"NO-R169 ?34 THE ROLE OF LOSBYISTS IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET iS v/iPROCUREMENT PROCESS(U) RMY MAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS

NO-l'9 ?EDPA R H ROCK 15 MAY 86

UNCLASSIFIED FIGS 5/'4

14, 12. 2-. 'r

132~

.57.

110 111112.0

11111125 1.

/' /

(D)The vievs expressed in this paper are those of the authorand do not necessarily reflect the views of theDepartment of Defense or any of its agencies. Thisdocument may not be released for open publication untilit has been cleared by the appropriate military service or

- government agency.

q*0

THE ROLE OF LOBBYISTS IN THE DEFENSE BUDGETAND PROCUREMENT PROCESS

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD W. ROCK, AR

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for public release:distribution is unlimited.

- -N

15 MAY 1986 -

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE. CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

'€ - ? 'I m.L~~a~~a.a -==-- .... -......... ---"==='6

LWXI , V,.- .0 -7, n 7 7..

_____ UNCLASSIFIEDSLCUP?"" '*' ASSIFICATION OF TH!S AE " N, f)ee, Fner?-d)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRtCTIONSO Ei3FoRE COMPLETING FORM

REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION N). ,-L CPJENT", t ATAU') NUMBER

4 TITL F (-d Sot

!tl.) 'YPE OF REFIORT , PERIOD COVERED

The Role of Lobbyists in the Defense Budget and STUDENT ESSAY T.

Procurement Process 6 PERFORMING ORG, REPORT N_'BER

7. AUTHCR(e) 8 CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBEV,)

LTC Richard W. Rock

9 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRES tO ID ROG!FAM ELEMENT. PROJECT TASKAREA i WORK UNIT NUMBEP",

U.S. Army War CollegeCarlisle Barracks, PA 17013

I. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRE s 12. REPORT DATE

SAME 1 1315 May 19863 NUMBER OF PAUL

2014 MONITORING AGENCY NAME AODRESS(If different from Controtling Office) 'S SFCURITV CLASS 1,f this rport)

IS.. DECLASSIFICATIDN DOWNGRADINGSCHEDULE

7s6 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

DISTRIBUTION STATENENT A: Approved for public release-distribution is unlinited.

17 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abettact entered itn Block 20, If dlffent from Report)

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19 KEY WORDS (Continoe I e Ivets side it reeCssr- and Identify by block number)

20 AUSTRACT cConflt.,e m r of*** if n.tesemav and IdentIfv bv block nutmter) 'Lobbyists have been with us since thle founding of the countrx but there

is roai for debate as to whether or not their influence is positi'e or neqative,particularly in regard to defense budget and procurement. The legal basisfor lobbyinq is found in the,Corstitution and supported through leqal pro-ce dence, but lany aspxcts of the practice reniin lcxlally and ethically anb1iuou.ue,,stioned are practices such as the "revolving door" where national securit,

cxr(rts piss between goverrcnt and the defense inoustry takini inside know-l(jdge and influence with thrd..Also the influence of Political Action eonti )

DDFOHIO 147 EDITION OF Mo AS 0 65SOR.OL- 7E

SCS ;,!At( A IN I 'AI , -%1 tl. ~ g ' €I ar lW '3r r t ~ t, la' h:i,',

UNCILASSIFI ED)-

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION C 'HIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

F31ICK 20 (continued)

Cccrttees (PACS) and their ability to prevent the disclosure of politicalcontributions casts doubts on the system. Questioned also is the Departmntof Defense practice of lobbying Congress even thouqh such practice is re-stricted by law. But the overriding factor in all this is Congress' attitudetoward protection of home district interests or 'pork barreling" which beccnes- -.

too often the overriding consideration for too many national defense issues.But throuch this maze of distrust and vague legalities the lobbyist emergeson the positive sLide of the ledger, it is the covernmient agencies that needto be uore specific in defininci the parzm-rters of the lobbyist and in makinatheir practices more public. '-

