military review, november 1960

7/28/2019 Military Review, November 1960

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ILIT R Y ~ REVIE" .

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Review EDITOR IN\:1CHIEF

COL KENNETH E. LAY, INF ASSISTANT EDITOR

I.T COL JERRY G. WALLACE, ARMORFEATURES EDITOR

LT COL CLEO S. FREED, ARMOR SPANISH-Al\IERICAN EDITION

Editor LT COL C. BETANCES-RAMIREZ, INF Assistunt Editors

l\1AJ JUAN R. MELENDEZ, INF CAPT ANTONIO BUDET, INF

BHAZILIAN EDITION Editor

LT COL ALBERTO DE A. CARDOSO, INF Assistant Editor

MAJ MAURicIO FELIX DA SIl.VA, ARTY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

CWO W-4 T. H. GUFFAIN, USA PRODUC1'ION OFFICER LT COL LoUIS RUlZ, CMLC

STAFF ARTIST CHARLES A. MOORE

,

MISSION.The MILITARY REVIEW, official:pUblication of the United StatesArmy and the United States

Army Command and General StaffCollege, disseminates modem military thought and C)lrrent Armydoctrine concerning command andstaff procedures of the division andhigher echelons and provides aforl}m for articles which" stimulatemilitary thinking. Authors, civilianand military alike, are encouragedto submit articles which will assistin the fulfillment 6f this mission.

'I

POLICY.Unless otherwise indicated, theviews expressed in the original ilrticles in this magazine are those

of the individual authors and not.those of the Department of theArmy or the United States ArmyCommand and General Staff College.

Editor.

;REVIEW-Publi.hed monthly by J : .S. AI".,i::Qmmand 'and General Staff College. F a l ~ Lenv.KansM, in English, Spanb.h. and pbJttugues \ co,\dwcJaas postage pnid at Fort LcaVCnWOl"th, ..

r a t ~ s : $3.50 (US currenoy1- a - ~ y e n the- United States. United Stutes military llostand those countries which nre members of tlle". n ..Amtlri('nn Postal Union (including Spain):n year in all other countries. Address 6ubscrlptionf,d\1n to the Book Department, U. S. Army ComGenel'al Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. K a ~ ' a ~ . . '


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MILITARY REVIEW, VOLUME XL NOVEMBER 1960 . NUMBER 8

CONTENTS Guerrilla Warfare in the UkraineEnrique Martinez CodaLRRP and Nuclear Target Acquisition _________ .___________ 15

Lieutei1:ant Cdlonel Andrew J. DeGraff, ArmorThe Petersburg Crater and Nuclear Weapons _ ' ___ ' ___ __ 22 ) Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Case, Transportation CorpsTwilight War ___ . ________ - - - . __ . _______ . __________ . ____ 28

Colonel Robert B. Rigg, ArmorThe Armed Might of Red China _ _ _ 33 Major Edga1' 0'Ballance, British Army (TA)Battle Is His Business ______ _________ . _______ . ____ . _ 43 Master Se1'geant Forrest K. Kleinman, United States ArmyThe Mutual Weapons Development Program ____ 48 Lieutenant Colonel George W. McIntyre, ArmorThe View From the Bottom ______ . ___ . 55 Elihu RoseIf You Don't Like the Mess ___ . ___ 61

Colonel Lynn D. Smith, Infantry MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD 68 MILITARY DIGESTS _________________________ _ _______________ . 78

Man, the Principal Force' in War-A Soviet View ________ 79 The Morale of the Soldier in War. ___________ . _._____ 85 Human Relations in Military Societies __ . _________ . _____ .__ . 91 Occupation Can Be an Advantage! _____________________ . 98 Artillery in Mobile Combat .__________________________ 102

BOOKS OF INTEREST TO THE MILITARY READER _ 107


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WARFARE IN THE UKRAINEEnrique Martfnez Codo'

:E perversion of historical fact toSoviet propaganda ends is no

than in stuc9.es concerningoperations behina the German

The Soviets would havebelieve that al l guerrillas, and particoperating in the Ukraine,Communist and that they fought un

control against the Germans.Western writers, relying on the ac

of abundant Soviet, informationhave cultivated the

the Soviet propahave planted the seeds of dis

emphasis, and halfOf such ingredients the military

of "General" Khrushchev isI t is true that Red guerrillas were ac

the Ukraine. But they were mostlyof the regular forces which thescattered during the first few

of the war or they were specialparachuted behind the German

Their actions were of little consethe years 1941-44.

Fonner Ukrainian guerrillas nowliviug in A rgentina furnished the in-101'matioll on which Malt{nez CodDbased his rcportorial article. The natm'e 01 all guerrilla wal'fal'c and thel IrNI to "afegnal'/ 80m'ces COnllCctcdwith thi8 Nationalist movement lor{I'udom and independence imposc& limits on the documentation normally evi-denl in the MILITARY REVIEW. Altho1lgh . . 'the UTcminian strnggle f01' independence so far in this century has notsucceeded, it is impOl'tant to recognizethat clements of the movcment whichM U)tlnez Coda describe.. could 801ne-day become an active f01'ce, in anywol'ld con/lict.-Edit01. l't "The Ukrainian people never backed the

Soviet guerrillas. They were not only antiCommunist but also anti-Russian by tradition. The Ukrainians fought both theGerman Army, of occupation and the Soviet guerrillas who attempted to operatein their country.

U R r ~ i n i a n Guerrilla Army continues to ~ a r r y on actfve propagandathe event of a fll-

war" this force could lead the way to Ukrainian independence,
http:///reader/full/stuc9.eshttp:///reader/full/stuc9.es


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MILITARY REVIEW NOVEMBER 1960

This was a natural consequencll of thehistory. The Ukraine had de

its independence from Russia inin 1920 was subjugated by the

d Army. Since then, various secretanti-Communist movementsoperated with the objective of liber

from Soviet rule.Thus, because of a well-defined patriotic

nd political feeling, it was not astonishng that the Ukrainian people welcomedhe German troops as liberators whenin\ftlded Russia on,22 June 1941. Noras it a strange circumstance that the

German penetration and the largst encirclements took place in Ukrainian

Soldiers of Uhainian nationality in theul1its defending the Ukrainiandeserted in large numbers at the

of the approaching German Armies,had no desire to fight in defense

f the regime imposed on them. Entireby their Jommanding offi

surrendered without firing a singleIn the great Battle' of Kiev alone,in September 1941, more than 675,0 men, a large proportion of which wereto the Germans.

After the Battle of Kiev, the GermansMarshal Kryvonos, Commander of

Region of Kiev, and 17 offiof his general staff dead. Ukrainian

believe they were shot by the(Soviet Secret Police) on the susthat they were Ukrainian Nation

to surrender the entire armyto the Germans.

Nightingale BattalionThe German High Command (OKH),

of the nationalistic feelings amonghe Ukrainian people, created a sP!lcial

Enrique Martinez Cod6 is a civilianliving in Buenos Aires. He i8he edito)' of Manual de Informaciones,publication of the Intelligenceof the Argentine Army, and ofLibre, independent magazinein Buen08 Aires.

unit called the .Nightingale Battalionmanned by Ukrainian Nationalists. TheGerman political administration, however,always in disagreement with the GermanArmy authorities, bungled this mutualunderstanding which would have gainedfor Hitler the collaboration of a countryof 40 million inhabitants and, more im-portant, the security of his rear area.

General Heinz Guderian confirms in hisMemoirs the favorable reception tenderedthe Germans by the Ukr.ainians and thesubsequent deterioration of the good relations between the two, when he says:

It is a pity that the friendly attitudeof the Ukl-ainian people toward the GCl'-mans lasted only llnde)' the benevolentmilitm'y administration. The so-called'Reich Commissars' did a good job i)l de-stroying in a short time the f)'iendlll attitude of the Ukrail1ia1!s toward the Germans, and prepared the ground for the)'cbeZ 0 ) ' partisan slruggle.

On 30 June 1941, scarcely one week after the invasion started, the Ukrainianpeople liberated the city of Lvov and announced over the 'radio the restoration oftheir national independence. This surprised the German politicians who ordere!lthat the members of the recently formedUkrainian national government be arrested and confined in val'ious concentration camps.

This action served as a warning thatthe German "liberatol's" were not I goingto recognize their independence-'--theywel'e merely new oppressors.

Thus, in 1941 the first anti-Germanguerrilla bands were formed and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists cameinto being. Finally, on 14 October 1942the small detachments of guerrilla fighters were organized under one single command, tak;ing the name of UkJ-ainskaPovstancha A I'In ia (UPA), UkrainianGuerrilla Army.

The Ukrainian resistance movement hadthe following missions:


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NORTHERN REGION .O

SOUTHERN ~ ~ ~ ]REGION ,

INDEPENDENT _.OPERATIONAL BROUPSEASTERN REGION

WESTERN REGION

AcrUAlBORDERLIMITS

) ! UKRAINIAN ZONES UNDERr' ........... . I " 1 ~ \ THE CONTROL OF THE(' O,\KU"U UKRA1.NIAN GUERRilLA ARMY IN 1944

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-",.......1OONETS Io(D O N ~- ~ l Y l ~ "':'")

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MILITARY REVIEW NOVEMBER 19601. To organize politically and militarily the mass of the Ukrainian population,

and reorient them to oppose the new invader. , , )2. To organize a network of revolu

tionary fDrces in the Ukraine and instructthem in anti-Grman sabotage idisDbedience to German .orders and instruction inself-defense against the Gestapo).3. To .organize campaigns against theforced employment of laborers in Germanagriculture and industry.

