PANORAMA: A FIGHT TO THE DEATH

The Hutton Inquiry.Tx: Wednesday 21 January 2004 20.30

NOTE: TRANSCRIPT SUPPLIED FOR GUIDANCE ONLY. PLEASE CHECK ACCURACY AGAINST TRANSMISSION

“David, sorry I’m late. “

Soon after the Iraq war ended, a BBC reporter met a government scientist at this London hotel.

They discussed the Iraq dossier No.10 had published which was based on secret intelligence and said that Saddam Hussein was a current and serious threat to British interests.

(RECONSTRUCTION)KELLY: “….It was transformed in the week before publication.

GILLIGAN: To make it sexier?

KELLY: Yes. To maker it sexier.”

What passed between these two men led to the most damaging charge the Blair government has ever had to confront: that No.10 had taken us to war by deception.

GILLIGAN (RECONSTRUCTION) “…the government probably knew that that forty-five minute figure was wrong even before it decided to put it in.”

In the row between the BBC and No.10 that followed, Dr Kelly was caught in a vicious war of words. He was later found dead.

His death led to a public inquiry.

In tonight’s Panorama, we’ve reconstructed key events based on the evidence to the inquiry chaired by the law lord Lord Hutton.

BLAIR (RECONSTRUCTION) “I mean look this was an absolutely fundamental charge……had the allegation been true, it would have merited my resignation.”

Just as fundamental to the BBC Chairman was the Corporation’s right to report what a credible source had told them, free of pressure from No.10

DAVIES (RECONSTRUCTION)“…..I do not at any stage in my life ignore the facts. The most important thing, undoubtedly, is to tell the truth to the public.”

The Hutton inquiry has investigated not just how Dr Kelly was treated – but also how the Iraq dossier was put together. The verdict will be delivered next week.

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The inquiry has prized opened up parts of the establishment which might otherwise have remained closed forever.

At stake is whether both the government and the BBC can be trusted to tell the truth.

TITLE:A FIGHT TO THE DEATH

ACTUALITY “The answer as to why we’re here is because we’ve been ordered to be here..”

The Prime Minister deployed 45,000 British troops to the Gulf because he said Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction.

The evidence had been set out in Mr Blair’s Iraq dossier.

Never could he have imagined that lawyers and the world’s media would be scrutinising the dossier so minutely so soon after victory.

Least of all could Mr Blair have imagined that he himself would need to defend his reputation before one of highest judges in land.

ACTUALITY “Sir can you just turn around here. Sir”

At the judicial inquiry chaired by Lord Hutton Mr Blair said the purpose of the Iraq dossier was to inform the public of the threat from Saddam.

It was categorically NOT a propaganda device for rallying the country to war.BLAIR (RECONSTRUCTION) “..it is important to recognise that the September dossier was not making the case for war, it was making the case for the issue to be dealt with; and our preferred alternative was indeed to deal with it through the United Nations route…” The Prime Minister said it was critical the threat assessment came with the full authority of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the most senior government officials which has provided such assessments for ministers for sixty years.

BLAIR (RECONSTRUCTION) “The whole purpose of having the JIC own this document was in order to provide the absolute clarity and certainty….. it was essential that anything that we said in the course of my statement or in the dossier we could hand on heart say: this is the assessment of the Joint Intelligence Committee.”

Why, therefore, if the dossier was to be free of political spin, was the Prime Minister’s Director of Communications and Strategy Alastair Campbell involved?

(RECONSTRUCTION)CAMPBELL: Yep, come in.

SCARLETT: Hi Alastair.

CAMPBELL: Hi John, take a seat.” 

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John Scarlett, a former MI 6 man, was the official put in charge of compiling the dossier. He’s chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

(RECONSTRUCTION)CAMPBELL: ”The new dossier must be, and be seen to be, the work of you and your team. It’s credibility depends fundamentally upon that. SCARLETT: I need to take ownership of the document. CAMPBELL: It goes without saying that nothing should be published that you are not 100% happy with. I’ll look at it from a presentational point of view and make some recommendations.”

Spin doctors like clear simple messages; rarely is intelligence so clear cut.

One of Scarlett’s predecessors as chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, or “JIC”, is Sir Rodric Braithwaite.

He was also ambassador in Moscow when Scarlett was there.

Braithwaite believes Scarlett crossed a red line by allowing Campbell a say in the process.

BRAITHWAITE (SYNC) “..The JIC is there to try and produce a dispassionate assessment on some problem usually involving a threat to this country. It's not there to be helpful, it's there to try and make an honest judgement which is very difficult. I’m not suggesting it’s easy to come to a conclusion in the JIC and very often the conclusions of the JIC are boring – on the one hand this, on the other had that…”

Exceptionally, some of Campbell’s team of press officers were security cleared to sit alongside intelligence officers while drafts of the dossier were discussed.

Their criticisms of an early draft came thick and fast.

Danny Pruce – a press officer at No.10 – e mailed Campbell: VOICE OVER“….much of the evidence is largely circumstantial so we need to convince our readers that the cumulation of these facts demonstrate an intent on Saddam’s part..”   Phil Bassett, a senior special adviser to the Prime Minister sent two e mails on the first draft of the dossier:

VOICE OVER“… very long way to go…it’s….intelligence-lite… we’ve got find a way to get over this by having better intelligence material…”

That evening John Scarlett met Alastair Campbell and several other members of the Prime Minister’s inner circle.

(ARCHIVE SIMPSON IN RECONSTRUCTION)“…it’s quite extraordinary…”

Scarlett says they did discuss these concerns raised by Campbell’s staff.

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Campbell says he has no recollection of this.

(RECONSTRUCTION)[KNOCK ON DOOR]Hi gents...

What is certain is that earlier that day Scarlett’s team had sent out an urgent message to the intelligence services.

(RECONSTRUCTION)CAMPBELL: Phil and Danny on the way?

MAN: Yes, they’ll be here shortly.”

No.10 had wanted more facts in the dossier like how many chemical and biological weapons Saddam was supposed to have - and what type.

The intelligence services didn’t have anything like this sort of detail.

So the latest plea from Scarlett’s team to the intelligence services contained a note of desperation:

VOICE OVER“…..No. 10, through the Chairman, want the document to be as strong as possible within the bounds of available intelligence. This is therefore a last (!) call for any items of intelligence that agencies think can and should be included…..”

BRAITHWAITE (SYNC)“…That is not what the JIC is for…..

BRAITHWAITE (SYNC)“ ..it’s not their job is not to fiddle with documents in order to make them more presentable with the public. If they start doing that, they get involved instead of in analysis which is their job, in presentation, and presentation means not falsifying the facts but presenting them in an order which is designed to produce a particular impression on the audience. It's ceasing to be objective, it's becoming an advocate.”

At the Hutton inquiry Alastair Campbell was asked if No.10 wanted to strengthen the dossier because the early drafts were not going to convince the public Saddam was a serious and current threat to Britain.

All sides were represented by barristers. The BBC’s quoted back to Campbell some of the emails sent by his own staff.

(RECONSTRUCTION)

CALDECOTT :… an e-mail to you from Mr Bassett, your senior special adviser, it is the top of the page: ‘Re draft dossier. Very long way to go, I think. Think we’re in a lot of trouble with this as it stands now.’ What trouble did you understand him to be meaning there, Mr Campbell?

CAMPBELL I think he is saying that he was not terribly impressed with the draft; but I was impressed by the draft and actually thought it did form the basis of a very strong

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document.

CALDECOTT He meant political trouble, did he not?

CAMPBELL I don’t believe so.” No.10’s plea for more intelligence was followed the next day by a visit from the head of MI6 to the Prime Minister.

Sir Richard Dearlove told him they had some new and ultra sensitive intelligence on Iraq.

The public has not been told what exactly this intelligence was.

Even some members of the Joint Intelligence Committee were not told before signing off the dossier.

But armed with this new intelligence, the Prime Minister wrote this foreword to the dossier. It was categoric:VOICE OVER"..What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam Hussein has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons…” Some intelligence analysts did not believe the Prime Minister was right to be so certain - amongst them this man Dr Brian Jones.

