mg diss ch6ii

7/30/2019 MG Diss Ch6ii

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PAGE 192r oyal cour t i t sel f . 47 Cor r upt i on came i n a myr i ad of f orms i nI r an. I t i nvol ved not onl y t he I r oyal f am l y and weal t hy busi ness-

I

men but al so t r i bal and r el i gi ~us l eader s, gover nment empl oyees atIdl l l ~v~ s, dnd ~VQn peasant s and t he ur ban ungmpl oyed. Whi l e i t s

pr i mar y mot i ve i n most cases was per sonal gr eed, cor rupt i on al soser ved an i mpor t ant pol i t i cal pur pose: i t enabl ed t he shah and hi sal l i es t o buy t he l oyal t y of t he peopl e i nvol ved and t hus exer tcont rol over t hem Thi s had t he ef f ect of el i m nat i ng many pot en-

It i al compet i ng cent er s of power and cr eat i ng a vast syst em of!pat r onage whi ch l i nked t he r oY~1 cour t i n a per sonal way t o vi r t u-

al l y al l segment s of soci et y. As di scussed above, t her e i s someevi dence that U. S . f or ei gn ai d was used by t he shah and hi s of f i -ci al s f or cor r upt pur poses. Gi ven t he secr ecy i nvol vi ng t hesemat t er s, t he cases ci ted may have been onl y t he t i p of t hei ceber g.

A f i nal mechani sm used by t He shah t o coopt t he opposi t i on wasempl oyment or member shi p i n government - cont rol l ed orgovernment - af f i l i at ed i nst i t ut i ons such as t he uni ver si t i es andr esear ch i nst i t ut es, t he gover nment bur eaucr aci es, and t he l egalpol i t i cal par t i es. Because of t he sheer si ze of t he gover nment ,much of t he most pr est i gi ous e~pl oyment i n I r an l ay i n t he publ i csect or . Thi s was par t i cul ar l y i r ue f or t he secul ar , wel l - educat ed

Ichi l dr en of t he upper and m ddl e cl asses, who f ormed t he cor e oft he l i ber al and r adi cal opposi t i on. As di scussed above, appl i cant sf or government posi t i ons wer e car ef ul l y scr eened by SAVAK. Thosewho had par t i ci pat ed i n opposi t i on pol i t i cal act i vi t i es wer eei t her bar r ed f r om publ i c ser vi ce or gi ven unsui t abl e or t empor ar yempl oyment . Thi s cr eat ed power f ul i ncent i ves f or st udent s t or ef r ai n f r om engagi ng i n pol i t i cal act i vi t y. Gover nment empl oyeesIwer e cl osel y wat ched and si m l J r l y f ound i t di f f i cul t t o be pol i -t i cal l y act i ve. Much t he same si t uat i on hel d i n many newspaper s,busi nesses, and l abor uni ons, whi ch of t en had di r ect t i es t o t hegovernment or wer e r un by al l i es of t he shah. 48


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PAGE 193A si m l ar r ol e was pl ayed by t he var i ous gover nment - sponsor ed

pol i t i cal par t i es, whi ch f i r st l appear ed i n 1957. These par t i eswer e i n no way popul ar or r epr esent at i ve. Rat her , t hey ser ved

Imai nl y as soci al i zat i on and r ecr ui t ment or gans f or t he st at e, w t hmember shi p bei ng vi r t ual l y obl i gat or y f or anyone hopi ng t o ent eri nt o t he hi ghest l evel s of gover nment . These par t i es hel ped t ocoopt opposi t i on t o t he shah i n t wo mai n ways . Fi r st , member s oft hese par t i es coul d not , of cour se, openl y bel ong t o ot her par t i esor cr i t i ci ze t he shah. Hence t l he of f i ci al par t i es had t he ef f ectof f or ci ng pol i t i cal l y- act i ve I rani ans t o make a cl ear choi cebet ween t he shah and t he opposi t i on. Second,par t i es coul d nom nat e candi dat es f or t he Maj l es, t he opposi t i onwas deni ed an or gani zat i onal base f or ent er i ng t hi s body. ( I nde-pendent candi dat es wer e, however , per mt t ed t o r un f or of f i ce. )Ei t her t he shah hi msel f or a t r ust ed al l y al ways headed t he of f i -ci al par t i es and sel ect ed t hei 1 candi dat es. Hence t her e was l i t t l echance f or t he opposi t i on t ~ become a power f ul f or ce i n t heMaj l es, and t hi s body never r egai ned t he power i t had hel d underMossadeq. 49

3) THE SHAH AND THE OPPOSI T I ON

I n t he year s af ter he was r et ur ned t o power i n 1953, t he shahused hi s coer ci ve appar at us and t hese mechani sms of coopt at i on t osyst emat i cal l y underm ne al l sour ces of opposi t i on t o hi s r ul e.Thi s meant not onl y t he l i ber al and r adi cal opposi t i on but al sor eal and pot ent i al t hr eat s f r om t he m l i t ar y, t he cl er gy, and evenf r om t he t r adi t i onal l anded upper cl ass. I n t he pr ocess,st at e- soci et y r el at i ons i n I r an evol ved f r om t he pl ur al i sm of t hel at e 1940s and ear l y 1950s t o t he aut hor i t ar i an, r el at i vel y aut on-omous di ct at or shi p of t he 1960s and 1970s .


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PAGE 194THE NAT I ONAL FRONT AND THE

The f i r s t t ar get s of t he

TUDE~III

Ishah wer e, of cour s e, t he l i ber al s and

PARTY

r adi cal s of t he Nat i onal Fr ont and t he Tudeh par t y. The Nat i on alFr ont s uf f er ed a mor t al bl ow wi t h t he over t h r ow of t he Mos s adeqgovernment i n 1953 and t he subs equent wave of ar r es t s . I t cont i n -ued t o exi s t un der a var i e t y of di f f er ent names and r emai n ed t hemos t vocal oppos i t i on f or ce i ~ I r an unt i l t he l as t days of t heIs hah' s r e i gn . However , becaus~ of i t s br oad popul ar i t y and t hepe r s onal t hr eat i t had pos ed t o hi m i n 1953, t he shah har as s ed t heNat i o nal F r ont mor e t han any ot her gr oup. The ef f ec t of t he shah' sat t acks was al r eady evi dent by 1963 when t he c l er gy r at her t hant he l i ber al oppos i t i on l ed t he mas s i ve demon s t r a t i ons whi choccur r ed i n t hat year .