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .V.A......... MM7

;'Ws expressed in this pa.,' are ;:';e author and do not necessarily reflect thet

Of the Oepartment of De!LCie r a;;) I Pt'lUes. his document may not be releasedr n public2tion until it has been c! , y,prupriate military serVic Or governmentY.enmN

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

THE ROLE OF LOBBYISTS IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET AND PROCUREMENT PROCESS

AN INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. Rock, AR

Colonel Charles S. Palmer

Project Adviser

US Army War College

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

15 May 1986

DISTRIBUTION STATEENT A:

Approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

a

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Richard W. Rock, LTC, AR

TITLE: The Role of Lobbyists in the Defense Budget and ProcurementProcess

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 15 May 1986 PAGES: 18 CLASSIFIED: Unclassified

Lobbyists have been with us since the founding of the country, butthere is room for debate as to whether or not their influence ispositive or negative, particularly in regard to defense budget andprocurement. The legal basis for lobbying is found in the Constitution

and supported through legal precedence, but many aspects of the practiceremain legally and ethically ambiguous. Questioned are practices suchas the "revolving door" where national security experts pass betweengovernment and the defense industry taking inside knowledge andinfluence with them. Also the influence of Political Action Committees(PACs) and their ability to prevent the disclosure of politicalcontributions casts doubts on the system. Questioned also is theDepartment of Defense practice of lobbying Congress even though suchpractice is restricted by law. But the overriding factor in all this is

Congress' attitude toward protection of home district interests or "porkbarreling" which becomes too often the overriding consideration for toomany national defense issues. But through this maze of distrust andvague legalities the lobbyist emerges on the positive side of theledger, it is the government agencies that need to be more specific indefining the parameters of the lobbyist and in making their practicesmore public.

SAccession For

* "T'. 7*J ,.. . . . . . . . .-

;:;ii

J_. . .

.,...

THE ROLE OF LOBBYISTS IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET AND PROCUREMENT PROCESS

Defense contractor, design representative, lobbyist; whatever

they're called they play a significant role in defense weapon

procurement and defense budgeting. The question is whether that role is

positive or negative. Often these representatives act as go-betweens

for the users of military equipment in the field and procurement

officers to ensure that the military gets precisely the sorts of

equipment they need. And when Congress begins to scrutinize budget

requests they serve as a source of political intelligence, keeping the

services posted on Capital Hill developments that effect their programs.

Other watchers paint the role of defense contractors in darker

colors. They see them as a tight knit group of overly influential

individuals who move easily in and out of government service, teaming up

with vested congressional interests to influence billion dollar

procurement decisions in cooperation with pliant Pentagon procurement

officers.

Gordan Adams, a long time critic of the military remarked in The

Iron Triangle that there is a flow of people and money that moves

between the defense contractors, the executivebranch.. .and Congress, creating an iron triangle ondefense policy and procurement that excludesoutsiders and alternative perspectives.1

Although many of the overt lobbying activities such as Caribbean

vacations are gone, many more subtle approaches--small gifts,

entertainment, and flattery--are still very much present. And many of

those who are the object of this effort contend that the iron triangle

is alive and well, an incestuous network that stifles ideas and new

initiatives in the military.

i~~~~~~~~~~.':._.............. • ""'- "" " '' '"..........-

Still others note that the contractors provide valuable technical

information which enables Defense Department personnel to judge military

programs better. Lobbying often injects competition into procurement

decisions where previously there had been none.

It is these issues that will be developed, answering a fundamental

question: Are lobbyists an unwarranted influence, or do they provide a

valuable service to politicians and Defense Department officials in the

budgeting and procurement process?

The word lobby was first recorded in 1808 when it appeared in the

annals of the 10th Continental congress, although the idea is actually

as old as the right of petition as outlined in the Magna Carta. By 1832

"lobbyist" was a widely used word at the US Capitol, referring to those

favor seekers previously called lobby-agents by various political

institutions.

