NEWYORKUNIVERSITY

HAUSERGLOBALPROGRAM

GLOBALFELLOWSFORUM

October7th,2014

THEROLEOFINSTITUTIONALREFORMINTRANSITIONALJUSTICEAND

THEOBSTACLESFORITSDEVELOPMENT

MarlonAlbertoWeichert

SUMMARY

Theessentialconceptoftransitionaljusticeissettled,thoughsomeelementsare

stillindebate.Idefineitasapublicpolicytoaddressthelegacyofgravehuman

rightsviolationsinpost‐conflictorpost‐repressiverulesocieties,withtheaimof

achievingreconciliation,strengtheningthedemocraticruleoflawandpromoting

guaranteesofnon‐recurrence.Transitionaljusticecomprisesjudicial,legislative

andadministrativemeasures,suchasthepromotionofaccountabilityfor

perpetratorsofhumanrightsviolations,truth‐seekinginitiatives,victims’

reparation,therecoveryofmemory,andinstitutionalreform.Althoughthesefive

policyareasshouldideallybepursuedinacoordinatedmanner,fewcountries

havesucceededinimplementingallofthemtogether.Empiricalevidence

suggeststhatinstitutionalreformhasbeenthemostneglectedamongthese

policies.Thisresearchwillanalyzetherolethatinstitutionalreformisexpected

toplayintransitionaljusticeprocessesand,morespecifically,whatactionscan

beadoptedtoreshapesecurityforcesthatwereinvolvedinhumanrights

violations.Itwillalsoaddressthequestionofwhattheobstaclesthathinderthe

implementationofinstitutionalreformareandif–andinwhatlevel–thegapof

institutionalreformcompromisestheachievementoftransitionaljusticeaims.

Finally,itwillarguethatthefailureinpromotinginstitutionalreformis

connectedtothepersistenceofhumanrightsviolationsafterre‐democratization,

usingBrazilasacasestudy.

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BACKGROUND

AbriefdefinitionofTransitionalJustice

TheconceptofTransitionalJusticehasbeennormativelydevelopedbasedonthe

empiricexperienceof:SouthAmericancountriestransitionsduringthelate

1970sandearly1980s,afterthemilitarydictatorship‐era;theSouthAfrican

transitionafterthefalloftheapartheidregimein1994;andtheendofthesoviet

blockintheEasternandCentralEurope,duringthe1990s.Itisalsoareflection

aboutthefailureoftheinternationalcommunitytopreventgrosshumanrights

violationsintheformerYugoslavia(theBalkansWars;1991‐2001)andRwanda

(genocidein1994).

Itdiscusseshowpost‐conflictorpost‐authoritariansocietiesandgovernments

shoulddealwiththelegacyofhumanrightsviolations,consideringatthesame

timeboththeinternationallawstandardsthatbindstatestoensurevictims’

rightsandtopromotejusticeforperpetrators,andthedesiredgoalof

strengtheningdemocracyandpreventingnewperiodsofhumanrights

violations1.

Whileinthelate90stheoreticaldiscussionontransitionaljusticewasinitsearly

stages,ithasexperiencedaquickdevelopmentsincethen,andtheliteraturein

thetopichasgrownexponentially.However,manyquestionsarestillopen.This

canbejustifiedbyitsempiricaloriginandtheenormousdiversityoftransitional

situations,aswellasthedifficultiestogetconcreteevidencesofthecontribution

thatdifferentapproachesoftransitionaljusticemaybringtothefield.

Aconsensualdefinitionofthetermisnowsettled2.However,adoptingalegal

approach,Iwilldefineitinthispaperasapublicpolicytoaddressthelegacyof

1ForahistoricalreconstructionoftheoriginofTJ,seeArthurPaige.“How‘Transitions’ReshapedHumanRights:aConceptualHistoryofTransitionalJustice”,HumanRightsQuarterly,31(2009),p.321‐367.2“FortheUnitedNations,transitionaljusticeisthefullrangeofprocessesandmechanismsassociatedwithasociety’sattempttocometotermswithalegacyoflarge‐scalepastabuses,inordertoensureaccountability,servejusticeandachievereconciliation.”GuidanceNoteoftheSecretary‐General–UnitedNationsApproachtoTransitionalJustice.Seehttp://www.unrol.org/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf;FortheInternationalCenterofTransitionalJustice–ICTJ,“transitionaljusticereferstothesetofjudicialandnon‐judicialmeasuresthathavebeenimplementedbydifferentcountriesinordertoredressthelegaciesofmassivehumanrightsabuses.Thesemeasuresincludecriminalprosecutions,truthcommissions,reparationsprograms,andvariouskindsofinstitutional

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gravehumanrightsviolationsinpost‐conflictorpost‐repressiverulesocieties,with

theaimofachievingreconciliation,strengtheningthedemocraticruleoflawand

promotingguaranteesofnon‐recurrence.Transitionaljusticecomprisesjudicial,

legislativeandadministrativemeasures,suchasthepromotionofaccountability

forperpetratorsofhumanrightsviolations,truth‐seekinginitiatives,victims’

reparation,therecoveryofmemory,3andinstitutionalreform.4

Therearesomeelementsincludedinthisconceptionthatdeserveexplanation.

Duetothelimitedextensionofthispaperandthespecificpurposeofthe

research,theyaregoingtobedevelopedonlyinaperfunctorymanner,

nevertheless.ThefirstofthemiswhyIlimittransitionaljusticetopost‐conflict

orpost‐ruleoflawrepressivesocieties,excludingsocietiesthatarestillin

conflict,butmakingeffortstoreachpeace.

