military review november 1970

5/24/2018 Military Review November 1970

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Military Review November 1970 - Ethnic Weapons article (pdf pgs 7-15) - Race Specific Biological Weapons


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UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERALSTAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KANSAS

COMM ND NTMajor General John H Hay Jr

DEPUTY COMM ND NTBrigadier General James M Gibson

The Military Review is published by the United States Army Command and GeneralStaff College in close association with the United States Army War College. t provides aforum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy, nationalsecurity affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command.


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Military ReviewProfessional Journal of the US rmy

' ' i Q / J , , ~ ' i J i l J 1 ' l ' YEARS PF MILITA,BYBEBVIC:S.~ s : ; ~ ~ ~ ~ . . < _

Ethnic Weapons . Carl A. Larson 3

An MR Special Feature

and MAl Ronald 1. Smircich, USA

The Need for Assault Capabilities CPT Carl H. Amme, Jr., USN, Ret 12The Sino-Soviet Conflict and the Balance of Power . . TongChin Rhee 23Economy of Force in the Central Highlands MG Donn R. Pepke, USA 32Prevention of War . . . . . . . John F. Scott 44Fedayeen: Palestinian Commandos COL Selby F. Little, Jr., USA 49

Automotive Testing in the Desert LTC Kendall l Peterson, USA, Ret 56Alam Haifa-Last Chance in North Africa Sherwood S. Cordier 62The European Nuclear Dilemma . 1. E. Cadoux 75Challenge of the Mediterranean Robert A. Kilmarx 81Automation and Mobility . MAl John l Mentor, USA 90Military Notes 95Milita'l Books 104Reader Forum 110

VO NOV 1910 NO 11Library of Congress Catalog Card No 3433760 Rev.The VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS' and not necessarily those 'of the


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US Army or the Command and General Staff College.


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ETHNIC WEAPONSCarl A Larson

A NEW generation of chemicalweapons seems to be growingout of information collected and in-terpreted in research centers in bothEast and West. So far chemicalagents have been considered effectivemainly against tactical targets oflimited area. Even if this view maystill be maintained a new edge canbe honed to an already formidableweapon. Forthcoming chemical agentswith selective manstopping power willput into the hands of an assailant aweapon with which he cannot be at-tacked.At the bottom of this new reasoninglies a careful exploration of the reac-tion of individual soldiers to chemicalagents. Tactical consequences of thewide variation of such reactions in-volve both target analysis and theovember 197

selection of personnel for special mis-sions.With or without expoSUre to toxicproducts most molecules of the humanorganism keep to their ordinary tasksof maintaining structure. A fairlygreat number of molecules are heldin reserve against predicted needsbut a fatal chaos would result if toomany molecules were ready to reactwith each other. Our energy require-ments are satisfied by the transforma-tion of molecules capable of releasingenergy into other molecules with aless energy content. But every trans-formation whether it takes place na gun chamber or in a muscle callsfor the supply of activation energy.High pressure and temperature arenot compatible with vital functions.As in all other living organisms our


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molecules are kept arrayed until par-ticular trigger mechanisms lower theactivation energies of chemical reactions. These carefully safeguardedprocedures for alerting molecules areextremely selective and they dependon the activities of enzymes.Such catalysts of living organismshave attracted an increasing interestand new methods for the study of enzymes have accumulated some imposing and mostly new facts. One wayto knowledge about the ladders ofchemical reactions furthered at eachstep by a special enzyme is to studywhat happens when one enzymaticstep is blocked. Material for suchstudies is provided by nature and byartificial inactivation of particular enzymes intentional and accidental.Catalase ActivityThe immense laboratory of humannatural variation provides many instances of sharp differences in theactivities of well-defined enzymes.Catalase belongs to this category. Itstask is to split hydrogen peroxide Hz0. setting free oxygen. Today hydrogen peroxide may be better knownas a rocket propellant than as a disinfectant. If used in the latter capacitydiluted peroxide foams when broughtinto contact with blood or a freshscratch in the skin. Without catalasethere is no foam. We need the enzymeto inactivate hydrogen peroxide generated by bacteria trying to invade thegums through minute injuries.

arl A Larson heads the Depart-ment of Human Genetics at the Insti-tute of Genetic8 University of LundSweden. He holds a Licentiate degreefrom the Medical School of LundUniversity and i8 a licensed physician.Dr. Larson has published researchwork and popularized science in Amer-ican and European periodicals.

In the early fifties several Japanese families were observed wheresome members lacked catalase activity.Their blood produced no gas when incontact with hydrogen peroxide andthey had more or less severe ulceration of the gums with loss of teeth.This enzyme defect is rare and itfollows a simple mode of inheritancewith the parents of patients havinga normal or practically normal catalase activity. The changed gene responsible for lack of catalase is notconfined to east Asian populations aswas once suspected.Scores of enzyme failures due togene mutations have now becomeknown. Many of them cause earlydeath or severe mental retardation.Sometimes a dietary adjustment suffices to overcome tJ; e consequencesof enzymatic ineptitUde. The studyof such heritable disturbances hasincluded their p r e v l e ~ c e in differentgeographic regions.Basic PatternAlthough some outstanding inequalities between widely separatedethnic groups have been registereddetrimental genes are as a rule rareall over. Significant is the basic pattern repeating itself in scores ofenzymatic failures of a changed genecausing a distinct enzyme block. tdoes so alone or together with itssimilarly changed partner gene carrying its false message unaltered fromgeneration to generation.Besides these experiments by nature revealing the existence of anenzyme and its determining gene byreplacing the gene with an inert imitation information about enzymes hasbeen obtained from the study of theirinhibitors. Chains of vital processesin the human body concerned withenergy provision and material replace-

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MilitaryETHNIC WE PONS

Ami NHJ Featuf AEnzyme inhibitors could tum these troops into a state of paralysis

ment can be broken at will. For practical purposes the effect of a specificenzyme inhibitor is a disturbed function that can be seen or measured withspecial methods. In effect a supplypoint has been demolished.For widely varying purposes enzyme inhibitors have long been systematically studied. Their principalmodes of operation have been tracedand their practical use includes agents

with antibacterial and antitumor activity. The systematic search for enzyme inhibitors useful as insecticidesbegan in Leverkusen in the RhineProvince in the thirties. Insects havesolved their internal supply problemsmuch in the same way as the gar-dener or farmer who tries to survivehis bug fauna but there are differences in susceptibility to enzyme inhibitors. In 1937 the Leverkusen lab- ovember 197

oratories could however report a series of organophosphorous compoundsthat killed the gardener as well as hisbeetles.Keeping quiet about these reportsthe Wehrmacht began large-scale production in Dyhernfurth in Silesia ofwhat was code-named Trilon. Thiswas in April 1942. By 1945 some12 000 tons had been produced oftabun or GA Thus began the massproduction and stockpiling of the so-called nerve gases.Such highly toxic enzyme inhibitors demonstrate quite convincinglythe need for an orderly mobilizationof molecules for a given mission inthis case signal transmission. Toomuch or too little too early or toolate means chaotic performance byactivated molecules.When the brain orders a muscle to

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shorten the signal is dispatched viaa nerve which triggers numerousmuscle fibers. This is done throughthe transcription of the nerve signalto a chemical message acetylcholinebeing released t the endings of nervefibers. As long as the flow of impulses

mediate result is a persistent muscular contraction a st te of crampfollowed by paralysis. And this is exactly wh t happens when the criticalesterase called acetylcholinesterasebecomes inhibited by a G-type phosphorous compound. When the block

Ann. N ~ t D eaturesFace masks provide protection from a variety of agents but a minute droplet of VE orVX passing rapidly through the skin can be fataltravels through the nerve acetylcho- between nerve and muscle affects theline is discharged and the muscle re- limbs the result is temporary inabilitymains contracted. What happens when of service. But muscles of respirationthe muscle gets word to suspend ac- are also involved with death followtion is not only th t the tr nsmitter ing exposure to relatively small quansubstance acetylcholine 8toIls being tities. Thus GA can kill in concenset free but the chemical signal be- trations of 4 milligrams per cubiccomes muted and acetylcholine is im- meter of ir during 1 minutes ofmediately broken up into inactive com- exposure through inhalation. How-pounds. This vital t sk is fulfilled by ever GB and GD have a lethal con- n esterase a specialized enzyme. centration of only 1 milligrams underWithout normal activity of this the same conditions.esterase acetylcholine remains t the A further development of the Gnerve fiber endings. The command to series of chemical agents is reprecease action does not arrive. The im- sented by the V anticholinesterases