The s hah' s mai n i n s t r ument i n deal i ng wi t h t he oppos i t i on wasr epr es s i o n . Vi r t ual l y t he ent i r e l eader s hi p of t he Nat i onal Fr ontwas ar r e st e d i n Augus t 1953, and af t er t hat ar r es t and i mpr i s on -ment became a r out i ne ma t t e r . 50 P ubl i c meet i ngs and demons t r at i onsby t he Nat i onal F r ont wer e banned and f r e quent r ai ds wer e made t odi s r upt pl an ni ng s es s i ons , s ei z e m meogr aph machi nes . et c .Cens or s hi p was used t o deny t he Nat i onal Fr ont a publ i c f or umRi gged el ec t i ons and t he ban on i ndependent pol i t i cal par t i es madei t v i r t ual l y i mpos s i bl e f or t he Nat i onal Fr ont t o pl ace candi dat esi n t he Maj l es . The pOWer f ul Qas hqai Khans wer e exi l ed i n t hem d - 1950s , denyi ng t he s ubs t ant i al r es our ces of t he Qas hqai Tr i balCon f eder acy t o t he Nat i onal F r ont . S l

Repr es s i on not on l y made i t di f f i cul t f or t he Nat i onal Fr ont t ooper at e but r educed i t s publ i c l appeal as wel l . The shah al s o us edt he mechani sms of coopt at i on I de s c r i bed above t o unde r m ne t hepopul ar i t y of t he Nat i onal F r ont . Al t hough t hi s coopt at i onoccur r ed i n a gr eat var i ~t y of Ways , i t was t he r Qf or m pr ogr am of


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PAGE 195had gr eat est ef f ect on t he Nat i onalhe ear l y

Front .1960s whi ch

The or i gi ns of t hi s pr ogr am l ay i n t he event s of t he m d- 1950s.I ran qui ckl y r eached a st at e of r el at i ve pr osper i t y af t er oi lstart ed t o f l ow agai n i n l at e 1954. Rumbl i ngs about r edi s t r i but i ngt hi s weal t h and about l and r ef orm wer e soon hear d. Al so i n t hem d- and l at e- 1950s a gr ow ng number of I r ani an st udent s began t or et ur n f rom Eur opean and Amer i l can uni ver si t i es w t h i deas aboutr ef orm These f act or s pl ayed i nt o t he hands of t he Nat i onal

IFr ont , whi ch 1n ear l y 1960 st ~ged i t s f i r st publ i c demonst r at i onss i nce 1953. I n 1961 t he Kennedy Adm ni st ra t i on was i naugurated,addi ng t o t he pressure f or r ef or m

The shah soon r eal i zed t hat he coul d har ness and channel t hesepr essur es f or r ef orm f or hi s : own pol i t i cal benef i t . I n 1961 heappoi nt ed Al i Am ni as pr i me ~ ni st er . Amni was a l i ber al t ech-

Inocr at w t h no popul ar f ol l ow ng and no r eal t i es t o t he Nat i onalFront . Amni l aunched t he r ef orm program w t h hel p f r om hi s ver ycapabl e m ni st er of agr i cul t ur e, Dr . Hassan Ar sanj ani . Am ni wasf or ced t o r esi gn i n J ul y 1962 and Ar sanj ani f ol l owed soon af t er .Havi ng used Am ni and Ar sanj ani t o st eal t he t hunder f r om hi s

Il i ber al and r adi cal cr i t i cs, t he shah now made t he r ef or m pr ogr amI

hi s own under t he banner of ~he "Whi t e Revol ut i on. " The coup deQr ace was admni st er ed t o t he Nat i onal Fr ont i n J une 1963, af t ert he l ar ge demonst r at i ons l ed by Khomei ni . Hundr eds wer e ki l l ed andt housands ar r est ed i n t hese demonst r at i ons, i ncl udi ng manyNat i onal Fr ont l eader s and suppor ters.

Despi t e t he maSSl ve ar rest s whi ch f ol l owed t he 1953 couP. t heITudeh par t y emer ged r el at i vel ~ unscat hed f r om t he over t hr ow ofMossadeq. I t had l ong si nce or gani zed i tsel f i nt o cl andes t i necel l s and i t s l eader shi p and cadr es had gr own adept at oper at i ngsecr et l y dur i ng t he year s i n whi ch t he par t y was out l awed .


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PAGE 196However , i n August 1954 t he secur i t y f or ce l ed by Bakht i ar and t heAmer i can m l i t ar y at t ache managed t o come up w th a l i st of t hemember s of t he Tudeh m l i t ar y I net work. 52 Thi s net wor k cont ai nedover 600 of f i cer s, i ncl udi ng Zahedi ' s per sonal bodyguar d and t hehead of ar my G- 2. I t had been set up dur i ng t he Sovi et occupat i oni n 1941-1946 and apparent l y was desi gned pr i mar i l y t o gat heri nt el l i gence on t he I r ani an army r at her t han t o car r y out subver -si ve oper at i ons. 53 Thi s net wor k had been t he backbone of t he Tudehpar t y. I t s dest ruct i on f i ni sh, d t he Tudeh as a ser i ous t hr eat t ot he shah.

The Tudeh par t y and t he var i ous mani f est at i ons of t he Nat i onalFr ont wer e t he onl y maj or l egi t i mat e r epr esent at i ves of I r an' semer gi ng m ddl e and l ower cl asses. Hence t hei r dest r uct i on w t ht he oper at i ons car r i ed out i n 1953 and 1954 marked t he i naugu-r at i on of an aut hor i t ar i an r egi me. These operat i ons and t he subse-quent combi nat i on of r epressi on and coopt at i on kept t he shah' spopul ar opposi t i on ef f ect i vel y under cont r ol . However , i n t he1950s and ear l y 1960s t he shah' s aut ocr at i c ambi t i ons wer e st i l lt hr eat ened f r om ot her sour ces. The most i mmedi at e of t hese t hr eat scame f r om a ser i es of ambi t i ous m l i t ar y of f i cer s who at t empt ed t ooust t he shah.