Although the actual term had not yet been coined the right to

"lobby" is inherent in the First Amendment to the Constitution, which

provides that

Congress shall make no law... abridging.. .the rightof the people to petition the Government for redressof grievance.

The Supreme Court later upheld this same idea stating,

The very idea of a government, republic in form,implies a right on the part of its citizens to meetpeaceably for consultation in respect to publicaffairs and to petition for redress ofgrievances. 2

Throughout the 1800's and early 1900's evidence accumulated that

selfish or misguided methods used by pressure groups led to legislation

that lined the pockets of the pressure group or imposed the group's

2

standards on the nation. Based on that evidence a series of

congressional investigations began in 1913 to probe the activities of '

several of these lobbying organizations. In its own inimical style of

inefficiency, however, it was not until 1938 that reform legislation of

any kind at all passed. In that year Congress approved the Foreign

Agents Registration Act, requiring persons in the United States acting

for foreign powers to register with the Justice Department.

The next attempt at reform was not made until 1946 when a general

lobby registration law was adopted. The act's vague language, coupled

with emasculating court interpretations, seriously reduced the

effectiveness of the law's spending and disclosure provisions.

Additionally, under the 1946 law there is an almost total lack of

enforcement, and the only penalties are criminal in nature and rarely

invoked. Reports are only filed with the Clerk of the House and the

Secretary of the Senate, but neither has any investigative or

enforcement power.

The dilemma that Congress and the courts faced in writing any

legislation was to curb dishonest pressure activities without

interfering with the constitutional rights of free speech and petition.

Equally significant was congressional reluctance to probe into

activities that might lower the public's image of Congress, should these

activities eventually come to light. The result remains a lack of any

strong Federal legislation restricting lobbying or requiring the open

disclosure of lobbying activities, personnel, or dollars spent.

Lack of decisiveness, however, does not prevent flurries of activity

brought on by crisis, or the perception of crisis, in Washington. Lobby ,-

reform fever struck hard, for instance, following the Watergate

3

S-

scandals. Several serious attempts were made at reform legislation, butt .

all manner of pressure groups, from one man church lobbies to the US

Chamber of Commerce, have managed to kill the proposals. In 1976 a

major revision to the 30-year-old Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act

actually passed the Senate but died a slow death in the House. Two

other significant efforts at reform in 1978 and 1979 met similar fates

even though they received strong support from the American Civil

Liberties Union and Common Cause, the two principal groups actively

pushing for improvements in lobbying conduct.

Only the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 made a stab at

limiting the lobbyist's power, but this was done indirectly. This act

limits the amounts individuals can give to any one candidate, requires

disclosure by the candidate of contributions received, and improves the

regulation of political action committees (PAC's) that are set up by

corporations, unions, and other strong pressure group organizations.3

It must also be remembered that this legislation primarily affects the

Executive Branch, and stops short of changing the system for financing

congressional races.

Despite protests from many quarters, Congress repealed a portion of

the 1974 law that barred government contractors from forming PAC's.

PAC's often represent corporations, many of those defense businesses,

who funnel money to the candidates campaigns. These contributions are

often given by groups that regularly engage in lobbying and are often

given with legislative purposes in mind. Common Cause, the most active

pressure group advocating reform on this issue, argued that companies

spend large sums of money to lobby, but launder that money through

PAC's. and do not have to disclose those sums of money because lobbying

4

-7

AAN

is not the "principle purpose" of the contributing companies. The

concern exists that secret money spent in secret ways for secret

purposes may become the most corrupting influence in American politics,

but as of this time no reform is in the offing.4

As the defense procurement budget increased from $35 billion to more

than $83 billion between 1980 and 1986 there was tremendous competition

and a scurry for contracts. To better influence decisions in a timely

manner and to better exert pressure on decision makers, contractors

established offices in Washington where they could be close to the

action. They also paid top dollar to men and women who knew the system

and knew the right people to pressure. Often these were former

Congressmen, former military officers, or former employees of the

Administration or bureaucracy. The cost of staffing this effort was

enormous, but the rewards could be handsome.