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which are active after having passedthe skin. The G agents are also absorbed through unprotected skin butthey evaporate too fast for full effect.A minute droplet of VE or VX passing rapidiy through the skin into theblood circulation can kill a soldier.Questions about the limitations ofchemic8 warfare have been raisedfrom time to time. The high toxicityof G and V-type enzyme inhibitorsand the possibility of using strategicmissiles with chemical warheads carrying well above four tons of payload have raised the discussion toanimated altitudes. With existing ordnance employed on a modest scale andwith only a fraction of the GB nowin stock the inhabitants of ParisOsaka or Los Angeles could be asphyxiated. But this does not draw thewhole picture.Blocking gentsBy a peculiar coincidence an inbornvariability in the activity of cholinesterases has been observed. For variousmedicinal purposes drugs are used tointerrupt the transmission of thenerve impulse where it reaches themuscle. One objective is relaxation ofthe abdominal wall so that surgicalmanipulations can be carried outwithout resort to deep anesthesia.Blocking agents of the same typeare also used. to decrease muscularspasms in tetanus and to prevent mishaps in the electroshock treatment ofpsychiatric disorders. One widely usedblocking agent derives from curarethe South American arrow poison.Another is suxamethonium which cutsthe nerve-muscle signal by interferingwith the shifting of electrons at thecritical junction.The therapeutic effect aimed atshould vanish with the need for relaxation but in some patients suxa-November 191

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methonium caused unexpectedly longlaming of muscles and dangerousstandstill of respiration. While curarewas at an earlier stage of its medicaluse the carefully guarded secret oftribal witch doctors nothing in thatway entered modern anesthesiology.The relaxant was right; the patientwas unfit. The untoward reaction wasbrought about by a weak or absentcholinesterase activity.Persons with this potentially fatalweakness are in excellent health aslong as they are not exposed to suxamethonium. The deficient enzyme differs in some respects from the cholinesterase handling acetylcholine. t isproduced by the directives of achanged gene and the fault appearsin consecutive generations.Human VariationsSuch chance findings of heritabledifferences inevitably attract the at-tention of people who study the distribution of different genes in humanpopulations. The esterase differenceshave been studied in detail with theaid of specific enzyme inhibitors. Inessence their inheritance follows wellknown Mendelian patterns. A personwho has the usual gene on both oftwo ordinary chromosomes is endowedwith a lOO-percent esterase activity;the atypical gene on the same site ofboth chromosomes renders only 50percent enzyme activity. f two suchpersons start a family their childrenwill each have one usual and oneatypical gene and 75-percent enzymeactivity.

Close to four percent of the normalpeople in Canada and Britain carrythe atypical gene with the resultingreduced esterase activity. Similar proportions of 75 percenters have beenobserved in non-European populations.t is quite possible that the atypical


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gene and a third gene causing induplicate zero esterase activity willfinally be found to have about thesame distribution in geographicallywidely separated populations.But this is only a stray observationfitting into a repeatedly confirmedpattern of human variation. n briefhuman populations can be characterized by frequencies of distinct genes.Sometimes; gene frequencies agreefairly we between widely dispersedpopulations but more often there aregreat differences. This view differsfrom the concept of typification established in physical anthropology untilmathematical models and the observation of simply inherited normaltraits made the study of gene frequencies meaningful.

iochemical DifferencesWith World War I came the firstimpetus to the new approach bloodgroup frequencies in Allied armiesbeing found to vary considerablyamong personnel of different geographic origin. Next blood groupswere used to map the world population. n central Asia the B-gene frequency comes near 30 percent; inAmerican Indians this gene is originally absent. When new blood groupsystems were discovered EUropeanAsian and African populations couldbe characterized by a number of independently varying gene frequencies.Widely used in such studies ofhuman populations is the ability totaste diluted solutions of phenylthiourea. Persons who carry a variantof the taster gene on both of thecritical chromosomes are nontasters.f somebody were to dissolve a sufficient amount of phenylthiourea in

the drinking water in Mahar India54 percent of all water drinkers wouldcomplain of the bitter taste. Among

Brazilian Indians an identical experiment would make little more than onepercent aware of the admixture.Several other biochemical differences between human beings havebeen studied with an increasing awareness that some of these differencesmay be adaptive. When a simply inherited variant of the red coloringmatter of blood practically absent inEurope was observed to be commonin a broad belt across central Africait was brought into relation with thehigh incidence of malaria in theseregions.Carriers of the changed gene havean increased chance of becominggrandparents in spite of the highmortality among their children wherethe abnormal gene in the duplex stateis a merciless killer. The cause is thegreater resistance to malaria grantedby a single gene for the deviant pigment. n the Mediterranean regionsimilar situations include other variants of blood pigment and also anenzyme defect significantly commonin old malaria regions.Enzymatic Reactionsn the present decade knowledgeabout enzyme polymorphisms has accumulated. f a deviant gene is toocommon in a given population to remain prevalent only through newmutations it has a polymorphic distribution. More often than not theselective forces balancing such relatively high frequencies of a substandard gene are completely unknown. Thechance observation of a reaction toa certain drug is obviously just theshadow on the wall. The real itemhas to be searched for among entangled molecular supply lines in theliving organism. Clearly a relativeadvantage in one environment grantedcarriers of a mutant gene can be

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entirely void in another environment.But the decisive environmentsl factors of selection can hardly be suxamethonium drugs sulfonamides orBZ-type chemical agents.Careful analyses of enzymatic reaction patterns to a series of drugsare underway and we may soon havea grid where new observations of thiskind can be pinpointed. One set ofreference lines in this grid goes fromgenes necessary for enzyme production. Another set of lines marks substances turning on and off the makingof active enzymes which can but neednot be alerted.Recently a series of widely debatedobservations have revealed an enzymedeficiency in southeastern Asian populations making them susceptible to

a poison to which Caucasoids arelargely adapted. In such situationsthe sketchy grid just mentioned isof some use. One looks for the possibility of the poison-provoking enzymeproduction an individual adaptationobserved in several instances.The poison now at issue is milk. InEuropeans intolerance to lactose ormilk sugar occurs as a rare recessivetrait Healthy parents each carryinga single mutant gene have childrenapproximately one-fourth of whomreact to milk ingestion with diarrheavomiting malabsorption and evendeath. When reports on milk intolerance in various groups of non-European began to accumulate it was remembered that malnourished childrenin east Africa got diarrhea when

Innate differences in vulnerability to chemical agents between different populationshave led to the possible development of ethnic weaponsovember 197 9


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treated with dried skimmed milk.Then, the enzyme lactase was foundto lose its activity in the intestinalmucosa of African infants over thefirst four years of life.New reports on milk intolerance inChinese, Filipinos, and Indians weremet with skepticism in that the groupsstudied might not be representativeof their peoples. A study reportedfrom the Chiengmai University inThailand has, however, revealed awidespread lactose intolerance inadults in northern Thailand, the lactase activity getting lost between thefirst and fourth years of life. By inference, it has been found likely thatSoutheast Asians, in general, aredeficient in lactase production.Rapid and Slow Inaetil atorsSimilar observations of geographically distinct enzyme differences areto be expected. Among the obviouslyinherited differences in enzymaticresponse to chemical agents, acetylation is marked by a clear separationof people in two groups. Originally,one group was characterized as composed of rapid inactivators of isoniazid, a drug used against tuberculosis.The other group of slow inactivatorscarries an alternative gene less i-cient in converting isoniazid to acetylisoniazid. Europeans, as well as Americans of African descent, have amongtheir numbers about 50 percent slowinactivators. Eskimos and Japanesehave approximately 10 percent slowinactivators.

The method of acetylation to inactivate a molecule is not confined toisoniazid. People belonging to the twoacetylator classes reveal differencesin handling a number of other drugs,including enzyme inhibitors actingupon the central nervous system. Although the study of drug metabolizing

enzymes is only beginning, observedvariations in drug response havepointed to the possibility of great innate differences in vulnerability tochemical agents between differentpopulations.A series of enzyme inhibitors andchemically active substances interfering with signal transmission in thebrain and spinal cord have been intensely studied since the early fifties.Many of these substances have acolorful prehistory saturated withtribal sorcery.The incapacitant known as BZ derives from a drug which before itspresent renaissance as lysergic aciddiethylamide (LSD) caused epidemicoutbursts of Saint Anthony s fire inthe ark Ages. With ditran-like compounds, BZ shares the capacity toproduce transient toxic psychosis,sometimes compared to schizophrenia.Search ContinuesSurrounded with clouds of secrecy,a systematic search for new incapacitating agents is going on in manylaboratories. The general idea, as discussed in open literature, was originally that of minimal destruction. Psychochemicala would make it possibleto paralyze temporarily entire population centers without damage to homesand other structures. In addition, withthe small quantities required for fulleffect of modern incapacitating agents,logistics problems would be minute.The effective dose of BZ-type agentsamounts to micrograms.

t is quite possible to use incapacitating agents over the entire rangeof offensive operations, from covertactivities to mass destruction. Onefairly obvious offensive preparationis protection of the country s own personnel by tolerance-building. This iswhere enzymatic response to psycho-


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chemicals enters the scene. Exposureto drugs or to molecules of almostidentical composition is known to produce with varying degrees of -curacy resistance to the toxic effectat repeated exposure. As this is aknown and thoroughly discussed procedure concealment of large-scalepreparations of this type probablywould be difficult if not wholly impossible.Another prospect may tempt an aggressor who knows he can recruitfrom a population largely tolerantagainst an incapacitating agent towhich the target popUlation is susceptible. An innate immunity wouldoffer concealment of preparationsand obvious advantages in many tactical situations. When the properchemical agent is used against intermingled friendly and enemy units

c s u l t i ~ s may occur in proportionsone to 10.Such inferences are barely extrapolations of observed genetic differences between major human populations and of research programs knownto be in progress. Widely differentopinions have been ventured as tothe type of chemical operations likelyto be directed against military personnel and the civilian population ina future war. There have been somerecent tendencies to stress the widelatitude between incapacitating andthe lethal action of BZ-type agents.Friendly troops could use them todampen belligerence. They effectivelyslow down physical and mental activity make the poisoned personnelgiddy disoriented and more or lessunable or unwilling to carry out commands.

