatemala in 1837.38

31. Ibid., pp. 84-113. Belize merchant Marshall

Bennett was most active in pursuing concessions to

the extent of curtailing the rights and opportunities

of Guatemalan citizens.

32. Ibid., pp. 114-19; AGCA, leg. 164, exp. 3428,

fol. 6; Pineda de Mont, Recopilacion, I, 822-23.

33. Griffith, Empires, pp. 138-50.

34. Holleran, Church and State, pp. 74-96, 102.

35. Ibid., pp. 101-20; Mamie, Efemerides, pp. 60-

64, 70.

36. Marure, Efemerides, pp. 71, 80, 93; Boletin

Oficial, no. 105 (Oct. 10, 1837), pp. 437-52.

37. Incidents of Travel in Central America, Chiapas,

and Yucatan, edited with an introduction and notes

by Richard L. Predmore, 2 vols. (New Brunswick:

Rutgers University Press, 1949), I, 134.

38. Garcia Granados, Memorias, II, 154-61, 177;

Dunlop, Travels, pp. 185-86; Holleran, Church and

State, pp. 121-27; Solis, Carrera, p. 16; Arlene Eisen,

Social Revolution in Guatemala

None of Galvez' reforms were closer to him

than his plan to remove education from the

traditionalist hands of the Church and to re-

place it with secular schools open to all Gua-

temalans. An ambitious program called for es-

tablishment of public schools throughout the

country, and a broad range of cultural promo-

tions attempted to westernize the Guatemalan

Indian. Trying to change long-established

customs and prejudices naturally exposed the

Galvez administration to bigoted criticism

from the illiterate masses.39

Probably no part of the Galvez program

proved quite so objectionable to so many as

his effort to revise the judicial system of the

country. Thoroughly convinced that the Span-

ish system of private fueros and multiple

courts was unjust and out of step with en-

lightened, 19th-century progress, the Lib-

erals — owing chiefly to the endeavors of Jose

Francisco Barrundia — adopted the Livingston

Codes, which went into effect January 1, 1837.

Written by Edward Livingston for the State

of Louisiana in 1824, but never adopted, this

Anglo-Saxon code suggested to Liberal Gua-

temalans a modern replacement for the sys-

tem they had been abolishing piecemeal. As

the central feature of the new system was trial

by jury, Barrundia praised it on the day it

went into effect in these terms : "The justice of

a nation is no longer abandoned solely to the

discretion of a salaried judge and to the

obscure labyrinth of cruel and bloody laws."40

Almost immediately, however, problems arose

in the countryside. In a country where il-

literacy Was general and a class system was

well established, trial by jury proved imprac-

ticable, and anecdotes quickly circulated

"The Indians in Colonial Spanish America," in Ma-gali Sarfatti, Spanish Bureaucratic-Patrimonialism in

America (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies,University of California, 1966), p. 104.39. Galvez' educational program is explained in Mi-riam Williford, "The Educational Reforms of Dr. Ma-riano Galvez," Journal of Inter-American Studies, X(July, 1968), 461-73. See also her Las Luces, pp.35-40; Marure, Efemerides, pp. 62, 65-66, 72-73,87; and Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, pp. 43—44.40. Speech of J. F. Barrundia, Guatemala, January1, 1837, in the Biblioteca Nacional de Guatemala,Collection of Hojas Sueltas, cited in Mario Rodriguez,The Livingston Codes in the Guatemalan Crisis of1837-1838 (New Orleans: Middle American ResearchInstitute, Tulane University, 1955), p. 14.

ridiculing the decisions of Indian juries. Therequirements of Livingston's penal code

proved to be equally impracticable, as jails

with separate cells for prisoners did not exist,

and their construction with forced labor addedto the resentment of the population, whoidentified the Codes much more with cen-

tralized rule from Guatemala City, with for-

eign influence, and with anti-clericalism, than

with social justice.41

Measures of enforcement took place that

seemed to belie the Liberals' rhetoric about

liberty and freedom. Reforms were intro-

duced with brutality, with harshness, and in

a totalitarian manner. Such tactics had been

escalating in Guatemalan government ever

since the strong-armed rule of Captain-Gen-

eral Bustamante,42 and the Liberals who came

back into power in 1829 were vengeful against

the Conservatives who had preceded them.

Such methods, however, did little to ingratiate

the Galvez government with the people. In

October, 1832, Galvez divided the state into

four comandancias, with a general in com-

mand of each.43 Thereafter, military govern-

ment was a characteristic. Both the Morazan

and Galvez governments were insensitive in

their efforts to regulate the morality of the

inhabitants, in suppressing criticism of their

own policies, and in persecuting their enemies

through exile and confiscation of property.

One of the first acts of the Guatemalan leg-

islature in 1829 was a decree ordering the re-

payment of all salaries paid to public officials

from October, 1826, through April, 1829, en-

forced by confiscatory measures. The con-

duct of government troops often inflamed the

people in the country. The educational pro-

gram, designed to insure education to all,

41. Many writers have dealt with the effect of the

codes, nearly all agreeing that they were a major

cause in turning the rural population against the Gal-

vez government. Rodriguez' work (ibid.) offers the

most perceptive account.

42. Woodward, "Economic and Social," pp. 557-60.

43. la-Departamento de Guatemala, General Carlos

Salazar: 2a-Departamentos de Sacatepequez y Solola,

General Juan Prem; 3a-Departamentos de Chiquimu-

la y Verapaz, General Juan Jose Gorriz; 4«-Departa-

mento de Quezaltenango y Totonicapan, General

Agustin Guzman. These military governments con-

tinued until their suppression October 23, 1838, fol-

lowing Galvez' resignation. Marure, Efemerides, p.

74.


provided that uneducated children might be

taken from their parents and assigned to "Pro-

tectors" who would provide for their educa-

tion. In practice this often provided inex-

pensive personal service for the elite, and the

poorer classes viewed it unfavorably. The

government also maintained an active pro-

paganda campaign designed not only to pro-

mote its own program, but to discredit the

opposition.44 The Liberals' good intentions,

evidenced by adoption of the Livingston

Codes, must have exceeded actual practice

greatly, for Conservatives denounced those

who claimed to be "partisans of progress and

civilization" as guilty of "cruel inhumanity."45

44. Bancroft, Central America, III, p. 102; Williford,

Las Luces, pp. 35-39; Garcia Granados, Memorias,II, 92-93; Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, p. 161; Grif-

fith, Empires, p. 97.

45. A letter published in El Tiempo (Guatemala),no. 23 (Aug. 11, 1939), pp. 91-92; read: "Un movi-

miento de horror, a que no puedo resistir, me obli-

ga a suplicar a UU. se sirvan insertar en su periodico

lo que he visto con mis ojos en el siglo 19, y enGuatemala cuando los que se dicen partidarios del

progreso y de la civilization manejaban los negocios.

Quiero denunciar el publico un rasgo de inhumanidadcruel. Y para aumentar el escandalo dire, que sus

autores son los que ahora en sus escritos furibundos

nos llaman retrogrados y obscurantistas. Pero quese comparen los hechos.

"Hace pocos dias, que por curiosidad fui al Con-vento de Santo-Domingo. Los vestijios de destruc-

cion y de ruina que presenta aquel edificio, no ex-

citaron mi atencion por que asi estan todos los es-

tablecimientos publicos, y ya me lo figuraba. Mi de-

seo era conocer las carceles que se preparaban se-

gun el sistema de Livingston; y creia ver realizadas

las hermosas descripciones que habia leido de las pe-

nitenciarias de Filadelfia y otros lugares de NorteAmerica. Pero mi sorpresa fue indecible, cuando mevi en un cementerio. Si, aquellos calabozos son se-

pulcros de vivos, donde los desventurados que hu-biesen entrado, debian morir entre la desesperacion,

la hambre, y la dificultad de respirar. Entre en va-

rios de aquellos horrorosos calabozos; y medi su largo

que era como de dos varas y media: su ancho era

de una vara larga; y a la altura de tres o cuatro varas,

una ventanita redonda como de tres pulgadas de dia-

metro que servia para comunicar una muy escasa luz,

que venia de un callejon largo y obscuro. Estaban fa-

bricadas sobre cincuenta; y delineadas mas de ciento.

El que crea que falto a la verdad, que vaya al mo-menta a satisfacerse por si mismo, antes que las aca-

ben de deshacer.

"Esto hacen los que se han apropiado, como untitulo esclusivo, los dictados de filantropicos, ilustra-

dos, filosofos y progresistas. Uno de los mas entu-siastas [Pedro Molina] recorriendo aauella horrible

masmorra, se mostraba muy complacido y daba se-

nates inequfvocas de su aprobacion. Yo quiero se

me diga, si habrian hecho mas los tiranuelos de los

tiempos feudales; o los inquisidores mas sanguinarios.

Que mediten los pueblos sobre esos monumentos que

Into this atmosphere of bitterness camethe terrible scourge of cholera. The epidemic

that hit Guatemala in 1837 was not unanti-

cipated by the government. As early as De-

cember, 1831, a Guatemalan newspaper hadnoted the severe cholera epidemic that wascausing "terror" throughout Europe.46 In 1833

it struck Mexico, and Galvez warned of the

danger to his state as he established sanitary

cordons, opened up new water supplies and

sewage facilities, and prohibited burials in-

side of churches.47 In 1836 the danger becameimminent, and, despite increased precautions,

cholera penetrated the cordons late that year

or early in 1837, probably via Belize.48 In

March and April, 1837, the government began

to quarantine infected areas and to tighten the

sanitary cordons.49 These measures were un-

doubtedly justified, but they were poorly un-

derstood and they did not succeed. The mas-

ses, already alienated from the Galvez govern-

ment, feared the vaccines, and they believed

priests who told them that the medicine that

the government's health officers put into the

water was poison. Panic resulted and violence

broke out, particularly in the hard-hit eastern

region.50

Irate over the government's reforms and

with cholera settling over the land like a

divine retribution (which the priests said it

was!), uprisings of peasants occurred in

nos han dejado los libres de nuestro pais y de nues-

tros dias.