WhileIrecognizethatmanyoftransitionaljusticestrategiescanbesynergicwith

peacebuildingapproaches–sincebothareboundbyinternationallawvalues

andduties,andbothhavethecommonaimofovercomingviolenceandhuman

rightsviolations–Iconsiderthatwithoutendingtheconflicttransitionaljustice

measuresandobjectivesconcerningvictimsrightscannotbeachieved.Indeed,

untilpeaceisimplementedorperpetratorsareoverthrown,victimsremain

vulnerableandwillnotbeabletoheadortakepartintheprocess.Itisalso

noteworthythatpeaceprocessesandtransitionaljusticehavedifferentaims;the

firstarefocusedoncurbingviolenceandendingbloodsheds,mostlythrough

disarmament,demobilizationandreintegration,inordertoallowthereturnof

theruleoflaw;thesecondendeavorstoachievesocialreconciliation,democracy

stabilityandguaranteesofnon‐recurrence.Despitebothbeingclosely

interconnected,transitionaljusticeisastepafterthepeaceprocess.

reform.”Seehttp://www.ictj.org/about/transitional‐justice.3Manyauthorsdonotconsidertherecoveryofmemoryasanindependentstrategy.AccordingtotheUNframework,forexample,TJwouldbecomprisedoffourdifferentmechanisms(see“TheGuidanceNoteofTheSecretary‐General:UnitedNationsApproachtoTransitionalJustice”,March2010,http://www.unrol.org/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf.).4Iunderstandthatthisisnotanexhaustivelist,sincesomeotherpoliciescanbeaddedtothesetoftransitionaljusticemeasures,accordingtolocalspecificities.Itwouldbethecaseofeducationalapproaches,mainlyinsocietiesinwhichchildrenweredirectlyaffectedbyviolence;oreconomicandsocialrightspromotion,where–forinstance–theoriginsoftheconflictweredirectlyconnectedtothefightforscarceresources.

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Secondly,IneedtobrieflyjustifywhatIconsidertobetheaimsofatransitional

justiceprocess5.Asmentioned,Iidentifythreefinalgoalstobeachieved:

reconciliation,strengtheningofthedemocraticruleoflaw,andthenon‐

recurrenceguarantee.As(1)reconciliation—atermthatintheliteratureisstill

controversial—Irefertotwophenomena:(1.a)thereestablishmentofpeople’s

confidenceinthestateanditsagencies;and(1.b)thetrustamongsocialgroups.

Dictatorsandauthoritariangovernmentskeeptheirpowerbygranting

privilegestothesocialgroupsthatsupportthemandintensivelyrepressing

dissidents,which,asaconsequence,createsdivisioninsociety,fracturingthe

notionofcivictrustandstimulatinghatredtowardsdivergentpolitical,ethnic,

religious,racial,ideologicaloreconomicalopinions.

Thesepracticeserodecivictrustinbothaverticalandahorizontalperspective.

Indeed,whiletheviolenceandharassmentofoneormoresocialorpolitical

segmentsbreaksouttherelationsbetweencitizensandpublicinstitutions

(verticalperspective),italsocontaminatesthetrustbetweenthesocialgroups,

whichseeeachotherwithsuspicion(horizontalperspective).Thus,

reconciliationreferstotheactionofrebuildingcivictrustinpublicagencies,but

italsoexpressesthatgroupsthathadbeenopposedbeforehavestartedrelying

oneachother.6Bothgoalsaredimensionsoftheprincipleofequality.When–

andif–theStateshowswillingnessandcapacitytotreatdifferentsocialgroup

interestswithoutprivileges,thereasonsforrivalryanddistrustamongthem

decreaseand,atthesametime,thetrustofthediscriminatedinthepublic

agenciesincreases.Theseare“twosidesofthesamecoin”,ortwoeffectsofthe

respectbypublicauthoritiestotheessentialvalueofequality.

Thisnotionofreconciliationiscloselyrelatedtotherecognitionandreparation

ofvictims,becauseitisthesignalthatthestatehasaddressedtheirrightsand

hasbeenadoptingmeasurestoreintegratetheminamoreegalitariansociety.

Anothercrucialelementforreconciliation,thiswayunderstood,isthepromotion

5MostofmyideasinthisissuehavebeendevelopedsincethestudiesofPablodeGreiff.See“TheorizingTransitionalJustice”.InWilliams,Melissa.TransitionalJustice.NewYork:NYUPress,2012,p.31‐77.6SeePablodeGreiff,“TheRoleofApologiesinNationalReconciliationProcesses:OnMakingTrustworthyInstitutionsTrusted”,inMarkGibney,RhodaE.Howard‐Hassman,Jean‐MarcCoicaudandNiklausSteiner(eds.).TheAgeofApology:FacingUptothePast.Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,2008.

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ofaccountability;thecriminalpersecutionofperpetratorsindicatesthatjustice

isavalueenforceableforanyone,evenforhigh‐levelauthorities,reinforcingthe

principleofequalitybeforethelaw.

Thesecondaimisthestrengtheningofdemocracy.Whilehereisnottheplaceto

discusswhatdemocracymeans–whichisaverycontestedconceptandthathas

deservedextensiveliteratureforcenturies–,itisnecessarytoatleastdelineate

itsboundariesforthepurposeofthisresearch.Theaspirationofdemocracyin

thecontextoftransitionaljusticeisrelatedtotheconceptofpolitical

democracy7,butnotmerelyinaproceduralorformalsense(periodicandfair

elections).Theconsolidationofthedemocraticprincipleisachieved“when

undergivenpoliticalandeconomicconditionsaparticularsystemofinstitutions

becomestheonlygameintown,whennoonecanimagineactingoutsidethe

democraticinstitutions”8;thatmeans,whenisfullyassumedbyallstakeholders

thatanyconflictorcrisismustbedecidedandsolvedaccordingtotheruleoflaw

(followingtheconstitutionalproceduresandbytheconstitutionalinstitutions),

andwithoutanyfearorthreatofauthoritarianoutbursts.Moreover,itinvolves

thesensethatthegovernmentanditscivilandmilitaryagenciesrecognizeand

respectthecitizensastheholdersofthestatepower,acceptingthattheycan–

andshall–accessandcontrolpublicauthoritiesandtakepartwheneverpossible

indecision‐makingprocesses(participatorydemocracy).Thus,inaconsolidated

democracythevastmajorityofthesocialgroupsacceptandrespecttheruleof

lawandthepoliticalproceduresand,atthesametime,theentirepublicsphereis

committedtoitsconstitutionaldutiesandawarethateverycitizenshallbe

treatedasholdingrightsbeforeanyauthorities.

Transitionaljusticestrategiesareapowerfuldriveinaddressingdemocratic

valuesand,inapost‐conflictorpost‐repressivesociety,areabletocreate

shortcutstoincorporatetheirstandardsindailylife.Imeanthat,ifaperpetrator

7TheTransitionaljusticeapproachisnotabletodealwithallthequestionsofeconomicandsocialdemocracy,butthatdoesnotmeanthateconomicandsocialrightsshouldbeleftoutoftheprocessofconsolidatingdemocracy.Thedevelopmentofsocialandeconomicrightsisessentialtotheexerciseoffreedomand,therefore,fortheautonomytotakepartinademocraticsociety.Itisalsoconnectedtotheideathatademocraticstatemusthavesocialjusticeasoneofitsstandards.8AdamPrzeworski,DemocracyandMarket:politicalandeconomicreformsinEasternEuropeandLatinAmerica.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1991,p.26.