ETHNIC WE PONS

Friendly forces would discriminatingly use incapacitants in entangledsituations to give friend and foe ashort period of enforced rest to sortthem out. By gentle persuasion aidedby psychochemicals civilians in enemy cities could be reeducated. Theadversary would use incapacitants tospare those whom he could use forslaves. There is little that humanbiology can contribute to prognoses ofthat type.

The factual basis of abundant enzyme inhibitors of widely differenttypes can be neglected as little asmodern methods for their distribution. They need not be gases in atrue sense. Well-studied enzymes represent a small proportion of the totalnumber of catalysts necessary for ourvital processes. When new enzymevarieties are discovered some of themare likely to overstep the prevalencelimits so far observed both high andlow in different populations.

ut the production of enzymes inthe living cell could not be selectivelyquenched until details of early signaltransmission from the gene becameknown in 1969. During the first halfof that year several laboratories reported factors engaged in passing overthe genic message from DNA theprimary command post to RNA whichrelays the chemical signal. The enzymatic process for RNA productionhas been known for some years butnow the factors have been revealedwhich regulate the initiation andspecificity of enzyme production. Notonly the factors have been found buttheir inhibitors. Thus the functionsof life lie bare to attack.

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ASSAULT CAPABILITIESCaptain Carl H. Amme, r ~ United States Navy Retired

T IS GENERALLY assumed th tsome military options re politicallymore acceptable th n others, nd th tsome options re even ruled out be-cause of the political costs or the ulti-mate risks they entail. The militaryplanner may plan on the basis of mili-t ry considerations only to discoverth t political considerations dominatemilit ry imperatives. Poli1lical consid-erations operate to facilitate or con-str in the choice of military alterna-tives and limit the use of militarypower in the event of conflict, and f-

fect the decision to use military forcein the first place.The two re clearly interrelated.The same complex considerations th tcause w r in the first place also influ-ence the choice of military objectivesand the restrictions placed on militaryforces. Military choices re drawn notonly on the basis of military require-ments involving the capability offriendly and enemy forces, but alsowith reg rd to the consequences a par-ticular choice may work among thenations of the world.

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The motives behind a decision touse force or make war are expressedin the way priorities are assigned tovarious political goals. The politicalvalues considered important at onetime, in one context, may not have thesame importance at another time, inanother context. The most seriousthreat to an important national interest does not automatically lead to adecision to intervene on behalf of theinterest. There must be some prospectof success if intervention is to beseriously entertained.Direct ResponseBoth the United States and the Soviet Union have the power to enforcetheir wills on nations within their respective spheres of influence. The existence of the strategic-nuclear balance, embodied in the nuclear strik-ing forces of the two countries, tendsto influence each country to avoid direct conflict with the other. When oneof the countries has a cause to advance, it tends to advance the causethrough means that will not calI fortha direct response against itself.

Captain Carl H. Amme, Jr., USNavy, Retired, is a Senior OperationsAnalyst with the Stanford ResearchInstitute, Menlo Park, California. Hereceived a B.S. degree from the USNaval Academy at Annapolis; an M.A.in International Relations from theAmerican University, Washington, DC.; and is a Ph. D candidate at theUniversity of Southern California.During World War II, he served in theAleutians, and subsequently with theMilitary ir Transport Service and asDeputy Director of Missile Development, Bureau of Naval Weapons. He isa frequent lecturer at universities andcol/eges, and is the author of NATOWithout France and numerous articleson the politico-military aspects of national defense problems.

SS ULT C P BILmESAt the same time, abstract principles play a part in shaping decisionsabout intervention, whatever the goalor national interest that interventionis meant to serve. Thus, there is, inthe United States, a substantial inter

est in nonintervention as a principleat the same time that there is a substantial interest in not suffering astrategic defeat. The principle has todo with feelings about what one wouldprefer not to do while the interest hasto do with what others may do to usif we suffer a strategic defeat.Bay of PigsHans J. Morgenthau uses the Bay ofPigs as an example of the conflict between principle and interest:

The United States was resolved tointervene on behalf of its interests,but it was also resolved to intervenein such a way s not openly to violatethe principle of non-interventionThe United States failed to assignpriorities to these two interests. Inorder to minimize the loss of prestige,the United States jeopardized the success of the intervention. Instead ofusing concern for prestige as a datumamong others in the political equation. tha t is, as an interest among othersi t submitted to it as though it werean abstract principle imposing absolute limits upon the actions necessary

to achieve success.The Soviet Union escapes the dilemma between principle and interestby promulgating the Brezhnev doc

trine, calling for intervention in theaffairs of Socialist countries when ir-responsible leaders cause the countryto stray from the valid pathway ofSocialist development.The rapidity with which Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 receded

1 Hans J . Morgenthau, To Intervene or Notto Intervene. FOf eign A f f a ~ r t J April 1967, p 481.


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US 'Ann.1IKorea was a form of direet intervention eharaeterized by a deliberate decision toemploy armed forces in support of US interestsfrom memory in the West and the ment of principle about European in-ease with which Soviet intervention tervention in US affairs as in thein Czechoslovakia bas been passed over Cuban case runs afoul of the equallyby most of the world seem to have certain principle of nonintervention bymade a Soviet statement of principle the United States. Revulsion at USsupertluous wben it comes to interven- intervention in Latin-American affairstion. The statement was not made certainly intluenced tbe outcome of thetherefore to legitimize intervention in Cuban affair from the Bay of Pigs tothe eyes of the world .but only to lay the missile crisis.down a firm rule that could be called The result of the con1lict betweento the attention of any member of the two equally valid principles was thatSocialist Commonwealth who might be the Soviet Union was granted tacitthinking about swimming against the recognition of its right to stationcurrent of Socialist reality as defined forces in Cuba so long as they wereby the Soviet Union. not equipped with missiles and me-Conflict between two principles of dium bombers. At the same time theoperation in foreign relations can be United States has been left with theas difficult to resolve as contlict be- dilemma of deciding which is moretween national interest and principle. i m p o r t n ~ b s e r v n c e of the princi-The Monroe Doctrine a clear state pIe of nonintervention in order to keep

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the Latin Americans happy, or observance of the principles of the MonroeDoctrine in the interest of US security.egree of TensionsThe importance of an issue in dispute between the two superpowerscannot always be ascertained with anypl'ecision. When an issue is raised,however, it can be assumed that oneside or the other think$ it importantwhether or not the objective viewercan see the importance. t must besupposed that, once an issue is raised,some judgment of the priority assigned to the issue may be made. However, the tension and antagonism generated around an issue may be a measure less of its importance than of thedepth of the conflict between the policies of the two superpowers.Tensions, such as those of the coldwar, are not susceptible of rationalanalysis. The conflict of interests overa well-defined objective lDay becomecharacterized by the passionate clashof ideologies and attempts to assertprestige and test resistance. What isat stake in the conflict between thesuperpowers is domination. The tensions are heightened or relaxed according to the specific issues at themoment, but they submerge the clear

cut political goals that are in conflict.The importance of various politicalobjectives and interests must, therefore, be judged in the context of thetensions between the United Statesand the USSR: Action-reaction resp01l8e in Soviet-United States relations affects themeans by which the two superpowerspursue objectives and establishes aclimate that conditions the policiesof other powers. For example, thedetente in Europe creates concern inGermany that the United States andNovember 197

