mr. edward a. degregorio * dr. raymond a. janssen dr. lee w. wagenhals * dr. richard messier *...

Mr. Edward A. DeGregorio *Dr. Raymond A. Janssen **Dr. Lee W. Wagenhals ***

Dr. Richard Messier *

2004 CCRTS

Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium

June 15 -17, 2004

San Diego, CA

Integrating Effects-Based and Attrition-Base Modeling

Integrating Effects-Based and Attrition-Base Modeling

GMU

George Mason UniversityIntegrated Defense Systems

* *****

2GMUGeorge Mason University

Integrated Defense Systems

OVERVIEW

• Purpose: Examine process and methods of interfacing high-level probabilistic Effects-Based models with higher fidelity attrition-based models and performing evaluations of alternative Courses of Action using the combination of these modeling techniques

• Outline:– Effects-Based Challenge– Case Study from Persian Gulf War– Conclusions



Evolution of Warfare* and Modeling & Evolution of Warfare* and Modeling & Simulation ApproachesSimulation Approaches

* Measuring the Effects of Network Centric Warfare, Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 1999

PCW Ni NCW (N)n

Single Dimension WarfareSingle Dimension Warfare

RomanRoman

LegionLegion

Lanchester’s Equations: Attrition Modeling

Lanchester’s Equations: Attrition Modeling

Force N on M

Physics-Based Force-on-Force Attrition Modeling

(Campaign, Engagement)

Physics-Based Force-on-Force Attrition Modeling

(Campaign, Engagement)

** BGEN Deptula, USAF, 2001, on “EBO: Change in the Nature of War”

CarthaginiansCarthaginians

Paradigm Shift to EBO** requires modeling Physical + Belief +

Reason Domains

Paradigm Shift to EBO** requires modeling Physical + Belief +

Reason Domains



Network-Centric Effects-Based Operations Network-Centric Effects-Based Operations (EBO) … Shaping the Adversary’s Behavior(EBO) … Shaping the Adversary’s Behavior

• JFCOM defines EBO as “a process for obtaining a strategic outcome or effect on the enemy through synergistic, multiplicative, and cumulative application of the full range of military and non-military capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels”.

• Network-Centric Operations (NCO) enables EBO– NCW enabled by 4 technologies:

• Sensors• IT and Network Architectures • Precision Weapons• Stealth Platforms

EBO is the key to broadening the role of NCO EBO is the key to broadening the role of NCO beyond Attrition Warfarebeyond Attrition Warfare

EBO is the key to broadening the role of NCO EBO is the key to broadening the role of NCO beyond Attrition Warfarebeyond Attrition Warfare


Integrated Defense Systems Dimensions of Network Centric Dimensions of Network Centric Warfare (NCW)*Warfare (NCW)*

Force

Force

Tim

eT

ime

SpaceSpace

Engagem

ent G

rid

Engagem

ent G

rid

(Wee

ks …

Min

utes)

Information/Knowledge GridInformation/Knowledge Grid

(Nanoseconds)

Sensor GridSensor Grid

(1000s - 1,000,000s m.)(1000s - 1,000,000s m.)

* Measuring the Effects of Network Centric Warfare, Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 1999

Network & Info Technology

Network & Info Technology

Stealth Platforms, Precision Weapons

Stealth Platforms, Precision Weapons

C2ISR Sensor

Networks

C2ISR Sensor

Networks



Integrate Physical & Cognitive Integrate Physical & Cognitive Effects ModelingEffects Modeling

TimeTime

(Nanosec.)(Nanosec.)

Space (Battlespace Vol.)Space (Battlespace Vol.)