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facesaccountability(transitionaljusticeinitiative),itisanindicationthatthe

stateisreadytodealwithjusticeandthatthelawisbindingforanyone,no

matterhisorhersociallevelorpoliticalinfluence(democraticachievement).

Underasimilarperspective,atruthseekingprocess(transitionaljustice

initiative)pushtherighttoaccessinformationandthecultureoftransparencyin

publicaffairs(democraticachievement).Transitionaljusticeperforms,therefore,

asignificantroletowardstheaffirmationofdemocraticvalues.

Anotherdimensionisthekeyrolethattransitionaljusticemeasurescanplayin

theempowermentandmobilizationofthecivilsociety.Indeed,victimsandnon‐

governmentalorganizationsareprominentinthewholeprocessoftransitional

justiceandsuchengagementprovidesskillsandabilitiesthatlaterwillhelpthem

intakingpartinthedailyprocessofcontrollingandadvocatingbeforepolicy‐

makingauthorities.Thus,thestrengtheningofdemocracyisaninexorable

consequenceofaholisticprocessoftransitionaljustice,notonlybecauseit

facilitatestheincorporationofitsessentialvaluesinpoliticalandnormative

fields,butalsoasatooltoempowercivilsocietyasarelevantstakeholderinthe

advocacyofrights.

Nevertheless,itisclearthattransitionaljusticesetsofpolicies,bythemselves,

arenotenoughtoconsolidatedemocracyandarenoteventhesoleconditionto

achievesuchgoal.However,itisundisputablethatthereisacausallinkbetween

transitionaljusticepoliciesandthesubstantiveconceptofdemocracy.These

processesareinterconnectedandtheygraduallyrestoretheconfidencein

justice,equalityandtruthasessentialvaluesforsocialandpoliticallife.I

rememberthatthesestrategieshavebeeninitiallystudiedfromadescriptive

perspective,basedontheexperienceofmanycountriesinLatinAmerica,

EasternEuropeandSouthAfrica,whichweredealingwithaccountabilityfor

perpetrators,truth‐seekingandvictimsreparations.Afterthat,aconceptionhas

beenindevelopment,pointingoutthatacoordinateddevelopmentofthese

groupsofinitiatives,togetherwithothermeasuresrelatedtomemorialization,

educationandreformofpublicinstitutionscouldincreasethepossibilitiesof

democracyconsolidationandguaranteesofnon‐recurrence.Obviouslythatitisa

normativeapproach,fromwhichpolicy‐makerscanbuildconcretesolutionsto

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addressthechallengesfacedinthefield.However,itisnotautopianor

unrealisticgoal.Themorecommittedtotheseprinciplesasocietyis,thecloser

totheguaranteeofnon‐recurrenceitwillalsobe(thethirdgoaloftransitional

justice).Indeed,thestrengtheningofdemocracyandthecivictrustprovidethe

conditionstopreventrepetitionofpastwrongdoings,speciallythetemptationof

consideringauthoritarianismashortcutforstabilityordevelopment,orthat

humanrightscanbetreatedinrelativetermsfortheachievementofother

objectives.

Non‐recurrence,however,isnotonlyalookatthefuture,topreventrepetitionof

previousfailures,butalsoatooltoovercomethelegacyofauthoritarianismthat

remainsinpublicagenciesevenafter(re)democratization.Indeed,institutions

thatduringdictatorshipsorconflict‐eraswerestructuredandorientatedto

repressdissidence–restrainingrightsandperpetratinghumanrightsabuses–

willprobablynotgiveuptheirpowersorbeabletochangetheircultureby

themselves,merelybecausetheregimecollapsed.Thus,itisnotuncommonthat

suchinstitutions(speciallysecurityforces)continueviolatingcitizens’rights

duringandaftertransition,followingthepatterntheyhadadoptedduringthe

formerregime,inaphenomenonthatmaybecalledperpetuationofhuman

rightsviolations.

Transitionaljusticepoliciesshallcurbsuchpractice,mainlybyimplementing

culturalandstructuralreformsintheseinstitutions,andbreakingimpunity

throughaccountabilityforperpetratorsofhumanrightsviolations.

Forthisreason,Iarguethattransitionaljusticeaimstowardsmorethanthe

avoidanceofrepetition;itaddressesthecontinuityofbadbehaviorsofofficials

aswell.Thus,theguaranteeofnon‐recurrencecomprisestwogoals:oneisthe

preventionofrepetition,inthesenseofforestallingthereturnofan

authoritarianregime;andtheotheristhecessationofwrongpracticesthat

democraciesperpetuateasalegacyofthepast.Thefirstisfocusedinthefuture,

whilethelastisconcentratedinthepresent.

Asrepeatedlymentioned,fortheachievementofthesethreefinalobjectives

(reconciliation,consolidationofdemocracyandguaranteeofnon‐recurrence)

severalsetsofmeasuresorstrategiesarerecommended.Althoughtheissueof

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categoriesofmeasuresisstillcontroversial,Iadoptadivisionaccordingtotheir

specificgoals.9Icalltheseobjectivesasintermediateorimmediate,sincethey

arestagesinthewholetransitionaljusticeprocess(whichhasthefinalandmain

objectivesdescribedabove).Iidentify,attheleast,fiveimmediateaims:

promotionofjustice,truthseeking,memoryrecovery,reparationsforvictims

andinstitutionalreform10.