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the Soviet Union might reach agreement before the problem of reunification is resolved. The eziBtence of spheres of influence in any particular area places ahigher importance on the interests ofthe country that exercises the predominant influence. For example, theexistence of a US sphere of influencein West Europe and the tacit Sovietrecognition of US predominance wouldresult in ranking the importance ofUS interests higher then Soviet interests in that area. The reverse is trueof East Europe. This has placed alimit, for example, on how far Czechoslovakia and other satellite states maygo in their liberalizing and nationalistmovements. Clutnges n the stra tegic blllanceaffect the willingness of each superpower to court conflict or even militaryconfrontation and affect the constraint that can be exercised on lesserpowers by nuclear threats. The Sino-Soviet split and the active competition offered by China'sbrand of communism in the developing areas of the world affect SovietUnited States relations and the im. portance that the Soviets and Americans assign to their respective politicalgoals and objectives.Values of NationSecuritY, power, and wealth havebeen cited as three of the more important values of a nation. Nationalsecurity is usually regarded as thehighest political value; it is a vitalinterest simply defined as one forwhich a nation would fight. But thisdefinition conceals the fact thet nationa will differ in the efforta they willexpend to gain security. How else canone account for the lag in US reactionto the German and Japanese threat ofthe thirties or to the fact that Czecho


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slovakia lifted not a finger to preserveits independence in 1938, 1948, and1968?Even today, it is difficult to identifyand rank the political values inherentin the US support of the Republic ofVietnam. National security, US reliability as an ally, right of self-determination, support for the Free World,containment of communism, a demonstration of commitment and resolve,interests and purposes of allies (forexample, the Philippines, Australia,and Thailand), prestige, the American tradition of winning its wars, andbuying time have al\ been cited aspolitical values important to theUnited States. No doubt some subjective assessment of both the pragmatic and idealist values could bemade, but only at the hazard of widedisagreement.Analyzing the national interests andpolitical values does not produce clearcriteria for a scale of values. A statehas many national interests and political values, and some, like the greatgeneralities of the constitution, embody the political and cultural traditions within which a nation formulates its foreign policy. The valuesmay be vital, or merely peripheral, butit is difficult to categorize them without considering the role and availability of military forces to preserve them.Role of Military ForcesThe role of military force derivesfrom the purpose of maintaining aninternational environment withinwhich a nation can pursue its nationalpurposes without having to use military force. The requirement to beplaced on the military forces cannotbe clearly defined in advance of contingencies. The only recourse is tomaintain a force of sufficient size andflexibility so that the nation's capacity

to deal with threat to its values isunambiguous.Some insight can be gained intothese crucial political considerationsby examining situations since WorldWar II in which US leaders contemplated military intervention or actually intervened for the purpose ofdefending US interests or those of itsallies.orms of InterventionAside from a peaceful show of force,military intervention may take twogeneral forms. The first is direct intervention actually carried out inKorea and the Dominican Republic andthreatened during the Cuban missilecrisis. Such intervention is characterized by a deliberate decision to employ armed forces to the extent necessary to prevent the enemy from achieving his objective or to restore peaceon terms compatible with US interests.The second form is Vietnam where

the United States became involved indirectly, not as a result of a majordeliberation, but through a series ofsmal\ decisions involving military assistance and advisors, and where eachstep that deepened the US commitmentwas reasonably regarded at the timeas the last that might be necessary.US intervention in Lebanon in 1958was of the first type. even though noshot was fired. Landing the battalionof 6th Fleet Marines was quickly followed up by Marine reinforcements,the US Army 24th Airborne Brigadeand elements of the 19th Air Force.US forces deployed in the vicinity ofBeirut in the next few days includedabout 15,000 men of whom 8,000 wereUS Army and about 6,000 were USMarines. Also committed were 150 USAir Force combat aircraft and 270aircraft of the 6th Fleet carriers.This was a sizable force to commit

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to a situation where the existing civilwar had already reached a stalemate.The fortuitous outcome, however,could not have been foreseen, and, hadthe civil war again erupted at the timeof intervention, even more US troopswould have been required.

The United States also intervened

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Treaty Organization allies by threat-ening retaliation.The United States intervened indirectly in Guatemala, Quemoy, Bay ofPigs, and in Vietnam at least, in the

last case, initially). Each of these conflicts was characterized by an explicitdecision not to project US military

Yono Dirioionlut oring ComJ GflYAir assault and amphibious forces form an essential component of US capability toproject its power to the rimIandsdirectly at the time of the 1956 Suezcrisis, but not militarily. Both theUnited States and theOUSSR broughtpressure to bear to bring that war toa close. The United States put greatdiplomatic pressure on Britain andFrance, including financial pressurethrough the World Bank. The USSRentered into vigorous diplomatic correspondence and made nuclear threatsagainst London and Paris. The UnitedStates, after some delay, responded tothe Soviet threat to its North AtlanticNovember 197

forces into the existing conflict toachieve the US limited objective. Therisks of getting involved militarilywere low in the case of Guatemala andthe Bay of Pigs, but were appreciablyhigher in Quemoy and in Vietnamwhere there were distinct possibilitiesthat a well-armed Communist enemymight commit hostile acts against USforces.The accompanying chart summarizes the influence of political considerat,ions on the decision to intervene,

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Inlluence of Political Considerations anDecisions to Intervene and Choice o Alternative Military Forces

s ;t:l. lt : ~I i llIll 0

III

=1~'S ......i t::1 i l~ O i ~0

Korea High Low, thenHigh High Low ConflictGuatemala High High SuccessSuez High High SuccessLebanon High High High Low SuccessQuemoy High High High SuccessBay of Pigs High Medium High FailureLaos(Thailand) High High High Low SuccessCuba Missile High High High High SuccessDominicanRepublic High High High Low ConflictVietnam High High High Low Conflict

military objectives, military constraints, and choice of alternative military forces in 10 selected crises. Theinfluence of US political considerationswere uniformly high on the decision tointervene and on the military constraints imposed.The choice of military objectives inthe indirect support rendered inGuatemala and Quemoy did not appear to be influenced by US politicalconsiderations. Particularly in thecase of Quemoy, the United Stateswould have preferred for NationalistChina to pull back to Taiwan. Theselection of the Bay of Pigs as an objective rather than the town of Trin-

idad was dictated by the US desireto conceal its involvement in the operation.In Korea, General Douglas MacArthur had considerable leeway initially in choosing military objectives.After the Chinese crpssed the Yalu,US political consideraltions influencedthese military choices to a muchgreater extent. Four direct and twoindirect interventions resulted in successful attainment of US political objectives without involving US forcesin conflict. Two direct and one initiallyindirect intervention resulted in conflict (Korea, the Dominican Republic,and Vietnam). One indirect interven-

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tion, the Bay of Pigs, resulted in fail-ure.Political considerations influencedthe choice of alternative militaryforces to a significant extent only inthe case of Quemoy, where naval es-cort was chosen over bombing main-land Chinese airfields, and in theCuban missile crisis (where a navalblockade was chosen over bombing andinvasion).The analysis of 10 crises and con-flicts revesled that The major political values influencing the decision to intervene withmilitary forces were the strategic interests political objecti1les commitments and constraint8 that were percei1led by the President and his advisors in the circumstances at the time. The choice o alternati1le militaryresponses was based primarily on theavailability and auitability o the mili

tary forc6s in being. The structuralarrangements within the Departmentof Defense and the operating philoso-phy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff revolvearound the concept of balanced gen-eral purpose forces. The wide range ofcontingencies examined indicated thata large variety of capabilities wereneeded and, in most part, were avail-able for the military responses decidedupon.There were exceptions. For example,President Harry S Truman s decisionto intervene in Korea was based, inpart, o a mistaken assessment of thecapabilities of the South Koreanarmies. But it was not a crucial factorin his view. Political considerations greatlyinfluenced the choice o military ob-jecti1les and the constraints imposedupon the actions o military com-manders. For example, President

us AnIo.The C-5A enhances US strategic airlift capability, bat it does aot eliminate the needfor assault forcesN Yember 197 19


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Dwight D. Eisenhower s preoccupation with not provoking the SovietUnion during the Suez crisis of 1956led him to modify the Joint Chiefsmeasures for improving the Nation sstate of readiness by insisting thatthey be carried out progressivelyrather than all at once.Also, the response of convoying Nationalist Chinese forces to Quemoyand providIng them with certain amphibious vessels was chosen in lieu ofbombing the Chinese artillery emplacements on the mainland out offear of widening the scope of the confiict. In Lebanon, political considerations prevented the army from disembarking its onest John missiles.These conclusions provide importantperspectives for future military strat-egy. Barring a major war that wouldradically change the strategic balancebetween the Soviet Union and theUnited States, US military strategywill continue to be based on the requirement of projecting US power inall ita forms overseas to the rimlands.ea and ir dvantagesThe military and logistic advantages of sea and airlift have beendemonstrated in historical case studies

and by analysis. For example, AlbertWohlstetter has shown that the UnitedStates can lift four times as much tothe Thai-Laotian border from 8,500miles away as China can from 450miles away.2 Air assault and amphibious forces are an essential componentof this capability. To bank on the useof military forces to protect administrative landings without preparingfor possible assault places too great atrust in the accuracy of inteIligenceand forecloses on options of nationaldecision makers. The distinction be-