"Dispensen, sefiores Editores, lo mal escrito de micomunicado: no aspiro a ser tenido por gran escritor;

pero si por un hombre sensible y amante de la hu-

manidad.—Un Curioso."

46. El Siglo de Lafayette (Guatemala), no. 9 (Dec.

15, 1831), p. 34.

47. Williford, Las Luces, p. 37; Tobar Cruz, Losmontaneses, p. 54.

48. Griffith, Empires, pp. 153-54; Tobar Cruz, Losmontaneses, pp. 56-57.

49. Boletin Oficial, no. 88 (Mar. 29, 1837), pp.231-32: Boletin Oficial, segunda parte, no. 9 (Apr.

25, 1837), pp. 107-08; Boletin Oficial, tercera parte,

no. 11 (Mar. 19, 1837), p. 42; no. 12 (Mar. 31,

1837), pp. 45-46; no. 13 (Apr. 4, 1837), pp. 47-48;

no. 14 (Apr. 26, 1837), pp. 49-50; no. 15 (Apr.

29, 1837), pp. 51-52.

50. Mariano Galvez, "Mensaje del Gefe de Estadode Guatemala, Dr. Mariano Galvez, al abrir sus se-

siones ordinarias la Asamblea Lejislativa en 1837,"

in Collection of Hojas Sueltas, Latin American Li-

brary, Tulane University, New Orleans (hereinafter

cited as L.A.L. ), p. 4; Montiifar, Besena historica,

II, 348-54; Solis, Carrera, p. 16.


various places beginning in March, 1837. The

greatest trouble was in the eastern montana

zone, more ladino than Indian, and tradi-

tionally more restless while at the same time

more generally under the domination of par-

ish priests. The first major insurgency took

place at San Juan Ostuncalco, where natives

rose up against officials charged with effecting

the Livingston Codes.51 Other uprisings fol-

lowed and from the village of Mataquescuin-

tla there arose a natural leader, Jose Rafael

Carrera. Born in the run-down Candelaria

section of Guatemala City in 1814, Carrera

was twenty-two when the revolt reached Ma-

taquescuintla. His biographers have differed

over his racial stock, but he seems to have

been of mixed Indian, Negro, and European

blood, and was not purely an "Indian" as he

was called by his enemies. His early life may

have been fairly representative of lower-class

51. Marure, Efemerides, pp. 91-92; Dunlop, Travels,

pp. 192-93, recounts what happened there: "On the

6th of March, a serious disturbance took place in the

town of San Juan Ostuncalo [sic], the people, whowere nearly all aborigines, being provoked at being

compelled to work at the construction of prisons, and

excited against the new laws, rose en masse, to

attack the circuit judges, at that time holding their

first court of justice in the town. They and the of-

ficers accompanying them were compelled to save

themselves from the popular indignation by a pre-

cipitate flight. The magistrate of the district, es-

corted by a troop of dragoons, proceeded to re-

monstrate with the Indians; but he had no sooner

begun to speak than they directed against him a

shower of stones. An engagement then took place

between the mob and the dragoons, when the former

was dispersed with considerable loss after killing

twenty-four of the dragoons. The Indians left behind

them an idol and a jar filled with stones collected

from the bed of a neighbouring river. It appears

that they had been made to believe that the jar,

if broken at the moment of the attack, would throw

lightning upon the enemy, and by enchantment, a

number of venomous snakes would rush out from a

neighbouring wood and bite the soldiers;—an event

which was to be brought about by the assistance of

ladinos of the period. Receiving no formal

education, he drifted about working at various

jobs. By the time he was fourteen he was

a drummer boy in the Guatemalan army and

fought on the losing side against the forces

of Morazan. After the civil war he worked in

Amatitlan for a while, but by 1834 he was

driving hogs in the district of Mita and his

fortunes began to improve. A favorable re-

lationship with the village priest of Mataques-

cuintla opened the door to marriage with Pe-

trona Garcia Alvarez, the daughter of a fam-

ily of modest means. Frequently wounded in

battle, Carrera was a man of exceptional physi-

cal courage and undaunted determination. Hewas capable of violent outbursts of passion

and may have been intemperate in his per-

sonal life but, through native intelligence

and common sense, in 1837 he became revered

or feared as a guerrilla leader. 52

the old gods of the country, which, though nominally

discarded by the Indians, are always recurred to in

times of necessity, as the Romish superstition is bythose in Europe professing a purer creed. The idol

was a monstrous figure of a man seated cross-legged,

with the head reclining upon the back, and the arms,

encompassing an enormous belly, hanging down fromthe throat, being doubtless one of the old idols whichhad been concealed from the careful search of the

inquisition."

52. Max Leon Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera of Gua-temala: His Life and Times," (unpublished doctoral

dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1942),

pp. iv-v, 9-16, 45-46; Cobos Batres, Carrera, pp.7-43, 48; Antonio Batres Jauregui

;La America Cen-

tral ante la historia, 3 vols. (Guatemala, 1916-49),III, 162-83; Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, pp. 63-64;

Soils, Carrera, pp. 17-19, 27; Stephens, Incidents.

I, 177, 195-98; Bancroft, Central America, III, 125-

26; Dunlop, Travels, pp. 88-89, 195; Thomas Young,Narrative of a Residence on the Mosquito Shore,

durinti the Years 1839. 1840, and 1841, ivith an Ac-count of Truxillo and the Adjacent Islands of Bonaccaand Roatan (London, 1842), p. 144; Boletin Extra-

ordinario (Guatemala), August 17, 1857, in AGCA,leg. 1109, exp. 24621, fol. 33; Garcia Granados.

Memorias, II, 246.

rpHE WAR OF LA MONTANA is one* more bloody chapter in Central American

history. Popular uprisings against the Liberal

reforms stretched from El Salvador to Quezal-

tenango during the first half of 1837, but it

was in the district of Mita where Rafael Ca-

rrera was first involved and where the nucleus

of the Revolution developed. On May 6 some

2000 peasants rioted against the district gov-

ernor, Francisco Aqueche, who was trying to

isolate the area in accordance with the gov-

ernment's health regulations. Aqueche took

refuge in the convent, where Carrera's friend

of the same name, probably a relative of the

governor, lived. The mob demanded that the

governor be turned out of the convent so that

they could kill him, but the priest sent young

Rafael Carrera instead to talk to them. With

difficulty, he succeeded in persuading them

to disperse. The young swineherd dominated

the village from this moment on. Soon after,

a new health officer appointed Carrera to

command a platoon of troops enforcing the

health cordons denying passage into the dis-

trict. Carrera accepted the position reluctant-

ly. Meanwhile, two residents of nearby Santa

Rosa, Jose Maria Zapeta and Teodoro Mejia,

were going from village to village in the

region preaching resistance to the govern-

ment and plotting rebellion. When a detach-

ment of government troops approached Santa

Rosa to suppress this movement on June 8,

the Santarrosenos sent word to Mataques-

cuintla, calling for aid. Carrera led a small

band and headed for the neighboring town,

where he arrived late the next evening, find-

ing not a fighting force but a mob of men, wo-

men, and children expecting to meet the sixty

government dragoons assembled on the plain

of Ambelis. The battle went badly for the

rebels at first, but then Carrera took the initi-

ative from Mejia and with a daring charge

put the government forces to rout. Mejia con-

tinued to coordinate and propagandize the

rebellion thereafter, but from that day

forward there were few who did not knowthat Rafael Carrera was in command, and his

peasant followers were soon calling him

"Angel," "Son of God," and the "Lord."53

Similar uprisings occurred in several towns

and villages in El Salvador and they may not

have been unrelated to events in eastern Gua-

temala. To meet the threat there, on May 27

Morazan decreed martial law in the depart-

ments of Cuscatlan and San Vicente, as well

as in San Salvador where there were also

disorders.54 In Guatemala, Galvez responded

to the violence with two decrees on June 12.

He acknowledged that "many villages of the

District of Mita have been incited to rebellion

and that they are spreading terror and

violence," and "that similar disorders have ap-

peared in other districts, which have been

made to believe that the pestilence which

devastates the peoples is a poison in the wa-

ter and in the medicines." Thus, to prevent

the further spread of cholera and to restore

order, Galvez decreed that all those parti-

cipating in any Way in the uprisings would be

tried by military courts as traitors, punishable

by death. To enforce this, his second decree

provided for immediate reorganization of re-

serve militia forces.55 Three days later, gov-

ernment troops launched a vindictive attack

on Santa Rosa and Mataquescuintla. Pri-

soners taken at Mataquescuintla implicated

Father Aqueche, Rafael Carrera, and others.

The troops killed several peasants and de-

stroyed much property. The rebels fled to the

surrounding hills, from whence began a long

53. Marroquin Rojas, Morazan, pp. 112-19; Tobar

Cruz, Los montaneses, pp. 62-65; Solis, Carrera, pp.

21-29; Marure, Efemerides, pp. 95-96; Young, Nar-

rative, p. 144.

54. Boletin Oficial, segunda parte, no. 10 (June 26,

1837), pp. 120-22.

55. Ibid., tercera parte, no. 17 (June 12, 1837), pp.

55-58.

55


campaign of raiding and harassing govern-

ment forces.56 A special sesion of the Gua-

temalan legislature convened on June 13 and

began a stormy debate, as Liberal opposition

rose up against the growing arbitrariness of

Galvez.57 There was genuine fear in both

parties of the popular uprisings, and on June

18 the legislature authorized Galvez to raise

the armed forces to whatever size necessary

to suppress the revolt. Galvez signed the de-

cree on the 20th and proceeded to use his

dictatorial powers in an effort to restore

peace.58

While Galvez employed repressive mea-

sures, he also offered pardon to those whowould lay down their arms, first on June 22,

excepting only those who had actually killed

government forces, and then on August 24, to

all the rebels.59 He did not have forces suf-

ficient to deal a fatal blow to the guerrillas.

