MiJi ---~~

2 Letters

Full Spectrum Operations 4 Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations

Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, U.S. Army, and Major Patrick R. Michaelis, U.S. Army Task Force Baghdad’s campaign plan created the conditions to keep our soldiers safe and our homeland sound.

18 An Organizational Solution for DOD’s Cultural Knowledge Needs Montgomery McFate, Ph.D., J.D., and Andrea Jackson

The United States should develop a specialized organization to produce, collect, and centralize cultural knowledge within the Department of Defense.

Current and Future Warfighting 22 Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

John A. Lynn, Ph.D. Statebuilding, peacekeeping, and counterinsurgency are not military operations other than war; they are war.

28 Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency? Major Lee K. Grubbs, U.S. Army, and Major Michael J. Forsyth, U.S. Army

Is there depth in the nonlinear battlefield? If so, how can planners develop concepts for achieving operational effects that defeat insurgencies?

32 “Stay the Course”: Nine Planning Themes for Stability and Reconstruction Operations Lieutenant Colonel David P. Cavaleri, U.S. Army, Retired

Nine planning themes including legitimacy, security, unity of effort, and commitment apply to stability and reconstruction operations in the Global War on Terrorism.

Latin America 39 Defining Venezuela’s “Bolivarian Revolution”

Harold A. Trinkunas, Ph.D. Venezuela’s foreign relations, particularly its growing closeness to Cuba, Iran, Russia, and China, disturb many in the U.S. foreign policy establishment.

45 The Battle of Darwin-Goose Green Robert S. Bolia

Based on the forces available and commonly accepted military doctrine, Argentina should not have lost the Falklands War so easily.

51 War in Algeria: The French Experience Colonel Gilles Martin, French Army

For the French Army, the end of the war in Algeria was a terrible ordeal, but the Algerian war had at least one benefit: young officers read the stories of their predecessors.

Colonel William M. Darley Vaughn Neeld Consulting EditorsEditor in Chief Supervisory Editor Colonel

Lieutenant Colonel John H. Garabedian Haroldo Assad Carneiro Brazilian Army, Arthur E. Bilodeau Associate EditorLieutenant General Brazilian EditionManaging Editor Nancy MazziaWilliam S. Wallace Lieutenant Colonel Major Chris Lukasevich Books and Features Editor Hugo Alfredo Leonard Commander,

USACAC Editor, Latin American Editions Diana L. Keeler Argentine Army, Hispano-American EditionMajor Jeffrey L. Wingo Editorial Assistant Lieutenant ColonelProduction Manager Winona E. Stroble Edmundo Villaroel

Webmaster Chilean Army, D. M. Giangreco Hispano-American EditionDesign Editor Patricia L. Wilson Secretary

Headquarters, Department of the Army U.S. Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Volume LXXXV — July-August 2005, No. 4

www.leavenworth.army.mil/MILREV milrevweb@leavenworth.army.mil Professional Bulletin 100-05-7/8

Transformation 58 Why Small Brigade Combat Teams Undermine Modularity

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen L. Melton, U.S. Army, Retired Transformation will not achieve its intended objectives if the Army maintains Brigade Combat Teams as they are currently designed.

64 Growing the Iraqi Security ForcesMajor Steven M. Miska, U.S. Army

The U.S. tactical victory in Samarra was the equivalent of giving Iraqi citizens a fish. Building an Iraqi Security Force taught them how to fish.

70 Marketing: An Overlooked Aspect of Information Operations Captain Stoney Trent, U.S. Army, and Captain James L. Doty III, U.S. Army

Information operations are too crucial and complex not to demand the best marketers the United States has to offer.

75 Ultramicro, Nonlethal, and Reversible: Looking Ahead to Military Biotechnology Colonel Guo Ji-Wei, The People’s Liberation Army, China, and Xue-Sen Yang

Biotechnological weapons, superior to conventional weapons, can injure the enemy’s genes or protein structure. Only after obvious wounding will he realize he is under attack.

Guantanamo 79 Defining Success at Guantanamo: By What Measure?

Jeffrey H. Norwitz

84 Generational Differences in Waging Jihad Chief Warrant Officer 3 Sharon Curcio, U.S. Army Reserve

Insights 89 Clausewitz: “On Afghanistan”

Major Frank Sobchak, U.S. Army

92 Fox Conner and Dwight Eisenhower: Mentoring and Application Jerome H. Parker IV

96 Book Reviews

Military Review presents professional information, but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army position and

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LettersRM

Other Services See Dangerous ActionColonel Neal H. Bralley, U.S.

Army, Retired, Lansing, Kansas—I read Major General Robert H.Scales’ article, “Urban Warfare: A Soldier’s View,” in the January-Feb-ruary 2005 Military Review, withinterest. However, I have reserva-tions about several of his assertions. These few statements detract from what began as an excellent articleon an important topic facing oursoldiers in Iraq, today.I agree our infantry soldiers pay a

high cost in combat losses: theirs isa most noble, necessary, and highlydangerous task. However, other sol-diers, sailors, airmen, and Marines die in combat actions, too. Some of these actions in which our service-members have died haven’t neces-sarily been deemed acts of war byour government, but they are withinthe definition of the law of war: theyclearly meet the threshold.On page 10 of his article, Scales

mentions [that] the last major ship-to-ship action was in the Battle ofLeyte Gulf, October 1944. I can listseven instances of U.S. Navy shipsbeing attacked or suffering damage,and in five of these instances, loss of life occurred due to enemy seaaction whether by air, surface, orsub-surface mine attack: USS Liberty, AGTR-5, 8 June

1967 attacked by Israeli aircraft(much debate surrounds the intentof the Israeli armed forces, but it is widely held by many people to havebeen a purposeful attack). Deaths:34 USN sailors. I would assert that these 34 sailors died from enemy airaction. When someone is attackingyour ship with guns, bombs, andtorpedoes, from a combat aircraft,it is very much a hostile action. Thecaptain of the USS Liberty, Com-mander William L. McGonagle,USN, received the Medal of Honor for his actions on 8 June 1967. Servicemembers don’t receive the

Medal of Honor for noncombat actions. USS Pueblo, AGER-2, on 23 Jan-

uary 1968, was intercepted, attacked,and forced into the port of Wonsan,North Korea by North Korean pa-trol boats. The USS Pueblo was in international waters at the time of attack. Deaths: 1, and 82 sailors were imprisoned for 11 months. TheUnited States is still technically atwar with North Korea. USS Stark, FFG-31, on 17 March

1987, was attacked by an IraqiMirage F-1 aircraft which launchedan Exocet missile. Deaths: 37 USN sailors. Considering this attack fol-lowed an attack by two other aircraftearlier the same day on a Cypriottanker, both attacks were hostile acts of war. USS Samuel B. Roberts, FFG-58,

on 14 April 1988, struck a mine re-sulting in the injury of 10 sailors.USS Tripoli, LPH-10, struck a

floating mine on 18 February 1991in the Persian Gulf resulting in sig-nificant damage to the ship.USS Princeton, CG-59, also

struck a submerged mine resultingin multi-million dollar damage to theship and injuries to three sailors.USS Cole, DDG-67, was at-

tacked on 12 October 2000 by twoAl Qaeda terrorists in a small boat filled with explosives. This attack inAden Harbor, Yemen, resulted in 17 deaths and 39 injured sailors. Whilethis attack happened before the 9/11attack, it was clearly a precursor tothe Global War on Terrorism. Al Qaeda had previously at-

tempted to attack the USS Sullivans,DDG-68, on 3 January 2000, butits bomb-carrying boat sank beforebeing able to fulfill its intendedmission. Scales’ assertion about the last

serious air-to-air combat action being in Operation Linebacker IIduring the Vietnam war may betrue. The USAF, USN, and USMC aircraft have recently achieved stun-

ningly favorable air-to-air combatsuccesses; however, they have hadless success against surface-to-airmissile threats. The USAF took seri-ous losses during a ground terroristattack at Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia on 25 June 1996. This attack resulted in the deaths of 19 USAF personnel and injuries num-bered in the hundreds. On page 12, Scales asserts, “The

enemy can hide inside urban struc-tures, but aerial dominance robs him of the ability to move freely andmass.” Within urban areas, particu-larly urban areas having row build-ings, tenements, and large apartmentcomplexes, forces may easily movethrough buildings by blowing holesthrough walls, and they can entersewage systems to move freelywithout any threat of observationby USAF or other aerial platforms.The enemy can mass within citiesmuch more easily than he can inopen terrain.Scales’ comments regarding the

origin of U.S. forces’ small arms,while interesting, has no real bear-ing on urban warfare. U.S. forcesneed weapons that fire reliablyand accurately in all environmen-tal and combat conditions. The Army, the service having Title10 responsibilities for small-armsweapons acquisition, has done wellin keeping effective weapons in thehands of our soldiers. There have been times when our enemies mayhave had a better weapon, but suchevents aren’t limited to just rifles,pistols, or machineguns. Our fieldartillery cannon haven’t always hadthe longest ranges, but our entirefield artillery system of cannons,missiles, ordnance, survey control,fire direction, meteorological data,communication, and target acquisi-tion—all combined is unrivalled. The same is true for many othersystems within our Army and ourArmed Forces. On page 18, Scales makes the

