mg diss ch5i

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CHAPTER 5 - THE ESTABLI SHMENT OF A U. S. CLI ENT STATE, 1951- 1954

Chapt er s 3 and 4 di scussed I rani an domest i c pol i t i cs and U. S.pol i cy t owar d I r an i n t he er a bef or e t he appoi nt ment of MohammedMossadeq as pr i me m ni st er on Apr i l 29. 1951. I n chapt er 3 i t wasar gued t hat t he 1941 Al l i ed i nvasi on whi ch ended t he di ct at or shi pof Reza Shah usher ed i n a 12- year per i od of i nt ense pol i t i calact i vi t y i n I r an. Thi s per i od was consi der abl y mor e democrat i ct han ei t her t he pr evi ous or subsequent er as. I t was char act er i zedby a pl ur al i t y of pol i t i cal act or s. r el at i vel y f r ee pol i t i cali n5t i t ut i ons. and a vocal par l i ament w l l i ng t o chal l enge t heestabl i shed power of t he r oyal cour t and t he t r adi t i onal r ul i ngcl ass. Mor eover , w t h t he emer gence of ef f ect i ve pol i t i cal par t i esand a gr ow ng number of gi f t ed l eader s, t he t r end t owar d democr acyi n t hi s per i od was becom ng st r ongl y est abl i shed i n I r ani an soci e-t y. The i nt el l ect ual and soci al or i gi ns of t hi s democr at i c move-ment wer e t r aced i n chapt er 3 t o t he const i t ut i onal movement oft he ear l y 1900s and t o t he br oad soci o- econom c changes whi chbegan i n t he ni net eent h cent ur y and accel er at ed under Reza Shah.I t was al so ar gued I n chapt er 3 t hat whi l e f or ei gn power s hadpl ayed a maj or r ol e i n I r an' s af f ai r s si nce t he ear l y ni net eent hcent ur y t hei r r ol e had decl i ned subst ant i al l y af t er 1925. excepti n t he per i od of Al l i ed occupat i on dur i ng Wor l d War I I .

Chapt er 4 di s cussed U. S. i nt er est s and pol i ci es i n I r an bef or e1951. The U. S. r ol e i n I r an was never subst ant i al i n t hi s per i od,


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PAGE 112al t hough i t gr adual l y i ncr eased w t h war t i me occupat i on and t hedeepeni ng Col d War . Bef or e 1951 U. S. pol i cy t owar d I r an was mot i -vat ed pr i mar i l y by st r at egi c r at her t han econom c concer ns. U. S.pol i cymaker s wer e cont ent t o l et Br i t ai n pl ay t he l eadi ng r ol e f ort he West i n I r an dur i ng t hi s per i od.

Thi s chapt er t i es t hese t hemes t oget her by exam ni ng t he event swhi ch l ed t o a f at ef ul conf r ont at i on i n August 1953 bet ween t hemovement t owar d democr acy i n I ran and t he st rat egi c vi ews hel d byt he Ei senhower Adm ni st r at i on. By 1951 t he democr at i c movement i nI r an had become cl osel y bound up w t h t he oi l nat i onal i zat i oni ssue and w t h Mossadeq and t he Nat i onal Fr ont , who wer e i t s mai nproponent s. Mossadeq and t he mai nst r eam of t he Nat i onal Fr ont wer eext r emel y popul ar i n I r an and had st r ong democr at i c i deal s. Mor e-over , whi l e nat i onal i zat i on was t he most pr om nent i ssue pur suedby t he Nat i onal Fr ont , a mor e f undament al goal of t hi s or gani za-t i on was t he achi evement of a mor e democr at i c di st r i but i on ofpower i n I r an. At t he hei ght of Mossadeq' s popul ar i t y i n l at e1951 I r an appear ed t o be on t he verge of est abl i shi ng anon- al i gned, popul i st ( i f not t r ul y democr at i c) st at e, not unl i ket hose exi s t i ng at t he t i me i n I ndi a and Ar gent i na.

The enact ment of t he nat i onal i zat i on l aw i n Apr i l 1951 set t hest age f or a conf r ont at i on bet ween t he Nat i onal Fr ont and Br i t ai n.The Tr uman Adm ni st r a t i on adopt ed a r el at i vel y neut r al posi t i on i nt hi s di sput e, suppor t i ng t he Bri t i sh embar go on I r an but al soencour agi ng t he Br i t i sh t o negot i at e and r est r ai ni ng Br i t i shi nt er vent i oni sm However , w t h t he i naugurat i on of t he Ei senhoweradm ni st r at i on Mossadeq became t he t ar get of a new U. S. approacht owar d Thi r d Wor l d nat i onal i sm The Uni t ed St at es pl ayed a cr uci alr ol e i n oust i ng Moss adeq i n August 1953 and i n t he post - coupconsol i dat i on of power by t he shah and Pr i me M ni st er Zahedi . Byh~ pi ng t o d~st r oy t he Nat i onal Fr ont and i nst al l an aut hor i t ar i anr egi me, t he Uni t ed St at es, act i ng l ar gel y on st r a t egi c consi der -


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PAGE 113dt i ons, deal t a deci si ve bl ow t o t he l ong- t er m pr ospect s f ordemocr acy i n I r an.

1) I RAN ON THE EVE OF NATI ONALI ZATI ON

THE OI L I SSUE

W t h t he col l apse of t he Sovi et - suppor t ed aut onomous r epubl i csi n Azer bai j an and Kur di st an i n l at e 1946, I r an coul d once agai nbegi n t o f ocus on i nt er nal i ssues. Chi ef among t hese was t hest at us of t he 1933 oi l agr eement negot i at ed by Reza Shah. Thi sagr eement was w del y r egar ded i n I r an as a sel l out t o t he Br i t i shand a sur r ender of I r ani an sover ei gnt y. Know edgabl e I r ani ans wer ewel l awar e of t he successf ul nat i onal i zat i on by Mexi co of i t sf or ei gn- cont r ol l ed oi l i ndust ry and of t he f avor abl e deai s whi chMexi co and Venezuel a had obt ai ned f r om U. S. oi l compani es. Pr es-sur e i n t he Maj l es l ed t o t he passage of a bi l l i n Oct ober 1947r equi r i ng t he gover nment t o r enegot i at e t he agr eement w t h t heAI OC. Af t er t he Al Oe announced a 100% i ncr ease i n pr of i t s bet ween1946 and 1947 a speci al Maj l es comm ssi on was est abl i s hed t o st udyt he oi l quest i on.

Secr et negot i at i ons ai med at secur i ng a new agr eement wer ebegun w t h t he Al Oe i n August 1948. The I r ani an negot i at i ng t eampresent ed an el abor at e 25- poi nt l i st of compl ai nt s, whi ch t he Al Oepr ompt l y r ej ect ed. Tal ks cont i nued i nt er m t t ent l y unt i l J ul y 1949,when a Suppl ement al Agr eement was si gned. Thi s Agr eement cal l ed

I

f or i ncr eased payment s t o I ran but di d l i t t l e t o sat i sf y t heI r ani an l i st of demands. The pr esent at i on of t he Suppl ement al


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PAGE 114Agr eement t o t he Maj l es caused an i mmedi at e upr oar , whi chpr ecl uded r at i f i cat i on bef or e t he Maj l es adj our ned i n l at e J ul y.Oi l r emai ned an expl osi ve i ssue dur i ng t he ensui ng el ect i ons. Thepr i me m ni st er who had begun t he secr et negot i at i ons ( Hazhi r ) wasassassi nat ed by t he xenophobi c Fedayan- i - I sl am The new Maj l esconvened i n Mar ch 1950 was even l ess sympat het i c t o t he Suppl e-ment al Agr eement . I n J une t he i ssue was t ur ned over t o anl 8- member oi l comm ssi on. The oi l comm ssi on st udi ed t he agreementand f i nal l Y r ej ect ed i t i n November , am d cal l s by t he Nat i onalFr ont and t he Tudeh par t y f or nat i onal i zat i on.

By l at e 1950 oi l had come t o dom nat e I r ani an pol i t i cs. Shor t -l y af t er t he comm ssi on r ej ect ed t he Suppl ement al Agr eement ARAMCOannounced t hat i t had concl uded a 50- 50 pr of i t - shar i ng ar r angementw t h Saudi Ar abi a, t he f i r st such agr eement t o be r eached i n t heM ddl e East . The Al oe qui ckl y of f er ed t o r enegot i at e t he Suppl e-ment al Agr eement al ong si m l ar l i nes ( near l y doubl i ng i t s pr evi ousof f er ) , but by t hi s t i me had wai t ed t oo l ong. I n J anuar y 1951 67pr oposal s deal i ng w t h t he oi l i ssue wer e subm t t ed t o t ha Maj l es,i ncl udi ng one aut hor ed by Mossadeq whi ch cal l ed f or nat i onal i za-t i on. Pr i me M ni st er Razmar a publ i cl y opposed t he nati onal i zat i onbi l l and was assassi nat ed i n ear l y Mar ch by t he Fedayan- i - I s l amFol l ow ng a ser i es of pr ot ract ed and vi ol ent st r i kes i n t heoi l f i el ds i n Mar ch and ear l y Apr i l , t he oi l comm tt ee appr ovedMos sadeq' s nat i onal i zat i on bi l l on Apr i l 26. On t he same day a newproposal was present ed by t he Br i t i sh cal l i ng f or t he est abl i sh-ment of a new Br i t i sh company havi ng I r ani an r epr esent at i on on i t sboar d of di r ect or s whi ch woul d cont r ol I r an' s oi l and di vi deprof i t s on a 50- 50 basi s. Thi s pr oposal di f f er ed onl y super f i ci al -l y f r om t he pr evi ous Al Oe of f er , and was l ost i n t he r ush ofevent s. Yi el di ng t o popul ar pr essur e, t he shah appoi nt ed Mossadeqpr i me m ni st er on Apr i l 29 and si gned t he nat i onal i zat i on bi l li nt o l aw on May 1.1