Short of volunteers and funds and unable to

secure sufficient recruits through conscrip-

tions, on July 17 he authorized arming of pri-

soners, offering to commute the sentences, ex-

cepting only robbers and assassins, of those

who took up arms against the insurgents.60

The high incidence of cholera in the jails of

the capital provided further incentive for pri-

soners to volunteer.61 The disease was now

serious in the capital, where the death toll

had reached 819 by mid-July.62

As the epidemic spread, the panic of the

natives increased. This, combined with rising

apprehension over foreign influence, seems to

have been of greatest concern to the peasants

of the eastern zone. Carrera's guerrillas in-

creased in numbers and effectiveness, and he

56. Ibid., no. 19 (June 19, 1837), pp. 61-62; Ma-rure, Efemerides, p. 97; Montufar, Reseha historica,

II, 355-61; Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, pp. 55-57;

Solis, Carrera, pp. 30-38.

57. Manure, Efemerides, p. 97.

58. Boletin Oficial, no. 98 (June 21, 1837), pp. 393-

95.

59. Ibid., tercera parte, no. 20 (June 23, 1837), pp.

63-64; no. 24 (July 27, 1837), p. 73; no. 25 (Aug.

24, 1837), pp. 75-76.

60. Boletin Oficial, no. 100 (July 17, 1837), pp.

403-04.61. El Editor: Periodico de los Tribunales (Guate-

mala), no. 15 (July 13, 1837), p. 62.

62. Ibid., Alcance al no. 15, July 20, 1837. Theepidemic had also spread into the highlands of the

west by this date. Quezaltenango recorded 161 deaths

from the disease between April and July. No sta-

tistics are available for the state as a whole.

announced a program for the revolution in

late June which included six points : ( 1

)

abolition of the Livingston Codes; (2) protec-

tion of life and property; (3) return of the

archbishop and reestablishment of the reli-

gious orders; (4) abolition of the head tax;

(5) amnesty for all persons exiled in 1829;

and (6) respect for Carrera's orders as law

under pain of death to violators.63 The pace

of fighting picked up and peasant distrust of

the government grew as ill-paid and poorly

supplied government troops looted and pil-

laged as they searched out guerrillas. Amongthe atrocities committed was an attack on

Carrera's wife by government soldiers. Roused

to fury, Carrera vowed never to lay down his

arms while an officer of Morazan remained

in the state, and he took his vengeance on

judges and government officials. Often de-

feated, he evaded capture, always finding re-

fuge among the peasants of the mountainous

country where his legendary image grew

daily.64

In the face of popular rebellion, the Liberals

in the capital fell to bickering among them-

selves as to what course to follow. In a

misguided search for unity, Galvez became

more conciliatory toward the Conservatives,

which alienated the more extreme of the Lib-

erals headed by Barrundia and Pedro Molina.

With increasing invective the Barrundia fac-

tion criticized the government in the press and

in the legislature, accusing Galvez of suppres-

sing freedom throughout the Republic in

order to quell a local rebellion. In December,

Galvez appointed two moderates, Juan Jose

Aycinena and Marcial Zebadua, to his key

ministerial posts, temporarily gaining some

conservative support but antagonizing even

further the Barrundia forces. Confronted by

a spreading peasant revolt and with growing

dissension within the government in Guate-

63. Solis, Carrera, p. 24.

64. Stephens, Incidents, I, 178; Tobar Cruz, Los

montaneses, pp. 67-73. Examples of the type of

actions in which Carrera engaged during this period

are in the- reports of government officers in the

AGCA, leg. 2522: Copala, Aug. 11, 1837, exp. 57100;

Cuajinalpa, Oct. 19, 1837, exp. 5104; Atiquizaya,

Oct. 28, 1837, exp. 57056; Las Flores, Nov. 9, 1837,

exp. 57059; and Santa Rosa, Nov. 14, 1837, exp.

57035.


mala City, Morazan began to have grave

doubts about Galvez, and he failed to send

the kind of assistance that might have saved

the Guatemalan governor.65

In response to criticism of his dictatorial

manner, Galvez signed on September 11 the

"Declaration of Rights and Guarantees per-

taining to all Citizens and Inhabitants of the

State of Guatemala," which the legislature

had passed on August 18.66 In the meantime,

however, Galvez continued his campaign of

repression against Carrera in the countryside

and waged a relentless, but futile, propaganda

war against Barrundia, accusing him both of

being against the interests of property and

civilization and of being the ally, or dupe, of

Carrera.67

65. There is considerable literature on the split

among the Liberals in late 1837 and early 1838, butthis subject will not be discussed here. Among the

most useful works on the political intrigues in Gua-temala in the face of Carrera's revolt is Vela, Ba-rrundia, see especially, I, 210-51. See also AntonioBatres Jauregui, El Dr. Mariano Galvez y su epoca,

2d ed. (Guatemala: Biblioteca Guatemalteca de Cul-tura Popular, vol. 15, Editorial del Ministerio de Edu-cation Publica, 1957), pp. 75-76; Tobar Cruz, Losmontaneses, pp. 73-87; Garcia Granados, Memorias,II, 183-89; Alberto Herrarte, La union de Centro-america (tragedia y esperanza); ensayo politico-social

sobre la realidad de Centro America, 2d ed. (Gua-temala: Centro Editorial "Jose de Pineda Ibarra" del

Ministerio de Education Publica, 1964), pp. 125-26;Charles DeWitt to John Forsyth, Guatemala City,

Jan. 13, 1838, Doc. #793, William R. Manning, ed.,

Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, In-

ter-American Affairs, 1831-1860, Volume Ill-Cen-tral America, 1831-1850 (Washington: Carnegie En-dowment for International Peace, 1933), pp. 145-46,148; Marure, Efemerides, pp. 97-99; Rodriguez, Li-

vingston Codes, pp. 3, 8, 20-22.

66. Boletin Oficial, no. 103 (Sept. 11, 1837), pp.417-23.

67. A good example of this propaganda was a broad-side addressed to "Guafemaltecos" on Oct. 28, 1837.It read: "Mariana pretende la nueva aristocracia triun-

far del pueblo, enganandolo y desacreditando a susdefensores; pero no triunfara sino el pueblo sobe-rano.

"Alerta propietarios, comerciantes y hacendados,porque si los revolucionarios y su candillo Barrundiaconsiguen sus miras, pronto tendrein aqui a su pro-tejido Carrera aliviandoos de la carga de vuestrosintereses y dinero como sucedio al patriota C. Juande Dios Mayorga. [Dios Mayorga was killed by un-known assassins in September, 1837.]

"Alerta artesanos, no os dejeis enganar de los quenunca se han acordado de vosotros, y vierten las masatroces injurias contra vuestros compafieros Abarca yAlvaro, porque estan colocados en los destinos deelection popular, donde no sufren verlos.

"Alerta. militares defensores de la patria, con losAyerdia, los Valenzuelas, los Arevalos y otros muchosde estos mismos revolucionarios que han representado

Meanwhile, as the war raged on and went

badly for the government, Galvez' reforms

were one by one sacrificed for lack of funds —that had to be spent for the military. Thestate's budget put into effect on September 4,

1837, revealed that of a total of just under

300,000 pesos, 110,00 were appropriated for

the Department of War, 57,000 for the De-partment of Justice, and only 12,000 for public

education.68 Having placed too much faith in

advanced laws and too little in the sentiments

of the people, Galvez was paying the price.

With too few troops to occupy the entire

country, Galvez sought to defeat and capture

the caudillo, but the raiding and looting con-

tinued and the war was becoming a race war,

with Indians, mestizos, mulattos, and zambos

joining together against the whites.69 Thestate of the country was revealed in the ap-

peal to the rural inhabitants made by Galvez'

new ministers on December 16. Aycinena and

Zebadua made an impassioned plea for the

peasants to end the widespread violence and

to stop following the caudillo, in order to end

the bloodshed of their loved ones and to re-

store the peace and tranquility of former

times. 70 The countryside had become com-

al gobierno, para que en premio de vuestros sacrifi-

cios y de vuestra sangre derramada por la Patria,

salgais manana fuera de la ciudad, privandoos deesta manera del derecho electoral que os dan las le-

yes fundamentales de la Republica y del Estado,para quedarse ellos solos en los cantones, cuandoen los peligros corren a los tabancos y salinas, y voso-

tros poneis vuestros pechos al frente de las balas.

"Hacendados, comerciantes, artesanos y militares,

concurrid manana a sufragar por las personas de to-

da vuestra confianza, pues que estos son los deseos

de los Verdaderos Patriotas." Collection of HojasSueltas, L.A.L.68. Boletin Oficial, no. 107 (Oct. 30, 1837), pp.457-66.69. A United States racist later observed that race

was at the root of the problem. Ephraim G. Squier(Notes on Central America, p. 58) believed "that

the only hope of Central America consists in ad-verting the numerical decline of its white population,

and increasing that element in the composition of its

people. If not brought about by a iudicious en-

couragement of emigration or an intelligent system

of colonization, the geographical position and re-

sources of the country indicate that the end will

be attained by those more violent means, whichamong men, as in the material world, often an-

ticipate the slower operations of natural laws."

70. Marcial Zebadua and J. J. de Avcinena, "LosSecretarios del Gefe de Estado a los habitantes del

campo," Guatemala, Dec. 16, 1837, in Collection of

Hojas Sueltas, L.A.L.


pletely unsafe because of the guerrilla activity.

Commerce and communication were at a

standstill. In January, U. S. charge d'affaires,

Charles DeWitt, informed his Secretary of

State that "the roads leading from this capital

have for the last six weeks been so infested

by armed bands of highwaymen, that no

prudent traveller, and least of all a foreigner,

will venture to set out for any distant point."

DeWitt said they were "under the chieftain-

ship of an abandoned outlaw named Carrera,

whose war cry is 'down with the Livingston

Code and trial by jury!' and who scruples not

in the pursuit of his nefarious designs to com-

mit the most atrocious crimes .... So au-

dacious has he of late grown and so good an

understanding has he continued to cultivate

with the Guatemalan troops," DeWitt con-

tinued, "that a band of his most daring fol-

lowers penetrated into the very environs of

the City."71

Galvez' days in office were now numbered.