ForceForce

Perceptions Perceptions (Red & Blue)(Red & Blue)

Cause-Effects Cause-Effects RelationshipsRelationships

COA SelectionCOA Selection

MoveMove

StrikeStrike

ProtectProtect

Sit Sit AwarenessAwareness

CC22

Speed of Speed of CommandCommand

Physics-BasedPhysics-Based

Attrition ModelsAttrition Models

Force-on-ForceForce-on-Force

Effects-Based Effects-Based Operations Operations

(EBO)(EBO)ModelsModels

CC22ISR, Comms ISR, Comms ModelsModels

Physical

Physical

SpaceSpace

Reason, BeliefReason, Belief

MappingMapping



EBO Modeling Linked to Attrition-Based Modeling EBO Modeling Linked to Attrition-Based Modeling & Simulation& Simulation

Kill

Ch

ain

AccessAccess LocateLocate IDID TrackTrack DesignateDesignate CommComm AttackAttack AssessAssess

+

EBO NCW

Operational

System

(Physical Dimension: Force, Space, Time Domain)

Intel & Planning

Cam

pai

gn

Pla

n

Intel + Planning + Execution Assessment

Blue Actions

Influence Net

Lead to

AnalystsAnalysts

t

ABC

tA BC

COA 1

COA 2Candidate COAs t

ABC

tA BC

COA 1

COA 2Candidate COAs

Timed Probability Profile

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

0 10 20 30Time

COA 1

COA 2

Timed Probability Profile

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

0 10 20 30Time

COA 1

COA 2

Effects

Blue and RedCOA Analysis

(Reason & Belief Domain)

* EBO are coordinated sets of actions – including diplomatic, economic, information operations, psychological operations, and lethal/non-lethal warfare—directed at shaping the behavior of friends, foes and neutrals in military operations



CASE STUDY APPROACH

• Persian Gulf War (Desert Storm) well documented; much unclassified information published. Many of the situations encountered there are still significant today.

• We first used documentation* from Desert Storm to create a high level EBO model – Model behavior was “validated” using the Final Report

• We attempted to discover how the higher level model can foster the development and analysis of the lower level model and how, in turn, the lower level model results can impact the higher level model.

• By using a known situation it was possible to validate model results and to test the postulated interfaces between the models that were developed

• Specific results then are generalized

"Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress" [DoD, 1992]



National Policy Objectives(5)(6)

CINCCENT’s Mission(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)

CENTCOM’s Theater Military Objectives(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)

JFACC’s Tactical Components(18)(19)(20)(21)(22)(23)(24)(25)(26)

(27)(28)(29)

Maritime Campaign Objectives(30)(31)(32)(33)(34)

NAVCENT’s Tactical Components(35)(36)(37)(38)(39)(40)(41)

Ground Campaign Objectives(44)(45)

Air Campaign Objectives(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)

Joint Force Tactical Components(42)(43)(46)(47)(48)

*(x) refer to event numbers in the report that were assigned the EB model

FLOW DOWN OF PERSIAN GULF WAR OBJECTIVES



Desert Storm War Scenario



Fleet CommandFleet Command Naval Warfare Simulation… Naval Warfare Simulation…3D Real-Time Modeling, Simulation & Visualization3D Real-Time Modeling, Simulation & Visualization

Adapted by Raytheon for use on DARPA / NAVSEA Submarine Payloads & Sensors Program. Developed HLA-compatible interface to Raytheon Hi-Fi Missile Server. Can be run in Monte Carlo mode (turn off graphics).Tested sensitivity to various Mission / System Concepts within context of ScenariosConducted Operational Utility Analysis to Quantify Military Value:

»Notional Korea-China Scenario, (UNCLASS ver.)»Persian Gulf Scenario (UNLCASS ver.)

Features: Geographically accurate 3D environment

–Bathymetric Data (display depth with mouse) –1000 meter resolution Terrain (Standard)

»Integrated DTED Level 1 (100 m resolution)

Complete Jane’s Order Of Battle for 16 countries; countries can be added

Sim Objects include Submarines, UUVs, Surface Ships, Aircraft, UAVs, Missiles, Tanks, TELs, Land Vehicles, undersea mines and some ground installations; can customize sim objects

Multiple views of unfolding scenario

Fleet Command functionality:• Set up Geo-scenario using Mission Editor GUI• Modify Platform/Sensor/Weapon Parameters with Database GUI • “Drag and Drop”: Lay-down Red/Blue Forces (Lat/Long) on Geographic Map Window• Simulation can be run in different ways:

– Computer (Blue) vs Computer (Red)– Human (Blue) vs. Computer (Red) – Human (Blue) vs Human (Red)

Fleet Command functionality:• Set up Geo-scenario using Mission Editor GUI• Modify Platform/Sensor/Weapon Parameters with Database GUI • “Drag and Drop”: Lay-down Red/Blue Forces (Lat/Long) on Geographic Map Window• Simulation can be run in different ways:

– Computer (Blue) vs Computer (Red)– Human (Blue) vs. Computer (Red) – Human (Blue) vs Human (Red)


Integrated Defense Systems HLA Architecture Supports Distributed Scenario HLA Architecture Supports Distributed Scenario Generation, Req’mnts Analysis & Concept Generation, Req’mnts Analysis & Concept

DevelopmentDevelopment

Federates

Functions

Create Scenario x

Send Scenario x

Receive Scenario x x

Convert Scenario x

Execute Scenario x x

Send Results x

ScenarioProcessor

FleetCommand

RMAST:

MissileComms

Model

Net

Net

Raytheon ORION Network

RTI

RMAST FOM

RTI

RMAST FOM

Raytheon Mission Analysis & Simulation Technology (RMAST)

ScenarioProcessor

VisLink

VIS

Dedicated

UNIX Server

Aircraft

Server

Threats & Interceptors

• Standard Missile• TBMs• Projectiles

(AGS, ERGM, Excalibur)

• Cruise Missiles

• ESSMs

• Others

(Manual

Link)

IDS-Portsmouth

RMS-Tucson (2001-2003)

x

VIS

(Dec 03)

Effects-Based Models**George Mason Univ Tools installed at IDS/Portsmouth

Comms Network Modeling Tool

NCS, Fullerton

(Dec 04)

Real- Time Naval Warfare Sim

•



COURSES OF ACTION FOR EBO

• An effects-based way of thinking has been evolving for some time. Objectives can be obtained by achieving effects. Effects can be achieved by actions that comprise COAs

• Needed is an approach that captures the rationale for COAs that explain how actions can achieve effects

• Different levels of detail impact the type of analysis that can be done

– Detailed Engineering and physics knowledge can allow engineering models to show the behavior of systems to actions

• How to disrupt electric power, POL, an IADS are examples

• If we have the knowledge and the models they can give very precise results

– Qualitative knowledge about system or the reasoning belief and decision make aspects require a more abstract approach

• Probabilistic modeling techniques may be helpful



Effects Based Modeling for COA Development

Command Intent

Desired End States

Set of Desired and Undesired Effects on Red

EffectsActions Model Construction

Set of Desired BlueEndStates



Effects Based Modeling for COA Development


Command Intent

Desired End States

Set of Desired and Undesired Effects

Probabilistic model relating actionable events to effects through a network of influencing relationships: Influence Net model

From Red’s Point of View

May include Red’s COAs



Integrated Defense Systems Effects Based Modeling for COA Development

Command Intent

Set of Blue’s potential Actions that will affect Red.

Time-phased broad actions Desired End States




Set of Desired BlueEndStatesFrom Red’s Point of View



Integrated Defense Systems Effects Based Modeling for COA Development


Command Intent

Ops

Pol

TransFin

Rel

IO

Set of Blue’s potential Actions that will affect Red.

Time-phased broad actions Desired End States



From Red’s Point of View





Red achieves Brown annexation


Red uses WMD takes military action


Blue believes Red will stop WMD activity


Forces invade Red and change regime


.13 .50

.07 .50

0.0 .50

.0.0 .50

Effects-Based Modeling

Objective: Codify belief structure of Adversary to establish cause and effect relations and impact of actions

Identify - Intent/outcome - Beliefs - Initial events - Actions

Establish - Cause and effect relationships - Probability estimates - Times (when, how long)