2 July-August 2005 MILITARY REVIEW

LETTERS

statement, “Even the most advanced bombing system cannot kill any ob-ject, even a large one, on the move.”There are missile systems capable ofdestroying large, and even not-so-large, moving targets. Hellfire mis-siles, for example, have been used tokill automobiles and their passengersfrom unmanned aerial vehicles. This may still be a challenging endeavor,but his use of the words “cannot kill any” are not wholly correct. Groundcombatants must make use of everyavailable fire support asset, and thenthey must select the optimal systemfor a particular target. One can easilyget into semantics concerning thefiner points between bombs, mis-siles, rockets, and other weapons.However, U.S. airmen are capableof killing moving targets; it maynot be easy, but it can be done. Infact, field artillery weapons systemsemploying specific munitions, Cop-perhead, for instance, can hit and killmoving targets.I was disappointed in what ap-

peared to be a lack of a “fair andbalanced” joint perspective withinScales’ article. Editor’s note: Bralley used information

from the following sources: ; ; ; ; ; ; .

Understanding versusAppreciating CulturesLieutenant Colonel Alan Farrier,

U.S. Army—I am writing in refer-ence to the “Military Cultural Edu-cation” article in [the] March-April2005 Military Review by ColonelMaxie McFarland. My opinion ismy own and does not represent myemployer or Army Reserve unit,the U.S. Army Civil Affairs andPsychological Operations CommandAirborne. McFarland makes several good

points in his article. The army needsto expand its already formal regionalstudies program to include soldiersoutside the special operations com-munity. Officers should be encour-aged to learn a foreign language,particularly one not normally heard

in the United States. I would add that officer professional develop-ment at the unit level should focus as much time on other cultures as we do OERs [Officer EvaluationReports] and counseling.Unlike McFarland, I would not

“learn more about states or cultures with whom we are most likely toform a coalition or participate ina multinational campaign” [page65]. I think the United States is justas likely to form coalitions withthe usual group (NATO countries,for example) now as it has in thepast. The real challenge is learningabout those countries and cultures the United States rarely comes intocontact with and yet stand as themost likely to be adversarial.That said, I pull up short when

McFarland suggests “culturallyliterate soldiers . . . appreciate andaccept diverse beliefs, appearancesand lifestyles” [page 63], and thatsoldiers and leaders “must appreci-ate, understand, and respect thosenorms . . .” [page 63].I do not appreciate and accept ju-

dicial punishments in some societieswhere flogging and amputation arepart of the cultural or religious norm.Nor can I accept the legitimacy offemale genital mutilation, slavery,or that life is pre-ordained by stonegods, the stars, or tea leaves. Onthe other hand, I do understand that other people think this way. Ido understand that these views are important to some people in somecultures. Knowing and understand-ing, however, are not the same asappreciating and accepting.The reason why our soldiers need

to understand other cultures and languages is so that they can betterserve the mission of their commands and the ultimate objective of armedconflict—winning wars. As soldiers,we are members of the armed serv-ices, not the social services. Has the author forgotten the

words from the Code of Conduct? “I am an American fighting in theforces that guard my country and ourway of life . . . . I will never forgetthat I am an American fighting forfreedom, responsible for my actions,and dedicated to the principles, whichmade my country free. I will trust inmy God and in the United States

of America” (emphasis added). Orperhaps the author should considerthe words of writer Gilbert K. Ches-terton, “Tolerance is the virtue of the man without convictions.”

Effects-Based Operations and theExercise of National Power—A ResponseMajor Bryan Boyce, U.S. Army,

Retired—I only recently read theJanuary-February 2004 article onEBO [Effects-Based Operations]by Army Major David W. Pendall. Iwonder what comments you receivedafter that issue by those [who] musthave felt [that] Pendall’s take onEBO was not at all the EBO that JFCOM [Joint Forces Command]is advocating. The “effects” in EBOare not what blue does to red. This is not a correct understanding or use of“effects-centric” or EBO in general.“Effects” in this usage [is] not creat-ed by blue forces, as described with“effects-based targeting,” rather, ac-cording to JFCOM Effects Planningand Assessment Processes, the keycharacteristics of effects are [that]“they must support the objective. . . , they express a single idea . . . ,they must be achievable . . . , theymust be measurable . . . , they mustbe observable . . . , they are notdescriptions of blue actions or adver-sary motivations . . . , they describehow we want the adversary to act .. . [and] they can also express howwe want to shape the battlespaceto achieve our objectives.” This isa common misperception that con-tinues to be promulgated because itsounds reasonable. According to JFCOM, “effects”

are “the physical and/or behavioralstate of a PMESII [political, military,economic, social, infrastructure, and information] system that resultsfrom a military or nonmilitary ac-tion or set of DIME [diplomatic,information, military, and economic]actions.”

Correction Colonel Kim L. Summers, U.S.

Army, Retired, is an Associate Pro-fessor of Military Art and Science,U.S. Army Command and GeneralStaff College, and Committee Chieffor the Center of Army Tactics.

MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2005 3

Winning the Peace TheRequirement forFull-SpectrumOperations Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, U.S. Army Major Patrick R. Michaelis, U.S. Army

You [military professionals] must know some-thing about strategy and tactics and logistics, butalso economics and politics and diplomacy andhistory. You must know everything you can knowabout military power, and you must also under-stand the limits of military power. You must un-derstand that few of the important problems of ourtime have, in the final analysis, been finally solvedby military power alone.—John F. Kennedy1

FOR THE LAST 3 decades serving as an Armyofficer, the traditional military training modelprepared me to win our Nation’s wars on the plainsof Europe, or the deserts of the Middle East. I en-visioned large, sweeping formations; coordinatingand synchronizing the battlefield functions to createthat “point of penetration;” and rapidly exploitingthe initiative of that penetration to achieve a deci-sive maneuver against the armies that threatenedthe sovereignty of my country. But in Baghdad,that envisioned 3-decade-old concept of realitywas replaced by a far greater sense of purpose andcause. Synchronization and coordination of thebattlespace was not to win the war, but to win thepeace. Penetration did not occur merely throughsynchronization of the battlefield functions, but thatand more: local infrastructure improvement; train-ing of security forces, understanding and educatingthe fundamentals of democracy; creating long-lasting jobs that would carry beyond short-terminfrastructure improvement; and, an informationoperations (IO) campaign that supported the cul-tural realities of the area of operations.The proverbial “point of penetration” for the 1stCavalry Division and the coalition occurred on 30January 2005. Millions of eligible Iraqi citizens,from across the sectarian divides, triumphed overa fractured insurgency and terrorist threat in a showof defiance never before seen across the Middle East. The purple index finger, proudly displayed,became a symbol of defiance and hope. The Iraqipeople proved to the world their willingness to trydemocracy in whatever unique form evolves.

Task Force Baghdad’s campaign to “win thepeace” in Iraq has forced us, as an instrument ofnational power, to change the very nature of what itmeans to fight.2 Although trained in the controlledapplication of combat power, we quickly becamefluent in the controlled application of nationalpower. We witnessed in Baghdad that it was nolonger adequate as a military force to accept classicmilitary modes of thought. Our own mentality of aphased approach to operations boxed our potentialinto neat piles the insurgent and terrorist initiallyexploited.We found that if we concentrated solely onestablishing a large security force and targetedcounterinsurgent combat operations—and onlyafter that was accomplished, worked toward es-tablishing a sustainable infrastructure supportedby a strong government developing a free-marketsystem—we would have waited too long. Theoutcome of a sequential plan allowed insurgentleaders to gain a competitive advantage throughsolidifying the psychological and structural supportof the populace.Further, those who viewed the attainment of security solely as a function of military actionalone were mistaken. A gun on every street cor-ner, although visually appealing, provides only ashort-term solution and does not equate to long-term security grounded in a democratic process.Our observation was born not from idealism, but because it creates the essence of true security, pro-tecting not only our soldiers, but Iraq, the region,and, consequently, our homeland.On 3 August 2004, following a tenuous cease-fire agreement between Task Force Baghdad andthe forces of Muqtada Al Sadr in Shi’a-dominatedSadr City, over 18,000 city residents went to workfor the first time earning sustaining wages byrebuilding the decrepit infrastructure that charac-terized the 6- by 8-kilometer overpopulated arealocated on the northeast corner of Baghdad.For the first time, visible signs of the futureemerged with clear movement toward a function-

