of bealoty organisational conflict as social drama … · "the social destruction of bealoty...

"THE SOCIAL DESTRUCTION OF BEALOTYORGANISATIONAL CONFLICT AS

SOCIAL DRAMA"

by

Martin KILDUFF*and

Mitchel ABOLAFIA**N° 89 /24

Assistant Professor of Organisational Behaviour, INSEAD,Boulevard de Constance, 77305 Fontainebleau, France

* * Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University,Ithaca, NY 14853

Director of Publication:

Charles WYPLOSZ, Associate Deanfor Research and Development

Printed at INSEAD,Fontainebleau, France

The Social Destruction of Reality:

Organizational Conflict as Social Drama

MARTIN KILDUFF

European Institute of Business Administration (INSEAD)

Boulevard de Constance

77305 Fontainebleau, France

Tel: (331) 60 72 40 00

MITCHEL Y. ABOLAFIA

Johnson Graduate School of Management

Cornell University

Ithaca, NY 14853

Tel: (607) 255-4627

Social Drama 2

The Social Destruction of Reality:

Organizational Conflict as Social Drama

Rival coalitions have incentives to try to overturn accepted

organizational orthodoxies by proffering alternative constructions of

reality. According to the social drama approach, the interpretation

of conflict events can be framed by the protagonists within four

distinct genres: comedy, tragedy, melodrama, and irony. A social

drama is initiated by a breach of norms, and is concluded by

ceremonies of separation or integration. During the social drama,

coalitions compete to impose their preferred stories on events.

Social Drama 3

There has been a constant attempt to tear down management,to disparage everything the company has tried todo....Today, this isn't a strike, it's a battle of good vs.evil. Frank Lorenzo, CEO, Eastern Air Lines. ("Labor's,"1989, p. 21)

Lorenzo's battle with the machinists, said Bryan, was "thepurest case of evil vs. good." Charles Bryan, leader ofthe striking Machinists union. ("Eastern," 1989, p.46)

People construct the worlds in which they live, building on

previous fabrications offered by their cultures, organizations,

families, and experiences. The concept of the social construction of

reality has become increasingly important to both the theoreticians of

social science (e.g., Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Giddens, 1984), and the

methodologists (e.g., Fiske & Shweder, 1986). Within organizational

theory, both the institutional school (see Scott, 1987, for a revie)

and the enactment perspective (Weick, 1979) have taken social

constructionism as a starting point from which to analyze phenomena as

diverse as utility regulation (Ritti & Silver, 1986) and the enactment

of speculative bubbles (Abolafia & Kilduff, 1988).

From the institutional and enactment perspectives, organizations

embody sets of taken-for-granted assumptions that are transmitted from

generation to generation of role occupants (cf. Zucker, 1977; Weick &

Gilfillan, 1971). Left unstudied, however, has been the social

destruction of reality, the process by which one group deliberately

and systematically seeks to undermine the legitimacy of another

group's taken-for-granted assumptions. Concrete social privileges

accrue to groups that succeed in impressing their definitions of

Social Drama 4

reality upon society (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 118). For this very

reason, rival coalitions are likely to try to overturn accepted

orthodoxies by proffering alternative realities. It is this process

of interpretive conflict that the present paper analyzes as social

drama, defined as the framing and enactment of conflict events in

terms of familiar story prototypes.

In the case of the battle between the unions and management of

Eastern Air Lines in 1989, the quotations at the beginning of the

article illustrate how each side tried to paint the other as the

embodiment of evil in an on-going melodrama. A consultant had earlier

advised the union to caricature Eastern's CEO as the "pillager of the

American Dream" with union members filling the roles of "fathers and

mothers, people just like you and your neighbors" ("Labor's," 1989, p.

20).

According to the social drama approach, the interpretation of

conflict events, such as the Eastern strike, can be framed by the

protagonists within genres of drama such as melodrama, tragedy,

comedy, and irony (see Table 1). These broad generic classifications

have been used by literary theorists (e.g., Frye, 1957), historical

scholars (e.g., White, 1973), and social scientists (e.g., Kilduff,

1986; Wagner-Pacifici, 1986) to encompass a range of possible story-

types that are readily available to consumers of folk-tales,

literature, television dramas, plays, and movies. People's stories

about on-going conflicts tend to be variations of the generic

prototypes with which they are familiar. The use of such prototypical

Social Drama 5

stories as the fall of the hero, or the crusade against evil, to

interpret and guide action may serve important individual and

organizational interests. As Hirsch (1986) has suggested, the

grounding of conflicts in genres of drama: a) reduces the unnerving to

the familiar; b) provides participants with clearly delineated roles;

c) ritualizes and contains violent emotions; and d) facilitates the

evaluation of heroes and villains.

Insert Table 1 about here

Comedy, as a generic frame, involves a challenge to the old guard

by the unconventional ideas of the young hero, who goes on to build a

new society (Frye, 1957, p. 157). (This definition, like that of the

other genres, derives from literary critical theory, and differs from

popular usage.) Entrepreneurs, seeking to legitimate radical

proposals that violate taken-for-granted business truths, often have

recourse to a comedic frame, portraying themselves as renegades who

will shake up the industry and rebuild it in their own image. This

frame is also popular with corporate raiders who promise vigorous new

leadership in place of the moribund policies of the target managements

they seek to replace.

The melodramatic frame involves a polarization of the

protagonists into those on the side of good and those on the side of

evil. Crusading social organizations, such as the Temperance

movement, often frame their struggle as a holy war against corruption

Social Drama 6

and vice. By framing events within this genre, the protagonist

anticipates a series of adventures ending in one climactic battle in

which the opposition will be defeated (Frye, 1957, p. 189). For

example, the strikers against Eastern Air Lines portrayed themselves

as engaged in one of a series of battles against the evil forces that

were trying to destroy the labor movement ("Suicide," 1989, p. 18).

In contrast to the melodramatic frame, which can be used to deny

the humanity of one's adversaries, the use of a tragic frame is an

explicit recognition of the human fraility of the protagonist. The

tragic frame focuses on the tragic hero, who is pitched from the top

of the wheel of fortune into danger and humiliation (Frye, 1957, p.

207). This frame places much of the blame for the predicament of the

hero on fate rather than on personal responsibility, and is therefore

popular with embattled managements facing impending disaster. For

example, Lee Iacocca's campaign for federal loan guarantees to save

Chrysler Corporation emphasized that the company had been "driven into

the ground" by the "relentless lash of more and more government

regulation" (Iacocca, 1985, p. 205). This tragic framing, focusing on

the fateful and unanticipated effects of government regulation, was

effective in eliciting sympathy for the plight of a huge company

facing bankruptcy.

