part 10 itaac and proposed license conditions revision1 update tracking report revision 2 · 2012....
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Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4 COL Application
Part 10
ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions Revision1
Update Tracking Report
Revision 2
May 5, 2011
Revision History
Revision Date Update Description - 11/20/2009 COLA Revision 1 Transmittal
See Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09074 Date 11/20/2009
- 10/19/2009 Updated Section: Appendix A.5 See Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09055 Date 10/19/2009 Incorporated responses to following RAIs: No. 50
- 10/26/2009 Updated Section: Appendix A.1 See Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09058 Date 10/26/2009 Incorporated responses to following RAIs: No. 56
- 11/5/2009 Updated Section: 3 See Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09061 Date 11/5/2009 Incorporated responses to following RAIs: No. 71
- 11/13/2009 Updated Section: Appendix A.1, Appendix A.2, Appendix A.3 See Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09065 Date 11/13/2009 Incorporated responses to following RAIs: No. 81, 82, 83
- 11/18/2009 Updated Section: 2, 3, Appendix B.1 See Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09072 Date 11/18/2009 Incorporated responses to following RAIs: No. 70, 78
0 12/8/2009 Updated Sections: Appendix A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4 Incorporated the response to RAI No.83
1 1/8/2010 Updated Section Appendix A.1, A.2
- 2/22/2010 Updated Section: 3 See Luminant Letter no. TXNB-10010 Date 2/22/2010 Incorporated responses to following RAIs: No. 132
- 3/5/2010 Updated Section: 3 See Luminant Letter no. TXNB-10019 Date 3/5/2010 Incorporated responses to following RAIs: No. 70 Supplemental
- 8/9/2010 Updated Section: 2, 3 See Luminant Letter no. TXNB-10056 Date 8/9/2010 Incorporated responses to following RAIs: No. 169
- 9/16/2010 Updated Section: Appendix 1 See Luminant Letter no. TXNB-10064 Date 9/16/2010 Incorporated responses to following RAIs: No. 70 Supplemental
- 10/6/2010 Updated Section: Appendix A.1, A.3 See Luminant Letter no. TXNB-10067 Date 10/6/2010 Incorporated responses to following RAIs: No. 174
- 10/11/2010 Updated Section: Appendix A.3 See Luminant Letter no. TXNB-10072 Date 10/11/2010 Incorporated responses to following RAIs: No. 177
- 4/11/2011 Updated Section: Appendix C See Luminant Letter no. TXNB-11025 Date 4/11/2011 Incorporated responses to following RAIs: No. 211
2 5/5/2011 Updated Section Appendix A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6, Appendix B, Appendix C
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Tracking Report Revision List
Change ID No. Section ITAAC Rev.1 Page *
Reason for change
Change Summary Rev. of
T/R
RCOL2_ 11.05-2
Appendix A.5
29 Response to RAI No. 50 Luminant Letter no.TXNB-09055 Date 10/19/2009
Newly added Appendix A.5.
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RCOL2_14.03.03-1
Appendix A.1 Table A1-1 (Sheet 1 of 6)
9 Response to RAI No.56 TXNB-09058 Date 10/26/2009
Revised 2.a and split into two new ITAAC (2.a.i and 2.a.ii)
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RCOL2_14.03.03-2
Appendix A.1 Table A1-1 (Sheet 2 of 6)
10 Response to RAI No.56 TXNB-09058 Date 10/26/2009
Revised 2.b and split into two new ITAAC (2.b.i and 2.b.ii)
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RCOL2_14.03.03-3
Appendix A.1 Table A1-1 (Sheet 2, 3 of 6)
10,11 Response to RAI No.56 TXNB-09058 Date 10/26/2009
ITAAC items 3.a and 3.b were revised to state “a report exists”
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RCOL2_14.03.03-4
Appendix A.1 Table A1-1 (Sheet 4 of 6)
12 Response to RAI No.56 TXNB-09058 Date 10/26/2009
Revised ITAAC item 5.b to include new ITA and AC 5.b.i and 5.b.ii.
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RCOL2_13.04-1 3 5 Response to RAI No.71 TXNB-09061 Date 11/5/2009
Added the Groundwater Monitoring Program as a Licensing Condition.
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RCOL2_13.04-2 3 5 Response to RAI No.71 TXNB-09061 Date 11/5/2009
Added the Primary-to-Secondary Leakage Monitoring Program as a License Condition.
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RCOL2_13.04-3 3 5 Response to RAI No.71 TXNB-09061 Date 11/5/2009
Added the Highly Radioactive Fluid Systems Outside Containment Monitoring Program as a License Condition.
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RCOL2_13.03-2 RCOL2_13.03-8
2.6 4 Response to RAI No. 78 Luminant Letter no.TXNB-09066 Date 11/12/2009
Added Emergency Planning Action – See RAI# 70
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Change ID No. Section ITAAC Rev.1 Page *
Reason for change
Change Summary Rev. of
T/R
RCOL2_14.03.07-1
Appendix A.1 Table A.1-1 (Sheet 1 of 6)
8 Response to RAI No.81 Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09065 on 11/13/2009
ITAAC Item 1.b in Table A.1-1 has been revised to be consistent with the DCD Tier 1 revision
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RCOL2_14.03.07-3
Appendix A.1 Table A.1-1 (Sheet 3 of 6), Appendix A.2 Table A.2-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)
10, 20 Response to RAI No.81 Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09065 on 11/13/2009
Revised ITAAC items 5.a. ITAAC item 5.b already revised to reflect answer in
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RCOL2_14.03.07-4
Appendix A.1, Table A.1-1 (Sheet 5 of 6), Appendix A.2 Table A.2-1 (Sheet 2 of 2)
12, 21 Response to RAI No.81 Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09065 on 11/13/2009
ITAAC Item 6.b in Table A.1-1 and Item 3.b in Table A.2-1 have been revised to be consistent with the similar ITAAC in DCD Tier 1.
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RCOL2_14.03.07-5
Appendix A.1 Table A.1-1 (Sheet 5 of 6)
12 Response to RAI No.81 Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09065 on 11/13/2009
ITAAC Item 7 in Table A.1-1 has been revised to refer to Table A.1-2
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RCOL2_14.03.07-6
Appendix A.1 Table A.1-1 (Sheet 6 and of 7) Table A.1-2, Appendix A.2 Table A.2-2
13, 15, 16, 21, 23
Response to RAI No.81 Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09065 on 11/13/2009
Table A.1-1 ITAAC Items 9.b, 10.b, and Table A2.1 ITAAC Item 5.b have been revised to be consistent with the DCD template for “PSMS Control.” Table A.1-2 and Tables A.2-2 have added a PSMS Control column.
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RCOL2_14.03.07-7
Appendix A.1, Table A.1-1 (Sheet 7 of
14, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24
Response to RAI No.81 Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09065
Table A.1-3 “MCR/RSC Control” entries Table A.2-1, ITAAC Item 6
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Change ID No. Section ITAAC Rev.1 Page *
Reason for change
Change Summary Rev. of
T/R
7) Table A.1-3, Appendix A.2 Table A.2-1 (Sheet 2 of 2) Table A.2-3
on 11/13/2009 Table A.2-1, ITAAC Item 7 Table A.2-2 includes the temperature indicators for the UHS pump houses. Table A.2-3 has been revised to be consistent with DCD Table A.2-3 temperature indicators have been deleted
RCOL2_14.03.07-8
Appendix A.1 Table A.1-1 (Sheet 7 of 7)
14 Response to RAI No.81 Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09065 on 11/13/2009
ITAAC item 13 has been revised to indicate that the basins are part of the UHS system.
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RCOL2_14.03.07-9
Appendix A.3 Table A.3-1 (Sheet 2 of 3)
27 Response to RAI No.81 Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09065 on 11/13/2009
Language corrections -
RCOL2_14.03.07-10
Appendix A.3 Table A.3-1 (Sheet 1 of 3)
27 Response to RAI No.81 Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09065 on 11/13/2009
COLA Part 10, Table A.3-1, ITAAC Items 2.a and 2.b have been revised to address the design bases for protection against internal and external flooding.
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RCOL2_14.03.07-11
Appendix A.3 Table A.3-1 (Sheet 1 of 3)
27 Response to RAI No.81 Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09065 on 11/13/2009
Table A.3-1, ITAAC Item 4 has been revised to specify the wall thickness by reference to the thicknesses indicated in Table A.3-2, thereby providing measurable acceptance criteria.
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RCOL2_14.03.07-12
Appendix A.3 Table A.3-1 (Sheet 2 of 3)
28 Response to RAI No.81 Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09065 on 11/13/2009
Table A.3-1, ITAAC Items 6, 7, and 8 have been revised Also provides answer to RAI 82-3366, Question No. 14.03.07-19
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RCOL2_14.03.07-14
Appendix A.1 Table A.1-1
14 Response to RAI No.82 Luminant Letter
ITAAC Item 14 in ITAAC Table A.1-1 has been revised into two ITAACs
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Change ID No. Section ITAAC Rev.1 Page *
Reason for change
Change Summary Rev. of
T/R
(Sheet 7 of 7)
no. TXNB-09065 on 11/13/2009
(14.a and 14.b)
RCOL2_14.03.07-15
Appendix A.2 Table A.2-1 (Sheet 2 0f 2)
21 Response to RAI No.82 Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09065 on 11/13/2009
ITAAC Table A.2-1 ITAAC Item 4 Design Commitment and acceptance criteria has been clarified
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Appendix A.2 Table A.2-1 (Sheet 2 0f 2)
21 Response to RAI No.82 Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09065 on 11/13/2009
ITAAC Table A.2-1 ITAAC Item 5.a acceptance criteria have been clarified
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Appendix A.3 Table A.3-1 (Sheet 2 0f 3)
28 Response to RAI No.82 Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09065 on 11/13/2009
ITAAC Item 5.a in Table A.3-1 has been revised to require documentation to demonstrate consistency
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Appendix A.3 Table A.3-1 (Sheet 2 0f 3)
28 Response to RAI No.82 Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09065 on 11/13/2009
ITAAC Item 5.b in Table A.3-1 has been revised to require documentation to demonstrate consistency
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RCOL2_14.03.07-19
Appendix A.3 Table A.3-1 (Sheet 2 0f 3)
28 Response to RAI No.82 Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09065 on 11/13/2009
Appendix A.3, Table A.3-1, ITAAC Item 8 acceptance criteria have been clarified
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Appendix A.3 Table A.3-1 (Sheet 3 0f 3)
29 Response to RAI No.82 Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09065 on 11/13/2009
Appendix A.3, Table A.3-1, ITAAC Item 9 Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA) has been clarified
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RCOL2_14.03.07-21
Appendix A.2 Table A.2-2
23 Response to RAI No.83 Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09065 on 11/13/2009
Table A.2-2 has been revised to add the UHS ESW pump house supply and exhaust backdraft dampers.
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Appendix A.1 Table A.1-1 (Sheet 4 of 6), Appendix A.2 Table A.2-1
11, 20 Response to RAI No.83 Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09065 on 11/13/2009
Table A.1-1 ITAAC Item 6.a, and Table A.2-1 Item 3.a have been revised to be consistent with similar DCD ITAAC
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Change ID No. Section ITAAC Rev.1 Page *
Reason for change
Change Summary Rev. of
T/R
(Sheet 2 of 2)
RCOL2_14.03.07-27
Appendix A.2 Table A.2-3
24 Response to RAI No.83 Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09065 on 11/13/2009
The temperature switches in the last two columns of Table A.2-3 have been deleted. The revised ITAAC Table A.2-3 also incorporates the recommended changes for RAI 81-3293, Question No. 14.03.07-6.
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RCOL2_13.03-1 2.6 4 Response to RAI No. 70 Luminant Letter no.TXNB-09072 Date 11/18/2009
Added Section “2.6 Emergency Planning Actions” and revised subsequent section numbers accordingly.
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RCOL2_13.03-1 3 5 Response to RAI No. 70 Luminant Letter no.TXNB-09072 Date 11/18/2009
Added two proposed licensing conditions to the table in Section 3
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RCOL2_13.03-15 Appendix B.1
38, 39 Response to RAI No. 78 Luminant Letter no.TXNB-09072 Date 1118/2009
Removed Table B-1 “EP ITAAC Not Required in CPNPP COLA” and associated text in Appendix B.1 Emergency Planning Section. Renamed Table B-2 to B-1.
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RCOL2_13.03-15 Appendix B.1 Table B-1 (Sheet 1 of 37 through Sheet 37 of 37)
40-77 Response to RAI No. 78 Luminant Letter no. TXNB-09072 Date 11/18/2009
Incorporated elements of RAI response into Table B-1 “Emergency Plan Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria”
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RCOL2_14.03.07-28
Appendix A.1
7 Response to RAI No. 83 Luminant Letter no.TXNB- 09065 Date 11/13/2009
Added Section A.1.1 Design Description.