July-August 2005 MILITARY REVIEW 4

FULL SPECTRUM OPS

ing sewage system, a functioning fresh watersystem, electricity being wired to every house,and trash being picked up out of the streets. Thoseperforming the projects were residents from SadrCity. The extraordinary effort by the leaders andsoldiers of Task Force Baghdad to synchronizethe elements needed to implement the “first mile”projects within Sadr City were to pay big dividendsnot only to the people of Sadr City, but to the forceprotection of the soldiers of Task Force Baghdad.But on 5 August 2004, 72 hours after an entirecity had been mobilized to improve their infrastruc-ture, Muqtada Al Sadr’s forces attacked. He brokethe fragile 6-week-old cease fire and mounted anoffensive against coalition forces.The jobs in the northern two-thirds of Sadr Citystopped. The repair to infrastructure stopped. Thequestion is: why?Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B),Task Force Baghdad, at its zenith a 39,000-sol-dier, 62-battalion coalition task force centered in and around Baghdad, conducted a relief in placewith the 1st Armored Division on 15 April 2004.This relief in place was midstride of an unforeseen11-day-old multiparty insurgent uprising that leftmany soldiers injured or killed and rocked thefoundation of Task Force Baghdad’s campaign toachieve decisive results in the influential center of gravity of Iraq.But the task force, through adherence to an over-all thematically based commander’s intent, main-tained orientation on a well-founded operationalcampaign plan balanced across five integrated con-ceptual lines of operations (LOOs). Each LOO wastied to a robust IO capability (equating to a sixthLOO), moving incrementally and cumulativelytoward decisively accomplishing the ultimate goalof shifting Baghdad away from instability and afertile recruiting ground for insurgents, to a thriv-ing modern city encompassing one-third of Iraq’spopulation. Baghdad had to be secure not onlyin its sense of self-preservation, but its economicfuture had to be led by a legitimate governmentthat radiated democratic ideals across Iraq. Thisarticle examines Task Force Baghdad’s approachand methodology in implementing full-spectrumoperations. Operational Art in an Urban Environment–BaghdadWith the mass migration of humanity to citiesand the inability of developing nations to keepabreast of basic city services relative to growth,discontent erupts. Such conditions create advanta-geous conditions ripe for fundamentalist ideologuerecruitment.

Baghdad, a city about the size of Chicago inpopulation density, and Austin, Texas, in landmass,divided through the center by the Tigris River, is,like many overpopulated yet underdeveloped cit-ies, subdivided into neighborhoods with distinctdemographic divergences, reliant on a social sys-tem of governance based on tribal and religiousaffiliations, and interconnected by modern linesof communications and technology. The neglectby Saddam Hussein and the gray period followinginitial coalition combat operations created those“ripe” conditions in Baghdad.

The Demographic BattlespaceIn accurately defining the contextual and cul-tural population of the task force battlespace, itbecame rapidly apparent that we needed to de-velop a keen understanding of demographics aswell as the cultural intricacies that drive the Iraqipopulation.3 Although tactically distinct in scope,density, and challenges, we operationally dividedthe populace into three categories that help definethe battlespace: anti-Iraqi forces, supporters, andfence-sitters. Anti-Iraqi forces. The first group defined asinsurgents (and terrorists) were those who cannotbe changed, who cannot be influenced, and who,although politically and ethnically different inscope, had essentially the same desired endstate—to perceptually de-legitimize the current IraqiGovernment and drive a wedge between the Iraqipopulace and coalition forces.4 Through forcing ademonstration of the inability of the governmentto bring security, projects, hope, and prosperity tothe city of Baghdad and greater Iraq and increas-ing the psychological distance between coalitionforces and the Iraqi populace through increasedlimited use of force, they turn the populace toaccept their message.5 Their aim is disruption forpolitical gain; their organization is cellular basedand organized crime-like in terms of its rapid abil-ity to take advantage of tactical and operationalgaps. Iraqi insurgents take full advantage of theArab Bedouin-based tribal culture so importantto understanding the battlespace. They target thedisenfranchised neighborhoods that see little to noprogress, recruiting from those who see, throughthe insurgent, basic services being fulfilled, societalleadership, safety being provided, and ultimately,direction given.When the insurgent achieves his goal, themethods of resistance among the populace take aspectrum of forms ranging from avoidance to sym-pathetic obliviousness or passing of information todirect attacks against coalition forces. Intimidationof the people, in particular, those who work for the

MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2005 5

coalition, public sector employees, and governmentofficials is a technique used quite effectively. Theinsurgents are small in relative size and cellular indesign operating normally off of intent, but theireffect can and does achieve tactical and operationalsignificance. It takes few insurgents specificallytargeting a small group of select individuals toachieve resonance across a large portion of thepopulation.In an effort to describe the effect, a corollarywould be the effect the D.C. Sniper had on theCapital and Nation in 2002. Fear gripped the cityand the Nation, producing a paralysis that had aquantifiable effect on the economy. Every whitevan was suspect. People feared stopping at gas sta-tions and parking at retail establishments becausethey could be the next victims. Multiply this100-fold and you can understand the effect androle anti-Iraqi forces have from an intimidationperspective on the populace.What made our challenge completely differentfrom any other our military has endured is theunique variable of international terrorism. Terror-ist aims do not lie with the interests of the Iraqipopulace but, rather, global objectives played outon the world stage through manipulation of mediaand the resonance associated with a “spectacularevent.” Direct-action killing or capturing the terroristwas (and is) the only option to immediately miti-gate their strategic effect. We also chose an indi-rect approach, through co-option of the populaceusing information operations, to deny the terroristphysical and psychological sanctuary in an effortto thwart their objectives.Supporters. The second demographic consistedof supporters who represented the coalition forcebase of support throughout neighborhoods, districts,and the government. The supporters see the futureof Iraq through cooperation with the currently estab-lished Iraqi Government and coalition forces. Thereality is that, when queried, most supporters pre-ferred the removal of coalition forces from Bagh-dad and Iraq, but they simultaneously recognizedthe relative importance of the security provided andthe flow of funding from these contributing nationsto the short- and long-term future of Iraq.While a large majority of Iraqis do not like thepresence of coalition forces, during a February2005 Baghdad survey, the question was posed asto when coalition forces should leave Iraq. In theTask Force Baghdad area of operations, 72 per-cent of those polled stated that only after certainsecurity and economic conditions were met wouldit be appropriate for coalition forces to leave.This clearly demonstrated to the task force that

although the Iraqi populace inherently did not likethe presence of coalition forces in their country,they understood the value of that presence andthe need to first establish certain conditions before withdrawal began.Fence-sitters. Finally, we had those on theproverbial fence. We considered the fence-sittersas the operational center of gravity for both TaskForce Baghdad and insurgent forces. They arethe bulk of the populace, and they are waiting todecide who will get their support. From the intel-ligentsia to the poor and uneducated who havelittle or no hope, the fence-sitters are waiting onclear signs of progress and direction before castingtheir support.The fence-sitters become the base from which power is derived. Strong evidence exists that sug-gests Muqtada Al Sadr’s attacks against coalitionforces in early August 2004 were initiated becauseof the visible signs of progress manifested by thenumber of projects and local labor force hires thatthreatened his scope of power and ability to recruitfighters within the Shi’a population.Insurgents can clearly influence the fence-sit-ters by attacking visible symbols of governmentservices and provoking government repression,both of which discredit the legitimacy of the gov-ernment. In a further demonstration of potency,the insurgents then step in and provide a shadow government.6 In one example, insurgents attacked electricaldistribution nodes outside the city of Baghdad andseverely limited the already overworked electricalgrid, knowing the Iraqi populace abhorred attackson infrastructure. The insurgents deftly placedblame for the “lack of power” squarely on theimpotence of the fledgling Iraqi Government andsupporting coalition forces, citing the historicaltruth of power always being available under theSaddam regime.7 During the coordinated insurgent uprising inApril 2004, Muqtada Al Sadr, as one of his firstacts, gained control of the electrical substationsin Sadr City. By providing uninterrupted power,something not seen since the fall of Saddam Hus-sein, he was able to sway support. A shadow gov-ernment able to provide services, with governanceby religious decree and enforcement by Shariacourts, Muqtada Al Sadr was able to provide aviable, attractive alternative to the coalition. To-gether, the Iraqi Government and the coalition mustsend clear signals of their own, directly targetingthose waiting for direction through a full-spectrumcampaign that mitigates the insurgent base withvisible and tangible signs of progress within alegitimate context.

July-August 2005 MILITARY REVIEW 6

Full Spectrum Information Operations End State: A secure

and stable L environment for Iraqis, E maintained

G by indigenous police and I security

forces under T the direction I of a

legitimateM national governmentA that is freely C elected and

acceptsY economic pluralism.