S Albert WohIstetter Theory and Opposed Y -tems Design tJ Conflict Resolution September 1968

tween peacekeeping operations andlimited war is finely drawn.There is another political consideration that argues strongly for an assault capability. The Soviets haveplaced a major effort in developing amerchant marine that would permitpeaceful penetration and subversion incertain countries of the third world.The Soviet Navy itself is beginningto playa role in this strategy with itspenetration into the Mediterraneanand Red Sea and its visits to portsand anchorages in the United ArabRepublic, Algeria, Yemen, and othercountries,The presence of Soviet warships inthe port of a strife-torn nation mightwell inhibit US decision makers fromusing these ports for delivery of military assistance or combat support forfear of a direct confrontation. Air assault capabilities provide an obviousalternative.Current MoodThe fact that the current mood ofthe country is for more limited commitments abroad actually i n r e ~ s e sthe size of general purpose assaultforces likely to be required as the decision to intervene is delayed by political considerations. f one could be surethat the political decision to intervenewith military forces would be prompt,then joint air-ground task forcesmight offer initial advantages in somecases. But the historical analyses haveshown that, with the sole exception ofKorea, political considerations operated to delay decisions long enoughfor both air assault and amphibiousforces to arrive on the scene.The case for the use of decisive military force at the outset rests principally upon the propositions that gradual escalation is, in the end, morecostly; that the desired objectives are,

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in fact, obtainable through dominantUS military force and not throughlesser means of US support; and thatprompt, decisive action will not trig-ger the entry of some other majorpower that otherwise might not bedrawn into the conflict.These propositions must be basedon political judgments in the contextof each new military action that iscontemplated. The problems that haveattended gradual escalation in Vietnam are not proof that any othercourse would have been bound to succeed in Vietnam or that the Vietnamexperiences may be projected upon asituation involving different geographic factors, different arrangements of loyalties, different conceptsof US interests, and different risksand opportunities.Alternative ResponsesOnce the crucial decision to intervene is made, the choice of alternativemilitary responses will be based primarily on the availability and suitsbility of the militsry forces in being.An air barrier over sovereign terri-tory might preclude the use of certainair routes, thus negating the theoretical advantage of speed of response normally attributed to airlift.

Austria protested our infringementof its airspace during the Lebanoncrisis, and there is a distinct possibility that even some of our allies, suchas France and Turkey, might react insimilar manner. North African stateslikewise would probably bar the useof their airspace in connection withconflicts in central Africa. One couldargue that these political considerations would be overridden in time ofactual limited war. But they are realconstraints during periods of crisiswhen peacekeeping operations are setin motion to forestall a conflict.November 197

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One can clearly assume that, in thefuture, US commitments will be minimized and kept as equivocal as possible. In a crisis, the United States willmake a pronounced effort to abstainfrom action outside the diplomaticrealm. I f however, military action istaken, it will be taken in concert withother powers if possible with as littleforce, as little damage, and as littleprovocation of the USSR as appearsachievable in pursuit of the objectivesof US action.Simultaneous Crises

On the other hand, the frequency ofconflict has actually increased duringthe past two decades. Experience hasshown that crises often occur simultaneously in different parts of theworld. Furthermore, crises cannot always be considered as isolated incidents. They are often a part of alarger political context.

In other words, a conflict that mightoccur in Libya or Ethiopia cannot beregarded as an isolated situation outside of the demonstrated United.States-USSR contention for influence 0in the Middle East and elsewhere inthe world. Also, one does not have toascribe a monolithic exercise of control of the Communist world to recognize that advantage can be taken ofUS involvement in one area to precipitate a crisis in another. This wasclearly demonstrated in the simultaneity of the Chinese-Indian borderwar at the time of the Cuban missilecrisis.The role of military forces derivesfrom the overriding political objectiveof maintaining an international environment within which the UnitedStates can pursue national ends without the use of military force. Thus, USmilitary forces must be responsive tothe anticipated needs of our political

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leadership, recognizing that theseneeds cannot always be clearly definedwell in advance of contingencies. Thisrequires a force of sufficient size andflexibility to make manifest the abilityof the United States t deal with conflicts threatening significant US security interests.The availability and presence of air

assault and amphibious forces withinrange of crisis areas provide the President with options not only in the decision to intervene or not to intervene,but also in the selection of military objectives that serve US national interests. To cut back on our military preparedness eliminates important national options that prudence demands.

JUNIOR OFFICERSThe Military Review is particularly interested in the opin

ions and attitudes of junior officers regarding the Army. Leadership, the place of the Ariny officer in society, Army education,the service as a career, discipline--in short, what s wrong aswell as what s right with the Army are all subjects whichmerit discussion. Why not put your thoughts on paper and submit a manuscript to us. Here is a chance to present your ideasto colonels and generals and earn a little money to boot. Manuscripts should be mailed to: Editor, Military Review, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.

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TheSino-SouietConflict

olance of PowerTong-Chin Rhee

A FEW years ago the suggestionof the present state of affairsbetween Communist China and the Soviet Union would have raised suspicionconcerning the knowledge of the person making it. With human memorybeing so short we tend to ignore important messages buried in the past.However a study of history is essential for an understanding of presenttimes and events. Among many epi- ovember197

sodes involving the Chinese one pertinent today can be gleaned from thememoirs of the late Admiral of theFleet William D. Leahy.In 1945 after the Yalta agreementthe Chinese Nationalist Governmentof Chiang Kai-shek was negotiatingwith the Soviet Union on a treaty ofalliance and friendship. Because theSoviets had extracted a long list ofconcessions from the Chinese as the

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price of their last-minute interventionin the war against Japan, Washington's major concern was how to bolsterthe weak Chinese position to avert excessive Soviet extortion over andabove what had been agreed upon between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin at Yalta. Tensions weremounting between Moscow and Washington, and the cold war was alreadyon.Soong s ositionRetlecting this mood of concern,Admiral Leahy, the President's chiefmilitary aide, cautiously remindedForeign Minister T. V. Soong of Chinathat any further concessions to theSoviet Union, over and above what theUnited States had promised Moscow,were to be made without US recognition and entirely on China's volition.Soong's position was that China:

Was too weak to withstand thepressing demands of the Soviet Union. Had to be cautious and friendlyto the USSR lest it should antagonizeMoscow to the point of supporting theChinese Communists overtly in the impending struggle of power.Tong-Chin Rhee is Assistant Pro

fessor, Department of History, University of Dayton, Ohio. A native ofSeoul, Korea, he received his B.A. andM.P.A. degrees from Seoul NationalUniversity; his M.A. in InternationalRelations from Lehigh University,Bethlehem, Pennsylvania; and hisPh. D. in History from Clark University, Worcester, Massat:husettll. From1958 to 1960, he served in the Republicof Korea Army, National Defense Col-lege, and with the Joint Chiefs ofStaff. He also has been a Research Assistant and Consultant with the Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D. CHis article, Pompidou and FrenchPolicy, a fYPeared in the October 1969issue of the MILITARY REVIEW.

Would prefer to settle the controversy by military action some timein the future.To Leahy's question concerningwhen the military reckoning' wouldtake place, Soong answered, ''Well,that might be any time in the next fivehundred years. 1ationalistic RegimeThis essentially Chinese remarkcould still apply to the Red Chinese.

What people have forgotten is that themainland Chinese regime has gradually transformed itself from a totallyRed regime to an essentially Nationalistic Red regime in the past decadeor so. Practically everybody had theobsession of a monolithic Communistworld and had difficulty predicting thephysical confrontation between thebrother parties of the Red world. Thebasic nature of the Communist inter-nationalism of Karl Marx, V I Lenin,and even Joseph Stalin simply did notallow such a prediction.Whatever the analysis of the eventstaking place between the two nominally Communist giants, we must accept the fact of confrontation and thepossibility of a military exchange aswell. An understanding of the problems must start from that premise although a negotiated settlement cannotbe entirely ruled out.If we acknowledge the clashes atDamansky (Chenpao) Island on theUssuri River or along the borders ofSinkiang Province, our immediate concern would be how real or immediateare the dangers of physical contlict between the Chinese and the Soviets?Or if the chances of military contlictare real enough, how much possibilityis there for these two Communist

1 Admiral of the Fleet William D Leahy 1 WasTher : Th P ona Storti of th hief of Staffto Pf eaidentB Boo 6velt and TnLman Based on HiNotes Btld Dia.ries MGde: t t th Time. WhittleseyHouse McGrawBill Book Co N Y 1950 p 389Military eview4