THE M LI TARY

The f i r st was Gener al Zahedi . Zahedi ' s ambi t i ons wer e commonknow edge. I n 1953 when Zahedi was chosen t o l ead TPAJ AX i t wasgener al l y assumed by t he CI A t hat t he shah woul d re i gn r at her t han

Ir ul e and t hat ef f ec t i ve cont r ol of t he count r y woul d be i n t hehands of Zahedi . The shah was evi dent l y concer ned about Zahedi ' sambi t i ons f r om t he very begi nni ng. When Denni s W i ght was sent t o


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PAGE 197Tehran as char ge i n December 1~53 t o r eopen t he Br i t i s h embas s y

It he shah s ounded hi m out abou t ~he Br i t i s h at t i t ude t owar d Zahedi .IThr oughou t 1954 t he s hah cont i n~al l y as ked t he Br i t i s h and Amer i -I

can ambas s ador s whet her t hey suppor t ed Zahedi . The shah t r av el edt o t he Uni t ed St at es and Br i t ai n i n December 195~. When t he i s s ueof Zahedi ' s t enur e i n of f i c e was not br ought up t he shah appar ent -l y bel i e ved he had r ecei ved a gr een l i ght f r om t hes e t wo count r i est o r emove Zahedi . He di d s o i n Apr i l 1955. s4

Tho 50t ond t hr oat ' r om t ho J ; l i t ar y eamo ; n Mar ch 1958. A gr oupof r ef or m- m n ded of f i cer s l ed by Gen er al Gar an eh ( t he head of ar myG- 2 ) and appar ent l y as s oc i at ed wi t h Am ni an d Ar s an j ani S5 or gan-i z ed a coup whi ch came wi t hi n t wo days of s ucceedi ng. The shahsomehow got wi nd of t he pl ot an d managed t o br eak i t uP . Gar anehand s ome of hi s col l abor at o~s

IAm ni and Ar s anj an i wer e br i ef ~yback i nt o f avor wi t h t he s hah.

wer e gi ven shor t pr i son t er ms .det ai ned but s oon managed t o f al l

The t hi r d t hr ea t t o t he s hah f r om t he m l i t ar y came f r om Bakht -i ar . As chi ef of SAVAK, Bakht i ar had become pr obabl y t he s econdmos t power f ul man i n I r an by 1960. The s hah was by t hi s t i me al er tt o t he t hr eat f r om power f ul s ubo r di nat es , and managed t o f i r e hi mi n ear l y 1961. Bakht i ar t hen began t o cons pi r e wi t h ot her r et i r edof f i cer s and I r an i an pol i t i c al f i gur es . He was f or ced t o f l ee I r ani n J anua r y 1962, am d r umor s of a coup at t empt . F r om ex i l e i nEur ope, Bei r ut , an d Baghdad, Bakht i ar appar ent l y cont i nued t o pl o taga i ns t t he s hah. Bakht i ar was k i l l ed i n a hunt i ng acc i den t 1n1970. The r e i s l i t t l e doubt t ha t he was ac t ual l y execu ted bySAV AK. S6


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PAGE 198THE LANDOWNI NG ARI STOCRACY AND THE CLERGY

The r ef orm progr am of t he ear l y 19605 al so enabl ed t he shah t ost r i ke at t he t wo r emai ni ng soJ r ces of pot ent i al opposi t i on t o hi sr ul e: t he l anded upper cl ass and t he cl er gy. Much of t he power oft he l andowni ng cl ass l ay i n i ts abi l i t y t o del i ver t he vot es oft he peasant r y i n t he Maj l es e~ecti ons. By br eaki ng up t he l ar gef eudal est at es, t he shah sever ed t he peasant - l andl ord rel at i onshi pand r ender ed t he l andowni ng cl ass l ar gel y power l ess. 57 I n f act ,t he l and r ef orm pr ogram t ook t hi s pr ocess one st ep f ur t her . Bydecr eei ng t hat t he l ar ge estatbs shoul d be sol d t o t he gover nmentat a reasonabl e pr i ce f or r esal e t o t he peasant s r at her t hansi mpl y expropr i at ed, t he shahi i n ef f ect conver ted t he l andowni ngar i st ocr acy i nt o a new bourgeo?si e. Si nce t he st at e t ook a l eadi ngr ol e i n t he economy t hr ough t he Devel opment Pl ans, t hi s new bour-geoi si e was subor di nat e t o t he I st at e and hence t o t he shah.

The r ef orms of t he ear l y 1960s al so si gnal ed t he emer gence of aconf r ont at i on bet ween t he shar and t he conser vat i ve cl er gy.cl er gy had tr adi t i onal l y r el i ed on l ar ge endowed est at es as an

The

i mpor t ant sour ce of r evenue. B~ breaki ng up t hese est at es t he shahI

ser i ousl y under cut t he power of t he cl er gy i nIr ef orms enact ed under t he

t hi s r egar d. Anumber of ot her Whi t e Revol ut i on,i ncl udi ng most notabl y t he enf r anchi sement of women, conf l i ct eddi rect l y w t h Shi r i t e doct r i ne and t hr eat ened t o Underm ne t hehol d of t he cl er gy on I r ani an soci et y. I t was, i n f act , t he i ssuesof l and r ef orm and t he enf r anchi sement of women t hat spar ked t hedemonst rat i ons i n 1963 l ed by ~homei ni . 58

Al t hough t he cl er gy wer e hJ r t by t hese measur es and by t he waveof ar r est s whi ch f ol l owed t he 1963 demonst rat i ons, t her e was aIl i m t t o t he damage whi ch t he shah coul d i nf l i ct on i t . Shor t of


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P AGE 200I

Ii mpor t ant now t o c l a r i f y t he nel a t i ons hi p bet ween t hes e t wo bas i cIt hemes . By summar i z i ng how U. ~. pol i c y cont r i but ed t o t he es t ab-Il i s hment of t he s hah' s di ct at or s hi p, t hi s s ec t i on r ecapi t ul at esIt he bas i c ar gument of t hi s ~t udy: t hat pol i c i es des i gned t oIpr omot e s t abi l i t y i n a c l i ent dount r y can i n s t ead pr omot e aut hor i -I

t ar ' ao' _ m aod r . , . t ' aot ooom1"

