ngo and donor coordination to speeds up reconstruction and avoid ngo competition - arwin soelaksono

8/6/2019 NGO and Donor Coordination To Speeds up Reconstruction and Avoid NGO Competition - Arwin Soelaksono

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NGO and Donor Coordination To Speeds up Reconstruction and Avoid NGO Competition

NGO and Donor Coordination to Speeds upReconstruction and Avoid NGO Competition

Arwin Soelaksono

Website: http://www.disaster-response.cc Email: [email protected] November 9, 2009

2008-2009: Deputy Director Construction Department Aceh ProgramSave the Children

2005-2008: Operations Director Tsunami Disaster Response ProjectHabitat for Humanity Indonesia

Abstract

During 2005-2006, in cities like Banda Aceh, Meulaboh andother parts in West Coast, the presence of Non GovernmentOrganizations (NGOs) made these places feel small. These

places were crowded of organizations. Nearly everyone was in ahigh spirit to run their program. Bad things happened when

NGOs persuaded beneficiaries to receive someone's program andin the same time reject others.

Conflicting programs amongst NGOs was another problem asa result of the lack of NGO or donor coordination. The presenceof one program affected the quality and delivery schedule of other program. When it getting worse the size of the programreduced and impeded. And at the end it created bad attitudesamongst the beneficiaries. There should be a way onstrengthening NGO coordination otherwise there will be a hardcompetition amongst NGO .

Keyword: tsunami, reconstruction, NGO, competition,coordination

I. I NTRODUCTION

Officials describe the December 26, 2004 tsunami asone of the worst natural disasters in recent history [1] . Thefive countries that suffered most due to their coastlines

being swallowed up by tsunami were India, Indonesia, theMaldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Several other countrieswere also affected including Bangladesh, Myanmar,Kenya, Malaysia, the Seychelles, Somalia and Tanzania

[2]. Extensive media coverage reported the impact in theaftermath of the tsunami. Massive destruction of infrastructure, public facilities and housing in thosecountries was widely reported through many media fromtraditional publications as newspapers to more recenttechnology such as video streaming. The coverage becamemore dramatic when the media reported on the loss of life.Approximately 225,000 people died or are still missing.Overall, an estimated two million people were directly or indirectly affected, and 1.7 million of these wereinternally displaced [2]. During the preparation of the 2005

New Year and weeks after, television companiesinundated their viewers with horrific and heartbreakingfootage of the tsunami victims. Contrasting thecheerfulness of New Year celebration to the tragedy, itcreated deep sympathy. For instance, in Jakarta,

Indonesia, many 2005 New Year’s parties were cancelledand people donated their money to government offices,social and religious organizations.

The fundraising was a remarkable success. By the endof 2005, the world raised an estimated $13.6 billion. Some92 countries provided assistance during the first year,including countries such as North Korea and Niger,themselves in need of aid [3] . For Aceh the totalcommitment of USD 7.7 billion was the biggest fundingever committed for the relief effort [4]. By mid 2005 morethan 5,000 international humanitarian workers startedarriving in Aceh [5]. During the heyday of rehabilitationand reconstruction of Aceh there were 124 International

NGOs, dozens of United Nations (UN) organizations and430 local NGOs [6]. Funded with a substantial amount of money, workers from big NGOs came and hit the groundrunning. However everyone faced difficulties due to themassive devastation of infrastructure and in some placesmainly in the West Coast even public services were wipedout by the tsunami. The implementation of relief,rehabilitation and reconstruction projects under thosecircumstances was even more difficult due to theuniqueness of the beneficiaries’ background.

The tsunami victims trying to rebuild their lives were people who had lived through a 32 years high intensity of conflict, both vertical and horizontal [7]. People in thiscircumstance tend to be insecure about their future. Due to

peace and war repeatedly happening, they have difficultiesrunning their business in long term process. The war candestroy their wealth or investment overnight which makesmany of them live just for short term opportunity. It isdifficult to combine their mindset to work and managetheir expectation with NGO’s approach in thedevelopment work.

