mg diss ch6i

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CHAPTER 6 - THE CONSOL I DATI ON OF A CL I ENT STATE

1) T HE U. S . - I RAN CL I ENCY RE L AT ] ONSHI P , 1953- 1963

Af t er t he 1953 coup t he mai n U. S. goal i n I r an was t o keep t hatcount r y f r om f al l i ng under Sovi et dom nat i on. A Nat i onal Secur i t yCounci l r epor t appr oved i n December 1953 stat ed t hat I r an' s West -

Ier n or i ent at i on was of "cr i t i c~ i mport ance" t o t he Uni t ed St at es.I

Accor di ng t o t hi s r epor t . t he 1055 of I r an t o t he Sovi et Uni onwoul d: i ) t hr eat en t he secur i t y of t he M ddl e East and Sout hwest -er n Asi a; i i ) i ncr ease Sovi et oi l r esour ces; i i i ) weaken t he "w l lt o r esi s t " of U. S. al l i es and damage U. S. pr est i ge i n t he ar ea;i v) enabl e t he Sovi et s t o deny I r ani an oi l t o t he West ; and. v)"have ser i ous psychol ogi cal i mpact el sewher e i n t he f r ee wor l d. "I r an was t o be kept out of SoJ i et hands by cr eat i ng a st r ong andst abl e gover nment under t he shah and hi s pr i me m ni st er . l

Thi s was t o be achi eved i n t hr ee mai n ways. Fi r st , a set t l ementof t he oi l di sput e whi ch woul d enabl e I r an t o r esume i t s oi lexpor t s was t o be obt ai ned at t he ear l i est possi bl e dat e. Towar dt hi s end t he Nat i onal Secur i t y Counci l r ecommended t hat t he pr esi -dent secur e par t i ci pat i on by t he maj or U. S. oi l compani es 1n aconsor t i um ar r angement si m l ar t o t hat pr oposed by Tr uman i n l at e1952 by of f er i ng t o dr op ant i - t r ust act i on t hen pendi ngagai nstt hem i n f ederal cour t . Ei senhower accept ed t hi s r ecommendat i on


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P AGE 170and an agr eement w th I r an was f i nal l y r eached i n August 1954.Second, a l ar ge- scal e econom c ai d package was t o be made avai l -abl e t o t he I r ani an gover nment t o enabl e i t t o meet t he oper at i ngdef i ci t i nher i t ed f r om Mossadeq and i nst i t ut e soci al and econom cr ef or ms, whi ch wer e vi ewed as necessar y t o achi eve l ong- t er mst abi l i t y. Fi nal l y, a l ar ge m l i t ar y ai d package f or I r an wasrecommended. U. S. m l i t ar y ai d was necessar y t o st r engthen I r anagai nst out si de at tacks and t o i mprove mor al e i n t he m l i t ar y,whi ch was r ecogni zed as t he shJ h' s "onl y r eal sour ce of power .H2

M LI TARY AND ECONOM C AI D

As ment i oned i n chapt er 5, at l east S73 m l l i on i n econom c ai dwas gi ven t o t he Zahedi gover nment i n t he f i r st t hr ee weeks af t erMossadeq' s overthrow. Thi s amount ~d t o over one t hi r d of t hegover nment r evenue sai d t o have been l ost up t o t hat poi nt as ar esul t of t he oi l bl ocade. Tabl e 3 shows t hat r oughl y Sl bi l l i oni n U. S. m l i t ar y and econom c ai d gr ant s wer e gi ven t o I r an i n t he

Idecade af t er t he coup. U. S. 104ns and gr ant s t oget her t ot al ed overI$1. 2 bi l l i on i n t hi s per i od anq account ed f or about 21 per cent of

gover nment expendi t ur es. Thi s ! per cent age i s even hi gher i n t heyear s i mmedi at el y af t er t he coup. U. s . l oans and gr ant s i n1954- 1958 f i nanced 33 per cent of gover nment expendi t ur es, aboutt he same amount account ed f or by oi l r evenues i n t hi s per i od. Thi sf i gur e; s 44 per cent f or 1953- 1954. Fr om Sept ember 1953 t hr ought he end of 1954 i t i s pr obabl y cl oser t o 60 per cent , si nce u . s .ai d had been r educed t o a t r i ckl e bef or e. Mossadeq was ousted. 3

- t abl e 3 about her e-

Thi s massi ve i nf l ux of ai d came at a. t i me when government


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) )

Tabl e 3 - U. S. Ai d t o I ran and Oi l Revenues as Per cent agesof I r ani an Gover nment Expendi t ur es, 1950- 1967

( a) (b) ( c) ( d)Year Gover nment U. S. Ai d ( l oans ( b) as % U. S. Ai d ( c) as % Oi l _ ( d) as %-- Expendi t ur es and grant s) of ( a) ( gr ant s onl y) of ( a) Revenues of ( a)1950 225. 9 11. 8 5. 2 11. 8 5. 2 38. 5 17. 01951 188. 3 _-27. 8 14. 8 27. 8 14. 8 19. 9 10. 61952 149. 6 44. 1 29. 5 44. 1 29. 5 0 01953 167. 6 52 . .5 31. 3 52. 5 31. 3 0 01954 201. 2 110. 1 54. 7 110. 1 54. 7 7. 4 3. 71955 285. 1 90. 7 31. 8 58. 7 20. 6 77. 5 27. 21956 415. 3 97. 7 23. 5 85. 3 20. 5 131. 5 31. 71957 414. 0 138. 5 33. 5 115. 5 27. 9 182. 4 44. 119: : 8 506. 8 157. 0 31. 0 117. 0 23. 1 211. 9 41. 81959 611. 6 132. 0 21. 6 94. 3 15. 4 224. 9 36. 81960 697. 9 123. 4 17. 7 123. 4 17. 7 244. 6 35. 0- - - - - - r 961 - --T21.4 ~1Li6.8--- - 20~~ - - - - - g~9 - 1- "3- ; - 2- 25- 82- - - 3578 -1962 893. 3 113. 4 12. 7 88. 5 9. 9 286. 1 32. 01963 1117. 6 103. 5 9. 3 81. 3 7. 3 329. 8 29. 51964 1185. 6 54. 7 4. 6 49. 4 4. 2 411. 4 34. 71965 1248. 4 101. 6 8. 1 39. 7 3. 2 440. 2 35. 31966 1305. 9 175. 1 13. 4 71. 9 5. 5 498. 0 38. 11967 1469. 3 202. 4 13. 8 39. 8 2. 7 637. 4 43. 4

sour ces: ( a) J ul i an Bhar i er , Econom c Devel opment i n I r an, 1900- 1070 ( London: Oxf or dUni vers i t y Pr ess , 1971) , pp. 68, 90- 98, 126- 127. The val ues gi ven her e i ncl udeboth "or di nar y" expendi tures and expendi t ur es on t he var i ous devel opment pl ans.Year l y pl an expendi t ur es wer e est i mat ed usi ng t he act ual out l ays Bhari er gi vesf or aggr egat ed per i ods. Bhar i er s f i gur es wer e converted i nt o U. S. dol l ar s.( b) , . ( c) U. S. Depar t ment of st at e, Agency f or I nt er nat i onal Devel opment , unpub-l i shed wor ksheet s f or U. S. Over seas Loans and Gr ant s and Assi st ance f r omI nt er nat i onal Or gani zat i ons ( Washi ngt on, 1981) .( d) Bhar i er , pp. 158, 165. These f i gures wer e conver t ed f r om Engl i sh Pounds atan exchange r at e of $2. 40 per Pound.not e: Al l vol ume f i gur es ar e gi ven i n m l l i ons of U. s . dOl l ar s.


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PAGE 171spendi ng was i ncr eased dr amat i cal l y i n an ef f or t t o sol i di f y t he

t ur es gr ew by an aver age of 23 per cent per year i n 1954- 1958 and16 per cent i n 1959- 1963. Whi l e r el i abl e f i gur es ar e not avai l abl ef or 1954 or 1955, about 27 per cent of gover nment expendi t ur es i n1956- 1962 wer e f or t he secur i t y f or ces ( m l i t ar y, pol i ce, Gendar mer i e, and pr esumabl y al so SAVAK) , w t h about 12 and 33 per cent

t or shi p. I t i s evi dent t hat , par t i cul ar l y i n t he 1950s, U. S. ai dI

pl ayed a maj or r ol e i n devel dpi ng t hese as cor ner st ones of t heshah' s r egi me.