Barrundia determined to form an alliance with

Carrera as a means of ousting Galvez, con-

fident that he could dominate the supposedly

illiterate guerrilla leader. In late 1837 a del-

egation headed by Barrundia sought to nego-

tiate with the rebels, but the hatred of the

priests advising Carrera precluded agreement.

On January 16, 1838, the Barrundia faction

set up an opposition government in Antigua

and several departments soon recognized it.

Aycinena and Zebadua resigned on the 17th.

Morazan failed to come to the aid of Galvez

and he was left alone. The municipal govern-

ment dissolved itself and anarchy reigned in

the capital.72

Yet he refused to surrender. On January 20

he called for the raising of an army of 2000,

including 500 cavalry, within six weeks, anddecreed a forced loan on the propertyholders

of the capital to pay the cost until the leg-

islature convened.73 On the following day he

bravely announced that government forces

would attack all rebel troops within eight

leagues of the capital.74 It was a futile gesture,

and there was general dissatisfaction with the

government even within the capital.75 Ba-

rrundia traveled to San Salvador where he

gained Morazan's permission to treat with Ca-

rrera. In the meantime, the commander of

Barrundia's Antigua forces, Manuel Carras-

cosa, anticipated him by negotiating with Fa-

ther Mariano Duran, a close adviser to Ca-

rrera. Significantly, Carrascosa agreed to

terms that would have been unacceptable to

Barrundia. Specifically, in return for Ca-

rrera's military alliance, he agreed to aboli-

tion of the Livingston Codes, to relaxation of

the anti-clericalism, and, most dangerous of

all, to acceptance of Carrera as commander of

all the insurgent forces. The accord suc-

ceeded in bringing down Galvez, but it spelled

eventual disaster for Barrundia's cause.76

In the face of this unholy alliance, Galvez

sent two envoys (the Vice-President of the

Republic, Jose Gregorio Salazar, and the Sec-

retary of Foreign Relations, Miguel Alvarez)

to negotiate with Carrascosa, and they agreed

to the Convention of Guarda Vieja on the

afternoon of January 28. It was a compro-

mise among the Liberals, hoping to avert a

Carrera take-over. Galvez agreed to resign,

his remaining forces pledging their allegiance

to President Morazan. The capital would be

occupied by Carrascosa's forces from Sacate-

pequez, which would guarantee the lives and

property of all.77 Carrera would have nothing

to do with this, however, and Carrascosa's

force could not contest his horde, which on

January 31 poured into the capital. Estimates

of the size of the caudillo's ragtag army range

as high as 12,000. John Lloyd Stephens re-

lated the scene78 as told him by a gentle-

man who saw them "from the roof of his

house, and who was familiar with all the

71. DeWitt to Forsyth, Guatemala, Jan. 13, 1838,Doc. #793, Manning, Central America, pp. 144-45.72. Marure, Efemerides, p. 100; Tobar Cruz, Losmontaneses, pp. 88-92; Batres Jauregui, AmericaCentral, III, 138-40.73. Boletin Oficial, tercera parte, no. 34 (Jan. 20,1838), pp. 106-07.

74. Ibid., no. 36 (Jan. 15 [sic, 25], 1838), p. 108.

75. On Jan. 26 the important Concordia Battalion in

the capital pronounced against Galvez, demandingrestoration of the Aycinena-Zebadua ministry. Ma-rure, Efemerides, pp. 100-01; Garcia Granados, Me-morias, II. 204-05.76. Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera." p. 27; Sob's, Ca-rrera, p. 54; Montufar, Resena historica, II, 572-73;Garcia Granados, Memorias II, 192-93.

77. Bancroft, Central America, III, 128-29.

78. Stephens, Incidents, I, 183.


scenes of terror which had taken place in that

unhappy city":

Choking up the streets, all with greenbushes in their hats, they seemed to him at

a distance like a moving forest. They werearmed with rusty muskets, old pistols, fowl-

ing pieces, some with locks and some with-

out; they carried sticks formed into the shapeof muskets, with tin-plate locks, and clubs,

machetes, and knives tied to the ends of long

poles. And swelling the multitude were twoor three thousand women, with sacks and al-

forjas for carrying away the plunder. Many,who had never left their villages before,

looked wild at the sight of the houses andchurches, and the magnificence of the city.

They entered the plaza vociferating Viva la

religion, y muerte a los estrangeros! Carrera,

himself, amazed at the immense ball he hadset in motion, was so embarrassed that hecould not guide his horse. He afterward said

that he was frightened at the difficulty of

controlling this huge and disorderly mass.

The traitor Barrundia, the leader of the op-

position, the Catiline of this rebellion, rode

by his side on this entry into the plaza.

The U.S. charge d'affaires reported the anti-

foreign sentiment of the rural forces: "The

shouts of vengeance raised in the streets by

Carrera's Indians were mostly directed against

what are here called English foreigners."

Among the conditions for peace, DeWitt

noted, was "that English foreigners be de-

stroyed, Spaniards excepted!"79 In spite of

some inevitable brutality and vengeance by

the peasant force, order was quickly restored

and Carrera gained the praise of Barrundia

and others for his conduct. His forces gen-

erally respected property and the principal

commercial houses. Carrera himself was obe-

dient to the new government and maintained

his troops under command, evacuating most

of them within a few days. He had succeeded

in toppling the government, he had been as-

sured that the Liberals' excesses would be

discontinued, he could return to la montana

with victory80 and, according to some sources,

with an $11,000 bribe for himself and his

men.81

The Barrundia-Molina faction appeared to

have triumphed. Galvez had resigned in favor

of his lieutenant governor, Pedro Valenzuela,

more acceptable to Barrundia. Carrera, com-

missioned a lieutenant colonel and given mil-

itary command of his home district of Mita,

was out of the capital with his dreaded

peasant army. Pedro Molina was chosen as

president of the legislature. 82 The real si-

tuation was otherwise, however, for it was

a delicate coalition that sustained the govern-

ment, and all feared a return of the guerrilla

caudillo. Although Galvez was out, he still

had supporters in the legislature, and in ad-

dition to the Barrundia faction, the Conser-

vative-Clerical party now made an important

resurgence, having gained first from their al-

liance with Galvez and now from the pro-

clerical attitude of Carrera. In the mean-

time, the departments of Los Altos took ad-

vantage of the situation and seceded from

the state, declaring allegiance to Morazan,

and weakening the position of Guatemala. 83

A series of actions by the Guatemalan gov-

ernment reflect Carrera's presence and the

government's desire to appease him. By Feb-

ruary 20, the government was addressing Ca-

rrera as "General" and processing with kid

gloves complaints of hacendados regarding

Carrera's peasants on their lands. 84 Pedro Mo-

lina resigned as president of the legislature,

which now restored the Church to its former

position, removed the military governments,

and called for a return to constitutional rule.

Under the threat of a new mobilization by

79. DeWitt to Forsyth, Guatemala City, Feb. 10,

1838, Doc. #794, Manning, Central America, p. 148.

For other accounts of Carrera's occupation of the

capital, see Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera," pp. 27-29;

Solis, Carrera, pp. 54-58; Tobar Cruz, Los monta-neses, pp. 94-99; and Bancroft, Central America, III,

130-32.80. Garcia Granados, Memorias, II, 219-21.

81. Stephens, Incidents, I, 185. Bancroft {Central

America, III, 132) cites Stephens, but also says, "Thefacts appear in the records of the asamblea." Pedro

Valenzuela later claimed (AGCA, leg. 3600, exp.

82810, fol. 2) that Carrera demanded 500 pesos from

him, the money to be divided among his troops.

82. Secretaria de la Asamblea del Estado de Guate-

mala al Secretario del Gobierno, Guatemala, Feb. 4,

1838, Boletin Oficial, no. 110 (Feb. 30, 1838), pp.

470-71.

83. The departments of Quezaltenango, Solola, and

Totonicapan, although never particularly friendly to

the Liberal cause, had resented domination by Gua-temala and accepted Morazan now as a means of

gaining sovereignty in Quezaltenango. Montufar, Re-

sena historica, III, 9-23; Marure, Efemerides, p. 101.

84. AGCA, leg. 1962, exp. 45282.


Carrera, the body repealed the Livingston

Codes in March. These decrees reflected the

popular will, as voiced by the guerrilla leader.

The preamble of a decree of March 12, which

terminated all nonelective officeholders, il-

lustrated the attention the legislature gave

to this will when it acknowledged that "a

great majority of the populations of the State

have armed themselves to resist the admin-

istration that violated their guarantees and

the fundamental pact," and justified the re-

volution against Galvez, "directed to reestab-

lishing law and liberty . . . and demanded by

self-preservation against tyranny, [as] not only

legitimate but consecrated by reason and

justice."85 The liberal language of this decree

probably reflected the continuing influence of

Barrundia, but the repeal of the Livingston

Codes soon after revealed the shifting power.

The decree suppressing these codes gave as

the principal reason "the opinion of the peo-

ple, unprepared for so important an enter-

prise."86 New demands for funds brought dis-

satisfaction with the Valenzuela government

and enabled the Conservatives to consolidate

support, inevitably drawing them closer to

Carrera.87

Barrundia failed to recognize the growing

Conservative strength and doubted the ability

of Carrera to bring sufficient force against a

united government. Carrera, on the other

hand, dissatisfied with the government's pro-

gress toward his demands, prodded by grow-

ing antigovemment sentiment from rural pro-

pertyholders, and convinced by the priests

that he was being used by the Liberals, re-

newed his campaign of guerrilla warfare. Va-

lenzuela, urged on by Barrundia, responded

with repression.88 The election of a new Re-

presentative Council, clearly reflecting the

Conservative gains in public opinion and

headed by Conservative Mariano Rivera

Paz,89 put Barrundia in an untenable position.

Although he retained considerable influence

in the legislature for some time longer, Con-

servative strength was rising and was drifting

into a natural alliance with the masses. In

the end, Barrundia had to fall back on his

liberal ally, Francisco Morazan, and the re-

entry of the federal president with 1000 Sal-

vadoran troops into the state in mid-March

marked a new phase of the struggle.