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PAGE 115THE I RANI AN POLI TI CAL SCENE I N 1951

By May 1951 most of t he pr oponent s of nat i onal i zat i on hadal i gned t hemsel ves w t h t he Nat i onal Fr ont . The Nat i onal Fr ont hadbeen or gani zed i n 1949 t o pr ot est t he shah' s at t empt t o r i g t hesi xt eent h Maj l es el ect i ons. I t qui ckl y became an umbr el l a or gan-i zat i on f or a var i et y of gr oups f avor i ng nat i onal i zat i on and seek-i ng a change i n t he pol i t i cal st at us quo. The mai n or gani zat i onsgr ouped i n t he Nat i onal Fr ont i n 1951 wer e t he pr ogr essi ve,nat i onal i st I r an par ty, l ed by Al l ahyar Sal eh and Kar i m Sanj abi ,whi ch was f or med i n t he ear l y 1940s and was composed mai nl y ofl ef t - w ng, ant i - Sovi et i nt el l ect ual s; t he Toi l er s par t y, l ed byMozaf f ar Baqai , whi ch st ood t o t he l ef t of t he I ran par t y andcont ai ned bot h i nt el l ect ual and wor ki ng cl ass/ bazaar el ement s; andt he Moj ahadi n- ; - I sl am l ed by t he demagogi c Ayat ol l ah Kashani andcomposed mai nl y of bazaar wor ker s and mer chant s and r ank- and- f i l ecl er gy. The Nat i onal Fr ont al so at t r act ed a l ar ge number of i ndi -vi dual s w t h no or gani zat i onal af f i l i at i on, par t i cul ar l y among t hegr ow ng ur ban m ddl e cl ass. The mai n or gani zat i ons f avor i ngnat i onal i zat i on whi ch wer e not al i gned w t h t he Nat i onal Fr ontwer e t he Tudeh par t y and t he f anat i cal Fedayan- i - I sl am2

The di ver se el ement s of t he Nat i onal Fr ont shar ed one pr i mar ygoal : t he nat i onal i zat i on of I r an' s oi l r esour ces. Br i t i s h cont rolover I r an' s oi l was w del y vi ewed as t he mai n obst acl e t o I r an' si ndependence and as a hi ndr ance t o i t s soci al and econom c devel -opment . However , f or vi r t ual l y al l el ement s of t he Nat i onal Fr onta mor e f undament al obj ect i ve l ay behi nd t he oi l i ssue: a r edi s-t r i but i on of pol i t i cal pow~r away f rom t he r oyal cour t and t hel andowni ng cl ass t owar d t he emer gi ng m ddl e and l ower cl asses. Thecour t and t he l andowni ng cl ass wer e l i nked w t h t he Br i t i sh posi -t i on i n t he oi l di sput e because of t hei r l ong- st andi ng t i es w t ht he Br i t i sh and b~cause t h~y had consi st ~nt l ~ opposed f ul l nat i on-


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PAGE 116al i zat i on. These l i nks made t he oi l i ssue an i deal medi um f orat tacki ng t he pol i t i cal power of t hese gr oups. They al s o gave t heoi l nat i onal i zat i on movement a popul ar char act er , t yi ng i t t o t hedemocr at i c movement whi ch had begun w t h t he const i t ut i onal r evo-l ut i on.

Whi l e a r edi st r i but i on of pol i t i cal power was f avor ed i n onef or m or anot her by vi r t ual l y al l el ement s of t he Nat i onal Fr ont ,t her e wer e consi der abl e di f f er ences, mai nl y of an i deol ogi calnat ur e, over t he ext ent a r edi s t r i but i on of power shoul d t ake andover t he gr oups i t shoul d be t ar get ed at . The l i ber al s andcent r i s t s i n t he Nat i onal Fr ont ( whose vi ews most cl osel y cor re-sponded w t h t hose of Mossadeq) f avor ed r ef or ms or i ent ed t owar dt he m ddl e cl ass but di d not chal l enge f undament al i nst i t ut i onssuch as t he const i t ut i onal monar chy or t he capi t al i st economy. TheMar xi st s i n t he Toi l er s par t y and i n t he I ran par t y wer e spl i ti nt o var i ous f act i ons whi ch cal l ed f or t he est abl i shment of asoci al i st st at e model ed al ong par t i cul ar i deol ogi cal l i nes.Kashani ' s suppor t er s i n t he Moj ahadi n- i - I sl am sought t he abol i t i onof secul ar l aws and i mpl ement at i on of t he Shar i ' a, much l i ke t hef ol l ower s of Ayat ol l ah Khomei ni i n post - r evol ut i onar y I r an.

The var i ous gr oups i n t he Nat i onal Fr ont di f f er ed f ur t her overt act i cs, par t i cul ar l y on t he quest i on of adher ence t o l egal andconsti t ut i onal means of pol i t i cal act i vi ty. The most l oyalel ement s of t he Nat i onal Fr ont ( i . e. , t hose whi ch cont i nued t osuppor t Mossadeq unt i l hi s over t hr ow i n 1953) wer eWest er n- or i ent ed and wer e comm t t ed t o wor ki ng w t hi n t he f r ame-wor k of t he const i t ut i on. These i ncl uded bot h t he l i ber al s andcent r i st s gr ouped cl osel y ar ound Mossadeq and t he l ef t - w ng i nt el -l ect ual s of t he Toi l er s par t y and t he I r an par t y. Al t hough t hel at t er wer e, f or t he most par t , Mar xi st s who had at one t i mesuppor t ed t he Tudeh par t y, t hey ar e best descr i bed as democrat i csoci al i st s. Thus t he Toi l er s par ty, despi t e i t s soci al i st ~het o~ c


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PAGE 117and pr ogr am cont i nued t o f avor r et ent i on of t he const i t ut i onalmonar chy. 3

Mossadeq hi msel f had spent much of hi s l i f e i n publ i c ser vi ceand was deepl y comm t t ed t o democr at i c pr i nci pl es. Al t hough he wasa weal t hy l andowner , he l ed an aust er e l i f e and had a r eput at i onas a scr upul ousl y honest pol i t i ci an. As a young man he had beeni nvol ved i n t he const i t ut i onal movement . Exi l ed i n 1906 f or hi spol i t i cal act i vi t i es, he st udi ed l aw i n Fr ance and Sw t zer l and,wher e hi s pol i t i cal bel i ef s wer e f ur ther devel oped. Af t er r et ur n-i ng t o I r an he hel d sever al adm ni st r at i ve post s and became aMaj l es deput y. I n 1925 he publ i cl y opposed t he cor onat i on of RezaShah on t he gr ounds t hat t he monar ch coul d not , under t he const i -t ut i on, r et ai n t he pr i me m ni st er shi p and t he war m ni st ry. RezaShah sent hi m i nt o i nt er nal exi l e. He r et ur ned t o publ i c l i f e i n1944 as a Maj l es deput y and aut hor ed t he 1944 bi l l Dut l aw ng al lf ut ur e f or ei gn oi l concessi ons. Thi s bi l l was desi gned t o guar an-t ee t hat I r an' s oi l r evenues woul d be used f or domest i c pur posesr at her t han t o paci f y t he super power s. Mossadeq campai gned i n1944 on t he i ssues of neut r al i t y i n f or ei gn pol i cy, par l i ament ar ycont r ol over t he ar med f or ces, and el ect or al r ef or m He cont i nuedt o st r ess t hese basi c t hemes as pr i me m ni st er i n 1951- 1953. 4

Whi l e Mossadeq and hi s cl osest suppor t er s wer e t hus comm t t edt o uphol di ng t he pr i nci pl es of t he const i t ut i on, t hE~same cannotbe sai d f or al l el ement s of t he Nat i onal Fr ont . Ayat ol l ah Kashaniand hi s suppor t er s i n t he Moj ahadi n- i - I sl am made no pr et ensesabout wor ki ng w t hi n t he f r amewor k of t he const i t ut i on. Kashaniopenl y br agged about hi s l i nks t o t he ki l l er s of Pr i me M ni st erRazmar a5 and mai nt ai ned cl ose t i es w t h spor t s cl ub gangs whi chcoul d be hi r ed t o st age demonst rat i ons or at t ack hi s opponent s.Much t he same can be sai d f or Baqai and hi s suppor t er s i n t hewor ki ng cl ass/ bazaar w ng of t he Toi l er s par t y, and f or Hossei nMakkj , a popul ar Maj l es deput y f r om Abadan who was secr et ar y of


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PAGE 118t he gover nment ' s oi l comm t t ee. Fol l ow ng t hei r def ect i on f r om t heNat i onal Fr ont i n l at e 1952 and ear l y 1953 Kashani , Baqai , andMakki used t hese t act i cs t o hel p undermne and event ual l y over -throw Mossadeq hi ms el f .