4. To organize activities tD preventgrain exports to Germany and tD instructthe people in how to hide provisions, clothing, and other goods frDm the Germanrequisitioning patrols.

5 .. TD .organize an information and propaganda campaign to expose the true purposes .of the Nazis and Bolsheviki in theUkl'Qine.

6. To organize schools to teach clandestine resistance procedures to political andmilitary leaders.

7. To collect arms, ammunition, andother military equipment tD be used bythe future Ukrainian armed forces.8. To clear the Ukrainian territory ofBolshevik secret agents, who under various guises were able to join the Germanagencies, including the Gestapo, to helpthe Germans destroy the Ukrainian resistance.Reinforced by the transfer of membersfrDm the police forces of the principalUkrainian cities and other SDurces, theUPA promptly acquired an unexpectedcapability for combat action. Numerouscontingents of Ukrainian troops whichhad deserted the Red Army joined theUPA, as well as contingents from .othertraditionally anti-Communist nationalities,such as Georgians, Tartars, Azerbaijani,and Turki.

The German reaction was not slow inappearing. In the spring of 1943 bloodybattles were fought in ' the vicinities ofSarny, Stolyn, and Volodymirz, in al l ofwhich the UPA succeeded in disrupting

the German suppDrt .organizations. Vio-lent guerrilla attacks followed against theconcentratiDn camps of Kremenets, Dubno, KDvel, Lutsk, and Kyvertsi, which reosuIted in the liberation of political prisan.ers who promptly joined and strengthenedthe guerrilla ranks.By the summer .of 1943 the anti-Germancampaign was in full swing. The GermanscDntrolled .only the large cities and largemilitary installatiDns. Even stronglyguarded German movements were re-stricted to daytime and were always vul-nerable tD sabotage and direct attack fromguerrillas.

The Ukrainian people accepted the UPAgovernment and supported it actively andvoluntarily with money and goods.

Notable AccomplishmentsIn May 11)43 the Ukrainian g u e l ' l ' l l l a ~

ambushed and killed the German SA Com-mander Victor Lutze and his escort, anincident which the German press playeddown referring to it as a "traffic accident."During 1943 the Ukrainian guerrillasfought successfully in a series of pitchedbattles. At Volyn in July 1943 an attackof a mixed German-Hungarian divisionwas repelled successfully by guerrillas.In May 1944 a German division wasforced tD retreat after a battle in theChDrny Lis (Black Forest) regiDn of theStanislav province. In July 1944 the guerrillas repelied the attack of two Germandivisions against UPA positions at Lo-pata Hill. A 10-day fight, frDm 6 to 16July, between Skole and Bolejiv, climaxedthis series of battles and resulted in heavylosses to the attacking German-Hungarian division.

From this moment .on, in view of thecrumbling German front in Russia, theGermans changed their political tacticsand sought to co(}rdinate anti-Soviet ac-tions with the Up;A. However, the UPArejected such negotiations. The Germanplan failed, and the anti-Getman periodof the Ukrainian guerrilla war ended. It


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7GUERRILLA WARFARE,l,N THE UKRAINEthat during this period

there was little activity of Redthe Ukl'aine, because theas well as the UPA, had

them out of the region.The most serious Red guerrilla attemptpenetrate the Ukrainian region wasunder the leadership of the Soviet

complete annihilation. Only 700 men sUcceeded in escaping from the UPA attacks.They returned to the Soviet lines ex-hausted and unable to gain sympathizersamong the Ukrainian people.

UPA Organization in 1944By the end of the German occupation -tj

it is estimated that the UPA had aboutGENERAL ORGANIZATION OF THE UKRAINIAN GUERRILLA ARMY-1944

BUKOVINAYOLYN KAMENETS PODOLSKI KRIVOI ROGVINNITSA ODESSAKREMENCHUGKIEVUMANCRIMEA

rOLESIE ZHITOMIR GALITZIA DONETSKIEV (PROVINCE) CARPATHIAN UKRAINE ONEPROPETROVSKKHARKOV

GI G2 G3 G4 G, G6Figure 2.

after crossing the Pripetand headed toward Galitzia withof reaching the Carpathian

But the village militia ande regular units of the UPA pursuedd harassed them to the p'oint of almost

200,000 armed guerrillas organized inunits assigned to ' four territorial operational regions and to a series of independent operational groups. (See Figure 2,)These regions were: The Northern Region, comprising the


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MILITARY REVIEW NOVEMBER, 196frof Polesie and the northern part

f the Volyn province. The Southern Region, formed by thepart of Bukovina and the prov

of Kamenets Podolski and Vinnitsa. The "Eastern Region, formed by theforest sectors of Kiev and Zhi

The Western Region, the best orof all, comprising the provincesf Galitzia and the Carpathian Ukraine

(sectors of Lvov, Ternopol, Stanislav,Drogobych, 'Przemysl, Lemand Jolm) .

The independent operational groupson their activities with success inhe Donets River Basin, in Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, Krivoi Rog, Odessa,

remenchug, the city of Kiev, Uman, andcities and in the Crimean

eninsula.Each region was subdivided into mili

districts, each consisting of a deermined number of guerrillas formed in

C battalions, and regiments.The tactical operational unit was theOnly in special situations would

three or four companies unite to form aattalion, or two or three battalions to

form a regiment. Battalions and regiments were formed only on personal or

the commander of the militarywho would generally assume comthe larger unit_ thus formed. Thecable and competent company com

anders were assigned as battalion comanders.Only in exceptional defensive situations

the battalions allowed to join onheir own accord if it was not possible

or the consent of the disrict commander. This wa.s rare becausehe command posts of the military disricts were mobile and were continuously

the situation where dangeras the greatest.The company organization (Figure 3)

rigid, but generally followed onethese two types:

1. The light type company c01l?istingof 168 men armed with rifles, light machineguns,' submachineguns, hand grenades, and demolition materia1s. Its prillcipal mission was to effect hit-and-runraids. When an engagement against tankswas anticipated, the companies were l'einforced with antitank rifle (panzel'busche43, 88-mm bazooka) teams and antitankbazooka teams."l'he company was organized in the triangular system (three platoons. of threesquads each) but "he strength of thesqualls was flexible. The rifle platoonswere equipped with 50-mm l i f ~ t mortars.

2. The heal'Y type company consisted ofabout 186 men, its organization also following the triangular concept. The armament was similar to the light company,but it was reinforced by a three-pieceheavy machinegun platoon, and a threepiece 82-mm mortar platoon. The missions'of these companies were the attack of important areas, the defense of certain objectives, and open battle against enernyforces. I iJMounted guerrillas fought in the Northern Region. They formed special heavysquadrons sometimes equipped with Iig-htartillery.

Artillery was used only on rare occasions and then almost never organically.for the cannon constituted a great hazardfor the guerrilla fighter. I t is a heavycrew-served weapon whose characteristicsof employment, even for the light mountain type, are not readily adaptable togueiTilla 'Yarfare. The gun fixes the guerrilla fightrer activities, minimizes theirmobility and speed, and, unless it is ofthe mountain type, ties the fighters to theroads, giving the enemy a chance forpursuit.

The guerrilla fighter, tied to this crewserved weapon, cannot keep close tab onthe situation and is not aware of dangeruntil it is too late to avoid defeat. Thishappened to the Communist guerrillas under General Kovpak in their fight against


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9

THREE'PIECEHEAVY

MACHINfGUNPLATOON PLATOON

GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE UKRAINE

TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS OF THE INFANTRY-GUERRilLA COMPANIES OF THE UKRAINIAN GUERRILLA ARMY-1944

TOTAL: 168 MEN

THE RIFLE PLAtOON WAS 0RGANIZED FOLLOWING THE TRIANGULAR CONCEPT, THREE SQUADS OF 12 TO 15 MEN

TOTAL 186 MEN

Figure 3.

UPA forces. Guerrillas preferred morand made good use of so-called "po

artillery." Groups of infantry-the enemy guns ande tl,1em against their former owners in

captured gunsretained were used only in theof strong points and to train theartillerymen in the use of the

I t is evident that had recoilless riflesavailable at that time they wouldthe "art,illery of the guerrillas."

The seizure of weapons and ammunitionwas a permanent objective of the Ukrain.ian guerrillas, inasmuch as they had nooutside help whatsoever and depended entirely on their own resources. Thus, during the German occupation period (194144) the German weapons and those oftheir allies were Widely used by the UPA.During the Soviet occupation period,starting in mid-1944, they used Russianweapons almost exclusively.

In addition to the units already described, which might be called "regular"

The UPA forces considered light auto-suited to guerrilla tacpopular among these was

its easy han-and firepower which made it the

The standard hand gre-the German' and Soviet Armies,as those manufactured by the

favoriteThe efficient German panzer

and the panzeybllsche 43 were usep,as a 'variety of antitank mines.The source of armament for these forcess the German and Soviet arsenalsraids and major engagements.

within the irregularity of guerrilla organizations, selfdefense detachments orvillage militia existed for the protectionof small towns and villages. They wereparticularly effective at night againstGerman and Soviet foraging parties andraids. This technique, which arose spontaneously in the Ukraine, also had 'beimpracticed in China during the Japaneseoccupation, and later appeared in Indochina between the French and the Vietnamese. Thus, the "regular" UPA ttoopswere something like the Indochinese Chll-lie, while the Ukrainian village militiawas similar to the Dan-Quan of Vietnam.