Link with Engagement Models - Quantity appropriate action for increased fidelity

Blue believes assured success

is achievable


is achievable

Red believes Blue using covert sensing


Red believes Blue will attack


Red believes its sovereignty has been

threatened


threatened





Red believes additional attacks imminent






.01 .50

0.0 .50

.82 .50

.05 .50

.13 .50

.07 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

.0.0 .50

Int’l community believes Red doing WMD issues

sanctions


sanctions

.01 .50

Blue initiates efforts for coalition force


Red initiates UN support important



is achievable


is achievable

Blue deploys covert maritime assets in theater


Red initiates WMD activities


Red leadership takes aggressive posture




Red captures part of SOFRed captures part of SOF

Additional Red WMD activity observed


Blue takes unilateral action


Blue attacks first WMDBlue attacks first WMD




threatened


threatened





Blue attacks Red military infrastructure








0.0 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

.01 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

.82 .50

.05 .50

.13 .50

0.0 .500.0 .05

.07 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

.0.0 .50

Red terrorists attacks on potential coalition partners






Red initiated anti-access measures



is achievable


is achievable


Blue deploys covert maritime assets in theater Blue initiates covert ISRBlue initiates covert ISR








Red preemptively invades Brown uses

WMD


WMD

Blue coalition formed


Blue publishes Red WMD evidence


Red discovers Blue has collected irrefutable

evidence


evidence

Red claims to Int’l community that Red sovereignty invaded


Red proclaims its sovereignty cannot be violated






Int’l inspections show WMD exists



Additional forces flow into area


Brown places its military on heightened alert





threatened


threatened



Red postures for attack on Brown


Red civilian collateral damage occurs








Blue attacks Red mainland WMD sites






.05 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

.05 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

.05 .50

.05 .50.05 .50

.01 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

.05 .50

.82 .50

.05 .50

.010 .50

.01 .50

.05 .50

.14 .50

0.0 .50

.13 .50

.15 .50

0.0 .500.0 .05

.07 .50

.05 .50

0.0 .50

.010 .50

0.0 .50

.01 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

.0.0 .50

+S, -S

+S, -S

+S, -S

+S, -M +S, -W

+S,-W

+S, -S










is achievable


is achievable











WMD


WMD




sanctions


sanctions




evidence


evidence



















threatened


threatened



















.05 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

.05 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

.05 .50

.05 .50.05 .50

.01 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

.05 .50

.82 .50

.05 .50

.01 .50

.010 .50

.01 .50

.05 .50

.14 .50

0.0 .50

.13 .50

.15 .50

0.0 .500.0 .05

.07 .50

.05 .50

0.0 .50

.010 .50

0.0 .50

.01 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

.0.0 .50

+S, -W

+M, -S

+S, -

S

+M, -W

+W, -S

+W, -M

-W,+S

+S, -S

+S,-S

+M, -S

+S, -S

+S, -S

+M, -S

+S, -S

+M,-M

+M, -M

N, N

+S, -M

+M, -

W

+M, -

S

+S, -M

+S,-W

+S,-W

+M, -S

+W, -S

+S, -M

N, -S

+S, -S

+M, -S+S, -W

+S, -S

+M, -S

+S, -S-M, N

+M, -M

+S, -S

+S, N

+S,-W

+S, -S

+S,-S

-M, +W

+S,-W

+S, -S

-S, +W

+M, -W -M,+M

-S,+M

+M,-S

+W ,-S

+S, -

S

+M, -

M

+S,

-S

+S, -

S-W

, +W

+W, N

+M, N

+M, -W

-S, +W

-M, +W

+W, -S

+M, -S

+M, -S

+M, -M

+M, -S

+M, -M

+S, -W

+M, -

S

-S, +W

+M, -S

+W, -S

-S, +

S

+M, -S

+S, -M










is achievable


is achievable











WMD


WMD




sanctions


sanctions




evidence


evidence



















threatened


threatened



















.05 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

.05 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

.05 .50

.05 .50.05 .50

.01 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

.05 .50

.82 .50

.05 .50

.01 .50

.010 .50

.01 .50

.05 .50

.14 .50

0.0 .50

.13 .50

.15 .50

0.0 .500.0 .05

.07 .50

.05 .50

0.0 .50

.010 .50

0.0 .50

.01 .50

0.0 .50

0.0 .50

.0.0 .50

Detailed Component Modeling & Sim

Subsystem/Product Performance

System Engineering/Integr

Engagement

Campaign

EngagementModel

AN INTEGRATE MODELING APPROACH

Strategic Model



HYPOTHESES

• Use of more detailed modeling improves the derivation of the elements of the higher-level EBO model– High fidelity simulations can provide more accurate values

for the conditional probability values and the time delay information that the higher-level models use as input.