FULL SPECTRUM OPS

operations. What also becameclear was that the traditional phased approach, grounded in

COMBAT OPERATIONS U.S. doctrine, might not be theanswer; rather, an event-driven “transitional” approach might

TRAIN & EMPLOY SECURITY FORCES be more appropriate based ona robust set of metrics and analysis.9

ESSENTIAL SERVICES Combat operations. Combat operations, the foundation ofour skill set, was oriented on

PROMOTE GOVERNANCE targeting, defeating, and deny-ing influence to the insurgentbase throughout the area of

ECONOMIC PLURALISM responsibility through lethal useof force. Precision analysis ofinsurgent networks, logistics, fi-

Figure 1. Full Spectrum Operations nancing, and support, integrated

Right or wrong, the fence-sitters (and the popu-lation as a whole) believe that because America puta man on the moon, it can do anything—and do itquickly. When we fail to produce because of lackof authority, shortage of resources, or bureaucraticinefficiencies, they believe it is because we, as acoalition, do not want to fix it. Therefore the alter-native becomes clear. From Task Force Baghdad’s perspective it wasclear: shape operations for decisive results byoptimizing the support of those who see throughthe coalition a future; kill, capture, or disrupt theinsurgents and terrorists by denying influence andsanctuary; and, finally, decisively engage the opera-tional center of gravity for insurgents and coalitionforces—those on the fence—through promotionof essential infrastructure services; establishing acapable, legitimate government; and creating op-portunities for economic independence through afree market system.

The Balanced Approach: Full-Spectrum OperationsTackling the task of executing multiple opera-tional themes into a full campaign plan, the taskforce defined through contemporary, historical,cultural, and doctrinal analysis and through ob-servation and collaboration with the 1st Armored Division, critical conceptual lines of operationsoriented on truly demonstrating in Baghdad, as thecoalition center of gravity, viable results to achievethe campaign objective.8 What became clear to the task force during mission analysis and missionpreparation was that to achieve the operational goalthe task force had to simultaneously work alongall five equally balanced, interconnected lines of

with tactical human intelligence and national-level collection and exploitation as-sets, helped shape the effect desired by disruptinginsurgent and terrorist capabilities across the taskforce. The tenaciousness of U.S. soldiers in taking thefight to the enemy cannot be emphasized enough.One hundred sixty-nine soldiers from the taskforce lost their lives, and over 1,900 were seriouslyinjured in moving Baghdad toward sovereignty.But even in the execution of combat operations,they balanced the effect across the other lines ofoperations and cultural empathy. Understandingthe role of our actions through the eyes of thepopulace was a critical planning, preparation, andexecution factor. Train and employ Iraqi security forces (mili-tary and police). The migration of training andequipping foreign internal security forces from theunconventional to the conventional force presentedchallenges and opportunities to task force leaders.Following the April 2004 uprisings, the task forcehad to create a police force of about 13,000 menand a military security force approaching two bri-gades, and provide the requisite staff and resourcesto assume areas of responsibility. The task forcethen had to integrate these forces into planning andexecuting full-spectrum operations.10 Over 500,000 hours of dedicated training byan embedded advisory staff, who lived, ate, andtrained with the Iraqi Army, resulted in over 3,000Iraqi missions executed independent of coalitionpresence in and around Baghdad. This critical stepin the progress toward establishing full indepen-dence was accomplished through a robust advisorysystem where the division embedded over 70 full-time military advisory teams per Iraqi battalion

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AIF Terrorist

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Gov’t /Coalition

AIFTerrorist

AIF Terrorist

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Coalition

D

over the course of the deployment. Resourceddown to the platoon level, the advisers leveragedthe cultural importance of relationships to the Arabpeople to build trust and rapport and to create mo-mentum toward a truly professional military force.These forces were trained to conduct counterinsur-gency operations 24 hours a day, as opposed to theculturally desirable strike-force model.A critical step toward validation of this trainingand equipping strategy (which continues today)manifested itself through transfer of authority oflarge swaths of the most contentious neighbor-hoods of downtown Baghdad to an Iraqi Armybrigade in early February 2005.11 Under the watch-ful eye of task force leaders, the brigade operatedas an integral team member contributing to thebattlespace situational understanding through in-tegration into the task force C2 system.In addition to training and equipping Iraqi Armyforces, the task force also conducted task trainingand resourced the Iraqi Police Service (IPS).12 Al-though still lacking in sheer numbers and through-put for training (basic estimate is that about 23,000are needed to properly police the streets of Bagh-dad), the symbolic and practical importance of arobust police force to the people of Baghdad wasabundantly clear: 72 percent of the local populacestated there was a direct correlation between their sense of security and the presence of the IPS.13 One of the challenges associated with trainingand equipping the Iraqi Police Service centered onthe Ministry of Interior’s view toward applicationof police forces. There have always been traditionalMiddle East tensions between defense and interior ministries, and Iraq is no different. If given leeway,the propensity is to establish police “strike forces”that conduct blitz operations rather than operateas the “cop on the beat.” Although coalition vet-ting and recruitment of Iraqi police throughout thedeployment was on par to Startingachieving the level needed Conditions

-1% Three Constituencies to support a city of from 6 5% to 7 million, the reality wasthat many of those recruits,after graduating from one ofthe two academies, were si-phoned off to support strike-force operations or into an al-ready over-populated policebureaucracy. This practiceseverely hindered the desiredneed of the Baghdad popu-lace for established local se-

extent, the Iraqi Police Service, both of which existwithin an Arab-style chain of command, opera-tionally under task force control yet subject to thewhims of the ministries who own them, presentednumerous leadership and engagement challengesfor those tasked with overwatch. The previous two LOOs (Combat Operationsand Train and Equip Iraqi Security Forces) are twomissions that we, as a military force, are extremelycomfortable conducting. Our training and doctrinereinforce the simple, direct-action approach to ac-complishing military objectives. With a firm graspof the complexity of the Arab culture and the valueplaced on extreme concepts of “honor above all,”the task force concluded that erosion of enemyinfluence through direct action and training ofIraqi security forces only led to one confirmable conclusion—you ultimately pushed those on thefence into the insurgent category rather than thesupporter category. In effect, you offered no viablealternative. Kinetic operations would provide thedefinable short-term wins we are comfortable with as an Army but, ultimately, would be our undoing.In the best case, we would cause the insurgency togrow. In the worst case, although we would neverlose a tactical or operational engagement, the mi-gration of fence-sitters to the insurgent cause wouldbe so pronounced the coalition loss in soldiers andsupport would reach unacceptable levels.To understand how this limited view of op-erations will never contribute to a total solution, it is important to understand that the Arab andIraqi culture is grounded in extreme concepts ofthe importance of honor above all, so much sothat “lying” to defend one’s honor is a culturalnorm—something that we, with our Western valueset, cannot comprehend, is accepted.One prime example that demonstrates this con-cept, which has been repeated numerous times over

Best Worst Case Case

(Option 1) V

15%

On the COMBAT OPERATIONS Fence

On the TRAIN & EMPLOY SECURITY FORCES Fence

curity. The complexity ofmanaging and resourcing the Figure 2. The Three Constituencies – Option 1 Iraqi Army and, to a greater Percentages are for illustrative purposes only and do not constitute the size of opposition.

July-August 2005 MILITARY REVIEW 8

~I

FULL SPECTRUM OPS How You Breed Insurgents

Enemy Activity Sadr Cells

Cell 1 Cell 2 Cell 3 Cell 4 Cell 5 Cell 6

Power Distribution Sewage

3 hours on / 3 hours off Raw Sewage 2 hours on / 4 hours off

Figure 3.

Sadr City is an example of the direct correlation between enemy actions against Coalition forces and lack of basic services.

the last 12+ months, occurred in the southern Al the potential exists to grow many more if culturalRasheed district of Baghdad. In May 2004, on the mitigation is not practiced. If there is nothing elsedeath of approximately 100 potential IPS recruits done other than kill bad guys and train others toat a police station targeted by terrorists using a car kill bad guys, the only thing accomplished is mov-laden with explosives, an amazing thing happened: ing more people from the fence to the insurgent on the following day there were over 300 potential category—there remains no opportunity to growrecruits standing tall, ready to join the Iraqi Police the supporter base.Service—not out of nationalistic feelings, but to Cultural awareness and an empathetic under-“honor those who have fallen.” Tribal, religious, standing of the impact of Western actions on aand familial honor drove a new batch of recruits to Middle East society were constantly at the forefrontdefend the honor of those killed—and this was not of all operational considerations, regardless of thean isolated occurrence. This clear understanding of complexity. Clearly, traditional methods of achiev-cultural norms directly applied to our actions when ing ends in Baghdad, as the Iraqi center of gravity, planning, preparing, and executing all operations. were severely lacking. The situation was muchWe operated many times on limited intelligence more complex. The task force could win engage-in order to defeat insurgent activity and exercised ments by killing or capturing an insurgent emplac-extreme moral judgment when targeting potential ing an improvised explosive device, and it couldinsurgent sanctuary. By integrating the Iraqi Police win battles by targeting, disrupting, and killing offService and Iraqi Army into all of these operations, insurgent cells. But it could only win the campaignwe put Iraqis front and center as a clear indica- if the local populace revealed insurgent and terror-tor that Iraq is in charge of Iraq. But the cultural ist cells and, accordingly, denied sanctuary.reality is that no matter what the outcome of a Cultural awareness and understanding how combat operation, for every insurgent put down, insurgents gain support from the center of gravity

MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2005 9

LocalJobs

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became the important campaign consideration. positive options through clear improvement inFrom this, the task force adopted the next three quality of life.nontraditional lines of operation to achieve sustain- The division dedicated the expertise of the engi-able gains across Baghdad and greater Iraq. neer corps (enhanced by a robust preparation phaseEssential services. When U.S. forces liberated of training with the Texas cities of Austin andBaghdad, it was a city with virtually no traditional- Killeen) and established a cooperative effort withly functional city services, although there had been the University of Baghdad to identify, fund, andfar-reaching plans dating back to the early 1980s work with local government officials, contractors,to update decrepit city services (relative to pro- the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Agencyjected growth). But Saddam Hussein’s orientation for International Development (USAID) to provideon Iran during the 1980s and Kuwait during the the essential services critical to demonstratingearly 1990s, followed by U.N.-imposed economic those visible first-mile signs of progress in areassanctions and his propensity to build self-serving most likely to produce insurgent activity.14 monolithic creations to himself, caused Baghdad Most of the task force commander’s actions to become a city lacking basic services even as the were weighted toward shaping funding to supportpopulation grew. the tactical commander’s desired infrastructure-As the “first among equals” line of operation, repair effort. The U.N. had estimated the total billopportunities for direct infusion of visible and for rebuilding the infrastructure of Iraq at abouttangible signs of progress with repair (or creation) $60 billion. In late 2003, the administration signedof basic first-mile city services through use of local into law an $18.4 billion supplemental dedicatedcontractors and labor (creating jobs) became a criti- to infrastructure improvement for Iraq. The dis-cal component of the task force campaign plan to tribution of monies was heavily weighted towarddeny the insurgent a base of support, thereby lead- large capital projects, such as landfills, sewage anding to enhanced force protection. Creating symbols water treatment plants, and electrical-generationof true progress by establishing basic local services plants, and relied on other donor nations to fundand providing employment within neighborhoods projects that connected large-capital projects toripe for insurgent recruitment directly attacked the local neighborhoods.insurgent base of support. The failure for these funds to be immediatelyThe task force’s understanding of the importance provided created the need to reprogram portionsof establishing essential city services came from of the $18.4 billion supplemental to affect theanalysis of enemy actions in relation to current in- immediate signs of progress at the local level, orfrastructure. Cell congregations, red zones, and an- what we considered the “first mile.” Concentratingticoalition, antigovernment religious rhetoric origi- on local-level infrastructure repair led to an abruptnated from those areas of Baghdad characterized realization of the complex interconnectedness by low electrical distribution, sewage running raw through “What have you done for us in the last 12 months?” – An Iraqi Voice the streets, little to no potable Visible water distribution, and no solid Progress waste pickup. Concurrently,

Homesunemployment rates rocketedin these extremely impover- Street Lines ished areas and health care was almost nonexistent. A direct Neighborhood Lines correlation existed between the level of local infrastructure

City Line Rstatus, unemployment figures, I and attacks on U.S. soldiers. V The findings were an epiphany E

Rto the task force—this was Eventual Sewage about force protection. These Treatment Facility (Temporary were breeding grounds for anti- (Long term solution) Solution)

SupplementalIraqi forces. The choice was to Fundingcontinue to attrit through direct Visible Sewer+Water+Electricity+Garbage Deny Insurgent action or shape the populace Progress f Local ( ) InfluenceEmployment+Governance = to deny sanctuary to the insur-

gents by giving the populace Figure 4. The First Mile.

July-August 2005 MILITARY REVIEW 10

and balancing act of maintaining a functioning

sults across the most desperate areas of Baghdad,

(Below) The sudden emergence of large numbers of infrastructure rebuilding jobs when funding came available denied the insurgents their power base in Sadr City. (Inset) The accounting office of Baghdad’s southeastern landfils distributes pay to its workers, July 2004.

city system. Sewage, water, electricity, and solidwaste removal all exist below the noise level of normal city life.15 In reality, there is a vast city-planning effort that keeps services flowing andbalanced. Many areas of Baghdad never had thesebasic services to begin with. This compoundedthe dilapidated nature of the already existing butun-maintained and un-synchronized systems. If solid waste was not removed, it would clog thesewage lines, which would back up and taint thewater supply. Further, that same sewage wouldprobably have no place to go if the sewage lift sta-tions were not working because the electrical gridwas not functioning. Large swaths of Baghdadwere left with raw sewage running freely throughthe streets, piles of garbage, a polluted water sys-tem (where there was any at all), and intermittentelectricity.The restructuring effort of already programmedfunding moved swiftly to effect immediate local re-

MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2005

FULL SPECTRUM OPS

US

Air

Forc

e

US

Arm

y

coupled with hiring local labor. This effort achieveda two-pronged result: it provided a job alternativeto the locals who had no job, and it produced vis-ible signs of progress in their neighborhoods. Earn-ing from $5 to $7 a day to feed your family becamea viable alternative to $300 a month, payable at theend of the month, to fire rocket-propelled grenadesat U.S. forces. And, there is no sewage runningthrough the streets of your neighborhood.In Al Rasheed, a capital-level project became alocal labor success. In building the southern Bagh-dad landfill, we saw a hiring opportunity. Insteadof using advanced machinery to dig the landfill,employing a minimal number of workers, the taskforce worked closely with the firm designated tomanage the project to mobilize the local economy.Working through local tribal leaders, the projecthired up to 4,000 local laborers at from $5 to $7per day, using handheld tools, to help create the landfill. This meant that the approximately 4,000

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Sadr City SIGACTS surgents and the fence-sitters.It created another option, andit gave hope. Across Bagh-dad, infrastructure repair be-

A direct correlation emerged came the immediate impact between funding, when it be-came available to employ Sadr theme that set conditions for City residents near the end of long-term security. 2004, and a steep decline in the number of terrorist incidents Will Muqtada Al Sadr or occurring in the same area. his lieutenants attack again?

Probably. But the support forthe attacks will be waning atbest and will not last if infra-structure improvements con-tinue and progress is matchedalongside the other LOOs.He will have to go elsewhereto find true support. The people just will not support Figure 5.

Some level of criminal activity will always exist, so not all a resumption of large-scale can be attributed to AIF/MM incidents.

people, who on average supported a household offrom 10 to 15 people, factoring in the additional0.5 more service-oriented jobs per job created aseconomists proclaim, potentially took out of theinsurgent base a pool of about 60,000 men.It took another 10 weeks of intense fighting tobring Muqtada’s forces to the concession table inSadr City. By the time he conceded, he had dugdeep into the well of the local populace for a fight-ing force. Average approximate ages of fighters had sunk to 13-15 years.But rather than 6 weeks to completely mobilizeand begin local-level infrastructure projects, the di-vision had prepared by coordinating with local- andnational-level contractors, local government, andthe U.S. mission to implement an event-driven planthat would have up and running, within 72 hoursof a cease-fire being implemented, over 22,000jobs oriented on local infrastructure repair withinthe most lacking areas of the city that correlatedto the power base of Muqtada’s lieutenants. Thequickness of execution and the visible infrastruc-ture projects that were immediately recognized bythe local populace took away the power base fromthe insurgents.The task force had given the populace anotheroption. During the 10-week period of fighting fromearly August to mid-October 2004, attacks againstthe coalition topped out at 160 a week. From theweek following the cease-fire until the present,they averaged fewer than 10.In mid-February 2005, over 200,000 residents ofSadr City awoke to the first running water systemthe city had ever seen. Built by local labor, the sys-tem created a psychological divide between the in-

violence in the face of clear signs of progress.

Governance. Integral to infrastructure improve-ment was the promotion of both the legitimacyand capacity of the Iraqi Government to govern onbehalf of the populace. The government’s ability to“secure and provide” targeted the shadow-govern-ment attempts of the insurgent.In Baghdad, tribal and religious influences dateback thousands of years and are coupled with thesubjugation of the Iraqi populace over the previous35 years and the inherent Middle East culture ofcorruption (by Western standards). Each presenteda unique set of challenges in educating and tran-sitioning to a government reliant on democraticideals. The method set in motion to create an ability forthe local and national government to govern andto develop legitimacy within the eyes of Iraqi citi-zens, was through reinforcement of the CoalitionProvisional Authority-emplaced neighborhood,district, and city advisory councils. Project fundingprovided by the $18.4 billion supplemental wasconditionally approved by local government rep-resentatives as part of a full-fledged effort to forcelegitimacy and build local government capacitywith assistance and guidance from the coalitionand the U.S. mission in handling the administrationof government.Advisory assistance from the task force inter-nally created the governance support team (GST).Under the leadership of the division’s chief engi-neer, and created from an array of city planningand contracting expertise within the task force,the GST provided the connecting tissue betweenthe U.S. mission; nongovernmental organizations(NGOs); task force leaders; and local, city, and

July-August 2005 MILITARY REVIEW 12

FULL SPECTRUM OPS

The 1st Cavalry Division and Baghdad government restored the Abu Nuwas Park along the Tigris River in order to demonstrate a return to normalcy in the city and spur business activity in the area, August 2004.