Inanutshell–andforthepurposeofthisintroductorynote–wemayreferthat

justiceisachievedmainlythroughthecriminalpersecutionofperpetratorsof

gravehumanrightsviolationsorcrimesagainsthumanity11;truthissought

whenordinaryorspecialinstitutions–suchasTruthCommissions–succeedin

investigatehumanrightsviolationsandthebreachoftheruleoflaw,aswellas

theirorigins,causesandconsequences12;memoryisrecoveredifthe

remembranceoftheatrocitiesareregistered,preservedandrevealedthrougha

trans‐generationalapproach13;reparationsaregrantedforvictimsiftheremains

oftheirmissinglovedonesaresearchedandidentifiedandiftheirindividualand

collectiverightsarerestitutedorcompensated14;andinstitutionalreformis

implementedwhenpublicagenciesandinstitutesaresubmittedtochangesin

theirpeople,culture,structureandnormativelevels,inordertocommitthemto

thedemocraticandconstitutionalvalues,includingthefullrespectofhuman

rights.15

9Irecognizethatthisis–asalmostallinitiativestoassigncategoriesinsocialscience–anextremelyartificialexpedient.Nevertheless,itisusefulfordidacticpurposesand,moreover,itisconsolidatedintheliteratureoftransitionaljusticeandinthelanguageofinternationallaw.10Seefootnotes3and4.11SeeMarlonAlbertoWeichert.“CrimescontraahumanidadeperpetradosnoBrasil.LeideAnistiaeprescriçãopenal”,RevistaBrasileiradeCiênciasCriminais,v.74,p.170‐229,2008.12SeeMarlonAlbertoWeichert.“AComissãoNacionaldaVerdade”,inSILVAFILHO,JoséCarlosMoreirada;TORELLY,Marcelo;ABRAO,Paulo(orgs.).JustiçadeTransiçãonasAméricas–olharesinterdisciplinares,fundamentosepadrõesdeefetivação.BeloHorizonte:EditoraFórum,2013,p.161‐180.13Thesitesofconsciencecanassumemanydistinctivefunctionsinsociety.Forvictimstheymaybe,morethanawaytoremember,placesformourning.Forother,theymightrepresentatributeorhomagetotheresistantsandothervictims.Forthenextgenerations,theyshallguaranteetheopportunitytoknowandunderstandthepastwrongdoingsoftheirsociety.SeeClaraRamirez‐Barat(ed.).TransitionalJustice,Culture,andSociety:BeyondOutreach.NewYork:SocialScienceResearchCouncil,2013.14SeePablodeGreiff.“Justiceandreparations”.InDeGreiff,Pablo(ed.).TheHandbookofReparations.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress/InternationalCenterforTransitionalJustice,2006,p.451‐477.15Thisideawillbedevelopedin“Researchquestions”,belowinthispaper.

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Itisrelevanttonoticethat,whileeachtransitionalmeasureisconceivedto

pursueitsownsgoals,allthemserveinreality“morethanoneimmediateaimat

atime”16.Therearedistinctdimensionsofrightsorintereststhatauniquepolicy

canachieve,especiallybecauseallthesesetsofmeasuresandgoalsare

interwoven.Asanexample,areparationprocessmaygatherinformationabout

repression,helptoseektruth,preservememoryandpromotejusticeagainst

perpetrators.Inanycase,thesemeasuresarenota“menu”fromwhichpolicy‐

makerscanchoosewhattoimplement.Theyarearticulatedandcomplimentary

strategies,or“partsofawhole”17,whichmutuallyreinforceeachother.

Inthesamesense,thesepoliciesshallbeadoptedinanintegratedapproach;

simultaneously,inidealterms,butattheleastinasequentialmanner.Thisis

whyIdefinetransitionaljusticeasapublicpolicy.Itisasetofadministrative,

judicialandlegislativeactivitiesheadedbythestatetoachieveaimssocially

relevantandpoliticallydetermined.18

Itisrelevanttostressthatthisconceptisentirelycompatiblewiththeideaof

civilentitiessharinganddevelopingtasks;however,inapublicpolicythereisa

legalandadministrativeactivitythatnecessarilyrequestthepresenceofthe

State.Transitionaljusticepreciselyhasthischaracteristic;whilethecoreofits

activitiesremainsinpublichandsandcannotbedelegatedortransferred–for

example,thepromotionofaccountabilityforperpetrators,thecreationoftruth

commissions,theenactmentofnewlawsregardingthefreeaccesstopublic

archives,thepaymentofreparationsforvictims,andtheimplementationsof

institutionalreformareinitiativesthatonlythepublicauthoritiescanlead–,civil

societyisanessentialstakeholderduringboththeformulatingstageofthepolicy

andtheimplementationofthemeasures,providingthelegitimacyfortheentire

process.

Inanycase,itisdifficulttofindacountrythathasbeenabletoimplementall

thesestrategies,evensequentially,formanyreasons,suchas:post‐conflictor

16PablodeGreiff.See“TheorizingTransitionalJustice”.InWilliams,Melissa.TransitionalJustice.NewYork:NYUPress,2012,p.39.17PablodeGreiff.See“TheorizingTransitionalJustice”.InWilliams,Melissa.TransitionalJustice.NewYork:NYUPress,2012,p.34.18SeeMariaPaulaDallariBucci.DireitoAdministrativoePolíticasPúblicas.SãoPaulo,Saraiva:2002,p.241.

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post‐repressiveruleoflawgovernmentsarenotentirelycommittedto

democraticvalues;pressureorinfluenceofgroupsthatsupportedtheold

regime;thetransitionwasnegotiatedandtheoldgovernmentsortheir

defendersensuredamnestyandotherlimitsregardingpasthumanrights

violations;thescarcityofresourcesimposestransitionaljustice’spoliciestobe

traded‐offagainstdemandsforeconomicandsocialrights,which–mainlyaftera

conflict–arenotonlyenormousbutalsoapriorityissue;thevastsetof

transitionaljusticetasksimposeslongtermprocesses,weakeningthroughthe

timethesocialorpoliticalwillingnesstopromotethem.Theconsequencesof

thesegapsaredifficulttobeweighedbut,underanormativeperspective,itis

undisputablethattheyjeopardizetheachievementofthefinalaimsof

transitionaljustice

Theoriginsoftheresearch–institutionalreformgapinBrazilian

transitionaljusticeprocessandthepersistenceofpoliceviolence

Thereisenoughevidencesuggestingthat,amongthefivetransitionaljustice

policies,institutionalreformhasbeenthemostneglected.19Indeed,theother

foursetofmeasureshavebeingimplementedmoreextensiveandintensively.

Evenjustice‐promoting,whichisthemostcommonissueoftransitionaljustice

subjectedtonegotiationsandtrade‐offs,hasbeenlargelymovedforwardinthe

last20years.20TruthCommissionsandotheractionstoaccessinformationand

revealthefactsare,inasimilarsense,initiativesthathavebeendevelopedin

morethanfortycountries.21Thegrantingofreparationsforvictims22andthe

19Empiricalevidencecollectedthroughnon‐systematicanalyzesoftransitionaljusticeprocessesindifferentcountries,aswellasinformalinterviewswithnationalandinternationalauthoritiesandtransitionaljusticeactivists.Thisperceptionisstronglyreinforcedintheliterature,whichhasveryfewcasestudiesconcerninginstitutionalreform,andconcentratealmostentirelyonvettingorlustrationexperiences.20SeeKathrynSeeking,Thejusticecascade:howhumanrightsprosecutionsarechangingworldpolitics.NewYork:W.W.Norton&Co.,2011.21SeePriscillaHayner.Unspeakabletruths.FacingthechallengeofTruthCommissions.Seconded.NewYorkandLondon:Routledge,2010.22SeeTryciaOlsen,Payne,LeighA.,andReiter,AndrewG.“TransitionalJusticeintheworld,1970‐2007:insightsfromanewdataset”.JournalofPeaceResearch47(6),p.803‐809.