The Commander in Chief of the UPA


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MILITARY REVIEWas assisted by a general staff with an

section, intelligence section, orand personnel section, logistics

military instruction section, andinstruction secticn. (See Figure

)The operations sectlOll planned tactical

them by meansf general instructions or concrete or

del's; planned and directed the politicallyand strategically important raids; evaluated the general situation; and preparedmilitary maps and sketches. Officers of

section were attached to each regionalcommand so they could develop the plans

f action on the ground, and, at the _samedirect local large-scale operations.When the mission required the commitment of p e r s o ~ n e l of other regional commands, the orl\anization and direction ofthe forces was a responsibil ity of thegeneral staff.

The intelligence seclio had over-all diof the intelligence and counterin

telligence effort. The collection of information was of primary importance forthe movement of the guerrillas. The guerrillas had the backing of the civilian population in these operations. The intelligence system was so effective that as soonas the German troops and Soviet guerrillas sta'rted any operation, the UPAGeneral Staff knew of their course of action and their strength. The cooperationof the civilian population is conditio sinequa nOll for guerrilla operations.

The organization and pCl'sonnel sectionwas in charge of preparing the tables oforganization, of personnel replacement, ofoperating a roster of guerrilla fighters,and of the mobilization of military regions.

The logistics section had the difficultand important task of supplying food,ammunition, and clothing. Its mission included, also the repair and maintenanceof all materiel. In these tasks the cooperation of the people was essential. Thisection also was in charge of the estab

lishment of large subterraneanstorage bunkers, four to 10 meters underground, facilitating the problem df supply i9Ul'ing the winter. '

In combat the lJPA guerrillas wore mil,i tary uniforms and their leaders wore dis- ,tinctive insignia, such as the U k r a i n i a ~trident. In other words, they conformedto the laws and rules of land warfare andnormally would have been considered reg- :'ular t roops-a fact ignored most of thetime by both the Soviets and Germans.

The militQ1'Y inst1'1lction section was Incharge of writing directives and manualsfor the cadre schools and for the militaryinstruction therein. The problem of organizing competent cadre (officers andnoncommissioned officers) was critical d ~ eto the growth of the U l 'A and the consequent growing need for better and largercadres. The section was in charge of twoofficers' schools which- operated in theNorthern and Western Regions. Therewere noncommissioned officer schools inevery military district. The milital'Y instructors for these schools were Ukrainianmilitary men who had pursued their military careers in the armies of Poland,Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Russia;from the cadres organized in Germanybefore the war (cadres from the Nightingale Battalion); and the old leaders ofthe Ukrainian National Army of IV1,7-22.

In addition to the actual military instruction, the section was in charge ofediting the directives, manuals, and tactical regulations of the UPA. Amongthese works there is one deserving specialmention: The Practical ManHal of Guer-rilla Warfare, a 364-page volume of tactical concepts for these forces.

The political instruct lOll section (psychological action) had one of the mostimportant missions. Because the UPA depended strictly on voluntary enlistments,it had to win the good will of its peopleas well as that of the people of foreigncountries. Thus, i t was necessary to havea psychological warfare apparatus to raise


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11'I tGUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE UKRAINE Ithe morale and political standards of itsmen and make the UPA a strong politicalforce. To accomplish this, two officialtracts wel'e published and circulatedamong guerrillas and civilians 'alike: Thel'ol'stallets (The Guerrilla FightCl") andthe excellent review Do Zb"oi (Tt) Alms).

T h e ~ e supplemented the clandestine pressof the Ukrainian movement for nationaliiLeration which published more than 20titles. They also operated several clandestine radio stations which broadcastUkrainian propaganda and anti-G('nnanant! anti-Soviet counterpropaganda tothe Ukrainian people and the peoples ofgubjugated neighboring countries. Thissection also was in charge of liaison withother Ukrainian political organizations,particularly with the Organization ofUkrainian Nationalists. .

An underground commuJlicatioJl ami li-ui .ol! se,piec-which used the most variedcommunication means imaginable, ranging" from technical equipment to foot mes,eng'crs-was operated by the gencmlstaff in addition to the a f o r c m c n t i o n ( > { ~netivities.

During the Gprman occupation the oi-ganization of a central technical liaisohteam was started but was not completeduntil the beginning of the SoV'iet O1;cupa-tion in 1944. Time needed to train specialists and to assemble equipment. whichwas obtained mainly from the enemy orbuilt locally, pI'olonged the organiZation.In those areas not ofcupied by the enemy (during the German occupation),Ukrainian forces communicated over existing conventional telephone and telegraph lines by codes or prearranged messag"es. They sent messages in the clearonly to give orders calling for immediateaction. The messenger service, whether onfoot, mounted, or motorized, was organized iii sucli a way as to ensure deliveryof messages to the UPA headquarterswithin 24 hours and to the regional commands within 12 hours. A permanent sys

tern of relay couriers was opei'ated regularly for this purpose.The combat urlits (companies, I>attalions) in the fiel1 used the conventionalcommunications means employed by regular armies-Jow-power radios (walkie" talkies). and visual signals (semaphores,flags, and panels).The UPA Headquarters had under itsdirect command a .headquarters securityforce (generally a reinforced company),a nledical service, and a counterespionageservice.The medical servicc (Ukrainian Red. Cros's) labored under critical conditions

, due to its precarious means of evacuationand the lack of security in the l'ear areawhich forced the field hospitals as well asthe recuperation centers to operate entirely ,clandestinely. Furthermore, medical supply was spOl'adic and d e p ~ n d e n tupon captured e n ~ m y materiel or contributions by gcneroqs civilians at great per,anal sacrifice. Fq,r this reason the German and Soviet ambulances and h o ~ p i t a l swere favorite targets for thc U l 'A groupsas sources of supplies. However. theywere careful not to disturb the welfareof wounded p e r s o n n ~ 1 .

Another problem the medical servicefaced was the rccruiting and training ofspecialists. Generally speaking, the V l 'Avolunteers Were reluctant at first to servein these noncombat units. The positionswere filled by women and elderly men. Indue time the importance of this servicebecame evident and the numbel" of volunteers increased. The enemy never recognized the Ukrainian Red Cross, and it sposts were attacked and looted as anyordinary military objective. Thus. theUPA aid men ~ e c a m e active combat soldiers.

Nursing schools were established formen and women, and special textbookswere prepared for them. Due to the shortage of drugs and patent medicines, medicinal herbs were widely used. These weregathered by civilians, partic\llarly school


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12 MILITARY REVIEW NOVEMBER 196Uchildren, for the UPA groups. The med-,ical service published a small' manual

'called M e c l i c a ~ Plants and Their 'Usewhich was used by all .echelons of themedical service in the fighting forces andalso by the civilian population.The lowest medical service echelon wasthe aid man in each guerrilla squad. Nextin line was the company 'surgeon whosemission ,-\\as to supervise first aid treatment, to administer emergency treatment,and to dispense morphine injections, whennecessary. Serious c a ~ e s were taken tocamouflaged special centers and clandestine laboratories where they received final

. treatment to include surgical operations.The battalion surgeon was responsible forthese clandestine centers and administeredthe treatment and performed the operations.

The Ukrainian Red Cross also had tohelp the population of the free zones overwhich the occupying force had no control.This was an additional strain on the overtaxed medical service, Thus, the servicewas split into two divisions: a civiliandivision which operated among the civilian population, and eventually supportedthe combat units when these were engagedin combat in its zone of responsibility,and a military division which operatedexclusively with the UPA troops.

The security or counterespionage of theUPA was another important servicewhose mission was to uncover the Communist and Nazi agents infiltrated throughthe Ukrainian lines. The Communists, inparticular, sent secret agents to obtainexact information concerning Ukrainianstrength and armament and logistic bases,as well as information about their contacts with the Ukrainian civilians. I twas a difficult task to fight these infiltrators, because: Soviet agents were excellently trained and it was fairly easy todisguise themSeives as Ukrainians or refugees of vaItious nationalities who had!escaped from I prison camps. However, thecounterespionage service of the UPA was

successful by virtue of effective countermeasures and in spite of the refined andcunning methods employed by the enemyespionage agents.Also operating directly under higher.headquarters were the inspecting officers,a group of active officers whose missionwas to control the UPA activities in theentire territory where the guerrillas operated.

The regional staffs followed the organ:izational pattern of the general staff, andhad similar sections and services, but operated with fewer personnel. The militarydistrict staffs did not have inspecting officers and the various sections operatedwith even fewer people.

With this general o ~ g a n i z a t i o n the UPAfaced the new occupation of their territory by Soviet troops and administration,I t is noteworthy to mention that the Germans-who up to this' moment had calledthe Ukrainian guerrillas by such epithetsas "Bolshevik spies," "bandits," and"criminals"-now reversed their propaganda line and started calling the Ukrainian guerrillas "heroes of the anti-Bolshevik struggle" and "Ukrainian freedomfighters." The Soviet propaganda beganto refer to them as "traitors," "FascistNationalists," and "Bandera's murderers"(named after the Ukrainian leader, Esteban Bandera, who was murdered inMunich on 15 October 1959 presumablyby Kremlin agents).