US

Arm

y

national Iraqi Government entities. The Amanatand Baghdad Governate were forced to expand todevelop the capacity to manage and resource theproject process, subsequently developing legiti-macy in the eyes of the populace.16 All levels of command were intimately involvedin educating and mentoring the emerging Iraqifederalist-based, democratic system. In manyinstances there was a degree of unlearning thatneeded to occur. Although the population despisedthe rule of law under Saddam Hussein, it was the only model they knew, and they were prone to fallinto patterns of governance reminiscent of thatregime. Careful structuring, checks and balances,training, and funding help instill democratic, ratherthan autocratic, ideals. Economic pluralism. We cannot create a sustained economic model by creating essentialservice jobs alone—these last only as long as thecontract is open, and although they create spinoff,they are not enough to promote a mature economy.This line of operation—economic pluralism—withthe previous four, is the most sequential in termsof execution. We created “economic incubators” in each neighborhood, with heavy investmentin goods and services where we helped provide(through coordination with the government) thephysical space, funding, and education on how tocreate a business plan. We brought together thosewho needed loans with those who gave loans and

located spaces where businesses could be situated.In this manner, we launched the process of creatingthe conditions for a true free market. Most large metropolitan areas are concernedwith bringing in investment and opportunity by“gentrifying” city centers and creating businessparks. One example of successful investment wasAbu Nuwas, a district of Baghdad along the TigrisRiver across from the International Zone. The area, formerly a park district, was closed by SaddamHussein in the 1990s and later used as a forward operating base during Operation Iraqi Freedom I.The mayor of Baghdad asked for help in restoringAbu Nuwas as a symbol of the return of Baghdadto normalcy. His secondary goal was to use thearea as an incubator for business generation. Thedivision, coupled with the local Iraqi Government,began restoring the park, which resulted in someamazing consequences. Within the first monthof restoration, local fish restaurants and markets began to populate areas adjacent to the riversidepark, which sparked other service-oriented busi-ness endeavors to spring up in support of the parkand local restaurants. This one example of an in-cubator was a model in helping create conditionsfor long-term growth across all neighborhoods inBaghdad.Another example is the agricultural facet ofthe Iraqi economy. Our estimate was that the areaaround Baghdad, if resourced and irrigated, could

MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2005 13

AIF Terrorist

Supportthe Gov’t / Coalition

Full Spectrum Information Operations AIF

Terrorist

Support

the

Gov’t /Coalition

easily feed all of Iraq. But Three Constituencies Startingthe antiquated farming meth- Conditions (Option 2) ods were only providing for

-1% .5%25 percent of the country’s needs, forcing imports of On the Combat Operations most foodstuffs. Although Fence the $18.4 billion Iraqi sup-plemental did not provide On the

Fence Train & Employ Iraqi Security Forces for any agricultural improve-ments, we were able to im-port, through reprogrammed Restoration/Improvement of Essential Services funding, over 2,000 tons ofgrain, fertilizer, and feed.Immunizations, coupled with Promote Governance Legitimate National Government rejuvenating the irrigationapparatus around Baghdad,created conditions for eco- Economic Pluralism nomic independence.Promoting economic plu-ralism by working closelywith NGOs and through the Figure 6. The Three Constituencies – Option 2 local government’s identi- Percentages are for illustrative purposes only and do not constitute the size of opposition. fication of potential areasof exploitation (simultaneously working toward coupled with aggressive counterinsurgent op-achieving the objective for the governance LOO, erations and training and equipping Baghdad’slegitimizing their purpose) and basic business prac- police and security force, produced an integrated,tices and methods, we helped local and city gov- synergistic approach to accomplishing objectivesernments create business centers and warehouse within the Task Force Baghdad Campaign Plan. Wedistricts and develop the capacity for the city to restructured the staffing functions and headquarterssustain economic development with limited foreign to achieve a capacity that equally weighted eachinvestment well beyond our departure. line of operation against the other. The importanceOne of the looming indicators of economic of an economic engagement could trump a combatprogress (and the inability of the fledgling gov- engagement if it was deemed more important toernment to keep pace) was the length of the wait achieving the division’s ultimate campaign objec-at gas pumps. There were only about 109 gas sta- tive. This became an education process across thetions within Baghdad, and normally, only a fourth division in mentally shifting from that which weto a half of the pumps were actually operational were comfortable with (combat operations andat any one time. Lines of people waiting for fuel training) to a far broader set of critical tasks.were relatively short in the early stages of the task A robust set of measures of effectiveness, relyingforce campaign, but by the time we conducted our on the Balanced-Scorecard approach, allowed therelief-in-place with the 3d Infantry Division, wait- division to gauge, through each line of operation,ing lines had grown to unmanageable lengths and whether we were meeting campaign objectives or,people were waiting for hours to purchase fuel. based on environmental reality, needed to shift orParadoxically, the increase in wait times was a change to reflect current reality. This allowed apositive sign of economic growth: it indicated that transitional rather than a phased approach to thethe purchasing power of the common Iraqi had campaign plan that allowed nontraditional ap-grown. Conversely, it was a troubling sign that the proaches to campaign accomplishment to have theIraqi-controlled distribution mechanisms could not same weight as traditional methodologies.keep pace with growth. The result was long lines Information operations. A significant realityand an entrepreneurial (or contraband) system of of the task force campaign is that it is fought ongas being sold on the street. the local, national, and international stages. TheWe tracked closely the price of goods and actions of soldiers and leaders and their efforts on services throughout Baghdad and looked hard at the ground can resonate at a strategic level in an in-average wages. If there was a demand for higher stant. Shaping the message and tying that messagewages based on basic supply and demand, it was to operations is as important, if not more so, to thea definite sign of economic progress. desired individual effect as the previous five linesThe last three lines of operations—essential of operations. Understanding the effect of opera-services, governance, and economic pluralism— tions as seen through the lens of the Iraqi culture

July-August 2005 MILITARY REVIEW 14

FULL SPECTRUM OPS

and psyche is a foremost planning considerationfor every operation.The speed of understanding the media cycle isas important at the local level as it is on a globalscale. On the night before the successful electionsof 30 January 2005, a crudely fabricated rocketlanded in the international zone, killing two U.S.citizens. The news rapidly moved across the medialandscape and created an impression of instabilitytoward the election within Baghdad, greater Iraq,and the world at large. (From our polling data weknew over 90 percent of Baghdad’s citizens gottheir news about the election from television.)Moving swiftly and using targeting-patternanalysis, the task force was in the right place atthe right time to observe the launch of the rocketson tape. Detaining the insurgents, quickly declas-sifying the footage, and releasing it to the mediaoutlets within hours of the event helped calm localand global fears—an IO event that leveraged asuccessful combat operation through integration ofthe public affairs apparatus designed to counteractthe exact effect the insurgents were attempting toachieve. In many ways, the manifestation of the five linesof operations by enhancing information operationsbecame the indirect approach to targeting the ter-rorist threat. We knew visible signs of progress,an understanding of the uniqueness of governancethrough democracy and a federalist system, andthe creation of jobs in concert with training Iraqisecurity forces and directly combating insurgentactivity could in essence reduce and freeze insur-gent influence and recruitment by creating an irre-versible momentum. But, only through co-optionof the people of Baghdad and Iraq could we defeatthe international terrorist threat. Through use of our IO venues we not only radi-ated the accomplishments of the fledgling IraqiGovernment but also provided causal proof of theinability of the Iraqi populace to move forwardtoward democracy because of terrorist actions.In addition, we provided an anonymous venue togive information to the coalition through whichto directly target terrorist, insurgent, and criminalactivity in the face of intimidation.17 The full spectrum of information operationswithin the task force ranged from consequencemanagement before and after conducting directaction to the education of the intricate complexitiesof a democracy, local safety announcements, andinfrastructure status, to a Command Information Program. What was the message? How would itbe received? How can we influence and shape themessage to support the action? And vice versa:how can we influence and shape the action to sup-port the message?To target the operational center of gravity, infor-

mation operations, in concert with actions, rose to alevel of importance never before deemed necessary,and it was well known that the insurgents knewthe value of an information operation executedat the right opportunity. Unless coalition-initiatedprojects were methodically thought through andpublicized, insurgents would claim credit for theresults, using posters, graffiti, or even sermons toinform the people they were the ones responsiblefor improvements.