The ironic frame is used to discredit one's enemies, who may have

tried to impose comedic or melodramatic frames on their actions. In

irony, heroes are exposed as fools and knaves (Frye, 1957, p. 223).

By interpreting apparently heroic actions as part of a scam to fleece

Social Drama 7

a gullible public, the romantic facade that has hidden corruption or

incompetence from view can be stripped away.

Insert Figure 1 about here

These genres of social drama describe a range of possible themes

that protagonists can discover and impose on events. But how is social

drama initiated, how does it develop, and in what ways is it

concluded? In order to identify a conflict as a social drama. and as

a way of separating the floe of events into conceptual categories for

the purpose of analysis, a four phase model has been developed (see

Figure 1). All genres of social drama can be modelled in terms of the

following four phases: 1) a public breach of crucial social norms

leading to 2) mounting crisis, and 3) attempts at redressive action

that culminate in 4) ceremonies of reconciliation or separation

(Turner, 1974). In the complex and high speed world of modern

organizations, the crisis and redressive action phases may overlap, or

the process may cycle backwards as attempts at redressive action

repeatedly fail. Temporary reconciliations between the protagonists

may fracture into renewed enmity. Social dramas rarely run smoothly

in the sense of neatly following a particular linear sequence (Turner,

1980, p. 152).

From the perspective adopted in this paper, the breach of social

norms that initiates social drama is a socially constructed reality

rather than an objective fact. There is always enough ambiguity about

Social Drama 8

social interaction to allow any particular action to be labelled

acceptable or unacceptable. The declaration by a group that crucial

norms have been breached may be a tactical ploy in a strategic game

rather than simply a spontaneous outburst of indignation. For

example, the management of Walt Disney Productions considered framing

the 1984 hostile takeover bid by raider Saul Steinberg in melodramatic

terms as the attempted rape and pillage of a beloved American

institution by a "corporate visigoth" (Taylor, 1987, p. 79). This

response would have helped foment a crusade for the hearts and minds

of all the Americans who cherished Disney as the personification of

the American spirit. The Disney management decided that such a

crusade would not influence the institutions which held the majority

of Disney shares (Taylor, 1987, pp. 122-123). To prevent the hostile

takeover, they felt compelled to pay Steinberg's company $31.7 million

as a "greenmail" premium for his shares.

Unfortunately for the Disney management, the Wall Street

community of speculators, investors, and raiders had become convinced

by Steinberg's framing of the Disney social drama as a comedic

challenge with himself as a possible hero. Steinberg promised to

revitalize the performance of what Wall Street insiders considered to

be poorly-managed assets. Steinberg argued that the unacceptable

breach of norms was not his hostile takeover bid, but the decision by

Disney management to dilute the value of existing Disney shares by

issuing new stock to hastily acquire a property development company

and a greetings card company. Ironically, Disney's attempt to defend

Social Drama 9

itself from possible takeover by reducing the percentage of shares

owned by Steinberg's company, gave Steinberg the perfect excuse to

finally launch the takeover bid. He claimed that he "had to move"

because Disney management would keep on diluting the values of shares

held by existing shareholders "forever and ever" (Taylor, 1987, p.

114). Steinberg's version of the social drama has been widely

accepted by management gurus, who portray him as "an outstanding

example of the useful role raiders play in identifying underperforming

companies and forcing changes which improve their performance"

(Taylor, 1987, p. 246).

As the Disney takeover example shows, social drama is generally

initiated by attempts at revolutionary rather than incremental change.

The challenge to the established order is public rather than private,

and is waged with rhetoric, symbols, and spectacle, as well as with

more tangible resources. For example, the strike at Eastern Air Lines

has been described as a case where "symbolism was far more important

than economics for all parties concerned" ("Suicide," 1989, p. 18).

According to the four phase model, organizations can be thrown

into crisis following attacks on their taken-for-granted assumptions.

Coalitions of competing interests may be exposed as the threatened

leadership seeks for redressive actions to limit the spread of the

crisis. At the level of symbolic action, these redressive actions can

include reiterated appeals for support of values central to the

audience of consumers, shareholders, citizens, employees, suppliers,

and other stakeholders. Thus, in pressing for legislative action to

Social Drama 10

prevent the transfer of management control, a target of a hostile

takeover may invoke the dangers the raider presents to the long-term

welfare of the community and the employees. In one case the embattled

management succeeded in obtaining a court order which annulled the

raiders' voting rights on the grounds that their activities were

"socially unacceptable" (Vagstyl, 1988). Similarly, a government

may react to a terrorist challenge with urgent calls for the defense

of democracy (cf. Wagner-Pacifici, 1986). Finally, in the last act of

social drama, ceremonies of reconciliation or separation are enacted

and the villains and heroes decisively labelled.

Within any of the stages of social drama, any one of the generic

frames can be invoked by the protagonists (see Figure 1). Indeed,

much of the interpretive conflict involves the battle by different

disputants to impose different frames on events. Protagonists may try

to stage actions in accordance with their preferred interpretive

frame. As the one-way arrow in Figure 1 suggests, generic frames can

help direct action. Facing unexpected developments, protagonists may

also shift from one generic frame to another, in an attempt to find a

story that better fits the data. The ease with which protagonists can

switch frames may well depend on the intensity and duration of the

previous role play, as Mills (1963, p. 445) has suggested: "The long

acting out of a role, with its appropriate motives, will often induce

a man to become what at first he merely sought to appear."

Unlike staged performance, social drama is an ad-hoc affair, in

which the different actors may be trying to enact different scripts

Social Drama 11

for the benefit of quite different audiences. The simultaneous framing

of events in terms of different genres by conflicting coalitions gives

social drama much of its chaotic and sensational character. Clearly,

initiators of social drama will tend to characterize themselves as

challengers (comedy) or crusaders (melodrama), whereas those under

attack are likely to have recourse to all four dramatic frames,

including blaming fate for their predicaments (tragedy), and trying to

discredit myths proffered by the other side (irony).

This paper draws together many diverse strands of scholarly

activity from psychology, anthropology, sociology, and literary theory

to forge the social drama approach to organizational analysis. The

aim is to stimulate theoretical discussion and empirical research.

The remainder of the paper is organized into five sections. First, we

discuss the relationship of the social drama approach to other

perspectives on conflict. Second, we review the basic psychological

assumptions of the social drama approach. Third, we outline how the

approach can be used to analyze organizational behavior. Fourth, we

present an agenda of empirical research that could elaborate many of

the ideas presented here. Finally, we discuss the policy implications

of the social drama approach.