I n addi t i on t o t hei r democr at i c pr ocl i vi t i es, Mossadeq and t hemai nst r eam of t he Nat i onal Fr ont wer e al so by f ar t he most popul arpol i t i cal f or ce i n I r an at t he t i me. Mossadeq' s Maj l es opposi t i onnever grew beyond a har d cor e of some f i f t een conservat i ve,pro- Br i t i sh deput i es. Vi r t ual l y al l out si de obser ver s, i ncl udi ngt op pol i cymaker s i n bot h t he Uni t ed St at es and Br i t ai n, adm t t edt o t he popul ar i t y of t he Nat i onal Fr ont and of M05Sadeq i n par t i c-ul ar . Thr oughout t he t enur e of t he Tr uman adm ni st r at i on t heSt at e Depar t ment r ecogni zed Mossadeq' s popul ar i t y and vi ewed hi mas t he most ef f ect i ve bar r i er t o a communi s t t akeover i n I r an. ASt at e Depar t ment st udy i n ear l y 1952 expr essed concer ns t hatMossadeq' s popul ar i t y i n t he ar my made i t s l oyal ty t o t he shahdoubt f ul i n t he event of a shah- Mossadeq power st r uggl e. Much thesame vi ews wer e hel d i n t he CI A, who des cr i bed Mossadeq as "t hedom nant pol i t i cal f or ce i n I r an~ because of hi s "popul arprest i ge. " Even t he Br i t i sh, whi l e maki ng cont i nual ef f or t s t ounseat hi m wer e f or ced t o adm t t o Mossadeq' s "per s onal popul ar i -t y. " Si m l ar vi ews about Mossadeq wer e al so expr essed i n bot h t heBr i t i sh and t he Amer i can pr ess. 6

Al t hough Mossadeq was cl ear l y t he most popul ar f i gur e i n t heNat i onal Fr ont , ot her pr om nent f i gur es l n t hi s or gani Zat i onenj oyed cons i der abl e popul ar i t y as wel l . Kashani , Baqai , and Makkiwer e abl e t o mobi l i ze ext ensi ve popul ar suppor t on t he basi s ofboth t hei r personal appeal and t hei r t i es t o spor t s cl ub l eader s.The def ect i on of t hese key l eader s f r om t he Nat i onal Fr ont weak-ened i t t o some degr ee by r educi ng i t s base of suppor t . However ,t he abi l i t y of Mossadeq and t he Nat i onal Fr ont t o r emai n i n poweraf ter t hei r def ect i on and t o sur vi ve r epeat ed coup at t empt s ( i n


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PAGE 119whi ch t hese men wer e deepl y i nvol ved) i ndi cat es Mossadeq' s gr eatpopul ar i t y and hi s f undament al r ol e i n t he or gani zat i on. Of t heNat i onal Fr ont f i gur es who r emai ned l oyal t o Mossadeq. Khal i lMal eki . l eader of t he i nt el l ect ual w ng of t he Toi l er s part y ( whospl i t w t h Baqai t o f or m t he Thi r d For ce i n l at e 1952) , and t hel eader s of t he I r an par t y al so enj oyed consi derabl e publ i csuppor t .

Asi de f r om t he Nat i onal Fr ont , t he onl y ot her pol i t i cal or gan-i zat i on whi ch can be sai d t o have enj oyed any broad- based popul ar -i t y i n I r an at t hi s t i me was t he Tudeh part y. The Tudah party,whi l e st i l l out l awed, was maki ng a st r ong r ecover y f r om t he def eati t had suf f er ed i n l at e 1946. I t had wel l - di s ci pl i ned cel l s i n al lt he maj or ci t i es. whi ch oper at ed t hrough f r ont or gani zat i ons andpubl i shed a var i et y of newspaper s. CI A est i mates i n ear l y 1952pl aced Tudeh member shi p i n Tehr an at 8, 000, w t h t hr ee t o f ourt i mes as many sympat hi zer s. I n addi t i on, t he Tudeh had successf ul -l y penet r at ed sever al gover nment depar t ments and. apparent l y w t h-out t he know edge of t he CI A, was i nstal l i ng an el abor at e net wor ki n t he I r ani an ar my. The Tudeh par t y cont i nued t o be ext r emel ypopul ar among t he oi l wor ker s i n t he sout hwest . wher e i t was abl et o st age massi ve demonst r at i ons. 7

Al t hough t he mai n or i entat i on of t he Nat i onal Fr ont was t owar dI r an' s emer gi ng m ddl e cl ass. i t enj oyed cons i derabl e suppor t f romt he urban l ower cl ass and t he i ndus t r i al wor ki ng cl ass as wel l ,pr i mar i l y t hrough Kashani and t he Toi l er s party. The popul ar i t y oft he Nat i onal Fr ont among t he wor ki ng cl ass and i t s essent i al l yl i beral pol i ci es l ed i t i nt o f r equent conf l i ct w t h t he Tudehpar t y, whi ch denounced i t as " t he l ast hope of t he decadent r ul i ngcl ass. "e Al though t he t wo shar ed some si m l ar goal s and col l ab-orat ed at t i mes. not abl y i n a ser i es of vi ol ent demonst r at i ons inJ ul y 1952 whi ch r et ur ned Mossadeq t o power af ter a bri ef per i od 1nwhi ch he had been r epl aced by Qavam t he Nat i onal Fr ont gover nment


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PAGE 120f r equent l y harrassed t he Tudeh and was car ef ul t o keep i t undercont r ol . Oddl y enough, several St at e Depar t ment st udi es at t het i me por t r ayed Mossadeq and t he Nat i onal Fr ont as ant i - communi stand ant i - Tudeh. The l ack of Tudeh suppor t f or t he Nat i onal Fr ontr emai ned a maj or poi nt of sel f - cr i t i ci sm w t hi n t he par t y f oryear s af ter Mossacl eq' s over t hr ow. 9

Asi de f r om t he Tudeh par t y, t he onl y opposi t i on t o t he Nat i onalFr ont bef or e t he def ect i on of Kashani , Baqai , and Makki came f r oma l oosel y- or gani zed gr oup of weal t hy l andowner s, busi nessmen, andt op m l i t ar y of f i cers . Al t hough t he young shah was qui t e i ndeci -si ve i n t hi s per i od, he i nvar i abl y si ded w t h t hi s gr oup agai nstt he Nat i onal Fr ont . Thi s t r adi t i onal r ul i ng el i t e had no si gni f -i cant popul ar suppor t , but managed t o r et ai n a number of Maj l esseat s by buyi ng vot es and encour agi ng peasant s t o vot e f or t hecandi dat es desi gnat ed by t hei r l andowner s. I n addi t i on t o i t ssmal l Maj l es f act i on ( l ed by J amal Emam ) , t he r ul i ng el i t econt r ol l ed t he upper house of par l i ament , had st r ong i nf l uence i nt he r oyal cour t and i n par t s of t he secur i ty appar at us, and wor kedcl osel y w t h t he Br i t i sh. The conf l i ct s bet ween t hi s gr oup and t heNat i onal Fr ont consequent l y amount ed t o a conf r ontat i on betweent he popul ar br anch of par l i ament and t he cr owds i n t he st reet s ont he one hand, and t he r oyal cour t , t he senat e, and par t s of t hem l i tar y ( al l backed by t he Br i t i sh) on t he ot her . Despi te i t svar i ous st rengt hs, t he CI A saw l i t t l e chance of t hi s group com ngt o power or st ayi ng i n power w t hout maki ng concessi ons t o nat i on-al i st sent i ment s and usi ng author l t ar i an t act i cs. 10

2) THE ANGLO- I RANI AN OI L CRI SI S, 1951- 1952


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PAGE 121THE ANGLO- I RANI AN OI L NEGOTI ATI ONS

Af t er t he nat i onal i zat i on bi l l was si gned i nt o l aw on May 1.1951, t he pr i mar y Br i t i sh obj ect i ve was t o r et ai n ef f ect i vecont rol over t he pr oduct i on and mar ket i ng of I r an' s oi l . I n or dert o achi eve thi s goal t he Br i t i sh wer e w l l i ng t o make m ni malconces si ons on pr i ce and accept t he pr i nci pl e of nat i onal i zat i on,pr ovi ded t hat t hi s woul d not j eopar di ze t hei r posi t i on of cont rol .Thi s obj ect i ve was pur sued bot h t hr ough di r ect negot i at i ons w t ht he I r ani an gover nment and t hr ough appeal s t o t he UN, Secur i tyCounci l and t he I nt er nat i onal Court of J ust i ce. The Br i t i s h al sosought t o pr essur e I r an by i nst i t ut i ng a ser i es of econom c embar -goes agai nst i t and conspi r i ng w t h opposi t i on gr oups t o r emoveMossadeq f r om of f i ce. Beyond t hi s, bot h t he Uni t ed St at es and t heI nt er nat i onal Bank f or Reconst r uct i on . and Devel opment becamei nvol ved i n at t empt s t o medi at e t he di sput e.