Anti-Soviet ActivitiesAs soon as the German troops wereforced by the Spviet offensives to with

draw from the Ukrainian territory, theUPA took advantage of the situation andcollected all the materiel and equipmentabandoned in their withdrawal. Thus,when the Communist Armies entered theUkraine, they met a strongly organizedand well-s,uppJied resistance. 0 -

I t did not take long for thEY Soviet administration to start its usual purges ofthe "people's enemy" and to make mass


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\ !GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE U K R A : I ~ E

deportations of Ukrainians to far-off Siberia. The UPA t\eacted with a series ofraids against S o ~ i e t installations. Thefirst battle of importance against the Redforces occurred in the winter of 1944 withthe ambush against Marshal Vatutin andhis powerful escort which included armored vehicles. It was in this battle thatMarshal Vatutin was fatally wounded.Unfortunately, the Northern Region Commander of the UPA and his Chief of Staffabo lost their lives in the battle. Sovietnewspapers. suppressed the facts, andMarshal Vatutin's death appeal's officiallyin many professional and civilian publications, Soviet and even some Western,to have been due to "wounds received atthe battlefront."

After replacing the regular Soviettroops-who appeared to be lukewarm to,or even sympathizers of, the Ukrainianguerrillas-with NKVD selected personnel, the Soviets launched a series of offensives. The first of these was commandedby the "Ukrainian" Minister of Inte:rior,Lieutenant General Ryassny, under thedirect supervision of the Ukrainian "Premier," "General" Nikita Khrushchev. TheSoviet propaganda ministry announcedthe end of this "greatly successful" offensive in October 1945, and declared thatit had demolished the "resistance of theUkrainian Fascists." On 31 October, fivebattalions of the UPA attacked and captured the city of Stanislav, capital of theprovince of the same name, clearly demonstrating that their resistance was aliveand acting with relative impunity.

When a second Soviet offensive wasJaunch{!d, preparatory measures designedto ensure the success of the campaign included such activities as setting forestfires, forced conscription by territorialquotas, contamination of water, sale inthe "black" market" of medicines contaminated with typhus, and forced evacuationof populated zones. During this offensive,a UPA detachment set an ambush near

the railroad station at Tiaziv in Stanislavprovince, where the commander, GeneralMoskalenko, and his staff were due toarrive on 3 May 1946. The general's armored car was hit by an antitank shellkilling all its occupants.

Efforts to Crush UPAIn spite of the official declaratilln of.

"victory" by the Soviets, the Ukrainianguerrillas continued their activities. On29 March 1947, in another spectacular;ambush, the UPA killed Poland's ViceM;inister of War, General Swierczewski,who had achieved fame as "GeneralWalter" during the Spanish Civil Warat the head of the international bri,gades.Impressed by this act, the Soviet Union,Poland, and Czechoslovakia (whose Minister of Interior was Communist) signeda tripartite pact on 12 May 1947 callingfor the joint action of the armies of thethree countries to complete destruction ofthe UPA. Shortly thereafter, joint operations were launched with units in divisionstrength c o m p ~ i s i n g Polish infantry,Czechoslovakian mountain troops, Redpartisans, Soviet armored troops, infantry of the NKVD, paratrooper units, andSoviet Air Forces, plus Hungarian andRomanian units made up of gendarmesand frontier guards.

This concerted attack, conducted at fullspeed and on a wide front, could not wipeout the UPA resistance. Their forcesdispersed into small detachments andavoided the open combat the Communistssought. The guerrilla forces took refugein the mountain and forest bunkers, and'sometimes waited there for months untilthe enemy pressure subsided. Afterward, .the UPA Command sent groups of menon propaganda missions to Eastern European countries-even to Russia-toprove the existence of the Ukrainian resistance, Some of these groups were ableto cross the "Iron Curtain" to freedom inWestern Europe.However, in Western Ukraine (Galit


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i14 MILITARY REVIEW NOVEMBER 196,0zia) the struggle between the UPA andthe tripartite pact forces continued. On5 March 1950, near the town of Bilohor-sha, the cvmmander of the UPA, GeneralRoman Shujevych, better known by hiscover name of "Tanis Chuprynka," waskilled in action. He had served as Com-mander in Chief of the UPA for nineyears.

From then on, in view of the attritionof the fighting units, it was decided toshift the emphasis from active combat topsychological warfare, and the UPA wentunderground. The fundamental objectivesof the struggle remained the same, onlythe means and methods were altered. The

P A groups were scattered and absorbedby clandestine armed' organizations whichhad the following missions:

1. To maintain and develop the subversive, clandestine organizadon in allUkrainian territory occupied by the So-viet Union.

2. To maintain and strengthen theUkrainian people's ideological and moralstatus, Tdisseminating the ideals of libertyand independence, and fostering sabotageand evrn raids against determined Sovietobjectives.3. To publicize the Ukrainian revolu-tionary spirit and spread the idea of antiCommunist revolution to all the countriessubjugated by the USSR.

4. To make known to the Free Worldthe fight that the Ukrainian people-particularly their armed organization, theUPA-had sustained against the Red oc-cupation and the Communist oppression,

and the possibilities offered to the West-ern strategists in another World War.

Conclusions,This is the present situation of the

Ukrainian resistance movement. I t has notceased to carvy on active Propagandacampaigns and tinexpected sabotage actsagainst the Soviet administration. This isthe reason for the brief "police" reportswhich appear periodically in the Commu-nist Ukrainian press mentioning the cap-ture of "reactionary elements" and suchnews as trials and death sentences, suchas the ones which occurred in 1959 in thecities of Kiev and Rovno. This is also thereason the combined troops of Soviet Rus-sia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia "maneuver" in the Carpathian Mountains, in thewestern areas of Eslovakia, and other re-gions. Their true objective is to flush outand wipe out the U P guerrilla fighterswho still perform sabotage and engage inpropaganda activities as attested by thepatriotic demonstrations which took placein March 1959 in the cities of Mukachevo,Uzhgorod, and Just.

The resistance movement also carrieson passive. resistance activity among thepeople with the purpose of sabotaging andretarding the Communist production pro-gram. They have perfected alibis to jus-tify the feigned sickness of laborers, wasteof time at plants and collective farms, lowproduction, and demands for more per-sonnel.

The UPA represents a potential forceto resume guerrilla warfare in the e v ~ n tof another war.

,.- '.


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...

, , " hh'" , ,: ~ ; ' I J teaaat'C6Iohl Andrew,"

F a t u i ~ , U ~ S;'Army Command and ",., ~ _ , . 1 . " . f t ' ' ' '

hE rifleman fires his piece at a targethe can see or sense. As we progress upthe scale of weapons in caliber, range, anddeadliness more factors influence the decision to fire and the effects. Nuclearweapons present the extreme in requirements for timely and Ilccurate information. Unlike the infantryman, thecommander and his staff charged withexercising the responsibilities of nuclearweapons capnot fire indiscriminately andmove on. The need for immediate, workable procedures for nuclear target acquisition transcends almost every other combat problem in the Army today. Battlefieldsurvival and victory in war are the stakes.We cannot settle for less.Field exercises in Europe during the

past few years partially reveal thethought and activity going into the searchfor answers to the over-all problem. InFebruary 1958, the 5th US Corps, participating in Sabre-Hawk, conducted tests oftechniques involving the use of LongRange Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP's)for the collection of intelligence, primar-'i1y that pertaining to nuclear target acquisition. This was not t h ~ first attemptto exploit the capabilities of ground reconnaissance in a target acquisition- role.The 7th Corps employed stay-behind patrols in Exercise WmHawk held in December 1956. The 5th Corps effort represented an improved concept of operationalemployment as well as the first full-scaleattempt to select, organize, and train per-

Nuclem' weapons intenSify the problem of target acquisition. Their'potential influence on the outcome of battle demands workable pro-cedures for timely, accurate, and rapidly transmitted information

..


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16"1 ..

MILITARY REVIEW NOVEMBER 1 ! 1 ' 6 ~ .sonnel in the special techniques of long-range reconnaissance prior to participation in a field exercise.

The experience of 5th Corps in SabreHawk pointed up the need for an organization to carry out long-range reeonnais,sanee. I t also emphasized the need forspecial training of individuals for LRRPoperations, improved communications, refinement of entry and exit techniques,precise planning for use of long-rangepatrols, and detailed intrastaff coordination on those levels controlling long-rangereconnaissance. .

Subsequent to Sabre-Hawk but prior tothe 1959 exercises, a 5th Corps study resulted in specific conclusions and recom-mendations concerning the organization,equipment, and employment of combatsurveillance units. These conclusions werea direct outgrowth of 5th Corps earlierexperiences and served as a starting pointfor further field testing of long-range recOllllaissance operations.

In two separate field exercises held inGermany in 1959, 5th and 7th Corps experimented further with long-range re-connaissance and target acquisition. Thetest reports suggest that significant progress was made toward the developmentof a suitable organization for combat surveillance and improved techniques of op-erational employment. However, there stillremained areas for further refinementand improvement in the selection andtraining of personnel, suitability of com-munication equipment and procedures,and capabilities of Army aviation.

Recently, the Seventh United StatesLieutenant Colonel Andrew J. DeG)'offis a member of the faculty of the U. S.Army Command and Gene)'al Staff Col-lege. He was gmdnated f)'om the UnitedStates Military Academy in 1944 andsubsequcntly sel'ved with the IJ,th Infanh'y Regiment in World Wa)' II . Othe)'service includes assignments with the edA1'1no)'cd Division and at Headqllariel'sSeventh Army. He is a graduate of the1959 Regular Course of the USA CGSC.

Army conducted a winter maneuver, FTXWYnter Shield, wherein one of the pri-mary objectives was again the perfectionof target acquisition methods. The finalreport does not make clear the extent towhich this objective "'las realized. Amongsubjects the report l i s ~ e d for further con-sideration were a tB\ble of distribution(TD) for long-range reconnaissanceunits, an addendum to the Army trainingdirective on "stay-behind" operations, andsky cavalry for combat surveillance.