Social Drama and Other Approaches to Conflict

From a social drama perspective, the destruction of old norms in

a society undergoing rapid change is only one element in the

generation of social conflict (see Gurr, 1968, for an alternative

view). As resource mobilization theory has suggested, organizational

Social Drama 12

conflict grows out of the struggle for power among well-defined groups

(Tilly, Tilly, & Tilly, 1975, p. 7). There is always enough

discontent in any society or organization to sustain an effectively

organized movement supported by some members of an established elite

(McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Social movement organizations, such as the

Temperance movement, develop because they successfully garner

resources within the political system (Gusfield, 1963).

Social drama analysis involves the study of both pageantry and

underlying power distributions. The emphasis is on the imaginative

energies of organizational coalitions, their semiotic capacity to

enact ceremonies that legitimate their interpretations of events in

conflict situations. This emphasis stands in sharp contrast to much

of the current literature in interorganizational relations, for

example, which has been accused of virtually ignoring conflict in

favor of analyses of routine failures of cooperation (DiStefano,

1984).

The social drama approach includes impression management as one

aspect of the stage management of interpretive conflict (Wagner-

Pacifici, 1986). But the social drama approach extends the

dramaturgical metaphor beyond the routine games of strategic

interaction described so insightfully by Goffman (1959). If dramaturgy

is concerned with the enactment of everyday routines, social drama is

concerned with the breaking of routine and the ensuing consequences.

Social drama begins when routines are breached, and escalates through

the opportunistic use of narrative framing and theatrical gesture.

Social Drama 13

The battle is to control the interpretation of events and to

legitimate social constructions that have been rudely challenged.

Thus a social drama analysis can deal with spectacular disruptions of

routine such as the 1981 strike by the Professional Air Traffic

Controllers that quickly escalated from a labor dispute to a symbolic

battle between an elected presidency and union power (Shostak &

Skocik, 1986).

The social drama perspective is similar to political economy

approaches to organizational analysis (e.g., Benson, 1975; Zeitz,

1980) in making the assumption that structural change is a "ubiquitous

and constituent element of social structure" (Dahrendorf, 1959, p.

132), and in its focus on the struggle for domination and power.

Social drama is different from political economy approaches in its

emphasis on the symbolism of action, its preoccupation with spectacle,

and its inclusion of conflicts triggered by attacks from outside the

interorganizational network, from, for example, a corporate raider or

a terrorist group.

In summary, the social drama approach differs in three important

ways from other possible perspectives on organizational conflict.

First, the social drama approach focuses on how mutually opposed

coalitions attack each other's legitimacy, rather than on how

cooperative partners remedy problems of coordination. Second, social

drama shifts attention from the objective nature of conflict events to

how those events are interpreted, and how such interpretations

constrain subsequent enactments. Third, social drama offers a

Social Drama 14

narrative theory of conflict processes derived from cultural

anthropology, cognitive psychology, and literary theory, that can

enrich game theoretic or other normative models of decision making in

conflict situations. Social drama is concerned with how imaginative

energies are expended to impose meaning on ambiguous events, rather

than with how individuals choose among an array of yell-defined

options.

Psychological Assumptions of a Social Drama Analysis

Social drama analysis proceeds on the basis of one overriding

assumption: that individuals seek to stage-manage events and to

interpret actions in terms of familiar story structures. Reality

construction, from this perspective, involves drawing upon the store

of socially shared dramatic archetypes to simplify and explain complex

and ambiguous evidence in the service of strategic goals.

Psychoanalytic theory has long maintained that individuals

unconsciously replicate such archetypal stories as the Oedipus myth

(Freud, 1922). The social drama claim goes a step further in

suggesting that individuals can be aware of a connection between the

enactment and its narrative parallel.

There is some evidence from social drama research to support the

connection between narrative structure and the actions of

protagonists. For example, an analysis of the events following the

kidnapping of Aldo Moro, the Italian statesman, by the Red Brigades

terrorist organization, concluded: "That the Moro affair protagonists

were conscious of and working with the dramatic progress of the event

Social Drama 15

is patently clear" (Wagner-Pacifici, 1986, p. 232). Similarly, the

conflict between Henry II, King of England, and Thomas Becket, head of

the English church, has been analyzed as a recreation of Christ's

Passion stage-managed by Becket, with Becket himself in the starring

role of martyr (Turner, 1974).

The interdependent relationship between social drama and

narrative forms is not restricted to political action, however. As

cognitive psychologist Jerome Bruner (1986, p. 42) has recently

stated: "Businessmen and bankers today (like men of affairs of all

ages) guide their decisions by...stories...These narratives, once

acted out, 'make' events and 'make' history." According to the social

drama perspective, people faced with threats to their social

constructions, draw upon a large repertoire of remembered stories in

order to frame events. As Sarbin (1984, p. 32) has commented:

"Dramatistic scripts are patterned after half-remembered folktales,

myths, legends, and other stories. Not taught and learned in any

systematic way, the plots of these stories are absorbed as part of

one's enculturation."

There is considerable research evidence in cognitive psychology

showing that people can acquire story structures through experience

with listening to or reading stories (see Mandler, 1987, for a

review). These story structures are powerful cognitive frames: people

tend to recall irregularly arranged stories in "canonical form rather

than in the form in which they were presented" (Handler, 1987, p. 2).

In other words, if a story is missing part of the structure that makes

Social Drama 16

for "storyness," people will tend to remember the story as containing

the missing part. Similarly, people will simplify complex testimony

by weaving a story to explain the extended sequence of events (Read,

1987). Such stories facilitate attributions and judgments concerning

blame in conflict situations (Pennington & Hastie, 1986). In summary,

the research from cognitive psychology indicates that people do have

story models in their heads and will impose these models on incomplete

and ambiguous data, much as the social drama approach suggests. The

question remains: are people aware of using story models to guide

attributions and behavior?

Field research in anthropology has shown that people self-

consciously use tribal myths as guides to behavior (see the discussion

in Wilkins, 1983, p. 83). Similarly, in organizations stories are

often created by management for the explicit purpose of controlling

the behavior of employees. For example, at Hewlett-Packhard "stories

emphasize and legitimate the management philosophy" (Wilkins, 1983,

pp. 81-82). The same stories are used by many different

organizations, however, with each organization claiming its version

to be unique (Martin, Feldman, Hatch, & Sitkin, 1983). This false

uniqueness phenomenon is compatible with the idea of a common origin

for such stories in a myth central to the culture at large. Indeed, a

study of one organization shoved that a sense-making myth was

consciously adopted by the staff from a traditional fairy tale to

simplify a confusing interorganizational :onflict and to justify

action against the organization's leader ;Smith & Simmons, 1983). The

Social Drama 17

finding that participants in social dramas such as hostile takeovers

deliberately borrow myths and dramatic laiguage from the surrounding

culture of books, movies, legends, and viieo games has also been

extensively documented by Hirsch (1986; Hirsch 6, Andrews, 1983).

