myth defined and undefined

8/13/2019 Myth Defined and Undefined

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Myth Defined and Undefined

Marc Lombardo

Part I: Myth Defined and Undefined

mythical thought always progresses from the awareness of oppositions

toward their resolutions (Lvi-Strauss 1972 22!"#

These words of Claude Lvi-Strauss suggest that if we are to study

mythical thought in a manner consistent with its own processes, we mustfirst find it an opposition. But we certainly cannot go seeking an

opposition to something thats nature is unclear to us as it is difficult to

know what something is notwhen you do not know precisely what it is.

So, what is a myth! This is a "uestion with very many answers, very few

of which seem satisfactory. Take the $%ford &nglish 'ictionary

definition for e#ample$

% purely fictitious narrative usually involving supernatural persons, actions, or events,and em&odying some popular idea concerning natural or historical phenomena '()*

++$ +/.

The editors could &e admired for an una&ashed certainty 'as opposed to

an accuracy/ in definition if they had omitted the definitions only sign of

caution-0usually.0 1oticing that 0a purely fictitious narrative0 is placed

eforerather than after0usually0 tells us that it is the cru# of the

definition, to which a/ 0involving supernatural persons, actions, or

events0 and &/ 0em&odying some popular idea concerning natural or

historical phenomena0 are to &e 0usually0 supplementally added. 2iven

that all three of the definitions parts are of an additive rather than

preclusive nature, the analysis ac"uired in e#amining the summation of

any two of the parts should also apply when all three are taken together.

%s a matter of fact, doesnt this process of adding the information gainedfrom comparing the items as pairs mirror the processes of the reader
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when he or she weighs and integrates a sememe into a schematic &ase

with the aid of comparative isotopies as suggested &y 2reimas '+3$ +-

4/! The only complicative feature here is the 0usually0 operator.

5owever, all that is indicated &y 0usually0 is that the relationships have

to &e understood within the ru&ric of dominance. 6e can get a &etter idea

of this if we lay out the pairs$

%S7S% n8 +3, p.+93

% four-part homology from the ad:ectives of the first concept would look

like this$

fictitious (always) : supernatural (usually) :: fact (always) : natural (usually)

0%lways0 and 0usually0 are not negated in the second half of the

homology &ecause rather than &eing the content that is compared, they

are operators which specify the comparisons made. Therefore, the

ad:ectival homologues for all three concepts are$
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But why focus e#clusively on the ad:ectives! ;or one thing, they make

for clearer antonyms. 5owever, this fact in itself only calls into "uestion

the usefulness of ad:ectival homologies for such purposes rather than

supporting that pro:ect. and ;odor cited in ;odor +$ 9/.

%S7S% n8 +3, p.+99

6e can infer then that semantic markers D &eing presenters of

0systematic relations0 rather than direct referents D contri&ute to

meaning &y signaling what the defined le#ical item is not and thus

isolating it from many of the possi&le word-concepts. (nce this isolation

has taken place, only then is it possi&le to 0distinguish0 the wordE to

clarify its am&iguity. The point &eing that ad:ectives 'or at least

ad:ective-&ased antonyms/ are necessary for that first denotative

relationship to take place. %nd likewise, the connotative relationship

relies on the previous denotative one.

Let us now return our scope away from these grander matters and focus

on an analysis of ?yths Concept +. This is the simplest, most consistentof the three concepts. There is only one ad:ective per part 'Cru#$
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fictitious, Supplement %$ supernatural/, and whats more they agree.

Because of the consistency of ad:ectives, when reading 0% purely

fictitious narrative usually involving supernatural persons, actions or

events,0 the reader is presented with a clear idea that needs little semantic

processing in order to achieve competency. % simplified summary of the

concept could read$ % fake story a&out fake things. This is clearly mucheasier to grasp than either 0a real story a&out fake things0 or 0a fake story

a&out real things.0 5owever, a general clarity and an ease of

comprehension form only one dimension in a definitions usefulness, and

a far less important one than correctness. ed it would &e of considera&ly less value than if it was too

specific. Concept 4, while not sharing Concept +s simplicity of ad:ectival

agreement, is decidedly more general. The idea of 0a fake story a&out real

things,0 while it is more o&fuscatory in nature, seems to &e a&le to apply

to more things than 0a fake story a&out fake things.0


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This last point can &e made evident if we &riefly consider the relationship

&etween the definitions two supplements that forms Concept 3. Taken in

tandem 0involving supernatural persons, actions, or events0 and

0em&odying some popular idea concerning natural or historical

phenomena0 present a seeming dichotomy of the natural.


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a process of hermeneutics. %s for that matter, should knowledge itself$ 0if

we consider the matter well, poetic truth is metaphysical truth, and

physical truth which is not in conformity with it should &e considered

false0 '+$ 4JH/.