The s i ngl e mos t i mpor t ant aJ pec t of U. S. pol i cy t owar d I r an i nIt hi s r egar d was t he CI A - l ed o~er at i on t o over t hr ow Mos s adeq. TheIi mpl i cat i ons of t hi s oper at i o~ f or I r an ' s domes t i c pol i t i c s wer eIdi s cus s ed at s ome l engt h i n t he l as t s ec t i on of chapt er 5. The

over t hr ow of Mos s adeq and t ~e wave of ar r es t s whi ch f ol l owedr emoved t he Nat i onal F r ont f r om power and des t r oyed i t as anef f ec t i ve pol i t i cal f or ce. I n i t s pl ace was i n s t al l e d a di c t at or -s hi p l ed by Zahedi and t he s hah. The Nat i onal F r ont had emer ged i nt he l at e 1940s as t he i nher i t dr of t he democ r at i c movement whi chf i r s t appear ed wi t h t he con stt ut t one I upr i s i ng of t he ear l y t wen-t i et h cent ur y. I t was t he pol i t i c al embodi ment of t he new m ddl ec l as s whi ch began t o emer ge i n t he 1920s and 1930s under RezaShah. By des t r oyi n g Mos s adeq and t he Hat i onal F r ont , t he CI A - l edcoup of 1953 cut s hor t a pr oces s of t r ans i t i on t o democr acy and

If r us t r at ed t he pol i t i c al as pi r ~t i ons of t hi s new c l as s .I

IW t hi n weeks of t he coup t He Uni t ed s t at es pr ovi ded I r an wi t hIat l eas t $73 m l l i on t hr ough t he Poi nt Four ai d pr ogr am t he CI A,

and t hr ough or di nar y f or ei gn ai d channel s . Thi s was f ol l owed i nt he next decade wi t h an addi t i onal $900 m l l i on i n ai d gr ant s and$200- 3UO m l l i on i n l oans . whi ch t oget her account ed f or about 21per cent of expendi t ur es by t he I r an i an gover nment i n t hat per i o d.Beh~een August 1953 and November 1954 U. S. ai d acc ount e d f or

Ir oughl y 60 per cen t of t he ex pehdi t ur e s of t he Zahedi governmen t .IGi ven t he chaos i n I r an 111 t hi s l per i o d . t he absence of any popul ar

s uppor t f or t he Zahedi 90ver nment 1 and t he ef f or t s made by i t t or es t or e or der and s ol i di f y i t s domes t i c pos i t i on, t hi s ai d pr ogr am


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PAGE 201can onl y be r egar ded as havi n g l pl ayed a maj or r ol e i n t he es t ab-l i s hment of t he s hah- Zahedi di c ~at or s h i p.

IIIWhi l e U. S . ai d dec l i ned s omewhat as a per cent age of gover nmentIexpend i t ur es i n t he f ol l owi n~ decade, i t cont i nued t o pl ay anIi mpor t ant r ol e i n t he s hah' s cohs o l i dat i on 6f power . Mos t of t hi sIai d was us ed t o f i nance econom c devel opment pr oj ec t s and t he

moder n i zat i on of t he s hah' s m ~i t ar y and s ecur i t y f or ces . I nas -Imuc h as t hes e devel opment pr oj ec t s and t he s ecur i t y appar at us wer eIf undament al pi l l a r s of t he s ha~' s di ct at or s hi p. U. S. ai d i n t hi s

way made an i mpor t ant cont r i bu~i on t o t he cons ol i dat i on of t h i sIdi c t a t or s hi p. Mor eover , t he U. S. ai d pr ogr ams i n I r an al s oIi nc l uded subs t ant i al t echni cal l advi ce and t r ai ni ng. Hence t heyIcont r i but ed not on l y t o t he f i nanc i ng of t he mai n i ns t i t ut i ons

us ed by t he s hah t o cons ol i dat e hi s r ul e but al so t o t he par t i c-ul ar f or m t hey t ook and t hei r ef f i c i ency ~nd ef f ec t i venes s as

Ipol i t i cal i ns t r ument s . F i nal l y , ' t her e i s s ome evi dence t hat U. S.,ai d t o I r an was us ed by t he s ha~ t o ext end hi s pol i t i c al i n f l uence

It hr ough pat r onage and cor r upt i on .

For t he pur pos es of t hi s s t u8y t he s i n gl e mos t i mpor t ant as pec tof t he U. S. ai d pr ogr am i n I r an af t er t he 1953 coup was t heas s i s t ance gi ven t o t he s hah' s s ecur i t y f or ces . Thi s began i mme-di at el y af t er t he coup wi t h t he m ss i on of t he U. S. m l i t ar yat t ache and cont i nued i n t o t he: ear l y 19605. The s hah' s s ecur i t yf or ces evol v ed under t hi s pr ogr am f r om a poor l y - or gan i z ed andi nef f ec t i v e appar at us di v i ded among t he Nat i onal Pol i ce, t heGendar mer i e, and m l i t ar y i nt el l i gence t o t he moder n, ef f i c i entor gan i z at i on cent r al i z ed under SAVAK. By t he ear l y 1960s SAVAK hadbecome t he s i ngl e mos t i mpor t ant pi l l ar of t he s hah' s

Idi c t at or s hi p. I t penet r at ed and di s r upt ed oppos i t i on or gan i z a-It i ons and under m ned t hei r b~s es of s uppor t by coopt i ng and

demobi l i z i ng t hei r c ons t i t uenc i ~s . To t he ext ent t hat U. S. t r ai n-Ii n g and as s i s t ance f or SAVAK ahd i t s pr edeces s or s made t hem mor e


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PAGE 202Ief f ec t i ve, t hi s as pec t of U. S. bol i c y t owar d I r an had obvi ous andIi mpor t Bnt i mpl i cat i ons f or i t s domes t i c pol i t i c s .

Ther e can be l i t t l e doubt t hat t he ac t i ons j us t s ummar i z edwhi c h t ook pl ace under t he U. s . I - I r an c l i ency r el at i o ns hi p pl ayed as i gn i f i cant r ol e i n t he es t Bbl i s hment Bnd cons ol i dat i on of t he

Is hah' s di c t at o r s hi p. However , ~ var i et y of ot her f ac t or s can beIment i oned whi c h al s o cont r i bu~ed t o di c t at or s hi p i n I r an . TheIBr i t i sh oi l bl ocade cr eat ed s ever e econom c pr obl ems whi c h weak-

ened Mos s adeq' s bas e of s uppor t . Conver sel y , t he r api d gr owt h ofI r an ' s oi l weal t h af t er November 1954 hel ped t he s hah f i nancedevel opment pr ogr ams and ot her pr oj ec t s whi c h s er ved t o cooptunr 9s t . I r an di d not have a I bng- st andi ng democ r at i c t r adi t i on .

