mixing legal and non-legal norms alexander boer [email protected]

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Mixing Legal and Non-legal Norms Alexander Boer [email protected]

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Mixing Legal and Non-legal Norms

Alexander [email protected]

Overview

The ontological status of norms Why norms as preferences? Validity of norms as preferences

Contrary-to-duty situations Normative conflict

Further work Only in the paper

Composition of non-legal preferences vs. Composition of legal preferences (choice

principles)

The ontological status of norms

‘Norm’ is an epistemological category in assessment Of a broken circuit board (norm group) Of abnormal behaviour (normal) Of undesirable behaviour (normative)

‘Preference’ is an epistemological category in planning Personal preference Adopted preference (constraint)

In context of agent: norm = preference

Norms and Preferences in the Legal System

1. ‘Norms of analysis’ of involved stakeholders in drafting legislation

2. Legal norms adopted from legislation by addressees of legislation

3. Social norms adopted by addressees of legislation

4. Personal preferences of addressees5. Adaptation of personal and social

preferences to legal norms (evasion)

Uses of preferences

Making decisions constrained by legal norms (Legal Services Counter, E-POWER)

Assessing behaviour against legal norms (CLIME)

Assessing expected behaviour (adapted to legal norms) against ‘norms of analysis’ (E-POWER simulation)

Comparing two alternative sets of legal norms (E-POWER simulation)

Almost always legal and non-legal preferences involved

Why?

My PhD Thesis Newton workbench

Understandable Legal Knowledge Acquisition

Understandable representation method Semantic Web (merging norms from

different sources) ESTRELLA Project

European project for Standardized Transparent Representations in order to Extend LegaL Accessibility

Legal Knowledge Interchange Format (LKIF) Make everybody happy: represent whatever you

want, apply reasoning rules depending on purpose

Ideas

Entity-Relationship-based (boxes and lines) method for representing normative statements in the Web Ontology Language (OWL)

Use mainstream Decision Theory concepts (choice, preference, composition of preferences) Mixing with non-legal preferences

Use concepts from Knowledge Acquisition methodology Concept Triads and decision trees/tables

Knowledge Acquisition as eliciting choices

Ontology and Decision Trees Concepts and differentiae

Repertory grids Triads: Binary choices, opposites Choice reveals a preference

Norms Binary choice between compliance and

violation Choice is guided by imposed preference

(acceptance of a norm)

Norms as preferences?

Revealed vs. motivating preference Preference for things vs. classes of

things Combinative vs. exclusionary

preference Conditional vs. absolute preferences?S

A ¬AdisjointWith

subClassOf

<

Subsumption

Conditional preference

Deontic operators to preference relations

A fourth deontic operator: Liberty

Representation in OWL

Entity-relation model (subject-predicate-object triples)

Very similar to description logics (KIF, LOOM, KRSS, etc.) but very different (graph-based) syntax

Separates statements about concepts (terminology) and instances (assertions)

No Unique Name Assumption for instances

Merging triples from different sources

Preference for classes of things in OWL

Operational semantics of preference relation is similar to =, =<, >=, >, <

Relation on concepts, not instances Second order relation Either not OWL DL but OWL Full, or two

separate OWL DL terminological boxes “Second order Reasoning” in practice

simple

Not possible to represent that = and < are disjoint! No disjointness on relations…

=< >=

< >=

Validity of norms as preferences?

Contrary-to-duty situations Chisholm, Forrester, Gentle Murderer,

Reykjavic, etc.

Normative conflict Conflict of disaffirmation

Disaffirming an imperative Disaffirming a permission Hill’s ‘intersection’ conflicts

Conflict of compliance Other conflicts

Hohfeldian concepts, etc.

Contrary-to-duty situations

Chisholm’s situation

Chisholm’s situation

The Reykjavic situation

Normative Conflict

Conflicts of disaffirmation: disaffirmation of an imperative

Using the network facilities in the university building is prohibited.Using WiFi in the classrooms is permitted.

Conflicts of disaffirmation: disaffirmation of a permission

Using the network facilities in the university building is permitted.Using WiFi in the classrooms is prohibited.

Unresolved cases of disaffirmation

Symmetric subsumption of situation vs. alternatives: Using the network facilities in the

classrooms is prohibited. Using WiFi in the university building is

permitted. No clear solution:

Is this simply not a conflict? Does the most specific description of

alternative take precedence? Hill’s “intersection conflicts”?

Unresolved cases of disaffirmation

Conflicts of compliance

‘Impossibility of joint compliance’ (IJC) In S you ought to both P and not P

Did you voluntarily enter into situation S? Can you move out of situation S?

Example: Police: night clubs ought to lock

unguarded emergency exits Fire department: night clubs ought not to

lock emergency exits

Conflicts of compliance

Conflict between permissions?

Elhag et al:“There seem to be other types of conflict as

that between the permission for A to live in a certain house and a permission for B to destroy that same house. These conflicts need our attention and have to be embodied in a theory on normative conflicts.”

1. Neither agent has to deal with a circular ordering of alternatives

2. Both agents are free to act

Other cases of conflict?

Conflict of legal and non-legal norms permission for A to live in a certain house

and a permission for B to destroy that same house

permission for A to live in a house that is to be destroyed (given B’s preferences?)

A norm of analysis is violated… Alternative: assumption of implicit right-

duty relation between A and B?

Conflict of a norm with reality Unrealizability of compliance with norm

Other work

Composition of preferences in Law vs. Decision Theory Choice rules (Lex Specialis etc.) work

because of restricted format for legal preferences

Additive (MAUT) and multiplicative (utility) composition in Decision Theory

Hohfeldian legal concepts Right, duty, power, liability, etc.

Further work

ESTRELLA’s LKIF and Newton Axioms on/off

Automated Problem Solving vs. evaluation queries

Isomorphism MetaLex legislative XML structures to OWL representation Classification of sentence patterns Normative statements about (application

of) legislation Choice rules defined in legislation

E.g. overruling Lex Posterior