J ust under hal f of t he val ue of U. S. l oans and gr ant s gi ven t oI r an i n t he decade af t er t he coup was f or m l i t ar y assi st ance.U. S. m l i t ar y ai d t o I r an was si m l ar i n char act er t o t hat gi vent o ot her maj or U. S. al l i es i n t he t hi r d wor l d dur i ng t hi s per i od.Equi pment r angi ng f r om ammuni t i on t o t anks and j et ai r cr af t waspr ovi ded. A M l i t ar y Assi s t anqe Advi sor y Gr oup ( MAAG) uni t wasst at i oned i n I r an t o t r ai n and advi se t he I r ani an ar my. Over si xt housand I r ani an sol di er s


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PAGE 172T he t ot al val ue of U. S . ec onom c ai d t o I r an ( bot h l oans andgr ant s ) i n 1950- 1967 was $944. 1 m l l i on. Be f or e 1950 and af t er

1967 U. s . ai d t o I r an was al mos t negl i gi bl e. amoun t i ng t o l es st han $25 m l l i on f or bot h pe r i ods t oget her . Of t he $944. 1 m l l i ongi ven i n 1950- 1967, $200. 4 m l l i on was i n expo r t - i mpor t bankl oans . T he s e l oans ar e gene r al l y us ed t o f i nance U. S . expo r t s t ot he r ec i pi ent c oun t r y , and mus t be r epa i d i n f ul l ( wi t h i n t er es t ) .Hence t hei r ma i n val ue 1 es i n l eas i ng t he r ec i pi ent t hr ough t empo-r ar y per i ods of f or ei gn eXChJ nge s car c i t y , s uc h as t he per i odbef or e November 1954 when I r 1n' s oi l was kept of f t he i nt er na-t i onal mar k e t . L oans of t hi s s l r t c an t hus be qui t e us ef ul t o t her e ci pi ent go ver nment , al t hough t hei r domes t i c s oc i al i mpac t i sf el t onl y i ndi r ec t l y .

Of t he r emai ni ng $743. 7 m l l i on I n u . s . econom c ai d, $183. 1m l l i on came i n t he f or m of F ood f or P eace ( or P . l . 480) ai d, andt he r emai ni ng $610. 6 m l l i on i n o r di na r y f or ei gn ai d appr o pr i -at i ons . Mos t , al t hough not al l . of t he F ood f or P eace ai d was us edf or t he pur chas e of bas i c f ood commodi t i es s uc h as wheat , but t er ,c oo ki ng o i l , f eed gr ai ns , and dr y m l k . S ome $34 m l l i on wasear mar ked f or econom c devel opment pur pos es , i nc l udi ng hi ghwayc ons t r uc t i on, i mprovement s t o J he Mehr abad Ai r por t i n T ehr an, and

Iot her publ i c i nf r as t r uc t ur e P 1oj e c t s . Smal l er amount s wer e s penton m l i t ar y c ons t r u c t i on ( $~. 9 m l l i on) and l oans t o expandpr i vat e ent er pr i s e ( $4. 7 m l l i on) . I n addi t i on, $58. 5 m l l i on i nor d i nar y f or ei gn ai d appropr i at i ons was us ed t o f i nance s ugari mpo r t s . Addi ng t hi s and s ubt r ac t i ng t hat par t not us ed f orcommodi t y i mpor t s , s ome $197 m l l i on i n U. S . ai d dur i ng 1950- 1967was s pent di r ec t l y on f ood s uppl i es .

About one t hi r d of t he $610. 6 m l l i on i n or di nar y f or ei gn ai dapp r opr i at i ons came i n t he f or m of l oans , and t he r es t as gr ant s .T he l a r ges t por t i on of t hi s ( $139. 3 m l l i on, or about 23 per cent )was f or budget s uppor t , whi ch i s us ed di r e c t l y t o under wr i t e


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P AGE 173gover nment s pendi ng. Anot her ] 108. 1 m l l i on ( or 17 per c ent ) wass pent on publ i c i n f r ~s t r uc t ur e pr oj e c t s s uch ~s hi ghway. por t . andr ai l r oad cons t r uc t i on. S pendi g on econom c devel opment pr oj e c t sC" 1 di "1' .. I . d' d 1 t I 'nc U 1ng agr 1cu L ur e, m1n1ng, 1n uS L r y , an oans a r an sdevel opment bank) t ook anot he~ $83. 9 m l l i on. T he r emai ni ng 46PQr cQnt of f or ei gn ai d appr opr i at i ons was s pr ead ac r os s a Var i et yof s mal l e r ar eas . S oc i al pr ogr 1ms s uch as haal t h, educat i o n, hous -i ng, and di s as t er r el i e f accol unt ed f or $37. 3 m l l i on. Non- f oo d

. commodi t i e s s uch as t ext i l e s , machi ner y, and mot or vehi c l e s t ook$69 m l l i on. P ubl i c adm ni s t nat i on and publ i c s af e t y as s i s t ance( i nc l udi ng t he pol i c e t r ai n i ng pr ogr am des cr i bed bel ow) acc ount e df or $10. 8 m l l i o n . T he r emai nder was ei t her s pent i n s uppor t of

car r i ed ouJ t he above ac t i vi t i es or cannot bet he m s s i o ns whi c heas i l y i dent i f i ed. 6

Whi l e t he U. S . ai d pr ogr am i n I r an appear s on paper t o havebeen compr ehens i v e and wel l - ba anced i t was , i n f ac t , t he s ubj ec tof f r equent cr i t i ci sm ond cont 1over s: . House subcomm t t ee exomi ned t hi s pr ogr am i n 1957 and ~ound t hat i t was 50 poor l y adm ni s -t er ed t hat i t c oul d not be ~et er m ned how ai d f unds had beens pent . F undi ng l evel s appear J d " t o have bee n pi cked out of t he

Iai r . " wi t h no appar ent r egar d ~or I r an' s econom c needs . Ai d gi vent o I r an i n 1953 and 1954 wJ s des c r i bed as " nei t her t echni c alossi st once nor econom c devel o~ment but on od hoc met hod of keep-i ng t he I r ani an economy af l oa~. " T he subcomm t t ee c r i t i ci sed notonl y t he r el a t i vel y hi gh l evel 1 0 f budget s uppor t gi ven t o I r an buts~ec i f i c pr oj ec t s as wel l . A I ~hough i t s t opped s hor t of c har gi ngt hat U. S . ai d had been us ed i ~ a cor r upt manner . t he s ubcomm t t eer epor t c ont ai ned c l ear i n f er e~ces t hat U. S. ai d had been us ed byt he I r ani a n gover nment f o r dom4s t i c pol i t i c al por pos es . 7

F ur t her ev i denc e t hat t he U. S . ai d pr ogr am i n I r an was us ed f orc or r upt pur pos s s by t he s hah appear ed i n 1965 when an ar t i c l e i nT he Nat i on char ged t hat U. S . ai d had been us ed t o f i nance payment s


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of over $40 m l l i on t o t op ] r ani an and Amer i can of f i ci al s andmember s of t he shah' s i nne1 ci rcl e. Af t er t hi s ar t i cl e waspubl i 5h~d ~ S~n~t ~ i nv~5t i a~~ on i nt o t h~ m~t t ~r was abr upt l yhal t ed and The Nat i on was t hr eJ t ened w t h a l awsui t . Whi l e st r ongevi dence was pr esent ed, t he c, ar ges wer e never pr oved. ' Ther e ; 5al so r eason t o bel i eve t hat some U. S. m l i t ar y ai d was pocket ed byI r ~ni an m l i t ar y of f i cer s. 9

P AGE 174

SECURI TY ASSI STANCE

Fi r ~~~ ; : : ~~: t : ec: : : : : t a: : : C: J l ~r : : r eca: : o: ~: : : YW : h t : : e: ; : ; : ~: :It r ai ni ng and equi pment by t he Uni t ed st at es. The t r ai ni ng pr ovi ded

was ext ensi ve and qui t e di ver sd. I n at l east one case i t i nvol veda U. S. advi sor who wor ked i n a t op command capaci t y. Second, acer t ai n amount of i nt el l i gence i nf or mat i on was exchanged bet weent he U. S. and I r ani an seCUr i , y ser vi ces. As w l l be di scussedbel ow, secur i t y assi st ance of J hi S l at t er ki nd was not ext ensi ve,and hence ; s of l ; m t od ; mpor t] nce ; n t hi s st udy.