0
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Change ID No. Section ITAAC Rev.1 Page *
Reason for change
Change Summary Rev. of
T/R
RCOL2_14.03.07-28
Appendix A.2
15 Response to RAI No. 83 Luminant Letter no.TXNB- 09065 Date 11/13/2009
Added Section A.2.1 Design Description.
0
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Appendix A.3
21 Response to RAI No. 83 Luminant Letter no.TXNB- 09065 Date 11/13/2009
Added Section A.3.1 Design Description.
0
RCOL2_14.03.07-28
Appendix A.4
27 Response to RAI No. 83 Luminant Letter no.TXNB- 09065 Date 11/13/2009
Added Section A.4.1 Design Description.
0
MAP-00-201 Appendix A.1 Table A.1-2 Table A.1-3 Appendix A.2 Table A.2-2 Table A.2-3 Figure A.2-1
12, 13, 18, 19, 20
The change of numbering rule of Tag number
Change Tag numbers 1
RCOL2_NONE-3 3 7 and 8 Response to RAI No.132 Luminant Letter No. TXNB-10010 Date 2/22/10
Revised Part 10, ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions to provide additional detail per NRC letter to NEI dated 12/2/09
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RCOL2_13.03-2 3 Table of “Proposed License Condition”
4
Response to RAI No. 70 Supplemental Luminant Letter no.TXNB-10019 Date 3/05/2010
Added license condition (B) in table to develop site-specific Emergency Action Levels.
-
1‐7
Change ID No. Section ITAAC Rev.1 Page *
Reason for change
Change Summary Rev. of
T/R
RCOL2_10.02.03-2
2.3 3 Response to RAI No. 169 Luminant Letter no.TXNB-10056 Date 8/9/2010
Modified the description to make consistent with Section 3.
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RCOL2_10.02.03-2
3
4 , 7 Response to RAI No. 169 Luminant Letter no.TXNB-10056 Date 8/9/2010
Added “COLA FSAR Subsection 10.2.3.5” to license condition. Added turbine inspection program and the implementation milestone in the table listing Operational Programs.
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RCOL2_13.03-1 S02
Appendix 1 Emergency Action Levels
A1-i through A1-134
Supplemental Response to RAI No. 70 Luminant Letter no.TXNB-10064 Date 9/16/2010
Replaced the existing Appendix 1 in its entirety with a table identifying differences and deviations between the Comanche Peak Units 3 and 4 EALs and NEI 99-01, Revision 5.
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RCOL2_14.03.07-29
Appendix A.1 Table A.1-1 (sheet 3 of 6)
13 Response to RAI No. 174 Luminant Letter no.TXNB-10067 Date 10/6/2010
ITAAC 5.b.ii reworded from “a report exists” to new language
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RCOL2_14.03.07-29
Appendix A.1 Table A.1-1 (sheet 4 of 6)
14 Response to RAI No. 174 Luminant Letter no.TXNB-10067 Date 10/6/2010
ITAAC 7 reworded from “a report exists” to new language
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Change ID No. Section ITAAC Rev.1 Page *
Reason for change
Change Summary Rev. of
T/R
RCOL2_14.03.07-29
Appendix A.3 Table A.3-1 (sheet 2 of 3)
32 Response to RAI No. 174 Luminant Letter no.TXNB-10067 Date 10/6/2010
ITAAC 5.a, 5.b reworded from “a report exists” to new language
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RCOL2_14.03.07-32
Appendix A.3 Table A.3-1 (sheet 1 of 3)
31 Response to RAI No. 177 Luminant Letter no.TXNB-10072 Date 10/11/2010
Modified language of ITAAC 2.a and 2.b from “a report exists” to “inspection of.”
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RCOL2_14.03.12-5
Appendix C Table C-1 (Sheet 2 of 5)
78 Response to RAI No. 211 Luminant Letter No. TXNB-11025 Dated 04/11/2011
Added new physical security ITAAC 3.C.
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RCOL2_14.03.12-5
Appendix C Table C-1 (Sheet 4 of 5)
80 Response to RAI No. 211 Luminant Letter No. TXNB-11025 Dated 04/11/2011
Added new physical security ITAAC 11.C-2. Revised ITAAC 11.d to 11.c. Revised ITAAC 11.e to 11.d.
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RCOL2_14.03.12-5
Appendix C Table C-1 (Sheet 5 of 5)
81 Response to RAI No. 211 Luminant Letter No. TXNB-11025 Dated 04/11/2011
Added new physical security ITAAC 16.C-2.
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A.1.1 A.1.2
A.2.1 A.2.2 A.3.1 A.3.2 A.4.1 A.4.2
7 [9-12] 15 [24 , 25] 21 [33 , 34, 35] 27 [42, 43]
Consistency with DCD Revision 3 Tier 1
The changes in this section of the design description are: Text relocated within
subsection to align with the sequence and numbering of the corresponding DC in the ITAAC table.
Text edited for consistency between the Design Description (DD) and the Design Commitment (DC) in the ITAAC table.
Deleted redundant text.
2
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Change ID No. Section ITAAC Rev.1 Page *
Reason for change
Change Summary Rev. of
T/R
A.5.1 C.1 C.2
46 47 [86,87, 88]
Deleted text that is too detailed for COLA Part 10.
Deleted text that is inconsistent with SRP 14.3 guidance.
Editorial changes made for clarification and consistency.
Editorial changes made to correct grammatical error.
CTS-01174
Table A.1-1 Table A.2-1 Table A.3-1 Table A.4-1 Table A.5-1 Table B-1 Table C-1
8-11 [13-19] 16, 17 [26, 27 28] 22, 23 [36, 37, 38, 39] 28, 29 [44, 45 29 [46] 31 [ 50 through 85] 48 through 52 [89 through 95]
Consistency with DCD Revision 3 Tier 1
The changes in the ITAAC table are the following: Consistency between
DCD Tier 1 and R-COLA Part 10
Consistency between design description and acceptance criteria
Consistency between the Inspection, Test, and Analysis and the Acceptance Criteria.
Consistent reference to the Design Description
Consistent use of “a report exists”
Consistent use of “seismic Category I”
Consistent reference to Tables and Figures where applicable
Consistency with Tier 1 interface requirements.
Removed redundant ITAAC
Revised ITAAC to be consistent with latest SRP guidance.
2
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Table A.1-1 ITAAC # 15, 16, 17, 18.
11 [19]
Consistency with DCD Revision 3 Tier 1
Added ITAAC to meet the interface requirements described in DCD Tier 3 Section 3.
2
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Change ID No. Section ITAAC Rev.1 Page *
Reason for change
Change Summary Rev. of
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CTS-01208 Table A.1-2 Table A.1-3 Figure A.1-1
12 [20, 21] 13 [22] 14 [23]
Consistency with FSAR Chapter 9
Added isolation valves between the ESWS discharge strainer backwash, UHS basin, and CWS blowdown main header consistent with FSAR.
2
CTS-01208 Table A.2-2 18 [29, 30]
Consistency with FSAR
Revised the fifth column to indicate “Remotely Operated Damper.”
2
CTS-01208 Table A.2-3 19 [31]
Consistency with FSAR
Changed unit heater equipment number consistent with FSAR.
2
CTS-01208
Figure A.2-1
20 [32]
Consistency with FSAR
Figure simplified to be consistent with FSAR.
2
CTS-01208 Table A.3-1 (sheet 2 of 4) #3
22 [37]
Consistency with FSAR
ITAAC was deleted because no penetrations in divisional walls exist.
2
CTS-01208 Table A.3-1 (Sheet 1 and 2 of 4) #2.b, #5.a, #5.b
22, 23 [36, 37]
Consistency with FSAR
ITAAC were deleted because barriers, penetrations, and doors are not credited for safety function
2
CTS-01174 Table A.3-1 (Sheet 3 and 4 of 4) #10
23 [38, 39]
Consistency with DCD Revision 3
Added ITAAC to address seismic fragilities task of the seismic margin analysis.
2
CTS-01208 Table A.3-2 (Sheet 2 of 2)
26 [41]
Consistency with FSAR
Revised concrete thickness to be consistent with FSAR
2
CTS-01208 Table A.5-2
39 [46]
Consistency with DCD Revision 3 and FSAR
Location of radiation monitors was added.
2
CTS-01174 Appendix A.6
[47] Consistency with DCD Revision 3
Added ITAAC for the fire protection interface identified in the DCD
2
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Change ID No. Section ITAAC Rev.1 Page *
Reason for change
Change Summary Rev. of
T/R
CTS-01174 Table B-1 (Sheet 6 through 11 of 36) #6, 8
31 [55-60]
Consistency with DCD Revision 3
The ITAAC for EOF and TSC were separated from DCD as site-specific.
2
*Page numbers for the attached marked-up pages may differ from the revision 1 page numbers due to text additions and deletions. When the page numbers for the attached pages do differ, the page number for the attached page is shown in brackets.
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix A.1
Revision 19
PART 10 - APPENDIX A.1
ULTIMATE HEAT SINK SYSTEM (UHSS) AND ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (ESWS) (PORTIONS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE CERTIFIED DESIGN)
A.1.1 Design Description
The ultimate heat sink system (UHSS) is a safety-related system that (1) removes heat from the essential service water system (ESWS) during normal operation, transients, accidents and design basis events, (2) provides the required cooling for a minimum of 30 days without make-up during all plant operating conditions including normal plant operations, abnormal and accident conditions, (3) provides water to the seismic stand pipe header of the fire protection system to assure manual fire suppression capability following a safe shutdown earthquake.
As shown in Figure A.1-1 and described in Table A.1-2, the major components of the UHSS are four 50 percent capacity mechanical draft cooling towers, one for each ESWS division, and four 33 1/3 percent capacity basins to satisfy the thirty day cooling water supply criteria. In addition, a UHS transfer pump is located in each UHS basin to enable water transfer between UHS basins during accident conditions.
The UHSS is capable of performing required safety functions assuming that one division is out of service for maintenance coincident with the postulated loss of offsite power and any single failure within the UHSS.
The essential service water is cooled by the UHS cooling tower before being returned to the UHS basin. Heat rejection to the environment is effected by direct contact of the hotter essential service water discharging from the ESWS with the UHS cooling tower forced airflow.
Upon the receipt of an ECCS actuation signal, all UHS cooling tower fans automatically start or continue to operate. Upon the receipt of an ECCS actuation signal or UHS basin low water level signal, the UHS basin blowdown control valves automatically close. A water level signal at six inches below the normal water level causes the makeup water control valve to open. A signal at normal water level then causes the makeup control valve to close.
The UHSS can supply at least 18,000 gallons of water to the seismic standpipe system via the ESWS if necessary for manual fire suppression following a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).
1.a The functional arrangement of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design) is as described in the Design Description of Section A.1.1 and as shown on Figure A.1-1.
1.b Each mechanical division of the UHSS and ESWS (Division A, B, C & D) is physically separated from the other divisions, except for the header portion
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Revision 110
of the transfer line piping, so as not to preclude accomplishment of the safety function.
2.a.i The ASME Code Section III components of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), identified in Table A.1-2, are fabricated, installed and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.
2.a.ii The ASME Code Section III components of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), identified in Table A.1-2, are reconciled with the design requirements.
2.b.i The ASME Code Section III piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201, is fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.
2.b.ii The ASME Code Section III piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), including supports, identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201, is reconciled with the design requirements.
3.a Pressure boundary welds in ASME Code Section III components, identified in Table A.1-2, meet ASME Code Section III requirements for non-destructive examination of welds.
3.b Pressure boundary welds in ASME Code Section III piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201, meet ASME Code Section III requirements for non-destructive examination of welds.
4.a The ASME Code Section III components, identified in Table A.1-2, retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.
4.b The ASME Code Section III piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201, retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.
5.a The seismic Category I equipment, identified in Table A.1-2, is can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
5.b The seismic Category I piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), including supports, identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201, can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of its safety function.
6.a The Class 1E components, identified in Table A.1-2, are powered from their respective Class 1E division.
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Revision 111
6.b Separation is provided between redundant divisions of Class 1E cables, and between Class 1E cables and non-Class 1E cables.
7. The UHSS is capable of removing the maximum design heat load transferred from the ESWS during normal plant operations, abnormal and accident conditions of the plant.
8. Controls are provided in the MCR to open and close the remotely operated valves identified in Table A.1-2.
9.a The remotely operated valves, identified in Table A.1-2 as having an active safey function perform an active safety function to change position as indicated in the table.
9.b The remotely operated valves identified in Table A.1-2 as having PSMS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from PSMS.
9.c After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves, identified in Table A.1-2, assume the indicated loss of motive power position.
10.a Controls are provided in the MCR to start and stop the pumps and fans identified in Table A.1-3.
10.b The fans identified in Table A.1-2 as having PSMS control perform as active safety function after receiving a signal from PSMS.
11. Alarms and displays identified in Table A.1-3 are provided in the MCR.
12.a Alarms, displays and controls identified in Table A.1-3 are provided in the RSC.