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states actually to blow each otherapart? And, then, if they did, withwhat consequences?Obviously, as there is a serious imbalance of forces between Peking andMoscow, 'in material terms, the answercould vary depending on the anglefrom which we examine the presentsituation. From the Soviet point ofview, the confrontation is not only possible, but could even be desirable. Inboth conventional and nuclear armament, the Soviet Union enjoys anenormous superiority over the Chinese.Even in comparison with the UnitedStates, Moscow has the capability ofinflicting grievous damage on its opponent. This capability is still increasing, both in volume and diversity.However, although a major militaryconfrontation with the West is unlikely under the present conditions ofnuclear stalemate, between Peking andMoscow there is no such stalemate.Geographic NearnessFurthermore, if the US argumentfor a ''thin'' antiballistic missile wasrather facetiously based on the presentnuclear capacity of the Chinese, anymilitary capability on the part of theChinese could be an immediate menaceto the Soviet Union simply because ofgeographic nearness. Hence, the threatof China to the Soviet Union is morereal than t is to' Washington. As theChinese perfect their delivery systemswith massive stockpiling of nuclearand hydrogen warheads, the threatposed to the Soviet Union and the at-tendant Soviet concern is understandable.There is no guarantee that the Chinese Communists might not resort toforce to rectify the wrongs of the pastimposed on them by the Russians. MaoTse-tung was reported t have said onovember 197

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the occasion of the establishment ofthe Red regime in 1949 that the daysof imperialistic encroachment onChina had passed for good, never toreturn again.Drastic olutionUnder these circumstances, it shouldnot be a great surprise that some radical elements in Moscow's leadershipare in favor of seeking a drastic solution to the Chinese problem. The bellicose image of China has hardened inthe years since the Korean War. Theoften misunderstood concept of thepaper tiger and the attendant nuclear philosophy of the Chinese leadershave bolstered the image of an irresponsible and insane Peking. The excesses of the Red Guards and th cultural revolution have shocked theworld, and, even among the neutralsof the world, the general goodwill toward Red China has decreased sharply.Clearly, then, the Soviet leadersmight feel that the time is propitiousfor them to exploit local border incidents and expand them into a majormilitary operation. Therefore, the revival of the Yellow Peril theme inSoviet propaganda may have to be considered more seriously as carrying a

. message of import than has hithertobeen judged in the West.The other important problem fromMoscow's viewpoint concerns the question of border demarcation or territo-rial readjustment claimed by the RedChinese. Considering Chinese irredentism and their charges of neoczarismagainst the Soviet Union, Siberia, tra-ditionally neglected by European Russia, immediately takes on vulnerabilityfrom alien attack. Some correctivemeasures have been taken such as theyet uncertain Soviet-Japanese agreement on joint development of Siberiaand state-supported and financed mi

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NATO . ifteen NGtioMChinese frontier guards confront an intruding Soviet armored vehiele along the ssuriRiver Isst yeargration. Nonetheless, Siberia is stillvirtually a no man s land.The exposed flank of the MaritimeTerritory provides yet another threatfor Soviet dreams in Asia not only forthe present, but for the decades ahead.The growing naval power of the So-viet Union, together with the increas-ing Soviet attempt to penetrate theAsian oceans, and the rivalry withChina over Southeast Asia all presup-pose the existence of secqre homebases in Asia. t the moment, only theMaritime Territory with Vladivostokcould satisfy this need.As the Soviets perceive a growingthreat from China, and these basesare increasingly in jeopardy, Moscow sdesire to settle the issues with theChinese through military means canonly grow. Leonid I. Brezhnev s vagueproposal for an Asian security alliance

system and the activities of the Sovietdiplomats abroad, sampling the pos-sible reactions to preemptive Sovietattack against the Chinese nuclearcapabilities, indicate their frustrationand jittery posture and the rise ofhardliners in their leadership. Hereinperhaps lies the greatest possible men-ace to Asian peace.On the other hand, China s re-sponses reportedly have been cautious,measured, and inflective. f the Chi-nese actions in the early part of 1969were vigorous and provocative, theirpresent posture seems to be one ofavoiding recklessness and thereby de-nying the Soviet Union what mightconstitute legitimate excuses for tak-ing drastic counteractions.The debilitating elements the Chi-nese Communist leaders now have toconsider seriously are many. First, the

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political confusion has been such thatthey may 'not be sure of the nationalunity and political loyalty of the people to the present leadership. Any miscalculation in this regard could belethal to the regime at this point. Infact, the task of stabilization and recovery is so pressing that, notwithstanding hostile pressures, Pekingcould have ruled out all foreign adventures for the time being.Second, the general economic picture at this point is too dishearteningto allow enormous military diversion.Not only agriculture, but the generalextractive and manufacturing production have suffered during this giganticpolitical confusion.Third, the political infighting and

the purges have rendered the militaryestablishment a dubious instrumentfor vigorous national defense. In amajor conftict with the Soviet Unioninvolving modern technology and philosophy, the highly politicized andproletarian armed forces withlargely obsolescent equipment may betotally undependable as an effective deterrent.Furthermore, the present militaryleadership has deemphasized professionalism and reverted to the guerrilla-peasantry philosophy of the Yenandays which may well prove to be asource of handicap for Peking. Although Peking does not admit it publicly, its actions seem to verify itstacit appreciation of these weaknesses.

Manufacturing produetion n Communist hina is ImproYtna gradually following thepolitical confusion which aeeompanied the eultural revolutionovember 197 27


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Fourth, had the Chinese reallycounted on the development of crediblenuclear capability as the realization oftheir political instr/lment in Asia,there is no reason why Peking shouldat this stage want to act recklessly toinvite a devastating military attack.Fina\1y, the Soviet Union, afteryears of slackening control, suddenlyseemed to tighten up the reins to otherCommunist countries. The Czechoslovakia invasion and the so ca\1ed Brezhnev doctrine may have had a dampening effect on the Chinese in their actsof cha\1enge to the Soviet Union.

f all these diverse elements playtheir role, it is understandable why theSoviet Union is now acting more aggressively toward China, but China isquietly reversing its gears.Holy WarHowever, there are still numerous

possibilities of miscalculation by bothMoscow and Peking leadership. Thesestill could engulf Asia in a massivewar. For instance, despite their recognition of weaknesses, should the Chinese be pressured to the limit, therecould be a chance of sliding to a military explosion-a kind of immenseHoly War for the Chinese nation.Reportedly, the Chinese are doingtheir best to prepare the people forjust such an eventuality with the Soviet Union.2

But should war come between Peking and Moscow, what would be itsgeneral scenario and its ultfmate impact on the global balance of power?In a broad sense, there could be twodifferent engagements although, inreality, it may involve elements ofboth.

The reported moving of Chinese nuclear instal-lations to Tibet or IlOmewhere in south China andthe frosty and fruit less Ale ksei N KOBYIrin ch.ouEn la1 eonvenationa re indications of Chinesedetermination and Moseow s careful preparationfor action.

The Soviet Union, employing itavast military superiority and fearingthe repetition of the Japanese andUnited States experiences in Chinaand Vietnam, could apply fast-movingand hard-hitting surgical operationsaimed at selected targets of extremeimportance in China. Upon successfulachievement of these limited objectives, Moscow would pu\1 back and concentrate all its efforts on gaining apolitical settlement to guarantee itscontrol of China.The nuclear insta\1ations of LopNor, Lanchow, Paotow, and the industrial complexes of northeastern Chinaand Manchuria would be lucrative targets for the Soviets. These targetscould be effectively taken out by theuse of airpower with tactical nuclearweapons.Conventional eans

The Soviets could achieve a comparable result using only conventionalmilitary means such as a powerfularmored column with sufficient aircover, along with airborne units presently available in the Far East. If warcomes, this latter scenario seems moreprobable. It takes pains to distinguishbetween the Chinese leadership andthe people. Soviet contention has beenthat communism has been betrayed byMao Tse-tung and his irresponsiblecohorts.Also, even if it would be relativelyeasy for the Soviet Union at presentto destroy the nuclear forces in China,it would merely delay, probably byabout 10 years, their re-creation. Furthermore, a deliberate nuclear attackcould entail a host of political problems. The Soviet Union would destroya\1 ties with the Chinese people, writeoff chances for reconciliation, and initiate a conflict with no end. Besides,by resorting to a nuclear first strike,

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Moscow would establish a dangerousinternational precedent in the use ofnuclear weaponry for political ends.There is no question that the SovietUnion is concerned with the possibilityof protracted guerrilla warfare on

ut if the Soviet Union managedthe swift surgical operation and suc-ceeded in achieving a satisfactory po-litical settlement, there would arise thegreatest problems the Asian balanceof power has ever faced. Such an event