Previously in development work there were no largeconstruction projects. In Aceh, NGOs who had no

previous experience in construction became real estatedevelopers promising to build hundreds or even thousandsof houses. Others started to look like a constructioncompany when pledging to build quite a number of schools, clinics and other public infrastructures. NGOswith strong support from donors who provide large




amount generous funding can do this. However, fundingaside, is there any in-house-capacity in the organization tomanage the construction work? The question becomesmore critical when realizing the circumstances in Acehand the massive construction that needs to carried out. Thelack of in-house-capacity eventually becomes a big

problem for many NGOs, which results in qualityconcerns, fraud and costly implementation.

In short there are three components which made theAceh reconstruction unique: enormous donations floodingAceh, conflict affected beneficiaries and lack of in-house-capacity in the NGO to work in construction. These threecomponents eventually lead to a larger problem which iscompetition amongst NGOs.

II. COMPETITION O N THE FIELD

In the early coordination meetings with localgovernment almost every NGO submitted their plan ontypes of their interventions. This included the size of the

program such as how many houses will be built or other public infrastructure such as clinics, schools, water

sanitation facilities and local government facilities as well.Obviously the program varies from one NGO to another depending on the funding availability. Then responding tothe commitment, local government issued Memorandumof Understanding (MOU) on who will work where.

Competition on having beneficiariesIt was not clearly realized the when allotting the area of

work before long started to create tension between NGOs.On the MOU between local governments and the NGOs,the agreement says how many clinics or schools or housesin certain sub-district an NGO will build. But it did notmention the village. In the early pledge NGOs gaveambitious commitment. Pledges of more than a thousand

houses were a common promise. But the commitment wasgiven before the cost of construction surged to more thandouble along the fourth quarter of 2005 [8]. The price of construction material was at the peak along first half of 2006.

The sky rocketing prices were shocking to every NGO.They were forced to redo the budget; many of themseeking approval from donors. For instance in housingconstruction many NGO had to reduce their commitment

by up to 50% its earliest commitment. Theirs took time – some needed several months to explaining to the donor and get approval for reducing the target. During this timethe construction in the field was slowed down or even

halted. The beneficiaries were frustrated since theythought the NGO had abandoned their commitment.

Even if the donor has no objection to any targetchanges, there was no assurance the progress in the fieldwas in full swing. Beneficiaries’ selection to ensure their eligibility was a long and tedious process and impededtheir progress. Process of procuring construction materialsand awarding to the job to contractors was also achallenging job. Reports on low quality materials or boguscontractors appeared many times in the NGO meetings.

The situation made the progress in the field was quiteslow.

The construction sites were looked desolated andneglected by the NGO. Other NGOs who were newlyarrived, saw this as an opportunity to help the

beneficiaries out from their frustration. With opened armsthe beneficiaries accepted the new plan. Sometimes thenew NGO gave promises that they could work faster and

build better houses.

Soon in that village two or even NGOs or even morewere competing to get the beneficiaries. Both NGO havelegal agreement with the local government. One resumedtheir work and the other was doing assessment andsocializing their program. The competition started to keepor to get the beneficiaries to accept the program. In thiscase, it meant competition to win beneficiaries to givethem houses.

Situation mentioned above is just an example. Other similar conditions occurred in others area in housingreconstruction. For example there were two NGOs inLangung village at Meurebo sub-district in Aceh BaratDistrict and in Crak Mong Village Mukim Kulam Mulia atSampoiniet sub-district, Aceh Jaya District who competedfor beneficiaries.

The case of competition in Crak Mong Village in Lhok Kruet Area

On February 2005 Yayasan Obor Berkat Indonesia(OBI) in partnership with Habitat for Humanity Indonesia(HFHI) signed MOU with the Head of Aceh Jaya Districtto build 1,600 houses in the area of Lhok Kruet, KudheePatek and Pulo Raya. The MOU did not mention clearlythat those are located in Sampoiniet sub district. But in theMOU the District Head was assured there will be no other

NGO work in those areas working with the sameintervention.