85. Boletin Oficial, no. Ill (Mar. 17, 1838), pp.474-77.86. Ibid., no. 114 (Mar. 30, 1838), pp. 486-91.87. Garcia Granados, Memorias, II, 236-37; Bole-

tin Oficial, tercera parte, no. 38 (Mar. 7, 1838), pp.112-14.

88. Vela, Barrundia, I, 231; Moorhead, "Rafael Ca-rrera," pp. 31-32; Boletin Oficial, tercera parte, no.

38 (Mar. 7, 1838), pp. 112-14; no. 39 (Mar. 10,

1838), pp. 115-16; no. 40 (Mar. 15, 1838), pp.117-19.89. Boletin Oficial, no. 113 (Mar. 23, 1838), pp.482-83.

A S EARLY AS February 9, 1838, the Gua-

*"-temalan government had cautioned Mora-

zan not to march into the state, as he would

upset the recent understanding with Carrera,

who had returned to Mita in peace.90 Yet the

resumption of warfare by Carrera in Marchforced the state to look to the federal govern-

ment for help. After negotiators rejected

Carrera's demands, Morazan launched a major

campaign to crush the rebellion.91 The guer-

rillas responded with a new ferocity, parti-

cularly, although not exclusively, against for-

eign-owned properties. Often losing skirm-

ishes but never decisively defeated, the guer-

rillas harried the government in an ever-ex-

tending area, stretching finally from the Ca-

ribbean to the Pacific and westward into the

Verapaz and Sacatepequez. Morazan in-

creased his control over the machinery of the

state government and, as Galvez had done be-

fore, escalated the repression.92 In the course

of the war, Carrera's father-in-law was cap-

tured and shot, a severity which in the opin-

ion of one of Morazan's officers was "im-

politic, serving only further to bathe the re-

volution in blood."93

With Morazan in control of the capital, the

Liberals reinstituted some of their program

which had been sacrificed earlier to appease

Carrera.94 In the meantime, however, the

90. AGCA, leg. 166, exp. 3470.91. Solis, Carrera, p. 39; Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera,"

pp. 32-33; Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, pp. 108-10;Montufar, Resena historica, III, 105-09.

92. George Washington Montgomery, Narrative of aJourney to Guatemala, in Central America, in 1838(New York, 1839), p. 33, 148, 174; Garcia Grana-dos, Memorias, II, 249, 262-63, Griffith, Empires,

pp. 152, 163; Marure, Efemerides, p. 103; Stephens,Incidents, I, 191; Manning, Central America, p. 151;Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, pp. 111-12; Boletin

Oficial, no. 116 (Apr. 23, 1838), pp. 495-96; no.

117 (Apr. 24, 1838), pp. 500-02; AGCA, leg. 1405,exp. 32888; leg. 3600, exp. 82790; leg. 3618, exp.

84635.93. Garcia Granados, Memorias, II, 246.94. See, for example, Montufar, Resena historica, III,

federation over which he presided was be-

coming a fiction, and on May 30 the Federal

Congress, in San Salvador, allowed the states

to go their separate ways.95 When, on July

7, Congress went even further and declared

the states to be "sovereign, free and inde-

pendent political bodies," Morazan decided it

was time to return to San Salvador and put

his government in order. He believed, in-

correctly, that he had greatly weakened the

Carrera revolt in Guatemala. He would be

equally ineffective in restoring the now shat-

tered Central American union.96 Following

Morazan's departure, a growing liaison be-

tween Conservatives and Carrera developed.

Within a month the Conservatives had gained

control of the government, supported by pop-

ular demonstrations calling for action to fore-

stall a new invasion of the capital from la

montafia. On July 22 Valenzuela turned over

the executive power to Rivera Paz.97 TheU.S. charge d'affaires reported the marked

increase of popular support for Carrera: "Ow-ing to the nature of the country, the numeri-

cal strength of the insurgents, and the en-

couragement they receive from one of the

political parties in this city, it has become as

difficult to subdue them as the Seminoles in

Florida. Besides," he wrote to Forsyth, "the

Ladino farmers from fear or inclination are

generally speaking in favour of Carrera, so

that, except in the cities and large towns,

Gen. Morazan is master of no more ground

than he can cover with his troops."98

On July 25 the legislature decreed a gen-

eral amnesty for all political acts in the state

95. Boletin Oficial, no. 123 (July 16, 1838), pp.533-34.96. MoOrhead, "Rafael Carrera," pp. 36-37, citing

Pineda de Mont, Recopilacion, I, 69.

97. Boletin Oficial, no. 124 (July 16, 1838), pp.535-38; no. 125 (July 26, 1838), p. 544; Stephens,

Incidents, I, 191; Marure, Efemerides, pp. 105-06;

Montufar, Resena historica, HI, 181-91.

98. DeWitt to Forsyth, Guatemala City, July 24,

1838, Doc. #797, Manning, Central America, p. 153.

61


since 1821, welcomed back exiles and de-

clared all civil rights and guarantees reestab-

lished." There followed a stream of legisla-

tion dismantling the Liberal program and be-

ginning the restoration of the institutions of

the colonial era. In rapid succession the leg-

islature provided for State support of the

Church,100 formally declared State sovereign-

ty,101 reduced by half the direct head tax, 102

repealed civil marriage and divorce, 103 re-

voked Galvez's municipal organization sys-

tem,104 and decreed other measures to reverse

the direction of Guatemala's government. At

the same time, the Rivera Paz government

continued its military efforts to suppress the

guerrillas, but with Morazan's troops gone

Carrera made notable gains and by early

September he had occupied Antigua and once

more threatened the capital. 105 A sudden

counter-offensive by the Liberal general, Car-

los Salazar, however, dealt Carrera a stun-

ning defeat at Villa Nueva on September 11,

although Carrera escaped into the hills once

more. In November, Morazan joined the

chase. Although Carrera's situation was des-

perate, he managed to continue the resist-

ance.100 Carrera bought time to reorganize

his haggard forces, when, on December 23,

1838, he signed with General Agustin Guz-

man, of the State of Los Altos, a treaty agree-

ing to lay down his arms and recognize the

government of Guatemala in return for his

restoration as military commander of the Dis-

trict of Mita. Rivera Paz and Morazan both

agreed, and the country enjoyed a breath of

peace.107

The respite was short, however, for, en-

99. Boletin Oficial, no. 125 (July 26, 1838), pp.539-41; Doc. #797, Manning, Central America, p.

153.

100. Ibid., pp. 542-43.101. Ibid., no. 126 (July 28, 1838), pp. 547-50.102. Ibid., p. 551.103. Ibid., pp. 554-55.104. Ibid., pp. 552-53; no. 127 (Aug. 5, 1838),pp. 559-60.105. Montufar, Reseiia historica, III, 204; AGCA,leg. 1413, exp. 33009, fol. 2; leg. 3607, exp. 83853;leg. 3652, exp. 86106; Marure, Efemerides, pp. 107.

106. Bancroft, Central America, III, 135-37.107. AGCA, leg. 1413, exp. 33009; leg. 153, exp.

3260, fol. 14; Solis, Carrera, pp. 86-87; Marure,Efemerides, p. Ill; Pedro Zamora Castellanos, Vidamilitar de Centro America (Guatemala, 1924), p.167.

couraged by the apparent collapse of the Ca-

rrera movement, the Liberals attempted to

recoup their position. On January 30, 1839,

Morazan deposed Rivera Paz with General

Salazar, the hero of Villa Nueva. 108 Mean-while, Conservatives gained power in Hon-duras and Nicaragua and joined forces

against Liberals in El Salvador. Carrera wasin league with those Conservative leaders as

well as with those in Guatemala, and the newLiberal thrust by Morazan convinced himthat there could be no peace until Morazanwas defeated once and for all.

109 Morazan's

term as President of the Federation expired

on February 1, and his opponents nowclaimed that he was the true rebel, for he

was in office illegally after that date. No suc-

cessor had been elected. 110 The cause of the

Conservatives and of Carrera had now be-

come one: the elimination of Morazan. OnMarch 24 Carrera issued a manifesto from

Mataquescuintla. Defending his own action in

taking up arms once more on the grounds of

defense of his country, he accused Morazanof cruelty toward the clergy and others, of

destroying commerce, of confiscating private

property, and of spreading terror throughout

Guatemala. Swearing before God Almighty,

he promised to restore Rivera Paz and to join

with the Conservatives of Honduras and Nica-

ragua in ousting Morazan. 111.

Three weeks later, on April 13, he entered

the capital unopposed at the head of a large

and orderly army. Carrera rode directly to

the house of Mariano Rivera Paz and restored

his authority. The Conservatives had re-

gained control almost to the day a decade

108. AGCA, leg. 2437, exp. ^51825; Victor Jerez,

"General Don Carlos Salazar," San Salvador y sus

hombres (San Salvador: Ministerio de Educacion,

1967), p. 98. . __109. Robert S. Chamberlain, Francisco Morazan,Champion of Central American Federation (Coral

Gables: University of Miami Press, 1950), p. 37;

Tobar Cruz, Los montafieses, p. 125; Franklin D.Parker, The Central American Republics (London:Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 184.

110. Chamberlain, Morazan, p. 37. Morazan also

assumed the office of Governor of El Salvador, the

only state remaining in the Federation.

111. Rafael Carrera, Pronunciamiento del GeneralRafael Carrera y del ejercito de la Constitucion del

Estado de Guatemala (Mataquescuintla. March 24,

1839), in Collection of Hojas Sueltas, L.A.L.


after they had lost it to Morazan. 112 Carrera

spent the remainder of the year mopping up

Liberal resistance in Guatemala and support-

ing Conservative forces in neighboring El Sal-

vador and Honduras. 113 In January, 1840, he

moved swiftly into Los Altos and crushed the

Liberal stronghold in Quezaltenango, an

event evidently welcomed by the majority

there. 114 In a "Farewell Address" to the in-

habitants there, he assured them of his con-

tinued protection now that he had put that

province back on the road to progress. Tangi-

ble benefits were provided immediately.