IAl t hough t her e was an emer gi n~ moder n m ddl e c l as s , s oc i a l andIpol i t i cal c ondi t i ons s uch as : t he l ow l evel of l i t er acy, t he

ent r enched power of t he l ando~ni ng ar i s t oc r acy, t he pr o- Sovi etor i ent at i on of t he Tudeh par t y, t he br oad appeal of I s l am and t hemos ai c of t r i bal and et hni c l oyal t i es hi nder ed pr os pec t s f ordemoc r acy i n I r an .

I

I f ot her f ac t or s t hus cont r i but ed t o di ct at or s hi p i n I r Bn, CBnIi t be s ai d t hat t he r ol e of c l ~ency was c r uc i a l ? Fur t her mor e, howIdoes c l i ency compar e i n i mpor t ance t o t hes e ot her caus al f ac t or s?

The evi dence pr es ent ed i n t hi s Bnd t he pr evi ous chapt er i ndi -Icat es t hat c l i ency did pl aya c r uc i al r ol e i n t he es t abl i s hment of

di c t at or s hi p i n I r an. The CI A pl anned and car r i ed out t he oper a-t i on t hat r emoved Mos s adeq f r ~m of f i ce. Al t hough I r an i ans wer ei n v( ) l ved i n t hi s oper at i on , t hey wer e subor di n Bt e t o t he CI A t eamwhi c h i mpl ement ed i t . As t he oper at i on unf ol ded t he s hah f l ed t hecount r y i n pan i c and Zahedi t ook r ef uge i n a CI A s af e hous e. TheBr i t i s h oi l bl ocade al s o made ~ cont r i but i o n t o Mos s adeq' s down-

If al l . However , as was ar guedl i n chapt e r 5, whi l e Mos s adeq mayIwel l have f al l en i n ~he absence of a CI A coup, t he di ct at or shi pIII


12/19

PAGE 203t hat emerged under Zah~di dnd t he shah was pr obabl y t he l eastl i kel y al t er nat i ve t o Mossadeq. U. S. econom c ai d kept t he Zahedigover nment af l oat f or f i f t een mont hs unt i l oi l expor t s wer er esumed. The concl usi on t hat t he Uni t ed st at es was i nst r um~nt al i ni nst al l i ng t he shah' s di ct at or shi p t hus appear s i nescapabl e.

~stabl i shed i n power .I

shah was f i r m y U. s . economcai d and secur i t y assi st ance p~ayed an i mpor t ant . t hough per hapsnot cr uci al . r ol e i n keepi ng hi m t her e. Al t hough I r an' s year l y oi lr evenues f i r st sur passed U. S. ai d r ecei pt s i n 1956. t hey r emai nedof compar abl e magni t ude unt i l 1962 when t hey f i nal l y exceededt w ce t he dol l ar val ue of U. S. ai d ( see t abl e 3) . Hence U. S. ai dcont i nued t o be an i mpor tant sour ce of f undi ng f or devel opmentpr oj ect s and ot her mechani sms of coopt at i on t hr ough t he ear l y19605. U. S. t rai ni ng f or t he shah' s secur i t y f or ces cer t ai nl y madet hem mor e ef f ect i ve as i nst r ument s of r epr essi on. However . i tcannot be sai d w t h any cer t ai nt y t hat t hey coul d not have beenef f ect i ve i n t hi s r egar d w t hout U. S. assi s tance. H~nc~ whi l e u. S.

Iai d was i mpor t ant i n mai nt ai ni ng t he shah i n power i n t he l at e1950s and ear l y 19605. domest i c f act or s al so wor ked i n hi s f avorat t hi s t i me.

How does cl i ency compar e i n i mpor tance t o ot her f act or s whi chhel ped t o pr omot e di ct at or shi p i n I r an? Of t he many i nf l uences onI rani an pol i t i cs 1n t he ear l y- and md- 1950s. onl y t hr ee wer e

Inovel and of SUf f i ci ent i mpor t pnce t o br i ng about such a dr amat i cchange i n t he t ype of r egi me: t he Br i t i sh oi l embar go. t he r enewalof oi l expor t s i n l at e 1954. and t he est abl i shment of t he cl i encyrel at i onshi p.

As di scussed i n chapt er 5, whi l e t he Br i t i sh oi l bl ocadeundoubt edl y cont r i but ed t o t he downf al l of Mossadeq. any of anumber of ot her l eader s coul d have emer ged i n hi s pl ace as ar esul t . By cont r ast , t he CI A operat i on TPAJ AX whi ch i naugur a~ed


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PAGE 204t he cl i ency r el at i onshi p was under t aken not onl y t o r emove Mossa-deq f r om power but al so t o ~nst al l a par t i cul ar r egi me underZahedi and t he shah. Hence whi l ~ t he oi l bl ocade hel ped under m neM05sadeq, i t di d not i n anyof a di ct at or shi p.

I

di r ect way l eadIII

to the establ i shment

ISi m l ar l y, t he i nf l ux of pi l r evenues af t er November 1954cer t ai nl y hel ped t he shah cons6l i dat e hi s di ct at or shi p. However ,t hi s i ncome di d not r each hi gh: l evel s unt i l some ei ght een mont hs

Iaf t er Mossadeq was oust ed. Byl t hi s t i me t he Nat i onal Fr ont andI

t he Tudeh par ty had been t hor oughl y cr ushed ( w t h subst ant i al U. S.Iass; st ance) and t he shah was I f i rm y i n power . Thus whi La 0 i 1

r evenues hel ped the shah f ur t h~r t o consol i dat eal r eady t ar en pl ace by t he

II

hi s r egi me, muchof t hi s pr ocess had t i m~ they becameavai l abl e.

IOt her f act or s, such as I r an' s comparat i vel y weak democr at i ct r adi t i on and t he soci al and po~ t i cal condi t i ons ment i oned above,al so cont r i buted t o di ctat orshi p i n I ran. However, t hese f actorswere not net " i n t he ear l y 1950~. They di d not st op Mossadeq f r omestabl i shi ng hi msel f f i r m y i power and had not prevented theIemer gence i n t he 1940s of democr at i c i nst i t ut i ons such as r epr e-sent at i ve par t ies and a f r ee: pr ess. Moreover , t he soci al and

Ieconom c devel opment whi ch occur red i n I r an i n t he 19405 and ear l yI1950s and t he exper i ence of t he Mossadeq er a can onl y have

st r engt hened t he soci al and pol i t i cal bases f or democr acy i n I r an.Hence whi l e t hese f act or s may have cont r i but ed i n a gener al way t ot he est abl i shment of t he shah' s di ct at or shi p, t hey can onl y havepl ayed a backgr ound r ol e.