12.b Controls on the RSC operate the as-built pumps, fans and valves identified in Table A.1-3.
13. Each UHS basin has a volume to satisfy the thirty day cooling water supply criteria.
14. The UHS transfer and ESW pumps have sufficient NPSH .
15. ESW pump operation does not cause vortex formation at minimum allowed UHSS water level.
16. Water hammer is prevented in the UHSS.
17. The sum of the ESW pump shutoff head and static head is such that the ESWS design pressure is not exceeded.
CTS-01174
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix A.1
Revision 112
18. The UHSS is capable of performing its safety functions under design basis event conditions and coincident single failure with or without offsite power available.
A.1.2 Inspections, Tests, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria
Table A.1-1 describes the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteriaITAAC for the UHSS and ESWS portions outside the scope of the certified design.
CTS-01174
CTS-01174
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix A.1
Revision 113
Table A.1-1 (Sheet 1 of 7)
Ultimate Heat Sink System and Essential Service Water System (Portions Outside the Scope of the Certified Design)
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1.a The functional arrangement of the systemUHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design) is as described in the Design Description of Section A.1.1 and as shown on Figure A.1-1.
1.a An iInspection of the as-built UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design)system will be performed.
1.a The as-built UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design)system conform to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section A.1.1 and as shown on Figure A.11.
1.b Each mechanical division of the UHSS and ESWSsystem (Division A, B, C & D) is physically separated from the other divisions, except for the header portion of the transfer line piping, so as not to preclude accomplishment of the safety function.
1.b Inspections and analysis of the as-built UHSS and ESWS system will be performed.
1.b A report exists and concludes that eachEach mechanical division of the as-built UHSS and ESWSsystem (Division A, B, C & D), except for the header portion of the transfer line piping is physically separated from the other divisions of the system by structural and/or fire barriersby spatial separation, barriers, or enclosures so as to assure that the functions of the safety related systems are maintained.
2.a.i The ASME Code Section III components of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), identified in Table A.1-2, are designed and constructedfabricated, installed and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.
2.a.i An iInspection of the as-built ASME Code Section III components of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design) identified in Table A.1-2 will be performedconducted of the as-built components as documented in ASME design reports.
2.a.i The ASME Code Section III designdata report(s) (certified, when required by ASME Code) and inspection reports (including N-5 Data Reports where applicable) exist and conclude that the as-built ASME Code Section III components of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design) identified in Table A.1-2 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.reconciled with the design documents.
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.07-1CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.07-1CTS-01174
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.03-1
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix A.1
Revision 114
2.a.ii The ASME Code Section III components of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), identified in Table A.1-2, are reconciled with the design requirements.
2.a.ii A reconciliation analysis of the components identified in Table A.1-2 using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Section III design report(s) (NCA-3550) will be performed.
2.a.ii The ASME Code Section III design report(s) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that the design reconciliation has been completed in accordance with the ASME Code, for the as-built ASME Code Section III components of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design) identified in Table A.1-2. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.
2.b.i The ASME Code Section III piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201, is designed and constructedfabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.
2.b.i An iInspection of the as-built ASME Code piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201, including supports, will be performedconducted of the as-built piping as documented in ASME design reports.
2.b.i The ASME cCode Section III designdata report(s) (certified, when required by ASME Code) and inspection reports (including N-5 Data Reports where applicable) exist and conclude that the as-built ASME Code Section III piping of the as-built ASME Code piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), including supports, identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201 is fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section IIIreconciled with the design documents.
2.b.ii The ASME Code Section III piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), including supports, identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201, is reconciled with the design requirements.
2.b.ii A reconciliation analysis of the piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201, including supports, using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Section III design report(s) (NCA-3550) will be performed.
2.b.ii The ASME Code Section III design report(s) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed in accordance with the ASME Code, for the as-built ASME Code Section III piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), including supports, identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.
Table A.1-1 (Sheet 2 of 7)
Ultimate Heat Sink System and Essential Service Water System (Portions Outside the Scope of the Certified Design)
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.03-1
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.03-2
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix A.1
Revision 115
3.a Pressure boundary welds in ASME Code Section III components, identified in Table A.1-2, meet ASME Code Section III requirements for non-destructive examination of welds.
3.a Inspections of the as-built pressure boundary welds in ASME Code Section III piping identified in Table A.1-2 will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.
3.a The ASME Code Section III code reports exist and conclude that Tthe ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of the as-built pressure boundary welds in ASME Code Section III piping identified in Table A.1-2.
3.b Pressure boundary welds in ASME Code Section III piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201, meets ASME Code Section III requirements for non-destructive examination of welds.
3.b Inspections of the as-built pressure boundary welds in ASME Code Section III piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design) identified in FSAR Table A.1-2 will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.
3.b The ASME Code Section III code reports exist and conclude that Tthe ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of the as-built pressure boundary welds in ASME Code Section III piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design) identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201.
4.a The ASME Code Section III components, identified in Table A.1-2, retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.
4.a A hydrostatic test will be performed on the as-built components, identified in Table A.1-2, required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.
4.a ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that Tthe results of the hydrostatic test of the as-built components identified in Table A.1-2 as ASME Code Section III conform to the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
4.b The ASME Code Section III piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201, retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.
4.b A hydrostatic test will be performed on the as-built piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201, required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.
4.b ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that Tthe results of the hydrostatic test of the as-built piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design) identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201 as ASME Code Section III conform to the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
5.a The seismic cCategory I equipment, identified in Table A.1-2, can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
5.a.i Inspections will be performed to verify that the as-built seismic cCategory I as-built equipment identified in Table A.1-2 is installedlocated in the location identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201a seismic Category I structure.
5.a.i The seismic cCategory I as-built equipment identified in Table A.1-2 is installedlocated in the location identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201a seismic Category I structure.
Table A.1-1 (Sheet 3 of 7)
Ultimate Heat Sink System and Essential Service Water System (Portions Outside the Scope of the Certified Design)
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
RCOL2_14.03.03-3
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.03-3
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.03-3CTS-01174
CTS-01174
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.07-3
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix A.1
Revision 116
5.a.ii Type tests, and/or analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of the seismic cCategory I equipment identified in Table A.1-2 will be performed using analytical assumptions, or will be performed under conditions which bound the seismic design basis requirements.
5.a.ii A report exists and concludes that The results of the type tests and/or analyses conclude that the seismic cCategory I equipment identified in Table A.1-2 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
5.a.iiiInspections and analyses will be performed to verify thaton the as-built seismic Category I equipment, identified in Table A.1-2, including anchorages, is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
5.a.iiiA report exists and concludes that Tthe as-built seismic Category I equipment identified in Table A.1-2, including anchorages, is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
5.b Each of tThe seismic cCategory I piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), including supports, identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201, is designed tocan withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capabilitysafety function.
5.b.i Inspections will be performed to verify thaton the as-built seismic Category I piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), including supports, identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201 are supported by a seismic Category I structure(s).
5.b.i Each of tThe as-built seismic cCategory I piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), including supports, identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201 meets theare supported by a seismic cCategory I structure(s)requirements.
5.b.ii Inspections and analysis will be performed to verify that the as-built seismic Category I piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), including supports identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of its safety function.
5.b.ii A report exists and concludes that the as-built seismic Category I piping of the UHSS and ESWS (portions outside the scope of the certified design), including supports, identified in FSAR Table 3.2-201 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of its safety function.
6.a The Class 1E components, identified in Table A.1-2, are powered from their respective Class 1E division.
6.a A Ttests will be performed on each division of the as-built systemClass 1E equipment identified in Table A.1-2 by providing a simulated test signal only in each the Class 1E division under test.
6.a The simulated test signal exists at the as-built Class 1E equipment identified in Table A.1-2. under test in the as-built system
Table A.1-1 (Sheet 4 of 7)
Ultimate Heat Sink System and Essential Service Water System (Portions Outside the Scope of the Certified Design)
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
CTS-01174
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.03-4
RCOL2_14.03.07-29CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.07-22
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix A.1
Revision 117
6.b Separation is provided between redundant divisions Class 1E divisionscables, and between Class 1E divisionscables and non-Class 1E cables.
6.b Inspections of the as-built Class 1E divisional cables and raceways will be conductedperformed.
6.b The as-built Class 1E electrical cables with only one division are routed in raceways assigned to the same division. There are no other safety division electrical cables in a raceway assigned to a different division.Physical separation or electrical isolation is provided in accordance with RG 1.75, between the as-built cables of redundant Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E cables and non-Class 1E cables.
7. The system provides adequate heat removal capability transferred design heat load from the ESWS.The UHSS is capable of removing the maximum design heat load transferred from the ESWS during normal plant operations, abnormal and accident conditions of the plant.
7. Tests and analyses of the as-built system will be performed.Tests and analyses will be performed to determine the heat removal capability of the as-built UHSS. The analysis will consider that the maximum ESWS supply water temperature is 95° F under the peak heat load condition.
7. A report exists and concludes that the as-built system provides adequate heat removal capability transferred design heat loadA report exists and concludes that the as-built UHSS removes the maximum design heat load transferred from the ESWS during normal plant operations, abnormal and accident conditions of the plant while maintaining a UHSS outlet temperature ≤ 95°F.
8. Controls existare provided in the MCR to open and close the remotely operated valves identified in Table A.1-2.
8. Tests will be performed on the as-built remotely operated valves listedidentified in Table A.1-2 using controls in the as-built MCR.
8. Controls in the as-built MCR operate to open and close the as-built remotely operated valves listedidentified in Table A.1-2.
9.a The remotely operated valves, identified in Table A.1-2 as having an active safety function to perform an active safety-related, function to change position as indicated in the table.
9.a.i Type tests or a combination of type tests and analyses of the remotely operated valves identified in Table A.1-2 as having an active safety function will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions.
9.a.i A report exists and concludes that Eeach remotely operated valve identified in Table A.1-2 as having an active safety function changes position as indicated in Table A.1-2 under design conditions.
9.a.ii Tests of the as-built valves identified in Table A.1-2 as having an active safety function will be performed under pre-operational flow, differential pressure, and temperature, and flow conditions.
9.a.ii Each as-built remotely operated valve identified in Table A.1-2 as having an active safety function changes position as indicated in Table A.1-2 under pre-operational test conditions.
Table A.1-1 (Sheet 5 of 7)
Ultimate Heat Sink System and Essential Service Water System (Portions Outside the Scope of the Certified Design)
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.07-4
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.07-5
RCOL2_14.03.07-29
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix A.1
Revision 118
9.b The remotely operated valves identified in Table A.1-2 as having PSMS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from PSMS.Upon the receipt of ECCS actuation signal or UHS basin low water level signal, the blowdown control valve closes automatically.
9.b Tests will be performed on the as-built remotely operated valves identified in Table A.1-2 using a simulated test signal.
9.b The as-built remotely operated valves identified in Table A.1-2 as having PSMS control perform the active function identified in the table after receiving a simulated signal.Upon the receipt of a simulated test signal, the as-built blowdown control valve closes automatically.
9.c After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves, identified in Table A.1-2, assume the indicated loss of motive power position.
9.c Tests of the as-built valves identified in Table A.1-2 will be performed under the conditions of loss of motive power.
9.c Upon loss of motive power, each as-built remotely operated valve identified in Table A.1 -2 assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.
10.a Controls existare provided in the MCR to start and stop the pumps and fans identified in Table A.1-3.
10.a Tests will be performed on the as-built pumps and fans identified in Table A.1-3 using controls in the MCR.
10.a Controls in the MCR operate to start and stop the as-built pumps and fans listedidentified in Table A.1-3.
10.b The pump and fans identified in Table A.1-23 start after receiving a signal. as having PSMS control perform as active safety function after receiving a signal from PSMS.
10.b Tests will be performed on the as-built fans identified in Table A.1-2 using simulated signal.
10.b The as-built pump and fans identified in Table A.1 -23 start as having PSMS control perform the active function identified in the table after receiving a simulated signal.
11. Alarms and Ddisplays of the parameters identified in Table A.1-3 can be retrievedare provided in the MCR.
11. Inspections will be performed for retrievability of the system parameters inalarms and displays identified in Table A.1-3 the as-built MCR.
11. TheAlarms and displays identified in Table A.1-3 can be retrieved in the as-built MCR.
12.a Remote shutdown console (RSC) displays and/or controls provided for the system are identified in Table A.1-3 .Alarms, displays and controls identified in Table A.1-3 are provided in the RSC.
12.a Inspections will be performed on the as-built RSC displays and/or controls for the system.Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the alarms and displays identified in Table A.1-3 in the as-built RSC.
12.a Displays and/or controls exist on the as-built RSC as identified in Table A.1-3.Alarms and displays identified in Table A.1-3 can be retrieved in the as-built RSC.