Within the context of these field ac-tivities, what, precisely, are we seeking inthis twilight area of target acquisition?The objective is to develop a reliable andconsistent intelligence system capable oflocating and reporting transient nucleartargets of tacticat interest to the fieldarmy. The scope of the acquisition effortincludes a capability to penetrate the en-emy's countel'reconnaissance and securityscreen in order to locate his reserves, con;-bat support forces, and installations; andto obtain and report timely informationin order to permit the effective engage-ment of appropriate targets with nuclearweapons.

Current target acquisition capabilitiesand new developments in electronics anddrone aviation provide a logical base onwhich to devise an organization for battle-field surveillance and target acquisition.

Current CapabilitiesConsiderable potential means to providean effective target acquisition capabilityexists in the field army. Unfortunately.this potential has not always produced thevital and timely intelligence our tacticaloperations demand. Nonetheless, the cu-mulative effort of the following SOUl'resand agencies are far from insignificant.With the addition of the proposed targetacquisition organization, the capabilitiesof the field army intelligence system maybecome sufficient to meet the increasingdemand for swift, accurate reporting of.nuclear target information.


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17UCLEAR TARGET ACQUISITIONIntelligence officel's.-There is a grow.ing trend among intelligence officers to.-

ward the use of less common techniquesin search of n ~ c l e a r target information.The ,practice of';war gaming the enemy"to determine his most likely dispositions,movements, and courses of' action' is anexample' of such techniques. Further refinement of this art, in concert with theetforts of other intelligence agencies workiilg for the G2, could result in highly productive nuclear target intelligence. Thejudgment, experience, and reasoning ability of the G2 are determining factors inboth the deduction process and the empluyment phase.Elcch'onic war/are wzits.-The procedures for integrating electronic warfare'units into the information collecting system of the G2 al'e adequately set forth intl1l' doctrine for employment of such units.It ig sufficient here merely to point outtwo unique capabilities of electronic warfarC' units thnt can b,' especially usefulto the G2,

First, the ability to confirm the presenceof an enemy in a specific aI'ea by connnunkations intelligence (COMINT) techniques; and second, the ability to establi'h and maintain radio communication,as a base station, with other intelligence

a ~ ( ' n c i e s operating behind enemy lines.lrnconventional /Ol 'CCR.- This categoryincludes all clandestine elements operat

in the immediate battle area. Suchforces have a recognizable, but not always clearly definable, information gathering capability. Numerous intangiblesand uncertainties associated with the employment of unconventional forces makethis so. Under optimum conditions, theirtarget acquisition potential may be saidto approach that of conventional groundand sky cavalry units, The techniques ofemployment of unconventional forces ina target acquisition role are generally thesame as for convElntional forces, althoughthe latter normally have the advantage of

better organization, training, and equipment.Army and Ail' Force aviation.-The developm(mt of d r ~ n e aircraft and moreadvanced types of electronics surveillance(qulpment, such as Side Looking Aerial

Radar (SLAR), suggests the probability"f a vastly increased potential for targetacquisition by Army and Air Force aviation. The greatest significance of suchfuture develqpment lies in the all-weathercapability that will accrue to reconnaissance aviation. The techniques of inte- ,grating Army and Air Force aviationinto the G2's information collecting system are adequately described in present"doctrine,

G)'Oll11rl and 81(11 cavalr1l.-Conventionalarmored reconnaissance and sky cavalrypotentially are the best units for battlefi


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18 MILITARY REVIEW NOVEMBER 1960tim;I, previously mentioneq, would be introduced into the field army's intelligencesystem for the sale purpose of acquiringprecise and timely nudear target information. It is visualized that the organization will be a unique corps of ground andsky-to-ground reconnaissance troops who,in cooperation with other agencies, willhave a maximum capability for accomplishing the required level of target acquisition. The type of individual and unit,in mind are best exemplified by the air-I

of nuclear warfare contemplates. The requirement for a special target acquisition organization (completely separateand distinct from the commonly acceptedintelligence agencies) appears to be inescapable, and follows from the simple statement of fact that the Army to date hasnot been able to satisfy its needs for nuclear target information in any otherway.

The organizational and operational con-cepts that follow parallel certain conclu-

TARGET ACQUISITION COMPANY (AIRBORNE)

HEADQUARTERSDETACHMENT COMBATFLIGHTONE OFFICER FOUR ENLISTED MENFOUR ENLISTED MEN

(I) COMMAND, ADMINISTRATION, MAINTENANCE, SUPPLY, MESSING(2) EMPLOYED AT CORPS AND ARMY LEVELS, ESTIMATED 20 DETACHMENTS PER CORPS(3) EMPLOYED AT DIVISION LEVEL ON THE BASIS or APPROXIMATELY 10 DETACHMENTS PER DIVISION(4) EQUIPPED WITH fIXED-WING AND HElICOPTER AIRCRAFT toR ENTRY AND EXIT TRANSPORT or TARGET ACQUISITION DETACHMENTS

borne pathfinder and ranger, and by theairborne pathfinder team. These persons,and others of equal knowledge and skillin the art of long-range reconnaissance,must be made availllble to the field armyin sufficient numbers to man suitable tableof distribution fOI'('es.

The emphasis is on a sej:laI'ate, elite,highly trained corps of target acquisitionspecialists who Will have that full capability fo r battlefield surveillance and target acquisition which the Army's doctrine

~ i o n s of various unclassified studies andreports. These similarities are acknowledged b e c a u s ~ they tend both to corroborate and accentuate the al'eas in whichfurther development of techniques is re'quired if the Army is to realize its totalnuclear capability. The following observations pertain to the organization, training, operations. and communications ofthe proposed target acquisition detachment (airborne).

The detachments should be table of dis


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19UCLEAR TARGET ACQUISITIONtribution organizations, comprised of pel'soooel from the field army at large but110t levied against the TOE of other assigned units. The expedient of using organic army, corps, and division' troops onan as-available-basis to organize npn-TDtarget acquisition .detachments is neitherefficient nor economical. They should beorganized at field army level to ensure uniformity in selection of personnel, training, and operational procedures. Additionally, the field army is best suited toprovide both the special administrativesupport and communications required forLRRP operations.

QualificationsThe manning tables for target acqUIsItion detachments should specify that allas,igned personnel will be fully qualified

airborne ranger ~ p e c i a l i s t " capable of indl'l1l'ndcnt action behind enemy lines under the most hazardous and trying conditions. I t is appan'lJt that p e r ~ o n n c lwithout these high qualifications wouldtenrl to degrade the performance of thedctaehmcnts in an operational environnwnt.

Target acquisition detachments (airborne) Rhould be small cellular type units,cnpable of sustained operations within andbehind enemy formations for a period ofthree to five days. The desirahility of aparent organization for command and administrative support, such as a target acquisition company (airborne), should beconsidered.

The d e t a ~ h m e n t s should be operationally controlled at army, corps, and divi;;ion levels where suitable nuclear delivery means also exist. An estimated 10detachments at division level and a proportionate number at higher headquarterswould be sufficient to provide full surveillance coverage within respective areas ofinfluence.

When conditions warrant, detachmentsmay be attached to existing military in

telligence organizations, or operate directly under the G2. The parent TDorganization would be operationally controlled at field army level.

TrainingTraining should be as rigorous and specialized as that received by airborne pathfindel' teams; it should emphasize techniques of long-range penetration, developskill in locating and evaluating potential

nuclear targets, put particular stress oncommunicating and reporting, and thoroughly indoctrinate each individual in theart of survival behind enemy lines. (The5th US Corps outlined such a programfor developing these advanced skills inits training directive preceding Sab)"'-Hawk.)

Organization alone does not provide thecntire solution. The concepts for employment of target acquisition detachments(airborne) require additional qualitativeanalysis and fiere test before final acceptance. For example, operational control ofthe target acquisition detachment (airborne) shOUld be under the G2 becausethis, in principle, is an intelligence agencyin its purest form. This concept in noway precludes or minimizes the continuing requirement for detailed intrastaff'coordination.

Moving TargetsBasic type missions should be directed

toward specific point reconnaissance andsurveillance, as opposed to either routeor area surveillance. This is in keepingwith our experience which has shown thata moving enemy (ground) target has arelatively low probability of being effectively engaged by nuclear weapons. True,we have no wartime experience in thismatter, but complex channels of control,un1"eliable commuiications, ponderous organization, and difficulties attendant t'Oobtaining a decision to fire diminish ourchances for successful engagement of moving targets today. Experience also tends


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20 MILITARY REVIEW NOVEMBER 1960_to show "that a . moving rkconnaissanceunit-has an even lower probability of bothaccomplishing the detection and reportingof nuclear targets, and ass\llring its ownsurvival. I

Planning for operations: should consider all possible means of correlating theefforts of target acquisition' detachments(airborne) with other intel\igence agencies working for G2. In ~ h i s manner,target acquisition detachments can be introduced into those enemy' areas whereother sources of intelligence indicate ahigl1_ assurance of successful long-rangeoperations. The scattering o ~ detachmentsbehind enemy lines at random or accordting to, a preset pattern has o b v i o ~ s disadvantages.

Planning also should visualize the general scheme of employment of target acquisition detachments (airborne) at leastthree to five days in advance of their contemplated use. The introduction of thesedetachments into enemy rear areas is aprecision maneuver With little, if any,margin for error. The practice of "crashplanning," sometimes indulged in by ourheadquarters, is entirely unacceptable inan operation in which success is significantly influenced by detailed and precisecoordination and planning.