In summary, there is evidence that pzople impose story structures

on ambiguous and complex data; that they ;elf-consciously use stories

to guide their own and other people's behavior; and that they adopt

well-known cultural stories to make sense of and faciltiate action in

situations such as hostile takeovers in vlich the framework of taken-

for-granted assumptions is under attack.

Social Drama and Organizational Behavior

In the modern world, in which resour:es, power, status, and

privilege increasingly adhere to individuals primarily as members of

organizations, battles over the legitimac y of social constructions

often take the form of conflicts between )rganizations. For example,

the fight by rural American Protestants t) prevent their way of life

from being undermined by the arrival of nmi immigrant groups was

transformed into a conflict between organizations for and against

prohibition (Gusfield, 1963). Even in a zontext supposedly free of

organizational influences, such as the futures markets, an analysis of

crisis revealed that coalitions of organizations cooperated to change

the sacrosanct principles of free trade ii order to protect the

interests of member firms against the innovative practices of

outsiders (Abolafia Ed Kilduff, 1988).

Social Drama 18

In organizational societies, social iramas are enacted on public

stages such as those provided by the court room, the mass media, and

the stock market. The drama is sustained through support from an off-

stage cast of lawyers, bankers, and publi: officials. The public

struggles between organizations form themselves into narrative texts

that can be analyzed like literary texts (cf. Ricoeur, 1971). The four

phase model developed by Turner (1974) ccicentrates research attention

on such specific aspects of social texts as the breach of norms, the

crisis, the redressive action, and the re2onciliation or separation.

Cutting across these categories are the gmeric frames that guide the

rhetorical and symbolical strategies that organizational protagonists

use to appeal to the audience of consumers, investors, electors, and

other important publics, both institutional and individual.

Social drama between organizations is often enacted as a public

spectacle that captures the attention of a whole society. The events

surrounding the kidnapping and subsequent murder of the Italian

statesman Aldo Moro are an example of how sustained stagecraft

throughout all phases of the drama transf3rmed a personal tragedy into

a melodramatic triumph of democracy (Wagner-Pacifici, 1986). The

leaders of organizations at the center of Italian politics used their

political dominance to frame the events diring each phase of the drama

in terms of one genre rather than another, thus confirming the

observation that, "He who has the bigger stick has the better chance

of imposing his definitions of reality" (3erger & Luckmann, 1967, p.

108).

Social Drama 19

The Moro social drama, like most organizational social dramas,

involved a struggle to define the nature 3f reality through symbolic

resources, such as rhetoric and ceremony, and material resources, such

as wealth. The protagonists offered polarized perceptions to the

Italian people through the electronic and print media, with each side

in the drama defining the other as the em,odiment of evil (cf.

Gusfield, 1963, chapter 4). The melodramatic framing of events led

the political parties and their terrorist opponents into a villain-

victim rendition of events that precluded negotiation or compromise.

Whereas a national crisis of the dimensions of the Moro affair is

a form of political social drama, the hostile takeover is a form of

corporate social drama. A recent sociological account of the

inception, popularization, and eventual r3utinization of the hostile

takeover focused on the surprisingly dramatic language used by

participants and observers of this conteff,orary social invention. The

members of organizations involved in hostile takovers used such

dramatic scenarios as the Wild West, medieval chivalry, and Star Wars

to frame their social constructions of events (Hirsch, 1986).

The public fascination with the spectacle of corporate giants

fighting with each other became intensified as the status of the

corporations increased, and as the corporations became relatively

closely matched in terms of status (cf. Geertz, 1973, p. 441). Like

the cockfight in Bali, the hostile takeover became a form of deep

play, an arena in which such fundamental zoncerns as esteem, honor,

dignity, and respect were enacted (cf. Geartz, 1973, p. 433). Chief

Social Drama 20

executives found their status threatened end the continued existence

of their firms in peril. As the earlier example of Saul Steinberg's

bid for Disney suggested, hostile takeovers can involve a war of the

genres, with raiders typically casting themselves as comedic heroes

challenging the incompetent old-guard, while the incumbent management

portray themselves as melodramatic defenders of virtue and taken-for-

granted values.

The examples of organized terrorism and hostile takeovers have

shown that interorganizational social drana involves people as members

of organizations battling to control the interpretations placed on

events. These interpretations are framed in dramatic language that

justifies the polarization of perceptions of the protagonists. The

repetition of a particular kind of social drama (such as the hostile

takeover) can lead to a routinization of :onflict, however, as

societal norms shift to accept what had been considered outrageous

breaches of expected behavior. Interorgalizational social drama,

then, involves new and unexpected attacks by one organization on the

taken-for-granted assumptions of another 3rganization.

Social dramas are not an exclusively interorganizational

phenomeneon, however. Within organizations, coalitions also fight to

control the social engineering of privilege and the distribution of

prestige. Social drama research can be used to analyze the critical

incidents that shape an organization's deielopment over time (e.g.,

Pettigrew, 1979), and can also illuminate the complex dynamics of

Social Drama 21

publicly staged conflict in organizations (e.g., Kunda, forthcoming;

Rosen, 1988).

The life course of an organization is fractured by break-points

such as leader succession, technological 1iscontinuity, and structural

transformation (Morgan, 1988; Tushman & Rlmanelli, 1985). At these

break points, the taken-for-granted assum ptions normally transmitted

from generation to generation are often disrupted. Coalitions compete

to implement alternative social constructions favorable to their own

preferred outcomes. Social drama errupts as old fiefdoms are

challenged by radical innovations. At one company, university trained

programmers in casual clothes worked irregular hours to implement a

revolutionary new inventory control technDlogy. Their arrival in the

organization breached so many existing norms that

"many...employees...never got over the ex,erience" (Pettigrew, 1973,

p. 85).

As a result of the breaches of norms, the organization was thrown

into crisis, during which old conflicts between groups were reignited,

and new ones generated. Each side in the dispute developed

explanations justifying its own intransigence in the on-going struggle

and derogating the opposing combatants. 'or example, the inventory

control staff refused to accept data produced by these "long-haired

highly paid yobos" (Pettigrew, 1973, p. 87). The programmers, for

their part, referred to the stock controllers as "idiots" (p. 87).