Lhok Kruet itself is a village from out of total 12villages in Mukim Kulam Mutia. Lhok Kruet is widelyknown for its beautiful beach and its public facilities,

particularly because they have Puskesmas (regionalcommunity health center). That is why Mukim KulamMulia is also known as Lhok Kruet area. One village inthis area is Crak Mong village in which HFHI openedtheir office and main warehouse as the operation center of its construction work in 4 villages in Lhok Kruet area.Those villages are Alue Gro, Meunasah Kulam,

Housing construction in other three villages progressed, but not in Crak Mong. In this village the beneficiaries haddisagreement amongst themselves. Some of them wantedto have on-site reconstruction, which is on the land of their previous houses which were wiped out by tsunami.Meanwhile others wanted to have a relocation site at thehill. HFHI told the community to settled their differencesand choose where they wanted to build. The dispute wenton for 10 months, keeping HFHI from commencing their work. On February 2006, the problem is got bigger.




Canadian Red Cross (CRC) came to HFHI showed their MOU with the Sub-district Head, showing that Crak Mong was their working area. The same area with twoMOUs signed by different government entities, one is theDistrict Head and the other is Sub-District Head.

Soon the situation instilled tension between the two NGOs. CRC asked HFHI to hand over the area. At thattime it was difficult for HFHI to release Crak Mong

because of three reasons. They had already built itsoperation center there, reported Crak Mong as their working area to Headquarters and people from Crak Mongwho are working in HFHI still expected HFHI build their village. Then the competition started .

HFHI proposed to build houses on their previous landinstead on the hill. The decision to work on-sitereconstruction was based on engineering calculations thatto build on the hill they would have to have additional coston road infrastructure. Obviously it is costly to open a newroad to the hill.

CRC came to Crak Mong villagers, and promised themthat they would get temporary shelter from InternationalFederation of Red Cross (IFRC) on their previous land.CRC also promised that by June 2006 they would have a

brand new house on the hill. So Crak Mong beneficiarieswould have two houses. One is the temporary shelter andsoon they will have the brick house too. The proposalfrom CRC certainly outbid HFHI’s offer.

To settle the dispute, the Office of the UN RecoveryCoordinator for Aceh and Nias (UNORC) organized thevillagers to vote. They had to choose who will build their houses. On May 19, 2006 the voting took place and as

predicted, CRC won the vote [9] .

Competition on the completeness of the servicesWhen the construction works started there is no

uniformity on the design of houses that will be built. TheGovernment of Indonesia (GOI) clearly stated that theywould build 36 sq meter house for the tsunami victims [10].And from the guidelines as from Sphere standard of 3.5meters per person, a 36 sq meter home can accommodate10 people [11] . Based on these many NGOs calculated their

budget; to decide how many houses can be built on their pledge. This was good since each NGO can determinewhat kind of house they will build including choosingwhat kind of material to use for construction.

By the middle of 2005 when the construction works

were beginning across Aceh, people started to seedifferences. There were so many variations on the type of houses. There were one story and two story houses. One

NGO built a stone masonry house, others built timber houses or combination on both of them. One built 36 sqmeters other built 45 sq meters. Then the people start tocompare and became troubled with jealousy.

In May 2005 [12] at a coordination meeting in Meulaboh(Aceh Barat District) an NGO presented their plan to build45 sq meters houses, which is 9 sq meters bigger than the

standard. The local authorities then ruled that theminimum size for all homes to be built in Meulaboh in thefuture would be 45 sq meters [13]. Local authorities wereaware this will leads to reducing the number of houses.They prefered to choose fewer houses rather than havedispute and jealousy in their communities. Subsequently

people in other district such as Aceh Jaya District, whichis geographically side by side with Aceh Barat Districtstarted to asked their NGO to build 45 sq meters instead of 36 sq meters, too.