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disseminationofthememory23arealsospreadaround.Though,institutional

reform,whenadopted,isusuallyrestrictedtovettingandlustrationpolicies.

Understandingthisgap,itscausesanditsconsequencestotransitionaljustice

aimshasbeenthefirstimpetusforthestudy.Acomplimentarymotivation,

however,istheBraziliancase,inwhichanincreaseinhumanrightsviolations

aftertheendofthedictatorshiphasbeenexperiencingandthereisevidencethat

thisphenomenonis,attheleast,partiallylinkedtothefailureofthestatein

implementinginstitutionalreformandothertransitionaljusticemeasures.24

Suchconnectionbetweenthegapofchangeinsecurityforcesinthecontextof

transitionaljusticeandthepost‐dictatorshipstateviolenceisadriveofthe

research.

Tobetterunderstandthisbackground,ashortdescriptionoftheBrazilian

dictatorshipandtransitionisnecessary.Themilitarymadeacoupd’étatonApril

1st,1964,againstanelectedgovernment,whichwerestartingaprocessof

economicandsocialreformsthatwasfrighteningtheelites,theconservative

middleclass,themilitary,andthechurch.Thesegroups–stronglysupportedby

theUSgovernment–stimulatedthemilitaryinterventionunderthethoughtthat

–ashadhappenedbefore–thepowerwouldsoonreturntothem.25Butthe

dictatorshiplastedfor21years.

Thetransitionforre‐democratizationwasaprocessthatstartedin1979,with

theenactmentofanamnestylaw.26Theprocessoftransferringthepowertoa

civiliangovernmentwasentirelycontrolledbythemilitaryandended6years

later,afterhugepopulardemonstrationaskingfordirectelectionsforpresident.

Thus,in1985thefirstcivilpresidentinauguratedhisterm27.

23Forinstance,theInternationalCoalitionofSitesofConsciencegathersmorethan185institutionsin47countriesacrosstheworlddedicatedtotherecoveryofthememoryofhumanrightsviolations.Seehttp://www.sitesofconscience.org/issues/.24SeeKathrynSikkink,andWalling,CarrieBooth.“TheimpactsofhumanrightstrialsinLatinAmerica.”JournalofPeaceResearch,LosAngeles,London,NewDelhiandSingapore,v.44,nº4,2007,p.427‐445.Accordingtotheauthors,“Brazilexperiencedagreaterdeclineinitshumanrightspracticesthananyothertransitionalcountryintheregion.”(p.437).25SeeMarcosNapolitano.1964:HistóriadoRegimeMilitarBrasileiro.SãoPaulo:Contexto,2014.26TheAmnestyLaw(nr.6.883/79),accordingtotheBrazilianSupremeCourt,grantedabilateralamnesty,benefitingbothpoliticaldissidentsandstateofficials.27TheCongressindirectlyappointedaconservativepoliticianoftheoppositiontoPresident(TancredoNeves),havingashisvice‐presidenttheformerleaderofthepartythatsupportedthe

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In1988thecountrypromulgatedanewConstitution,whichisthewatershedin

theBrazilianre‐democratizationprocess,sinceithasreintroducedthe

democraticruleoflawandhasprovidedanextensivebillofrights.However,

concerningthelegacyofhumanrightsviolationsduringthedictatorship,thereis

onlyalegalprovisionestablishingthatthegovernmentshouldgrantreparations

forthosepersonspoliticallypersecuted28.Itisrelevanttonoticethatthe

Constitutiondidnotrefertothepoliticalpersecutedasvictims,butas

“amnestied”,sendingaclearsignalthattheconservativeforcesandthemilitary

didnotacceptanyrecognitionofpastwrongdoings.

In1995,alawwasapprovedinordertoestablishthepaymentofreparationsto

thefamiliesofmurderedordisappearedpeople29.In2001,asecondlawcreated

abroaderregimeofreparations,allowingvictimsofanykindofpolitical

persecutiontorequestcompensationfordamages.30Bothlawswereadopted

withoutanyreferencetotheframeworkoftransitionaljustice,creatingthe

feelingthatBrazilwasaddressingthelegacyofhumanrightsviolationsasan

economicandindividualinterestofvictimsandpromotingatrade‐offbetween

justiceandtruthagainstcompensation.

Onlyin2007–whentheFederalProsecutionServicebegantodealwiththe

demandforaccountability31–wastheconceptoftransitionaljusticeintroduced

inBraziliandiscussionsaboutthelegacyofthemilitarydictatorship32.Itwas

subsequentlyincorporatedintotheofficialspeechoftheAmnestyCommission,

theMinistryofJusticeandtheSecretaryofHumanRights.

militarygovernment(JoséSarney).TancredoNevesbecamesick,however,onthedaybeforehisinauguration,anddied37dayslater.Thus,thevice‐presidenttookoffice.28Article8oftheTransitoryConstitutionalDispositionAct(ADCT,initsinitialsinPortuguese).29Lawnr.9,140.ItalsocreatedtheSpecialCommissiononDeadandDisappearedPersons.30Lawnr.10,559.ItcreatedtheAmnestyCommission,whichisinchargeofgrantingthereparations.31TheauthorisafederalprosecutorinBrazilandhasbeeninvolvedinthediscussionandimplementationoftransitionaljusticemeasuresinthecountrysince1999.32InMayof2007theFederalProsecutorOfficecoordinatedameetinginSaoPaulo,inpartnershipwithboththeInternationalCenterforTransitionalJustice(ICTJ)andtheCenterforJusticeandInternationalLaw(CEJIL),inwhichforthefirsttimeinBraziltheconceptofTransitionalJusticewasofficiallydiscussed.Attheend,theSaoPauloLetterwaspublished,claimingforaccountability,thecreationofaforensicanthropologyteam,theopeningofarchives,anewlegislationconcerninginformationaccessandtheinstitutionofaNationalTruthCommission.