%S7S% n8 +3, p.+9

Since we have recogni>ed it as a deficiency of the $&'s definition to

have not integrated similar verum factumconceptions, surely it would &e

inconsistent at &est not to incorporate something to that effect in our

criti"ueE at least to the e#tent of acknowledging that the idea of myth as

something spurious, fictitious and untrue has its grain of truth in the fact

that it is an idea commonly held. The fact that the word is defined in sucha way in what is considered to &e the dictionary of record goes a long

way towards insuring this. 1ow we see the true significance of the $&'s

definition$ that it comes from the $&'. Terence 5awkes summary of the

pro:ect of Barthes)ythologiesseems rather fitting$ Barthes strives to

unmask the fact that 0despite the overt stance of the media, that no such

codes e#ist, that they innocently present the real world as it acutally is,0

there e#ists a 0contrary aim$ the generation, confirmation and

reinforcement of a particular view of the world in which &ourgeois values

emerge, as usual, as inevita&le and right at all levels0'+, ++J/. %nd

thus, allow me to complete this*ouissanceof semantic indulgence &y

saying what we have in the $&'s definition of 0myth0 could itself &e

considered a myth. 1ot in the sense of 0myth0 as potent fiction, &ut

rather, as myth &eing that which acts-as a structuring agent, an

organi>ational metaphor, a 0poetic truth.0


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trueand the second on what is elieved, then yes. % simple graphical

representation of the concept might look like this$

%S7S% n8 +3, p.+9

%s should &e readily seen, this illustration has more value as a rhetorical

argument than as any sort of rigorous model. This is partially due to the

elision 'and therefore lack of precision/ of definition that it owes its

e#istence to and also to the &inary nature of one of its a#es. ;or,

something can no dou&t &e elievedin a matter of degrees, &ut the very

'argua&ly erroneous/ concept of physically verifia&le truth is one that is

only satisfied with a yes or a no. This &eing said, it is not evident to me

that in any significant way this limits the inferences we can draw fromsuch a schematic.


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conte#t of seemingly "uestiona&le ontological purpose, that the meaning

of the word, its descriptive purpose, is largely to signify such an

ontological pro&lematic! e her 'it/ as

&eing an entity of truth or untruth, and known or unknown is the e#tent

that this theori>ed entity fits into our schematic. This presents a

su&stantial amount of material availa&le to us as these are the "uestions

which, almost a&ove all else, theorists have &een compelled to address

a&out women.
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+he )aternal ,ody - .oman as physically true ut elieved as false

1eit>che tends to theori>e 06oman0 as a dangerous, secreting truth

which disgusts when revealed. 0The magic and the most powerful effect

of women,0 he writes, 0is, in philosophical language, action at a distance,actio in distansE &ut this re"uires first of all and a&ove all-distance0

'1eit>che +9$ +49/. %nd when one gets too close 'to truth, woman/

0we no longer &elieve that truth remains truth when the veils are

withdrawnE we have lived too much to &elieve this. Today we consider it

a matter of decency not to wish to see everything naked, or to &e present

at everything, or to understand and know everything0 '+9$ 3/.

*oanne provides an analysis of this passage that proves "uite lucid$ 0By

securing truths position as a "uestion of decency vs. indecency as it

concerns the clothed or unclothed state of the &ody, 1iet>sche aligns it

more surely with the figure of the woman-a woman who refuses to or

cannot or ought not &e known0 '*oanne ++$ H/.

/n 0nnowale Lac - .oman as physically false and elieved as

false

This category derives from, and argua&ly receives its most pronounced

theoretical treatment in, the ;reudian concept of penis envy.


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&elieve the ultimate goal of the human sciences to &e not to constitute,

&ut to dissolve man0'Lvi-Strauss +$ 49/.

!he Point of "ri#in

ations

'truth7untruth, known7unknown/, where &etter to go 'rhetorically and

figuratively/ than the point of origin!


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to the action of another &ody. The solution of a solid into a li"uid alters

the disposition of its molecules.


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Bloomington$ che, ;riedrich. +he :ay Science. Trans. 6alter =aufmann. 1ew

Oork$ Iintage +9. 3, +49.

(#ford )nglish *ictionary, The Compact )dition. (#ford Aniversity

ress ++. +, +, +, 449+.

Iico, 2iam&attista. +he 5ew Science. Trans. Thomas 2oddard Bergin

and ?a# 5arold ;isch.


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3. ;or the curious among us, listed in the ()* for natural are four general groupings

of definitions constituted &y eighteen different definitions 'of which five are consideredo&solete/ and a total of thirty-three su&-definitions added to those 'eight &eing o&solete/.

The first definition is$ (f law or :ustice$ Based upon the innate moral feeling ofmankind$ instinctively felt to &e right and fair, though not prescri&ed &y any enactment

or formal contract. The fifth definition seems the one most directly related to our

practices here$ 5aving a real or physical e#istence, as opposed to what is spiritual,intellectual, fictitious etc '++$ +/. F@eturn 3G

9. (&viously, it goes far &eyond the scope of this articleto providethe reader with

anything remotely resem&ling a corpus to prove this assertion. < will however note that,

in addition to Barthes, Konathan Culler seems to use myth in a similar conte#t on acouple of occasions in Structuralist oetics$ the myth of the innocence of &ecoming$

that continual change, as an end in itself, is freedom, and that it li&erates one from thedemands that could &e made of any particular state of the system 'Culler +H$ 4H+/.

%nd again,

myth defined and undefined

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