"Compatriots," he declared, "I leave you free

of the head tax ( contribution ) ; and although

you will pay the sales taxes (alcabalas) and

other taxes to which you are accustomed, no

longer will there be those that they have been

collecting here, nor those that were collected

in the time of Galvez in Guatemala: Those

now established are more moderate on peo-

ples who obey the government."115

A showdown between Morazan and Carre-

ra became inevitable as each continued to

intervene in the other's state. Morazan, re-

fusing to abandon the federation idea, even

though since the fall of Los Altos he had

only El Salvador, took the initiative and in-

vaded Guatemala in mid-March. Success-

fully outmaneuvering Carrera's forces, Mora-

zan took the Guatemalan capital with little

resistance on March 18. On the following

day, however, Carrera's troops stormed into

the city, completely routing the Liberal forces

and ending Morazan's rule. 110 Morazan and

112. Montufar, Resena historica, III, 299-305; ElTiempo, no. 10 (June 12, 1839), p. 40; AGCA, leg.

2437, exp. 51825; "Disposition de Rafael Carrera,

Comandante de los Pueblos de Mita, 13 de Abril de1839," in Collection of Hojas Sueltas, L.A.L.

113. A running account of his activities and pro-

clamations is given in El Tiempo, nos. 7-70 (May14, 1839-Jan. 22, 1840), pp. 27-279. Extensive re-

ports on his military operations are available in the

AGCA, particularly in legs. 1141 and 2437.

114. El Tiempo, nos. 70-79 (Jan. 22-Feb. 25, 1840),

pp. 279-313.115. "Rafael Carrera a los pueblos de los departa-

mentos de Los Altos," Quezaltenango. Feb. 9, 1840,

El Tiempo, no. 79 (Feb. 25. 1840), p. 311. OnFeb. 26 Los Altos was formally reincorporated into

the State of Guatemala. El Tiempo, no. 81 (Mar.4, 1840), p. 332.

116. A number of publications in the Collection of

Hojas Sueltas in the Hemeroteca of the AGCA pro-

vide detail on the events of March 17-19: "El

a few of his officers escaped to Panama. 117

Two years later he returned to Central Amer-ica for the last time, briefly usurping powerin Costa Rica. Another popular uprising cut

short his aspirations of reunification, and he

died before a firing squad in San Jose on

September 15, 1842. 118

Much of Carrera's time in the years follow-

ing Morazan's defeat was spent consolidating

Conservative rule in Guatemala and its neigh-

bors. The Conservatives soon found, how-

ever, that they could not control the caudillo,

and the years from 1840 to 1844 were a peri-

od of political adjustment to caudillismo.

Although conservative in tone, it was unlike

earlier elite governments, for Carrera's will

Coronel V. Cruz a los Guatemaltecos," Guatemala,Mar. 17, 1840; "Lista de los individuos actuados,

que estaban presentes el 17 de marzo en estas car-

celes, y fueron sacados por la tropa de Morazan,"[Guatemala, Mar. 17, 1840]; Juaquin Duran, Se-

cretario del Despacho de Gobernacion, "Parte Ofi-

cial," Guatemala, Mar. 19, 1840; Rafael Carrera,

"Parte circunstanciado de la accion de los dias 18 y19 de marzo, que ha sido dirigido al Gobierno por

el General en Gefe del Estado," Guatemala, Mar.

23, 1840; "Coleccion de algunos de los interesantes

documentos que se encontraron en los equipajes to-

rnados en la accion de los dias 18 y 19 de marzo,"

(Guatemala, n.d.). See also Solis, Carrera, pp.88-90; Montufar, Resena historica. III, 455-71;

Chamberlain, Morazan, p. 40; Stephens, Incidents,

II, 89-95; Rancroft, Central America, III, 141-42;

Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, pp. 137-39.

117. Marure, Efemerides, p. 124; Montufar, Resenahistorica, III, 600-01; Morazan to Esteban Travieso,

David, N.G., Aug. 14, 1840, Doc. #54(29), Mora-zan Papers, L.A.L.

118. Marure, Efemerides, pp. 132-33; Arturo Hum-berto Montes, Morazan y la federacion centroameri-

cana (Mexico: Libro Mex Editores, 1958), pp. 281-

324; Arturo Mejia Nieto, Morazan, Presidente de la

desaparecida Republica Centroamericana (Ruenos Ai-

res: Editorial Nova, 1947), pp. 167-89; Rodrigo Fa-

cio, Traijectoria y crisis de la federacion centroameri-

cana, con tin acdpite sohre el proceso de la separa-

cion de Costa Rica de la Republica Federal y de su

constitucion como republica soberana, libre e indepen-

diente (San Jose de Costa Rica: Imprenta Nacional,

1949), p. 84; Marroquin Rojas, Morazan, pp. 228-40;

see also, in the Collection of Hojas Sueltas in the He-meroteca of the AGCA, the proclamation of General

Antonio Pinto on Morazan's execution, San Jose, Sept.

16, 1842, and of Mariano Rivera Paz, congratulating

the inhabitants of Costa Rica on the act, Guatemala,

Oct. 21, 1842, and a separate proclamation of Rivera

Paz of the same date to the people of Guatemala, in

which he thanked Divine Providence for coming to

their defense. "Morazan," he said, "el enemigo obse-

cada del orden, de la propiedad y de la libertad de

los pueblos, ya no existe: termino su carrera de unmodo desastroso en Costa-Rica, en la Ciudad de San

Jose el 15 de Septiembre, aniversario glorioso de

nuestra independencia."


was law, and he insisted from time to time

on the priority of peasant interests. At the

same time, his own interests gradually

shifted to the more traditional conservatism

of the oligarchy. The growth of his ownestate probably contributed to this. Begin-

ning with his wife's property, his holdings in-

creased with his military fortunes, and by the

time he became President in 1844 he and

his family had amassed a considerable

amount. 119

There is at least one good example of the

relation between Carrera's acquisition of

property and a departure from the views he

had held as a peasant caudillo. His anti-

foreign feelings were well known, and the

English colonization project of the Galvez

government had been one of the major causes

of the revolt. Carrera kept closely in touch

with the government on the question of a

concession of the District of Santo Tomas on

the Caribbean coast to a Belgian colonization

company. On February 16, 1842, Santos Ca-

rrera informed the government that Rafael

warned against making any concession to the

Belgians at Santo Tomas. Such a concession,

he said, "would be prejudicial to the State

and even to the entire Republic, for the peo-

ple, upon seeing a new foreign colony

founded, would believe it to be the first link

[in the chain of their] enslavement."120 Al-

though many of the Conservatives had shared

the distrust of the English company, there

was considerable support among them for the

less objectionable Belgian plan. Without Ca-

rrera's support the contract seemed likely to

fail in the legislature. Yet in mid-April, 1842,

Carrera reversed his position and declared

his support of the project. After sharp debate

119. Carrera's wife played a major role in the man-agement of Carrera's personal financial affairs. See,

for example, AGCA, leg. 2437, exp. 51828, fols. 1-3.

Dunlop (Travels, p. 88) said that "by extortions andconfiscations, he has amassed some hundred thousanddollars, in cash, lands, and houses; and it is conse-

quently his interest to maintain a settled govern-ment and give protection to property." See also Ste-

phens, Incidents, I, 197-98; AGCA, leg. 214, exp.

4941, fol. 242; and Rafael Carrera to Secretario del

Supremo Gobierno, Guatemala, July 15, 1839, ElTiempo, no. 17 (July 19, 1839), p. 67.

120. Santos Carrera to Ministro de Relaciones, Gua-temala, Feb. 16, 1842, AGCA, leg. 1395, exp. 32354,fol. 5.

the Guatemalan legislature approved the con-

tract on May 4. That there may have beenbribery by Belgian agents is strongly indi-

cated. 121 As for Carrera, it is impossible to

overlook the fact that on April 25 the govern-

ment requested that he be granted 100 caba-

llerias of land in the vicinity of the Port of

Santo Tomas and on May 6 the legislature

complied. 122

The legislation following Carrera's revolt

makes it clear that a very substantial reaction

took place, as the Conservatives restored

much of the institutional structure of the co-

lonial period. For this they paid a price. For

the first time in Guatemalan history, Indians,

and more especially ladinos, began to play

a part in Guatemalan political life. The hold

of the white elite over government was clear-

ly broken, even if their social dominance had

been restored. But it was a restoration with-

out the remainder of the colonial kingdom

of Guatemala. The Federation had ceased

to exist, and although lip service was often

paid to it thereafter, strong regional loyalties

outweighed any spirit of unification.

The new legislature installed in Guatemala

on May 29, 1839, dismantled the remains of

the Galvez program. Rivera Paz outlined the

conditions and needs of the state in a mes-

sage to the body on May 31. He noted the

depleted condition of the treasury and the

generally depressed state of the country ow-

ing to the incessant warfare. Urging the leg-

islature to pursue practical measures to pro-

mote agriculture, industry, and commerce,

he proposed restoration of Hispanic institu-

tions such as the merchant guild. In conclud-

ing, he left little doubt as to who was really

in command or what direction the govern-

would take. "The characteristics that dis-

tinguished General Rafael Carrera," said Ri-

vera Paz, "his dedication and effort to estab-

121. Griffith, Empires, pp. 135-45; William J. Grif-

fith, Santo Tomas, anhelado emporio del comercio en

el Atldntico (Guatemala, 1959), pp. 33-36; Pineda

cle Mont, Recopilacion, I, 824-38.

122. The official reason given for the grant was as

a gesture of gratitude for Carrera's recent military

victories against El Salvador and for the zeal that hehad shown in maintaining the rights of the State andthe integrity of its territory. AGCA, leg. 212, exp.