Lar ge- scal e U. s. t rai ni ng aJ d advi ce f or I r an' s secur i t y f or cesbegan i n Sept ember 1953, w t hi n weeks of Mossadeq' s over t hr ow. Asdi scussed i n chapt er f our U. S. advi s or y m ssi ons had been wor ki ngw t h t he I r ani an m l i t ar y and Gendar mer i e si nce t he ear l y 1940s.However , ot her t han assi st ance t o m l i t ar y i nt el l i gence ( orG- 2) , 12 t hese m ssi ons wer e noJ

I

~ I n Sept ember 1953 a U' S' J Ar my of f i cer who had been wor ki ngw t h t he CI A i n t he M ddl e Ea t f or sever al year s and who had abackgr ound i n pol i ce and det J ct i ve wor k was sent t o I r an as am l i t ar y at t ache. Hi s m ssi oJ was t o or gani ze and command a new

i nvol ved i n secur i t y t r ai ni ng Qg

secur i t y f or ce. t he mai n t ask of whi ch was t o seek out and el i m -


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P AGE 175nat e al l t hr eat s t o t he s hah. 13 T hes e wer e expec t ed t o come mal nl yf r om t he T udeh pa r t y . However ~ chal l enges t o t he s hah f r om m l i -t a r y of f i c er s and even f r o m r e mnant s of t he Hat i o nal F r o n t wer eIal s o r egar ded pos s i bl e I of t hr eat .s s ou rces

T hi s s ecur i t y f or ce was or gani z ed ar ound Gener al T ei mur Bakht -i ar and t hr ee ar my col onel s . I t di d not , at t hi s t i me, have awel l - def i ned or gani z at i onal s t r uc t ur e, and appar ent l y was not evengi ven a name. Rat her , i t opei at ed i nf or mal l y and c l andes t i nel y ,ac t i ng i ndependent l y of t he ot Her br anches of t he s ecur i t y appar a-I

It us and r epor t i ng di r ec t l y t o I t he U. S . at t ache, who hi ms el f haddi r ec t ac ces s t o t he s hah. 14 I t was bui l t pr i mar i l y on t he m l i -t ar y gover nor s hi p of T ehr an ( whi c h was put under t he command ofBakht i ar i n December 1953) , but dr ew r es our c es f r om a number ofexi s t i ng gover nment f ac i l i t i es , bot h m l i t ar y and c i vi l i an. I naddi t i on t o commandi ng t hi s or J ani z at i on, t he U. S . at t ache t r ai nedBakht i ar and t he t hr ee col onJ l s i n bas i c i nt el l i gence t ac t i cs .IT hes e i nc l u ded s ur vei l l ence and i n t er r ogat i on met hods , t he oper a-t i on of i nt el l i gence net wor ks , or gani z at i o nal s ecur i t y meas ur es ,et c. T hi s or gani z at i on was t he f i r s t moder n, ef f i c i ent s ecur i t yf or ce t o oper at e i n I r an. I t event ual l y evol ved i nt o t he not or i ouss ec r et pol i c e f or c e SAVAK, whi c h s er ved as a pr i mar y pi l l a r of t hes hah' s di c t at or shi p. I t s mai n r l chi evement was t o br eak up a l a r geT d h t k h h h d b I . d' t h d f T h'e ne wor w l C a een qr ganl z e I n e ar me or ces . I Soper at i on wi l l be des c r i bed i n s ome det ai l bel ow.

SAVAK1S was es t abl i shed i n 1957 wi t h Bakht i ar as i t s f i r s tdi r ec t or . T he s hah had t wo mai n goal s i n c r eat i ng SAVAK. F i r s t ,he want ed t o es t abl i s h an ef f i c i ent s ecur i t y appar at us whi c h coul dpr ov i de t he k i nd of s ecur i t s t r uc t ur e needed t o mai nt ai n anunpopul ar di c t at or s hi p s uch a~ hi s . T he T udeh m l i t ar y net wor kr ol l ed up I n S ept ember 1954 had i nc l uded s uch hi gh- r anki ng f i gur esas t he head of ar my G- 2 and t he pr i me m n i s t er ' s per sonal body-guar d. T he di s cover y of t hi s net wor k r eveal ed t he i ncompet ence and


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PAGE 176i nadequacy of t he exi s t i ng sec] l r i t Y f or ces and convi nced t he shaht hat a maj or r est ruct ur i ng of t hese f or ces was necessary. Second.t he shah deci ded t o cr eat e SAV~K i n par t t o el i m nat e t he over l ap

SAVAK wasand compet i t i on whi ch exi st ed bet ween t he var i ous or gani zat i onswhi ch wer e r esponsi bl e f or mai nt ai ni ng secur i t y.cr Qat Qd pr i mar i l y f r om t hQ or gani zat i on whi ch hadby Bakht i ar and t he U. S. m l i t J r y at t ache. However . i t al so i ncor -po r at ed per sonnel f r om ot her br anches of t he exi st i ng secur i t yappar at us. I t soon devel oped oper at i ng pr ocedur es and r ecr ui t i ngmet hods whi ch gave i t a ver y dj . s t i nct and i ndependent char acter .

Af t er Bakht i ar ' s associ at i I n w t h t he U. S. m l i t ar y at t acheended he was sent t o t he Uni t ed St at es t o st udy t he U. S. secur i t yor gani Zat i ons and exam ne how J hei r met hods and i nst i t ut i ons m ghtbe adapt ed t o sui t condi t i onJ i n I ran. I n 1957, shor t l y af t erI

ISAVAK was f or mal l y est abl i She" a t eam of f i ve CI A of f i cer s wassent t o I r an t o or gani ze and t r ai n SAVAK. Thi s t eam i ncl udedspeci al i st s i n i nt el l i gen~e anal ysi s, oper at i ons, andcount er - i nt el l i gence. Accor di 1g t o one of t he member s of t hi st eam t he assi st ance i t pr ovi d~d i ncl uded "ever yt hi ng f r om set t i ngup t he SAVAK l i br ar y t o hoJ t o set up count er - i nt el l i gencef i l es. " 16 Whi l e t he Uni t ed st a~es pr ovi ded ext ensi ve assi st ance t oSAVAK. i t was not model ed on U. S. i nst i t ut i ons such as t he CI A orFBI . I n f act , U. S. advi ce t o I t he shah t hat domest i c and f or ei gnoper at i ons shoul d be handl ed b~ di st i nct and i ndependent agenci es

I( l i ke t he FBI and CI A) was r ej l ct ed.

U. S. assi st ance t o SAVAK i nql uded t r ai ni ng f or SAVAK per sonnel .bot h i n I r an and i n t he Uni t ed I St at es. The t r ai ni ng gi ven t o SAVAKper sonnel consi st ed of st andar , cour ses made avai l abl e by t he CI At o " f r i endl y" secur i t y ser vi ces t hr oughout t he wor l d. These cour s-es ar e qu' t e s ' m l ar t o t he b1s , e t r a' n' ng g' ven t o CI A pers onnelat bases such as Ft . Meade, J i n Mar yl and. SAVAK per sonnel wer et rai ned i n t he f undament al s of spycr af t , such as sur vei l l ance,


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P AGE 177i nt er r oga t i on , and per s ona l s ecur i t y .t o t he cont r ar y. S AVAK per s onn~~ wer eni ques by t he CI A. ( CI A peOP I , of t enwer e al r eady adept i n t hi s ar ea. )

Des pi t e f r equent accus at i onsno t t r ai ned i n t or t ur e t ech-ar gue t hat SAVAK empl oyees

However . t hei r t r ai ni ngi nc l uded cour s es on how t o r es i s t t or t ur e. I n t hi s cont extdi f f er ent f or ms of t or t ur e wer e di s c us sed. 17 CI A of f i cer s wer ecer t ai nl y awar e of t he us e of t or t u r e by SAVAK. and at l eas t oneCI A of f i cer r epor t ed l y t our ed SAVAK t or t u r e chambe r s . 18 S AVAK

Iper s onnel wer e al s o t r ai ned i 1 t he Un i t ed S t at es at t he I nt e r na-t i onal P ol i ce Academy and ~he I nt er n at i onal P ol i c e S er vi cesSchool . T hes e t r ai ni ng cent er s wer e r un by t he U. S . Agency f orI nt er nat i on al Devel opment . al l eged l y wi t h cove r t C I Aspons or s hi p. 19