Although movement through this "revolving door" permits government

to take advantage of private sector expertise, it has been attacked as

detrimental to the overall procurement process because it creates a

community of shared assumptions about policy issues and developments and

opens the door for conflict of interest. The major difficulty with this

system is that this closed relationship stagnates initiative and limits

fresh perspectives on old problems.

Several measures have been taken to diminish the impact of the

revolving door; but, like other lobby reform, it lacks the punch in

terms of enforcement to be very useful. For example, each year the

Defense Department must send the Senate a list of military retirees or

civilian employees (GS-13 or above) who have gone to work for defense

contractors or vice versa. The average for the last few years shows

5

about 540 such people per year moving from defense to industry, while

about 25 moved the other way. The report does not include those who

move from policy positions outside of defense, such as Congressional

staffers or administration aides. Moreover, Common Cause reports that a

1975 study found that about one-third of those individuals required to

report did not. Those ignoring the law as late as 1982 were Richard

DeLauer, who left TRW Incorporated to become Under Secretary of Defense

for Research and Engineering, and Under Secretary of the Navy James

Goodrich, who had been Chairman of Bath Iron Works. 5 Although the

mere act of reporting may seem like a small point it does raise a

question of legitimacy and becomes another of those small points that

adds to the public distrust of the system.

The magnitude of this interchange of people has also led to media

accusations of conflict of interest. For instance, John Stirk, the

defense advisor to Senator Robert Morgan was hired by General Dynamics

during the debate over whether the Air Force should buy the FB-Ill as a

manned bomber. Stirk continued to advise Senator Morgan even while he

was on General Dynamic's payroll, and Morgan became a leading advocate

for the FB-111. 6 Disclosures such as this cannot have a positive

impact on supporters of military programs and certainly add fuel to the

fires of opponents.

On the other hand there is an argument that the influence of those

who move through the "revolving door" is really not that great, and

indeed the influence of contractors in general might be overstated.

And, in fact, defense contractor influence on Congress is limited

because Congressional control of defense spending is limited. By the

time a weapon system's budget has grown large enough to warrant

6

Congressional review that system has already lived through the

competition with other products. Assuming that Congress agrees with

Defense that the system is necessary then the companies can influence

little more than the size of the buy.

However; one should not assume that influence is not felt early on

in the acquisition process. The lobbyist educated the Defense

Department on the latest technology, provided technical support during

testing, and helped educate staffers or Members on the capability of the

system. And, no doubt, some good was done, as long as the lobby did not

so focus the buyers attention on the technology that long-range national

strategy was left out of the equation.

Another common criticism, and perhaps the one most directly related

to the defense budget and procurement process, is the charge that

companies use huge sums of money in their lobby effort, then tack those

charges on the price of their products, often military weapons.

Lockheed, for example, was charged by the General Accounting Office of

trying to recover $288,000 of its lobbying expenses by charging it to

existing defense contracts in 1982.

Title 18 of the US Code states that,

No part of the money appropriated by any enactmentof Congress shall.. .be used directly or indirectlyto pay for any personal service, advertisement,telegram, telephone.. .or any other device, intendedor designed to influence in any manner a Member ofCongress... 7

In plain English that means that no one is supposed to pay any lobbying

expenses with funds that originated in Federal appropriations. Thus,

all lobbying efforts must be paid for by the corporation or the private

individual. Although that may be the law, that is not how it was

7

working, and the issue became the catalyst for Common Cause and other

pressure groups to move for new legislation.