He was probably the country’s foremost intelligence analyst working on weapons of mass destruction.

Dr Jones worked for the MoD’s intelligence service, which is separate from MI6.

It’s known as the Defence Intelligence Staff, or DIS.

(RECONSTRUCTION)DINGEMANS Was there a perception, right or wrong, amongst DIS personnel that spin merchants were involved in the dossier? JONES Well, ‘spin merchants’ is rather emotive. I think there was an impression, right or wrong, and I do not know, I did not allow that to concern me as this process – I think there was an impression that there was an influence from outside the intelligence community. DINGEMANS: And were people in the intelligence community happy with that? JONES: No.”

Dr Jones said could only speak for his branch of DIS. But they did have a key role in checking the dossier’s accuracy for the Joint Intelligence Committee.

And he had a particular worry about its most headline-grabbing claim: that Saddam could deploy weapons of mass destruction in 45 minutes – even at British bases in Cyprus.

This intelligence had arrived at MI6 headquarters in London. It was hearsay and from just

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one source

At first the Joint Intelligence Committee had assessed it cautiously, saying only that it:

VOICE OVER“indicates that chemical and biological munitions could be…ready for firing within 45 minutes.” By the time the dossier was published the language had hardened, leaving no room for doubt:

VOICE OVER “….some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes….”

Alastair Campbell drew attention to nine passages in a draft of the dossier which he suggested could be strengthened, or implied were weak.

He sent these to John Scarlet, the official in charge of the dossier.Replying to Campbell, Scarlett said:

VOICE OVER“..We have been able to amend the text in most cases as you proposed…”

One man who knew of the disquiet over some of the dossier’s claims was Dr David Kelly.

He was one of the world’s top experts on Iraqi biological weapons.

In the week before the dossier was published, Dr Kelly twice visited Defence Intelligence Staff to review the latest draft.

One scientist there later complained to Dr Kelly about “the spin merchants of this administration.”

“Let’s hope the dossier turns into tomorrow’s chip wrappers,” he said.

Afterwards, Dr Jones placed his concerns on record, as did his chemical weapons expert who wrote:VOICE OVER“..the intelligence available to me….has NOT established beyond doubt that Saddam has continued to produce chemical [and biological] weapons…”

Dr Jones told the Hutton Inquiry that when he put his concerns on the record he was speaking for his colleagues.(RECONSTRUCTION)JONES: “Some of my staff said they were unhappy… my expert analyst on chemical weapons expressed particular concern… they were really about a tendency in certain areas, from his point of view, to shall we say, over-egg certain assessments in relation particularly to the production of CW agents and weapons since 1998.…”

JOHN WARE PTC“The letters from Dr Jones and his chemical weapons expert landed on the desks of the Director of Defence Intelligence and his deputy, both also serving members of the Joint Intelligence Committee which finally approved the dossier.

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Yet neither the Director nor his deputy even discussed the letters with their authors.  The Prime Minister had specially recalled parliament for a set piece debate on the dossier in the House of Commons. He’d set a deadline for a major publicity launch.”

Just before the publicity launch, Mr Blair’s Chief of Staff Jonathan Powell e mailed Alastair Campbell:

VOICE OVER“Alastair:  What will be the headline in the Evening Standard on the day of publication. What do we want it to be?”

Campbell said the coverage went very well, right round the world:

VOICE OVER“45 Minutes From Attack” (Evening Standard)

“45 minutes from a chemical war” (The Star)

"Saddam can strike in 45 minutes" (Express)

“HE’S GOT ‘EM… LETS GET HIM” (The SUN)

“Brits 45 minutes from doom… (The SUN) VOICE OVER (The Sun)“British servicemen and tourists in Cyprus could be annihilated by germ warfare missiles launched by Iraq, it was revealed yesterday.”

On the day the dossier was launched Mr Blair assured Parliament the picture the intelligence services had painted was detailed and authoritative.

BLAIR (ARCHIVE)“… It concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes…”

DAVID KELLY (SYNC)

“Ok let me just take a sip before we start..”

A month later, Dr Kelly gave an interview to Panorama which was never broadcast

DAVID KELLY (SYNC)

“You happy with the voice, I’m looking presentable, OK…

In public Dr Kelly qualified any reservations he had about the Iraq dossier’s 45 minute claim by making it clear he thought that Saddam’s weapons were a threat.

INTERVIEWER (SYNC) Are they an immediate threat?

DAVID KELLY (SYNC) Yes, they are. Even if they’re not actually filled and deployed today, the capability exists to get them filled and deployed within a matter of days and weeks, and so yes, they’re a real threat.”

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The war was short.

Several thousand Iraqi civilians and soldiers were killed – as well as 170 American and British troops.

ARCHIVEMAN “Three, two, one splash…”

A tyrant was toppled though, weapons of mass destruction have yet to been found.

Three weeks after President Bush declared the war over, Dr Kelly met a BBC reporter at this London hotel.

Neither could ever have imagined that Dr Kelly would later apparently kill himself following a titanic battle over what was – or was not - said here.

(RECONSTRUCTION)GILLIGAN: “David, sorry I’m late…..”

Andrew Gilligan was Defence Correspondent of the Today programme.

Dr Kelly was authorised to brief journalists on technical aspects of Iraqi weapons.

According to Gilligan’s version of the conversation, he went beyond that. His private position on the dossier was different from his public one.

(RECONSTRUCTION)GILLIGAN: D’ you mind if I take a few notes? So, back to the dossier. What happened to it? When we last met you were saying it wasn’t very exciting.

KELLY: Yes, that’s right. Until the last week it was just as I told you. It was transformed in the week before publication.

GILLIGAN: To make it sexier?

KELLY: Yes. To maker it sexier.

GILLIGAN: What do you mean? Can you give me some examples?”

What Dr Kelly said next, according to Gilligan, was a sensational allegation which led to the biggest row between the BBC and No.10 in recent history.

(RECONSTRUCTION)KELLY: “The classic was the 45 minutes. The statement that WMD could be ready in 45 minutes was single source and most things in the dossier were double source. GILLIGAN: How did this transformation happen? KELLY: Campbell.

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GILLIGAN: What, you know that Campbell made it up? They made it up?

KELLY: No it was real information but it was unreliable and it was in the dossier against our wishes.”

Upon these words, Gilligan based a report which amounted to an allegation of dishonesty:

..that at No.10’s behest, the government had ordered intelligence to put into the dossier – even though it probably knew the intelligence was wrong.

(RECONSTRUCTION)VOICE “Hello Andrew – we’ll be with you in a minute

GILLIGAN OK. “

Andrew Gilligan broadcast his story a week later live from home. He was interviewed by John Humphrys and he was not reading from a script.

(RECONSTRUCTION PICTURES, ARCHIVE VOICE)“It is now seven minutes past six. The Government is facing more questions this morning about its claims about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq… “

Gilligan had assured Dr Kelly he’d never publicly give him away as his source.

So when he referred to Dr Kelly’s criticisms of the Iraq dossier’s headline claim – Gilligan quoted an anonymous official.

(RECONSTRUCTION PICTURES, ARCHIVE VOICE)ANDREW GILLIGAN: “What we’ve been told by one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up that dossier was that actually the government probably knew that that forty-five minute figure was wrong even before it decided to put it in…Downing Street, our source says, ordered a week before publication, ordered it to be sexed up, to be made more exciting and ordered more facts to be, to be discovered.”

JOHN HUMPHRYS: [Cough] “Our Defence Correspondent Andrew Gilligan has found evidence that…”

That morning the Prime Minister was being feted in Basra over the fall of Saddam.

BBC news bulletins in London were already casting a long shadow over his celebrations.

(RECONSTRUCTION PICTURES, ARCHIVE VOICE)“The news headlines this morning..…. There have been new accusations over the reasons for fighting the war.”

By the time the Prime Minister met the Desert Rats, he’d been told about the allegation that the BBC had broadcast.

Mr Blair held back his mounting anger behind his famous smile.