ExfiltrationAirborne or helicopterborne entry gen

erally is preferable to ground infiltrationin offensive operations. The influence oftime and space factors plus the technicaldifficulties of overland penetration serveto point up the unreliability of ground infiltration, particuiarly in areas of heavyenemy security. Exfiltration of target acquisition detachments during offensive op'eratioh's represents no problem as longas the momentum of advance is continued.Should the friendly forward movementbe contained before target acquisition detachments are uncovered, then exfiltrationshould be carried out in the manner prescribed for retrograde operations.

Stay-behind patrols are preferable toother means of, entry in 1'lJirograde operations. These have been used in the pastin training exercises with some success.Target acquisition detachments must beexfiltrated by aerial means regardless ofthe aircraft attrition rate. I t is clearlyimpractical to consider exfiltration by anyother means such as "walk out." In theevent that exfiltration cannot be accomplished, alternate plans involving linkupwith special forces teams operating inthe same area, or employment of escapeand evasion techniques to elude capture,must be adopted.

Target acquisition detachments (airborne) should not be employed in otherthan their specialized role, in order not toexhaust their combat capability on lessimperative missions.

C o m m u n ~ c a t i o n sCommunications-wise, target acqulsI-'

tion detachments (airborne) should beequipped with a portable VHF radio withbuilt-in power source, high reliability,and capable of transmitting by voice orCW (continuous wave) to a range _of 50miles. An automatic system of brief codedsignals representing desired elements ofinformation should be built into the .transceiver, thus enabling the operator to typea message in clear text directly into thetransceiver. The message would then beautomatically encoded and transmittedover a set frequency to a base stationwhere the above procedures would be reversed, and the -message reproduced indear text in teletype form. This technique, combined with a simple brevitycode, would provide adequate securitysafeguards as well as the required speedof transmission for nuclear target intelligence.

Other electronic gear is essential tosuccess. The detachments should beequipped with the latest type navigationalaids and electronic surveillance devices.These must be simple to operate, rugged


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NUCLEAR TARGET ACQUISITION ~ lin construction, lightweight, and selfpowered.

New developments in the fields of electronic surveillance and drone aviationare not to he regarded lightly, fOJ: theymay well outstrip in productive inteIlig-enee the more prosaic sources upon whichwe are forced to rely today. Nonetheless,one should not overlook the possible deg-rading effect of enemy countarmeasureson these mechanical instruments. The extent to which this limitation is applicable

~ a n n o t be precisely measured, since welack full knowledge of .our potential enemy's electronic count.ermeasure capabil

ities. I t appears to be both wise and prubent not to place paramount reliance onnew electronics developments until theirreliability is fully established under op"erational conditions.

ConclusionsDevelopment of new organizations, concepts, and equipment is always painfullyslow. There appear to be sound reasonswhy this is true. In the field of nucleartarget acquisition we face a new andmore compelling challenge. Urgency ofsolution of its many problems does not

p ~ r i n i t us an instant's delay. "Delay" issynonymous with "perish."

One of the most complex technological problems facing us today is in thefield of target acquisition. Unless we can develop the means to determine andreport rapidly the locations of suitable tar!(et:; at r.m!(es of many miles andwith accuracies commensurate with the accur.acy of our weapons, it may frequently by unprofitable to l a u ~ c h our long-rlmge missiles against enemyforces.

The use of drone systems is one approach to the challenging problem ofbetter target acq'uisition... We seek a capability of determining more accurate ran!(e information for our fire support weapons. This could be in theform of an infrared device permitting every soldier to see in the dark; itcould be in the form of a portable i n s t r u ~ e n t permitting a soldier on a patrolto take a pidure of an enemy target and transmit it back automatically andI'lectromagnetically. I "I .

The target acquisition equipment we need must be accurate and light inweight-but most importantly it m u ~ t work-every time! I t must work in thetropics. the desert. and the arctic and in any weather. day or night. I t mustlive in the military environment-with all that word imillies: shock. vibration,mtid, dust, deferred maintenance, and so forth. And it must perform, at leastas well as today's equipment, in a radiation environment.

Equipment components must be capable of being mass produced-on abroad industr1al base. usin!( mechanized proce,Rses for high reliability andreasonable economy. . . ,{" ,, i

Within the framework of future possible c o n f l i c t s - ; - w h e ~ e r engaged inall-out nuclear war or in putting down aggression with com'cnlional weapons.Army combat troops must r.eact faster, cover more !(round. protect largerareas; disperse and regroup faster than ever' before. At the heart of thismobility problem is one simple fact-the greater the speed of movement overall "types of terrain. the greater the chances of tactical success.

Lieutenant General Arthur G. Trudeau


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THE attempt to breach the' heavilyfortified Confederate line at Petersburgin July of 1864-one of history's few ex-amples of the tactical employment of amass destruction weapon-provides thebasis for evaluating concepts for tacticalemployment of nuelear weapons. :'.fajorRaymond O. Miller, in "A , StupendousFailure," ,which appeared in the July1960 M'J'LITARY REVIEW, highlighted in twosentences the primary lesson of the Petersburg Crater for today's combat com-manders. "Speed was the key to successat Petersburg, both in attack and de-fense," he noted. "The battle was won andlost with this key."Grant's grim pursuit of LEle from theWilderness to Cold Harbor had finallycome to stalemate in the fortificationssouth of Petersburg. At 0445 on the morning of 30 July, four tons of I1owder, em-placed by Lieutenant Colonel HenryPleasants' 48th Pennsylvania VeteranVolunteer Infantry, were exploded be-neath the Confederate parapets opposite

Burnside's 9th Corps. When the dods ofearth, the cannon, 'and the bodies hadtumbled back and the smoke and dust hadeleared, 170 feet of the Confederate linehad disappeared. For 200 yards on eachside of the erater the men who mannedthe Confederate trenches had taken totheir heels. Right in the middle of theimpregnable defense system, ColonelPleasants' mine had blown a gap nearly500 yards wide, and all Burnside's corpshad to do was march through briskly, takeCemetery Hill, and end the war. A tacotical nuelear weapon could not have donemore or have done i t more effectively.

But the assault plans fell apart in aweltet of forgotten details and inept leadership. While Meade was trying to p;etthe attack rolling the Confederates wererecovering. Infantry regiments were be-ing reformed to seal the gap; artillerywas brought into action. The situationgrew worse by the minute. What. couldhave been done easily at 0500 by 0600 wasdifficult. By 0700 the battle was already

The tactical nuclear weapon can be" the key to victory in the flexibleformations and free m a ~ e u v e r of the future battlefield. Successfulexploitation of nuclear i r ~ s will depend upon doing simple things quickly


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23tTHE PETERSBURG CRATER AND N U ~ L E A R WEAPONS

THE CRATER: VITAL STATISTICS

CHARGE:

CRATER:

., I~ .. 301 ,'...,

...i'" /

' - - - GAP IN CONFEDERATE APPROX. 350 YARDS

LINES:

CASUAlTIES:

ESTIMATED CONFEDERATE FEDERAL CASUALTIES BYSTRENGTH IN CONFEDERATE COUNTERATTACK: .4.400VICINITY GROUND ZERO: 300

KILLED: 278

RESULTS: FAILURE


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24 I MILITAIW REVIEW NOtEMBER 1960' :'Iost" although the slaughter w ~ n t on untilnearly noon, 1In its environment, the 48th Pennsylvania's crater was a novel ~ m d radkalorder of firepower. The plan !for the exploitation was good, but precious minuteswere wasted while the Confederate Armywas stunned and its lines lay. open. Theprice of that waste was failu)'e and an.other 10 months of bloody war. On tomorrow's battlefield, the o ~ p o r t u n i t i e screated by nuclear fires also will be wastedif the exploitation is as tardy as Burn-side's.

The tactical nuclear weapon cannot winbattles alone.Maneuver Force

The object of ground forces on the battlefield is to dominate the enemy, to enforce submission of the enemy to the willof t h ~ commander. The nuclear weapondoes not dominate the enemy's will; byitself, the weapon merely destroys, Indeed,"fire kills," but if killing alone does notachieve the object of combat, Petain's slo-gan can no more point the way to effec-tive nuclear tactics than it did to soundstrategy for prewar forces. Only maneuver elements can apply the sustained forceagainst resistance which is the nature ofdomination, whether of terrain or of enemy troops. While the tactical as well asthe strategic object of war is dominationinstead of extermination of the enemy,the ground maneuver force must gain thefinal ends of battle.

From time to time, of course, employ-ment of nuclear weapons for destructioneffects alone is desirable. Attack of enemy

Lie1/tenant Colonel FI'ank B. Case iswith the G4 Section, Headquarters, UnitedStates Army, Alaska, Fort Richardson.He is a gmduate of.the 1958-59 RegularCourse of the U. S. AI'my Command andGeneml Staff College. A jI'eqllent contrib-utor to the MILITARY REVIEW, his latestarticle, "Decisive Battles of the World-The Kirgiz Steppe, 2002 A. D.," appearedin the November 1959 iSBue.

~ .reserves and rear installations, with theobject of reducing the enemy's endurancein combat, are typical of nuclEU1r employ.ment for destruction effects. But the optimized role of the tactical nuclear weaponis creation of conditions under which themaneuver force can operate with freedomand facility. The weapon is uniquely capable of creating such conditions, of softening up the enemy as a whole by a furiousblow on a single element. The special advantage of.,..nuclear fire as preparation formaneuver lies in its shock effects, in theimpact upon men and systems not de-stroyed outright.While the nuclear weapon, whenever itis used, is the chief element of fire sup-port in terms of explosive equivalent, itskilling effects are localized in space andtime. But the shock effects are generalized,Destruction wrought directly by theweapon alters the local balance of com-bat power by removing men and materielfrom the action, Shock effects impair thefunction of the entire enemy force.