12.b Tests of the as-built RSC control functions identified in Table A.1-3 will be performed.
12.b Controls on the RSC operate to open and close the as-built remotely operated valves and to start and stop the as-built pumps and fans identified in Table A.1-3 with an RSC control function..
Table A.1-1 (Sheet 6 of 7)
Ultimate Heat Sink System and Essential Service Water System (Portions Outside the Scope of the Certified Design)
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
RCOL2_14.03.07-6
CTS-01174
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.07-6CTS-01174
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.07-7
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.07-30
RCOL2_14.03.07-7
RCOL2_14.03.07-30CTS-01174
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix A.1
Revision 119
13. Each UHS basin has a volume to satisfy the thirty day cooling water supply criteria.
13. Inspections will be performed to verify the as-built UHS basins include sufficient volume of water.
13. The usable water volume of the each as-built UHS basin is greater than or equal to 3.12 x 106 gallons at the minimum maintained water level.
14. The ultimate heat sinkUHS transfer and ESW pumps and essential service water pumps have sufficient NPSH.
14. Tests to measure the as-built suction pressure will be performed. Inspections and analysis to determine NPSH available to each pump will be performed.UHS transfer and ESW pump will be performed. The analyses will consider vendor test results of required NPSH and the effects of:
• Suction from the UHS basin with water level at the minimum allowed value (after 30 days of accident mitigation)
• UHSS design temperature range.
14. The as-built system meets the design, and the analysis confirmsA report exists and concludes that the NPSH available to each UHS transfer and ESW pump is exceedsgreater than the required NPSH.
15. ESW pump operation does not cause vortex formation at minimum allowed UHSS water level.
15. Test of the as-built ESW pump will be performed.
15. ESW pump operation does not cause vortex formation at minimum allowed UHSS water level.
16. Water hammer is prevented in the UHSS.
16. Inspection and analysis of the as-built UHSS will be performed.
16. A report exists and concludes that the as-built UHSS is fabricated and installed to prevent water hammer.
17. The sum of the ESW pump shutoff head and static head is such that the ESWS design pressure is not exceeded.
17. Inspection, test and analysis of the as-built ESWS will be performed.
17. A report exists and concludes that the sum of the as-built ESW pump shutoff head and static head is such that the ESWS design pressure is not exceeded.
18. The UHSS is capable of performing its safety functions under design basis event conditions and coincident single failure with or without offsite power available.
18. Inspection and analysis of the as-built UHSS will be performed.
18. A report exists and concludes that the as-built UHSS is capable of performing its safety functions under design basis event conditions and coincident single failure with or without offsite power available.
Table A.1-1 (Sheet 7 of 7)
Ultimate Heat Sink System and Essential Service Water System (Portions Outside the Scope of the Certified Design)
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
RCOL2_14.03.07-8
CTS-01174
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.07-14
CTS-01174
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1208
.
Rev
isio
n 1
21
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
Ap
pen
dix
A.1
NO
TE
:
Das
h (-
) in
dica
tes
no
t ap
plic
ab
le.
ES
WS
Blo
wd
ow
n M
ain
Hea
de
r Is
ola
tion
Va
lve
to C
WS
blo
wdo
wn
ma
in h
ead
er
EW
S-A
OV
-577
3Y
es
Yes
Yes
/No
Tra
nsfe
r C
lose
d
EC
CS
ac
tua
tion,
L
OO
P,
Pu
mp
st
op
, UH
S
ba
sin
low
w
ate
r le
vel,
Rem
ote
m
an
ual
Clo
sed
Ulti
ma
te h
ea
t sin
k ba
sin
wa
ter
leve
lU
HS
-LT
-20
700
10
A,B
,20
71
011
A,B
,207
20
12A
,B,2
073
013
A,B
-Y
es
-Y
es/
No
--
-
Ulti
ma
te h
ea
t sin
k ba
sin
te
mp
era
ture
UH
S-T
E-2
070
,20
71
,20
72,2
073
01
0, 0
11,
01
2, 0
13
-Y
es
-Y
es/
No
--
-
Tab
le A
.1-2
(S
hee
t 2
of
2)U
ltim
ate
Hea
t S
ink
Sys
tem
an
d E
sse
nti
al S
erv
ice
Wa
ter
Sys
tem
(Po
rtio
ns
Ou
tsid
e t
he
Sc
op
e o
f th
e C
erti
fied
Des
ign
)E
qu
ipm
ent
Ch
ara
cte
rist
ics
Eq
uip
men
t N
ame
Tag
No
.A
SM
E C
od
e
Se
cti
on
III
C
las
s
Se
ism
ic
Ca
teg
ory
I
Rem
ote
ly
Op
era
ted
V
alv
e
Cla
ss 1
E/Q
ua
l. F
or
Ha
rsh
E
nv
ir.
Ac
tiv
e
Sa
fety
F
un
cti
on
PS
MS
C
on
tro
l
Lo
ss
of
Mo
tiv
e
Po
wer
P
osi
tio
n
RC
OL2
_14
.03.
07-6
CT
S-0
1208
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix A.1
Revision 122
Table A.1-3
Ultimate Heat Sink System and Essential Service Water System (Portions Outside the Scope of the Certified Design) Equipment Alarms, Displays, and Control Functions
Equipment/Instrument Name MCR/RSC Alarm
MCR/RSC Display
MCR/RSCControl
Function
RSC Dis-play
Ultimate heat sink transfer pumps UHS-OMPP-001A, B, C, D No Yes Yes Yes
Ultimate heat sink cooling tower fansUHS-OEQMFN-001A, B, C, D, 002A, B, C, D No Yes Yes Yes
Ultimate heat sink transfer pump discharge valvesUHS-MOV-503A, B, C, D
No Yes Yes Yes
Ultimate heat sink transfer line basin inlet valvesUHS-MOV-506A, B, C, D
No Yes Yes Yes
Ultimate heat sink basin blowdown control valvesESW-HCV-2000, 2001, 2002, 2003010, 011, 012, 013
No Yes Yes Yes
Ultimate heat sink basin water level UHS-LT-2070010A, B, 2071 011A, B, 2072012A, B, 2073013A, B
Yes Yes YesNo Yes
Essential Service Water basin water temperature UHS-TE-2070, 2071, 2072, 2073010, 011, 012, 013 Yes Yes YesNo Yes
ESWP Discharge Strainer Backwash Isolation Valve to CWS blowdown main headerEWS-AOV-576A, B, C, D
No Yes Yes
ESWS Blowdown Main Header Isolation Valve to CWS blowdown main headerEWS-AOV-577
No Yes Yes
RCOL2_14.03.07-7
MAP-00-201
CTS-01208
Rev
isio
n 1
23
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
Ap
pen
dix
A.1
Fig
ure
A.1
-1U
ltim
ate
Hea
t S
ink
Sys
tem
an
d E
ssen
tial
Ser
vice
Wat
er S
yste
m
(Po
rtio
ns
Ou
tsid
e th
e S
cop
e o
f th
e C
erti
fied
Des
ign
)
CT
S-0
1208
3
A-E
SS
EN
TIA
L S
ER
VIC
E W
ATE
R P
UM
P
A-U
LTIM
ATE
H
EA
T SI
NK
TR
AN
SFE
R
PU
MP
A-U
LTIM
ATE
H
EA
T SI
NK
B
AS
IN
A-U
LTIM
ATE
HE
AT
SIN
K C
OO
LIN
G T
OW
ER
FA
N
MO
V-5
06A
MO
V-5
03A
3
EWS
-H
CV
-0
10
EWS
-VLV
-5
44A
3
EWS
-V
LV
-552
A
EWS
-VLV
-5
51A
N 3
EWS
A
-RE
TUR
N L
INE
EWS
A-S
UPP
LY
HE
AD
ER
LIN
E
FIRE
PRO
TEC
TIO
N W
ATER
SUP
PLY
SY
STEM
M
M
M
M
M
M
EWS
-AO
V-
576A
N
MAK
EU
P W
ATE
R
B-E
SSE
NTI
AL
SE
RVI
CE
W
ATE
R P
UM
P
B-U
LTIM
ATE
H
EA
T SI
NK
TR
AN
SFE
R
PU
MP
B-U
LTIM
ATE
H
EA
T S
INK
BAS
IN
B-U
LTIM
ATE
HE
AT
SIN
K
CO
OLI
NG
TO
WE
R F
AN
MO
V-5
06B
MO
V-5
03B
3
3
EWS
-HC
V
-011
EW
S -V
LV
-544
B
3
EWS
-VLV
-5
52B
EWS
-V
LV
-551
B
N 3
EWS
B-R
ETU
RN
LIN
E
EWS
B-S
UPP
LY
HE
AD
ER
LIN
E
FIR
E PR
OTE
CTIO
NW
ATER
SU
PPLY
SY
STEM
M
M
M
M
M
M
EWS
-AO
V-
576B
N
MA
KE
UP
WA
TER
C-E
SS
EN
TIA
L S
ER
VIC
E W
ATE
R P
UM
P
C-U
LTIM
ATE
H
EA
T SI
NK
TR
AN
SFE
R
PU
MP
C-U
LTIM
ATE
H
EA
T SI
NK
B
AS
IN
C-U
LTIM
ATE
HE
AT
SIN
K
CO
OLI
NG
TO
WE
R F
AN
MO
V-5
06C
MO
V-5
03C
3
3
EWS
-H
CV
-0
12
3
EWS
-V
LV
-552
C
EWS
-VLV
-5
51C
N 3
EWS
C
-RE
TUR
N L
INE
EWS
C-S
UP
PLY
H
EA
DE
R L
INE
FIRE
PRO
TECT
ION
WAT
ER S
UPPL
Y
SYST
EM
M
M
M
M
MM
EWS
-AO
V-
576C
N
MAK
EU
P W
ATE
R
D-E
SSE
NTI
AL
SE
RVI
CE
W
ATE
R P
UM
P
D-U
LTIM
ATE
H
EA
T S
INK
TRA
NS
FER
P
UM
P
D-U
LTIM
ATE
H
EA
T S
INK
BAS
IN
D-U
LTIM
ATE
HE
AT
SIN
K
CO
OLI
NG
TO
WE
R F
AN
MO
V-5
06D
MO
V-5
03D
3
3
EWS
-HC
V
-013
EW
S
-VLV
-5
44D
3
EWS
-VLV
-5
52D
EWS
-V
LV
-551
D
N 3
EWS
D-R
ETU
RN
LIN
E
EWS
D
-SU
PP
LY
HE
AD
ER
LIN
E
FIRE
PRO
TECT
ION
WAT
ER S
UPPL
Y
SYST
EM
M
M
M
M
MM
EWS
-AO
V-
576D
N
MA
KE
UP
W
ATE
R
BLO
WD
OW
N
N
3
EWS
-AO
V-
577
REM
ARK
S
yste
m n
ame
of v
alve
num
ber i
s om
itted
in th
is d
raw
ing.
UH
S-##
#-++
+
3 3
33
33
33
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix A.2
Revision 124
PART 10 - APPENDIX A.2
UHS ESW PUMP HOUSE VENTILATION SYSTEM
A.2.1 Design Description
The UHS ESW pump house ventilation system provides and maintains area design temperature limits in the UHS ESW pump houses during all plant operating, abnormal and accident conditions.
The UHS ESW pump house ventilation system is located within the UHS related structure.
There are four separate and independent UHS ESW pump houses and each has its own ventilation system.
1.a The functional arrangement of the UHS ESW pump house ventilation system is as described in the Design Description of Section A.2.1 and as shown in Figure A.2-1
1.b Each mechanical division of the UHS ESW pump house ventilation system (Division A, B, C & D) is physically separated from the other divisions so as not to preclude accomplishment of the safety function.
2. The seismic Category I equipment, identified in Table A.2-2, can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
3.a Class 1E equipment identified in Table A.2-2 is powered from its respective Class 1E division.
3.b. Separation is provided between redundant divisions of UHS ESW pump house ventilation system Class 1E cables, and between Class 1E cables and non-Class 1E cable.
4. The UHS ESW pump house ventilation system provides ventilation air to maintain area temperature within design limits in the UHS ESW pump houses during normal operations, abnormal and accident conditions of the plant.
5.a. Controls are provided in the MCR to start and stop the UHS ESW pump house ventilation system exhaust fans and unit heaters identified in Table A.2-3.
5.b. The UHS ESW pump house ventilation system exhaust fans and unit heaters identified in Table A.2-2 as having PSMS control, perform as active safety function after receiving a signal from PSMS.
6. Displays of the parameters identified in Table A.2-3 are provided in the MCR.
RCOL2_14.03.07-28
CTS-01174
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix A.2
Revision 125
7. Displays and controls identified in Table A.2-3 are provided in the RSC.
A.2.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table A.2-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteriaITAAC for the UHS ESW pump house ventilation system.