BLAIR (ARCHIVE) When people look back at this time and this conflict, I honestly believe they will see this as one of the defining moments of our century….” 

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(ARCHIVE)MAN “….Look for me sir, once again for me sir, over here please…”

The broadcast has certainly become a defining moment for the BBC.

There have been reports – all denied - of ministers making veiled threats of revenge against the BBC Chairman, the Director General – even against the licence fee.

As the Prime Minister posed for photographs, No 10 spat out a furious denial - the first of many

(RECONSTRUCTION PICTURES, ARCHIVE VOICE)“We’ve had a statement from Ten Downing Street that says it’s not true, and let me just quote what they said to you: ‘Not one word of the dossier was not entirely the work of the intelligence agencies.’ Sorry to submit you to this sort of English, but there we are. I think we know what they mean…

Andrew Gilligan argues that he corrected the impression of bad faith in his next broadcast.

He didn’t repeat that the Government had put intelligence into the dossier probably knowing it to be wrong. But a strong suggestion of dishonesty did remain.

(RECONSTRUCTION PICTURES, ARCHIVE VOICE)“It could have been an honest mistake, but what I have been told is that the government knew that claim was questionable, even before the war, even before they wrote it in their dossier.”

That weekend in the Mail on Sunday Andrew Gilligan named Alastair Campbell as the man his source had said sexed up the dossier:

Mr Blair has said this gave the BBC story “booster rockets.”

Alastair Campbell was tracking these events on a daily basis in his private diary – which Lord Hutton required him to share with the British public.

Campbell noted the BBC was inflicting grave damage on Tony Blair’s reputation:  (RECONSTRUCTION) “It’s grim. It’s grim for me and it was grim for TB and there is this huge stuff about trust.”

And it was growing. Allegations of dishonesty were gaining momentum, and going around the world. ARCHIVE “It's being called Tony Blair's Watergate, with allegations he doctored intelligence reports to exaggerate the threat of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction….”

ARCHIVE “British Prime Minister Tony Blair is facing a barrage of accusations that he exaggerated evidence of deadly weapons.

ARCHIVE Blair is being characterised as a political Pinocchio in cartoons. An influential magazine spells Blair: ‘Bliar.’.

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As the row escalated, the BBC said they’d simply reported “serious and pertinent questions” from a credible source. They had not accused anyone of lying.

No.10 said the BBC was playing with words - just as the BBC had often accused No.10.

A week after the broadcast a cabinet minister felt he had to remind the BBC of what Gilligan had actually said on Today.

(RECONSTRUCTION PICTURES, ARCHIVE VOICE)REID: The central original allegation was that we deceived intentionally the people of this country and the second allegation...HUMPHRYS That is your interpretation, that is your interpretation. REID Well, listen, your listeners can listen to the quote again: `The Government probably knew that the 45-minute figure was wrong even before it decided to put it in.'  If any of your listeners can interpret that as anything other than an allegation of dishonesty, of putting in information we knew to be wrong, that it would confound me if they can decide that. 

HUMPHRYS No sorry if you’re making a serious accusation like that, and I do want to return No, I’m not disputing your transcript Dr Reid

REID Check your own transcript.. That afternoon, the BBC story dominated Prime Minister’s question time.

BLAIR (ARCHIVE) “…there was no attempt, at any time, by any official, or Minister, or member of No. 10 Downing street staff, to override the intelligence judgments of the Joint Intelligence Committee. And their judgments, includes the judgment about the so-called 45 minutes, was a judgment made by the Joint Intelligence Committee and by them alone.”

The BBC’s Director General and Editor in Chief heard the Today programme interview with John Reid.

A “riveting piece of radio” was how Greg Dyke described it to Hutton Inquiry.

But he said that neither he nor his senior managers registered the row as being exceptional.

(RECONSTRUCTION)LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you, Mr Dyke: you say you discussed Mr Gilligan's story in general terms. Were you aware of the actual details of the report, of what he had precisely said?

DYKE. No. I was aware that there was a disagreement going on.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. You were not aware that he had said that the Government probably knew that the 45 minute figure was wrong even before they decided to put it in?

DYKE. No, not at that stage at all.

LORD HUTTON: When did you first become aware of the actual words of that report?

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DYKE: I did not become aware of that for several weeks. BBC reporters had to assess the performance in the witness box of their own editor in chief. Mr Dyke did not get rave reviews.

(ARCHIVE) WITCHELL: “This I think was an environment with the forensic examination of facts in which he did not at times feel entirely comfortable... He is however, the editor in chief of the BBC and there were some very pointed interventions by Lord Hutton who frankly at times sounded faintly incredulous that the BBC’s Director General had not made it his business for example to find out more about Andrew Gilligan’s report..”

Buzz Buzz Buzz

During the war and its build up there had been twelve written complaints from Alastair Campbell. The BBC was Campbell fatigued.

When the 13th arrived the Today Editor, Kevin Marsh, dismissed it out of hand.

VOICE OVER “I started to look at this point by point… but it’s all drivel, and frankly it’d be easy to get as confused as Campbell is. The man’s flapping in the wind….”  Despairing of getting the apology he was demanding, Campbell set off for Parliament to publicly vent his fury at a committee hearing.

He’s said to have taken with him a pin to jab into his hand to keep his temper in check.

(ARCHIVE)CAMPBELL “… let’s get to the heart of what the allegation is – that the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the intelligence agencies, people like myself connived to persuade Parliament to send British forces into action on a lie. That is the allegation. I tell you, until the BBC acknowledge that is a lie, I will keep banging on, that correspondence file will get thicker and they had better issue and apology pretty quickly. I’m sorry if I get…

MAN No, that’s that’s very clear…” The pin seems to have had only a limited effect.

Campbell attacked the BBC as a whole – accusing them of being anti war.

(ARCHIVE)CAMPBELL... there was an agenda in large parts of the BBC… there was a disproportionate focus upon, if you like, the dissent, the opposition, to our position.  Campbell followed up with a blistering letter which he also made public

He wrote in his diary that he’d opened up a flank on the BBC.

(RECONSTRUCTION)“Does it still stand by the allegation made on that day that both we and the intelligence agencies knew the 45 minute claim to be wrong and inserted it despite

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knowing that? Yes or no?” Before he was called in front of Lord Hutton Andrew Gilligan was categorically insisting to his BBC bosses that his reports had “scrupulously matched the words” of his source.

ACTUALITY“Mr Gilligan – are you going to stand by your story 100%...”

Now, before Lord Hutton, Gilligan made a damaging admission.

ACTUALITY“Out the way, out the way…”

He said Dr Kelly had never actually said to him that No.10 had put intelligence into the dossier which it “probably knew to be wrong”.

(RECONSTRUCTION)GILLIGAN “The allegation I intended to make was of spin, but as I say, I do regard those words as imperfect and I should not have said them.

SUMPTION. And the reason why you should not have said them is that they did, in fact, accuse the Government of dishonesty, whether or not that was your intention.

GILLIGAN I think that is probably right, yes…

[mix] SUMPTION You accept, I think, that it was expressed by you as something that your source had said, whereas in fact it was an inference of your own?

GILLIGAN. Yes, that is right, that was my mistake.” Just a slip of the tongue in one live broadcast on Today, says Andrew Gilligan, though he still maintains it was a fair inference from what Dr Kelly had told him.

Gilligan also says he never repeated that suggestion of dishonesty in subsequent broadcasts.

But there is no doubt a suggestion of dishonesty did remain.

Until Alastair Campbell went public with his complaint against the BBC, the Director General had left his managers to handle the row. It was now clearly going nuclear.

Greg Dyke cancelled his engagements to oversee the drafting of the BBC’s reply at Television Centre

According to one executive Dyke put the position with some clarity:

“Have we f…ing got this right, because if we’ve haven’t…we’d better go back on it now.”

Richard Sambrook, the director of BBC News believed Andrew Gilligan had got it right.

Not least because newspapers were also reporting there was disquiet within the intelligence

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services about the Iraq dossier.

(RECONSTRUCTION)SAMBROOK: “Hi Andrew…”.