During 2005-2006 for NGOs who built houses of 36 sqmeters, it was common that the beneficiaries came to their

NGO asking them to reconsider their design. At that timeTurkish Red Crescent Societies set the bar as the mostfavorable design. They were widely recognized as

providing a complete and well-designed house. GermanRed Cross was another one of the favorite since theydelivered two stories and with robust structures. Somecommunities even asked NGOs to stop and leave if theywere not going to give them bigger house.

To some extent the competition brought good result.Every NGO tried to deliver good quality houses. But thenanother development came up. Some NGO gave their

beneficiaries furniture such as bed in their new house.Others gave money so the beneficiaries can move to their new houses. The money is for paying transportation costfor their belonging or to purchase appliances. Again,another bar was set.

The question is why there are so many gaps or differences among the NGO on how to deliver their houses. It happened because every NGO has their ownapproach. On giving complete houses or services, the

NGO wants the beneficiaries to have a better life than before tsunami as soon as possible. This can help the

tsunami victim out of their traumatic experience sooner.On the other hand NGOs who are strict with the standardsize house have a different approach. They actually builda core house. And ask beneficiaries to make it complete or even bigger by themselves. On constructing the corehouse, the beneficiaries asked for participation. The housewas given freely but they have to participate inconstruction such as guarding the material. The term for this is sweat equity.

Competition due to conflicting programsThese competitions were definitely different with those

2 competitions mentioned previously. The competitioncan happen in one area but affected because of the

housing construction or diminish it.

One of the example of this conflict is competition between Cash for Work (CfW) and construction work.How long CfW program should be done? The answer isalways debatable. But for sure this CfW program should

be stopped when the reconstruction work commenced.

There are three arguments why CfW may hamper reconstruction works. First, it is difficult to find workersfor construction. This is the common sense, working in




construction works is a hard work. Why would chooseconstruction which is harder if they can earn almost equalamount of money from CfW. From their experience,controls from the supervisors are stricter in thereconstruction work since the number of working peopleis less compared to CfW and the amount of works areeasier to quantify.

The other argument is the competition created higher cost for construction works. One of the most importantcharacteristics of construction works is continuity. Itmeans the work can not be stopped unless the project iscompleted. It is always costly to stop the work and thenresume. Every restart takes mobilization cost and in theidle time, the equipments and field staffs still need to be

paid regularly. In order to retain workers higher wagesshould be provided.

The third argument is the beneficiary’s participationwas deteriorated. In a humanitarian approach, when doingintervention, including the reconstruction work,

beneficiary participation is one of the keys of success. For example in housing reconstruction, the beneficiary canwork as a labor when his house is being reconstructed.He/she can receive wages for this work and at the sametime he/she built his sense of ownership during theconstruction. The CfW can distract them to leave workingon their housing reconstruction to work in CfW program.In reality, the last argument seems not practical in Acehreconstruction, since many beneficiaries were stillworking on their houses but sometimes has to work inother livelihood area such as fishermen or farmers as well .

III. CONSEQUENCES OF COMPETITION

On the 4 th quarter of 2005, many agencies started toaware that they were on competition. But to stop it was

too difficult since they endured tremendous pressure fromthe donor whom wanted them to complete their programreal soon [14]. Then to keep the program running and tokeep the communities as their beneficiaries, free-for-allcompetition amongst NGO went to a vicious circle. Eventhey wanted to stop it, the problem was getting bigger andthey started to bear the consequences.

No cost conscious on construction process, deteriorate thebusiness practices prudence and inflicted severe inflation

NGOs scrambled to purchase construction materialsuch as red brick, timber, cement and reinforcement steel.Due to limited of local supplier or local producer tosupply sufficiently to the demand, NGOs were willing to

pay at any price to outbid other NGOs. This was enjoyablemoment for the suppliers since in one day the price can bechanged 2 or 3 times in a day.