4815; leg. 218, exp. 4990.


lish a regime of justice in the state; his love

of order, and above all his impartiality and

modesty — cannot escape your attention. Thenation owes him great service. He has been

the restorer of authority, and he is today

the strongest supporter of the rights and in-

dependence of the State. I recommend him to

the Assembly."123 A few days later the gen-

eral himself addressed the Assembly, charg-

ing them to do his bidding. He reiterated

his opposition to the Galvez reforms and his

dedication to tradition and religion; he prom-

ised to support all efforts along these lines. 124

The Assembly moved expeditiously, begin-

ning with restoration of the religious orders125

and an invitation for the return of the exiled

archbishop, Ramon Casaus. 126It confirmed

a slate of appointments acceptable to the

Conservatives, including Carrera as Com-manding General of the Army, 127 began a

process of consolidating the customs service,

and put the treasury in order. 128 Municipal

elections in July gave the Conservatives con-

trol of the capital. 129 In August the legisla-

123. Mariano Rivera Paz, Memoria que presento a la

Asamblea Constituyente, en su primera sesion, el Con-sejero Gefe del Estado de Guatemala, por medio del

Secretario del Despacho de Relaciones (Guatemala,

1839).

124. "Felicitation del General de Brigada Rafael Ca-rrera a la Asamblea Constituyente del Estado," ElTiempo, no. 11 (June 14, 1839), p. 41. See also the

article praising the peace and tranquility of the His-

panic period in no. 47 (Nov. 9, 1939), pp. 187-88.

A quotation from Francois Mignet at the head of

each issue of El Tiempo reflected the philosophy of

the government toward "reform": "Cuando una re-

forma se ha hecho necesaria, y ha llegado el mo-menta de establecerla, nada la impide, y todo la

secunda." See also Stephens, Incidents, I, 160.

125. El Tiempo, no. 12 (June 21, 1839), p. 45;

no. 14 (July 15, 1839), p. 54; Pineda de Mont,Recopilacion, I, 273.

126. El Tiempo, no. 13 (June 28, 1839), p. 50;

"Rafael Carrera, General de Brigada de las armasdel Estado, a los pueblos que lo componen," ElTiempo, no. 16 (July 18, 1839), p. 62; Pineda deMont, Recopilacion, I, 242-43.127. El Tiempo, no. 13 (June 28, 1839), supple-

ment. Supreme Court justices were named in Dec-ember. See El Tiempo, no. 56 (Dec. 7, 1839), p.

223128'. El Tiempo, no. 15 (July 10, 1839), p. 58. Seealso the editorial, "Credito Publico," in no. 23 (Aug.11, 1839), p. 89, calling for Hamiltonian measuresand annual budgeting to restore the public credit,

policies generally followed during the Carrera years.

129. Those elected, all by easy margins over numer-ous other candidates, were: Damaso Angulo, Alcalde1°; Pedro Aycinena, Alcalde 2°; Manuel Rubio, Al-

ture reestablished the national mint and the

merchant guild, with a substantial road and

port development program under the latter's

supervision. 130 Later, it revived the office of

corregidor, reflecting the re-centralization of

control over the country, 131 reestablished edu-

cation under Church auspices, 132 established

a national bank, 133 and revived the residencia

examination for all public officials in the

state. 134

The legislators closed their first session with

more decrees designed to restore the His-

panic tradition. They reduced taxes on food-

stuffs in another response to popular opin-

ion, 135 and reinstituted the former alcoholic

beverages controls. 136 They abolished the

head tax altogether. 137 They restored the

tithe tax and enforced its collection. 138 They

decreed a new Declaration of the Rights of

the State and its Inhabitants, which, although

maintaining in print many civil liberties,

clearly turned the direction of the State to-

ward authoritarianism. 139 Roman Catholi-

cism once more became the official religion

and regained its fuero and cabildo eclesids-

tico.uo The session adjourned, having defi-

calde 3°; Felipe Prado, Rejidor 8°; Jose Najera,

Rejidor 9°; Alejo Vaca, Rejidor 10°; and Jose Maria

Palomo, Sindico. El Tiempo, no. 18 (July 22, 1839),

p. 72.

130. Ibid., no. 24 (Aug. 15, 1839), p. 95; no. 26

(Aug. 24, 1839), p. 102; Woodward, Class Privilege,

pp. xvi-xvii, 55-104, 122, 126-27. Regarding prob-

lems of currency, see also Manuel F. Pavon, "Informe

del Consulado sobre las monedas del Sur en circula-

tion," Guatemala, June 20, 1840, El Tiempo, no.

108 (June 28, 1840), pp. 430-31; and El Tiempo,

no. 148 (Dec. 5, 1840), p. 592.

131. Pineda de Mont, Recopilacion, I, 504-11; see

also the comunique from the Jefe Politico de Chi-

maltenango to the State Government, Oct. 7, 1839,

El Tiempo, no. 39 (Oct. 11, 1839), p. 153, in whichhe reveals that an uncooperative local alcalde has

been removed from office in Tecpan, permitting the

town to progress.

132. El Tiempo, no. 39 (Oct. 11, 1839), p. 154.

133. Ibid., no. 45 (Nov. 3, 1839), pp. 178-79.

134. Ibid., no. 48 (Nov. 14, 1839), p. 189.

135. AGCA, leg. 214, exp. 4941, fol. 607; Gaceta

Oficial (Guatemala), I, no. 44 (June 10, 1842), 191.

136. El Tiempo, no. 57 (Dec. 11, 1839), pp. 225-26.

137. Pineda de Mont, Recopilacion, II, 263.

138. Gaceta Extraordinaria (Guatemala), Aug. 14,

1841, t>. 1.

139. El Tiempo, no. 60 (Dec. 21, 1839), pp. 237-39;

Pineda de Mont, Recopilacion, I, pp. 230-35.

140. Montiifar, Resena historica, III, 381-82; ElTiempo, no. 146 (Nov. 26, 1840), p. 582.


nitively terminated the Liberal revolution. 141

In 1840 the reaction continued. The gov-

ernment, in an effort to balance the budget

in the face of Carrera's continued military

expenditures and a sizable debt, slashed sub-

stantially the salaries of public and military

officials. 142 Reestablishment of the tobacco

monopoly increased government revenues.143

With Carrera's cooperation, the government

sought to end military abuses against local

populations.144 It tried to develop the econ-

omy through promotion of new crops and

subsidies and reestablished the Sociedad

Economica to aid such promotions. 145 Ca-

rrera himself proposed protective tariffs for

local industries and division of lands by mu-

nicipalities to promote production of cochi-

neal and silkworms. 146 Meanwhile, the

Church regained more of its confiscated

property, although Carrera refused to sanc-

tion restoration of all it had lost.147 The Con-

servatives restored the colonial land institu-

tions that the Liberals had sought to destroy.

In so doing, they tied the Guatemalan econ-

omy to a relatively small group of wealthy

landowners and merchants and established a

major obstacle to movement toward a gen-

erally more dynamic prosperity. 148 The res-

toration of the University of San Carlos, with

Father Juan Aycinena as rector until 1854,

represented well the aristocratic, pro-clerical,

and reactionary philosophy that was regain-

ing control. 149

Such decrees had the effect of restoring the

stability and order of the Spanish regime.

They were accompanied by the distrust of

non-Spanish foreigners that characterized the

141. See El Tiempo, no. 56 (Dec. 7, 1839), pp.221-22, for a review of the accomplishments of this

legislature.

142. Ibid., no. 65 (Jan. 4, 1840), p. 260.

143. Gaceta Oficial, I, no. 55 (Aug. 9, 1842), 235-

144. El Tiempo, no. 70 (Jan. 22, 1840), p. 279.

145. Marure, Efemerides, pp. 125-26; Pineda deMont, Recopilacion, I, 808; AGCA, leg. 213, exp.

4868; leg. 225, exp. 5084, fol. 13.

146. Sept. 16, 1840. AGCA, leg. 3600, exp. 82802.147. AGCA, leg. 858, exp. 20678; Dunlop, Travels,

p. 214.

148. Facio, Trayectoria, p. 83.

149. Holleran, Church and State, p. 131; Marure,Efemerides, p. 73.

colonial period. The return to Hispanic tra-

ditions stopped short of actual return to im-

perial status, as happened briefly in the Do-

minican Republic, but in 1851 Carrera re-

turned the Spanish colors to the Guatemalan

national flag, where they remained symbolic-

ally for twenty years. 150

The white elite thus attempted to restore

their former position by alliance with Carrera

and the peasants. Certainly, by 1842 they

had achieved much success. Although some

Liberals continued to serve in the govern-

ment for several years, and Carrera often

played off Liberals against Conservatives to

hold his own position, the Conservative doc-

trines predominated. The Conservatives real-

ized that only through subservience to the

caudillo could they recoup the losses of the

Liberal period. As before, the families con-

nected with the Aycinenas, most notably the

Pavons, Pinoles, and Urruelas, set the stand-

ards in politics and society, and as before

there were those who objected to the "aristo-

cratic" domination of society. 151 A small olig-

archy came to dominate policy and society,

although a number of Spanish immigrants

had much to do with commerce. In 1846,

according to a British resident, Robert Dun-

lop, the principal trade was ,in the hands of

five Spanish firms, which had correspond-

ents in England, France, and Spain. 152 The

small group of other foreigners made few in-

roads. In 1842 U.S. Special Agent W. S.

Murphy reported that the principal division

in the state's politics was between the native

inhabitants, led by General Carrera, and pro-

English interests, which still had some

150. Maria Albertina Galvez, Emblemas nacionales

(Guatemala: Editorial del Ministro de EducacionPublica, 1958), pp. 153-55. Red and gold were add-

ed to the blue and white adopted in 1825.

151. Cobos Batres (Carrera, pp. 116-19) discusses

the principal figures of the Guatemalan government

of the 1840s and notes that there were a number of

Liberals who continued to hold office in this period.