Af t er t he enact ment of t he nat i onal i zat i on l aw t he f i r st act oft he Br i t i sh was t o appeal t o t he I nt er nat i onal Cour t f or a r ul i ngon t he oi l di sput e. I r an' s posi t i on was t hat t he cour t was notcompet ent t o r ul e on t he mat t er si nce t he Al Oe was, i n f act . anI r ani an company and t he di sput e was t hus a domest i c i ssue. At t hesame t i me t he Al Oe sent a negot i at i ng t eam t o Tehran. Thi s t eamproposed on J une 19 t hat , i n exchange f or r ecogni zi ng t he pr i nci -pl e of nat i onal i zat i on, t he Al Oe shoul d be hi red t o pr oduce andmar ket I r an' s oi l on a 50- 50 pr of i t - shar i ng basi s. Thi s pr oposaldi f f er ed l i t t l e f r om t he previ ous Br i t i sh of f er and was r ej ect edby I r an. The Al Oe meanwhi l e began a pr oduct i on sl owdown and t ookst eps t o pr event t anker s f r om l oadi ng oi l at t he por t of Abadan.These act i ons gr adual l y evol ved i nt o a f ul l - f l edged oi l bl ocade,whi ch r educed pr oduct i on t o vi r t ual l y not hi ng by t he end of J ul y.The ot her maj or oi l compani es. f ear i ng t hat nat i onal i zat i on woul d


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PAGE 122

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under m ne t hei r own posi t i ons i n ot her pr oduci ng count r i es, coop-er at ed f ul l y w t h t he AI OC. Si nce onl y t he maj or s had suf f i ci entt anker capaci ty t o mar ket I r an' s oi l t hei r cooper at i on wascr uci al . On J ul y 5 t he I nt er nat i onal Cour t r ecommended t hat bot hsi des r et ur n t o t he st at us quo as of May 1, but w t hhel d j udgementon t he quest i on of i t s compet ence i n t he case. Thi s l at t er i ssuewas f i nal l y set t l ed i n J ul y 1952 when t he cour t r ul ed t hat i t wasnot compet ent t o r ul e.

W th t he col l apse of t he J une r ound of negot i at i ons t ensi onsbegan t o escal at e r api dl y. The I rani an gover nment began t o t akecont r ol over t he oi l f i el ds and Br i t ai n sent sever al war shi ps i nt ot he Per si an Gul f . I n an at t empt t o r esol ve t he deepeni ng cr i s i sPr esi dent Tr uman sent Aver el l Har r i man t o Tehr an t o t r y t o medi at et he di sput e. Har r i man was gr eet ed i n Tehr an on J ul y 15 w t h bl oodyr i ot s, appar ent l y sponsor ed by t he Tudeh par t y. Af t er t wo weeksHar r i man f i n a l l y s uc c eeded i n ar r angi ng a f or mul a t o r eopen di r ec tnegot i at i ons. A Br i t i sh m ssI on under Ri char d St okes wasdi spat ched t o Tehr an and pr esent ed an 8- poi nt pl an' on August 13.Thi s pr oposal agai n di f f er ed l i t t l e i n subst ance f r om pr evi ousBr i t i sh of f er s and was event ual l y r ej ect ed. Mossadeq t hen del i v-er ed a count er - pr oposal t o St okes on August 22. St okes i ndi gnant l yr ej ect ed t hi s pr oposal and r etur ned t o l ondon t he next day.

Upon St okes' r et ur n t he Br i t i sh For ei gn Of f i ce made an om nousannouncement accus i ng the Mossadeq gover nment of vi ol at i ng t het er ms of Har ri man' s negot i at i ng f or mul a and st at i ng t hat i t woul dpur sue t he i ssue f ur t her at t he I nt er nat i onal Cour t . Mossadeqwai t ed unt i l Sept ember 5 f or a r epl y t o hi s count er pr oposal andt hen announced t hat al l Br i t i sh t echni ci ans woul d be expel l ed f romt he oi l f i el ds unl ess Br i t ai n r esumed negot i at i ons. Br i t ai n t henannounced t hat negot i at i ons had been cancel l ed and t hat i t saw nohope of r eachi ng a set t l ement w t h t he Mossadeq gover nment . ll


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PAGE 123W t h t he f ai l ur e of t he St okes m ssi on, Br i t ai n abandoneddi r ect negot i at i ons and adopt ed a t hr ee- t r ack st r ategy desi gned

t o pr essur e I r an i nt o a set t l ement on mor e f avor abl e t er ms. Thef i r st component of t hi s st r at egy i nvol ved t he i mpl ement at i on of apl an t o r emove Moss adeq f r om of f i ce. Thi s pl an had been devel opedover t he pr evi ous mont hs i n conj unct i on w t h cer t ai n pr o- Br i t i s hI r ani an pol i t i cal f i gur es. I t appear s t o have been coor di nat edw t h a l ar ge m l i t ar y bui l dup made by t he Br i t i sh i n m d- Sept emberi n r esponse t o Mossadeq' s ul t i mat i um The second component of t heBr i t i sh st r at egy cal l ed f or f u r t her econom c sanct i ons whi ch,t oget her w t h t he oi l bl ocade i t s el f , wer e desi gned t o t ur n domes-t i c publ i c opi ni on i ncr easi ngl y agai nst Mossadeq. These t wo compo-nent s w l l be. di scussed i n gr eat er det ai l i n t he next secti on.

The t hi r d component of t he Br i t i sh st r at egy i nvol ved an at t emptt o mobi l i ze wor l d opi ni on agai nst Mossadeq t hr ough an appeal t ot he UN Secur i t y Counci l . To t he gr eat di smay of t he Br i t i sh,Mossadeq announced t hat he woul d per sonal l y l ead t he I r ani andel egat i on. Thr ough a combi nat i on of gr eat showmanshi p and st r i -dent ant i - i mper i al i st r het or i c, Mossadeq was abl e f i r st t o wat erdown t he Br i t i sh r esol ut i on and t hen t o bl ock i t ent i r el y byhavi ng debat e post poned unt i l af t er t he deci si on of t he I nt er na-t i onal Cour t . Mossadeq made f ur t her gai ns dur i ng hi s st ay i n t heUni t ed St at es by meet i ng w t h Pr esi dent Tr uman and ot her t op U. S.of f i ci al s. He i mpr essed t hem w t h hi s w l l i ngness t o negot i ate andgot Tr uman t o agr ee t o consi der a $120 m l l i on l oan package f orI r an. Mosssdeq r et ur ned t o I r an i n l at e November and r ecei ved anover whel m ng vot e of conf i dence i n t he Maj l es. Buoyed by hi svi ct or i es i n t he Uni t ed st at es, he i mmedi at el y cal l ed f or newel ect i ons. l ~

El ect i ons wer e al so hel d i n Br i t ai n i n l at e Oct ob9r , br i ngi ngChur chi l l . Eden, and a new Conservat i ve gover nment t o power . Asmember s of t he shadow cabi net , Chur chi l l and Eden had been deepl y


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PAGE 124i nvol ved i n t he Br i t i sh pl ans of t he previ ous summer t o over t hr owMossadeq. 13 They wer e, of cour se, st aunch def ender s of t he Br i t i shempi r e, and as t or i es t hey had no di f f i cul t y i n opposi ng oi lnat i onal i zat i on or Thi rd Wor l d nat i onal i sm i n gener al . Eden qui ck-l y made i t cl ear t o Acheson t hat he was not i nt er est ed i n t hedi scussi ons t hen bei ng hel d i n Washi ngt on w t h Mossadeq, whi chU. S. pol i cymaker s wer e qui t e opt i m st i c about . He t ol d Achesont hat "no agr eement woul d be bet t er t han a bad one. " and di sputedAcheson' s vi ew t han communi sm was t he onl y al ter nat i ve t oMossadeq. 14

Fr om t hi s poi nt on t he Uni t ed St at es t ook t he l eadi ng r ol e i nt r yi ng t o revive t he st al l ed negot i at i ons. I t st rongl y backed aser i es of pr oposal s by t he I nt er nat i onal Bank, t he f i r st of whi chwas made dur i ng Mos sadeq' s stay i n New York and pur sued f ur t heraf t er hi s r et ur n t o Tehr an. Thi s pr oposal cal l ed f or a t hree- waydi vi si on of pr of i t s bet ween t he Bank, t he Al Oe, and I ran. I t al socal l ed f or a neut r al oper at i ng company ( w t h some Br i t i sh st af f )t o oper at e t he oi l f i el ds and t he r ef i ner y. Mossadeq r ej ect ed t hi si dea but l ef t t he door open f or f ur t her negot i at i ons. The Bankr evi sed i t s of f er sever al t i mes i n t he f ol l ow ng mont hs, maki ngf ur ther concessi ons on pr i ce and on t he i ssue of Br i t i sh r epr esen-t at i on i n t he pr oposed oper at i ng company. However , none of t heseproposal s made mor e t han nom nal r ecogni t i on of t he pr i nci pl e ofnat i onal i zat i on, and wer e t hus r ej ect ed by I r an. The Bank negoti -at i ons event ual l y r eached an i mpasse, and wer e i ndef i ni t el ysuspended on Mar ch 16 . 15

W t h t he col l apse of t hese ef f or t s negot i at i ons came t o acompl et e hal t . No f ur t her hi gh- l evel t al ks wer e hel d unt i l August1952, af t er t he I nt er nat i onal Cour t had r ul ed i n f avor of I r an ont he i ssue of i t s compet ence and af t er Moss adeq had l ef t of f i ce f ora br i ef , t umul t uous per i od i n l at e J ul y. The l at ter events touchedof f a f r enzy of act i vi t y on t he par t of t he Uni t ed St at es, whi ch


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PAGE 125f ear ed an i mm nent communi st coup. On August 11 t he Associ at edPr ess r epor t ed t hat t he Uni t ed st at es was "pr epar ed t o pr ess f or ar adi cal change i n Br i t i sh pol i c i es. "16 Thi s ef f or t r esul t ed i n t her el ease of a j oi nt U. S. - Br i t i sh pr oposal , whi ch was co- si gned byChur chi l l and Tr uman.