CTS-01174
CTS-01174
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix A.2
Revision 126
Table A.2-1 (Sheet 1 of 3)UHS ESW Pump House Ventilation System
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1.a The functional arrangement of the UHS ESW pump house ventilation system is as described in the Design Description of Section A.2.1 and as shown onin Figure A.2-1
1.a An iInspection of the as-built UHS ESW pump house ventilation system will be performed.
1.a The as-built the UHS ESW pump house ventilation system conforms withto the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section A.2.1 and as shown onin Figure A.2-1.
1.b Each mechanical division of the UHS ESW pump house ventilation system (Division A, B, C & D) is physically separated from the other divisions so as not to preclude accomplishment of the safety function.
1.b Inspections and analysis of the as-built UHEUHS ESW pump house ventilation system will be performed.
1.b EachA report exists and concludes that each mechanical division of the as-built UHS ESW pump house ventilation system is physically separated from other mechanical divisions by structural and/or fire barriersby spatial separation, barriers, or enclosures so as to assure that the functions of the safety related systems are maintained.
2. The seismic cCategory I equipment, identified in Table A.2-2, is designed tocan withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
2.a Inspections will be performed to verify that the as-built seismic cCategory I as-built equipment identified in Table A.2-2 is located in the UHS relateda seismic Category I structure.
2.a The as-built seismic cCategory I as-built equipment identified in Table A.2-2 is located in the UHS relateda seismic Category I structure.
2.b Type tests, and/or analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of the seismic cCategory I equipment identified in Table A.2-2 will be performed using analytical assumptions, or will be performed under conditions, which bound the seismic design basis requirements.
2.b The result of the type tests and/or analysesA report exists and concludes that the seismic cCategory I equipment identified in Table A.2-2 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
2.c Inspection and analyses will be performed to verify that on the as-built equipment identified in Table A.2-2, including anchorages, is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
2.c TheA report exists and concludes that the as-built seismic Category Iequipment identified in Table A.2-2, including anchorages, is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
CTS-01174
CTS-01174
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.07-3
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix A.2
Revision 127
3.a The Class 1E componentsequipment, identified in Table A.2-2, areis powered from theirits respective Class 1E division.
3.a A test will be performed on each division of the as-built Class 1E equipment identified in Table A.2-2UHS ESW pump house ventilation system by providing a simulated test signal only in eachthe Class 1E division under test.
3.a The simulated test signal exists only at the as-built Class 1E equipment identified in Table A.2 -2 under test in the as-built UHS ESW pump house ventilation system.
3.b. Separation is provided between redundant divisions of UHS ESW pump house ventilation system Class 1E divisionscables, and between Class 1E divisionscables and non-Class 1E cable.
3.b Inspections of the as-built Class 1E divisional cables and raceways will be performed.
3.b The as-built Class 1E electrical cables with only one division are routed in raceways assigned to the same division. There are no other safety division electrical cables in a raceway assigned to a different division.Physical separation or electrical isolation is provided in accordance with RG 1.75 between the redundant divisions of the as-built UHS ESW pump house ventilation system Class 1E cables and between Class 1E cables and non-Class 1E cables.
4. The UHS ESW pump house ventilation system provides ventilation air to maintain area temperature within design limitsprovides and maintains the proper environmental conditions within the respective roomUHS ESW pump houses during normal operations, abnormal and accident conditions of the plant.
4. Tests and analyses of the as-built UHS ESW pump house ventilation system will be performed for all four divisions.
4. TheA report exists and concludes that the as-built UHS ESW pump house ventilation system provides and maintains the proper environmental conditionsis capable of withinproviding ventilation air to maintain area temperature within design limits in the respective room by the exhaust fan and/or unit heater operationUHS ESW pump houses during normal operations, abnormal and accident conditions of the plant with outside ambient design temperature condition (i.e. -5°F - 115 °F).
5.a. Controls existare provided in the MCR to start and stop the UHS ESW pump house ventilation system exhaust fans and unit heaters identified in Table A.2-3.
5.a. Tests will be performed on the as-built exhaust fans and unit heaters identified in Table A.2-3 using controls in the as-built MCR.
5.a Controls exist in the as-built MCR operate to start and stop the as-built UHS ESW pump house ventilation system exhaust fans and unit heaters identified in Table A.2-3.
Table A.2-1 (Sheet 2 of 3)UHS ESW Pump House Ventilation System
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.07-22
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.07-4
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.07-1
RCOL2_14.03.07-15CTS-01174
RCOL2_09.04.05-15
RCOL2_14.03.07-16
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix A.2
Revision 128
5.b. The UHS ESW pump house ventilation system exhaust fans and unit heaters units identified in Table A.2-23 as having PSMS control, perform as active safety functionstart after receiving a signal from PSMS.
5.b. Tests will be performed on of the as-built UHS ESW pump house ventilation system exhaust fans and unit heaters identified in Table A.2-2 as having PSMSwill be performed using real or simulated signals.
5.b. The as-built UHS ESW pump house ventilation system exhaust fans and unit heaters identified in Table A.2-23 as having PSMS control, perform an active safety function identified in the table start after receiving a simulated signal.
6. Displays of the UHS ESW pump house ventilation system parameters identified in Table A.2-3 can be retrievedare provided in the MCR.
6. Inspections will be performed for retrievability of the as-built UHS ESW pump house ventilation system parametersdisplays identified in Table A.2-3 in the as-built MCR.
6. The dDisplays identified in Table A.2-3 can be retrieved in the as-built MCR.
7. Remote shutdown console (RSC) displays and/or controls provided for the UHS ESW pump house ventilation system are identified in Table A.2-3.Displays and controls identified in Table A.2-3 are provided in the RSC.
7.a Inspections will be performed on the as-built RSC displays and/or controls for the as-built UHS ESW pump house ventilation system.Inspections will be performed for retrievability of the displays identified in Table A.2-3 in the as-built RSC.
7.a The displays and/or controls exist on the as-built RSC as identified in Table A.2-3.Displays identified in Table A.2-3 can be retrieved in the as-built RSC.
7.b Tests of the as-built RSC control functions identified in Table A.2-3 will be performed.
7.b Controls in the as-built RSC operate the as-built equipment identified in Table A.2-3 with an RSC control function.
Table A.2-1 (Sheet 3 of 3)UHS ESW Pump House Ventilation System
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
CTS-01174
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.07-6
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.07-7
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.07-30
. .
Rev
isio
n 1
29
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
Ap
pen
dix
A.2
Tab
le A
.2-2
(S
hee
t 1
of
2)U
HS
ES
W P
um
p H
ou
se V
en
tila
tio
n S
yst
em E
qu
ipm
en
t C
har
act
eris
tic
s
Eq
uip
men
t N
ame
Tag
No
.
AS
ME
C
od
e S
ecti
on
III
Cla
ss
Sei
smic
C
ateg
ory
I
Rem
ote
ly
Op
era
ted
V
alve
Dam
per
Cla
ss
1E/
Qu
al. F
or
Ha
rsh
En
vir.
PS
MS
C
on
tro
l
Ac
tive
S
afet
y F
un
cti
on
Lo
ss o
f M
oti
ve
Po
we
r P
osi
tio
n
ES
W P
ump
Roo
m E
xhau
st
Fa
nV
RS
-OM
FN
-601
A,B
,C,D
-Y
es-
Yes
/No
Hig
h T
empe
ratu
reS
tart
-
UH
S T
ran
sfer
P
ump
Roo
m
Exh
aust
Fan
VR
S-O
MF
N-6
02A
,B,C
,D-
Yes
-Y
es/N
oH
igh
Tem
pera
ture
Sta
rt-
ES
W P
ump
Roo
m U
nit
Hea
ter
VR
S-O
EQ
ME
H-6
01A
,B,C
,D,
VR
S-O
EQ
ME
H-6
02A
,B,C
,D-
Yes
-Y
es/N
oLo
w
Tem
pera
ture
Sta
rt-
UH
S T
ran
sfer
P
ump
Roo
m
Uni
t Hea
ter
VR
S-O
EQ
ME
H-6
03A
,B,C
,D-
Yes
-Y
es/N
oLo
w
Tem
pera
ture
Sta
rt-
ES
W P
ump
Roo
m
Te
mp
erat
ure
switc
h
VR
S-T
S-8
03,
804,
805,
806
VR
S-T
S-8
23,
824,
825,
826
VR
S-T
S-8
43,
844,
845,
846
VR
S-T
S-8
63,
864,
865,
866
-Y
es-
Yes
/No
--
-
UH
S T
ran
sfer
P
ump
Roo
m
Te
mp
erat
ure
switc
h
VR
S-T
S-8
12,
813,
814,
815
VR
S-T
S-8
32,
833,
834,
835
VR
S-T
S-8
52,
853,
854,
855
VR
S-T
S-8
72,
873,
874,
875
-Y
es-
Yes
/No
--
-
ES
W P
ump
Roo
m A
ir In
take
G
ravi
ty T
ype
B
ackd
raft
Dam
per
VR
S-B
DD
-601
A,B
,C,D
-Y
es-
No/
No
-(1
)-
ES
W P
ump
Roo
m A
ir D
is-
char
ge G
ravi
ty
Type
Bac
kdra
ft D
ampe
r
VR
S-B
DD
-602
A,B
,C,D
-Y
es-
No/
No
-(1
)-
CT
S-0
1208
RC
OL2
_14
.03.
07-6
MA
P-0
0-20
1
RC
OL2
_09.
04.
05-1
4
RC
OL2
_14
.03.
07-7
RC
OL2
_14
.03.
07-2
1
RC
OL2
_09
.04
.05
-14
Rev
isio
n 1
30
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
Ap
pen
dix
A.2
(1)
Th
e ba
ckd
raft
dam
pers
are
pas
sive
co
mpo
nent
s th
at h
ave
the
saf
ety
func
tions
to o
pen
in th
e di
rect
ion
of a
irflo
w a
nd c
lose
by
coun
terb
ala
nce
whe
n no
air
flow
is p
rese
nt.
UH
S T
rans
fer
Pum
p R
oom
Air
Inta
ke G
ravi
ty
Type
Bac
kdra
ft D
ampe
r
VR
S-B
DD
-603
A,B
,C,D
-Y
es-
No/
No
-(1
)-
UH
S T
rans
fer
Pum
p A
ir D
is-
char
ge G
ravi
ty
Type
Bac
kdra
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ampe
rs
VR
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-604
A,B
,C,D
-Y
es-
No/
No
-(1
)-
Tab
le A
.2-2
(S
hee
t 2
of
2)U
HS
ES
W P
um
p H
ou
se V
en
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tio
n S
yst
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t C
har
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Eq
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t N
ame
Tag
No
.
AS
ME
C
od
e S
ecti
on
III
Cla
ss
Sei
smic
C
ateg
ory
I
Rem
ote
ly
Op
era
ted
V
alve
Dam
per
Cla
ss
1E/
Qu
al. F
or
Ha
rsh
En
vir.
PS
MS
C
on
tro
l
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tive
S
afet
y F
un
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on
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ss o
f M
oti
ve
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r P
osi
tio
nC
TS
-012
08
RC
OL2
_14
.03.
07-6
RC
OL2
_09.
04.
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Table A.2-3UHS ESW Pump House Ventilation System Equipment
Alarms, Displays, and Control Functions
Equipment/Instrument NameMCR/R
SC Alarm
MCR/RSC Display
MCR/RSCControl
Function
RSC Display
ESW Pump Room Exhaust Fan(VRS-OMFN-601A,B,C,D)
No Yes Yes Yes
UHS Transfer Pump Room Exhaust Fan(VRS-OMFN-602A,B,C,D)
No Yes Yes Yes
ESW Pump Room Unit Heater(VRS-OEQMEH-601A,B,C,D, VRS-OEQMEH-602A,B,C,D)
No Yes Yes Yes
UHS Transfer Pump Room Unit Heater(VRS-OEQMEH-603A,B,C,D)
No Yes Yes Yes
ESW Pump Room Temperature(VRS-TS-2610C,D,E,F, VRS-TS-2620C,D,E,F, VRS-TS-2630C,D,E,F, VRS-TS-2640C,D,E,F)
Yes No Yes No
UHS Transfer Pump Room Temperature( VRS-TS-2615C,D,E,F, VRS-TS-2625C,D,E,F, VRS-TS-2635C,D,E,F, VRS-TS-2645C,D,E,F)
Yes No Yes No
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Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
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ion
s
Ap
pen
dix
A.2
Fig
ure
A.2
-1U
HS
ES
W P
um
p H
ou
se V
enti
lati
on
Sys
tem
MA
P-0
0-20
1C
TS
-012
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Revision 133
PART 10 - APPENDIX A.3
PLANT-SPECIFIC STRUCTURES
A.3.1 Design Description
The site-specific structures are comprised of the UHS related structures (UHSRS), ESW pipe tunnel (ESWPT) and power source fuel storage vault (PSFSV), which are seismic Category I structures. The seismic Category I structures are designed and constructed to withstand design-basis loads without loss of structural integrity. Design basis loads are:
• Normal plant operation (including dead loads, live loads, lateral earth pressure loads, equipment loads, hydrodynamic loads temperature and equipment vibration)
• External events (including rain, snow, flood, tornado, tornado generated missiles and safe shutdown earthquake)
• Internal events (including flood, pipe rupture, equipment failure, and equipment failure generated missiles).