Nuclear attack peremptorily requiresthe staff of the defending forces to dealwith the situation produced by the attack,at the expense of other combat tasks. Theenemy must take positive measures to fillup the gap in his organization at just themoment when he is least able to determinewhat should be done. Destruction of thetarget force hinders collection of infor-mation. Observation and communicationsare degraded, Troops not killed outrightare stunned and relatively ineffective fora considerable distance from ground zero,

Formations outside the range of pri-mary effects are shaken, their responsive.ness impaired by the evident fact thatthey may be a target for the next weapon.And the value of whatever m e a s u r e ~ thedefender undertakes is weakened by thefact that his actions are reactions to theattacker's blow. The defender has lost theinitiative and with it the morale advantage-which may' prove decisive in nuclearcombat, as it has in conventional fighting.


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25' TH E PETERSBURG CRATJl;R AND NUCLEAR WEAPONSTime ElementDeciding upon and executing defensivereactions to nuclear attack takes time.During the period of defensive reaction- the attacker's golden hour-the attackercan execute his exploitation with relativefreedom and ease.But the conditions favorable for exploiting maneuver do not endure. As the minutcs pass after the nuclear detonation,,hock effects on the enemy force also pass.The defensive command structure is knitup; support weapons are brought to bear;mobile forces refill the gap made by the'1lucIear strike; soldiers surviving in thetarget zone find themselves alive and lookto their weaJ;lons, prOg'ressively regainingvision, initiative, and energy. When the

~ t t a c k e r ' s golden hour is over, the enemyis re,tored as a fighting organism, a littlefelwr in numbers than before but readyto seize the initiative by countermaneuvel' Hg'ainst an opponent whORe intentionsarc now declared.How long' is the favorable period forexploitation? How long does it take thedefender to restore the functioning' of hiswhole organism after nuclear attack onone of its parts? Present service schoolsolutions frequently allow an hour and'ometim


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26 MILITARY REVIEW NOVEMBER 1960be the limit of the poststrike period during which the US force must mount itsexploiting attack, gain contact with theenemy, roll over the reduced resistancepresented by the temporarily disruptedAggressor division, and gain momentumfor a followthrough which will rupturethe entire Aggressor defensive configuration.. Only experience will show whether theoptimum period for exploitation is anhour, half an hour, or an hour and a half.Certainly, al l d e f e n s i ~ e commanders willuse their best ingenuity to reduce the disrupting effects of nuclear strikes on theirforces and to shorten the time needed toassess damage and reestablish the integrity of their positions. The optimum exploitation time available to attackers willbe shortened as defensive commanderssucceed in minimizing nuclear strike effects. In the most favorable case, the optimum exploitation time will be brief.

Automatic ExecutionDuring the optimum exploitation time,

the attacker must do many things. To accomplish them in the time available, exploitation plans must be clear and complete, poststrike decision-making processesmust be simplHied as far as possible,movement times to objectives must be cutto the minimum, and execution of maneuver must be as nearly automatic as possible.The mi;sion type order has its place infuture war, but the initial phase of exploitation of tactical nudear weapons is notthat place. The prestrike position of everymaneuver element of the assault echelonmust be prescribed. Each route and alternate route to the objective must be defined and movement times calculated carefully. Conventional fire support must bepreplanned to secure maximum prolongation of the shock effects of the nuclearstrike on units adjacent to ground zero.

The go/no-go factors for the attackmust be clearly stated so that subordinate

commanders can act decisively and in con-cert regardless of communications conditions. The purpose of each maneuver ele-ment on the objective must be clearlydefined so that when communications arelost during the action-and some elementsalways will lose communications-thesense of the battle is not lost.

Whether or not to go with the exploiting maneuver is the primary decision.Poststrike analysis of the nuclear attackmust not be allowed, through an excess oftechnique, to become poststrike paralysis.To the attacking commander the decisivefact will be that the weapon detonatedreasonably near the enemy's position.When he knows this, he knows that theenemy has been hurt and that he holdsa critical, although a brief and passing,advantage. He knows, in general, the lo-cations and characteristics of the obstacles his maneuver forces must avoid. Poststrike analysis more technically refinedcan tell him little more that will helphim_ Accordingly, such strike analysiscan be reduced to a go/no-go basis: i fthe weapon is a dud, the attack is "USpended; if it detonates, the attack goes.

Advance AnalysisIn a mUltiple-weapon preparation, the

commander's calculation is more complexbut his decision remains subject to ad-vance analysis. In a two-weapon preparation, he may decide in advance to attackif one of the weapons detonates_ In athree-weapon preparation, he may derideto suspend the attack if he has more thanone dud . .In each case, he can establish thesignificant facts and mount his exploitation within two or three minutes aftertime on target, while enemy commandcontrol, fire support, and reserve reactions are least effective.

The ~ d v a n t a g e s of rapid poststrike de-cision processes can be nullified by tardymovement of maneuver elements to theirobjectives. Where possible. the attackshould be initiated automatically upon ob-


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27HE PETERSBURG CRATER AND NUCLEAR WEAPONSof the nuclear detonations byommanders of maneuver elements. Thisshould be accomplished to avoid the posibility of delays from communications inten'uptions, whether the result of normaloperational difficulties or of enemy, jamming.In order to permit contact to be gained

the enemy reaction capability is atthe minimum, prestrike positions of theexploiting forces should be as close aspracticable to the enemy. I f the exploitingfOlce is mounted in armor and the terrainis roasonably trafficable, 15 minutes' tin;edistance should allow satisfaction of reasonable troop safety standards. If theassault' force is not armored, greaterchances must be tallen. The time-distanceto a ~ s a u l t objectives should be controllingover ideal troop safety considerations. Nopurpose is scrved by s a v i ~ two percentof a force from cxtremc-ranp."e effects offriendly weapons and thereby losing 15percent to enemy fire in the subsequentatt[lck.

I f exploitation is executed so that itmakes full use of the shock effects of nu

, clear fires on the total enemy organism,if nuclear preparation and follow-upground attack with its conventional firesupport are conducted as one sustainedblow, the nuclear' strike' which destroysa battalion will lay open that battalion'sentire parent force to quick and completedefeat. Conclusion

In the flexible formations and free maneuver of the future battleground, successful exploitation of nuclear fires wifldepend upon doing simple things quickly.Casual staff work and command that lacksthe edge of urgency will wait for the dustto settle before mounting exploiting attacks, and wars will go on to other springs-unti l , perhaps, we run out of springs.Soul'ld, thorough staff work and hard command control will drive exploiting forcesonto objectives in time to win battles thatwill win wars.On the future battlefield, the tacticalnuclear weapon cun be the I{ey to victory.But the key will be u s e l e ~ s if the door itunlocks is not pushed open and passedthroug'h before the ('n!'my J'olocks it.

Careful planning is an essential ingredient in any operatlon, but particularly in one as fluid and unpredictable as a nuclear battle. Any effort to 'playby ear' such a complex and volatile situation is dangerous and jII-advised. Thebest staff plans are often never implemented. However, the study and consideration that goes into their preparation provides the basis for on-the-spotplans to meet the unexpected

..

As battle becomes more complex and unpredictable, responsibility must bemore and more decentralized. Thus mission type orders wiII be used at higherlevels of command in the future. This in turn requires that all echelons befully informed on the currellt situation and requires commanders to exerciseinitiative and imagination in exploiting their relative freedom of action.To aid in this, we have a built.in organizational flexibility in our tacticalforces. But planning must recognize and capitaliZe on this. To get the maxi

mum out of our combat 'power, the plalls tllemselr'es must be flexible to meetrapidly' changing situations. Careful planning is not enough. This must becoupled with a readiness to change and adapt to circumstances as they are-not as they were expected to be. General Bruce C. Clarke
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,TWILIGHTColonel Robert B. Rigg. Armor .Faculty. United States -Army War College

N O O N E has truly measured the potentialities and problems of an outer spacewar, much less fashioned the military doctrine for such a possible conflict. However, earthly warfare has a variety ofstill unsolved problems even more urgently in need of solution because they'are with us now. This is especially truein respect to "Twilight War." Twilig-htWar is a unique form of contemporaryand future conflict. I t is warfare whicha modern nation can fig-ht with true assurance that it will never lose, but withequally sound assurance that it has nochance of winning-, unless the countryconcerned is prepared to meet the strang-eproportions,of twilight conflict. The ug-Iyquality of. this type of armed strugg-lechallenges the orthodoxy of a modern military machine and it s inherent doctrine.The beauty of Twilig-ht War-from anag-g-ressor standpoint-is that it serves.to sap opposing strength by its form andattrition.

In the destruction and process of war,civilian structures are demolished or fall.Conversely, in the construction and process of peace, military concepts and procedures never fall or fail until ultimately

disproved by the next war. Then, it issometimes too late to rectify faulty military concepts and procedures.

Inherentiy, every nation largely acrept,lts own military solutions-solutions ba,ed011 it s own war experience. But the Ie,sons of military expel"ience should not beso narrowed. One must not be afraid toborrow wisely. There is no penalty fOJplagiarism in military methods. The penalty of defeat lies in the failure to capitalize on the experience of other,.