I n addi t i on t o t he CIA t ' l ai ni ng and adv i s or y m s s i on t ha two r kQd wi t h S AVAK, t hQr e was al i s o a cer t ai n amount of coope r at i onbet ween t he t wo agenc i es on i nt el l i gence c ol l ec t i on. Some i nt e l -l i gen ce i nf or mat i on was exchanged, pr i mar i l y mat er i al r el at i ng t ot hi r d c ount r i es s uch as t he S ov i et Uni on. T her e was al s o s omeexchange of i nf o r mat i on r el at i ng t o domes t i c mat t er s , t hough t hi swas much mor e l i m t ed i n s c ope . T he i nf or mat i on pr ov i ded t o t heCI A by S AVAK was gener al l y r ega r ded t o be of dubi ous val ue. F ori t s par t , t he CI A I t o pr ovi de SAVAK wi t h i nf or mat i o nas r e l uc t an ,f or f ea r t hat i t s s our ces woul d be expo s ed . I n any cas e, by t hem d- 196 0s S AVAK had become qui t e s ophi s t i cat ed and pr es umabl y hadbe t t er s our ces t han t he CI A . who by t hi s t i me had al mos t ent i r e l ys t opped us i ng agent s i n I r an. 20 Wh i l e ver y l i t t l e i nf or mat i onr e l a t i ng t o domes t i c mat t er s was t hus exc hanged, t he t wo s e r v i c esf r equen t l y di s c us s ed mat t er s of c ommon con cer n and c oo r d i nat edpol i c i es .

One ot he r ar ea i n whi ch t he Uni t ed S t at es c ont r i but ed s i gn i f -i c an t l y t o I r an' s s ecu r i t y capab i l i t i es was t hr ough a pol i c et r ai ni ng and advi s or y m s s i on adm ni s t e r ed , by t he U. S . Agency f or


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I nt er nat i onal Devel opment . T hi s m s s i on, whi ch was begun i n t hePAGE 178

s ummer of 1954 and cont i n ued a] l eas t t hr ough t he end of 1965, wases~~bl i s hed t o pr ov i de t r ~i n i ~g ~nd ~dvi c e f or I r an' s Nat i onalP 1 T h . . 1 j . .hi .. 11 d fo r c e , e o r r q t ne agr eemen" c ov e r r na "C lS mr e s ion ca e oras s i s t ance i n t he ar eas of hdadqUar t er s and f i el d or gani z at i o n,per s onnel pr ac t i c es , r ec or ds , J ot or vehi c l e mai nt enance, c ommuni -cat i ons, t r ai ni ng, t r af f i c man~gomont , i dont i f i cat i on, and i nv05-t i gat i ve pr ocedur es . Whi l e mucH of t he as s i s t ance pr ov i ded by t hi sm s s i o n i nvol v ed r out i ne P Ol i e, wor k and t hus i 5 of l i t t l e i nt er -es t her e, s ome of i t s ac t i v i i es wer e of cons i der abl e domes t i c

,

P at r ol men' s S chool , t he es t abl i s hment of a nat i o nwi d e pol i c e r adi o

pol i t i cal i mpor t ance. T hes e i nc l uded t r ai ni ng i n r i ot c ont r ol ,as s i s t ance i n r es t r uc t ur i ng ! t he Nat i onal P ol i ce Academy and

net wor k wi t h connec t i ons t o ~he i n t er nat i onal I nt er pol net wor k,and t ho dovo10p. ont of f i ngor pl i nt and phot ogr aphi c l obs. "

'I'I

I

T HE EVOL UT I ON OF U. S . - I RANI AN J E L A T I ONS

T he r el a t i ons hi p bet ween t ~e Uni t ed S t at es and I r an r emai nedIver y c l os e but pas s ed t hr ough I s ever al phas es i n t hi s per i o d , As' Idi s c us s ed above, t he mai n goa~ of U. S . pol i c y t owar d I r an af t erIt he 1953 coup was t o s t abi l l z e I r an ar ound a s t r ong cent r al

gover nment l ed by t he s hah a~d hi s pr i me m ni st er . T hi s goal ,whi ch was expl i c i t l y s t at edi i n t he Nat i onal S ecur i t y Counc i lr epor t appr oved i n Decembe r 1, 53, cal l ed f orof t he oi l di s put e and l ar g~- s c al e m l i t ar y

an ear l y r es ol u t i onand econom c ai d

I

pr ogr ams . I t al s o cal l ed f or t he es t abl i s hment of a new s ecur i t yappar at us under t he command : 1 of aU. S . m I i t ar y at t ache andsmal l - s c al e c over t U. S. open l at i ons agai ns t Nat i onal F r ont andT udeh t ar ge t s i n t he f al l of 1953 ( as des c r i bed i n chap t e r 5) .


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rAGE 179By t he end of 1954 t hi s goal had l ar gel y been achi eved. Oi l hadbegun t o f l ow agai n. The l i ber al opposi t i on had gr own doci l e

and t he Tudeh par t y had been deal t a deci si ve bl ow w t h t he r ol l upof i t s m l i t ar y net wor k. The pi ct ur e became even br i ght er f or U. S.pol i cymaker s when t he shah di sm ssed Zahedi i n Apr i l 1955. Thi swas r egar ded as a si gn t hat t he shah was at l ast r eady t o assume

Icont r ol over t he count r Y ar i d act deci si vel Y t o st amp out

Icor r upt i on, whi ch had gr own r i mpant under Zahedi . I n l at e Apr i l

~: : : e_: : : l eU' ~~su: : : : : : : n i : hi J ~hr : : d : : : : : : d t ; : t : : : 3 t : : : at be: :brought under cont r ol . The pr oJ l em now was t o r ei nf or ce t he r egi meagai nst t he cont i nui ng t hr eat J f Sovi et subver si on. Thi s was t o beaccompl i s hed t hr ough cont i nued m l i t ar y and econom c ai d andfu r t her st r engt heni ng of t he secur i t y appar at us. 22

Thi s new U. S. conf i dence i n t he shah and i n hi s abi l i t y t omai nt ai n cont rol was r ef l ect ed 1n t he act i vi t i es of t he CI Astat i on i n Tehr an at t hi s t i me. Cover t U. S. oper at i ons agai nstI r ani an t ar get s wer e scal ed back gr eat l y by t he end of 1954. Bot ht he TPBEDAMN oper at i on ( whi ch had pr ovi ded t he t wo pr i nci pal U. S.agent s used i n t he overthr ow of Mossadeq) and t he smal l oper at i onsunder taken i n t he f al l of 1953 agai nst t he Nat i onal Fr ont and t heTudeh par t y wer e ended. Si m l ar l y, The number of agent s used f orr out i ne i nt el l i gence- gat her i nJ i n I r an decl i ned st eadi l y af t erI1953. The new at mospher e of s~abi l i t y and gr ow ng U. S. conf i denceIi n t he shah di ct at ed a new l approach. Rat her t han i nt er veni ngdi r ect l y i n I r an' s af f ai r s, U. S. pol i cymaker s i ncr easi ngl y t houghti n t er ms of enabl i ng t he shah t o pr ovi de f or hi s own secur i t y bygi vi ng hi m ai d and bui l di ng up hi s secur i ty f or ces. The CI Ast at i on busi ed i t sel f mor e and mor e w t h cr oss- bor der oper at i onsdi r ect ed at t he Sovi et Uni on and Af ghani st an and w t h penet r at i onsof t he East er n Bl oc embassi es i n Tehr an. 23

I n t he l at e 1950s and ear l y 19605 t wo addi t i onal f act or s began


13/24

P AGE 180t o emer ge whi c h had t he ef f ec t of f ur t he r c u r t ai l i ng U. S . ac t i v-i t i es i n I r an. F i r s t , due l ar ~el y t o t he t r ai ni ng and as s i s t anc edes c r i bed above, S AVAK was beCl l m ng i nc r eas i ng l y ef f ec t i ve as as ecur i t y f or ce at t hi s t i me. I t was t her ef or e l es s dependent oni t s l i as on wi t h t he Uni t ed S t a t es and mor e abl e t o de t ec t anddi s r upt U. S . i nt el l i genc e- gat her i ng ac t i v i t i es . Second, i n 1957t he Uni t ed S t at es began t o i ns t al l el ec t r oni c l i s t eni ng dev i c es i nI r an. T hes e devi c es wer e of cni t i c al i mpor t anc e af t er t he S o vi e tUni o n l aunched Sput ni k becau s e I t he y wer e mor e r el i a b l el i t e s and hi gh- a l t i t ude ai r c r a~t and becaus e no ot her