13

Sincethen–buteversoslowly–,Brazilhasbeendevelopingmanymeasuresof

transitionaljustice.ItinstitutedaNationalTruthCommissionanddozenof

regionaltruthcommissions,33andeditedanewlegislationconcerningtheright

toaccessinformation,34bothin2011.TheFederalProsecutionService,forits

owninitiative,startedin2008tomoveforwardonaccountability35.Programsof

memoryrecoveryareinprogress,headedmainlybycivilsociety.

Butinthefieldofinstitutionalreformalmostnomeasurehasbeen

implemented.36Evensmallsteps,likevettingprocedures,havebeenrefusedby

thegovernmentandthejudiciary.Boththearmedforcesandthepoliceentities

havekeptthesamerules,structureandculturefromthepast.Moreover,the

armedforcescontinuetodenythattortureorhumanrightsviolationswere

perpetratedwithintheirpremises,preventinganyopportunityforapositive

discussionaboutresponsibilitiesandpreventionofrepetition37.

Atthesametime,BrazilisoneofthefewcountriesinSouthAmericathathas

experiencedanincreaseinhumanrightsviolationsafterthedictatorship.Ithas

anincrediblenumberofalmost2thousandpeoplekilledbypoliceofficialsevery

year(morethan5perday,onaverage)38andanendemicuseoftorturebythe

33Lawnr.12,528,ofNovember2011.TheNationalTruthCommissionshouldpresentitsreportinDecember2014.34Lawnr.12.527,ofNovember2011.35InspiteofadecisionoftheSupremeCourtin2010–whichdeclaredconstitutionaltheAmnestyLawforhumanrightsviolationsperpetrators–,theFederalProsecutionServiceispushingmanyinvestigationandhasofferedtencriminalcomplaints.ThefederalprosecutorsarefollowingtheGomesLundsentenceoftheInterAmericanHumanRightsCourtpublishedin2010,whichdeclaredtheAmnestyLaw–aswellasthestatuteoflimitation–tobeinvalidbeforetheAmericanConventiononHumanRightsandtheinternationaldutiesofthecountry.Thejudges,however,remainverycautiousinconfrontingtheSupremeCourtandhavenotyetconvictedanydefendant.36 AnexceptionisthereshapeofthePublicProsecutionService,promotedbythe1988Constitution.TheBrazilianPublicMinistryreceivedpowerstodefendthelegalorder,thedemocraticregimeandtheinalienablesocialandindividualrights(article127).Althoughitwasconceivedwithoutanyconnectiontotransitionaljusticeframework,itmaybeconsideredatypicalcaseofinstitutionalreform.37TheArmy,NavyandAir‐forcecommandersansweredinJune2014aninformationrequestpresentedbytheNationalTruthCommissionanddeniedanycaseoftorture,murderorenforceddisappearanceofpersonscouldhavetakenplaceinmilitarybarracksduringthedictatorship.Seehttp://www.cartacapital.com.br/sociedade/forcas‐armadas‐negam‐desvio‐de‐finalidade‐em‐instalacoes‐onde‐houve‐tortura‐8372.html.38In2012,therewere1,890fatalvictimsofon‐dutypolice.OtherSee“FórumBrasileirodeSegurançaPública.AnuárioBrasileirodeSegurançaPública.Ano7.2013,p.118‐127.Availableatwww2.forumseguranca.org.br/novo/storage/download//anuario2013‐corrigido.pdf.AstheUNSpecialRapporteuronextrajudicial,summaryorarbitraryexecutionsattestedin2008,“on‐duty

14

policeandprisonauthoritiestoextractinformation,confession,oras

punishment.39

Thispersistentpoliceviolenceisduetoseveralfactors40buttheabsenceof

institutionalreforminthecontextoftransitionaljusticeissurelyoneofthem.

Thus,theanalysisofsuchconnectionisthesecondissueunderresearch.

SCOPE,RESEARCHQUESTIONSANDAPPROACH

Asseen,theresearchhasoriginsintwoconcreteissues:thecausesand

consequencesofthegapofinstitutionalreforminthecontextoftransitional

justice,andtheconnectionsbetweenthisgapandthepersistentpoliceviolence

incountriessuchasBrazil.Attheend,itintendstounderstandanddescribethe

causesofthesefactsandtocontribute,inthenormativefield,todevelop

strategiestoovercomesuchsituations.

However,acknowledgingthelittleinformationavailableintheliterature,the

workwillinitiallydedicateroomtonormativeapproachesregardingthe

extensionanddepthofinstitutionalreformpolicy,whichwillprovidethe

frameworktoaddresstheresearchquestions.

Atthispoint,andduetothedifferentlevelsofextensionandcomplexityof

institutionalreforminpost‐conflictorinpost‐ruleoflawrepressivesocieties,

thescopeoftheresearchhasbeenlimitedtothesecondsituation(post‐ruleof

policeareresponsibleforasignificantproportionofallkillingsinBrazil”.ReportpresentedbyPhilipGAlstonbeforetheHumanRightsCouncil,eleventhsession;August,2008;item9.39SeethereportoftheUNSpecialRapporteurontortureandothercruel,inhumanordegradingtreatmentorpunishment,NigelRodney,presentedbeforetheCommissiononHumanRights,onMarch2001.Availableathttp://daccess‐dds‐ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G01/123/23/PDF/G0112323.pdf?OpenElement.SeealsoHumanRightsWatch’slettertoBrazilianauthoritiessentonJuly2014(availableathttp://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/20140728_Brazil_Tortura_PT_0.pdf)andAmnestyInternational’sAnnualReport2013‐Thestateoftheworld'shumanrights,p.51(availableathttp://files.amnesty.org/air13/AmnestyInternational_AnnualReport2013_complete_en.pdf).40Socialandeconomicinequalitiesinurbanandruralareasareanundisputablefactor,whichpushcriminalityand,inaviciouscircle,askformorerepressionandviolence.Theclaimforsecurityisveryserious,sinceBrazilhas50thousandhomicidesperyear(arateof24.3per100.000inhabitants),accordingtotheAnuárioBrasileirodeSegurançaPública.Ano7.2013,p.14.See“FórumBrasileirodeSegurançaPública.Availableatwww2.forumseguranca.org.br/novo/storage/download//anuario2013‐corrigido.pdf.