Our Changing Role from an Operational PerspectiveIt is no longer sufficient to think in purely ki-netic terms. Executing traditionally focused com-bat operations and concentrating on training localsecurity forces works, but only for the short term.In the long term, doing so hinders true progressand, in reality, promotes the growth of insurgentforces working against campaign objectives. It isa lopsided approach.The reality is that there are cultural mechanisms atplay that demand a more integrated plan. No longeris it acceptable to think sequentially through stabilityoperations and support operations by believing thatif you first establish the security environment, youcan work sequentially toward establishing criticalinfrastructure and governmental legitimacy thendrive toward economic independence.From an organizational perspective, the Armyhas successfully created the most modern, effec-tive set of systems for rapid execution of combatoperations on the planet. We can achieve immedi-ate effects through command and control of ourorganic systems. What we have not been able to dois create the systems and processes to execute thenonlethal side as effortlessly as combat operations.Our own regulations, bureaucratic processes, staffrelationships, and culture complicate the ability ofour soldiers and leaders to achieve synchronizednonlethal effects across the battlespace. Our tra-ditional training model, still shuddering from theecho of our Cold War mentality, has infused ourorganization to think in only kinetic terms. Thisdemands new modalities of thinking and a renewedsense of importance to the education of our officer corps.Critical thinking, professionally grounded in thecontrolled application of violence, yet exposed toa broad array of expertise not normally consideredas a part of traditional military functions, will helpcreate the capacity to rapidly shift cognitively to anew environment. We must create an organizationbuilt for change, beginning with the education ofour officer corps.Our strategic environment has forever changed.It demands a realignment of the critical tasksneeded to be successful as a military force. Those

MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2005 15

I I

I - I

I “ I ”

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G LACKS CAPAC TY TO GOVERN

MNF FA L URE TO DEL VER

SF RUSH TO FA LURE

ALIENATION OF RAQPEOPLE

INFORMA

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O ERAT

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critical tasks must be matched to how we execute the tools of national power from a structural andcultural perspective.The move toward modularity is of prime im-portance to the future of our force, yet advocatingradical surgery to mission requirements might notbe the optimal solution. The 1st Cavalry Divisionwas able to rapidly make the change from a tradi-tional armored force and focus quickly on a newenvironment because of the adaptability of soldiersand leaders who had developed the necessaryleader skills and team comfort based on trainingfewer, rather than more, training tasks. Concernarises when you diffuse the valuable, nonreturnableresource of time by increasing the number of tasksto be trained. In the case of an uncertain future, less might be more.From the perspective of asset allocation, thissame move toward modularity, without consider-ing its full effects, could hinder the immediateoperational resource needs of a unit of employment(UEx) headquarters. The full-spectrum campaignapproach forces the imperative of achieving bal-ance across multiple lines of operations. This pre-dictably will cause shifts in the main effort, but theforce multipliers, traditionally located at the divi-sion (now the UEx), are no longer readily availableand, instead, are committed Unit of Action (UA)assets. The friction of reallocation through missionanalysis then slows the tempo needed to achieveoperational balance.Our joint doctrine requires phased operations,which leads us to believe there is and always willbe a distinct demarcation between major combatoperations and stability operations. It would behelpful if the insurgents and terrorists we encounterwould follow the same doctrine, but they have notin Iraq, and they will not in the future. Transitional

indicators associated with the full spectrum of op-erations weighed against a campaign plan tailoredfor the environment might be a better method ofconflict evolution. We should consider paraphras-ing Clausewitz: full-spectrum operations are thecontinuation of major combat operations by other means. This campaign’s outcome, as the outcomes offuture similar endeavors will be, was determined by the level of adaptation displayed and the intensepreparation by the small-unit leader. Field gradeand general officers became a supporting cast whoexisted to provide guidance and to resource theneeds of small-unit leaders. Whether it was money,training, intelligence, or access to information in ausable format, our junior leaders could win engage-ments that, collectively, could offset the goals ofadversaries who were comfortable operating withinour decision cycle based on their flat organizationalstructure and communications methods. Even our own C2 systems and process, orientedon providing clarity above, had to be turned upsidedown to focus on providing the tip of the spear withthe information and actionable knowledge neededto determine the best course of action within the commander’s intent, guidance, rules of engage-ment, and law of land warfare. Doing this was ef-fective in mitigating and offsetting—on a collectivescale—the consequences of our own anachronisticcultural hierarchy against the networked, flat, viralnature of insurgents and terrorists.Although arming small-unit leaders with knowl-edge so they can determine the right course of ac-tion is the correct procedure, there was rarely (ifever) one decisive operation that would unequivo-cally shift the currents of change toward certainvictory. Rather, it was the net effect of many mi-crodecisive actions performed along all intercon-

nected lines of operation thatleft the indelible mark of true progress. Transition along theSimultaneous vs. PROMOTE ESSENTIAL interconnected lines of opera-tions began with acknowledg-

GOVERNANCE SERVICESSequential Effect SECURE

BAGHDAD ing that it was a battle with

COMBAT ECONOMIC OPERATIONS PLURALISM multiple indicators and mul-

IRAQI SECURITY

COERCIVE tiple conceptual fronts. FORCES A decisive, exhilarating Outcome

LEGITIMATE

“win” along one of the lines of operations would only create a salient to be predictably eroded

COMBAT OPERATIONS

IRAQI ECONOMIC by the insurgent. The broad

collection of small, decisive

SECURITY FORCES PLURALISM

SECURE BAGHDAD

PROMOTE

victories along all the lines ofGOVERNANCE

Those on the Fence

Outcome IRAQI

operations, supporting eachother in a delicate balance of perception and purpose, wouldmove the campaign towardFigure 7. The Lopsided Approach. positive results.

July-August 2005 MILITARY REVIEW 16

FULL SPECTRUM OPS

The campaign plan executed by Task ForceBaghdad created the conditions to keep our sol-diers safe and our homeland sound. Although wetrain and are comfortable executing wide sweepsthrough the desert, warfare as we know it haschanged. The demographic progression towardlarge urban areas and the inability of local gov-ernments to keep abreast of basic services breedscesspools for fundamentalist ideologues to takeadvantage of the disenfranchised. Using our eco-nomic strength as an instrument of national powerbalances the process of achieving long-term, sus-tainable success.

ExploitationThe election of 30 January 2005 was the “pointof penetration” in accomplishing U.S. objectivesin Iraq. Accurately expressing in words alone theculmination of emotions that rippled throughoutTask Force Baghdad that incredible day is simplyimpossible. Every soldier in the task force whowitnessed democracy in action will forever lookat the simple act of voting in a different way. But,as I reflect on the last year, I am concerned aboutthe “exploitation” phase through the shaping andimmediate targeting of the remaining funds associ-ated with the $18.4 billion supplemental and otherdonor-nation contributions. How you target that funding is just as important as getting the fund-ing. Within Task Force Baghdad, we were still short funding of approximately $400 million to

accomplish what was needed to achieve the same effect encountered in Sadr City, Haifa Street, Al Rasheed, Al Soweib, and other areas across all of Baghdad to completely isolate insurgent influence. Many people question why a military force isconcerned with infrastructure repair, governance,and economic pluralism: why not rely on the state,USAID, and NGOs? It comes down to a simpleanswer of capacity relative to the situation. TheU.S. military is built to create secure conditions.But true long-term security does not come fromthe end of a gun in this culture; it comes from abalanced application of all five lines of operationswithin a robust IO apparatus.It is easy to advocate a lopsided approach ofphysical security before infusing projects, eco-nomic incentives, and governance for short-termpolitical gain or bureaucratic positioning. But trueprogress, in the face of an insurgent threat thatdoes not recognize spans of control or legalisticprecedence (yet takes advantages of those sameinefficiencies of organizations designed for anotherera), should be weighed against accomplishing themission and protecting the force by using a morebalanced, full-spectrum, transitional approach.It is time we recognize with renewed clarity thewords of President Kennedy, who understood “thatfew of the important problems of our time have, inthe final analysis, been finally solved by militarypower alone.”18 MR

NOTES 1. President John F. Kennedy (remarks to the graduating class of the U.S. Naval Strategy into Action (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School, 1 September 1996).

Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 7 June 1961), on-line at , accessed 18 July 2005. to track and update multiple LOO-specific metrics as a way to analytically gauge by

2. Mayor Tamimmi, discussion with MG Peter W. Chiarelli, Abu Nuwas District, LOO where the task force lay along the spectrum of operational success criteria. Baghdad, July 2004. 10. Iraqi Armed Forces work for the Minister of Defense; Iraqi Police Service works

3. During the deployment to Baghdad, over 22,000 soldiers went through training for the Minister of Interior. on cultural awareness, which became an integral part of any operation. During the 11. As of February 2005, there were seven operational Iraqi Army battalions and ramp-up to Ramadan, the division enacted a full-spectrum command information one Iraqi Army brigade under the operational control of the U.S. task force brigade. operations campaign to create understanding and empathy for the religious event. The task force used a building-block approach, coupling a robust adviser team with

4. Bard O’Neil, Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare each element, using U.S. mission-essential task list assessments to track progress (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s Inc., 1990). O’Neil defines categories of insurgents across and skill-set-specific command post exercises to attain proficiency. seven objectives: anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, 12. In January 2005, the Iraqi National Guard was renamed the Iraqi Army by the and preservationist. When talking of insurgents, we run the spectrum from anarchist Iraqi Interim Government. to pluralist. The current foreign terrorist element in Iraq can be characterized through 13. Task Force Baghdad resourced the Baghdad city-wide survey, January 2005. an anarchist objective. Anarchists do not necessarily fit the traditional description of 14. The task force prepared to become fluent in these unmilitary-like tasks by insurgent as we discuss them. Although in size and scope they are relatively small, studying the complexity of managing a large southern U.S. city. We examined how the effects they achieve resonate on a strategic scale. a city plans, prepares, and executes the services we consider “a right” rather than a

5. A clear example of limited use of force is the vehicle-borne improvised explosive privilege. We laid those plans on top of a fully functional model of the cultural norms device, or suicide car bomb. Limited use causes citywide suspicion. Coalition forces are of the Arab people, the current status of Baghdad services and government, and the forced to interact with the Iraqi populace from a defensive posture, effectively driving networked strategy and actions of the insurgent and terrorist influence. a psychological wedge between the people and the protectors. 15. The task force also concentrated on hospitals, schools, communications, and

6. O’Neil, 82. emergency response networks. 7. Saddam Hussein routed all power in Iraq toward the capital. During the early 16. Amanat is the title of the Baghdad city hall.

days of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), equity became the mantra across 17. The division established a TIPS hotline through the local cell-phone network Iraq, cutting back normally accepted electrical expectations across Baghdad. to allow anonymous reporting. The IO campaign to support this had a refrig-

8. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern- erator-magnet effect ubiquitous to the entire population: it was always there in the ment Printing Office [GPO], 2001), 5-33. background.

9. Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, The Balanced Scorecard: Translating 18. Ibid, Kennedy.

Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, U.S. Army, is the commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division. He received a B.S. in political science from Seattle University, an M.P.A. from University of Washington, and an M.A. in national security strategy from Salva Regina University; and he is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the National War College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States (CONUS), Germany, Belgium, and Iraq. Major Patrick R. Michaelis, U.S. Army, is the operations officer of the 1st Squadron, 7th U.S. Cavalry,

1st Cavalry Division. He received a B.A. in history from Texas A&M University, an M.P.A. from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, and is a graduate of CGSC. He has served in various command and staff positions in CONUS, Germany, Bosnia, and Iraq.

MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2005 17

AnOrganizationalSolutionforDOD’sCultural KnowledgeNeeds Montgomery McFate, Ph.D., J.D., andAndrea Jackson

OVER THE PAST few years, the need for cul-tural and social knowledge has been increas-ingly recognized within the armed services and legislative branch. While much of this knowledge is available inside and outside the government, there is no systematic way to access or coordinate information from these sources. We can mitigate this gap quickly and effectively by developing a specialized organization within the Department of Defense (DOD) to produce, collect, and centralize cultural knowledge, which will have utility for policy development and military operations.

Know Your EnemyRecently, policymakers, combatant command-ers, Soldiers, and Marines have been calling for cultural knowledge of the adversary. In July 2004,Proceedings published retired Major General Robert Scales’ article “Culture-Centric Warfare,” which expresses his view that the conflict in Iraq requires “an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and their motivation.”1 Simi-larly, the 2005 “Defense Language Transforma-tion Roadmap” notes that “[l]anguage skill and regional expertise are not valued as Defense core competencies yet they are as important as critical weapon systems.”2 Although a number of institutions within the military community design and run programs with a cultural knowledge component, the programs are dispersed, underfunded, or not easily accessible to military commanders and policymakers from all agencies and services.3 The result is widespread confusion about how to gain access to needed in-formation and resources and a subsequent reliance on informal means of gaining information, such as discussions with taxi drivers about public opinion in their country of origin. The Defense Science Board’s (DSB’s) 2004 “Summer Study on Transition to and from Hos-

tilities” contains a number of recommendations for collecting, compiling, and sustaining cultural knowledge and notes that this requires an attention span far longer than the short-term focus common among today’s collectors and users of information. The DSB suggests the creation of a National Cen-ter for Contingency Support, to be organized as a federally funded research and development corpo-ration, which would have country and functional expertise to support contingency planning and joint interagency task forces. The DSB also suggests that regional combatant commanders (RCC) establish offices for regional expertise outreach to support country and regional planning and operations. The proposed RCC offices would maintain close working relations with country teams, regional centers, U.S. and foreign academia, think tanks, and so on.4

Pressing ConcernsAlthough the DSB’s suggestions are excel-lent, they do not adequately address a number of needs within the defense community. Creating an organization solely dedicated to contingency task force support would not serve the ongoing needs of policymakers and Office of the Secretary of Defense permanent staffs who also require cul-tural and social information. Decentralized offices located at the RCC level will lead to a duplica-tion of resources and effort, and a combination of contingency support and expertise dispersed at the RCC level would not address— • Ethnographic field research. • Cultural training. • Advisers. • Programmatic applications. • Analytic studies.Ethnographic field research. While some for-eign area expertise exists within the military com-munity, many of these cultural-knowledge resourc-

July-August 2005 MILITARY REVIEW 18

US Arm

y

es are inadequate. Over the past 40 years, social

the field with living human beings. For example,

CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE

1st Cavalry officer discusses civil military operations initiatives in Kabul, December 2002.

science research has not been a priority within the defense science and technology research portfolio. As a result, individual researchers have selected their own areas of study, often based on intellectual whims and the vagaries of philanthropic funding. Thus, academic research is often not available for specific areas of interest, such as Al Anbar or Di-yala provinces in Iraq, or research used to support the military is often outdated. For example, Task Force 121 used British 19th-century northwest-frontier anthropology to prepare for Afghanistan. Also, using intelligence assets to collect this type of information is not sufficient, since they lack the requisite training and skills. Furthermore, the ob-jective of the intelligence-collection process often concerns targeting and orders of battle as opposed to understanding a complex social system.Cultural training. Currently, cultural training within the military is generally not operationally relevant. For cultural training to have any value, Soldiers and Marines must be able to employ it in

MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2005

while many cultural-training programs note that Iraqis value honor, this knowledge is useless un-less soldiers know how to confer it, on whom, and when. Much so-called cultural-awareness training is not specific or local in focus and is often conducted on a train-the-trainer basis. The consequence of a lack of training (or inadequate training) is a misunderstanding that can complicate operations.Advisers. Operational commanders frequently identify an urgent need to understand local culture, politics, social structure, and economics. Lacking access to this type of expertise, other staff mem-bers, such as the information operations officer, the S5/G5, and the intelligence officer, must act as de facto cultural advisers. (Only rarely can com-manders engage a foreign area officer [FAO] as an adviser since this is not a FAO’s official role.) Because the officer corps generally lacks skills in anthropological field work, political science, sociology, development economics, and area

19

Background• Understanding human terrain critical to de-feating adversary • No organization currently exists within U.S. military focused on social science research and tools that offers training, planning, and operational utility

Goals • Conduct on-the-ground research in Iraq and

Afghanistan• Produce training products and courses • Populate analytical frameworks

• Prove the importance of social science research methodologies to operations • Establish center of excellence and staff of social scientists to perform operationally relevant social science research • Provide advice on the development of TTPs, SOPs, doctrine, and PME

Description• Establish prototype Office for Operational Cultural Knowledge • Staff of 75–combination of contractor and GS • Pilot should include these projects:• Iraq and Afghanistan Training Programs • Cultural Preparation of the Environment (CPE)

Schedule and Cost • Initial prototype of CPE will be completed 1 June 2005 • Update of Iraq Training Program $2.75 million • Afghanistan Training Program $2.75 million • Field testing of CPE for Diyala and population of Mosul AOR: $1.5 million

TIME FRAME: 1 September 2005–1 September 2006 TOTAL COST: Year 1: $6.5 million

Figure 1. Pilot proposal: Office for Operational Cultural Knowledge

studies, commanders must muddle through withinadequate—and sometimes wrong—information.This skills gap is particularly acute at the battalionlevel and below, where much of the interaction between the U.S. military and the populationactually occurs. Until changes in the professionalmilitary education (PME) system can fill this gap,commanders would benefit from cultural advis-ers who can identify legitimate leaders and theinterests of the population in the area in question;