The quest i on of whet her cl i ~ncy was mor e i mpor t ant t han ot herf act or s as a cause of di ct at or bhi p i n I r an can onl y be answer eddef i ni t i vel y t hr ough a det ai l edl anal ysi s of t he dynam cs of I r ani -an pol i t i cs. However , on t he basi s of t hi s di scussi on i t appear s

II


14/19

PAGE 205II

t o have pl ayed a more i mpor~ant r ol e t han any ot her f act orIm~nt i oned her e. I f t hi s i s t r ue, what t hen wer e t he l ong- t ermIi mpl i cat i ons of t he pol i cy of er gagi ng I r an i n a cl i ency r el at i on-

shi p? Thi s quest i on w l l be t he pr i nci pal i ssue addr essed i n t heconcl usi on of t hi s st udy.


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PAGE 206FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 61) Nat i onal Secur i t y Counc i l , Un i t ed St at es Pol i c y Towar d I r an,NSC- 1 75, December 21 , 1953, pp. 1 1 - 2 , 7.

I

2) I bi d. , pp. 3- 7 and Annex: pp. 21- 22 . On t he r es c i ndi ng ofant i - t r us t ac t i on t o s ecur e par ~i c i pat i on by t he U. S. maj or s , s eeJ ohn M. Bl ai r , The Cont r ol of Oi l ( New Yor k: Pant heon, 1976) , pp.43- 47, 71 - 76. Aut hor i z at i on t OI wai ve ant i - t r us t pr oceed; ngs cameunder t he Def ens e P r oduc t i on Abt of 1950, whi ch had been us ed i n1951 and 1952 t o hel p r es t r uc~ur e wor l d oi l s uppl i es af t er t heBr i t i sh oi l bl ocade was imp o s ad., See chapt er 5, f oot not e 50.3) The f i gur es gi ven her e wer e I cal c ul a t ed f r om t hos e s hown i n t het abl e. Not e t hat bot h m l i t ar y f nd econom c ai d ar e gi ven i n t abl e3, and t hat t r ans f er s f r om t hel CI A ar e exc l uded. I n addi t i on t ot he $7- 8 m l l i on gi ven by t he ~I A s hor t l y af t er t he coup, anot herSI m l l i on i s s ai d t o have been gi ven one year l at er t o f und al avi s h cel ebr at i on hel d by t hel s hah. The ai d gi ven i n t he weeksaf t er t he coup was al l ocat ed ov~r a per i od of mont hs , s o i t s f ul lval ue i s not r ef l ec t ed i n t he f ~gur es gi ven i n t he t abl e f or 1953.Si nce t he gover nment expendi t ur ~ dat a gi v en her e i n c l udes m l i t ar ys pend; ng, i t i s appr opr i ah~t OI c ompar e i t wi t h U. S. m 1 i t ar y andeconom c ai d s ummed t oget her . I4) Thes e f i gur es wer e cal cul at ~d f r om t he dat a gi ven i n t abl e 3and f r om dat a on whol e s al e pr i cbs and t he di s t r i but i on of gover n -ment expendi t ur es gi v en i n Bhar ~er , Econom c Devel opment i n I r an,pp , 46-47, 67-68. i5) Quot ed i n Davi d Hor owi t z , F r bm Yal t a t o Vi e t nam CHar mondswor t h,Pengui n , 1967) . p , i86. On t h~! [ di s t r i but i on of U. S. ai d t o I r ans ee t he s our ce r ef er r ed t o i nl t abl e 3. Ot her inf or mat i on c i t edher e i s f r om U. S. Senat e, Comm t t ee on For ei gn Rel at i ons , U. S.Mi l i t ar y Sal es t o I r an, Comm4t t ee P r i nt , 94t h Congr es s , 2ndSes s i on, J ul y 1976; Thomas 1 '1 . ; Ri cks , " U. S. Mi l i t ar y Mi s s i ons t oI r an: The Pol i t i cal Economy pf Mi l i t ar y As s i s t ance, " I r an i anSt udi es , Vol. XI I , Nos . 3- 4, Summer - Aut umn 1979 , pp. 163- 193; U. S .Depar t ment of Def ens e, SBcur i t y As s i s t ance Agency, F i s cal YearSer i es 1980, ( Was hi ngt o n, 1981 ) , p. 83.6) Dat a pr es ent ed her B on t he U. S. econom c ai d pr ogr ams i s f r omAI D Af f ai r s Of f i ce, Amer i c an Embas s y Tehr an, U. S . Econom c As s i s t -ance t o I r an at a Gl ance, FY 1950- FY 1967 ( W~s hi ngt on: AI DL i br ar y, dat e i l l egi bl e) and U. S. AI D Mi s s i on t o I r an, A. I . D.Econom c As s i s t ance t o I r an, 1~50- 1965 ( Washi n gt on: AI D L i b r ar y,1966) . The l at t er s our ce gi v es l good des c r i pt i ons of t he var i ousai d pr ogr ams car r i ed out i n I r an .

I7) The t ext of t hi s House Subcomm t t ee r epor t i s r epr i nt ed i nYonah Al exander and Al l an Nan~s ( eds . ) , The Uni t ed St at es andI r an: A Document ar v Hi s t or v ( ~r eder i ck, MD: Uni ver si t y Publ i c a-t i ons of Amer i c a, 1980) , pp. 295- 298 .8 ) Fr ed J . Cook , " The Bi l l i on- Dol l a r Mys t er y, " The Nat i on , Apr i l12 , 1965. A car ef ul anal ys i s of t hi s cont r over s y appear s i n Mar kHul ber t , I n t er l ock ( New Yor k: Ri c har ds on and Snyder , 1982 ) , ch. 2 .9 ) Conf i dent i al i n t er v i ew wi t h: t he s our ce ment i oned i n f oot not e13, bel ow. I10) Un l e s s ot her wi s e not ed, t hel mat er i al pr es ent ed i n t hi s s ec t i onwas obt ai n~d i n i nt er v i ews wi t h t wo f or mer CI A of f i c er s and af or mer U. S. m l i t ar y of f i cer whb wor ked c l os el y wi t h t he CI A. Them l i t ar y of f i cer and one of t he CI A of f i cer s headed or par t i c-i pat ed i n t he t wo maj or s ecur t y as s i s t ance m s s i ons des c r i bed