The depressing situation was not stopped there. Sincesurging price was no issue to NGOs, then suppliers set anew rule of the game. The paramount of the supplierssuccesses were they made NGOs paid full up-frontwithout any collateral such as bank guarantee. In NGOwhich has no in-house-capacity in construction businessthey fell in this very risky game.

ADB reported that after the tsunami, prices increasedmore sharply than nationwide, particularly in Banda Aceh,where year-on-year inflation in October 2005 reached37.5%—largely due to the heavy demand for constructionmaterials. The construction boom has also led to a 30– 40% surge in wages across all professions [15].

Decreasing on quality of construction materials and thecontractors

The construction market was not ready for theconstruction boom. During the 32 years of conflict therewere not so many construction works in Aceh. Thisaffects to the construction material availability and theworkmanship.

2005 marked as a challenging year for construction. Itwas difficult to find good quality on construction materialand contractors. Houses which were built in that year heavily criticized due to poor quality materials. Ithappened since NGO purchased vigorously anyconstruction material which available in the market. For instance based on the analysis of brick needed inconstruction works for 4 years, Aceh will shortfall of 350million high quality bricks but has a surplus of 5.05 billionlow quality one [16].

In the early year of reconstruction many contractorscame and submit their company profile then asking for the

job. Due to the competition amongst NGO, it was quiteeasy for a contractor to win a contract. And with the lack of in-house-capacity on managing construction work, the

problem on quality concerns increase significantly. NGOdo not have time or capacity to check thoroughly and

professionally their applicant before awarding thecontract.

To have understanding on how challenging to choosethe right contractor, the case of Badan Rehabilitasi danRekonstruki (BRR) on contractor prequalification phase isa good example. On March 2006, BRR open its

prequalification for contractors who were interested in participating for rehabilitation and reconstruction. And thenumber was astonishing. There were 3,088 companies,mostly local contractors, who took the prequalificationdocument. They were 2,885 contractors and 203consultants. Later on 2,338 companies submitted thedocuments. And the result was 1,586 companies passedthe prequalification. They were 140 consultants and 1,446contractors [17]. The question is, if before tsunami therewere not so many construction activities in Aceh, how

come in that month there were a lot construction companywant to get the job?

Competition amongst NGOs blindfolded the agencieson choosing the genuine contractors.

Ever demanding beneficiariesPeople who suffered prolonged conflict have

difficulties managing their expectations for results whichneed long term process. They prefer to take theopportunity what is already in front of them. When they




met NGO whose approach and mind set for developmentit is hard to blend with their expectation.

For instance they prefer to receive house donationwhich provided as a turnkey approach rather thancommunity participation and sweat equity. For someextent this condition still tolerable. But due to thecompetition, one NGO came persuaded the community toaccept their program which promised to be better andfaster but the community has to drop their agreement tothe previous contractor. Then the community can easilyreject the previous commitment and then waiting the new

program. It happens easily to be persuaded even in realitythey still have to wait without knowing when the new

program will start.

Competition open the way to fraud and manipulationBeneficiary selection is one of the crucial steps to be

taken to ensure NGO’s program reach the eligible person.The process can be long, tedious and also takes time. Soalong the process someone can receive the donation. Butother even they neighbors, since they are not eligible theyare rejected.

The modus operandi is the non-eligible person come toany NGO and persuades the NGO to work in their community. They usually mentioned there are still many

people need help and it was not coverage by the previous NGO. It can be also happen by someone who has receivedone house from one NGO then came to other NGO askingfor house. When the competition was tough such requesteasily granted.

IV. C OMMON APPROACH TO STRENGTHEN COORDINATION

During Aceh reconstruction there were quite number of

coordination meetings, but still we found toughcompetitions. It does not mean the meeting was useless,since the there were many issues and problems wereresolved. The problem was because agreement reached inthe coordination meeting was difficult to be implementedon the field. Hence the problem was not lack of coordination meeting, but because every NGO has their own approach on the implementation. At least there are 4approaches should be embedded in every stakeholder strategy on working in reconstruction. Local governmentshould support any NGO activities to ensure all programsincorporating these approaches before the any kind of work on rehabilitation or reconstruction commenced.Without all of these the effort will be difficult to have long

term impact and sustainable.