SAMBROOK:: “Before we reply to Campbell, are you able to tell me the name of your source?

GILILGAN Yes, his name is Dr David Kelly.”

Gilligan had also re-assured Sambrook that what he’d reported was “an absolutely accurate reflection” of Dr Kelly’s view, and I stand by it.”

(RECONSTRUCTION)SAMBROOK: …Thanks….”

DYKE: Andrew...

GILLIGAN: Greg…

But a “reflection” is not the same as a direct quote.

This should have rung alarm bells

Yet nobody took the precaution of looking at Gilligan’s original notes of his meeting with Dr Kelly

Had they done so, they’d have seen no reference to Dr Kelly saying the government probably knew that intelligence in the Iraq dossier was wrong.

Their failure has proved to be very costly.

JOHN WARE PTC“The central pillar of the BBC’s defence was they were reporting accurately what a credible source had told their reporter.

And yet that same reporter had already been hauled over the coals by the same BBC executives - now drafting the reply to Campbell - for using loose language in the past.

Indeed, the BBC’s Director of News Richard Sambrook had for some time been concerned about Gilligan’s lack of care in choosing some of his words.

He’d warned Gilligan that if he didn’t control this it was going to undermine him as a reporter.”

Trust in the BBC is an inheritance that’s been built up over nearly eighty years. It stands or falls on the accuracy of its news reporting.

Yet the Director General and his senior executives bet the farm on a shaky foundation.

They were drafting a robust letter of reply to Downing Street

- putting their full weight behind a reporter they knew had already used loose language -

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without a full investigation.

(RECONSTRUCTION)DYKE: So where are we Richard…

SAMBROOK: “I’ll read you from the letter. “We have to be believe you are conducting a personal vendetta against a particular journalist whose reports on a number of occasions have caused you discomfort…”

Whatever the BBC may have thought of Alastair Campbell’s motives, their reply to him contained a serious inaccuracy.

VOICE OVER“Andrew Gilligan accurately reported the source telling him the government… ‘probably knew the 45 minute figure was wrong..’”

Andrew Gilligan was shown a draft. But he never pointed out that not only should this phrase not have been in quotation marks, Dr Kelly had never even said it.

Most remarkably of all, just minutes before the BBC’s reply was faxed to Campbell, Gilligan’s editor Kevin Marsh was spelling out his doubts about his own reporter’s story-telling to his line manager.

VOICE OVER ‘The story was a good piece of investigative journalism, marred by flawed reporting – our biggest millstone had been his loose use of language and lack of judgment in some of his phraseology…’” Marsh had helped draft the letter to Campbell that day.

His memo should have come as no surprise to some fellow executives who’d also been involved. After all, they’d previously discussed inconsistencies in Gilligan’s different broadcasts, on the story.

When the BBC’s letter reached Campbell, he went ballistic. He took everyone by surprise by turning up at the studios of Channel Four

(ARCHIVE)

WOMAN: “John, Alastair is on his way to Millbank to do a live..

JON SNOW: You’re joking…

WOMAN: No, he’s here, he’s here…”

JON SNOW: Get the chair in!

An iron law of spin doctoring is never to become the story. But Campbell was so angry, he’d now put himself centre stage.

(ARCHIVE)JON SNOW Well now we are joined by Alastair Campbell a rare moment…

Once again, Campbell accused the BBC of failing to acknowledge the seriousness of the

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allegation.

(ARCHIVE)CAMPBELL: “…The BBC made the allegation that we deliberately exaggerated, abused, distorted intelligence..

JON SNOW And the answer to the question you put to the BBC: ‘Do they stand by it?’ the answer is: ‘Yes.’ A robust ‘Yes.’

CAMPBELL: Excuse me. That letter is about as robust as Blackburn Rovers war when they played Treleborgs. I’ll tell you the answer to the question: ‘Yes or No – did we abuse British Intelligence?’ the answer that questions is: ‘No!’”

Only now did the Director of News Richard Sambrook finally inspect Andrew Gilligan’s original notes – and found there were gaps.

But still he stood shoulder to shoulder with his reporter.

Sambrook had looked Gilligan squarely in the eye: was he still saying categorically that what he’d broadcast did accurately reflect what Dr Kelly had told him?

Gilligan again insisted he was.

Sambrook has told colleagues he was so struck by Gilligan’s confidence that he accepted this. The BBC’s supreme authority is the Board of governors led by chairman Gavyn Davies.

They were the last group left within the BBC who could resolve the conflict.

Independent of BBC managers, the governors regulate them on behalf of every licence payer.

But Davies had another pressing concern.

(RECONSTRUCTION)DAVIES: ….“Thank you all for coming at short notice on a Sunday evening. Greg Dyke and others from BBC Management Team will be joining us after our discussion.”

Davies told a special meeting of the governors that by accusing the BBC of having an anti war agenda, No.10 had made a full frontal assault on the corporation’s impartiality and independence.

It was a moment, he said, to stand up and be counted.

(ARCHIVE)“…24 Greg Dyke is here…” Greg Dyke and his team of managers arrived to defend Andrew Gilligan and their handling of the row.

(ARCHIVE)MAN : What will you be saying to the Governors Greg?

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DYKE : I’ll see what they say to me.”

They told Dyke and his team they were supportive – even before questioning the managers about the accuracy of the story.

JOHN WARE PTC“Sitting around this table the governors were told there were gaps in Andrew Giligan’s notes.

The Director of News Richard Sambrook was frank: he said for some time he’d known Gilligan was a journalist who painted in what Sambrook called ‘primary colours’

And yet far from ordering a thorough investigation into whether Gilligan had reported his source accurately, the governors backed the managers and Gilligan to the hilt with a public statement.”

(ARCHIVE)DAVIES “We are wholly satisfied that BBC journalists and their managers sought to maintain impartiality and accuracy during this episode.”

Gavyn Davies is a former Labour Party donor and his wife is political secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Was he making a stand to assert his independence of his political friends?

At the Hutton Inquiry, Davies was asked why he’d e-mailed governors to say that the BBC must not be seen to buckle to government pressure.

(ACTUALITY)MAN “Gavers, Gave….”

(RECONSTRUCTION)SUMPTION:  “What you were saying was that whatever details might emerge about the precise facts about the 45 minutes claim, there should be no compromise … and the Governors must not give way but must be seen to support the management. DAVIES: Absolutely not saying that whatsoever.  It does not say anything about supporting the management in there.… SUMPTION:  You were so concerned about creating the outward appearance of succumbing to political pressure that you were urging the Governors not to give an inch whatever a further investigation of the facts might show.  Is that not the position? DAVIES: It is absolutely not the position, Mr Sumption.  I do not, at any stage in my life, ignore the facts.  And the most important thing, undoubtedly, is to tell the truth to the public. 

The governors offered No.10 an olive branch by stressing the BBC had never accused the Prime minister of lying.

But according to his diary, Campbell wanted a clear win, not a messy draw.

17

At the MoD, there’d been a major breakthrough.

Out of the blue Dr Kelly had come forward.

In a letter to his bosses he admitted that he had met Andrew Gilligan.

However, he denied making any criticism of the Iraq dossier.

This put MoD officials in an acute dilemma. Could they be certain that Dr Kelly was Gilligan’s source?

(RECONSTRUCTION)HATFIELD: What did you say when Gilligan asked: ‘Why do you think the 45 minutes claim was in the dossier?’

KELLY: I said I assumed it was there for impact. I don’t believe I can be his primary source because I didn’t make any allegations against the Government.

HATFIELD: Are you confident that in your letter, you accurately reflect the meeting with Andrew Gilligan?

KELLY: Yes.

That night, Alastair Campbell wrote his diary. It graphically reveals that if Dr Kelly was Gilligan’s source - and if Gilligan had embellished what Dr Kelly had told him – Campbell and the Defence Secretary believed the BBC case would collapse.

(RECONSTRUCTION)“Geoff Hoon and I agreed it would fuck Gilligan if that was his source….”

If Dr Kelly was the source – and that was the problem.

Ultimately, only the BBC could answer that.

And they had given their source a solemn pledge of confidentiality.