I wer e c l os e enough t o t he Cent r al AS l an l aunc h s i t e s

t han s at el -U. S . al l i est o pr ovi de

compa r ab l e f ac i l i t i es . 24 A f or mal agr eement f or t he bas i ng oft hes e devi ces was never conc l uded. U. S . pol i cymaker s wer e cons e-quent l y ver y r el uc t an t t o unde r t ake oper a t i ons i n I r an whi c h m ghtanger t he s hah and l ead hi m t o , wi t hdr aw t hei r ba s i ng pr i vi l ege s .,,

IT hese f ac t or s l ed t o a f ut t her cur t ai l ment of U. S . i n t e l l i -ge nce- gat her i ng and ot her pol i t i cal ac t i vi t i es i n I r an. Bym d- 196 2 t he CI A t r ai ni ng m s s i on wi t h SAVAK had bee n gr e at l ys cal ed back. Whe re i n 1957 - 1959 i t had been ver y br oad i n scope,by t he ear l y 1960s i t s t r ai ni ng ac t i v i t i es wer e l i m t ed t o ver ys pe c i f i c pr oj ec t s , us ual l y ~nv ol vi ng s ophi s t i cat ed el ec t r oni c,equi pment . I n i t s pl ace t he CL A - S AVAK connec t i on had evol ved i nt oIa l i as on m s s i on who s e pr i mar y pu r pos e was t o car r y out j oi ntoper at i ons , mai nl y t o be di r ec t ed at t he T udeh pa r t y . However ,S AVAK of f i c i al s had become ver y obs t i nat e by t hi s t i me and noj oi nt ope r at i ons of t hi s k i nd ac t ual l y occur r e d . 25 S i m l ar l y , t hec l os e pe r s onal r el at i ons hi ps whi ch had ear l i er been of gr eat bene-fit t o bot h Amer i c an and I r ani an par t i c i pant s wer e now r epl aced bymor e di s t ant r e l a t i ons hi ps . I C I A of f i cer s wer ef o l l owed i n I r an and t he i r t el ephones wer e bugged.t ha t f or ei gn t r ai ni ng of S AVA J o f f i cer s oc cur r ed i t

now r out i nel yT o t he ext entwas now done

by I s r ael i s , of t en i n I s r a el .


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F or s i m l arP AGE 181

of U. S . embas s y of f i c i al sand t he T ehr an CI A s t at i on became mor e hi ghl y c i r cums c r i bed i n

t he ear l y 1960s as wel l . E xc ept f or one r ound of meet i ngs wi t hpr om nent Nat i onal F r ont f i gUr J s i n 1962 and 1963, c ont ac t bet ween

it he embas s y and t he I r ani a n OP 1os i t i o h was f o r bi dden by s uc ces s i v eU. S . ambas sador s , appar ent l y af t er c ompl ai nt s by t he s hah. T heCI A s t at i on, hav i ng dr opped m] l s t of i t s agent s , was by t hi s t i mer el y i ng al mos t exc l us i vel Y on S AVAK and over t s our ces ( such asnews paper s ) f o r i nt el l i gence. 16 T hi s s i t uat i on per s i s t ed unt i l1977, when gr owi ng unr es t l ed ~o a dec i s i on t o r enew cont ac t s wi t hIt he oppos i t i on. T hi s i s t he ma~n r eas on why t he I r ani a n r evol u t i oncaught U. S . pol i cymaker s s o mudh by s ur pr i s e. 27

IT he one ar ea of U. S . - I r ani J n r el at i ons whi ch was not gr eat l y

s ca l ed back i n t he ear l y 1960J was t he m l i t ar y and econom c ai dpr ogr am As s hown i n t abl e 3, I U. S. m l i t ar y and econom c ai d t oI r an r emai ned at hi gh l evel s t ~r ough 1967. al t hough i t i nc r eas i ng-l y s hi f t ed f r om gr ant s t o 11ans and dec l i ned not i c abl y as aper c ent age of I r ani an gover ~ment expendi t ur es . T hi s ai d was

Ir epor t edl y us ed i n 1961 t o pr es s ur e t he s hah i nt o appoi nt i ng t heAm ni as pr i me I m ni s t er . 28 U. s . pol i c ymaker s hadef or m s t A l i

Ibeen awar e of t he need f or s oc i al and econom c r ef or ms i n I r an f ors ome t i me. 29 However , i t was not unt i l t he i naugur at i on of t heKennedy Adm n i s t r at i on, wi t h t s dr amat i cal l y di f f er ent appr oach

on t he s hah.t o t he t hi r d wor l d, t hat pr es s u r e

IIf or r ef or ms was f i nal l y exer t ed

T hi s pr es sur e was r emar kabl y ef f ec t i ve. Am ni and hi s m ni s t erof agr i cul t ur e Dr . Has s an Ar s anj ani i ns t i t ut ed a wi de- r angi ngs er i e s i nc l udi ng l and r ef or m heal t h and l i t er ac yIpr ogr ams , t he enf r anchi s ement df women. et c . As wi l l be di s c us s e d

Ibel ow. t he s hah t ook t hi s pr o~r am t o be hi s own. c al l i ng i t t he" whi t e r evol ut i on" and t he " S~ah- peoP l e r evol ut i o n. " Hav i n g madet he r ef or m pr ogr am i nt o a cor l er s t one of hi s r egi me t he s hah was

of r ef o r ms ,


15/24

P AGE 182

can pr e ss ur e s.

IIt h Q pr o - Amer i c J nAt t he s ame t i de

Am ni and pr QQmpt f ur t hQr Amer i -U. S . ai d l evel s cont i nued t o dr op

abl Q t o di s m s s

of f . At t he l avi s h cer emoni es mar k i ng t he 2500t h anni ver s ar y ofP er s i an monar chy hel d at per 1epol i s i n 1971 t he s hah publ i c l yronounced f urt her U. S . ai d. . 1

U. S . - I r ani an r el at i ons by t 1i s t i me had come f ul l c i r c l e. W t ht he 1953 coup and l ar ge- s cal e l i l i t ar y and econom c ai d and s ecu-r i t y as s i s t ance i n t he f ol l owi ng year s , t he Uni t ed S t at Qs hadpl ayed a c r uc i al r ol e i n r es c J i ng t he s hah and maki ng hi m i nt o apowor f ul di ct at or . As t he Sha, became st rong and as I r an gr ew i ni mpor t ance t o t he Uni t ed s t at es t he U. S . - I r an c l i ency r el a t i ons hi pchanged dr amat i c al l y i n char ac J er . T he f l ow of c l i ency i ns t r ument s

Is uch as i nt er vent i on, ai d, and s ecur i t y as s i s t ance ended al mos tent i r el Y . T he l ever age whi c h l ai d had pr ovi ded gr adual l y di s ap-pear ed. Af t e r 1963 and cQr t ai ~l Y by 1971 I r an coul d no l onger becons i der ed a U. S. c l i ent i n t he s ens e i n whi ch t hi s t er m i s us edhere .