The confrontation was only settled with the departure of the

programmers, and the reinterpretation by the stock controllers of the

Social Drama 22

significance of the new technology in terms of status elevation rather

than reduction.

Such dramas of interpretive confrontation may be less frequent in

passive organizations or highly bureaucratic government agencies

(Clark, 1972, p. 180) than in organizations in turbulent environments.

For organizations that must "love chaos" (Peters, 1987) and discredit

past behaviors (Weick, 1979) in order to maintain flexibility, social

dramas with their attendant conflicts, coifusions, and high

emotionality, tend to become routine aspe:ts of organizational life,

with a consequent toll in terms of employee stress, turnover, and

burnout (Kunda, forthcoming).

Elaborating the Social Drama Model: A Research Agenda

Psychological Studies

The psychology of social drama is still relatively unexplored,

despite increasing attention from cognitve psychologists to the

importance of story processing schemas (e.g., Bruner, 1986; Sarbin,

1986). Most cognitive science research has treated stories as abstract

structures that link bits of information together (e.g., Pennington &

Hastie, 1986). There is a need therefore for laboratory studies that

go beyond the information processing paradigm to study the connection

between story structures and the repertoire of narrative forms with

which people are familiar.

The research showing that people stricture events after

remembered stories offers a foundation for further work directly

testing the relationship between narrative structures and interpretive

Social Drama 23

outcomes. Future work should explore the idea that people try to

influence the interpretation of events in conflict situations by

biasing the data in the form of one genre of drama rather than

another, as melodrama rather than tragedy for example. This generic

biasing can be expected where the protagonists to a dispute have a

stake in convincing an audience to support a particular version of

ambiguous events. Such biasing can be ex pected even though people in

general are not familiar with the technical differences between

different genres. All that is required i; that people base their

interpretive strategies on particular story prototypes. In a similar

fashion, people have been shown to utiliz2 the ancient Greek theory of

the correspondance between four elements and four temperaments even

though they have no knowledge of the specific details of this theory

(Martindale & Martindale, 1988).

Before embarking on studies of generic biasing, the utility of

the four-fold classification of social dramas introduced in this paper

must be verified. Do people reproduce these genres in accounts of

their organizational conflicts? Are there stories that fall outside

these genres? To answer these questions might require simulating a

variety of interpretive conflicts between and within organizations,

and then examining accounts of such conflicts to see what genres were

being employed.

Studies of generic biasing would start with the hypothesis that

different generic frames would produce different attributions and

judgments concerning the protagonists. Ii other words, the

Social Drama 24

experimenter could systematically vary the frame within which the

accounts of interpretive conflict were presented. Subjects would be

asked to take the role of Chief Executive Officer of an organization

involved in a social drama. That the same events can mean different

things depending on the context in which they are displayed is well

established (Kahneman S Tversky, 1984). The proposed research would

go further and examine the effects of gen=es of drama on judgments.

Finally, the questions raised by Hirsch (1986) concerning the

cognitive functions of generic framing require extensive research that

builds upon the program outlined above ari other hints in the decision

making literature. That story structures in general simplify complex

decision making has been shown by Pennington and Hastie (1986).

Dramatic frames, with their built in roles for villains and heroes,

may be particularly effective in clarifyiag judgments in conflict

situations. In particular, point of viev may be critical: compared to

observers, the actual participants in the dispute can be expected to

make more use of dramatic framing to justify their behavior.

Sociological Studies

Laboratory studies are necessary to verify the cognitive

assumptions and predictions of the social drama approach. But as a

framework for the analysis of how people in organizations strive to

destroy the legitimacy of competing social constructions, the approach

demands field studies of on-going social iramas. Hirsch's (1986) work

is exemplary here in showing how linguistic analysis can uncover

categories of generic framing. The basic questions which field

Social Drama 25

studies of interpretive conflict in organizations need to answer are

three. First, what methods do coalitions in organizations use to

undermine the consensual interpretations of other coalitions? Second,

how is the management of interpretations achieved? Third, how

adaptable are dramatic frames to changing circumstances?

Answering the first question requires either participant-observer

studies of social dramas in progress (e.g., Pettigrew, 1973; 1979) or

post hoc analyses of themes and symbols produced by participants (e.g,

Wagner-Pacifici, 1986). The different pr)tagonists in the dispute can

be expected to present stories that differ markedly with respect to

both genre and role because the ways in which events are presented can

determine audience response. For example, whether the audience

responds to a case of union busting in terms of the just defeat of an

evil cause (melodrama) or the destruction of a proud and noble

organization (tragedy) may depend on whici genre guides their

interpretation of events, and which groups are assigned the roles of

villain and hero (cf. Shostak & Skocik, 1)86). In the theater, the

genre organizes the emotional and rhetorical displays: a comedy

stimulates much different actor and audience response than a tragedy.

Similarly with regard to social drama, the hypothesis is that

different generic frames can provoke quite different imaginative

involvements by the human participants.

The second question concerns how the leaders of organizations

seek to impose their own dramatic frames In events. Close analyses of

codes (Barley, 1983), language (Hirsch, 1)86), texts (Kets de Vries &

Social Drama 26

Miller, 1987), and symbolic action (Kunda, forthcoming) can reveal how

dramatic scripts are enacted. Little is cnown about the relationship

between symbolic management and the enactnent of particular plots.

Turner (1980) has suggested a recursive relationship exists, such that

explicitly theatrical "stage business" structures the social drama as

it is enacted, whereas plays, films, and novels help to legitimate the

success of the winners of the drama after it has ended: "Just to be in

the cast of a narrated drama which comes to taken as exemplary or

paradigmatic is some assurance of social immortality" (1980, p. 155).

Analyses of communication networks can reveal the channels

through which social constructions are shaped, and whether, for

example, friends help support each other's constructions of reality

(cf Krackhardt Kilduff, forthcoming). Iz the case of the hostile

takeover bid for Walt Disney Productions, there is some evidence that

the Disney management lost the battle to determine the way the social

drama was framed on Wall Street because of their lack of social

connections. Unlike Saul Steinberg, the Disney team were outside the

dense network of professional takeover specialists: "Wall Street was

an alien arena for most of the company's officers, who were in the

business of running theme parks and making movies for children"

(Taylor, 1987, p. x). Network analyses can also help clarify the role

of top management in symbolic communication, and whether attributions

of management efficacy are themselves dranatic fictions (cf. Meindl,

Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985).