On Monday morning, the Prime Minister chaired the first of four meetings in No.10 on how to handle Dr Kelly.

(RECONSTRUCTION)BLAIR “Are we expecting David Omand to join us…

CAMPBELL: Yes, he’s being pulled out of a lecture now.

BLAIR : OK”

Alastair Campbell seems to have decided that the only way of getting Dr Kelly to ‘F…’ Gilligan was to force the BBC to admit he was the source - if necessary by getting get his name out to the public.

At the Hutton Inquiry, Mr Blair maintained he had no wish to play politics with Dr Kelly, by using him as a weapon to defeat the BBC.

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(RECONSTRUCTION)BLAIR “….in the end I have full responsibility for the decisions that are taken…. we handled this by the book, in the sense of with the advice of senior civil servants. Not, as I say, in order to pass responsibility to them, but in order to make sure that this was not, as it were, the politicians driving the system….” Dr Kelly was on a course at RAF Honington preparing to return to Iraq to help find Saddam’s elusive weapons of mass destruction.

The Prime Minister had asked his officials for a deeper analysis as to whether Dr Kelly was Gilligan’s source.

He was called back for a thorough interview.

While Dr Kelly was travelling back, Mr Blair was being accused of taking Britain to war by deception.

ARCHIVEMAN “Did you mislead Parliament Prime Minister?”

Dr Kelly arrived at the MoD to find officials were planning to issue a press statement.

(RECONSTRUCTION)HATFIELD: “I think we’ll have to say publicly that someone has come forward but I don’t think it will be necessary to reveal your name at the moment… This is a copy of a draft press release for you. There is always the possibility that your name will come out in due course however. There’s a lot of speculation in the newspapers as to your identity.

KELLY: Yes.”

Dr Kelly certainly wanted to remain anonymous. However, a few hours after the MoD had re-assured him,

Alastair Campbell wrote in his diary that some details should be got out, following a meeting with the Prime Minister

(RECONSTRUCTION)“..it was agreed… we should get it out that the source was not in the intelligence community, not involved drawing up dossier….” Almost these very words appeared in the following morning’s Times in a report about the source.   “He is not a member of the Intelligence Services and was not involved in drafting the report…

It also said he was “a WMD specialist” and that all these details were known to “Downing Street”

How did the Times know these details?

Campbell was careful not to give too much away.

19

(RECONSTRUCTION)

DINGEMANS Did you give any briefings to any journalists at the time?

CAMPBELL Well, I do not spend that much time speaking to journalists, but I do talk to journalists, yes.

DINGEMANS That is not an answer to the question.

CAMPBELL Well, yes is the answer….

DINGEMANS And what were you talking to them about?

CAMPBELL At this particular time?

DINGEMANS Hmm, hmm.

CAMPBELL I was -- I mean, I talked to journalists when -- I mainly talk to editors and senior journalists. At this time I was emphasising that I did not believe that the BBC source was a senior intelligence official and I did not believe that their source was somebody centrally involved in the drawing up of the dossier.” The Prime Minister seemed pre-occupied about exactly how to handle Dr Kelly.

On this day alone he chaired three further meetings with a stellar cast of advisers:

the Foreign Secretary, three permanent secretaries, his chief of staff, the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, several special advisers, Alastair Campbell, and both the prime Minister’s official spokesmen.

After Mr Blair left, some of this “stellar cast” crowded around a computer to draft a press release.

(RECONSTRUCTION)CAMPBELL: “So from the top

CAMPBELL : “a person who has come forward and volunteered that he has known Mr Gilligan for some months. Happy with that?

SCARLETT : Yup.

No.10 say they only gave details of the source’s background to show that the BBC had got their facts wrong - like describing him as a senior official in charge of drawing up the dossier and in the intelligence services.

(RECONSTRUCTION)CAMPBELL: He says that he met Mr Gilligan at a central London hotel at Mr Gilligan’s request. John?

SCARLETT: ‘He says that when Mr Gilligan asked about the role of Alastair Campbell with regard to the 45 minute issue he made no comment.’”

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The statement did not name Dr Kelly but said:

VOICE OVER“The individual is an expert on weapons of mass destruction who has advised ministers on WMD”

It also revealed that he worked:

VOICE OVER“…in the MoD…”

The statement was personally approved by the Prime Minister.

The government has “absolutely and categorically” denied the intention was to provide clues to help journalists uncover his name.

When the statement came out, Dr Kelly was at home with his wife.

Mrs Kelly was watching the 7 O’clock News.

She said her husband seemed a bit reluctant to watch it.

(RECONSTRUCTION)MRS KELLY: David.  News is on.

Dr Kelly had himself been given about an hour’s notice that the MOD were going ahead with a statement.

(RECONSTRUCTION PICTURES, ARCHIVE OF CHANNEL 4 NEWS REPORT IN RECONSTRUCTION)JON SNOW: “If you thought it was all over, it isn’t now. The Ministry of Defence said the source himself came forward. Tonight have they found the source or is this more spinning of the facts from Number Ten.”

(RECONSTRUCTION) DAVID KELLY: It’s me. At the Hutton Inquiry, the Prime Minister was asked: why the rush to make public the fact that an official had come forward? (RECONSTRUCTION)BLAIR: We thought that it was likely to come out at any particular moment…my concern was to get that information not concealed but, as it were, out there so that no-one could say afterwards: ‘Look, this is something that you people were trying to cover up...’” But the government hadn’t just issued a statement to say someone had come forward.

Behind the scenes, someone was also briefing journalists with further details about Dr Kelly’s background.

These were seized on as clues to his identity by press mole-hunters.

21

For the second day running, the Times was the favoured outlet.

It reported that the official who’d come forward was a former UN weapons inspector, now an adviser for

VOICE OVER… “the Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat at the Ministry of Defence…..”

JOHN WARE PTC“The information about the official’s position within the MoD was still supposed to be confidential.

This MoD briefing note says it was only to be released if – and only if - his name got to be known by the media.

But because the information was so precise it was yet another clue to Dr Kelly’s identity.

So when it appeared in Wednesday morning’s Times, the list of possible candidates was further narrowed. Only a handful of people now fitted all the clues.”

According to Alastair Campbell, he was under strict instructions from the Prime Minister not to name Dr Kelly. However his diary shows he was impatient for the name to get out.

(RECONSTRUCTION)“….We kept pressing on as best we could at the briefings, but the biggest thing needed was the source out..”

Also that Wednesday morning, the Defence Secretary met his press team to authorise a most unusual policy that ended with precisely the result Campbell was hoping for.

Normally government departments strive to protect the identity of middle-ranking civil servants.

(RECONSTRUCTION)HOON “Morning everyone

TEARE: Morning Secretary of State…

MAN: Morning Sir”

The government denies they had a strategy to name Dr Kelly.

But now Mr Hoon sanctioned his press officers to confirm Dr Kelly’s name to journalists if they guessed it right.

(RECONSTRUCTION)Ring ring..

When journalists heard what was being offered by the MoD press office, they started to put up lists of candidates for confirmation.

The barrister to the Kelly family described what followed as playing Russian roulette with his

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identity.

(RECONSTRUCTION)TEARE: No I’m sorry, it’s not him.

A Guardian reporter jokingly offered to read out the entire telephone directory until he got the right name

(RECONSTRUCTION) No.                                                   Another reporter quite literally played twenty questions. Unsuccessfully. But he was not discouraged. On his 21st attempt, he guessed it right.

(RECONSTRUCTION)VOICE:  Is it David Kelly? TEARE: Yes.

Dr Kelly was at home when he received a 46 second call from the MoD informing him that journalists had got his name and that it would be in the papers the next morning.

(RECONSTRUCTION)RUFFORD: “….David, hi how are you…

Nick Rufford from the Sunday Times was the first reporter to get to him.