A.3.1.1 UHSRS
The UHSRS consists of an UHS cooling tower enclosure, UHS ESW pump houses, and an UHS basin. These structures are described below.
UHS cooling tower enclosures - Each UHS basin has one cooling tower with two cells. Each cell is enclosed by reinforced concrete structures that house the equipment required to cool the water used by the ESWS. The reinforced concrete wall separates the two cell enclosures. A reinforced concrete wall, running eastwest, separates the cell enclosure portion of the basin from the rest of the UHS basin. Air intakes serving the cooling towers are configured to protect the safety-related substructures and components from tornado missiles.
UHS ESW pump house - The pump house is an integral part of the UHS basin supported by UHS basin exterior and interior walls. Each pump house contains one ESW pump and one UHS transfer pump with associated auxiliaries. The pump bay (lowest portion of the pump house required for the pump suction) is deeper than the rest of the UHS basin. A reinforced concrete wall divides the pump house basin from the rest of the UHS basin and is configured to prevent postulated direct or deflected design basis tornado missiles from impacting safety related components located within the structure. There is a fire barrier between the UHS transfer pump and the UHS ESW pump of each UHS ESW pump house.
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UHS Basin - There are four basins for each unit and each basin has one cooling tower with two cells. Each basin is constructed of reinforced concrete and serves as a reservoir for the ESWS. Two basins share a common foundation mat and a reinforced concrete wall divides them.
A.3.1.2 ESWPT
The ESWPT is a reinforced concrete structure that runs from beneath the T/B to the UHSRS. The ESWPT is divided into two sections by a concrete wall. Each section contains both ESWS supply and return lines. The ESWPT structure is isolated from other structures to prevent seismic structural interaction.
A.3.1.3 PSFSV
The PSFSVs are reinforced concrete structures, which house the safety-related and non safety-related fuel oil tanks for the emergency power generators. There is one vault for each PS/B founded on separate reinforced concrete basemats. The vault contains three oil tanks, two safety-related and one non safety-related. Each tank is contained in a separate compartment separated by reinforced concrete walls. The top of the roof slab is at the finished plant grade elevation, with a concrete curb. The curb is provided to prevent vehicular traffic on the roof.
1. The structural configurations of the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV are as described in the Design Description of Section A.3, in Table A.3-2, and as shown in FSAR Figures 3.8-201 through 3.8-214.
2.a Divisional flood barriers are provided in the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV to protect against internal flooding.
2.b Deleted
3. Deleted
4. For the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV, external walls below flood level are as indicated in Table A.3-2 to protect against water seepage.
5.a Deleted
5.b Deleted
6. Penetrations in the external walls of the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV that are at or below design basis flood level are fitted with wate-tight seals to protect against external flooding.
7. Redundant safe shutdown components and associated electrical divisions of the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV are separated by 3-hour rated fire
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barriers to preserve the capability to safely shutdown the plant following a fire.
8. Penetrations and openings through the fire barriers of the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV are protected against fire.
9. The UHRS, ESWPT and PSFSV can withstand design-basis loads.
10. SSCs that require evaluation in the seismic fragilities task of a seismic margin analysis have high confidence of low probability of failure (HCLPF) values equal to or greater than the review level earthquake.
A.3.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table A.3-1 describes the inspections, tests analyses, and associated acceptance criteriaITAAC for the ultimate heat sinkUHS related structure (UHSRS), essential service waterESW pipe tunnel (ESWPT), and power source fuel storage vault (PSFSV).
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Table A.3-1 (Sheet 1 of 4)UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses
Acceptance Criteria
1. The structural configurations of the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV are as described in the Design Description of Section A.3, in Table A.3-2, and as shown in FSAR Figures 3.8-201 through 3.8-214 and Table A.3-2.
1. Inspections will be performed to verify that of the as-built structural configurations of the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV will be performedconform to the structural configurations as described in the Design Description of Section A.3, Table A.3-2, and as shown in Figures 3.8-201 through 3.8-214 .
1. The as-built design configurations of the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV conform to the structural configurations as described in Table A.3-2 and as shown in are reconciled with descriptions in FSAR Figures 3.8-201 through 3.8-214 and Table A.3-2 with the following construction tolerances..
1) Thickness of exterior walls below plant grade: +12 inches/- 1inch
2) Thickness of exterior walls above plant grade, and interior walls: +1/-1 inch
3) Thickness of floors: +1/-1 inch
4) Floor level: +1/-1 inch.
2.a Divisional flood barriers are provided in the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV to protect against the internal and external flooding.
2.a.iAn inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisional flood barriers exist in the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV.An analysis will be performed to verify the as-built divisional flood barriers of the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV are designed to protect against internal flooding
2.a.i A report exists and concludes that Tthe as-built divisional flood barriers exist at the appropriate locations in the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV against the internal and external floodingare designed to protect against internal flooding.
2.a.iiAn inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisional flood barriers are provided in the UHSRS, EWSPT and PSFSV to protect against internal flooding.
2.a.iiAs-built divisional flood barriers in the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV are provided to protect against internal flooding.
2.b Water-tight doors are provided in the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV to protect against the internal and external flooding.Deleted
2.b An inspection of the as-built water-tight doors will be performed.Deleted
2.b The as-built water-tight doors exist at the appropriate locations in the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV against the internal and external flooding.Deleted
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3. Penetrations in the divisional walls of the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV, except for water-tight doors, are provided appropriately against the internal and external flooding.Deleted
3. An inspection of the as-built penetrations will be performed.Deleted
3. The as-built penetrations in the divisional walls of the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV are installed at an acceptable level above the floor, and are sealed up to the internal and external flooding levels.Deleted
4. For the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV, external walls thicknessbelow flood level are as indicated in Table A.3-2 below flood level is provided to protect against water seepage.
4. An inspection will performed ofto verify that the as-built external walls below flood level thickness for the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV will be performedare as indicated in Table A.3-2.
4. For the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV, the as-built external walls below flood level are as indicated in Table A.3-2 below flood level are provided with adequate thickness to protect against water seepage.
5.a Flood barriers of the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV are installed up to the finished plant grade level to protect against water seepage.Deleted
5.a An inspection of the as-built flood barriers will be performed.Deleted
5.a he as-built flood barriers are installed up to the finished plant grade level for the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV to protect against water seepage.Deleted
5.b Flood doors and flood barriers penetrations of the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV are provided with flood protection features.Deleted
5.b Inspections of the as-built flood doors and flood penetrations will be performed.Deleted
5.b For the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV, the as-built flood doors and flood barrier penetrations are provided with flood protection features to protect against water seepage.Deleted
6. Penetrations in the external walls, including those up to the subgrade level if necessary, of the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV that are at or below design basis flood level are fitted with water-tight seals to protect against external floodingprovided with flood protection features below flood level.
6. An inspection will be performed to verify that the flood protection features of the as-built penetrations in the external walls of the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV exist below flood levelthat are at or below design basis flood level are fitted with water-tight seals.
6. The as-built penetrations in the external walls of the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV that are at or below design basis flood level are fitted with water-tight seals to protect against external flooding.of the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV are provided with flood protection features below flood level.
Table A.3-1 (Sheet 2 of 4)UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses
Acceptance Criteria
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7. Redundant safe shutdown components and associated electrical divisions of the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV are separated by 3-hour rated fire barriers to preserve the capability to safely shutdown the plant following a fire. The 3-hour rated fire barriers are placed as required by the FHA.
7. An inspection will be performed to verify that of the as-built 3-hour rated fire barriers will be performedare placed as required by the FHA.
7. Redundant safe shutdown components and associated electrical divisions of each as-built UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV are separated by 3-hour rated fire barriers to preserve the capability to safely shutdown the plant following a fire. The 3-hour rated as-built fire barriers are placed as required by the FHA.
8. All pPenetrations and openings through the fire barriers of the UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV are protected against fire.
8. An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built components are provided to protect the penetrations and openings through fire barriers identified in the FHA are sealed or can be closed with fire rated components consistent with the fire resistance rating of the associated barrier.
8. All aAs-built penetrations and openings through fire barriers identified in the FHA of the UHSRS, ESWPT and the PSFSV are protected against fire with 3-hour fire rated components (i.ee.g. fire doors in door openings, fire dampers in ventilation duct openings, and penetration seals) consistent with the fire resistance rating of the associated barrier.
9. The UHRS, ESWPT and PSFSV are designed based on the structuralcan withstand design-basis loads.
9.i An analysis will be performed to reconcile each as-built UHSRS with the design basis loads.An analysis will be performed to verify that the as-built UHRS, ESWPT and PSFSV, other than the PCCV, structural design-basis loads are reconciled.
9.i Design rReports exist and conclude that for theeach as-built UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV are designed in accordance with structuralcan withstand design-basis loads.
9.ii An analysis will be performed to reconcile each as-built ESWPT with the design basis loads.
9.ii Reports exist and conclude that each as-built ESWPT can withstand design-basis loads.
9.iii An analysis will be performed to reconcile each as-built PSFSV with the design basis loads.
9.iii Reports exist and conclude that each as-built PSFSV can withstand design-basis loads.
10. SSCs that require evaluation in the seismic fragilities task of a seismic margin analysis have high confidence of low probability of failure (HCLPF) values equal to or greater than the review level earthquake.
10.a Analyses will be performed to verify that the SSCs requiring evaluation in the seismic fragilities task of a seismic margin assessment have HCLPF values equal to or greater than the review level earthquake.
10.a Reports exist and conclude that the SSCs evaluated in the seismic fragilities task of the seismic margin assessment have HCLPF values equal to or greater than the review level earthquake.
Table A.3-1 (Sheet 3 of 4)UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses
Acceptance Criteria
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10.b Inspection and analysis will be performed to verify that as-built SSCs requiring evaluation in the seismic fragilities task of a seismic margin assessment are bounded by conditions used in the seismic margin assessment.
10.b A report exists and concludes that the as-built SSCs requiring evaluation in the seismic fragilities task of a seismic margin assessment are bounded by the conditions used in the seismic margin assessment.
Table A.3-1 (Sheet 4 of 4)UHSRS, ESWPT and PSFSV Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses
Acceptance Criteria
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Mat Slab - 793.08’ 2’-0” No
Exterior Wall (North) - From 788.50’ to 823.60’ 2’-6” No
Exterior Wall (South) - From 788.50’ to 822.60’ 2’-6” No
Exterior Wall (East Wall of East Vault and West Wall of West Vault)
- From 788.50’ to 823.60’ From 2’-6” to 4’-6”
No
Exterior Wall (West Wall of East Vault and East Wall of West Vault)
- From 788.50’ to 823.60’ From 2’-6” to 4’-6”
No
Roof Slab - From 822.00’ to 823.60’ 2’-0” No
Mat Slab - 788.50’ 6’-6” No
Table A.3-2 (Sheet 2 of 2)Definition of Wall Thicknesses for Safety-Related Structures: ESWPT
Wall or Section Description
Column Lines
Floor Elevation or Elevation Range
Concrete Thickness
Applicable
NOTE:Dash (-) indicates not applicable.
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PART 10 - APPENDIX A.4
OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM (PORTIONS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE CERTIFIED DESIGN)
A.4.1 Design Description
1. The electrical system has a minimum of two independent offsite transmission circuits from the transmission network (TN) to the safety buses with no intervening non-safety buses (direct connection).
2. The offsite TN voltage variations, during steady-state operation, do not cause voltage variations beyond an acceptable tolerance of the loads’ nominal ratings.
3. The offsite TN normal steady-state frequency is within an acceptable tolerance of 60Hz during recoverable periods of system instability.
4. The offsite transmission circuits have the capacity and capability to power the required loads during steady-state, transient, and postulated events and accident conditions.
5.a Independence between the offsite circuits and the onsite Class 1E electrical system and components is maintained.
5.b The offsite circuits are physically separated from the onsite Class 1E electrical system and components.
6. Lightning protection and grounding features are provided for the offsite circuits from the TN to the safety buses.
7. Alarms and displays for monitoring the switchyard equipment status can be retrieved in the MCR.
8. If power through the normal preferred power supply is not available, the offsite electrical system has the capability to automatic fast transfer to the alternate preferred power supply if available.
9. The switchyard agreement and protocols between NPP and the TN system owner/operator assess the risk and probability of a loss of offsite power due to performing maintenance activities on the electrical system.
10. The probability of losing electric power from any of the remaining supplies as a result of, or coincident with, the loss of power generated by the nuclear unit, the loss of power from the TN, or the loss of power from the onsite electric power supplies, is minimized.