Beneficiaries’ participationBased on the lessons learned from the Tsunami

Response (2004-2009) and from Yogyakarta Earthquake(2006) shows beneficiaries and communities participationis the most important component in the program success.Yogyakarta shows huge difference in beneficiaries

participation compare to Aceh which lead to the faster result and less cost of reconstruction. This participation

brought to a stronger ownership and responsibility.

Admittedly there are wide spectrums of participations.The fullest extent is they provide construction materialand skilled labors for the rehabilitation of their houses or community infrastructure. On the lowest, they can guardthe material or provide access when the constructionmaterials come to their area. The participation can beanything but it should be there. All intervention by NGOsshould complemented by their sweat equity. This is theonly way if we want to develop mutual respect, synergiesand long term cooperation. At the end of the day thecommunities will be able not only survive when other disaster strike again but have the skills to help other communities surrounding

Engineering structural safetyIf it comes to safety, all rehabilitation work should

apply the engineering concept on structural safety. This becomes more important on the earthquake disaster pronearea. Catastrophic failure happens on houses, clinics,schools and other infrastructure buildings which built notfollow the engineering code. As per engineering concept,structural elements can be design as ductile elementswhich absorb earthquake energy. If the earthquake loads

big enough but within its specified loading code, theelements may be broken but no sudden collapse willhappen. In every earthquake shows that buildings without

proper engineering design and construction, the structural behave as a brittle material and collapse without anywarning to people inside the building to escape.

Local resourceThere is no one size fits all intervention by NGO. We

can not easily replicate the solution from one area to theother. If we want to rehabilitate or reconstruct housing or other infrastructure we can not just go copying the

previous intervention in other area. Each disaster area hasits own uniqueness. One of the uniqueness is the local

resource. We have to consider skilled builders,construction material, common technology and equipmentavailable on the site. On the structural safety side there isno compromise, it should be followed strictly but for using local resource we have to be innovative. We have touse what is available on site as much as we can otherwiselocal resource can be idle. We have to balance theappropriateness on engineering and its cost with the localresource availability. These affects to the decision on theengineering side which lead to materials to be used and

builders who will works. If we use bigger componentfrom outside the area it will reduce their participation. Inthis case NGO intervention will be partner inreconstruction to train, supervise and provide management

in reconstruction.

In case of Aceh rehabilitation and reconstruction withmassive construction work, it was valid to bring resourcesfrom out side. Construction material such as timber, brick,cement, steel bar and many others should be purchasedfrom other area; otherwise local resource will not besufficient. Human resource such as engineering experts,

project managers and contractors were valid decision on joining this reconstruction effort. Massive constructionworks always need people with long experience in this




kind of work, not just someone that jump in theopportunity to get a job. Therefore the presence of theexperts is how to develop local resource and maximizingit by combining it with imported resource.

SustainabilityThe sad part of Aceh reconstruction is there is no

significant and longer term effect in local economicgrowth. World Bank reported on Aceh Economic UpdateMay 2009 Aceh’s non-oil and gas gross domestic productgrowth had dropped to 1.9 percent in 2008, far below thenational figure of 6.5 percent. When NGOs started their reconstruction works in 2005 the non-oil and gas GDPwas 1.2%. Then on the heyday of reconstruction andrehabilitation in 2006 and 2007 the GDP became 7.7%and 7.0% respectively. But when NGOs phasing out in2008 the GDP plummeted to 1.9% [18]. There are severalissues such as security issue, which made the 7.7 billionUSD funding committed for the reconstruction of Acehand Nias have very minimum impact in sustainability inlocal economic growth.