Rufford, who knew Dr Kelly, said he looked “tired and pale.” He asked him if Gilligan had reported what he’d said to him accurately. (RECONSTRUCTION)KELLY:    "I talked to him about factual stuff. The rest is bullshit." RUFFORD:  "How do you think the MOD have conducted themselves?" KELLY:    "For the record they’ve been pretty good about it. Off the record, I’ve been through the wringer." RUFFORD: "D’you know that your name is going to come out?" KELLY:   "I am a bit shocked.  I was told it would all be confidential.” After Rufford left, the MoD advised Dr Kelly to leave immediately to avoid being followed by more journalists.

Within ten minutes they’d fled.

That night the papers were confident they had the name of the BBC’s source - just as Alastair Campbell had wanted.

The BBC though was still refusing to confirm it.

Boot slams.

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No.10 had briefed that Dr Kelly had been closely involved in the government’s media plans.

Not as closely as he might have been.

Although the MoD had spoken to him seven times that day, not once had they told him they offering to confirm his name to the papers.

Alastair Campbell admitted to the Hutton Inquiry that he did know of the plan for confirming Dr Kelly’s name.

But when he was cross examined, he categorically denied feeding clues to the Times newspaper and its reporter Tom Baldwin… to speed up the process.

(ACTUALITY) “Are you feeling confident Mr Campbell…”

(RECONSTRUCTION)

DINGEMANS I imagine you would deprecate all this briefing off the record after the event beyond the Q and A and the press statement, is that right?

CAMPBELL. Well, there would not be any need for it. The statement had gone out. … DINGEMANS Did you have any knowledge of any information given to Mr Baldwin at this time about Dr Kelly's status or anything?

CAMPBELL No.” (ARCHIVE)ANDREW MARR “Everybody including the Ministry of Defence and Mr Hoon say they wanted to protect his identity and yet at the same time, the government generally was dribbling little facts into the public domain which helped journalists lead to his being identified. And when you ask who really was responsible for that, a strange kind of mistiness descends on the proceedings, no-one can quite remember.”

On the last day of the Inquiry, some of the mist cleared.

No.10 had briefed that the MoD had taken the lead in how Dr Kelly was handled.

In fact, according to the MoD’s top civil servant, the key decisions were taken by the Prime Minister and his staff at No.10.

(RECONSTRUCTION)

TEBBIT: “…a policy decision on the handling of this matter was not taken until the Prime Minister's meeting on the Tuesday… And it was only after that that any of the [MoD] press people had an authoritative basis on which to proceed

GOMPERTZ So are you saying this: that the decisions which led, in fact, to the naming of Dr Kelly were taken at No. 10 Downing Street and not by the Ministry of Defence?

TEBBIT I was not trying to make that point… GOMPERTZ . Whether you were making that point or not, what is the position? That

24

the decision was taken at No. 10 and not by the Ministry of Defence, or by the Ministry of Defence? TEBBIT A decision was taken at a meeting in No. 10 with which the Ministry of Defence concurred.” However, on the most crucial point of all Mr Blair’s precise involvement remains unclear.

Did he authorise the decision to confirm Dr Kelly’s name to journalists?

This question was not put to him directly at the inquiry.

Nor were minutes taken of any of the key meetings at No.10.. (RECONSTRUCTION)

DINGEMANS. Do you know why further details are being given out about the unnamed MoD official? I mean, it is surely likely to lead to his identification.

BLAIR. Well, I mean again I do not know for sure and I do not -- I was actually myself on the Wednesday morning obviously preparing for Prime Minister's Questions. As I say, I had a stack of other things on too. But I think that the view was: we could not give people wrong information or mislead them, on the other hand we had not volunteered the name.” The government had perhaps not “volunteered” Dr Kelly’s name to the press. But his name had not exactly been protected either.  This fine distinction did not seem to impress Mrs Kelly when she gave evidence at the Hutton Inquiry.

She spoke from an adjoining courtroom to give her privacy from the press.

(RECONSTRUCTION)MRS KELLY: He felt totally let down and betrayed… DINGEMANS:  Who did he say that of?

MRS KELLY: He did not say in so many terms but I believed he meant the MoD because they were the ones that had effectively let his name be known in the public domain.” By contrast, the MoD Personnel Director Richard Hatfield told the inquiry their support for Dr Kelly had been “outstanding.”

As did the Secretary of State for Defence.

(RECONSTRUCTION)

GOMPERTZ We have heard from Mr Hatfield that he considered the support provided by the MoD for Dr Kelly was "outstanding". Do you agree with that?

HOON: I certainly think that every reasonable step was taken to ensure that Dr Kelly was properly supported, yes.” 

25

The BBC was still refusing to confirm that Dr Kelly was its source.

No.10 was just as determined to make the BBC do this.

Now No.10 ratcheted up the pressure.

They decided Dr Kelly should appear at two parliamentary committees, where they hoped he would say the BBC had got their story completely wrong.

The Prime Minister’s official spokesman recorded:

VOICE OVER“…This is now a game of chicken with the Beeb – the only way they will shift is if they see the screw tightening.”

But it was a game not without risk for No.10

Dr Kelly had made nearly 40 trips to Iraq as a UN weapons inspector.

Mr Blair had been warned he had “uncomfortable views” about the dossier, not least that he disagreed with the Prime Minister’s foreword which said that intelligence had “established beyond doubt…that Saddam” was producing chemical and biological weapons…

Privately Dr Kelly had been telling journalists it was only 30% likely Saddam was making chemical weapons

(RECONSTRUCTION)KELLY: “David Kelly

WATTS: “Hi David, it’s Susan here…”

KELLY: Hi Susan.

Dr Kelly had confided his reservations about the dossier to Susan Watts, the science editor of BBC Newsnight.

This time, there could be no doubt about what he said.

She’d taped the call to make sure she had an accurate record.

(RECONSTRUCTION)WATTS: But on the 45 minutes?

KELLY : Oh that I knew. Because I knew the concern about the statement. It was a statement that was made and just got out of all proportion. They were desperate for information. They were pushing hard for information that could be released.”

No.10 feared that if Dr Kelly disclosed any doubts about the dossier at the forthcoming parliamentary hearings, there may not be the clear win over the BBC they were seeking.

(RECONSTRUCTION)KELLY“…when they picked up on it, you can’t pull it back, that’s the problem..”

(ARCHIVE)

26

MAN : “Prime Minister, Prime Minister, are any weapons of mass destruction going to be found…”

Once again it was Mr Blair who made the key decisions about what would happen to Dr Kelly. He told his staff the scientist probably had to appear before both parliamentary committees.

An e mail from Mr Blair’s Chief of Staff also reveals the Prime Minister wanted Dr Kelly “to be properly prepared beforehand.”

Mr Blair’s views were passed on to the MoD where officials were told to:

“….strongly recommend that Kelly is not drawn on his assessment of the dossier but stick to what he told Gilligan.” The “preparation” of Dr Kelly took place on the eve of his appearance before the Foreign Affairs Committee.

The notes of this meeting suggest the MoD were worried about what Dr Kelly might say if questioned on “tricky areas” – like his views on the case for the Iraq war; and what he thought about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

At the Hutton Inquiry, Mr Blair was asked – but never pressed – as to why he wanted Dr Kelly to have careful preparation before giving evidence to two parliamentary committees.

(RECONSTRUCTION)DINGEMANS “If we turn to CAB/1/93,at the bottom: ‘Tried PM out on Kelly before the FAC and ISC next Tuesday. He thought he probably had to do both [pause] but need to be properly prepared beforehand.’

BLAIR: Hmm.

DINGEMANS: Were you aware of what steps were going to be taken to assist Dr Kelly with his evidence?

BLAIR: No, but I mean it was, in a sense, again the statement of the obvious, that if he is going to go and do these Committees, he needs proper preparation for them.”

JOHN WARE PTC“The Foreign Affairs Committee needed to be “properly prepared” as well.

This was to be where Downing Street hoped the BBC would be humiliated, its proceedings transmitted live on TV.

The Defence Secretary had agreed with the Committee chairman Donald Anderson terms and conditions for Dr Kelly’s appearance

He was not to be asked by members of the committee about either Iraqi weapons of mass destruction or the dossier. In other words the ‘tricky areas.’ Mr Anderson agreed to toe the line.”

For No.10, this was the day they hoped the BBC would have to broadcast their own source destroying their own story.