III2) T HE F OUNDAT I ONS OF DT CT AT ORSHI PI

T HE S E CURI T Y F ORCES

As i n any ot her di c t at or s hi p, t he pr i mar y pi l l ar of t he s hah' saut hor i t ar i an r egi me was i t s s ecur i t y appar at us . 30 Bef or e t he

seCU; ~i t y appar at us had had t hr ee mai nP ol i c e, t he Gendar mer i e, and t he ar med

f or ces . T he ar med f or ces i nc uded t he m l i t ar y gover nor s hi p of

c r eat i on of SAVAK, t hecomponent s : t he Nat i onal

T ehr an, whi c h r epl aced t he c i v i l i an adm ni s t r at i on when mar t i al


16/24

P AGE 183l aw was dec l ar ed i n 1953. T he m l i t ar y gover nor s hi p was i n t ur nt he mai n or gani z at i on whi c h Ba~ht i ar and t he U. S . m l i t ar y at t ache

Idr ~w upon i n ~s t abl i s hi ng t h~ pr ~d~c~s s or t o S AVAK.III

T he Nat i onal P ol i c e had beer l c r eat ed by Reza Shah t o pr ov i de auni f i ed, nat i onwi de s t r uc t ur e f or l aw enf or cement i n t he l ar gerc i t i es and t owns of I r an. I t s pr i mar y r es pons i bi l i t y was t o car r yout r out i ne pol i c e dut i es s uch as c r i m nal i nves t i gat i on andappr ehens i on. However , i t al s o I had a s ec r et pol i c e di v i s i on whi c hhandl ed domes t i c s ecur i t y ar i d i n t el l i gence mat t er s . T he mai n

Ir es pons i b i l i t y of t he s ec r et I P ol i c e was t o moni t or and di s r upts ubver s i ve el ement s whi c h pos~d a t hr eat t o t he r egi me. I n t hel at e 1940s and ear l y 1950s t h1s meant pr i mar i l y t he T udeh par t yand t he F edayan- i - I s l am T he s ec r et pol i c e had no f or ei gn i nt el l i -gence capabi l i t i es as s uch. l i J e much of t he gover nment bur eauc r a-Ic y at t he t i me i t was ext r emel y cor r upt and i nef f i c i ent . I t was no

IImat ch f or t he wel l - di s c i pl i neq T udeh par t y and was not ef f ec t i veIi n pr event i ng as s as s i nat i on at t empt s agai ns t t he s hah and hi sIpr i me m ni s t er s .

T he Gendar mer i e was t he ~ur al c ount er par t of t he Nat i onalP ol i ce. I t oper at ed t he bor der : pat r ol . pol i c ed t he smal l t owns and

Iv i l l ages , and s har ed r es pons i 1bi l i t y wi t h t he ar my f or keepi ngI

t r ac k of t he t r i bes . T he Ge~dar mer i e had a smal l i nt el l i g enceIpr i mar y f u nc t i on r as t o mai nt ai n s ecur i t y wi t hi n t he

i t s el f . T he Gend~r mer i e al s o handl ed c r os s - bor deri nt o I r an, t o t he ext ent t hat t hes e wer e handl ed at

s ec t i on whos e

i nf i l t r a t i onsal l . I t s mai n r ol e i n pr ov i di ng domes t i c s ecur i t y was i t s ac t i v-

I

i t i es r egar di ng t he t r i bes .IBef or e t he c r eat i on of SAVAK t he pr i mar y r es pons i bi l i t y f or

mai n t ai n i ng domes t i c s ecur i t y l a y wi t h t he ar med f or ces , i n c l u di n gt he mar t i al l aw adm ni s t r at i on and t he new s ecur i t y f or ce es t ab-l i shed under Bakht i ar and t he U. S. m l i t ar y at t ache. T he ar my


17/24

PAGE 184i t s el f pl ayed an i mpor t ant r ol e i n mai nt ai ni ng or der . I t had beende epl y i nvol ved i n t he over t hr J 1w of Mos s adeq and i n t he wi des pr eadar r es t s whi c h f ol l owed t he coup. I t c onduc t ed oper at i ons agai ns t

I

t he t r i bes and l at er agai ns t ~he guer r i l l a bands whi ch began t oemer ge i n t he l at e 19605. I n 1963 t he ar my was cal l ed out t o putdown l ar ge demons t r at i ons l ed by a l i t t l e- known c l er gyman namedKhomei ni . Hundr eds wer e k i l l ed i n t he ens ui ng conf r o nt at i on. E venwhen i t r emai ned i n t he bar r acks , f ear t hat t he m l i t ar y m ght

t o t he a1mos P her e of i n t i m dat i on and al i en-under t he s hah. T he ac t i v i t i es of t he ar med

Is uper vi s ed by t he s hah, and wer e coor di n at e d

i nt e r vene cont r i but edat i on whi ch pr evai l edf or c e s wer e c l o s el ywi t h t hos e of t he ot her s ecur i t y or gani z at i ons .

As ment i oned above, S AVAK was or gani zed i n par t t o end t hecompet i t i on and r edundancy whi c h t he s ys t em of over l a ppi ng s ecur i -

It y f or ces ent ai l ed. T hi s cons 9l i dat i on pr oces s ac t ual l y s eems t ohave begun wi t h t he es t ab l i s h~ent of t he or gani zat i on head~d by

IBakht i ar and t he U. S. m l i t ar y at t ache. T hi s or gani zat i on dr ewf r om bot h t he m l i t ar y and t he s ec r et pol i ce. W t h t he except i onof m l i t ar y G- 2 i t appear s t o have ent i r el y t aken over r es pons i -bi l i t y f or domes t i c i nt el l i gence ac t i vi t i es f r om t hes e or gani z a-t i ons . G- 2 onl y per i pher al l y i n domest i cnvo l vedasi nt el l i gence, bei ng mai n l y concer ned wi t h s ecur i t y i n t he m l i t ar y

I

i t s el f and wi t h t he ac t i vi t i es : of t he ar med f or ces i n nei ghbor i ngcount r i es . T he Nat i onal P ol i c e. t he Gendar mer i e. and t he m l i t ar ys t i l l pl ayed i mpor t ant r ol es i n mai nt ai ni ng domes t i c s ecur i t y.However , t hey ac t ed pr i mar i l y i n an enf or cement capac i t y , wher easBakht i a r ' s or gani z at i on and l a t er S AVAK as s umed r es pons i bi l i t y f ordomQs t i c i nt e l l i gence mat t Qr s .

T he manner i n whi c h SAVAK a~d i t e i mmedi a t e pr edeces s or car r i edout t he t as k of mai nt ai ni ng s ecur i t y changed c ons i der abl y i n t het WQnt y- f i ve year s af t er Mos s adeq was over t hr own. One s our ce oft hi s change l ay i n t he evol ut i on of S AVAK f r om a cor r upt , c ompar -


18/24

PAGE 185at i vel y backwar d or gani zat i on t o a moder n, ef f i ci ent secur i t yf or ce whi ch became somet hi ng 0 1 a model f or or gani zat i ons of t hi ski nd i n t he t hi r d wor l d. 31 1he key r ol e pl ayed by t he Uni t edSt at es i n t hi s pr ocess of evo~ut i on has been descr i bed above. Asecond sour ce of change i n SAV~K' s mode of oper at i on r esul t ed f r omt o t he changi ng r ol es i t was c~ l ed on t o pl ay by t he shah and. byext ensi on, f r om t he di f f er ent per sonal i t i es of t he men appoi nt edt o l ead i t .

The f ounder and f i rst di rel t or of SAVAK was Tei mur Bakht i ar ,who r emai ned i n t hat posi t i on unt i l Mar ch 1961 when he was exi l edIf or pl ot t i ng t o over t hr ow t ~e shah. Af t er t he 1953 coup andt hr oughout t he 19505 t he shah J as i n t he pr ocess of consol i dat i ng

Ihi s aut hor i t ar i an r egi me. An ef f i ci ent secur i t y f or ce under t hecommand of a r ut hl ess and dJ t er m ned l eader l i ke Bakht i ar wascr uci al t o t hi s pr ocess of conJ ol i dat i on. Bakht i ar was a cr ude andvi ol ent man, 32 and t he or gan~zat i on he l ed t ook on a charact ermuch l i ke hi s . Al t hough l i t t l e! i s wr i t t en about 5AVAK 1n t he 1950s

It her e can be no doubt t hat i t : was as br ut al as t he SAVAK of t he19705, i f perhaps somewhat l ~ss ef f ecti ve. Thousands of peopl e

Iwer e ar r est ed i n t he per i od af t er August 1953, most l y on char gesIof bei ng member s of t he out l a1ed Tudeh par t y. At l east 94 peopl e

wer e execut ed i n t hi s per i od, 33 and t he t r ue f i gur e was undoubt -edl y sever al t i mes hi gher . At l east some ar e sai d t o have beent or tur ed t o deat h. Bdkht i ar ' s secur i t y f or cQ was r Qsponsi bl Q f or

It he breakup of t he Tudeh m l i ~ar y net wor k i n Sept ember 1954 andIcl osel y moni t or ed al l ot her pol i t i cal gr oups. Opposi t i on pol i t i cal

Bakht i ar was succeeded as I head of SAVAK by Gener al Hassana hi ghl y cul t ur ed ~an of consi der abl e i nt el l ect who

I

par t i es wer e i l l egal at t hi s t i me, and over t pol i t i cal act i vi t ywas i mpossi bl e.