To minimize such problems NGOs have to leave thecompetition on waving flags and move forward to form asolid group. This group should produce pressure to every

party which can impede all rehabilitation andreconstruction effort. The obstruction can be securityissues, improper business practices since massivereconstruction effort may attract everyone seeks for opportunity and to some extent, very demanding

beneficiaries.

V. C ONCLUSION

Competition amongst NGO happens where there is bigfunding available to support the program. It means suchcompetition is inevitable. To minimize those potential

problems, every stakeholder should agree on commonapproach as the basis of their implementation. This shouldwork to every party, local authority and the NGO. Thenthe local authority should have the capacity to support the

NGO based on their core competence and this includesensuring the continuum of the program.

DISCLAIMER The material here is purely my personal opinion and donot necessarily reflect the views of institutions I amaffiliated with.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTI would like to acknowledge the inputs and support frommy direct supervisors during I am working for more than4 years in Aceh, until all construction program completed,Leonilo Escalada (Habitat for Humanity) and HariDarshan Shrestha (Save the Children). I am grateful toHelen C Smith for her critical reading of this paper.

R EFERENCES[1] Seth Mydans, Warren Hoge, Wayne Arnold, “Asia’s Deadly Waves:

The Overview; Toll in Undersea Earthquake Passes 25,000; A Thirdof the Dead Are Said To Be Children”, The New York Times,December 28, 2004.

[2] Dr Claude de Ville de Goyet& Lezlie C Morinière, InternationalCentre for Migration and Health (ICMH), "The role of needsassessment in the tsunami response", Tsunami Evaluation Coalition,July 2006.

[3] Karl F. Inderfurth, David Fabrycky, Stephen P. Cohen, “TheTsunami Report Card”, Foreign Policy Magazine, December 2005.

[4] Jock McKeon, “Aceh Reconstruction Expenditure Update June 2007data” The World Bank, November 2007.

[5] Carsten Völz, "Koordinasi kemanusiaan di Indonesia: dari sudut pandang LSM" Forced Migration Review Edisi Khusus Agustus2005, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, pp.26.

[6] Amir Sodikin quoted John Clark from World Bank, “Sia-siaRekonstruksi Jika Tanpa Rumah”, Kompas Cyber Media, December 24, 2005.

[7] Fachrul Razi, "Reintegrasi Ala Aceh" Acheh Press, May 6, 2009.http://achehpress.com/www.php/news/id/3327/Reintegrasi-Ala-Aceh.jp

[8] Accenture, Construction Boom Task Force, “Construction BoomAnalysis – Pilot analysis for bricks”, Banda Aceh, UNDP, January2006.

[9] Humanitarian Recovery Update, UNORC, May 2006.[10] “110 Jembatan Putus Total *Kerugian Akibat Tsunami Rp. 15

Trilyun”, Kompas Cyber Media, January 14, 2005.[11] Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster

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Workshop” Habitat for Humanity, Meulaboh, Indonesia, March 13,2007, unpublished

[13] Steven Weir – Habitat For Humanity International; Earl Kessler – Asian Disaster Preparedness Center. “Community-based Disaster Response: Only One Component of An Effective Shelter Framework”. Habitat For Humanity International, Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, International Housing Coalition, May 10,2006.

[14] Fayen Wong, "W. Bank says rebuilding in Aceh taking too long"Reuters, December 14, 2005.

[15] From Disaster to Reconstruction: ADB’s Response to the IndianOcean Tsunami, Asian Development Bank, pp.50.

[16] Accenture, Construction Boom Task Force, “Construction BoomAnalysis – Pilot analysis for bricks”, Banda Aceh, UNDP, January2006, pp.17.

[17] “Hasil Prakualifikasi BRR Diumumkan” Serambi Indonesia, April6, 2006.

[18] “Aceh Economic Update” World Bank, May 2009.

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ngo and donor coordination to speeds up reconstruction and avoid ngo competition - arwin soelaksono

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