Social Drama 27

Policy Implications

The social drama perspective suggests that narrative structures

are powerful tools for both explaining wh, events happened and

providing complex advice about the future (cf. Kaplan, 1986). Such

narrative tools are especially appropriate when the normal functioning

of the organization is disrupted by unique contingencies (Krieger,

1986). The impression management of alarming events may be more

important in terms of swaying public opinion than the nature of the

events themselves. A hostile takeover is likely to succeed if the

raider can project the impression that a :omedic shake-up of the old

guard is long overdue. The takeover is likely to fail if the

incumbent management can frame events in terms of a melodramatic

battle between righteous defenders and ra3acious villains. In order

to resist being assigned roles in some otaer protagonist's enactment,

managers, union leaders, and other organizational strategists may need

to become adept at formulating policies within overall generic frames.

The audience for social drama includes not only investors,

consumers, other organizations, and the general public, but also the

members of the embattled organization. By placing threatening events

within a dramatic frame, leaders can help unite and motivate

organizational members faced with the breach of norms, crisis,

redressive action and separation/reconciliation sequence. As Pfeffer

(1981, p. 34) has pointed out: "Symbolic action may serve to motivate

individuals within the organization and to mobilize persons both

within and outside the organization to tare action." Leaders can

Social Drama 28

reaffirm their leadership role by providiig individuals with a guiding

interpretation of both past and anticipated events.

The ability of top management, political leaders, or union

officials to control the development of social drama can be

overstated, however. The powerful forces that the dramatic framing of

events can unleash may not respond to interpretive manipulations.

Social drama has a momentum of its own that results from the dynamic

interaction of competing ideologies. Altlough leaders can try to

impose interpretations on the flow of everts, there is no guarantee

that these interpretations will succeed. Further, if the leadership

of an organizational coalition does succeed in framing events in terms

of an archetypal battle between good and evil, for example, there is

the risk that the resulting increased cornitment to a conflict may be

damaging to the organization (cf. Martin & Powers, 1983, p. 104). The

initiation of crisis situations can lead to outcomes neither

anticipated nor welcomed by even the most powerful participants

(Abolafia & Kilduff, 1988).

Conclusion

In this paper we have taken an approach to conflict rooted in

symbolic anthropology (e.g., Geertz, 1980; Turner, 1974) and applied

it to understanding the social destructio.i of shared realities in

organizations. We have focused on how organizational coalitions use

theatrical framing to control interpretations of events, and to

undermine the legitimacy of taken-for-grafted assumptions. Several

recent sociologcal studies of hostile takeovers, organized terrorism,

Social Drama 29

and the battle for prohibition, indicate the pervasiveness of dramatic

language, staging, and polarization in organizational conflicts.

The social drama approach rests not only on the observations of

anthropologists and sociologists, however, but also on psychological

assumptions concerning the way people stricture actions after

remembered stories. Existing research strongly supports the link

between narrative structures, perception, and behavior. Such research

offers a foundation for further work concerning the psychological and

sociological implications of social drama.

In conclusion, the collision between socially constructed

organizational worlds can result in an es:elating interpretive

conflict, featuring heroes and villains wlose battles resonate with

dramatic implications. To the extent that institutionalized realities

are real in their consequences, organizational coalitions can be

expected to use rhetorical strategies and dramatic framing to prevent

the delegitimation of even the most patently inaccurate social

constructions. Human beings may prefer to act in their own stories

even if other groups have better tales to tell.

Social Drama 30

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Social Drama 39

Table 1

The Four Genres of Social Drama

GENRE TYPICAL PLOT

COMEDY:

Entreprenurial renegade challenges old

The Challenge guard by breaking taken-for-granted

assumptions

Target of iostile takeover vilifies

the raider as the personification

of evil

Uncontrollable circumstances bring

company to bankruptcy despite best

efforts of CEO

The people's champion, who promised to

reform a c)rrupt industry, is exposed

as a crook

MELODRAMA:

The Crusade

TRAGEDY:

The Downfall

IRONY:

The Scam

Social Drama 40

Figure 1

The Phases and Genres of Social Drama

Breach---)Crisis---Redress--, Separation/Integration j

ACTION PHASES

A

INTERPRETIVE FRAMES

Comedy / Melodrama / Tragedy / Irony

Social Drama 41

Martin Kilduff (Ph.d, Cornell University) is Assistant Professor of

Organizational Behavior at the European Ilstitute of Business

Administration (INSEAD), Fontainebleau, France. Correspondence

regarding this article should be sent to iim at: INSEAD, Boulevard de

Constance, 77305 Fontainebleau, France.

Mitchel Y. Abolafia (Ph.d, SUNY at Stonybrook) is Assistant Professor

of Organizational Behavior and Sociology at the Johnson Graduate

School of Management, Cornell University.

An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the national meeting

of the American Sociological Association, Chicago, 1987. Many

individuals have helped shape this paper. We especially thank:

Reinhard Angelmar, Steve Barley, Davydd Greenwood, Manfred F.R.

Kets de Vries, Gideon Kunda, Dick Ritti, 3harles Stubbart, and John

Van Maanen.

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87/26 Roger BETANCOURTand David GAUTSCHI

87/27 Michael BURDA


87/29 Susan SCHNEIDER andPaul SHRIVASTAVA

87/30 Jonathan HAMILTONV. Bentley MACLEODand J. F. THISSE

87/31 Martine OUINZII andJ. P. THISSE

87/32 Arnoud DE MEYER

87/33 Yves DOZ andAmy SHUEN

87/34 Kasra FERDOVS andArnoud DE MEYER

87/35 P. J. LEDERER andJ. P. THISSE

87/36 Manfred KEES DE VRIES

87/37 Landis GABEL



1987

87/40 Carmen MATUTES and

Pierre REGIBEAU

"The internal and external careers: atheoretical and cross-cultural perspective",Spring 1987.

'The robustness of ?CDS configurations in theface of incomplete data', March 1987, Revised:July 1987.

'Demand complementarities, household productionand retail assortments", July 1987.

"Is there a capital shortage in Europe?",August 1987.

"Controlling the interest-rate risk of bonds:an introduction to duration analysis andimmunization strategies", September 1987.

'Interpreting strategic behavior: basicassumptions themes in organizations", September1987

"Spatial competition and the Core", August1987.

"On the optimality of central places',September 1987.

"German, French and British manufacturingstrategies less different than one thinks'.September 1987.

'A process framework for analyzing cooperationbetween firms', September 1987.