27

According to Alastair Campbell’s diary, the MoD had assured No 10 Dr Kelly had been well-schooled.

In the event, No.10’s attempt to guide their missile to their target backfired spectacularly.

During a torrid session on one of the hottest days of the year, the Foreign Affairs Committee concluded – wrongly - that Dr Kelly was not the BBC’s anonymous source after all.

(ARCHIVE)MACKINLAY: I reckon you are chaff; you have been thrown up to divert our probing. Have you ever felt like a fall-guy? You have been set up, have you not?

KELLY: That is not a question I can answer.

MACKINLAY: But you feel that?

KELLY: No, not at all. I accept the process that is going on.

CHAIRMAN: I am sorry. You accept ... ?KELLY: I accept the process that is happening.”

The hearing ended with Dr Kelly’s personal humiliation.

Andrew Gilligan had tipped off an MP on the Committee that Dr Kelly was the anonymous source for Susan Watts of BBC’s Newsnight.

Throughout the row with No. 10, Gilligan had presented himself as a journalist who would always protect his source.

Now, as he desperately sought corroboration for his own story, Gilligan was encouraging the public interrogation of his source.

Gilligan had e-mailed the extracts from Susan Watts’ broadcast to the MP David Chidgey

Chidgey, mistakenly, said he’d got it from Watts herself.

(ARCHIVE)CHIDGEY…Can I just confirm that you’ve also met Susan Watts of BBC Newsnight.

KELLY: I met her on one occasion.

CHIDGEY Thank you. I just like to read out to you a statement of notes that were made:’…The 45 minutes was a statement that was made and got out of all proportion.’ Now I understand from Ms Watts that is a record of the meeting she had with you. Do you still agree with those comments?

KELLY First of all, I do not recognise those comments, I have to say…”

Andrew Gilligan says he regrets putting his source under such pressure. He says he wasn’t thinking straight.

(ARCHIVE)KELLY “I cannot believe on that day I made that statement.”

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As Dr Kelly was driven away, he looked badly shaken.

At his MoD briefing, he’d assured them he had not spoken about the dossier to Susan Watts.

He must have known his employers would soon discover he’d lied to them - and to Parliament, albeit under massive pressure.

Trust was at the heart of Dr Kelly’s professional life.

And his profession had defined his life. Perhaps he feared he’d been shown unworthy of that trust.  At the Hutton inquiry Mrs Kelly described her feelings in their last hours together as the light in him seemed to flicker and fade.

(RECONSTRUCTION)MRS KELLY: By this time I had started with a huge headache and begun to feel sick. In fact I was physically sick several times at this stage because he looked so desperate… We sat together at the table opposite each other. I tried to make conversation. I was feeling pretty wretched, so was he. He looked distracted and dejected.”

DINGEMANS How would you describe him at this time? Oh, I just thought he had a broken heart. He really was very, very -- he had shrunk into himself. I couldn’t comfort him.” 

Dr Kelly’s last telephone conversation was to an MoD colleague.

He had now been asked for a full list of contacts with journalists.

He’d provided twenty six names.

Perhaps he feared a disciplinary investigation because he’d lied.

Exhales.

Shortly after 3 O’Clock, he went for a walk.

We may never know exactly what caused Dr Kelly to lose all hope.

VOICE “The PM has been given a hero’s welcome in Washington…”

This same day the Prime Minister was claiming a place in history.

(ARCHIVE)MAN “Members of the Congress, it is my great privilege and I deem it a high honour and a personal pleasure to present to you the Right Honourable Tony Blair…...”

On this day Mr Blair became the only British Prime Minister to be awarded the American Congressional Gold Medal of Honor apart from Winston Churchill.

(ARCHIVE)BLAIR I’m deeply touched by that warm and generous welcome. It’s more than I

29

deserve and more than I’m use to, quite frankly….

The Prime Minister was convinced as ever of the need for pre-emptive action against terrorism and the rogue states that support it.

(ARCHIVE)BLAIR “If we are wrong we will have destroyed a threat that at its least is responsible for inhuman carnage and suffering. That is something I am confident that history will forgive."

(ARCHIVE: NEWS AT ONE)ANNA FORD Hello and welcome to the BBC’s News at One O’clock. A body has been discovered in remote woodland in Oxfordshire, two miles from the home of senior government adviser Dr David Kelly…” 

In his despair, Dr Kelly appears to have taken his own life. He’d been caught in the crossfire between the government and the BBC.

Dr Kelly had been a distinguished public servant who’d always made time to explain the complexities of biological warfare to journalists, while never seeking the limelight for himself.

Only now did the BBC acknowledge that he had been Andrew Gilligan’s source.

Fade to black

When news broke of Dr Kelly’s death, the Prime Minister was airborne from Washington to the far east.

He arrived in Tokyo, the adulation of America, a distant echo. The hero hunted.

(ACTUALITY)MAN Have you got blood on your hands Prime Minister. Are you going to resign over this?

Pause…

Mr Blair ignored the question. But he knew it was one he was going to have to answer.

On the way home, the travelling press pack asked him: did he authorise the release of Dr Kelly’s name.

Angrily jabbing his finger, according to the Downing Street record, Mr Blair replied:

VOICE OVER“…emphatically not. I did not authorise the leaking of the name of David Kelly…. I believe we have acted properly throughout.”

These assurances were faithfully echoed by the Defence Secretary.

(ARCHIVE: HOON ON N24)“I'm not aware that his name was leaked. It was certainly not leaked by me, and I assure you we made great efforts to ensure Dr Kelly's anonymity."

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A few days after Dr Kelly’s death, Mr Hoon paid a private visit to his widow at her request.

For him and Mr Blair, to convince the public their word can be trusted, Lord Hutton will have to find their protestations are more than just word play.

Lord Hutton’s inquiry was announced on the day Dr Kelly’s body was found.

Within a fortnight its proceedings opened at the Royal Courts of Justice.

(ARCHIVE)LORD HUTTON “This Inquiry relates to a very tragic death. Therefore, ladies and gentlemen, I think it would be fitting if we stood for a minute's silence in memory of Dr Kelly.”

So what have we learned from the evidence to Lord Hutton about the Iraq dossier’s claim that Saddam could launch weapons of mass destruction in 45 minutes?

And what about Andrew Gilligan’s reports that the dossier was sexed up – and the suggestion that the government probably knew some of it was wrong?

(RECONSTRUCTION)GILLIGAN: What, you know Campbell made it up? They made it up?

GILLGIAN : No it was real information but it was unreliable and it was in the dossier against our wishes.

GILLIGAN: To make it sexier?

KELLY: Yes. To maker it sexier.

No.10 may recommendations changes to those drafting the dossier.

But the evidence to Lord Hutton suggests that Gilligan was wrong to say that anyone in No.10 – including Alastair Campbell – ordered the intelligence services to put anything into the dossier, far less anything they knew to be questionable or wrong.

Nor was evidence produced that Dr Kelly was even in a position to know directly what had been going on inside Downing Street.

Yet Gilligan was on to something.

Shortly after Gilligan’s broadcast, the Prime Minister had made this categorical denial to Parliament.

(ARCHIVE)BLAIR ".. the claim about 45 minutes provoked disquiet amongst the intelligence community, who disagreed with its inclusion in the dossier –again… that allegation is also completely and totally untrue. And I suggest instead of one anonymous source, or many anonymous sources,, if these people have any evidence, they actually produce it."

Evidence of disquiet about the dossier has now been produced.

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So: did the prime minister mislead parliament?

As we learned over the weeks of the Hutton Inquiry, there was disquiet - not about the inclusion of key claims – but how reliable was the intelligence on which they were based, and therefore how strongly No.10 could assert Saddam was a threat.

The branch of the intelligence services that was unhappy had a crucial role in checking the accuracy of the wording.

Its head Dr Brian Jones and his chemical weapons expert both put their concerns formally on the record.

(RECONSTRUCTION)JONES “….our concern was that what we were hearing was second-hand information….”