15

lawrepressivesocieties).Indeed,inpost‐conflictcasesinstitutionalreformmay

dealwiththelegacyoflarge‐scalefights,inwhichthearmedforcesconfronted

massivelythepopulation.Thedemandforreconciliationmight,thus,reachthe

needforthedismantlingofthearmyorothermilitaryforce,whicharenotan

usualelementinpost‐dictatorshipsocieties.Thisisonlyoneexampleof

specificitybetweenthetwomodels,butenoughtorecommendaseparate

approach.

Comingbacktothedevelopmentoftheresearch,thefirstissueunderanalysis

concernstheextensionofaninstitutionalreform,orthecriteriatoidentifythe

institutionsthatshouldbereformed.Indeed,itisbroadlyacceptedthatsecurity

forcesshouldbetheprimaryfocusofinstitutionalreform,astheyareoften

directlyresponsiblefortheperpetrationofhumanrightsviolations.However,

systematicabusesofteninvolvethedirectorindirectparticipationofotherstate

agents,suchasmembersofthejudiciaryortheforeignaffairsministry,among

manyothers.41Iarguethattheseotherpublicinstitutionsshouldalsobesubject

tothereformprocess,althoughindifferentdegreesandmanners.

Theresearchfollowstheliteraturethatrecognizesthatvettingprocessesare

fundamentalforthedemocratizationprocessofpublicinstitutions,but

insufficientifnotaccompaniedbyothermeasuresinthenormativeandmaterial

spheres.42Thus,acompleteprocessofinstitutionalreformmustalsoseekto

changenorms,values,andstructures,43entailingthedismantlingofthe

authoritarianlegacy,andtheredefinitionofinstitution’stasksandpractices

accordingtoademocraticconstitution.

Inthenormativefield,asanexample,thenormsregulatingtheuseofforceby

securitybodiesandestablishingtheresponsibilityoftheirofficialsforany

41Privateorganizationsmayberesponsibleforprovidingsupporttoauthoritarianregimesandtohumanrightsviolationpolicies.Measurestopreventrepetitionamongtheseprivateentitiesmayandshouldbeadopted.However,statescannotdirectlypromotethesereforms,butonlyenforcedemocraticlawsandpromotecriminalandcivilaccountability.Becausethisapproachentailsadifferentsetofconsiderations,Iwillnotincludeitwithinthescopeoftheresearch.42SeeAlexanderMayer‐Rieck,“OnPreventingAbuse:VettingandOtherTransitionalReforms”,inAlexanderMayerRieckandPablodeGreiff(eds.).Justiceasprevention:vettingpublicemployersintransitionalsocieties,NewYork:SSRC,2007,p.482‐520.43Indeed,thisshouldfollowabroaderprocessthantheonerecommendedintheGuidanceNoteofTheSecretary‐General.UnitedNationsApproachtoTransitionalJustice,p.9.

16

abusescannotbethesamefromthedictatorship‐era.Newnormsmustbeputin

placetoaddresssuchbehaviorsandtoeffectivelybindinstitutionstotheruleof

lawstandards.Inthesameperspective,policepracticesmustchangetoensure

respectofcitizens’rights.Institutionalreformprocessesmust–furthermore–go

beyondthesecurityforcesanddealwiththeremainingauthoritarianstructures

andpracticesinotherpublicpowerspheres,asitisthecaseofthejurisdictionof

militarycourts.

Oncethisframeworkisdrawn,itwillbepossibletoaddressthemainquestions

proposed:

1)Whattheobstaclesarethathindertheimplementationofinstitutionalreform

measures;

Theguidinghypothesishereisthatstrongpublicbodies(suchasthearmed

forcesorpolicingentities)tendtomaintaintheirpoliticalpowerafterthe

transitionasaconsequenceoftwofactors.

Thefirstisthethreatthattheyposetocivilianauthorities.Securityforcesare

powerfulinstitutionsinanycountry,sincetheyhavethemonopolyofthestate

violence;thus,theycaneasilycreateturbulenceandprovokefearinthe

population,especiallyiftheyadopta–explicitordisguised–speechthatreforms

couldjeopardizetheprotectionofsocietyagainstcriminalactivity.Governments

wouldconsidertoodangeroustostartaprocessthatcancreateinstabilityand

affecttheirpopularity.

Asecondreasonisthatsecurityforcesaresupportedbysomesectorsofsociety,

especiallyfromtheelitethatduringthedictatorshipsupportedtheregimeboth

politicallyandeconomically.Suchgroupshaveaninterestinretainingtheir

influenceovertheseinstitutions,bothtoavoidtherevelationoftheirown

responsibilityforpastabusesandtomaintaintheirinfluence.Aninstitutional

reformprocesscouldjeopardizethispowerand,toavoidanyrisk,theyjoin

forceswiththeofficialstohinderanyinitiativeofsubstantialmodificationinthe

securityforces,forminganallianceagainstchange.Fortheelite,despitethe

criminalityandthehighlevelofhumanrightsviolations,thefearoflosing

influenceinthesecurityforcesisstrongerthanthelossesthatviolenceprovokes

17

intheirfreedom.Idonotarguethatitisalwaysaconsciousdecision,butthefear

trendsdecision‐makerstowardsconservatism.

Thus,topromotedemocraticinstitutionalarrangementsgovernmentswould

need,first,tocreateawarenessinsocietyofthebenefitsandnecessityofsuch

reforms.Aprevioussupportofthewiderrangeofcivilsocietymustbeachieved

toconfrontminorityinterests.Atthesametime,governmentmustdemonstrate

astrongpoliticalwillandthedeterminationofimplementingthechanges,

gatheringpoliticalandsocialforcestoovercomecorporativeinterestsof

officials.Aprudentuseoftheauthorityisalsorecommended,especiallybefore

militaryentities,whicharehistoricallyandculturallycommittedtodiscipline

andhierarchy.Institutionalreformisataskthat–morethanothertransitional

justice–dependsonabroadsocialandpoliticalagreement.

2)Whattheconsequencesareoffailingtoreformstatestructuresfortransitional

justice’saims‐reconciliation,democracystrengtheningandguaranteesofnon‐

recurrence;

Thereareclearconnectionsbetweenthefailureofimplementinginstitutional

reformandthethreeaimsoftransitionaljustice.

Inrespecttothereconciliationgoal,institutionalreformisparamountto

restoringthecitizens’confidenceinpublicinstitutions,sinceitispreciselythis

processthatredefinestheroleofagenciesinvolvedinpasthumanrightsabuses,

andwhich,asaconsequence,canrestorethecitizens’trustinpublicbodies.