The Chur chi l l - Tr uman j oi nt not e cal l ed f or t he i ssue of compen-sat i on t o be subm t t ed t o t he I nt er nat i onal Cour t on t he basi s oft he pr e- nat i onal i zat i on st at us quo and f or a r esumpt i on of di r ectnegot i at i ons bet ween t he AI OC and I ran. I n exchange f or t hi s t heBr i t i sh econom c sancti ons woul d be l i f t ed, oi l pr oduct i on woul dbe r esumed by t he AI OC, and t he Uni t ed St at es woul d make an i mme-di at e cash gr ant of $10 m l l i on t o I r an. Thi s pr oposal ent i r el yi gnor ed t he f act of nat i onal i zat i on and cal l ed f or t he r et ur n oft he AI OC. Moss adeq di d not r ej ect t hi s pr oposal out r i ght , butr at her di scussed i t f or t wo weeks w t h hi s cabi net and w t h t heBr i t i sh and Amer i can ambass ador s. On Sept ember 16 he announced aser i es of count er pr oposal s and made a vei l ed t hr eat t hat di pl omat -i c r el at i ons w t h Br i t ai n woul d be br oken unl ess i t t ook a mor econst r uct i ve at t i t ude t owar d t he di sput e. These count er pr oposal swer e f l at l y r ej ect ed by t he Br i t i sh on Oct ober 14. Two days l at erMossadeq announced t hat di pl omat i c r el at i ons w t h Br i t ai n woul d besuspended.

A f i nal at t empt t o r each a set t l ement was begun by t he Uni t edSt at es i n November 1952. Negot i at i ons wer e hel d i n Tehr an i n J anu-ar y and Febr uar y 1953 bet ween Moss adeq and t he U. S. ambassador ,Loy Hender son. The Uni t ed St ates proposed t hat a pur chasi ng compa-ny st af f ed by Amer i can, Br i t i sh, and ot her unspeci f i ed nat i onal sbe f or med t o mar ket I r an' s oi l , t hat t he compensat i on i ssue besubm t t ed t o t h~ I nt er nat i onal Cour t f or ar bi t r at i on, and t hat ani mmedi at e $100 m l l i on U. S. l oan be ext ended t o I r an. These t al ksdr agged on unt i l Mar ch 20, when t hey wer e f i nal l y ended by Mossa-deq. I n cal l i ng f or a pur chasi ng company t he U. S. pr oposal r esem


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PAGE 126bl ed pr evi ous U. S. and Br i t i sh ef f or t s, whi ch I r an had r ej ect ed asi nconsi st ent w t h t he pr i nci pl e of nat i onal i zat i on. The U. S.~mbassy p~r sonnel i nvol ved i n t hese negot i at i ons became convi ncedt hat Mossadeq was not bargai ni ng i n good Tai t h. ATt er t he negot i -at i ons col l apsed Hender son soon came ar ound t o t he vi ew hel d byhi s t wo t op assi s t ant s t hat Mossadeq woul d have t o be r emoved f r omof f i ce. Fr om t hi s poi nt on t he Uni t ed St at es and Br i t ai n ent i r el yabandoned ser i ous negot i at i ons w t h t he Mossadeq gover nment andbegan t o i mpl ement a cover t pl an t o over throw i t . 17

BRI TI SH I NTERVENTI ON I N I RANI AN POLI TI CS

By 1951 Br i t ai n had been i nvol ved i n I r an' s domest i c af f ai r sf or wel l over a cent ur y. The most vi si bl e aspect s of t hi s i nvol ve-ment wer e Br i t ai n' s f r equent m l i t ar y i nt er vent i ons and i t s ext en-si ve econom c i nt er est s i n I r an. Dur i ng t he oi l cr i si s t he Br i t i shgover nment used bot h m l i t ar y power and econom C coer ci on i nconj unct i on w t h t he di pl omat i c ef f or t s descr i bed above t o weakent he Moss adeq gover nment . An equal l y i mpor t ant aspect of Br i t ai n' si nvol vement i n I r an at t hi s t i me was t he el abor at e net wor k ofagent s, i nf or mers, and i nf l uence peddl ers i t had devel oped t hr ought he year s. Thi s net wor k was empl oyed dur i ng t he oi l cr i si s t of ur t her weaken Mossadeq and t o pr ess f or hi s r epl acement by a mor ecompl i ant , pr o- Br i t i sh gover nment .

The Br i t i sh net wor k i n I r an had l ong been coor di nat ed t hr ought he Fr eemason l odge, whi ch count ed among i t s member s many ofI r an' s t op pol i t i ci ans, m l i t ar y of f i cer s, and busi nessmen. I n t he1940s and ear l y 1950s a key el ement of t he Br i t i sh net was t heRashi di an f am l y. The Rashi di ans had made a huge f or tune i n m l i -t ar y const r uct i on dur i ng Wor l d War I I w t h hel p f r om t he Br i t i sh.


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PAGE 127They s ubsequent l y s er ved as a pr i mar y cont act poi nt f or I r ani ansseeki ng Br i t i sh f avor s and as a l i ason bet ween t he Br i t i sh embassyand t he shah, w t h whom t hey r egul ar l y pl ayed poker . Anot heri mpor t ant el ement of t he Br i t i sh net was a gr oup of pr om nent ,pr o- Br i t i sh pol i t i ci ans. These i ncl uded Sayyi d l i a and t he Maj l esf act i on headed by J amal Emam . I n addi t i on t o t hese t wo gr oups t heBr i t i sh had access t o a br oad assor t ment of j our nal i st s , bazaarf i gur es, and mul l ahs who coul d i nf l uence opi ni on and or gani zecr owds and gangs of spor ts cl ub t oughs on t hei r behal f . l s

Oper at i ng t hr ough t hi s net wor k, t he Br i t i sh began t o wor kagai nst nat i onal i zat i on even bef or e i t became l aw. Thei r pr i nci palobj ect i ve i n t he mont hs bef or e t he nat i onal i zat i on bi l l was si gnedwas t o br i ng t o power a gover nment "w t h whi ch negot i at i ons coul dbe conduct ed r easonabl y. " Thi s was t o be achi eved t hr ough pr essur eon t he shah t o appoi nt Sayyi d l i a as pr i me m ni st er . 19 The shahwas appar ent l y agr eeabl e t o t hi s, and was r epor t edl y di s cussi ngt he mat t er w t h Sayyi d l i a when t he Maj I es nom nat ed Mossadeq f ort he pr i me m ni st er shi p on Apr i l 28, 1951. Af t er Mossadeq wasappoi nt ed t he Br i t i sh cont i nued t hei r ef f or t s t o i nst al l Sayyi dZi a. Thi s goal was pur sued despi t e st r ong r eser vat i ons expr essedby t he Br i t i sh ambassador i n Tehr an ( Si r Fr anci s Shepher d) and byt he head of t he East er n Department i n t he For ei gn Of f i ce. 2o

W t h t he appoi nt ment of Mossadeq as pr i me m ni st er Br i t ai n seti n mot i on t he di pl omat i c ef f or t s descr i bed i n t he pr evi oussect i on. These wer e accompani ed by a heavy r ound ofsaber - r at t l i ng. A par at r oop br i gade was di spat ched t o Cypr us i nmd-May and t he cr ui ser Maur i t i us was sent t o Abadan i n J une.These act i ons l ed t he Nat i onal Fr ont t o announce t hat t he f i r stshot f i r ed woul d "si gnal t he st ar t of Wor l d War 1 11 . " 2 1 I n l ondonBr i t i sh pol i cymaker s and academ c advi sor s began t o f or mul at el ong- t er m pl ans i n ant i ci pat i on of a br eakdown i n negot i at i ons.PI ~n5 f or covar t act i on and aconom c s~nct i on5 w~r a di 5CU5S~d.


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PAGE 128Chr i st opher Mont ague Woodhouse, an M 6 of f i cer who had pl ayed akey r ol e i n t he Gr eeK Ci vi l War , was di spat ched t o Tehr an t o coor -di nat e cover t act i vi t i es w t h t he Br i t i sh net . Ef f or t s t o i nst al lSayyi d Zi a wer e appar ent l y put on t he back bur ner pendi ng a br eaki n t he negot i at i ons. 22

The f i r st r ound of oi l negot i at i ons col l apsed i n l at e J une.Soon af t er , opposi t i on l eader s Chur chi l l and Eden began t o pr esst he For ei gn Of f i ce t o seek a j oi nt U. S. - Br i t i sh appr oach t o t heshah t o r emove Mossadeq. Thi s meant , i n t hei r wor ds, br i ngi ngabout "a COUp. " 23 Pl ans f or cover t act i on had al r eady been devel -oped. The r emoval of Mossadeq was vi ewed as "obj ect i ve numberone. "24 He was pr esumabl y t o be r epl aced w t h Sayyi d l i a. Oddl yenough, Fi t zr oy Macl ean and sever al ot her MPs par t i ci pat ed at t hi st i me i n a pr ot r act ed l obbyi ng ef f or t on behal f of a bi d t o t heFor ei gn Of f i ce by Qavam f or t he pr i me m ni st er shi p. The For ei gnOf f i ce r esponded t hat "cer tai n ot her pl ans ar e now under way" and"we have our money on anot her hor se, " appar ent l y r ef er r i ng t oSayyi d Zi a. 25 Pr essur es wer e evi dent l y br ought t o bear on t he shaht o r epl ace Mossadeq. He vaci l l at ed t hr oughout J ul y, f i r st opposi ngt he pl an and t hen f avor i ng a j oi nt Sayyi d Zi a- Qavam dover nment . Hechanged hi s m nd agai n when negot i at i ons wer e r esumed under t heHar r i man and St okes m s si ons. 26

The St okes m ssi on appear s i n r et rospect t o have been t he l astser i ous Br i t i sh ef f or t t o negot i at e w t h Mossadeq. When t hi sef f or t f ai l ed, Br i t ai n i mmedi at el y mount ed a mul t i - pr onged of f en-si ve agai nst Mossadeq desi gned t o r emove hi m f r om of f i ce. Of t hemany at t empt s under taken by domest i c or f or ei gn f or cQs t o oVer -t hr ow Mossadeq dur i ng hi s t enur e as pr i me m ni s t er ( i ncl udi ng t heone whi ch f i nal l y succeeded) , t hi s was t he most det er m ned and i smost deser vedl y descr i bed as a coup at t empt .