• High fidelity simulations can be useful in providing a more detailed look at actionable events that are created in the high level EBO model

Gulf War Model Rev 16b(18) Attack leadership

command facilities

(42) Position Coalition forces West

of Kuwait

(20) Attack Telecomm. and C3

nodes

(11) RGF in KTO neutralized

(14) Iraqi regime isolated

(48) Use electronic warfare to disrupt

comms.

(40) Prepare naval gunfire support

(9) Iraqi supply lines severed

(28) Attack railroads and

bridges

(34) Coalition coastline defended

(26) Attack oil refining and

distribution facilities

(22) Attack air forces and fields

(37) Prepare ASUW Operations

(32a) Naval tactical aircraft

strikes conducted

(45) RGF attacked from West

(43) Draw Iraqi reserve forces away from main attack

(47) Conduct SOF

(31) Iraqi shipping neutralized

(21) Attack strategic IADS

(39) Prepare MCM paths to Kuwait for amphibious assault

(16) Iraqi offensive capability

neutralized

(19) Attack electrical production facilities

(23) Attack NBC research,

production and storage facilities

(25) Attack Scud missiles, launchers, prod and storage

facilities

(32b) TLAM strikes conducted

(38) Prepare submarine TLAM

launches

(33) Amphibious assault feint conducted

(12) Kuwait City liberated

(17) Iraqi mechanized

equipment in KTO rendered

ineffective

(35) Prepare AAW operations

(36) Prepare Naval forces and port

logistics

(41) Decide not to do amphibious assault

(24) Attack military storage and

production sites

(15) Iraqi NBC delivery capability

neutralized

(2) Iraqi armed forces ejected from

Kuwait

(5) Legitimate government

restored in Kuwait

(3) RGF neutralized

(1) Iraqi National Command Authority

neutralized

(4a) Ballistic missile capability

neutralized

(8) Air superiority achieved

(10a) NBC production capability

neutralized

(7a) Political & military leadership

attacked

(13) Air supremacy gained

(30) Naval support conducted

(29) Attack army and RGF in KTO

(46) Conduct Psychological

operations to degrade morale

(4b) NBC capability

neutralized

(10b) NBC storage capability

neutralized

(7b) C2 neutralized

(27) Attack naval forces and port

facilities

(44) Supporting attack conducted

from South

06

07

08

01

02

09

10

03

04

0543

11

41

40

35

36

37

3839

13

14

18

19

20

21

22

24

4445

51

26

3334

28

30

29

3231

25

59

58

57

52

53

56

73

55

54

49

48

507267

46

47

42

81

65

83

63

66

71

70

6968

60

84

61

62

78

76

80

79

82

64

74

77

15

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

09

00

10

43

43

34

37

00

00

30

30

30

038

00

6

2810

2810

2810

038

335

4

5

3

40

12

40

40

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

(6) Iraqi military capabilities

reduced 01617

23

27

TACTICAL COMPONENTSCAMPAIGN

OBJECTIVESTHEATER MILITARY

OBJECTIVESMISSION & NATIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVES

Influence Key: h(%) g(%)strong 90 -90moderate 66 -66light 33 -33other other n

n

n

n

Event Nomenclature Key

(#) Event Name

##

Shorthand for the Event Name

Delay time (in days) of the event

COA start time (in days) for Actionable Events only

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

MARITIME

CAMPAIGN

AIR

CAMPAIGN

GROUND

CAMPAIGN



HIGH LEVEL MODEL VALIDATION

• Concentrated on the overall behavior given the choice of values for the influence strength parameters, since the structure and timing more were directly derived from the Final Report to Congress.