'European manufacturers: the dangers ofcomplacency. Insights from the 1987 Europeanmanufacturing futures survey, October 1987.

"Competitive location on networks underdiscriminatory pricing', September 1987.

"Prisoners of leadership", Revised version

October 1987.

"Privatization: its motives and likely

consequences". October 1987.

'Strategy formulation: the impact of national

culture', October 1987.

'The dark side of CEO succession*, November

'Product compatibility and the scope of entry",November 1987

87/41 Gavriel HAVAVINI andClaude VIALLF.T

87/42 Damien NEVEN andJacques-P. THISSE

87/43 Jean GABSZEVICZ andJacques-F. THISSE

87/44 Jonathan HAMILTON,

Jacques-F. THISSEand Anita VESKAMP

117/45 Karel COOL,David JEMISON andIngemar DIERICYY

07/45 Ingemar D1ERICKXand Karel COOL

1988

88/01 Michael I.AVRENCF. andSpyros MAKRIDAYIS


88/03 James TEBOUL



88/06 Reinhard ANGELMAR

88/07 Ingemar DIERICKX

and Karel COOL


and Susan SCHNEIDER

88/09 Bernard SINCLAIR-

DESCAGN6


DESGACN6


DESGAGNe

"Seasonality, size premium and the relationshipbetween the risk and the return of Prenchreason stocks", November 1987

"Combining horizontal and verticaldifferentiation: the principle of max-sin

differentiation", December 1987

'Location", December 1987

"Spatial discrimination: Bertrand vs. Cournotin • model of location choice', December 1987

"Business strategy, market structure and risk-

return relationships: a eausal interpretation",December 1987.

'Asset stock accumulation and sustatnabilityof competitive advantage", December 1987.

"Factors afacting judgemental forecasts andconfidence intervals', January 1988.

"Predicting recessions and other turning

points", January 1988.

"De-industrialize service for quality*, January

1988.

'National vs. corporate culture: implicationsfor human resource management', January 1988.

'The swinging dollar: is Europe out of step?",January 1988.

"Les conflits dans les canaux de distribution",

January 1988.

"Competitive advantage: a resource based

perspective", January 1988.

' Issues in the study of organizationalcognition", February 1988.

'Price formation and product design through

bidding", February 1988.

'The robustness of some standard auction gase

forms', February 1988.

"When stationary strategies are equilibriumbidding strategy: The single-crossingproperty", February 1988.

'Business firms and managers in the 21st

century', February 1988

'Alexithysia In organizational life: theorganization man revisited', February 1988.

interpretation of strategies: • study ofthe impact of CIO, on the corporation',March 1988.

'The production of and returns from industrialinnovations an econometric analysis for adeveloping country', December 1987.

'Market efficiency and equity pricing:international evidence and implications for

global investing', March 1988.

'Monopolistic competition, costs of adjustmentInd the behavior of European employment',September 1987.

'Reflections on 'Veit Unemployment' inEurope', November 1987, revised February 1988.

'Individual bias in judgements of confidence",

March 1988.

'Portfolio selection by mutual funds, anequilibrium model", March 1988.

'De-industrialize service for quality',March 1908 (88/03 Revised).

'Proper Quadratic Functions with an Applicationto kilt', May 1987 (Revised March 1988).

80/24 Maresh K. mALF1OTRA, 'Consumer cogni t ive complexity and theChristian PINSON and

dimensionality of multidimensional scalingArun K. JAIN

configurations', May 1988.

88/30 Catherine C. ECKEL 'The financial fallout from Chernobyl: riskand Theo VERMAELEN perceptions and regulatory response', May 1988.

08/31 Sumantra GMOSHAL and

'Creation, adoption, and diffusion ofChristopher BARTLETT

innovations by subsidiaries of multinationalcorporations', June 1988.

an/32 Kasra FERDOVS and

'International manufacturing: positioningDavid SACKRIDER

plants for success', June 1988.

88/33 mihkel M. TOMBAK

'The Importance of flexibility inmanufacturing", June 1488.

88/34 Mihkel M. TOMBAK

'Flexibility: an important dimension inmanufacturing', June 1988.

88/35 Xihkel M. TOMBAK

"A strategic analysis of investment in flexiblemanufacturing systems", July 1988.

88/36 Vlkas TIBREVALA and 'A Predictive Test of the NBD Model thatBruce BuGHANAN

Controls for Non-srationarity", June 1988.

08/37 Murugappa KRISRPAN "Regulating Price-Liability Competition ToLars_iiendrik ROLLER Improve Velfare", July 1988.

00/38 Manfred KETS DE VRIES 'The motivating Role of Envy : A ForgottenPactor . in Management, April 88.

88/39 Manfred KETS DE VRIES 'The Leader as Mirror : Clinical Reflections',

July 1988.

88/40 Josef LAYONISROK and 'Anomalous price behavior around repurchaseTheo VERNAELEN tender offers", August 1988.



00/14 Alain NOEL

88/15 Anil DEOLALIKAR andLars-flendrik ROLLER


88/17 Michael BURDA

08/18 Michael BURDA

88/19 M.J. LAURENCE andSpyros MAKRIDAKIS

88/20 Jean DERMINE,Damien NEVEN andJ.F. TIIISSE

88/21 James TEBOUL

88/22 Lars-Hendrlk ROLLER

88/23 Sjur Didrik FLAM

and Georges ZACCOUR

'Equilibres de Nash-Gournot dans le aarche

europien du gaz: un cu o6 les solutions enboucle ouvertc et en feedback coincident',

Mars 1988


88/42 Paul EVANS

"Assysetry in the EMS: intentional orsystemic7", August 1988.

'Organizational development in thetransnational enterprise", June 1988.

'Information disclosure, means of payment, and

takeover premla. Public and Private tenderoffers in Prance', July 1985, Sixth revision,April 1988.

'The future of forecasting', April 1988.

"Semi-competitive Cournot equilibrium inmultistage oligopolies', April 1988.

'Entry game vith resalable capacity',

April 1988.

'The multinational corporation as a netvork:perspectives from interorganisational theory',

May 1988,

88/43 B. SINCLAIR-DESCAGNE 'Croup decision support systems implementRayesian rationality", September 1988.

88/44 Essen MAHMOUD and

"The state of the art and future directionsSpyros MAKRIDAKIS. In combining forecasts', September 1988.

88/45 Robert KORAJCZYY

"An empirical investigation of international

and Claude V1ALLET

asset pricing', Noveober 1986, revised August1988.

88/46 Yves DOZ and

"From Intent to outcome: a process framework

Amy SRUEN

for partnerships', August 1980.