16/19

PAGE 207he r e. Al l t hr ee r eques t ed anon~m t y. The mat er i al t hey pr ovi dedwas cor r obor at ed wher ever pos s~bl e wi t h ot her s our ces . I n t hecour s e of my r es ea r ch, not hi ng has emer ged t o cont r adi ct anyi nf or mat i on pr ovi ded by t hes e s our ces on t hi s or ot her mat t e r s .11 ) For t he pur pos es of t hi s s t udy, t he t er ms " s ecur i t y f or ces , "" s ecur i t y s er vi c es , " et c . r e~er t o gover nment or gan i z at i onsi nvol ved i n i nt el l i gence ac t i v i t i es per t ai ni ng t o t he s ecur i t y oft he s t at e. The s e ac t i v i t i es i nc l ude bot h pas s i ve f Unc t i ons s uch asi nt el l i gence anal ys i s and sur v~i l l a n ce an d ac t i ve f unc t i ons s uchas i+ar r -o c a + i o n , a r - r - c s t, a n d a s s .a s s i a tin , Such or g


17/19

PAGE 20821) See USOM- I r an, Revi ew of U. S. Techni cal Assi st ance and Economi c Ai d t o I ran, 1951- 1957, Vol . 12 ( Washi ngt on: AI D Li br ar y, n. d. ) ,pp. 483- 486; "Compl et i on of To~r Repor t of Al ber t G. Var rel man, "J une 26, 1956, "Compl et i on of Tbur Repor t of Mr . Fr ank A. J essup, "J ul y 7, 1959, "Compl et i on of To~r Repor t , Mr . M chael G. McCann. "September 29, 1959, and "End of Tour Repor t , Publ i c Saf et yAdvi sor , " J une 12. 1961. al l f r om t he AI D Li br ar y i n Washi ngt on.22) Rount ree t o t he Depar t ment of St at e, Apr i l 25, 1955 ( Car t erWhi t e Paper ) . Thi s r epor t and bt her s r ef er enced i n t hi s way ar econt ai ned i n a l ar ge st udy of U. S. pol i cy t owar d I r an compi l ed byt he Car t er Adm ni st r at i on d~r i ng t ha host agQ cr i si s. Thi scol l ect i on i s avai l abl e t hr ough t he Depar tment of St at e under t heFr eedom of I nf ormat i on Act .23) Descr i pt i ons of CI A oper~t i ons gi ven her e and bel ow wer eobtai ned i n conf i dent i al i nt er~ ews w t h sever al of t he par t i c-i pant s. :2~) One i ndi cat i on of t he i mp~r t ance of t hese devi ces i s t hataf t er t he I r ani an r evol ut i on t he Car ter Adm ni st rat i on was f or cedt o make ar rangement s t o i nst al l si m l ar f aci l i t i es i n nor thwest er nChi na. The pr i ce of t hi s deal was pr esumabl y di pl omat i c r ecogni -t i on. See J ames Bamor d, The Puzzl e Pal ace ( Bost on:Hought on- M f f l i n, 1982) , pp. 19~- 201.25) J oi nt oper at i ons di r ect edl at t he Sovi et Uni on di d occur ,however . Because of t he ver y nat ur e of t hese oper at i ons, t he CI Ahad no choi ce but t o i nf orm and: i ncl udQ SAVAK. SAVAK mai nl y pl aYQda suppor t r ol e i n t hese oper at i ons, pr ovi di ng t r anspor t at i on.cover f or agent s, et c. I n r et ur n t he CI A pr ovi ded SAVAK w t h t hei nf ormat i on obt ai ned 1n t hes~ oper at i ons t hat was of di rectconcer n t o I r an. II26) By t he l at e 19605 t he pr i ~ar y CI A sour ce f or I ran was t her adi o i nt er cept s descr i bed i n f oot not e 20, above. Thi s i ncl udedi nt er cept s f rom SAVAK t ransm ssi ons. Whi l e t hi s i nf ormat i on wasi nadver tent l y pr ovi ded by SAVAK, i t s cont ent was obvi ousl y notdel i ber at el y sl ant ed f or i t s Amer i can audi ence.27) Car ter Whi t e Paper , Sect i on I I I . D. I . "Cont act s w t h Opposi t i onEl ement s; " The Washi ngt on Post , Oct ober 26, 1980, pp. 1. 18, 19.The Post ar t i cl e i s par t of a r i nf or mat i ve ser i es ent i t l ed "TheFal l of t he Shah. "

I28) I n 1977 t he shah t ol d a r~por t er t hat Pr esi dent Kennedy hadused $35 m l l i on i n econom c a~d t o pr essur e hi m i nt o appoi nt i ngAm ni . See Fer eydoun Hoveyda, I The Fal l of t he Shah ( New Yor k:Wyndham Books. 1979) , p. 5~. I29) See, f or exampl e, Ki t chen t o Rount ree, May 17. 1956 ( Car terWhi t e Paper ) . Ther e wer e al so debat es w t hi n t he CI A on t he needf or r ef orm Sever al f ormer CI A of f i cer s t ol d me t hat t hey pushedf or r ef orms i n t he 1950s. At l east t wo r esi gned f rom t he Agencyover t hi s i ssue. Fur t her evi dence of CI A ambi val ence about r ef ormscame i n i t s r esponse t o t he 1958 coup at t empt by Col onel Gar aneh.Gar aneh was a nat i onal i st and f avor ed r ef orms, not unl i ke GamelAbdel Nasser i n Egypt . The CI A st at i on i n Tehr an was awar e of hi spl ot and di d not war n t he shah about it. One of f i cer i n t hest at i on at t he t i me t ol d me t hat he had been i n f avor of a coup byGar an~h. I30) Except wher e r ef er enced I ; n t he f oot not es, t he mat er i alpr esent ed i n t hi s sect i on was obt ai ned i n i nt er vi ews w t h t hesour ces descr i bed i n f oot not e l b, above.


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PAGE 20931) Thomas P l at e and Andr ea Dar vi ,Doubl eday, 1981) , us e SAVAK as t hei rwor l d s ec r et pol i ce or gani z at i on.