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A.4.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table A.4-1 describes the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteriaITAAC for the Offsite power system portions outside the scope of the certified design.
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Table A.4-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)Offsite Power System
(Portions Outside the Scope of the Certified Design)Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1. The electrical system has a minimum of two independent offsite transmission circuits from the transmission network (TN) to the safety buses with no intervening non-safety buses (direct connection).
1. Inspection of the as-built transmission circuits will be performed.
1. The as-built electrical system has two independent offsite transmission circuits from the TN to the safety buses with no intervening non-safety buses (direct connection).
2. The offsite TN voltage variations, during steady-state operation, does not cause voltage variations beyond an acceptable tolerance of the loads’ nominal ratings.
2. Analyses of the as-built offsite TN voltage variability and steady state load requirements will be performed.
2. A report exists and concludes that the as-built offsite TN, during steady state operation, does not cause voltage variations beyond design limits.
3. The offsite TN normal steady state frequency is within an acceptable tolerance of 60Hz during recoverable periods of system instability.
3. Analyses of the as-built offsite TN normal steady state frequency will be performed.
3. A report exists and concludes that the as-built TN normal steady state frequency is within design frequency limits during recoverable periods of instability.
4. The offsite transmission circuits have the capacity and capability to power the required loads during steady state, transient, and postulated events and accident conditions.
4. Analyses of the as-built offsite transmission circuits from the TN to the safety buses will be performed.
4. A report exists and concludes that the as-built offsite transmission circuits have the capacity and capability to power the required loads during steady state, transient, and postulated events and accident conditions.
5.a Independence between the offsite circuits and the onsite Class 1E electrical system and components is maintained.
5.a Tests and analyses on the as-built offsite circuits and onsite class 1E electrical system and components will be performed.
5.a There is electrical independence between the as-built offsite circuits are isolated fromand the onsite Class 1E electrical system and components.
5.b The offsite circuits are physically separated from the onsite Class 1E electrical system and components.
5.b Inspections of the as-built offsite circuits and onsite Class 1E electrical system and components will be performed.
5.b The as-built offsite circuits are physically separated from the as-built onsite Class 1E electrical system and components.
6. Lightning protection and grounding features are provided for the offsite circuits from the TN to the safety buses.
6. Inspection of the as-built offsite circuits from the TN to the safety buses will be performed.
6. Lightning protection and grounding features exist for the system and components of the offsite circuits from the TN to the safety buses.
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7. MCR aAlarms and displays for monitoring the switchyard equipment status can be retrieved in the MCR.
7. Inspection will be performed for the retrievability of the as-built switchyard equipment status in the as-built MCR.
7. MCR aAlarms and displays for monitoring the switchyard equipment status can be retrieved in the as-built MCR.
8. If power through the preferred power supply is not available, the offsite electrical system has the capability to automatic fast transfer to the non-preferred power supply if available.
8. Inspection of the as-built offsite electrical system will be performed.
8. The as-built offsite electrical system is automatically transferred to the non-preferred power supply in power is not available through the preferred power supply.
9. The Sswitchyard agreement and protocols between the NPP and the TN system owner/operator/owner assess the risk and probability of a loss of offsite power due to performing maintenance activities on the electrical system.
9. Inspection of the switchyard agreement and protocols between the NPP and the TN owner/operator will be performed.
9. The switchyard agreement and protocols between the NPP and the TN owner/operator assess the risk and probability of a loss of offsite power due to performing maintenance activities on the electrical system.
10. The offsite electrical system (switchyard) design assesses the probability of losing electric power as a result of or coincident with, the loss of power generated by the nuclear unit, the loss of power from the TN, or the loss of the largest load.The probability of losing electric power from any of the remaining supplies as a result of, or coincident with, the loss of power generated by the nuclear unit, the loss of power from the TN, or the loss of power from the onsite electric power supplies, is minimized.
10. Analyses of the as-built offsite electrical system for transient stability will be performed.
10. A report exists and concludes that the as-built offsite electrical system design assesses the probability of losing electric power as a result of or coincident with the loss of power generated by the nuclear unit, the loss of power from the TN, or the loss of the largest load.A report exists and concludes that the probability of losing electric power from any of the remaining supplies as a result of, or coincident with the loss of power generated by the nuclear unit, the loss of power from the TN, or the loss of power from the onsite electric power supplies, is minimized.
Table A.4-1 (Sheet 2 of 2)Offsite Power System
(Portions Outside the Scope of the Certified Design)Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
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PART 10 - APPENDIX A.5
PLANT-SPECIFIC PROCESS EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITORING AND SAMPLING (PERMS)
1. The PERMS includes the radiation monitors as identified in Table A.5-2.
A.5.1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table A.5-1 specifies the ITAAC for the plant-specific PERMS.
Table A.5-1Process Effluent Radiation Monitoring and Sampling System
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table A.5-2Process Effluent Radiation Monitoring and Sampling System
Equipment Characteristics
Note 1: The monitor is located adjacent to Startup Generator Blowdown Equipment shown in FSAR Figure 1.2-1R (Sheet 2 of 2)
Note 2: The monitor is located adjacent to radwaste evaporator pond shown in FSAR Figure 1.2-1R (Sheet 1 of 2)
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses
Acceptance Criteria
1. The PERMS includes the radiation monitors as identified in Table A.5-2.
1. An inspection will be performed of the as-built radiation monitors identified in Table A.5-2.
1. The as-built PERMS include the radiation monitors as identified in Table A.5-2.
PERMS Monitor Name
Detector Number Safety Related
Seismic Category I
Class 1E/Harsh
Location
Startup Steam Generator Blowdown Heat Exchanger Downstream Radiation Monitor
RMS-RE-110 No No No/No (Note 1)
Evaporation Pond Discharge Radiation Monitor
RMS-RE-111 No No No/No (Note 2)
RCOL2_11.05-2
CTS-01174
CTS-01174
CTS-01208
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix A.6
Revision 147
PART 10 - APPENDIX A.6
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (PORTIONS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE CERTIFIED DESIGN)
A.6.1 Design Description
1. The seismic standpipe system can be supplied from a seismic Category I water source (ESWS) with a capacity of at least 18,000 gallons.
2. The fire protection system water supply is from two separate, reliable freshwater sources (the two fire water storage tanks).
A.6.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table A.6-1 describes the ITAAC for the Fire Protection System (portions outside the scope of the certified design).
Table A.6-1Fire Protection System (Portions outside the Scope of the
Certified Design) Inspections, Test, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses
Acceptance Criteria
1. The seismic standpipe system can be supplied from a seismic Category I water source (ESWS) with a capacity of at least 18,000 gallons.
1. Tests and analyses will be performed on the as-built system to confirm the ability of the ESWS to supply water to the seismic standpipes system.
1. A report exists and concludes that the seismic standpipe system is supplied with water from the ESWS with a capacity of at least 18,000 gallons.
2. The fire protection system water supply is from two separate, reliable freshwater sources (the two fire water storage tanks).
2. Tests will be performed to confirm the ability of the as-built fire water storage tanks to separately provide water to the fire protection water supply system.
2. The fire protection system is supplied with freshwater from two separate reliable freshwater sources.
CTS-01174
Rev
isio
n 1
50
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
1 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
1.0
Ass
ign
me
nt
of
Res
po
nsi
bil
ity
– O
rga
niz
atio
nal
Co
ntr
ol
10 C
FR
50.
47(b
)(1
) –
Prim
ary
resp
onsi
bilit
ies
for
emer
gen
cy
resp
onse
by
the
nuc
lea
r fa
cilit
y lic
ense
e, a
nd b
y S
tate
and
loca
l or
gani
zatio
ns
with
in th
e E
PZ
s ha
ve
bee
n as
sign
ed, t
he e
me
rgen
cy
resp
onsi
bilit
ies
of th
e va
rious
su
ppor
ting
org
aniz
atio
ns h
ave
bee
n sp
ecifi
cally
est
abl
ish
ed, a
nd e
ach
pr
inci
ple
resp
onse
org
aniz
atio
n h
as
sta
ff to
res
pond
an
d to
au
gmen
t its
in
itia
l res
pon
se o
n a
cont
inu
ous
basi
s.
1.1
The
sta
ff ex
ists
to p
rovi
de
24-h
our
per
day
em
erge
ncy
resp
onse
and
man
nin
g of
co
mm
uni
catio
ns li
nks,
incl
udin
g co
ntin
uou
s op
era
tions
for
a
prot
ract
ed
perio
d. [A
.1.e
, A.4
]
1.1
An
insp
ectio
n of
the
e
me
rgen
cy p
lan
proc
edu
res
will
b
e p
erfo
rmed
.
1.1
Em
erg
ency
pla
n pr
oced
ures
pr
ovid
e fo
r 24
-hou
r pe
r da
y em
erge
ncy
resp
onse
sta
ffing
an
d m
ann
ing
of c
omm
unic
atio
ns
links
, inc
ludi
ng
cont
inuo
us
ope
ratio
ns fo
r a
pro
tra
cted
pe
riod.
2.0
On
site
Em
erg
enc
y O
rgan
izat
ion
10 C
FR
50.
47(b
)(2
) –
On
-shi
ft fa
cilit
y lic
ense
e re
spon
sibi
litie
s fo
r em
erge
ncy
resp
onse
are
un
am
big
uou
sly
defin
ed, a
deq
uate
st
affi
ng to
pro
vide
initi
al f
aci
lity
acci
dent
res
pon
se in
key
func
tion
al
area
s is
mai
ntai
ned
at a
ll tim
es,
time
ly a
ugm
enta
tion
of r
esp
onse
ca
pabi
litie
s is
ava
ilab
le, a
nd th
e in
terf
aces
am
ong
va
rious
ons
ite
resp
onse
act
iviti
es a
nd o
ffsite
su
ppor
t an
d re
spon
se a
ctiv
itie
s a
re
spec
ifie
d.
2.1
The
sta
ff ex
ists
to p
rovi
de
min
imum
and
aug
men
ted
on
-shi
ft st
affin
g le
vels
, con
sist
ent
with
Tab
le B
-1 o
f N
UR
EG
-065
4/F
EM
A-R
EP
-1,
Rev
. 1. [
B.5
, B
.7]
2.1
An
insp
ectio
n of
the
e
me
rgen
cy p
lan
proc
edu
res
will
b
e p
erfo
rmed
.
2.1
Em
erg
ency
pla
n pr
oced
ures
pr
ovid
e m
inim
um a
nd
aug
me
nted
on
-sh
ift s
taffi
ng
leve
ls, c
onsi
sten
t with
Tab
le II
-2
of th
e C
om
anch
e P
eak
Nu
clea
r P
ower
Pla
nt U
nits
3 &
4
Com
bine
d Li
cens
e (C
OL)
A
pplic
atio
n E
mer
genc
y P
lan.
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
Rev
isio
n 1
51
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
3.0
Em
erg
ency
Res
po
nse
Su
pp
ort
an
d R
eso
urc
es
10 C
FR
50.
47(b
)(3
) –
Arr
ang
eme
nts
for
req
uest
ing
an
d e
ffe
ctiv
ely
usi
ng a
ssis
tanc
e re
sour
ces
ha
ve b
ee
n m
ad
e,
arra
nge
men
ts t
o a
cco
mm
od
ate
Sta
te a
nd lo
cal s
taff
at t
he
lice
nsee
’s n
ear
-site
Em
erge
ncy
O
pe
ratio
ns F
acili
ty h
ave
be
en
mad
e, a
nd o
ther
org
aniz
atio
ns
capa
ble
of
aug
me
ntin
g t
he
pla
nne
d re
spon
se h
ave
be
en
iden
tifie
d.
Not
use
d. P
rovi
ded
for
cons
iste
ncy
with
Reg
. Gui
de
1.20
6 T
able
C.II
.1-B
1 E
mer
genc
y P
lann
ing—
Gen
eric
In
spec
tion,
Tes
t, A
naly
sis,
an
d A
ccep
tanc
e C
riter
ia
(EP
-IT
AA
C)
ITA
AC
nu
mbe
ring
sche
me.
Not
use
d. P
rovi
ded
for
cons
iste
ncy
with
Reg
. Gui
de
1.20
6 T
able
C.II
.1-B
1 E
mer
genc
y P
lann
ing—
Gen
eric
In
spec
tion,
Tes
t, A
naly
sis,
an
d A
ccep
tanc
e C
riter
ia
(EP
-IT
AA
C)
ITA
AC
nu
mbe
ring
sche
me.
Not
use
d. P
rovi
ded
for
cons
iste
ncy
with
Reg
. Gui
de
1.20
6 T
able
C.II
.1-B
1 E
mer
genc
y P
lann
ing—
Gen
eric
In
spec
tion,
Tes
t, A
naly
sis,
an
d A
ccep
tanc
e C
riter
ia
(EP
-IT
AA
C)
ITA
AC
nu
mbe
ring
sche
me.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
2 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
Rev
isio
n 1
52
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
14.0
Em
erg
ency
Cla
ssi
fica
tio
n S
yste
m
10 C
FR
50.