In 1977 the Defense Contract Audit Agency, (DCAA) which reviews

contractor claims, reviewed the accounts of 10 major defense industry

companies including Hughes, Lockheed, and General Dynamics. The DCAA

found that a substantial part of the expenditures of these 10 major

companies had been used for lobbying. For instance; $17,185 was claimed

by Rockwell International for 100 prints of a film promoting the BI

bomber entitled "The Threat, What Can We Do?" $22,032 was claimed by

Lockheed Aircraft for travel expenses of executives and their spouses

who attended air shows in Paris and England. $181,000 to Martin

Marietta for building rapport with Congressmen in the states in which

the company has offices. And $120,000 to Sperry Univac to reimburse the

salary, entertainment, and other expenses for its public relations

manager in Washington.8

In October 1981 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger issued an

amendment to the defense acquisition regulation prohibiting contractors

from charging lobbying costs to the government. Defense contractors did

not seem alarmed and one quote sums up their attitude:

I have no problem with the regulation. I don'tthink our unallowable costs will materially increaseas a result of it,

stated Richard Cook of Lockheed.

And Cook was right, because the crux of the matter lies in the

definition of what really constitutes lobbying. The latest hearings on

i 8

the subject were held November 15 and 16, 1983 by the Senate

Governmental Affairs Committee. In their report they state:

Much of the past criticism of the act (1946 FederalRegulation of Lobbying Act) concerns the difficultyof determining whether a person is principallyengaged in lobbying activities and the narrowdefinition given "lobbying."

9

And the dilemma still exists today; there is no consensus on what

constitutes lobbying. In fact, there is no clear, uniform definition

of prohibited activities to which government agencies can refer. 1 0

Therefore, effective legislation to limit the secrecy, disclose

contributors and dollar amounts, and regulate the degree of influence is

impossible.

This lack of definition supports another aspect of lobbying that

needs review; lobbying of Congress by the Defense Department, which is

literally against the law. The criminal provision is section 1913 of

Title 18 of the US Code, but this law this law has virtually never been

enforced. Moreover, it contains a loophole: it does not prohibit

contact between legislators and Department of Defense if the request is

made by the legislator, then it is not considered lobbying but is

defined as "legislative liaison."

The marketing of the defense budget requires impressing Congress

with the urgency of the need for what has been requested, maintaining

good relations with Members, and getting the votes needed on key issues.

Legislative liaison offices (each service and DOD has one) are key to

winning many of these budget battles. Most of what these offices do is

legitimate, necessary for orderly legislative functioning, and a benefit

to both Defense and Congress. However, there are some activities that

are questionable and, of course, it is this area that catches the

9....................................... . .... ... ... ...

attention of critics and the media and erodes credibility with the

public.

The services, most often through these legislative liaison offices,

dispense a wide variety of favors to Members of Congress. Most often

cited by critics are Air Force flights for supporting legislators such

as Senators Barry Goldwater and Pete Domenici and their aides and often

spouses.

According to U.S. News and World Report,

documents obtained through a Freedom of Information

Act request revealed that DOD spent over $2 millionentertaining Members of Congress, staffs, andspouses during fiscal year 1982. The Air Force's89th Military Airlift Wing ferried 35 Senators, 11lRepresentatives, 21 spouses, and scores of CapitolHill staffers.11

All of which once again calls into question ways that the Pentagon

operates and how it employs its power to influence legislation.

All of these factors; the "revolving door," lobby costs charged to

the government, and the involvement in lobbying by the Defense

Department, may be over shadowed by the most powerful driver of all--The

Pork Barrel. It may be this preoccupation with "pork" that more than

any other single aspect drives the behavior of lobbyists and the way

Congress reacts. Most often when a Member expresses a keen interest in

some detailed item in the defense budget it involves his home district

and, specifically, jobs within that district. While it is only natural

that Members should try to help their constituents, this parochial view

from the pork barrel is detrimental to this country's overall defense

and leads to wasteful spending that does not support strategic aims.