But it is clear that the most prominent officers wereConservatives. See also Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera,"

pp. 46-47; Stephens, Incidents, I, 244; and the

"Proposition" of Jorge de Viteri, Guatemala, July 17,

1840, in Collection of Hojas Sueltas in the Hemero-teca of the AGCA.152. Travels, p. 317.


strength in the legislature. 153 Actually, there

were few English residents in Central Ameri-

ca, although from Belize British merchants

continued to control much of Guatemala's

overseas trade.154

Growth of Conservative strength was nat-

ural as Carrera lost no opportunity to attack

the Liberals. He condemned the Liberal

economic and political philosophy as being

prejudicial to the people's interests and at-

tacked the Liberals for failing properly to

provide for the people's needs. Threatening

the Liberals with death in popular slogans,

he made it clear that their residence in Guate-

mala depended on their abstenance from

politics. The caudillo remained in contact

with the peasants, and during the first years

of his rule their interests received some at-

tention. A combination of patriotic oratory,

successful military campaigns against Guate-

mala's neighbors, and tangible actions on their

behalf kept the masses loyal to the caudillo

and thus served as a check against the Con-

servatives during the early years of his

regime.155

Carrera's concern for the peasants inevit-

ably caused the elite to distrust him. His

guerrilla warfare had been aimed at the

wealthy and he had abstained generally from

attacking the persons or property of the

poorer classes. As he allied with the Guate-

malan elite, his attitudes perhaps changed

somewhat, but it was several years before the

wealthy felt secure. 156 Athough his concern

for the poor may have waned as his own

153. Murphy to Daniel Webster, Guatemala City,

Feb. 4, 1842, Doc. #805, Manning, Central America,

p. 173.

154. Naylor, "British Role," p. 367.

155. See, for example, "Rafael Carrera, General de

Brigada de las armas del Estado, a los pueblos que

lo componen," El Tiempo, no. 16 (July 18, 1839),

p. 62; "El Brigadier y Comandante General de las

Armas del Estado: a los pueblos," El Tiempo, no.

18 (July 22, 1839), pp. 71-72; "El General Rafael

Carrera a los habitantes del Estado," El Tiempo, no.

42 (Oct. 24, 1839), p. 167; "Proclama del General

Carrera a sus soldados," El Tiempo, no. 57 (Dec.

11, 1839), p. 227; "Proclama del General R. Carrera

a sus conciudadanos de los otros estados," El Tiempo,

no. 73 (Jan. 31, 1840), p. 292; "Rafael Carrera a los

pueblos de los departamentos de Los Altos," El Tiem-

po, no. 79 (Feb. 25, 1840), p. 311; and Stephens,

Incidents, I, 247.

156. Montgomery, Narrative, p. 147; Bancroft, Cen-

tral America, III, 265.

riches increased, there is little doubt that the

government he dominated provided through

charity and paternalism a better life for the

masses than had the progressivism of the

Galvez Liberals. 157 On the other hand, the

Carrera government provided for a status quo

situation, whereas the Liberals had claimed

that general prosperity would be the inevi-

table, if long-term, result of their programs.

The new government's attitude toward the

Indians is testimony to its reactionary phil-

osophy of looking back to the Hispanic peri-

od. On August 16, 1839, the Guatemalan

legislature, recognizing that Indians were a

majority of the state's population, and that

it was "an object of public interest, not only

to protect this numerous class of the society,

but also to develop and improve its customs

and civilization," decreed a code for dealing

with this class. Noting that the Liberal pro-

gram had mistreated and exploited the Indian

under a system that operated under the pre-

text of their equality, the comittee reporting

the bill said that the system of the colonial

era was really better. That system "com-

pelled them to work, to provide public serv-

ice on certain projects and to pay taxes; but

it also gave them protection against the in-

fluential and the powerful in their land

claims." It provided for their care and wel-

fare and for their self-respect, the committee

added. The system of the Liberals abolished

all that, and the Indians had lost their respect

for authority and good order. The new code

clearly reversed Galvez' idea of incorporating

the Indian into western civilization. It even

called for reestablishment of the office of In-

dian interpreter and charged the department-

al officials to have the decree translated into

the indigenous languages. Galvez' program

aimed at assimilating the Indians. The Con-

servatives claimed this meant exploitation,

with the danger of rebellion and violence.

Instead, they offered paternalism and pro-

tection. 158

157. See Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera," p. 148.

158. The "Dictamen a la Comision de organization

provisional sobre establecer un regimen ^de protec-

tion y fomento en favor de los indios," is in El

Tiempo, no. 21 (Aug. 2, 1839), p. 81. The decree


Carrera frequently communicated with

both Church and State regarding the welfare

of the Indians, as for example in July, 1840,

when he notified the government that the

Indians of Atiquizaya and other villages had

informed him that the Vicar General of the

Archdiocese had not attended to their com-

plaints or answered their questions.159 And

the caudillo took an active interest in restora-

tion of ejidos to Indian communities, him-

self mediating land disputes in some Guate-

malan villages.160 Such interest dropped off

sharply, however, after he assumed the office

of president in 1844, and peasant support for

him declined correspondingly. He now rode

about in a fine European carriage, had be-

come wealthy, and identified himself with the

white elite. Ironically, it was a popular peas-

ant uprising in the District of Mita that be-

gan the revolt that forced him from office in

1848. 161 He was able to return the following

of Aug. 16 is in no. 27 (Aug. 30, 1839), pp. 105-06.

Another comparison of the Liberal and Conservative

approach to the Indian in Guatemala is found in Ro-

driguez, Livingston Codes, p. 30.

159. AGCA, leg. 3594, exp. 82514.

160. Ibid., leg. 1419, exps. 33274, 33305, 33326,

33356.161. Ibid., leg. 3601, exp. 82899; Dunlop, Travels,

p. 90; Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera," pp. 66-68.

year and in 1852 became president for life,

an office which he held until 1865, but the

attachment to the people of his youth wasnot regained.

The white elite never succeeded in regain-

ing full control of the country, however, for,

if Carrera achieved nothing else, his great

contribution was the permanent entry of the

ladino class into affairs of state. His army

had few white soldiers, and he did not want

white officers. 162 Carrera's relatives and asso-

ciates, all ladinos, occupied important posi-

tions. Moreover, Indians made up a consid-

erable portion of the army and were able to

gain petty government offices as well. Thus,

while the legislature still remained largely

white, their monopoly over government was

broken, never to be regained, and the same

was true of landholding. 163 There was a

genuine, conservative reaction against the

Liberalism of Morazan, Barrundia, and Gal-

vez, but it rested on popular support and

therefore had to share political victory with

the lower classes. It is in this sense, more

than in any other, that Carrera's revolt may

be termed a social revolution.

162. Stephens, Incidents, II, 90.

163. Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera," pp. 64-65.

rpHE CARRERA REVOLT was an example*• of Karl Marx's 1848 maximum that "the

lower widdle class, the small manufacturer,

the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all

these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save

from extinction their existence as fractions of

the middle class. They are therefore not re-

volutionary, but conservative. Nay more: they

are reactionary, for they try to roll back the

wheels of history."164 These elements put

forth a powerful reaction in Guatemala in

1837 against ideas and reforms foreign to

their traditions and experience.

In 1838 the Guatemalan government com-

missioned the historian Alejandro Marure to

compare the Carrera revolt with the revolu-

tion in the Vendee in 1793, where peasants

in defense of Church and tradition took up

arms against the republican government. Thesimilarities were notable. 165 Most other rural

revolts against intellectual-dominated reform

movements, within and beyond Latin Ameri-

ca, follow a similar pattern, probably not ex-

cluding the widespread support for George

Wallace in the 1968 U.S. presidential election.

Liberal reform movements which fail to

capture support from a rural majority sel-

dom survive, particularly when they are

164. "The Communist Manifesto," section 1, in KarlMarx, Capital, The Communist Manifesto and OtherWritings, ed. by Max Eastman (New York: TheModern Library, 1932), p. 332.165. AGCA, leg. 3618, exp. 84635; Vela, Barrundia,I, 213; Batres Jauregui, Mariano Gdlvez, pp. 76-77;Marure's study was entitled "Memoria sobre la in-

surrection de Santa Rosa y Mataquescuintla, en Cen-troamerica, comparada con la que estallo en Francia,en 1790, en los departamentos de la Vendee." Forrecent accounts and analyses of the Vendee revolt

see Charles Tilly, The Vendee (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1964); Paul Bois, Paysans de Vouest;Des structures economiques et sociales aux optionspolitiques depuis Vepoque revolutionnaire dans la

Sarthe (Paris: Mouton & Co., 1960); and MarcelFaucheux, L 'insurrection vendeene de 1793: aspectseconomiques et sociaux (Paris: Comision d'histoireeconomique et sociale de la Revolution, ImprimerieNationale, 1964).

identified with foreign ideologies. As Jacques

Lambert has indicated: "The elites who had

assumed power were drawn to the ideologies

prevailing in countries far more advanced

than the Iberian countries, namely France,

England, and the United States. ... No de-

veloping country can resist the compulsion to

imitate advanced countries. . . . But the Latin

American countries more than other countries,

were irresistibly driven in this direction be-

cause of the alienation of their elites. Al-

though these elites were living in an econom-

ically and socially backward environment

without having the slightest intention of for-

saking the advantages it gave them, they

were intellectually part of North Atlantic so-

ciety."166 The Carrera revolt ended that

phase of Central American history. WhatCrane Brinton has written for Europe at the

turn of the 19th century applied equally to

Guatemala a third of a century later: "The

ideas of the Enlightenment," wrote Brinton,

"whether they sprang from the head or the

heart, or from both working hard together,

were clearly corrosive of existing institu-

tions. . . . After the French Revolution had

come to shock the civilized world with its

violence, it became fashionable in conserva-

tive circles, and even in popular circles, to

blame the philosophers of the eighteenth

century for destroying the old regime with

their criticism and leaving nothing in its place.

Into this nothing came the passions and im-

perfections of the real human beings the

eighteenth-century philosophers had neglect-

ed in their preoccupation with the rights of

abstract man."167

The Utopia envisioned by Galvez had

ignored the realities of Central America in

166. Lambert, Latin America, p. 121.

167. Crane Brinton, Ideas and Men, The Story of

Western Thought, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Pren-

tice-Hall, 1963), p. 312.


the 1830s, and the peasants served as the rock be it called Liberal or Conservative — and

on which Liberal idealism was broken. De- destroyed what they believed threatened their

manding not rapid change but traditional se- way of life. In the process they brought

curity, responding to the instinct of survival about a real social revolution by ending the

and banding around a charismatic caudillo, dominance of the white classes over politics,

they lashed out against the establishment— land, and society.

lee woodward - social revolution in guatemala

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