• Examined static behavior by examining how changes in input actionable events result in reasonable changes throughout the net as well as changes at the overall effect nodes (Mission and National Policy Objectives).

• Compared dynamic behavior with timelines in Final Report.

Actionable Event Group Probability of Effect

Air

Mar

itim

e

Gro

un

d

(5)

Legitimate government restored in

Kuw ait

(6) Iraqi

m ilitary capabilities

reduced

(2) Iraqi

armed forces

ejected from Kuw ait

(3) RGF

neutralized

(1) Iraqi

National Command Authority

neutralized

(4a) Ballistic

missile capability

neutralized

(4b) NBC

capability neutralized

no no no 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.04 0.12 no no yes 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.15 0.04 0.12 no yes no 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.29 0.35 0.09 0.28 yes no no 0.04 0.78 0.20 0.71 0.64 0.91 0.34 no yes yes 0.35 0.11 0.30 0.29 0.35 0.09 0.28 yes no yes 0.52 0.78 0.86 0.71 0.64 0.91 0.34 yes yes no 0.33 0.95 0.55 0.90 0.84 0.96 0.65 yes yes yes 0.94 0.95 0.98 0.90 0.84 0.96 0.65



(04a) Ballistic missile capability neutralized(01) Iraqi National Command Authority neutralized

(04b) NBC capability neutralized(03) RGF neutralized

(02) Iraqi armed forces ejected from Kuwait(05) Legitimate government in Kuwait restored

(06) Iraqi military capabilities reduced

Model = Gulf_War_Model_Rev_16b

COA = COA_Set_02 DELAY = Delay_Set_05

DYNAMIC BEHAVIOR - INITIAL HI LEVEL MODEL



INTEGRATING ATTRITION MODEL

• Identified specific tactical engagements within the campaigns (from the Final Report to Congress) for modeling with physics-based simulations

• Used a modified version of Jane's® Fleet Command™ [modified by Raytheon]





strikes conducted





launches




logistics



MARITIME

CAMPAIGN





strikes conducted





launches




logistics



Bubiyan Engagement

Prepared

Iraqi Port facilities 70% destroyed

Iraqi Navy 80% destroyed

Iraqi air forces rendered 90%

ineffective

Iraqi Airfields 60% destroyed

Iraqi SAM sites 40% destroyed

Iraqi Radar sites 50% destroyedM

ARITIME

CAMPAIGN



INTEGRATING ATTRITION MODEL

• The attrition-based model provides quantitative measures of effectiveness (% killed) of the engagement participants versus time.

– Thus, the effect(s) of the attrition model are events that reflect achievement in progress for the neutralization of adversarial participants.

• Such events became the vehicle for interfacing information from the lower level to the Hi Level EB model

• Several engagements were run in the attrition-based model and used to enhance the Hi Level EB Model

– Additional structure added

– Time delays refined

• The enhancements to the Hi Level model did not effect its basic behavior, but provided a more detailed description of intermediate events that could be examined



(18) Attack leadership command facilities

(42) Position Coalition forces West

of Kuwait

(20) Attack Telecomm. and C3

nodes

(11) RGF in KTO neutralized

(14) Iraqi regime isolated

(48) Use electronic warfare to disrupt

comms.