Some aspects of pork barrel politics involve retaining unneeded

military bases, constructing new facilities in home districts, or

10

... ."-".." -" "" "" " ""

* - . .-. : - - - - - - - .F -

I continuing production of obsolete or unnecessary weapons or planes just

to keep assembly lines open. Perhaps the best example of the "pork

barrel" in high gear is the A7 attack fighter, which was only recently

cut from the defense budget. Although the Air Force has no needed or

wanted more A's, each year the Congress ordered the Pentagon to buy

more, primarily for use by the Air National Guard.

The "Iron Triangle" was at its best with the A7. The legs of the

triangle were the Dallas based Vought Corporation and the Texas

congressional delegation; while the base was the National Guard, who

liked the aircraft because it was easy to fly and to use for

instruction. Only defense trims in 1982, coupled with pressure from

President Reagan, forced the cancellation of the obsolete aircraft over

the objections of the Texas congressmen and their supporters.12

Perhaps the best way to visualize the dynamics of lobbying and the

"pork barrel" in action is to look at one specific case study that shows

the many dimensions of the process. The most controversial and best

documented case in the recent past is the story of the C-5B Galaxy and

how Congress became embroiled in the seemingly obscure issue of what

cargo plane to buy. Few military issues captured more of Congress' time

and attention at that time; even though war had erupted in the Falkland

Islands, the Persian Gulf, and Lebanon.

In January 1982 the Department of Defense, over objections by the

Air Force, announced that it had changed its mind about buying the new

C-17 cargo plane which had been chosen only a few months prior. The

decision was not a complete surprise and in some ways only responded to

resistance felt from Congress and the General Accounting Office.

• ,: -.. .. . .. . , . , .,. , ---- -.. ,-., -:,-:. -- ..... i,. '. ., -. / .,., , .,-. . . . , , ,.-...-1

Instead of the C-17 the Air Force announced that it would purchase an

updated version of the Lockheed C-5 Galaxy.

During this time frame the Lockheed production line in Georgia,

where the original C-5s were built, had slowed tremendously and Lockheed

had no real production options to turn to.

The Air Force was unhappy with their 77 C-5s because of cost

overruns and a history of technical troubles. A design competition for

the new C-17 was won by McDonnell Douglas to replace the C-5, but it was

Boeing Corporation that really muddied the water when it entered the

fray in March 1982. Boeing offered to sell used 747s, refurbished for

use as cargo planes, at a much cheaper price than the new C-5Bs. The

747 offer also looked like a good opportunity for some troubled airlines

to dump some of their unprofitable planes on the Department of Defense.

The Pentagon thus faced three options; to develop and field the C-

17, to buy and convert 747s for considerably less money ($58 million

each vs. $118 million each for C-5Bs.), or to build 50 new C-5Bs.

Secretary Weinberger decided the most sensible choice was the C-5B.

All this occured just as Congress was scrutinizing the proposed

fiscal 1983 defense budget, and the decision on the cargo plane had to

clear the defense authorization and appropriation bills before any final

decision would be made. The Armed Services Committees rarely tamper

with Pentagon requests, and the C-5B purchase was no exception; the

Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) recommended passage.

In this case; however, Boeing had mobilized its lobbyists, who

attacked Capitol Hill with charts, photos, and lavish brochures.

Meanwhile, Senator Henry Jackson of Washington, Boeing's home state, r

strongly campaigned for the company, asserting it would help the

12

21

................ . . . . . . . . . . .

troubled airline industry. On the day of the vote Braniff declared

bankruptcy which did not hurt Boeing's cause.

Also lining up behind the 747 conversion were a troop of Senators

who's constituencies would all benefit by jobs in states where component

parts manufacture or construction would occur, principally Kansas and

Missouri. Corporations and other lobbying interests took sides

depending on their economic leanings.