In a war with the Chinese, the Soviet Union probably would utilize powerful armoredcolumns with air cover and airborne unitsChinese soil. Moscow will try its bestto avoid such a quagmire.Should the war be protracted in thatmanner, Moscow would then have toreorient its entire industrial postureto meet the gigantic demands of logis-tics. Obviously, such appreciation onthe part of the Soviet Union may in-duce Moscow to have second thoughtsand lead to a political settlement ofsome kind with the Chinese.Additionally, any protracted conflictin Asia would entail enormous difficul-ties in Europe for the Soviet Union.Since the Soviets regard Europe astheir central question, Moscow wouldtry to avoid a paralyzing involvementwith the Chinese at all costs.ovember 197

would endanger global equilibrium.Given the Soviets persistent aim ofcommunizing the world and theirvastly improved military capabilitiesrelative to the 1950 s, this could wellbe the major step toward their revolu-tionary goal on a global scale.Admittedly, Red China has playedthe role of the chief villain in theAsian situation since 1949. ut ironi-cally, a Soviet military and politicalvictory over China would assuredlypoint to the other fact that Red Chinahas been an important power balancerfor general peace in Asia.Verbally bellicose, but actually weakand cautious, China has so far ab-sorbed the major impact of Soviet in-

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trusion into Asia, and thereby indirectly aided in containing the SovietUnion and reducing its potential militancy to its present scale.There is a limit to what a weak andunderdeveloped China can do in Asiain terms of spoiling a balance. But anaggressive and materially equippedSoviet Unjon, once established inChina without any effective challengesand opposition, might entirely discard

its present policy of peaceful coexistence and fundamentally rupture thebalance of power in its favor.In such a case, not only a conflictsuch as Vietnam could be more ruth-lessly exploited, but nations in theAsian rim would find it impossible tomaintain their independence or evenneutrality. The United States wouldfind it almost impossible to remain uninvolved.War o AttritionAs to the second possible scenarioof Soviet attack against China, usingonly conventional arms and traditionalland thrusts one cannot entirely ruleout the possibilities that might leadto Ii war of attrition. There could betwo totally different developments inthis conventional conflict. One couldbe swift Soviet victory and disengagement before a definite political settlement. f the Chinese defeat weresevere, the Chinese might decide onpolitical settlement favorable to theSoviet Union. Or they could decide tocontinue the conflict with national mobilization.In this case, Moscow would have nochoice but to resume the conflict leading to a second entry of the Sovietforces into China and an eventual protracted war. In that case, Moscowcould be confronted with a monumental Vietnam in a greater landmass, involving greater humanity, and a to

tally unpredictable impact on Sovietnational life.In the case of a protracted war, theUnited States would have a much better chance of preparing itself againstall eventualities.Responses would vary depending onattitudes in Asia toward US effortsfor a multilateral or bilateral system.Japan might become more active andcooperate with the United States moresatisfactorily than in the past. But inthe long-range picture, Japan wouldprobably want to seek accommodationwith the power on the mainland. NorthKorea would radically change, and, incase of a Soviet victory, a recurrenceof another Korea would be entirelypossible. In the final analysis, rapidintensification of a confrontation withMoscow would be virtually unavoidable.ower Balance UpsetFrom any angle, a Sino-Soviet conflict would upset the world balance ofpower, and hence should be viewed asextremely damaging to the interestsof the United States and of the nonCommunist world. Equally important,a Sino-Soviet conflict and the resultantSoviet involvement in Asia in anymajor dimension would introduce awholly revolutionizing element in European relations. This could provideunprecedented opportunities to theEast European nations to assert theirindependence from the Soviet Union.This could be particularly serious in

the case of the East German regime.If for instance, the Soviet Union'scapabilities in Europe were damagedto the point of paralysis, it could leadthe West Germans to seek readjustment of all the pending issues withincentral Europe. Should these eventstake place prior to the congealing ofan atmosphere of etente between the

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B L NCE OF P WlREast and West European nationswould have to expect great difficultiesn controlling the rapid changes withinthe safety range.

Under the circumstances an abruptdecomposition of both the Warsaw andNorth Atlantic Treaty Organizationalliances without prior preparationcould bring forth unmanageable forcesof change in Europe. This could beeven more dangerous to Europeanequilibrium than the crises of the past.A total reversion to unsettling bilateral arrangements might developamong the continental nations and

force the United States to either aprotective isolationism or to a postureof bilateralism at the expense ofsmaller powers.Examining the many possibilities ofa Sino-Soviet conflict one cannot helpbut feel the sense of groping throughsome impossibly complicated maze. Already the world of nuclear stalemateis a highly risky arena for the decisionmakers. A Chinese con1lict with theSoviets would introduce the final premium of an unsettling effect which

would totally destroy sense and judgment all over the world.

~ IPIe t Send in your CH NGE OF DDRESSTo assure uninterrupted delivery of your Military Review be sure to

submit promptly both your old and new address including Zip code-fourweeks in advance if possible. Address to Military Review SubscriptionS e ~ v i c e Book Department U. S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 66027.

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Economy of Forcein the Central HighlandsMajor General Donn R Pepke United tales rmy

FROM November 1968 to November 1969 the 4th InfantryDivision had an economy of force mission in the CentralHighlands of Vietnam. While the principles of an economy offorce mission for an infantry division are well known theirapplication in a counterinsurgency environment can create newand unique problems whose resolution necessitates innovativetechniques. Although every challenge was not resolved by re-sponding with a set operational policy I believe that marty ofthe techniques developed and practiced by the division can en-hance the effectiveness of future economy of force operationsin similar environments.During that period the th Division had the largest area


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of operations of any US division in thecombat zone. This area extended fromDak Pek in the northwest corner ofthe highlands 190 miles southward toDuc Lap, and from the Cambodianborder on the west 100 miles eastwardto Binh Dinh Province-an area encompassing more than one-third of the2d Corps Tactical Zone.Massing ForcesConsidering this huge area of responsibility and the limited helicoptersavailable, the established policy ofmassing forces in critical areas whilepracticing spartan economy of forceelsewhere eventually proved strategically sound and extremely successful.The 4th Infantry Division defeatedevery enemy thrust toward the population centers of the highlands whilesimultaneously providing an outershell of security ringing adjacent hamlets, villages, and cities. The ultimate

Major General Donn R. Pepke isDeputy Chief of Staff for IndividualTraining, US Continental Army Com-mand, Fort Monroe, Virginia. His as-signments include duty in the Pacifictheater with the 6th Infantry Divisionduring World War II; with the 20thInfantry Regiment, Korea; at Head-quarters, European Command, Ger-many; as Senior Advisor to the 20thand 8th Divisions of the Republic ofKorea Army and later as Senior Ad-visor for Logistics, ROK Army; asChief of Staff, 1st Armored Division;and with the Pacific Area Command.Hawaii. In 1961 . he assumed theduties, of the Deputy CommandingGeneral, US Army School TrainingCenter, Fort Gordon, Georgia; and in1965, was assigned to the Office of theDeputy Chief of Staff for MilitaryOperations, Department of the Army.In November 1968 Genera Pepkewent to the Republic of Vietnamwhere he commanded the h Infan-try Division.ovember 197

CNTRAL HIGHLANDSresult was that the Republic of Vietnam s governmental agencies wereable to establish a durable influenceamong the civilian populace.Mod ied OrientationIn conventional warfare, there is anassertive orientation toward the destruction of the enemy s force and hiswill and ability to wage war. However,commanders at all levels operatingin a counterinsurgency environmentmust understand the significance andnecessity of a modified orientation.They must realize that destruction ofthe enemy s will and ability to fight issecondary to the mission of eliminating the conditions-socioeconomic aswell as military-which give vent toinsurgency, and of conditioning in thefriendly indigenous force the desireand ability to rout insurgents andprevent their success.Commanders, then, must learn toisolate quickly those factors which allow the indigenous building process toflourish. Thus, decisions not only as towhere, but also as to how, they willeconomize or mass their forces take onspeCial significance.A failure to recognize and actupon this new orientation, particularlywhere an economy of force mission isindicated, constitutes strategic errorand predestines failure. With our superior firepower, we are capable of inflicting continuous tactical defeatsupon the enemy. Yet if he is successful in luring the economy of forceinto concentrating its combat poweragainst him-if he can press commanders to commit the bulk of theirtroops to counter a threat and thusignore the pacification effort-he may,then, have the opportunity for victory.We must preclude any possibility ofallowing him to trade tactical defeatfor strategic victory lest we be caught

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in a situation where we are winningbattles but losing the real war.In the Central Highlands of Vietnam, the mission of the 4th Divisionwas to provide an impenetrable protective screen which would allow theGovernment of the Republic of Vietnam (GRVN) to control populationcenters and lines of communication inorder to instill and bolster a vitalsense of security among the people.

t was believed that, if the divisionwere able to contain the externalthrest represented by the North Vietnamese Army (NYA) regulars, theGRVN could systematically eliminatethe conditions which allow the VietCong to exist the lack of faith in lo-cal government and the absence ofhope for future socioeconomic stability. t became clear from the outsetthat the division would have to minimize the force necessary to preemptany NY A threat that developed andmeanwhile mass the bulk of our forcesnear the population centers to assistthe GRVN in its pacification role.Protective ScreenIntent upon intercepting the NY Aand forcing them to fight in remoteareas away from the population centers, the division perfected a multilayered protective screen and effectively exploited the principles offind, fix, and spoil. It was essentially this protective screen whichpermitted the orderly process of government and commerce to continue unabated in the highlands.