Pakravan,st ood i n mar ked cont r ast t o hi pr edecessor and successor as 5AVAKchi ef . The choi ce of Pakr avan, who had pr evi ousl y been Bakht i ar ' s


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PAGE 186deput y, came at al most t he same t i me t hat t he r ef or m st Al i Am ni

Iwas appoi nt ed Pr i me M ni st er . ' AVAK i s sai d t o have been much mor er est r ai ned under Pakr avan. Tor ~ur e was appar ent l y s t opped. 34 I r on-

Ii cal l y, Pakr avan, who was execut ed by Khomei ni ' s Revol ut i onar yGuar ds soon af t er t he r evol ut i on, i s sai d t o have convi nced t heshah t o spar e Khomei ni ' s l i f e af t er t he 1963 demonst r at i ons. I npar t because of t hese demonst r at i ons, t he shah became convi ncedthat Pakravan was t oo l eni ent . 35 Pakr avan was di sm ssed i n J anuar y

I1965 af t er Pr i me M ni st er Hassan Al i Mansour was assassi nated.I

Pakr avan' s successor as SAVAK chi ef was Gener al Nemat ol l ahNassi r i , who had been servi ng as head of t he Nat i onal Pol i ce.Hassi r i was a l oyal ser vant t o t he shah. The t wo had been cl ass-mat es at t he I r ani an M l i t ar y Academy. Nassi r i had del i ver ed t hef i r man di sm ssi ng Mossadeq i n August 1953 and af t er t he coup hadper s onal l y ar r es t ed Mos sadeq, Under Nassi r i SAVAK gai ned a wor l d-

Iw de r eput at i on f or br ut al i t y and ef f i ci ency, Not sur pr i si ngl y,Nassi r i was execut ed i n Febr uar y 1979, one of f our gener al s whower e t he f i rst vi ct i ms of t he post - r evol ut i onar y r egi me. 36

SAVAK was a compl et e i nt el l i gence ser vi ce, handl i ng bot h domes-t i c and f or ei gn mat t er s and havi ng access t o vi r t ual l y al l aspect sof l i f e i n I r an. I t had appJ oxi mat el y 3000 f ul l - t i me mpl oyees,and, accor di ng t o one sour ce, some 3 m l l i on par t - t i me agent s andi nf or mer s. 37 SAVAK had t hr ee mai n par t s: a cent r al or gani zat i ondi vi ded i nt o ni ne gener al depar t ment s, a br anch f or moni t or i ngact i vi t i es i n Tehr an, and br anches f or t he var i ous pr ovi nces. Thegener al depar t ment s comsi st ed of uni t s w t h r esponsi bi l i t y f orover al l command, f or ei gn i nt el l i gence- gat her i ng, domest i csecur i t y, SAVAK secur i t y, t ech~ cal mat t er s, suppor t per sonnel andIequi pment , over t i nt el l i gence sour ces, count er - espi onage, andover t oper at i ons. The most not or i ous of t hese was depar t mentt hr ee: domest i c secur i ty,


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PAGE 187I n 1971 depar t ment t hr ee had 300 f ul l - t i me empl oyees and wasdi vi ded i nt o f our sect i ons. Sect i on one handl ed oper at i ons and

i nvest i gat i ons. I t had separ at e br anches cover i ng t he Tudeh party,t he Nat i ona! Fr ont and i t s associ at ed par t i es, st udent s and ot herI r ani ans l i vi ng abr oad, t he Ar ab and Bal uch m nor i t i es , t he Kur ds ,and t he cl er gy. Sect i on t wo seems t o have had si m l ar dut i es,t hough i t was or gani zed f unc t i onal l y r at her t han by gr oup. I t hadbr anches deal i ng w t h t he pr ess, t he t r i bes, wor ker s and f ar mer s,t he of f i ci al pol i t i cal par t i ds, uni ver si t i es and school s, t hel egi s l at i ve houses and m ni st ~ es, and one br anch whos e f unct i onwas " t o el i m nat e t he peop~es' di scont ent . "3s Sect i on three

I

managed t he el abor at e syst em I of ar chi ves and r ecor ds kept bydepar t ment t hr ee. Sect i on f our handl ed enf or cement . I t had br anch-es f or censor shi p, i ndoc t r i nat i on and t r ai ni ng, speci aloper at i ons, and j udi ci al mat t er s, i ncl udi ng i nt er r ogat i on.

Depar t ment t hr ee al so cont ai ned i ndependent br anches f or t r ans-l at i on, f i nance, and m l i t ar y mat t er s, as wel l as an addi t i onal ,i ndependent j udi ci al br anch. Most of I r an' s pr i sons wer e under t hedi r ect i on of depar t ment t hr ee. The one except i on was t he dr eadedEvi n Pr i son i n Tehr an, whi ch was oper at ed by depar t ment ei ght( count er - espi onage) . Fi nal l y, depar t ment t hree wor ked cl osel y ( andper haps commanded) Tehran S1VAK, whi ch had separat e br anchescover i ng t he Nat i onal Fr ont ' l t he Tudeh par t y, t he cl er gy, t he

Iwor ker s, t he uni ver s i t i es , and I t he Tehr an bazaar , as wel l as sepa-Ir at e i nvest i gat i on and sur vei l l ance uni t s.

SAVAK was an ext r emel y sophi st i cat ed and ef f ect i ve i nst r umentof repressi on. I t s t act i cs r anged f r om t he cr udest f or ms ofvi ol ence t o car ef ul l y or chest rated psychol ogi cal oper at i onsdesi gned t o di sr upt t he opposi t i on and pr omot e l oyal t y t o t heshah.

The char ges of t or t ur e by S~VAK ar e wel l - k nown and need not be


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PAGE 188

d~t ai l ~d h~r e . 39 T or t ur e was wi des pr ead 1n I r an under t he s hah. I twas t he ul t i mat e r ecour s e of t he s hah' s s ecur i t y f or c es i n deal i ngwi t h obs t i nat e membe r s of t he oppos i t i on. I t al s o hel ped t oc r ea t e a c l i mat e of f ear and i nt i m da t i on whi c h, p robabl Y mor et han any ot h~r t ac t i c empl oyed by t he r eg i me, di s c our ag~d oppo-s i t i on t o t he s hah.

IDes pi t e t h~ cen t r al r ol e dl ayed by t or t ur e under t he s hah,

whi ch s er ved t o b reak down and J unde r m ne oppos i t i on gr oups . Ar bi -t r ar y ar r es t and i mpr i s onmen wer e commonp l ace. S AVAK of f i c er swer e empower ed under t he 19571bi I I es t abl i s hi ns SAVAK t o ac t as

Im l i t ar y magi s t r at es and ar r es t and det ai n s us pe c t s .Ichar ge i n s uch cas es was " f o~m ng or bel ongi ng t o or gani z at i ons

T he us ua l

oppos ed t o t he monar chy or havi ng a col l ec t i v i s t i deol ogy , " whi c hwas i l l egal under t he I r ani an penal code. Amnes t y I nt er nat i onalr e po r t ed i n 1976 t hat t her e wer e bet wee n 25, 000 and 100, 000 pol i -t i cal pr i s oner s 1n I r an. T r i al s f or pol i t i cal pr i s one r s wer econdu c t ed under m l i t ar y t r i bunal s . I nv e s t i ga t i ons f or t he pr os e-cut i on wer e car r i ed out by SAVAK. Def endant s wer e per m t t ed t o

Ichoose l awyer s f r om s hor t l i s t s pr epar ed by t he t r i buna l , us ual l yIc ons i s t i ng of r et i r ed m l i t ar V of f i cer s . Def e ns e l awyer s had no

mor e t han t en days t o prepar e t hei r cas es . T r i al s wer e hel d wi t h-out j ur i es and us ual l y i n c amer a. Def endant s had no r i ght t o c al lor c r o s s - ex am ne wi t nes s es . AJ nes t y I nt er nat i ona l knew of no s uchcases i n whi c h def endant s wer e l aCQUi t t ed. I n 1975 Amnes t y I nt er na-It i ona l s t at ed t hat " no count r y ' in t he wor l d has a wor s e r ecor d i nhuman r i gh t s t han I r an. " 40