Arguments raged in the Senate debating airlift scenarios, cost

estimates, strategic doctrine, and availability times. But the real

issue, and that which prevailed was purely politics. DOD was caught

asleep and thus manufacturing locations and associated jobs prevailed

over the long term cost to taxpayers and the effect on national security

and readiness. The Senate overrode the SASC recommendation and deleted

C-5B funding and directed the Air Force to buy 747s instead.

Stunned by the decision, th-. Pentagon and Lockheed decided to fight.

Boeing, for its part, continued its strategy of mobilizing

subcontractors, 747 operators, and others around the country to pressure

key Members of Congress for support.

A new twist occurred when a 27-page Lockheed document was leaked to

the press. The document revealed a coalition strategy where Lockheed

executives along with Air Force and DOD officials had been meeting at

least four time a week for strategy sessions in the Air Force

Legislative Liaison Office. It also listed 250 Congressmen who were to

be lobbied by military personnel or company lobbyists. The printout

detailed arrangements for a C-5B demonstration at Andrews Air Force Base

and arranged for former Representative Andrew Young to "work" the Black

Caucus.

13

.. ,-

Meanwhile, DOD applied pressure on Boeing and threatened that the

company might be punished through cancellation of current contracts and

programs (which totalled about $2.7 billion).1 3

Both Lockheed and Boeing pulled out all the stops and stepped-up

their lobby efforts, and both hired former Congressmen to assist them.

Former Members can be especially powerful because they have inside

contacts, knowledge of the system, and all important access to the House

floor. Both companies also pressed their allies to increase their

pressure on Members via the home district, grass roots lobby. They also

began extolling the virtues of their planes with splashy full-page

advertisements in the nations largest newspapers. And on the House

floor supporters from both sides lined up geographically to back their

product and deride the opposition; Georgians for Lockheed, backers from

Washington and Kansas behind Boeing

Despite all efforts; however, this round went decisively to

Lockheed. The full House decided nearly two to one to fund the C-SB

rather than the 747s.

Immediately following the vote in late July 1982 there arose an

outcry that the Pentagon had violated the law in its effort to persuade

Congress. The Lockheed printout describing the DOD/Lockheed coalition

tactics had been given to, among others, Dina Rasor, Project Director at

the Project on Military Procurement, a private watchdog group. The

following quote from Ms. Rasor underscores her attitude, and that of

other members of the press regarding the incident:

...the disclosure of the collusive efforts of theDepartment of Defense (DOD) and Lockheed Corporationto push the scandal-ridden C-5 cargo airplane.. .Thestory behind this massive effort and its detaileddocumentation give the public a rare look on how thePentagon really buys and promotes its weapons and a

14

"~~~~~.". .- .. ....... ..-.-.....-. .. . •.S..-.S . . .. . ... ..- ... .

better understanding of why we are buying so manyweapons that do not work.

14

The incident was far from over and based on the evidence found in

the Lockheed printout Senator William Proxmire asked the General

Accounting Office (GAO) to conduct an investigation into the charges

that the Pentagon used its equipment and funds for lobbying and perhaps

broke a 1919 law that prohibits the use of tax dollars for lobbying.

The subsequent GAO investigation concluded:

... extensive and cooperative effort was made by officials of the Air

Force, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Lockbeed Corporation,

and several other Defense contractors.-.to influence members of the

House of Representatives.. .amounts of appropriated funds and Government

resources were spent for the purpose of influencing this procurement

appropriation... 15

Following the GAO pronouncement the House Armed Services Committee

conducted hearings on these charges of illegal lobbying by the Pentagon.