I32) I t was r umor ed t hat Bakht i ar kept a bear t o maul hi spr i soner s . Thi s was r el at ed t o me by Pet er Aver y ( Cambr i dge ,Engl and, Sept embe r 17, 1983), II33) W l l i am J . But l er and Geor g~s l evasseur , Human Ri ght s and t heLeoal Sys t em i n I r an ( Geneva: I nt er nat i onal Comm ss i on of J ur i s t s ,1976 ) , pp . 7-8. 113 4) Chapour Bakht i ar , Ma F i del i t e82. i

Secr et Pol i ce ( New Yor k:pr i mar y ex ampl e of a t hi r d

( Par i s : Al bi n Mi chel , 1982) , p.35) Mar vi n l oni s , The Pol i t i cal E l i t e of I r an ( P r i ncet on: P r i nce-t on Uni v er s i t y P r es s , 1971) , p. 185.36) I bi d. Mouvement de l a Rel s i s t ance Nat i onal e I r an i enne, I r anP l a i dOl r e Pour l es Dr oi t s de I ' Homme ( P ar i s , 1982) , p. 14.

I37) NeLoJ 5LoJ eek, Oct ober 14, 19741. Thi s f i gur e i s pr obabl y an exag-ger at i on . However , i t t YP i f i e~h t he al mos t omni pot ent r eput at i o nSAVAK came t o pos s es s , an d whi c , i t no doubt cul t i vat ed. The bes ts i ngl e des c r i p t i on of SAVAK' s pr gani z at i on i s gi ven i n Nat i onalFr on t of I r an, " A Por t i on of t he Sec r et s of t he Secur i t y Or gani z a-t i on ( SAVAK) , " ( u npubl i s hed man~s c r i pt , May 1971) . Thi s s our ce i sus ed f or mos t of t he des c r i pt i oh of SAVAK gi v en her e.38 ) I bi d. , p , 9 .39) See, f or exampl e, Reza Bar aheni , The Cr owned Canni bal s ( NewYor k : Vi nt age Books . 1977) ; ~he I r an Comm t t ee, Tor t ur e andR~s i 5t anC( ; ! i n I r Cl n ( dCl t ( ; !l t 1 dlpl Cl ce of publ i cat i on unknown) ;Comm t t ee Agai ns t Repr e s si on i n I r an , I r an: The Shah' s Empi r e ofRepr es s i on ( London, 1976) . chi . 7; Al i - Reza Nobar i ( ed . ) , I r anEr upt s


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PAGE 210I46) Er i c J. Hoogl und, l and and Revol ut i on i n I r an, 1960- 1980 ( Aus-t i n: Uni ver si t y of Texas Pr ess, 1 1982) , chs. 4- 6.I

47) I n 1977 cor r upt i on i n t he r~yal f am l y had made I r an much l i ke"a haunch of meat t hr own t o an army of st ar vi ng r at s , " accor di ngt o t he br ot her of I r an' s pr i me m ni st er at t he t i me. See Fer ey-doun Hoveyda, The Fal l of t he Shah, p. 136, and al so pp. 90-93 and144-146.48) Thi s mat er i al was obt ai ned i n t he i nt er vi ews ment i oned i nf oot not e 42 and w t h Hormoz r ekmat ( Par i s, November 6, 1983) ,Nasser Pakdaman (Par i s , Oct ober 31, 1983) , and Homayoun Keshevar z( Par i s, November 2, 1983) . I

I49) A usef ul , but br i ef , descr i pt i on of t hese par t i es i s gi ven i nGeor ge l enc2owski , "Pol i t i cal Pr ocess and I nst i t ut i ons i n I ran:The Second Pahl evi Ki ngshi p, " i h Lenczowski ( ed. ) , I ran Under t hePakl evi s ( St anf or d: Hoover I nst ' i t ut i on Pr ess, 1978) , pp. 452- 454.See al so Zoni s, The Pol i t i cal E~ t e of I r an, p. 86- 90.50) Chapour Bakht i ar , who emer ged af t er 1953 t o become an i mpor -t ant Nat i onal Fr ont l eader , cl ai ms t o have kept a speci al sui t casepacked f or pr i son. See Ma Fi del i t e, p. 92. Thi s book gi ves a f ai r -l y good i nsi de account of t he measur es t aken by t he shah t owar dt he Nat i onal Fr ont . I51) Loi s Beck, " I r an and t he Qa~hqai Tr i bal Conf ederacy, " i n Ri ch-ar d Tapper ( ed. ) , The Conf l j c~ of Tr i be and St at e i n I r an andAf qhani st an ( l ondon: Cr oon Hel m, 1983) , p . 302.

I52) I t i s uncl ear whet her t h~ l i st was f ound acci dent al l y ordur i ng t he cour se of i nvest i gat i ons by t hi s secur i t y f or ce. Anumber of know edgabl e sour ces have t ol d me t hat i t was f ound whent he pol i ce ar r est ed someone i n a t r af f i c acci dent . However , t hem l i t ar y at tache i nvol ved t ol d me t hat i t had been uncover ed i nt he course of an ext ensi ve ant i - Tudeh operati on.53) Thi s was t he concl usi on of t he CI A at t he t i me. The CI A hadhad some i dea t hat t her e Was a Tudeh net i n t he m l i t ar y, andBssumed t hat i t s mai n pur pose was t o st age a coup on or der s f r omMoscow. Fear t hat t he Tudah m ght so act was t he mai n r eason t heCI A deci ded t o i mpl ement TPAJ A~. However , i n subsequent year s wheni t became appar ent t hat t he Tu~eh was deepl y spl i t and t hat t hem l i t ar y networ k was pr i mar i l y engaged i n i nt el l i gence- gat heri ng,CI A anal yst s r eal i zed i n r et rospect t hat t hei r f ear s of an i mm -nent Tudeh coup had been m st aken. Thi s was r el at ed t o me by oneof t he sources ment i oned i n f oot not e 10, above.5~) I nt er vi ew w t h Denni s W i ght ( Haddenham Engl and, November 14,1983) ,55) Cot tam Nat i onal i sm i n I ran, p. 362; Zoni s, The Pol i t i calEl i t e of I r an, p. 54.56) I bi d. , pp. 47- 52.57) Hoagl und, l and and Revol ut i on i n I r an, p. 78.58) Shahr ough Akhavi , Rel i gi on and Pol i t i cs i n Cont empor ar v I r an( Al bany: st at e Uni ver si t y of New Yor k Pr ess, 1980) , ch. 4.

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