(9) Iraqi supply lines severed

(28) Attack railroads and

bridges


(26) Attack oil refining and

distribution facilities

(22) Attack air forces and fields



strikes conducted

(45) RGF attacked from West

(43) Draw Iraqi reserve forces away from main attack

(47) Conduct SOF


(21) Attack strategic IADS


(16) Iraqi offensive capability

neutralized

(19) Attack electrical production facilities

(23) Attack NBC research,

production and storage facilities

(25) Attack Scud missiles, launchers, prod and storage

facilities



launches


(12) Kuwait City liberated

(17) Iraqi mechanized

equipment in KTO rendered

ineffective



logistics


(24) Attack military storage and

production sites

(15) Iraqi NBC delivery capability

neutralized

(2) Iraqi armed forces ejected from

Kuwait

(5) Legitimate government

restored in Kuwait

(3) RGF neutralized

(1) Iraqi National Command Authority

neutralized

(4a) Ballistic missile capability

neutralized

(8) Air superiority achieved

(10a) NBC production capability

neutralized

(7a) Political & military leadership

attacked

(13) Air supremacy gained


(29) Attack army and RGF in KTO

(46) Conduct Psychological

operations to degrade morale

(4b) NBC capability

neutralized

(10b) NBC storage capability

neutralized

(7b) C2 neutralized

(27) Attack naval forces and port

facilities

(44) Supporting attack conducted

from South

06

07

08

01

02

09

10

03

04

0543

11

41

40

35

36

37

3839

13

14

18

19

20

21

22

24

4445

51

26

3334

28

30

29

3231

25

59

58

57

52

53

56

73

55

54

49

48

507267

46

47

42

81

65

83

63

66

71

70

6968

60

84

61

62

78

76

80

79

82

64

74

77

Bubiyan Engagement

Prepared

Iraqi Port facilities 70% destroyed

Iraqi Navy 80% destroyed

Iraqi air forces rendered 90%

ineffective

Iraqi Airfields 60% destroyed

Iraqi SAM sites 40% destroyed

Iraqi Radar sites 50% destroyed

15

85

86

87

88

89

90

93

96

99

94

97

102

101

103

105

107

100

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

10

43

43

34

37

00

00

30

00

30

038

00

6

2810

010

2810

038

335

4

5

3

40

12

28

29

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

(6) Iraqi military capabilities

reduced 0

1

1

81

1

1

1

Operation Centers 100% destroyed

11011

1

Battle of Al Khafji

Prepared

Armored vehicles 80% destroyed

Small vehicles 60% destroyed

119

113

114

NGFS (Ras Al-Khafji)

122

121

123

Battle at Al Khafji

Combat Unit HQs 60% destroyed

112

115

118

Gun positions 80% destroyed

Troop transports 80% destroyed

117

Ras Al-Khafji Prepared

109

3

3

3

1

1

1

8

1

Attrition Engagements

Bubiyan Island

108

95

98

104

106

91

92

120

TACTICAL COMPONENTSCAMPAIGN

OBJECTIVESTHEATER MILITARY

OBJECTIVESMISSION & NATIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVES

Influence Key: h(%) g(%)strong 90 -90moderate 66 -66light 33 -33other other n

n

n

n

Event Nomenclature Key

(#) Event Name

##

Shorthand for the Event Name

Delay time (in days) of the event

COA start time (in days) for Actionable Events only

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

MARITIME

CAMPAIGN

AIR

CAMPAIGN

GROUND

CAMPAIGN

ENHANCED HI LEVEL MODEL



(04a) Ballistic missile capability neutralized(01) Iraqi National Command Authority neutralized

(04b) NBC capability neutralized(02) Iraqi armed forces ejected from Kuwait

(03) RGF neutralized(05) Legitimate government in Kuwait restored

(06) Iraqi military capabilities reduced

Model = Gulf_War_Model_Rev21c COA = COA_Set_04

DELAY = Delay_Set_03

Refined Results



CONCLUSIONS

• Using a case study approach we explored a process for relating a high- level effects-based model with detailed attrition-based models– Attrition models can provide a more detailed look at actionable events

that are created in the high-level EBO model and can help planners refine the courses of action selected from analysis of the EBO model

– Attrition models can help refine the structure and the conditional probability and time parameters EB model (increases the confidence in the EB model)

• Creating the interfaces was labor intensive; no “automated” technique for linking the two types of models was discovered

• Some preliminary “rules of thumb” were postulated for creating new structure in the EB model as a result of the analysis of the attrition model

• More research should yield a more efficient approach to establishing the ties between hi level effects based models and the higher fidelity attrition models

mr. edward a. degregorio * dr. raymond a. janssen ** dr. lee w. wagenhals *** dr. richard messier *...

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mr. edward a. degregorio * dr. raymond a. janssen dr. lee w. wagenhals * dr. richard messier *...