Essential LessonsThe records "f recent combat cau>" li '

to reflect on the fact that two natlOnaiforces have fought for a long time, andportions of their experience have .valueIn recent history, France has fought morethan 20 years. Communist China ha, I)pen'in combat for more than 26 ~ e a r s . !luring the Cou:l'se of this warfalie, each ofthese military forces has strengthenl'd itself by its failures. Certain essential Iessons are apparent: each side has harl tomodify its methods with the passa)':l' oftime, and adapt itself to new situatIOns.

For example, the Communist (,lune'"began military operations 'as an plu,ive

Twilight War challenges the orthodoxy of modem military forces andtlleir inherent docllines. Unless the country concerned is prepared tomeet the strange proportions of this conflict, it has no chance of wi1lning


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29WILIGHT WARGradually they changed into amilitary force, as in KOl'ea. Conthe French in Indochina opposed

enemy (Chinese oriented) withorthodox military force, and lost. FacedAlgeria with another elusive enemy,e French h a v ~ evolved a technique to

the enemy at his own game-andthey seem to be gaining strength and

headway.This is an age of two contrasts: the

of elusive enemies such as thoseIndochina, Malaya, and Algeria;d ~ e c o n d , of massive forces such as those

the human wave attacksnder certain conditions in Korea.The United States has not recentlyfought a Twilight War, characterized byombat with elusive enemies and years of

fru,tration wherein the people and geography of a region are as much of a combat factor as the enemy forces themselves.

~ ! a o ' , Communist Chinese and Ho-Chiminh's Vietnamese forces came to significant power on the basis of Twilight War.Today, France's power is once again b('inl' challenged (in Algeria) by an enemywaging Twilight War. The questionarisps, how well prepared are we to wageand win against an enemy who choosesthis typ


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30 MILITARY REVIEW

..... 4-'

.""Warfare of any type destroys and damages villages and crops, and produces completechaos. Consequently, the civil population always looks hopefully to whichever side canrestore normalcy.-US Army photos.


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31. TWILIGHT WARype destroys and damages villages and

and produces chaos. Consequently,population ahyays looks hope-

whichever side can r e s t o ~ J ( ' noreither partially or totally)' I t is

true that eople caught in the changtides war become close-moutheddo n t volunteer information. Themilitary force always needsinfol ation than the elusive force.

an I intelligencce viewpoint, uncomhinder military opera

In 1956 the French High Command wasreport from Brigadier Gen

young veteran-herotwo wars who analyzed hlis militaryedger and balance sheets with the con-lusion of military failure for lack of information. He recommended using troopso organize communities, to provide work,and to relieve local misery. Object: makethe military not a repressive force but aonstructive one; give the soldiers a fe!'lil!j!; of being engag'ed in construction aswdl as destruction', S ~ I ) p l a n t the mayorsand civilian bureaucracy with nonpoliticalpartisans-the military. General Bolladiere also made another unorthodox proposal: infiltrate squad-size units to liveoff the land and among the people.

Parallel ObjectivesHurd pressed, the French High Command finally agreed to eXl'criment withthese proposals. General Bolladicre had

no overnight success with his ideas. Hewas criticized for using troops as civiliansupervisors and medical practitioners. Buta portion of the French Army built andtaught schools, rebuilt bridges,' helpedwith il'l'igation and farm projects, andhelped the people in sickness "and inhealth-all in the process of its militaryeampaigns. French Army influence extended to the back areas and brought help.They used not only ordinary soldiers, butspecialists as well. They especially usedthe SAS 01' Specialized Administration

Section, the equivalent of our civil affairs, in joint and parallel action.

The lesson is that by directly helpingindigenous people, combat success is fur-the red and the area is militarily strengthened to the mutual security and benefit ofall concern!'d. This is not easy. To helpmeans to divert combat strength. To helpmeans to divert from the classic and clearcut missions of "Take Hill 109" or "Dropin Zone Zebra." Plain.1y, military operations in a Twilight War embrace not onlymilitary objectives. Military operationsand objectives are parallel to political opel'atiCons and objectives.

Twilight War may be considered nottrue war. Plainly, it is not war in theclassic sense, but it is true war in amodern sense. Twilight War generally ispractieed by the Communist and it will bewith us for a long time. From the Communist viewpoint it is a safe form of confliet that can be waged with conventionalweapons within the panoply of nuclearWNlpons.

The Communist technique-amply demonstrated 111 a decade in which mutual nuclear weapons have existed-is to posethe small threat, magnify it into armedconflict of Twilight War proportions, andthen challenge the West to contairl or endit. Twilight War is a special form oflimited war-but so "pecial as to chal.lenge present.day military doctrine. Dowe have an organizational concept tbatforesees sending a unit from platoon to"egiment size into the countryside on itsown? Could the. unit impose its will eitherby force or persuasion or both, while making full use of doctors, mayors, chaplains,and uniformed school teachers as well asmilitary bridge builders? Could the unitsimultaneously bring a true sense of military-political-economic protection to localcommunities? '

Classic military actions, especially thosein which the opposing forces sweep backl and forth in the ebb and flow of maneuver.
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32 MILITARY REVIEW NOVEMBER 1960and success, leave communities at themercy of self-survival.

I f limited. warfare is changing-andthere is evidence that it is- then, it ischanging into a form of a military-political-economic force wherein the soldieremerges to play dual and difficult roles.Heretofore, it was simply military affairsfor the military and political affairs forthe civil servant. Times change! The military, whether it likes it or not, will beconcerned with the full range of militarypolitical-economic affairs. In limited warsof the future it is pos"sible for the Westernsoldier to fight with al l his modern weapons, but he can become lost-and he canlose-if he doesn't have his political-economic feet under him.

The Communist soldier travels on manylegs: military, political, economic, soci:6logical, propaganda, and psychological.But the Western soldierl up to now haswalked primarily on only two-both military-yet he is learning rapidly that Twilight War differs from classic combat.

Basis for DoctrineSeven principles for the foundation ofa doctrine for Twilight War have emerged: Protcct the peoplr.-This is a difficult job, especially when warfare is fluid.This means that communities must begiven inner protection if they are isolated.This is objectionable because it bleedsfighting power. But in a Twilight War,if an area is lost temporarily to the enemy, it can be profitable to leave behindisolated but strong bodies of troops. Theseunits not only can protect the people, butalso !can provide combat islands in theenemy's territory. These military "left behinds" need never be "sacrifice troops,"provided they are supported by air andreinforced by subsequent air and groundcombat actiOn.

Organize civilian life to fit the situat ionat hand. This is a large order, but it

can be done. Aftep all, wars are foughtfOl' people and for their protection andneeds. Soldiers cannot stop, drop theirguns, and stoop to care for civilians, butthere are ways to delineate the problem,fix the areas and functions of responsibility, and keep the combat troops in action.This is an organizational problem of com-bining "packages."

Organize and cany Ol1t leconsfruclion and edllcation.-The havoc broughtby war is not quickly reconstructed. Theside that does its utmost quickly will winthe favor of the local populace to somedegree. Create a local administration ofpower, vigor, and efficiency. We have donethis before. The point is, that it must bedone quickly and with staying power.

Clean up Ihe tenorists.-The people,if assisted by a variety of methods andmeans, may be of help. However, if the reogion is a formerly. hostile one, the effortmust be persuasive, efficient, and logicalin a political-economic sense and the overall effort must have the quality of permanency and logic.

Find the enemy through the people- The keystone to the success of this effort will be what the military force hasdone for the people by applying the aforementioned principles. This principle wasapplied in Malaya with good success. Deny the enemy th"ough the people.- I n Malaya the British practiced thisprinciple and found it basic in wiping outthe Communist irregulars. Rally the pllblic.-This may bebrought about more easily if the otherprinciples have been applied soundly. Ommust project a logical poJitiC"llI ideal-atangible, sensible form of government andorder that has meaning to the people.

Perhaps al l ef these principles are selfevident. There is need to study, examine,and amplify them further, shaping theminto doctrine for Twilight War.


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The Armed 1 Mightof R e ~ Chino

Major Edgar O'Ballanee ~Sherwood Foresters. T e r ~ i t o r i a l Army. Great Britain I

LIE most disturbing factor about Com-munist China today is that she is the onlymajor power in the world to allege that&he j , not afraid of a nuclear war. Re-ports indicate that she is conditioning herpopulation not to fear such an eventuality. Unlike the other Communist giant,Russia, she shows little interest in peace-ful coexistence.

Reliable information about the armedforce,; of Communist China is scarce, butsufficient is available to enable a roughpicture to be drawri. The reliability of thefacts and figures quoted cannot be abso-lutely guaranteed, but they are invariablythe mean average of a number of varyingestimates which I have selected as beingthe most likely to be accurate.

Fir,;t of all, the immensity of Chinamust be understood. China covers almostfoul' million square miles, and has a pop-ulation of at least 650 million people.Moreover, the population is reputed to beincreasing at the rate of about 15 milliona year, and experts anticipate that in afew years' time it will exceed one billion.I f this thought is not overwhelmingenough, over 500 million, perhaps more,of the Chinese people are regimented intocommunes.Mao Tse-tung has boasted that he hasa militia of over 250 million, and varyingreports indicate that his standing armyis not far short of the five million mark.

With these facts as a background letus analyze the armed fQrces.Communist China shows little interest in tire Soviet line of peacefulcoexistence. Should tile Communist idols fall, or the Communist godsrepeal their feet of clay, a Chinese military junta could step into power


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34 MILITARY REVIEW NOVEMBER' 1960"The Army

The s.trength of the standing army probably is about four and one-half million,consisting of about three million com-batant troops and the remainder in support forces.

Of this large combatant element, about90 percent at least is infantry, thus leav-ing only a comparatively small proportion of specialists, suc

military review, november 1960

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