88/24 B. Espen Rail() and

Hervig 1/JfGOHR

88/25 Everette S. GARDNER

and Spyros MAKRIDAKIS

88/26 Sjur Didrik ELAMand Georges ZACCOUR

88/27 Mucugapper KRISHNAN

Lars-Hendrik ROLLER

88/28 Sumantra caosnAt. andC. A. BARTLETT

88/47 Alain BULTEZ.Els GIJSIIRECHTS,Philippe NAERT andPiet VANDEN AttElt

88/48 Michael BURDA

88/49 Nathalle DIERKENS

88/SO Rob VEITZ andArnoud DE MEYER

88/51 Rob VEITZ

88/52 Suasn SCHNEIDER endReinhard ANGELMAR


88/54 Lars-Hendrik ROLLERand Mihkel M. TOMBAK

88/55 Peter BOSSAERTSand Pierre MILLION

88/56 Pierre BILLION

88/57 Vilfried VANHONACKERand Lydia PRICE

88/58 B. SINCLAIR-OUGACHEand Mihkel M. TOMBAK

88/59 Martin KILDUFF

88/60 Michael BURDA

88/61 Lars-Hendrik ROLLER

88/62 Cynthia VAN HULLE,Theo YERMAELEN andNu' DE VOUTERS

•AsymsetrIc cannibalism between substitute!teas listed by retailers', September 1988.

"Reflections on 'Veit uneeploysent , inEurope, II", April 1988 revised September 1988.

"Inforsation asymmetry and equity Issues',

September 1988.

'Managing expert oystems: from inceptionthrough updating', October 1987.

'Technology, work, and the organisation: theimpact of expert systems', July 1988.

'Cognition and organization.' 4,141 7 .1e, vt10,eminding the store?", September 1988.

'Whatever happened to the philosopher-kings theleader's addiction to power, September 1988.

"Strategic choice of flexible productiontechnologies and velfare isplicatione,

October 1988

'Method of moments teats of contingent claias

asset pricing models*, October 1988.

"Size-sorted portfolios and the violation of

the random walk hypothesisi Additionalempirical evidence and !implication for tests

of asset pricing models", June 1988.

'Date tranaferebility; estimating the responseeffect of future events based on historicalanalogy', October 1988.

'Assessing economic inequality', November 1988.

'The interpersonal structure of decision

taking: a social comparison approach to

organizational choice', November 1988.

'Is mismatch teeny the problem/ Some estimatesof the Ghelvood Gate II model vith US date,

September 1988.

'Modelling cost structure, the Ball System

revisited • , November 1988.

"Regulation, taxes and the Racket for corporatecontrol in Belgium", September 1988.

88/63 Fernando NASCIMENTOand Vilfried R.VANHONACKER

88/64 Kasra FERDOVS

88/65 Arnoud DE MEYERand Kasra FERDOVS

88/66 Nathalie DIERKENS

88/67 Paul S. ADLER andKasra FERDOWS

1989

89/01 Joyce K. BYRER andTavfik JELASSI

89/02 Louis A. LE BLANCand Tavfik JELASSI

89/03 Beth H. JONES andTavfik JELASSI

89/04 Kasra FERDOWS andArnoud DE MEYER

89/05 Martin KILDUFF andReinhard ANGELMAR

89/06 Mlhkel M. TOMBAK andB. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE

89/07 Damien J. NEVEN

89/08 Arnoud DE MEYER andHellmut SCHOTTE

89/09 Damien NEVEN,Carmen MATUTES andMarcel CORSTJENS

89/10 Nathalle DIERKENS,Bruno GERARD andPierre BILLION

"Strategic pricing of differentiated consumerdurables in a dynamic duopoly: a numericalanalysis", October 1988.

"Charting strategic roles for internationalfactories", December 1988.

"Quality up, technology down", October 1988.

"A discussion of exact measures of informationassymetry: the example of Myers and Majlufmodel or the importance of the asset structureof the firs", December 1988.

"The chief technology officer", December 1988.

"The impact of language theories on DSSdialog", January 1989.

"DSS software selection: a multiple criteria

decision methodology", January 1989.

"Negotiation support: the effects of computerintervention and conflict level on bargainingoutcome", January 1989."Lasting improvement in manufacturingperformance: In search of a new theory",January 1989.

"Shared history or shared culture? The effects

of time, culture, and performance oninstitutionalization in simulatedorganizations", January 1989.

"Coordinating manufacturing and businessstrategies: I", February 1989.

"Structural adjustment in European retail

banking. Some view from industrial

organisation", January 1989.

"Trends in the development of technology andtheir effects on the production structure inthe European Community", January 1989.

"Brand proliferation and entry deterrence",February 1989.

"A market based approach to the valuation ofthe assets in place and the growthopportunities of the firm", December 1988.

89/11 Manfred KETS DE VRIESand Alain NOEL

89/12 Vilfried VANHONACKER


89/14 Reinhard ANCELMAR


89/16 Vilfried VANHONACKER,Donald LEHMANN andFareena SULTAN

89/17 Gilles AMADO,Claude FAUCHEUX andAndre LAURENT

89/18 Srinivasan BALAK-RISHNAN andMitchell KOZA

89/19 Vilfried VANHONACKER,Donald LEHMANN andFareena SULTAN

89/20 Vilfried VANHONACKERand Russell VINER

89/21 Arnoud de MEYER andKasra FERDOVS

89/22 Manfred KETS DE VRIESand Sydney PERZOV

89/23 Robert KORAJCZYK andClaude VIALLET

"Understanding the leader-strategy interface:application of the strategic relationshipinterviev method", February 1989.

"Estimating dynastic response models vhen thedata are subject to different temporalaggregation", January 1989.

"The impostor syndrome: a disquietingphenomenon in organizational life", February1989.

"Product innovation: a tool for competitiveadvantage", March 1989.

"Evaluating a firm's product innovationperformance*, March 1989.

"Combining related and sparse data in linearregression models", February 1989

"Cbangement organisationnel et realitesculturelles: contrastes Franco-americains",March 1989

"Information asymmetry, market failure andjoint-ventures: theory and evidence",March 1989

"Combining related and sparse data in linearregression models",Revised March 1989

"A rational random behavior model of choice",Revised March 1989

"Influence of manufacturing improvementprogrammes on performance", April 1989

"What is the role of character inpsychoanalysis? April 1989

"Equity risk premia and the pricing of foreignexchange risk" April 1989

of bealoty organisational conflict as social drama … · "the social destruction of bealoty...

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