The outermost layer of our fourlayer screen consisted of diverse intelligence-gathering resources. Not onlydid we rely upon intricate technicaldevices of reconnaissance and detection such as Snoopy 1 sidelooking air1 Odor.seDshm devlee also known PeopleSnifter.

borne radar (SLAR) , ed Haze 2 sensors, and air cavalry, but we also usedthe more traditional methods such asnetworks of agents. All of these provedeminently suitable for exploitation,and it became virtually impossible forthe enemy to move a sizable force, evenin small infiltration groups, throughour screen without being detected.Most significantly, the early warningprovided by this outer layer allowed ussufficient reaction time to align thethree additional layers to counter anythreat posed by the infiltrating NYAforces.Operation ScorpionTo our normal intelIigence-gathering resources in the outer layer weadded one particularly successful operation. We called it Scorpion-SnoO lY/laccompanied by Cobra gunship teams.Whenever heavy readings indicatingthe presence of a sizable enemy forcewere recorded by Snoopy the companion gunships immediately fired intothe area. Information from prisonersand Hoi Chanha ( open arms program returnees), as well as evaluationsof other intelligence indicators, provedthat this particular weapon systempaid good dividends by disrupting theenemy's movement and disorganizinghis effort.While we were extremely successfulin pinpointing NYA base areas, we didnot always have sufficient numbers ofground troops readily available to sealoff the enemy completely and preventhis escape. To compensate, we employed CBU-UA munitions as barriersto restrict movement and to canalizethe enemy into areas where we couldmass the combat power available todestroy him.Delivered by high-performance air-

Airborne reconnaissance lJghta to detect he temissions rom the ground.


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Constituting the second layer of the 4th Infantry Division s proteetive aereen are longrange patrols which report enemy movement through the CeJltral Highlaads. Here,patrol members pause t relsy information for analysis and evaluation.craft the CBU4SA bomblet deployedupon impact a network of trip lineswhich, upon activation, triggered explosives. t was learned that if properly targeted, these munitions could beemployed in two distinct roles: to seedkno n infiltration routes and to compress enemy movement within speci.fied areas.In early August 1969, intelligenceactivities in the triborder area confirmed heavy movement from Cambodia into the Republic of Vietnam.The division, in turn employed itsfirst aerial-delivered mine barrier tocheck infiltration. Later intelligencereports showed considerable disruption in the patterns of enemy activityand a definite curtailment of infiltraNovember 197

tion along the route. The enemy wasforced to make wide bypasses, therebyincreasing his time of movement anddiverting himself into areas vulnerableto other means of interdiction.Later, a second pattern of employ.ment evolved when it was decided toencircle known enemy base and supplyareas with CBU BA munitions in conjunction with B-5B strikes. The purpose of this method of employmentwas to compress enemy movement anddeny him freedom of exfiltration whileartillery and tactical air were programed into the clearly defined tar.get areas.Closer to the maneuver battalions,but still a considerable distance fromthe population centers, the division

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employed long-range patrols (LRP s).Their areas of operation were determined from information provided bythe intelligence-gathering resourcesoperating in the outermost layer. The40 LRP teams were organized to manthe second layer of the protective

screen. Once reinforcement was completed, we channeled our efforts towardfixing the enemy. Once they made contact, the reinforcements held to defensible terrain and directed artillery,tactical air, and gunships against theenemy. This approach proved highly

The Medieal Civic Action Programs demonstrated the benefits of cooperation withthe government of Vietnam

screen. To augment the normal LRPmission of detecting and reportingenemy movement, we provided selectedLRP teams with a sniper capabilityand assigned them the mission ofharassment. Captured enemy documents consistently revealed theenemy s respect for these small teams.Contrary to normal doctrine, we didnot usually extract LRP s immediatelyafter they made contact. Instead, wereinforced the team with an areorifleplatoon from a maneuver battalion inthe innermost layer of the protective

successful. The NVA normally appeared eager to engage our forces, andwith the enemy fixed in this posture,we had a lucrative target which couldbe attacked profitably by indirect fire.Such engagements repeatedlyspoiled major attacks, and generally,the enemy retreated to his bordersanctuaries after suffering heavy casualties. Instead of pursuing-whichsurely would have been costly since wewould have been fighting againstground-delaying tactics on the enemy sprepared battlefield-we continued to

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harass him with heavy concentrationsof indirect fire as he retreated.Our innermost screen, the fourthlayer, consisted of our maneuver battalions positioned along key terraindominating the avenues of approach tothe major population centers. This deployment permitted the battalions toparticipate actively in the GRVN pacification efforts by operating in thehamlets, villages, and cities of thedistricts they were securing.These maneuver battalions engagedin operations aimed at destroying theViet Cong infrastructure and disrupting Viet Cong base areas throughoutPleiku and Kontum Provinces. Withpeace talks in progress, acceleratedpacification and territorial security inearly 1969 became one of the chiefgoals of the GRVN and all Free WorldMilitary Assistance Forces in Vietnam. The more villages secured, thegreater was the government s bargaining power.Combined OperationsThe second objective in our campaign against the Viet Cong was tohamper future operations of the regular NVA forces. Experience hadshown that the main NYA units depended on local Viet Cong to guidethem through unfamiliar territory andto stoCkPile foodstuffs and munitions.In conjunction with Army Republic ofVietnam (ARVN) forces, our battalions conducted three types of combined operations: reconnaissance inforce, cordon and search, and MedicalCivic Action Program (MEDCAP).Reeonnaissance in force operationsdetected and destroyed Viet Cong basecamps and eliminated caches. Consistent operations of this nature inhibited movement of large local forceunits and reduced the Viet Cong s influence upon the civilian populace.November 197

CENTR L HIGHL NDS

Cordon-and-search operations wereconducted to eliminate the Viet Conginfrastructure. To insure success during these operations, we established aconcept of close liaison, staff coordination, and bilateral operations with theARVN.A program which increased the effectiveness of the District Intelligenceand Operations Coordinating Centerwas developed to provide local intelligence to US tactical commanders andto make all the necessary assets available to support a combined pacificationprogram. This particular effort wasrecognized by the Viet Cong as thegreatest threat to their infrastructure.Benefits of CooperationMEDCAP s were the heart of ourbattalions effort to demonstrate thebenefits of cooperation with theGRVN. In the villages, the battalioncommanders took note of the relativeimpact of various civic action projects .and gatJ: ered intelligence. fter repeated visits to a village, US personnel, l o n ~ with interpreters and National Police, were readily able todetect strangers among the regularpopulace. These intruders were detained for interrogation and frequently provided valuable informationconcerning enemy activity.The central function of the MEDCAP, however, was to offer a continuing source of medical personnel whowere trained to recognize and treat theafflictions common to the villagers.Equally important was the training.ofindigenous medics and the teaching ofself-help methods to the villagers. Repeated face-to-face contact with theinhabitants generated keen interest,gave better insight into problem areas,and cultivated an attitude among thepeople which enabled our Volunteer Informant Program to flourish.

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CENTR L HIGHL NDSStability also was fostered with theintroduction and training of Regionaland Popular Forces. To assist theGRVN in its nationbuUding effort, the4th Division established a biweekly

Regional Force-Popular Force Leadership School with special instruction inweapons, tactics, and communications.Eventually, these units became theprincipal defense force while ARVNbecame the primary reaction force.Naturally, our maneuver battalionsstood ready to react whenever requested. Yet it was leamed that, whenUS forces were involved in defeatingthe Viet Cong forces which attackedthe villages, a limited victory, at best,had been achieved. Conversely, whenthe Regional and Popular Force unitssuccessfully defended their villageswithout the aid of US forces, a newsurge of confidence and stability wasnoted.ShortRange PatrolsThe maneuver battalions also provided the third layer of the protectivescreen-short-range patrols (SRP s)and ambush teams. A division innovation, the SRP was normally composedof three to five men whose primaryweapon was the radio. Each companymanning its portion of the innermostscreen would position five to sevensuch teams 1,500 to 4,000 yards forward of its location. The SRP s wereinstructed never to initiate contact,but, rather, to remain concealed andrely upon indirect fire support.to routor eliminate the enemy. Individualweapons were to be fired only in selfdefense.Since the SRP s were line troops ofthe division, they carried less equipment than LRP s and received specialized training by their battalions.These alert teams produced spectacular results for the division. In the

vicinity of Due Lap during late fall of1968, for example, SRP-directed artillery fire decimated a force of 6 to700 NVA regulars within hours afterthe enemy had crossed the border intoVietnam.Saturating the avenues of approachto nearby villages with SRP s, the battalions of the division managed torestrict enemy movement and reducehis ability to acquire food and forcedlabor from the civilian population.Free from the Viet Cong s influence,the people were able to respond to thegovernment s pacification programs.Also, by placing these patrols alongknown or

military review november 1970

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