Soon af t er t he I r ani an t eam r ej ect ed hi s pr oposal s , St okes met


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PAGE 129w t h t he shah and i mpl or ed hi m t o di sm ss Mossadeq. 27 A memo wr i t -t en sever al days l at er by t he per manent undersecret ar y i n t heFor ~ gn Of f l c~ r Qcommended t hat Mossadeq be brought down as soonas possi bl e. Thi s memo r ef er r ed t o act i ons i n I ran whi ch wer e" i ndi r ect and behi nd t he s cenes, " and poi nt edl y not ed "an encour -agi ng gr owt h of opposi t i on t o ( Mossadeq) i n t he Maj l es. "28 Thi swas presumabl y a r ef erence t o ef f or t s by J amal Emam and hi sf act i on t o di sr upt t he Maj l es and bl ock vot es of conf i dence bypr event i ng a quorum Ambassador Shepher d f ol l owed up on St okes'appeal t o t he shah w t h a st r ong r ecommendat i on on August 29 t hatSayyi d Zi a be br ought i n t o repl ace Mossadeq. Meanwhi l e, t heFor ei gn Of f i ce was busy devel opi ng an el abor at e set of gui del i nesf or deal i ng w t h Mossadeq' s successor , whom i t pr esumed woul d beSayyi d Zi a. These i ncl uded a l ar ge Al Oe l oan and a modus vi vendi( whi ch Sayyi d Zi a had agr eed t o) cal l i ng f or a r esumpt i on of oi lshi pment s and a r et ur n of t he Al Oe under a di f f er ent name. TheM ni st er of Fuel and Power opt i m s t i cal l y specul at ed t hat t hesearrangement s m ght j ust enabl e Br i t ai n t o avoi d f ul l nat i onal i za-t i on. 29

These behi nd- t he- scenes ef f or ts wer e accompani ed by a ser i es ofeconom c sancti ons and an expanded Bri t i sh m l i t ar y pr esence. Thebl ocade of I r ani an oi l or gani zed by t he Al o e w t h hel p f r om t heot her maj or oi l compani es had by t hi s t i me r educed I r an' s oi lexpor t s t o a t r i ckl e. Br i t ai n' s Eur opean al l i es wer e asked i n l at eAugust t o di scourage t hei r ci t i zens f r om seeki ng empl oyment w t ht he new y- f or med I r ani an oi l company. The Al oe announced onSept ember 6 t hat i t woul d t ake l egal act i on agai nst any company ori ndi vi dual buyi ng oi l f r om t he I r ani an gover nment . Pl ans wer edr awn up i n ear l y Sept ember and qui ckl y i mpl ement ed t o embar goBri t i sh expor t s t o I r an OT i ron, steel , 011 pr ocessi ng equi pment ,sugar , and goods whi ch coul d be r esol d f or dol l ar s. Pr i vi l eges f orcur r ency conver si on wer e cancel l ed on Sept ember 10 and ot herf i nanci al r est r i ct i ons wer e subsQquent l y i mposed, vi ol at i ng a


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PAGE 130memor andum of under st andi ng whi ch Br i t ai n had si gned w t h I r an.Four Br i t i sh dest royer s ar r i ved i n t he Per si an Gul f on Sept ember5. Pl ans wer e al so made t o st rengt hen Br i t i sh l and and ai r f or cesi n t he r egi on. Toget her w t h t he cover t act i ons descr i bed above,t hese ef f or t s const i t ut ed a ser i ous and concer ted at tempt on t hepar t of t he Br i t i sh gover nment t o over t hr ow Mossadeq. 3o

Ambassador Shepher d t ook t hese ef f or t s one st ep f ur t her i near l y Sept ember by sendi ng a message t o t he For ei gn Of f i ce whi chpr ompt ed i t s Sept ember 6 st at ement t hat negot i at i ons had beensuspended and t hat Br i t ai n saw no hope of r eachi ng an agr eementw t h Mossadeq. Thi s st at ement , whi ch was " desi gned t o encour aget he opposi t i on gr oup headed by Sayyi d Zi a, " l ed Mos sadeq t o accuset he Br i t i sh of t r yi ng t o over t hr ow hi m 31 Shepher d r epor t ed t hatt he shah f avor ed a change of gover nment and suggest ed t hat t heopposi t i on was on t he ver ge of over t hr ow ng Mossadeq. These vi ewswer e heat edl y di sput ed by St okes, who ar gued t hat " mucki ng aboutw t h di scr edi t ed ol d men . . . w l l get us nowher e. "32 I n f act t heshah had t ol d Shepher d on August 31 t hat he pr ef er r ed Qavam t oSayyi d Zi a, and on Sept ember 17 he st at ed t hat Mossadeq coul d notbe r epl aced at t hat t i me. Shepher d appear s t o have been t he onl yBr i t i sh of f i ci al who f el t t he shah woul d di sm ss Mossadeq. Deput yUnder secr et ar y of St at e Si r Roger Maki ns ar gued t hat onl y t woal ternat i ves coul d come f r om t he pol i cy pushed by Shepher d: ei t herMossadeq woul d f al l ( whi ch he doubt ed> or t he Br i t i sh woul d beexpel l ed f rom Abadan. 33 The l at t er soon occur r ed. Notsur pr i si ngl y, Shepher d was soon named ambassador t o Pol and.

Af t er t he Sept ember 6 announcement Shepher d cont i nued t o pr esst he shah t o di sm ss Mossadeq. The Uni t ed st at es qui ckl y got w ndof t hese act i vi t i es and pr ot est ed vi gor ousl y. When Har r i mansuggest ~d t hat Sayyi d Zi a was "not capabl ~ of gover ni ng, " Shepher dwas mer el y t ol d not t o ment i on Sayyi d Zi a by name when pr essi ngt he shah t o r epl ace Mossadeq. 34 U. S. pol i cymaker s f el t Mossadeq


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PAGE 131was "anxi ous t o r each an agr eement , " and suggest ed t hat Br i t ai nr ~cei ve an I r ani an del egat i on. 35 Rat her t han negot i at Q, t h2 Br i t -i sh deci ded t o st ep up t hei r pr essur e on Mossadeq. Shor t l y af t erMoss adeq' s Sept ember 20 announcement t hat Br i t i sh wor ker s mustl eave Abadan, Pr i me M ni st er At l ee appar ent l y addr essed a per sonalnot e t o Tr uman suggest i ng t hat he was consi der i ng t he USQ of f or ceagai nst I r an. Tr uman r esponded t hat t he Uni t ed St at es woul d notsuppor t t hi s. A second message st at ed t hat t he Uni t ed St at es was" gr avel y concer ned" about t he pr esent cour se of event s, and agai nr ecommended negot i at i ons. Af t er Br i t i sh t r oops wer e posi t i oned i nt he Per si an Gul f and war shi ps hel d f i r i ng pr act i ce i n t he r i verof f Abadan, t he Br i t i sh cabi net deci ded t o t ake t he mat ter t o t heSecur i t y Counci l r at her t han USQ f or cQ. Al t hough t hey wer e "t i r edof bei ng l ect ur ed by t he Uni t ed St at es, " i t appear s t hat l ack ofU. S. suppor t hel ped f or ce t he Br i t i sh t o moder at e t hei rpol i ci es . 36

Mossadeq t r i umphed i n t he Secur i t y Counci l and r et ur ned t oTehr an i n l at e November , st r onger t han ever . I t was qui t e cl eart hat t he Br i t i sh had suf f er ed a ser i ous set back and t hat Mossadeqwoul d r emai n i n power f or some t i mQ t o comQ. Two maj or changesoccur red i n Br i t i sh pol i cy as a r esul t of t hese f ai l ur es. Fi r st ,whi l e t hey cont i nued t o l ook f or a way of oust i ng Mossadeq, t heyappear t o have accept ed t he U. S. ar guement t hat Sayyi d lia was t oodi scredi t ed t o assume power . Hi s name i s r ar el y ment i oned i n Br i t -i sh document s af t er t hi s per i od. I nst ead of Sayyi d l i a t he Br i t i shbegan t o back Qavam as a r epl acement f or Mossadeq. Qavam st eppedup hi s l obbyi ng ef f or t s, and t he Br i t i sh M ni st er of Fuel andPower suggest ed t hat he be put " i n f unds. "37 The U. S. St at eDepart ment bel i eved t hat " t he Br i t i sh ar e pi nni ng t hei r hopes f ora set t l ement of t he oi l i ssue on t he r epl acement of Mossadeq byQavam "38 Ot her candi dat es t o succeed Mossadeq, such as J avadBusher i , Mossadeq' s M ni st er of Roads, wer e subsequent l y al sodi scussed. 39 The second maj or change i n Br i t i sh pol i cy made at


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PAGE 132t hi s t i me was a gr eat er ef f or t t o coor di nat e pol i cy w t h t heUni t ed St at es. Thi s was most evi dent i n a ser i es of j oi ntappr ai sal s made by t he t wo embassi es i n t he f ol l ow ng mont hs.