The House Committee exonerated DOD by concluding:

The subcommittee finds no violation of existinglaw... Those charges against the Department ofDefense arose from an erroneous perception of themultiple meetings between the Department of Defenseand the contractor to plan strategy to influencemembers of Congress. This procedure is frequentlyfollowed in varying degrees. 16

Although those findings ended the formal inquiries into the matter

it did not quiet the press or defense opponents. The hearings became

known in the press as the "whitewash hearings," alleging that "

questioning was purposefully easy and that the GAO report had been

15

15 .* * . *

excused away. In the minds of the press the question still remains:

Is there anything wrong with a contractor and thePentagon lobbying together for a mutual

interest?1 7

Unfortunately this kind of negative connotation too often lingers e

around the procurement process. Forgotten too quickly is the real

purpose for military equipment, in this case heavy lift cargo planes

which are designed to move US forces to distant places to meet a threat

and then to keep those forces resupplied. Unfortunately real facts

rarely appear in the press, and too often important points are lost or

distorted because DOD does not educate and inform the public and the

press. For instance, a major point overlooked by the press was that,

unlike the 747, the C-5B can carry such outsized cargo as tanks and

howitzers, which can roll on and off the ramps of the C-5B. To load the

747, however, equipment must be hoisted 16 feet into the air.

Following the final decision on the C-5B some military officers at a

congressional hearing were asked whether the difference in performance

was worth the extra cost. The unanimous reply was, of course, yes. So

perhaps the Congress eventually made the right choice of airplanes, just

did it with the wrong motives and for the wrong reasons.

Those of us in the Department of Defense often complain that the

press and the liberal pressure groups do not understand the importance

of force modernization or the importance of a larger military budget to

counter a specific threat. But, perhaps the real fault is our own, and

that of Congress.

Lobbyists can be a positive influence on the system and should be

employed to educate both DOD and Congress on emerging technologies, new

products, and the best ways to test and use those devices. Few question

16

I

the benefits provided by the lobbyists, nor the First Amendment right to

lobby. The questions and distrust arise from the secrecy of the process

and the perceived shortage of public information about the operation.

DOD has nothing to hide in its budgeting and procurement process.

Its regulations are firm, perhaps too trivial and inefficient, but firm

on its dealings with contractors. So why does it always appear so

guilty? The solution is not the lobby reform, but a more open approach

with the ptiblic and the press.

It is not the lobbyist who is at fault in the system but the

government; the bureaucracy, the courts, and the Congress, who fail to

define the parameters in which the lobbyist can operate in performing a -

useful function.

.1

171

. . . . .. . . . . . . . . - - r -

'pp.

ENDNOTES

1. Michael R. Gordan, "Are Military Contractors Part of theProblem or Part of the Solution?", National Journal, 11 July 1981,p. 1232.

2. Hope Eastman, Lobbying: A Constitutionally Protected Right,

p. 3.

3. Eastman, p. 15.

4. Julie Kosterlitz, "At the Mercy of the Highest Bidder," CommonCause, August 1982, p. 16.

5. Common Cause, Defense Dollars and $ense, p. 69.

6. Congressional Quarterly, The Washington Lobby, p. 92.

7. David Pryor, "The Lobbying Industry: A Growing Concern," USA

Today, July 1982, p. 13.

8. Pryor, p. 14.

9. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs,Oversight of the 1946 Federal Regullation of Lobbying Act, p. 376.

10. Alton K. Marsh, "OMB Planning to Revise Political AdvocacyRules," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 7 March, 1983, p. 21.

11. Common Cause, p. 64.

12. Congressional Quarterly, p. 32.

13. Common Cause, p. 65.

14. Dina Rasor, "Pentagon Brass and Their Corporate Pals Team Up to

Woo Congress," Business and Society Review, Spring 1983, p. 18.

15. Richard Stengel, "Turbulent Flight for the C-5B," Time,2 August 1982, p. 14.

16. US Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Allegations ofImproper Lobbying by Department of Defense Personnel of the C-SB andB-IB Aircraft and Sale to Saudi Arabia of the Airborne Warning andControl System, p. 3.

17. Rasor, p. 20.

18

7- 2,

.4

I.-

S..-

I.

I1 t ~

~

~ ~ -............~ .**..**.-'*..**.f**.- .. /... . -.. *..% .-- -~ ...

- ~ .- .