S AVAK al s o had muc h s ubt l er ways of pr omot i ng conf or m t y. I t snet wor ks of i n f or mer s wer e 50 wi despr ead t hat I r ani ans wer e af r ai dt o s peak c r i t i cal l y about t he r egi me even i n t hei r own homes .Us i ng t he el abor at e f i l i ng s ys t em mai nt ai ned by depa r t ment t hr ee ,al l appl i cat i ons f or empl oymen~ i n gove rnment - r un or gani z at i ons( i n c l udi ng t he uni ver s i t i es ) and i n many pr i v a t e or ga ni z at i ons


22/24

P AGE 189wer e car ef ul l y scr eened by SAVAK. Appl i cant s who had opposed t her egi me or wer e even r el at ed t o someone who had opposed i t wer e notonl y kept out of sensi t i ve posi t i ons i n t hi s way but of t en deni edmQani ngf ul Qmpl oymQnt al t oget her . A si m l ar pr ocess was used t odeny passpor t s t o di ssi dent s. Censorshi p was ext r emel y t i ght i nI r an. However , SAVAK t ook censdr shi p one st ep f urther by publ i sh-i ng and di 55Qm nat i ng i nf or ma~ on dQsi gnQd bot h t o di scr Qdi t t he

Iopposi t i on and t o i ncr ease I popul ar f ear s about i t s ownoperat i ons. 41 Anot her 5AVAK 1act i c was t o cr eat e or gani zat i onswhi ch wer e m l dl y cr i t i cal of ~he shah' s r egi me i n or der t o cooptand channel di ssent and ga~her i nf or mat i on on t he r egi me' scr i t i cs. Such or gani zat i ons i nJ l uded t he I r ani an Soci et y f or HumanIRi ght s and an or gani zat i on f or , I r ani an i nt el l ect ual s. An unsuc-cessf ul at t empt was made t o est abl i sh a si m l ar or gani zat i on f orl awyer s. 42

MECHANI SMS OF COOP T AT I ONII

IIThe shah bal anced t hes~Icarrot - andst i ck appr oach w t h aIdesi gned t o buy suppor t f or hi ~

r epr essi ve capabi l i t i es i n aser i es of i nducement s and r ef or msr egi me and def l ect cr i t i ci sm f r om

t he opposi t i on. Thes e measur es, whi ch wer e onl y par t l y successf ul ,f el l i n t hr ee mai n cat egor i es: r ef or ms desi gned and f i nanced byt he gover nment , cor r upt i on, and cor por at i st pol i t i cal i nst i t ut i onssuch as t he of f i ci al par t i es and br anches of t he gover nmentbur eaucr acy.

Af t er t he 1953 coup t he shah and hi s Amer i can advi sor s came t or eal i ze t hat soci al r ef or ms and econom c devel opment woul d becr uci al i f t he r egi me was t o l ast . A maj or devel opment ef f or t wasconsequent l y l aunched. As Iment i oned above, gover nment sp9ndi ng


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i ncr eased by an aver age of 23 per cent per year i n 1954- 1958 and 16PAGE 190

per cent i n 1959- 1963. The per cent age of government expendi t ur eswhi ch want f or aconom c daval or mant r osa f rom 13 pgr C8nt i n 1954

!

t o 39 per cent i n 1962. 43 Wher e I t he Fi r st Devel opment Pl an ( cover -i ng 1949- 1955) cal l ed f or ( but ~ d not act ual l y spend) 21 bi l l i onr i al s f or devel opment , t he Second Pl an ( 1956- 1962) cal l ed f or 94. 5bi l l i on. Thi s i ncl udad a 448 per cent i ncr easa i n spendi ng f oragr i cul t ur al pr ogr ams over t he Fi r st Pl an l evel s, a 520 per centi ncr ease f or t r ansport at i on and communi cat i ons, and 220 and 217percent i ncr eases ( respect i vel y) f or i ndustry ~nd soci al pr ogr ams.These ef f or t s wer e qui t e succes~f ul . I r an' s GNP gr ew at an annualr at e of 7- 8 per cent i n 1955- 196b. Manuf act ur i ng empl oyment gr ew by

I

19 percent i n 1956- 1960. The h i umber of houses and pr i mar y andsecondar y school s gr ew by 10. 8 per cent and 47 per cent ( r espect i ve-l y) i n 1955- 1960. The pr oduct i on of l i vest ock i n 1955- 1959 was 48per cent hi gher t han i t had been i n t he pr evi ous f i ve year s . 44

I

Deval opment ef f or t s cont i nJI8d at a si m l ar paca i n t ha ear l y

1960s . Real gover nment expendi t ur es gr ew at an aver age annual r at eof 9. 4 per cent i n 1962- 1967 ' I andspendi ng f or devel opment hel dst eady at j ust under 40 per cent of gover nment expendi t ur es i n t hi sper i od. Avar age year l y out l ays r l anned under t he Thi r d Daval opment

I Pl an ( 1962- 1967) wer e al most t hr ee t l mes hi gher t han under t heISecond Pl an, w t h t he l ar gest : i ncreases bei ng i n i ndust r y ( 754

percent ) and soci al ser vi ces ( ~84 per cent ) . Real GNP gr ew at anaver ag~ annual r at e of 8. 7 per c~nt i n 1960- 1967. and ampl oyment i nmanuf act ur i ng gr ew by 37 per cent . The number of houses gr ew by10. 7 per cent i n 1960- 1965. and t he number of school s al mostdoubl ed. Whi l e l i vest ock pr oduct i on r emai ned at about t he samel evel s. domest i c per capi t a agr i cul t ur al pr oduct i on gr ew by 4. 6

Iper cent i n 1960- 1967. 45 IIII

I n J anuar y 1963 t he shah ~nnounced pl ans f or a ser i es ofr ef or ms whi ch came t o ba known l s t he Whi t e Ravol ut i on. By i dent i -


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PAGE 191

sought t or egi me so cl osel y wr t h a pr o~r am of r ef or ms t he shahpor t r ay hi msel f as a pr ogr ess1ve, moder ni z i ng monar ch

f yi ng hi s

and t hus def l ect cr i t i c i sm f r om t he l i beral and r adi calopposi t i on. The Whi t e Revol ut i olncl uded pl ans f or t he nat i onal i -zat i on of f or est s and wat er r r sour ces, l egi sl at i on t o i nt r oducepr of i t - shar i ng i n pr i vat e i ndi st r y, and pr ogr ams t o est abl i shheal t h, educat i on, and devel op~ent cor ps. The j ewel i n t he cr ownof t he Whi t e Revol ut i on, howevbr , was a l ar ge- scal e l and r ef or m

The l and t enur e syst em i n I r an had l ong been a ser i ous i mped-

pr ogr am

i m~nt t o soci al and econom c devel opment . l and r ef or m had been ay~a. s, and i h. shah had n bun a

r r ogram i n t he ear l y 1950s. The1r 6~S was of a much l ar ger scal e,

~eTor m pr ogr am was of f i ci al l y ended

pr om nent pol i t i cal i ssue f orl i m t ed l and r edi st r i but i onprogr am begun i n t he ear l yhowever . By t he t i me t he l and1n Sept ember 1971 vi r t ual l y ever y vi l l age i n I r an had beenaf f ect ed. The massi ve est at es i f t he l andowni ng el i t e, and hencet hei r pr i mar y sour ces of POl i t i r al power , wer e l ar gel y di smant l ed.Ni net y- t wo per cent of t he pr asant shar ecr opper s el i gi bl e t or ecei ve l and under t he pr ogr am event ual l y di d. Whi l e t he gr andscal e of t hese r ef or ms cannot b~ deni ed, t he pr ogr am cont ai ned onemaj or over si ght : t he l andl ess I agr i cul t ur al l abor er s who const i -t ut ed al most hal f of t he I r ani ar peasant r y wer e not onl y compl et e-l y excl uded f r om t he pr ogr am b~t wer e, i n most cases, f or ced of ft he l and w th t he breakup of l t he l ar ge f eudal est at es. 46 The

Iprof ound consequences of t he l and r ef or m pr ogr am f or I r ani an pol i -It i cs w l l be di scussed at some l engt h bel ow and i n t he concl usi on

of t hi s st udy.

s ecand mechani sm of ca~P t at l on us ed by t he s hah wascor r upt i on. Whi l e cor r upt i on under t he shah; s har d t o document( f o. ob. i ou a. on. l , t h f . no doubt t hat i t p at . d i h.I r ani an pol i t i cal pr ocess and r hat much of i t or i gi nat ed i n t he

I

mg diss ch6i

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