The Br i t i sh cont i nued t o devel op cover t pl ans t o oust Mossadeqi n t he w nt er and spr i ng of 1952. However , hi s st rong domest i cposi t i on and t he absence of a sui t abl e al t er nat i ve appear t o havel ef t t hem w t h no oppor t uni t y t o i mpl ement t hese pl ans. Asdi scussed i n t he pr evi ous sect i on, t he Br i t i sh al so t ook l i t t l ei nt er est i n oi l negot i at i ons w t h Mossadeq af t er August 1951.Thei r mai n st r at egy was t o weaken I r an' s economy by mai ntai ni ngt he oi l bl ocade and t he ot her econom c sanct i ons t hey had i mposed.Mossadeq' s opt i ons f or count er i ng t hi s st r at egy wer e expect ed t or un out i n m d- 1952. He woul d t her eaf t er f ace gr ow ng domest i cunr est , whi ch woul d l ead ei t her t o hi s f al l or t o negot i at i ons onmor e f avor abl e t er ms . 40

I n J ul y 1952 Mossadeq suddenl y r esi gned as pr i me m ni st er i n adi sput e w t h t he shah OVer cont r ol of t he ar med f or ces. TheMaj l es t hen el ect ed Qavam t o r epl ace hi m Qavam remai ned i n of f i cef or f i ve t umul t uous days, af t er whi ch vi ol ent demonst r at i ons byt he Nat i onal Fr ont and t he Tudeh par t y f or ced t he shah t o r el entand r eappoi nt Mossadeq. Thi s epi sode set of f a f l ur r y of act i vi t yby bot h t he Uni t ed St at es and Br i t ai n. Hopi ng t o st abi l i ze what i tr egar ded as a mor e cooper at i ve gover nment , t he st at e Depar t mentqui ckl y made pl ans t o of f er econom c ai d t o Qavam The Br i t i shagr eed " i n pr i nci pl e" w t h t hese pl ans, and Qavam even made af or mal r equest f or ai d t o t he U. S. embass y. 41 However , bef or eanyt hi ng coul d be done t o hel p Qavam Mossadeq was t r i umphant l yswept back i nt o of f i ce.

I n t he af t er mat h of t he Qavam epi s ode bot h ~he Uni t ed S~at esand Br i t ai n agai n r eeval uat ed t hei r pol i ci es t owar d I r an.Di scussi ons wer e hel d i n Washi ngt on on J ul y 29 bet ween t he Br i t i sh


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PAGE 133ambassador and Assi st ant Secr et ar y of St at e Henr y Byr oade on met h-ods of st oppi ng I r an f r om "goi ng down t he dr ai n. " Byr oadesuggest ed t hat "most unor t hodox met hods" m ght be necessar y, and"was per f ect l y w l l i ng t hat t he possi bi l i t y of a coup shoul d beexam ned. "4l Loy Hender son, t he U. S. ambassador i n Tehr an, wasi nst r uct ed t o pr epar e a j oi nt r eapprai sal of t he si t uat i on w t hhi s Br i t i sh count er par t , i ncl udi ng a r evi ew of possi bl e al t er na-t i ves t o Mossadeq and ways of br i ngi ng t hese al t er nat i ves t opower . Geor ge M ddl et on, t he Br i t i sh char ge who headed t he Tehr anembassy af t er t he r emoval of Shepher d, r eport ed t o London t hatonl y a coup coul d st op I r an f rom f al l i ng i nt o communi st hands. Noout st andi ng candi dat e had yet come f or ward, al t hough Gener alFazl ol l ah Zahedi was descr i bed as avai l abl e and adequat e. 43 A yearl at er Zahedi l ed t he coup whi ch f i nal l y t oppl ed Mossadeq.

Whi l e t hese di scussi ons wer e goi ng on Ambassador Hender son senta cabl e f r om Tehran whi ch pr ompt ed Secr et ar y of Stat e Dean Achesont o pr ess t he Br i t i sh f or a new r ound of negoti at i ons w t hMossadeq. Acheson suggest ed t hat t he Uni t ed St at es woul d i mme-di at el y ext end a $10 m l l i on gr ant t o I ran and t hat Br i tai n shoul dbuy some I r ani an oi l and r esume negot i at i ons. The Br i t i sh r epl i edt hat i n thei r vi ew Mossadeq shoul d not be hel ped. They ar gued t hatmor al e i n t he I r ani an ar my was i mpr ovi ng and t hat i t m ght sooni nt er vene agai nst Mossadeq. Thi s conf l i ct ed shar pl y w t h a pessi -m st i c r epor t on ar my mor al e made a f ew days ear l i er by M ddl et on.Henderson' s r eappr ai sal ar r i ved i n Washi ngt on . at about t hi s t i me.He al so r epor t ed t hat ar my mor al e was l ow and suggest ed t hatMossadeq' s r emoval m ght benef i t t he Tudeh. On August 9 Br i t i shForei gn Secr et ar y Eden addressed a note t o Acheson st at i ng agai nt hat t he ar my' s mor al e was i mprovi ng and t hat i t m ght soon i nt er -vene. Two days l at er t he Associ at ed Pr ess r an a st or y i ndi cat i ngt hat t he Uni t ed Stat es was "pr epar ed t o pr ess f or a r adi cal changei n Br i t i sh pol i c i es t owar d I ran. "44 The next day Acheson t ol d t heBr i t i sh ambassador i n Washi ngt on t hat t he Uni t ed St at es coul d not


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PAGE 134accept t he Br i t i sh posi t i on and r eser ved t he r i ght t o pur sue ani ndependent pol i cy t owar d I r an. 45

The Br i t i sh t al k of a m l i t ar y coup appar ent l y ceased at t hi spoi nt . Di scussi ons bet ween t he Uni t ed st at es and Br i t ai n soon l edt o t he dr af t i ng of t he Tr uman- Chur chi l l j oi nt not e, whi ch waspres~nted t o Mossadeq and event ual l y r ej ect ed. Whi l e t her e i s nor eason t o bel i eve t hat t he Br i t i sh di d anyt hi ng mor e t han cont empl at e a coup agai nst I ran i n t hi s per i od, i t i s evi dent t hat t heUni t ed st at es sought agai n t o r est rai n t he Br i t i sh i n t hi s r egar das t hey had i n Sept ember 1951.

Mossadeq' s r ej ect i on of t he j oi nt not e was soon f ol l owed by adeci s i on t o br eak di pl omat i c r el at i ons w t h Br i t ai n. Depr i ved ofbot h di pl omat i c cont act w t h t he I r ani an gover nment and a base ofoper at i ons i nsi de I r an, t he Br i t i sh wer e now f or ced t o r el y on t heUni t ed St at es t o r esol ve t he oi l cr i si s.

THE U. S. ROLE I N THE ANGLO- I RANI AN OI L NEGOTI ATI ONS

As di scussed i n chapt er 4, U. S. st rat egi c and econom c i nt er -est s i n t he M ddl e East wer e f ocused mor e on Saudi Ar abi a t han onI r an i n t he year s af t er Wor l d War I I . Saudi oi l was cont r ol l ed byU. S. compani es, whi l e I r an' s oi l was cont r ol l ed by t he Br i t i sh.Al t hough I r an pl ayed a key r ol e i n t he U. S. cont ai nment st rat egy,i t was not cover ed under t he Tr uman Doct r i ne and r esponsi bi l i t yf or i t s def ense was l ef t t o t he Br i t i sh m l i t ar y. I n 1950 U. S.pol i cymaker s began t o t ake gr eat er i nt er est i n I r an as i t s i nt er -nal si t uat i on det er i or at ed and as t he Col d War deepened. However ,whi l e econom c ai d was i ncr eased somewhat , no f undament al changeswer e made i n U. S. pol i cy t owar d I r an.


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PAGE 136ar r angement r ecogni zi ng t he pr i nci pl e of nat i onal i zat i on butassur i ng ef f ect i ve Br i t i sh cont rol . Accor di ng t o U. S. of f i ci al st he key was t o pay " l i p ser vi ce" t o I r ani an nat i onal i s m whi l esaf eguar di ng Br i t i sh i nt er est s. The Br i t i sh wer e pr essed t oaccept a 50- 50 di vi si on of pr of i t s, but wer e war ned t hat a l ar gershar e f or I r an woul d upset ot her pr i ci ng ar r angement s i n t heM ddl e East . 47

Af t er t he nat i onal ' 2at i on l aw went i nt o ef f ect t he Uni t edSt at es publ i cl y sought t o por t r ay i tsel f as neut r al i n t hedi sput e. On May 18 t he St at e Depar tment cal l ed f or a negot i at eds et t l ement bet ween Br i t ai n and I r an. I t ur ged bot h si des t o avoi dt hr eat s and i nt i m dat i on and st at ed t hat i t woul d not get i nvol vedi n t he speci f i cs of a set t l ement . Sever al days l at er Gener al OmarBr adl ey announced t hat u . s . t roops woul d not become i nvol ved i ff i ght i ng br oke out . On May 24 Secr et ar y of St at e Acheson pl edgedt hat t he Uni t ed St at es woul d not i nt er vene i n I r an' s i nt er nalaf f ai r s. Pr i vat el y t he Br i t i sh wer e t ol d t hat t he Uni t ed St at esopposed pr essur e on t he shah f or a change of go~er nment . U. S.of f i ci al s sai d t hey woul d vi ew "w t h gr ave concer n" t he use off or ce i n I r an, except under ver y l i m t ed condi t i ons. 48 Br i t i shof f i ci al s compl ai ned t hat t hey wer e "bot her ed" and " annoyed at t heAmer i can at t i t ude of r el at i ve i ndi f f er ence. " 49