[Flash] JONES “..the whole dossier was unusual…”

[Flash]

JONES “a tendency in certain areas, from his point of view, to shall we say “over egg” certain assessments”

[Flash]

JONES “Some of my staff said they were unhappy…

BRAITHWAITE (SYNC)“For somebody to write a formal minute saying he is unhappy with that process means that something abnormal is going on and you can't just dismiss it… I can think of a few examples from the past.  Of course it's something that superiors and politicians don’t like, but you don’t do it lightly if you're an official.” On the very day Dr Kelly’s body was found, the Defence Secretary was preparing to give “potentially misleading” evidence to a parliamentary committee.

It was investigating disquiet within the intelligence services over the dossier.

But Mr Hoon withheld the names of Dr Jones and his chemical weapons expert - and their written complaints.

Perhaps an admission that the BBC had got anything right might have cost too much loss of face

Mr Hoon, however, told Lord Hutton the matter was of little significance.

(RECONSTRUCTION)DINGEMANS Were you aware of any unhappiness expressed by members of the DIS with the dossier, either before or after publication? HOON: Not at the time, not before publication. Very much later, preparation for evidence that I gave to the ISC, I was aware that two officials had expressed some concern about certain language used in the dossier. I think it is important that I

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emphasise that this was of a linguistic kind. The debate was whether particular intelligence "indicated" or "suggested" or "showed"  a particular conclusion. So it was a very technical discussion….” Through the Hutton Inquiry, we learned what a difference a “technical” discussion could make to the way the threat from Saddam was presented.

As the dossier was about to go the printers the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff found a passage which he said was “a bit of a problem:”  VOICE OVER“Saddam is prepared to use chemical and biological weapons if he believes his regime is under threat.” To Jonathan Powell, this suggested Saddam was only a threat if he was attacked.

He asked the Joint Intelligence Committee to re-write it. The offending words were replaced.

VOICE OVER“Saddam is willing to use chemical and biological weapons……..”

Now the published dossier suggested Saddam might use his weapons of mass destruction against us – even if we did not attack him first.  The Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee told Lord Hutton the change in wording was supported by the intelligence.

And it is true John Scarlett did not agree to every request from No.10.

However the dossier was presented as an objective assessment of the threat.

Yet it did not have all the careful qualifications that intelligence assessments usually come with.   To some, not just John Scarlett, but every member of the JIC is as responsible for any sexing up as No.10.

BRAITHWAITE (SYNC)“….. I don’t think it was the finest moment in the JIC's history certainly…” BRAITHWAITE (SYNC)“….if your job is simply to analyse things, boring job basically, not very sexy, you have to avoid getting into the magic circle which always surrounds any Prime Minister, not only this one, a Prime Minister has to be surrounded by people who support him personally because it's a very tough and wearing job, who believe in what he's tried to do, who advocate what he's tried to do and very often will stick at nothing to ensure that what he's trying to do actually happens.  That's all legitimate.  But if you're part of an analytical process you have to keep outside that. It’s very difficult to do that and from time to time it fails. You get people who should be dispassionate being passionately involved in things..”  JOHN WARE: So are you saying then that the JIC unwittingly became a tool of Downing Street in presenting, or trying to rally a sceptical British public to the

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case for war? BRAITHWAITE: I think that's what it looks like.. .” What the evidence to the Inquiry suggests – contrary to what some BBC reports implied -- is that No.10 did not override the decisions of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

Instead, by signing up to the dossier, all the chiefs of the intelligence services acquiesced in the Prime Minister’s certainty.

And that is the real problem. Seldom is intelligence certain.

BRAITHWAITE (SYNC)“…intelligence never gives you the final answer, you never get a killer fact … you can never base everything on intelligence because there's never enough intelligence and it's never sufficiently unequivocal. You always have to put in judgement.”

Until the Hutton Inquiry this was the only photograph of John Scarlett.

Then head of MI 6 in Moscow, he’d just been asked to leave in a spying row.

Now summoned from the shadows by Lord Hutton, Scarlett made several admissions which underlined just how speculative some of the intelligence was.

The claim that Saddam could launch weapons of mass destruction in 45 minutes may have made a great headline.

But questioned by the BBC barrister, we learned there wasn’t much more to it than that.

(RECONSTRUCTION)CALDECOTT: There was no new intelligence at all after 9th September which related to the 45 minutes claim, was there? SCARLETT: There was not… [MIX]  CALDECOTT : You did not know what munitions the Iraqi officer was specifically referring to, did you? SCARLETT : No, that is right. [MIX] CALDECOTT: You did not know from where or to where the munitions might be moved within 45 minutes? SCARLETT: That is right. The chief of MI 6 himself also admitted the dossier should never have suggested Saddam could launch chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes against British bases in Cyprus.

(RECONSTRUCTION)HUTTON: I hope you can hear me clearly ... DEARLOVE: Yes I can my Lord..”

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 ‘C’ – as he’s known – gave evidence by audio link and never showed his face -- retaining some of the famed mystique of British Intelligence.  (RECONSTRUCTION)DINGEMANS: Can you tell his Lordship your full name? DEARLOVE: Richard Billing Dearlove. I am the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service popularly known as MI6. (RECONSTRUCTION)DINGEMANS: Did you consider that the 45 minutes – and they say "claim" -- was given undue prominence? DEARLOVE: l, I think given the misinterpretation that was placed on the 45 minutes intelligence, with the benefit of hindsight you can say that is a valid criticism. But I am confident that the intelligence was accurate and that the use made of it was entirely consistent with the original report.

LORD HUTTON: Would you just elaborate what you mean by the misinterpretation placed on the 45 minutes claim, Sir Richard?

DEARLOVE (Pause). Well, I think the original report referred to chemical and biological munitions and that was taken to refer to battlefield weapons. I think what subsequently happened in the reporting was that it was taken that the 45 minutes applied, let us say, to weapons of a longer range.” The Prime Minister was never asked if he knew the MI 6 intelligence was assessed as referring only to short range weapons like mortars and artillery shells which could never have hit British bases.

However, the Defence Secretary did know.

Yet Mr Hoon did not correct the false impression that the dossier had given to the newspapers - even though the whole point of it was to better inform the public about Iraq. (RECONSTRUCTION)

CALDECOTT. Why was no corrective statement issued for the benefit of the public in relation to those media reports?

HOON. I do not know.

CALDECOTT. It must have been considered by someone, must it not?

HOON. I have spent many years trying to persuade newspapers and journalists to correct their stories. I have to say it is an extraordinarily time consuming and generally frustrating process...

CALDECOTT. Do you accept that on this topic at least you had an absolute duty to try to correct it?

HOON. No, I do not.

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CALDECOTT. Can I suggest to you a reason why this was not done? It would have been politically highly embarrassing because it would have revealed the dossier as published was at least highly capable of being misleading.

HOON. Well, I do not accept that.”

(RECONSTRUCTION PCITURES, ARCHIVE SOUND)“…It’s six O’ clock on Thursday 29th May Good morning. This is Today with John Humphrys and Edward Stourton….” Unlike the government, the BBC has admitted it made some mistakes.

Andrew Gilligan should not have reported Dr Kelly as saying some words he never said.

And the Director General Greg Dyke says he wishes the BBC had investigated Alastair Campbell’s letter of complaint more thoroughly before replying to him.  (RECONSTRUCTION)

DYKE: “I would like to think that when I look back I would have said: let us stop. Let us just say we are not going to reply to this letter and let us go away and ask the Programme Complaints Unit to do a full investigation of this whole issue.

HUTTON: Yes.

DYKE: However, as I say, that is what I would like -- hindsight is a wonderful thing. HUTTON: Quite.

Regrets – but not, perhaps, that many.

The BBC still insists it got its story largely right – despite some flawed reporting.

Likewise, No 10 does not accept that it misled the public over the threat posed by Iraq.

Both sides are staking out their positions ahead of the only verdict that matters, Lord Hutton’s.

Precisely what effect the fight between the BBC and the government had on Dr Kelly’s mind may forever remain a mystery.

Another casualty was truth – and perhaps the public’s trust in two institutions which make a such virtue of telling it.

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