Therefore,insufficientorinadequatereformeffortsstymiethepossibilitiesfor

reconciliation.

Atthesametime,institutionalreformisthemajorstrategytobreakdownthe

resistanceofsecurityforcestochangetheirauthoritarianandarbitrary

practices,which,eveninademocracy,continuetoposethreatstohumanrights.

Furthermore,itmayprovidetheirofficialswiththetoolsandskillsnecessaryto

strengthentheirroleinpreservingtheruleoflaw,assuringthateveninthecase

ofpotentialauthoritarianoutcriestheywillhavethecapacitytoresistanti‐

18

democratictendencies.Thus,institutionalreformmaycurbhumanrightsabuses

andpreventrepetitionofrepressiveregimes,contributingdirectlytotheaimsof

democracystrengtheningandguaranteeofnon‐recurrence.

3)WhattheconnectionsarebetweenthegapofinstitutionalreforminBraziland

thepersistencepoliceviolenceinthiscountry.

Theanswertothislastquestionintendstobringcontributionstoaddressthe

problemofapersistenthighlevelofpoliceviolenceinBrazil,whereannuallyat

least2thousandpeoplearekilledbyon‐dutypolice44,andotherformsofhuman

rightsviolations,suchastortureandenforceddisappearanceofpersonsarestill

reality.Thestudywillenlightentheconnectionsbetweenthissituationandthe

gapofinstitutionalreforminsecurityforcesaftertheauthoritarianregime.

Indeed,thedictatorshipleftalegacy–stilluntouched–ofamilitaryand

repressivementalityinthesecurityforceswhichdrivespoliceactivitytotreat

anycitizen–butmostlythepoor,young,maleblackpopulation–asapotential

suspectandenemy.

Beyondidentifyingconnections,theresearchwillproposeinterventionsto

addressthisawfulheritage.Afirstchallenge45isthelegalframework,sincemost

ofthelegislationisstillfromthedictatorship‐eraandenactedunderthe

“securitynationaldoctrine”46.Itisnecessarytodemilitarizepoliceactivity,47to

reinforcethecivilgovernmentauthority,48tofacilitateaccountabilityofpolice

members(restrictingthemilitaryjurisdictionexclusivelyfordisciplinary

44Seefootnote38.SeealsoHumanRightsWatch’sreport“LethalForce”,launchedonDecember2009andavailableathttp://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/12/08/lethal‐force.45 This is a preliminary and still very perfunctory list of interventions conceived to implement an institutional reform in Brazilian security forces. 46PublicsecurityinBrazilismainlyataskofthestates(thecountryisafederation).Thus,eachstatehasitsownlegislation.Inmostofthem,newlawsrulingthepoliceactivityhavenotbeenenactedaftertheendofdictatorship.47Ineachstatetherearetwopoliceforces:themilitarypolice,whichisresponsibleforostensiveandpreventivepolicing,patrollingthestreetsandarrestingthosecaughtcommittingacrime;andthecivilpolice,whichisinchargeofcriminalinvestigationsandhasthedutyofarrestingaccordingtojudicialorders.48Forexample,thestatesgovernorsneedtosubmitthenominationofthemilitarypolicecommanderstocommanderofthefederalarmy.Thisruleweakenstheauthorityofthecivilgovernorsbeforethemilitaryforce.

19

issues)49,andtoredefinetheinvestigationblueprint(whichisconcentratedin

thecivilpoliceandisverybureaucratic50).Intheculturalfield,educational

programsshallembodythedemocraticroleofsecurityforces,preparingtheir

officialstounderstandandrespectthehumanrightsandtoadequatelytreat

suspicious.Atthesametime,formerandcurrentperpetratorsshallbesubjectto

vettingproceduresandfullaccountability,ensuringthespecificandgeneral

prevention.

Inconclusion,theconnectionoftheframeworkofinstitutionalreforminthe

contextoftransitionaljusticeandthesituationofhumanrightsviolationsin

Brazil–goalofthisresearch–meetstheclaimoftheUNSpecialRapporteuron

extrajudicial,summaryorarbitraryexecutions,towhom“[t]hepeopleofBrazil

didnotstrugglevaliantlyagainst20yearsofdictatorship,nordidtheyadopta

federalConstitutiondedicatedtorestoringrespectforhumanrights,onlyin

ordertomakeBrazilfreeforpoliceofficerstokillwithimpunityinthenameof

security”51.

METHODOLOGY

Todeveloptheworkdescribed,acombinationoftheoreticalandempirical

methodswillbeadopted.Thetheoreticalapproachwillmainlybeadoptedto

developanormativeframeworkabouttheextensionanddepthofinstitutional

reform.Thedescriptivemethodwillbeusedtoidentifyandanalyzetheobstacles

49AccordingtothestandardsoftheInterAmericanHumanRightsCourt.Seecases19Comerciantes(2004,parágrafos164a177),casoAlmonacidArellanos(2006,parágrafos130a133),casoCantoralBenavides(2000,parágrafos111a115),casoDuranteyUgarte(2000,parágrafos115a118)ecasoLasPalmeras(2001,parágrafo51a54),allavailablesathttp://www.corteidh.or.cr,andtheEuropeanCourtonHumanRights,case“PablaKyv.Finland”,availableathttp://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=pabla&sessionid=13914493&skin=hudoc‐em.50Braziladoptstheaccusatorysystem.However,thepolice,throughapoliceinquest,isinchargeofconductingcriminalinvestigation.ThePublicProsecutionServiceintervenesonlytocontroltheinvestigationbythepolice.Aftertheconclusionofthepoliceinquirytheprosecutorswillaccesstheevidenceofthecrimeandmayofferthecriminalcomplaint,closethecaseoraskformoreinvestigation.Thecommunicationbetweenpoliceandprosecutionserviceareregisteredinaproceeding.51ReportpresentedbyPhilipGAlstonbeforetheHumanRightsCouncil,eleventhsession;August,2008;summary.

20

forimplementationofinstitutionalreformandtheconsequencesofthisfailure

(firstandsecondresearchquestion)andforthestudyoftheBraziliancase(third

researchquestion).

Themaintoolswillbealiteraturereview;studyoflegalnorms;analysisof

reportsconcerningviolenceandhumanrightsabuses;andinterviewswith

Braziliancivilandmilitaryauthorities,scholars,expertsinpublicsecurityand

activists.Theprojectwilluseaninterdisciplinaryapproach,gatheringarguments

fromthelegal,social,andpoliticalfields.

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