Whi l e U. S. pol i cymaker s pr essed bot h si des f or an ear l y end t ot he di sput e, t hey qui et l y began t o f or mul at e a st r at egy f orrestruct ur i ng t he wor l d di st r i but i on of oi l t o make up f or t hei mpendi ng 1055 of I r an' s pr oduct i on. On J une 3 t he For ei gn Pet ro-l eum Comm tt ee ( c omposed of of f i ci al s f r om t he Depar t ment s ofDef ense, St at e, and Commer ce) adopt ed a pl an under whi ch U. S. oi lcompani es woul d vol unt ar i l y pr ovi de oi l t o U. s. al l i es whosesuppl i es had been di sr upt ed by t he cut of f of I r ani an pr oduct i on.Thi s pl an ul t i mat el y pr ovi ded some 46 m l l i on bar r el s of oi lpr oduct s t o af f ect ed count r i es i n t he f i r st year of t he bl ocade,


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PAGE 137whi ch amount ed t o 20% of I r an' s t ot al 1950 pr oduct i on. Theseact i ons wer e car r i ed out under t he Def ense Pr oduct i on Act of 1950i n or der t o ensur e t hat adequat e oi l suppl i es woul d be avai l abl ei n t he event of an out br eak of host i l i t i es. However , t hey had t heef f ect of st rengt heni ng Br i t ai n' s oi l bl ocade and hence hel ped t ounder m ne I r an' s economy and weaken the Mos sadeq gover nment . 50

As t he f i . r st r ound of oi l negot i at i ons br oke down i n J une, t heUni t ed st at es mai nt ai ned i t s neut ral post ur e but st epped up i t sef f or ts t o medi at e t he oi l di sput e. Af t er I r an r ej ect ed t he Br i t -i sh pr oposal s on J une 19 Acheson and Assi s t ant Secr et ar y of St at eGeor ge McGhee met w t h Br i t i sh of f i ci al s and agai n expr essed t hei ropposi t i on t o ef f or t s t o unseat Mossadeq. Acheson was qui t eal ar med at t he br eakdown i n negot i at i ons and on J ul y 4 pr oposed t ot he Br i t i sh ambassador t hat Aver el l Har r i man be sent t o Tehr an asa medi at or . Har r i man was gr eet ed i n Tehr an w t h l ar ge- scal e demon-st rat i ons, but soon managed t o ar r ange a r esumpt i on of negot i -at i ons under t he aegi s of t he St okes m ssi on. Al t hough t hi sef f or t ul t i mat el y f ai l ed, Acheson cr edi t s Har r i man w t h pr event i ngan out br eak of host i l i t i es bet ween Br i t ai n and I r an. S1

W th t he col l apse of t he St okes m ssi on Br i t ai n began t o i mpl e-ment t he el abor at e pl ans descr i bed above t o over t hr ow Mossadeq.The Uni t ed st at es cont i nued t o oppose t hese ef f or t s. U. S. of f i -ci al s f el t t hat Mossadeq was t he onl y I r ani an pol i t i cal f i gur ecapabl e of get t i ng an agr eement t hr ough t he Maj l es. They al sobel i eved t hat t he shah was unw l l i ng t o r epl ace Mossadeq. Har r i mant ol d Br i t i sh of f i ci al s t hat he was d~epl y di st ur bed at t hei rcover t act i vi t i es on behal f of Sayyi d Zi a. He suggest ed t hatei t her t he Uni t ed St at es or Br i t ai n shoul d of f er econom c ai d t oMossadeq. Ot her U. S. of f i c i al s r epeat edl y pr essur ed t he Br i t i sh t or esume negot i at i ons. Even af t er t he Sept ember 20 announcement t hat~r i t i sh wor ker s wer e t o l eave t he oi l f i el ds t he Uni t ed St at escont i nued t o oppose pl ans t o over t hr ow M05sadeq. On Sept ember 26


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PAGE 138Pr~s i d~nt Tr uman s~nt a m~ssag~ t o Pr i m~ M ni st ~r At l ~~ st at i ngt hat t he Uni ted St at es woul d not suppor t t he use of Tor ce byBr i t ai n. He al so ur ged a r esumpt i on of negot i at i ons. s~ On t hef ol l ow ng day At l ee' s cabi net deci ded not t o use f or ce and i nst eads~nt t he mat ter t o t he Secur i t y Counci l . Al t hough Acheson i ni t i al -l y oppos ed t hi s move on t he gr ounds t hat Br i t ai n had l i t t l e chanceof success , U. S. pol i cymaker s qui ckl y became involved i n t he ensu-i ng del i b~r at i ons. 53 Tal ks wer e al so h~ d w t h Mos5ad~q i n NewYor k and Washi ngt on on t he I nt er nat i onal Bank pr oposal and ot hermat t ers.

The gr av~ cr i si s whi ch had ~mer g~d by t he end of S~pt ~mb~r l edt o a subt l e but i mpor t ant shi f t i n U. S. pol i cy away f rom t he Br i t -i sh posi t i on on t he oi l i ssue. On Oct ober 10 t he J oi nt Chi ef s ofSt af f appr oved a memo whi ch st at ed t hat " I r an' s or i ent at i ont owar ds t he Uni t ed St at es i n peacet i me and mai nt enance of t heBr i t i sh posi t i on i n t he M ddl e East now t r anscend i n i mport ancet he desi r abi l i t y of suppor t i ng Br i t i sh oi l i nt er est s i n I r an. "s4Thi s memo was subsequent l y adopt ed as of f i ci al U. S. pol i cy by t heNat i onal Secur i t y Counci l . At t h~ same t i me a new appr oach t o t heoi l di sput e r ef l ect i ng t hi s vi ew was pur sued w t h t he Br i t i sh.U. S. of f i c i al s suggest ed t hat a mul t i nat i onal consor t i um be est ab-l i shed t o mar ket I r an' s oi l . Royal Dut ch/ Shel l was suggest ed as apossi bl e l eader of t hi s consor t i um and t her e was t al k t hat U. S.compani es m ght al so par t i ci pat e. A modi f i cat i on of t hi s ar r ange-ment was f i nal l y adopt ed t hr ee year s l at er , af ter Br i t ai n wasexpel l ed f r om I r an and Mossadeq was over t hr own. However , i n Oct o-ber 1951 t he Br i t i sh wer e st i l l hopi ng t o oust Mossadeq and gai n amor e f avor abl e set t l ement . Hence t hey had l i t t l e ent husi asm f ort hi s appr oach. I n any case i t i s doubt f ul t hat Mossadeq woul d haveaccept ed i t . 55

Thr oughout November 1951 t he Uni t ed St at es cont i nued t o opposeef f or t s t o over thr ow Mossadeq, ar gui ng t hat t he onl y al t er nat i ve


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PAGE 139t o hi m woul d be a communi st t akeover . Al t hough t he Br i t i sh cont i n-ued t hei r ef f or t s t o unseat Mossadeq t hey shar ed t hi s concer n. Aj oi nt appr ai sal made by t he t wo embassi es on November 19 st at edt hat " t he i mmedi at e, mut ual and over r i di ng Uni t ed st at es- Uni t edKi ngdom obj ect i ve i n I r an i s t o pr event t hat count ry f al l i ng i nt ocommuni st hands. H56 These f ear s i ncr eased when l ar ge- scal e Tudehdemonst r at i ons br oke out i n ear l y December . Opposi t i on deput i esoccupi ed t he Maj l es bui l di ng, and a New Yor k Ti mes r epor t er wasexpel l ed f r om I r an f or wr i t i ng l i es and i nsul t s about t he gover n-ment . Rumor s ci r cul at ed t hat Mossadeq was about t o sel l oi l t o t heSovi et Uni on. Mossadeq announced t hat ai d f r om t he West woul d onl ybe accept ed on an uncondi t i onal basi s. 57

U. S. pol i cymaker s wer e gr eat l y di st ur bed at t hese event s. Ar epor t i n m d- J anuar y of 1952 expr essed t he f ear t hat I r an m ghtcol l apse w t hi n t hi r t y days. By t he end of t he mont h U. S. of f i -ci al s vi ewed as. "hi ghl y pr obabl e" t he possi bi l i t y t hat Mossadeqwoul d t ur n t o t he Sovi et Uni on f or ai d. ss Br i t i sh of f i ci al s f el tt hat t hei r Amer i can count er par t s had "f al l en compl et el y f orCMossadeq' s) pr opaganda" and wer e "obsessed by t hei r over - r i di ngf ear of communi sm " s9 Feel i ng t hat econom C col l apse was i mm nent ,t he Uni t ed St at es announced on J anuar y 21 t hat t he poi nt 4 ai dpr ogr am i n I r an woul d be gr eat l y expanded. 60 Di s cussi ons on t heI nt er nat i onal Bank pl an. whi ch had begun i n Oct ober . wer e pr essedw t h r enewed vi gor .

Unr est cont i nued i n I r an i n t he f i r st f ew mont hs of 1952. Theseventeent h Maj l es el ect i ons wer e accompani ed by bl oody r i ot s i near l y Febr uar y. The Fedayan- i - I sl am shot and ser i ousl y woundedDeput y Pr i me M ni st er Hossei n Fat em and t hr eat ened t o ki l l Mossa-deq. The Tudeh par t y c ont i nued t o s t age v i o l e nt demons t r at i o ns .I n l at e J anuar y Mossadeq or der ed al l Br i t i sh consul at es cl osed.char gi ng i nt er f er ence i n I ran' s i nt er nal af f ai r s. A di sput eer upt ed w t h t he Uni t ed St at es when Mossadeq r ef used t o accept t he

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