47(b
)(4
) –
A s
tan
dard
em
erge
ncy
clas
sific
atio
n an
d ac
tion
leve
l sch
eme,
the
base
s o
f whi
ch
incl
ude
faci
lity
syst
em a
nd e
fflue
nt
para
me
ters
, is
in u
se b
y th
e n
ucle
ar
faci
lity
lice
nsee
, and
Sta
te a
nd lo
cal
resp
onse
pla
ns
call
for
relia
nce
on
info
rmat
ion
prov
ide
d b
y fa
cilit
y lic
ense
es fo
r d
ete
rmin
atio
ns
of
min
imum
initi
al o
ffsite
res
pons
e m
easu
res.
14.1
A s
tand
ard
emer
genc
y cl
assi
ficat
ion
and
em
erge
ncy
actio
n le
vel (
EA
L) s
chem
e ex
ists
, an
d id
entif
ies
faci
lity
syst
em a
nd
efflu
ent p
aram
eter
s co
nstit
utin
g th
e ba
ses
for
the
cla
ssifi
catio
n sc
hem
e. [D
.1**
]
[**D
.1 c
orr
espo
nds
to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
ev
alu
atio
n cr
iteria
.]
14.
1 A
n in
spec
tion
of t
he
cont
rol
roo
m, t
ech
nica
l su
ppo
rt c
ente
r (T
SC
), a
nd e
me
rgen
cy
ope
ratio
ns
faci
lity
(EO
F)
will
be
p
erfo
rme
d to
ver
ify th
at th
ey
have
dis
play
s fo
r re
trie
ving
fa
cilit
y sy
stem
and
effl
uent
pa
ram
eter
s in
spe
cific
E
mer
genc
y A
ctio
n Le
vels
(EA
Ls)
iden
tifie
d in
the
follo
win
g lis
t of
EA
Lsth
at c
ons
titu
te th
e b
ases
fo
r th
e cl
assi
ficat
ion
sche
me
in A
ppe
ndi
x 1,
Sec
tion
5, o
f the
C
oma
nch
e P
eak
Un
its 3
an
d 4
CO
L E
mer
gen
cy P
lan:
EA
Ls
in E
mer
gen
cy P
lan
A
pp
end
ix 1
, Sec
tio
n 5
Abn
orm
al R
ad L
evel
s/R
adi
olog
ical
E
fflue
nt:
14.1
.1 A
re
port
exi
sts
that
co
nfirm
s tT
he s
peci
fic
para
me
ters
iden
tifie
d in
the
E
AL
s in
Em
erg
en
cy P
lan
A
pp
end
ix 1
, S
ect
ion
5 h
ave
bee
n re
trie
ved
and
disp
laye
d in
th
e co
ntro
l ro
om, T
SC
, and
EO
F.
14.1
.2 A
rep
ort e
xist
s th
at
conf
irms
tTh
e ra
nges
ava
ilabl
e in
th
e co
ntro
l ro
om, T
SC
, and
EO
F
enco
mp
asse
d th
e va
lues
for
the
spec
ific
para
me
ters
iden
tifie
d in
th
e E
AL
s in
Em
erg
en
cy P
lan
A
pp
end
ix 1
, S
ect
ion
5.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
3 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
53
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
1.1
(co
ntin
ued
)A
U1
EA
Ls #
1, 2
, A
U2
EA
L #1
, AA
1 E
ALs
#1,
2, A
A2
EA
L #2
, AA
3 E
AL
#1,
AS
1 E
AL
#1, A
G1
EA
L #1
Co
ld S
hutd
own/
Ref
uelin
g S
yste
m
Mal
func
tion:
CU
1, C
U2,
CU
3, C
U4,
CU
7, C
U8,
C
A1,
CA
3, C
A4,
CS
1, C
G1
Fis
sion
Pro
duct
Bar
rier
Thr
esho
lds:
Fue
l Cla
d B
arr
ier
Thr
esho
ld V
alue
s2.
Pri
mar
y C
oola
nt A
ctiv
ity L
evel
3. C
ore
Exi
t The
rmo
coup
le R
ead
ing
s4.
Rea
ctor
Ves
sel W
ater
Lev
el6.
Con
tain
men
t Rad
iatio
n M
onito
ring
RC
S B
arrie
r T
hres
hold
Val
ues
2. R
CS
Lea
k R
ate
4. S
G T
ube
Rup
ture
6. C
onta
inm
ent R
adia
tion
Mon
itorin
gC
ont
ainm
ent
Bar
rier
Thr
esho
ld
Val
ues
2. C
onta
inm
ent P
ress
ure
3. C
ore
Exi
t The
rmo
coup
le R
ead
ing
s4.
SG
Sec
onda
ry S
ide
Rel
ease
with
P
-to-
S L
eaka
ge5.
Con
tain
men
t Iso
latio
n F
ailu
re o
r B
ypas
s6.
Con
tain
men
t Rad
iatio
n M
onito
ring
Ha
zard
s a
nd O
ther
Con
ditio
ns
Affe
ctin
g P
lan
t Sa
fety
:H
U1
EA
L #1
, HA
1 E
AL
#1
Sys
tem
Mal
fun
ctio
ns:
SU
1, S
U4,
SU
8, S
A2,
SA
4, S
A5,
S
S1,
SS
2, S
S3,
SS
6, S
G1,
SG
2
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
4 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
Rev
isio
n 1
54
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
25.0
No
tifi
cati
on
Me
tho
ds
and
Pro
ced
ure
s
10 C
FR
50.
47(b
)(5
) –
Pro
ced
ures
ha
ve b
een
est
ablis
hed
for
notif
icat
ion,
by
the
lice
nsee
, of S
tate
an
d lo
cal r
espo
nse
orga
niz
atio
ns
and
for
notif
icat
ion
of e
mer
gen
cy
pers
onne
l by
all o
rgan
izat
ions
; th
e co
nten
t of i
nitia
l and
follo
w-u
p m
essa
ges
to r
espo
nse
or
gani
zatio
ns
and
the
pub
lic h
as
bee
n es
tabl
ish
ed; a
nd m
ean
s to
pr
ovid
e ea
rly n
otifi
catio
n an
d cl
ear
inst
ruct
ion
to th
e p
opu
lace
with
in
the
plum
e e
xpos
ure
path
way
E
mer
gen
cy P
lan
ning
Zon
e ha
ve
bee
n es
tabl
ish
ed
25.1
Th
e m
ean
s ex
ist t
o no
tify
resp
onsi
ble
Sta
te a
nd lo
cal
orga
niz
atio
ns
with
in 1
5 m
inut
es
afte
r th
e lic
ens
ee d
ecl
ares
an
emer
gen
cy. [
E.1
]
25.
1 A
test
will
be
perf
orm
ed o
f th
e ca
pab
ility
to b
egin
initi
al
not
ifica
tion
to S
tate
and
loca
l o
rgan
iza
tions
no
late
r th
an 1
5
min
utes
afte
r th
e Lu
min
ant
d
ecla
res
an e
me
rgen
cy.
25.1
A r
epo
rt e
xist
s an
d co
nclu
des
that
con
firm
s co
mm
unic
atio
ns h
ave
been
es
tabl
ishe
d v
ia a
de
dica
ted
ci
rcui
t bet
wee
n th
e c
ont
rol r
oom
an
d th
e fo
llow
ing
ag
enci
es
and
no
tific
atio
ns
beg
an n
o la
ter
than
15
min
ute
s a
fter
the
de
cla
ratio
n o
f a
n em
erg
ency
:•
Som
erve
ll C
ount
y S
her
iff o
r D
ispa
tch
er•
Hoo
d C
oun
ty S
herif
f or
Dis
patc
her
•T
exa
s D
epar
tmen
t of P
ublic
S
afet
y
25.2
Th
e m
ean
s ex
ist t
o no
tify
emer
gen
cy r
esp
onse
pe
rso
nnel
. [E
.2]
25.
2 A
test
will
be
perf
orm
ed o
f th
e ca
pab
ilitie
s.25
.2 A
re
port
exi
sts
and
conc
lude
s th
at c
onfir
ms
notif
icat
ion
to m
obili
ze
CP
NP
Pth
e C
om
an
che
Pea
k U
nits
3 a
nd
4 em
erg
ency
re
spon
se o
rgan
izat
ion
ha
s b
een
perf
orm
ed.
NO
TE
: Con
firm
atio
n of
the
abi
lity
to m
obili
ze th
e C
om
anc
he P
eak
Uni
ts 3
and
4 e
mer
gen
cy
resp
onse
org
aniz
atio
n is
ad
dre
ssed
in A
ccep
tan
ce
Crit
erio
n 14
.1.1
.2.B
.1.b
.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
5 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
55
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
25.3
Th
e m
ean
s ex
ist t
o no
tify
and
pro
vide
inst
ruct
ion
s to
the
pop
ulac
e w
ithin
the
plum
e ex
posu
re E
PZ
. [E
.6]
25.
3 N
OT
E: T
he
requ
ired
test
is
incl
uded
in In
spec
tion
s, T
est
s,
Ana
lyse
s 81
4.1.
2 5.3
NO
TE
: The
mea
ns
to n
otify
an
d p
rovi
de in
stru
ctio
ns to
the
pop
ula
ce w
ithin
the
plu
me
ex
posu
re p
athw
ay
EP
Z a
re
add
ress
ed b
y A
cce
ptan
ce
Crit
eria
81
4.1.
1.2.
36.0
Em
erg
ency
Co
mm
un
icat
ion
s
10 C
FR
50.
47(b
)(6
) –
Pro
visi
ons
ex
ist f
or p
rom
pt c
omm
uni
catio
ns
amon
g p
rinci
pal
res
pon
se
orga
niza
tion
s to
em
erge
ncy
pers
onne
l an
d to
the
publ
ic.
36.1
Th
e m
ean
s ex
ist f
or
com
mu
nica
tions
am
ong
the
cont
rol r
oom
, TS
C, E
OF
, pr
inci
pal S
tate
and
loca
l em
erge
ncy
op
erat
ion
s ce
nte
rs
(EO
Cs)
, and
rad
iolo
gic
al fi
eld
as
sess
men
t tea
ms.
[F.1
.d]
NO
TE
: Tie
r 1
of th
e U
S-A
PW
R
Des
ign
Con
trol
Doc
um
ent
(D
CD
), R
ev.
0, a
ddre
sses
this
E
P P
rogr
am
Ele
me
nt in
the
fo
llow
ing
Des
ign
Com
mitm
ent
s (D
C):
•T
able
.2.7
.6.1
0-1,
DC
#2
•T
able
2.9
-1, D
C #
7l
36.
1 A
test
of t
he
as-b
uilt
com
mun
icat
ions
sys
tem
will
be
per
form
ed.
NO
TE
: For
com
mun
ica
tions
a
mo
ngbe
twee
n th
e co
ntro
l roo
m,
and
TS
C ,
and
from
the
con
tro
l ro
om a
nd T
SC
to
the
EO
F,
prin
cipa
l Sta
te a
nd
loca
l e
me
rgen
cy o
pera
tions
ce
nte
rEO
Cs,
and
rad
iolo
gic
al
field
ass
essm
ent
team
s, T
ier
1 of
th
e U
S-A
PW
R D
esi
gn C
ontr
ol
Do
cum
ent (
DC
D),
Rev
. 0,
add
ress
es th
e fo
llow
ing
Insp
ectio
ns, T
ests
, A
naly
seis
:•
Tab
le.2
.7.6
.10-
1, It
emD
C #
2•
Tab
le 2
.9-1
, Ite
m #
7l
36.1
A r
epo
rt e
xist
s an
d co
nclu
des
that
co
mm
unic
atio
ns
are
esta
blis
hed
bet
wee
n th
e E
OF
and
prin
cipa
l Sta
te a
nd
loca
l EO
Cs,
and
rad
iolo
gica
l fie
ld
asse
ssm
ent t
eam
s.
NO
TE
: For
com
mu
nica
tions
am
ong
betw
een
the
cont
rol
room
,and
TS
C, a
nd
from
the
cont
rol a
nd
TS
C to
the
EO
F,
prin
cipa
l Sta
te a
nd lo
cal
emer
genc
y o
pera
tions
ce
nter
EO
Cs,
an
d ra
diol
ogic
al
field
ass
essm
ent t
eam
s, T
ier 1
of
the
US
-AP
WR
Des
ign
Con
trol
D
ocum
ent
(D
CD
), R
ev. 0
, ad
dre
sses
the
follo
win
g A
ccep
tanc
e C
riter
iaon
:•
Tab
le.2
.7.6
.10-
1, It
em
DC
#2
•T
abl
e 2.
9-1
, Ite
m #
7l
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
6 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
56
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
36.2
Th
e m
ean
s ex
ist f
or
com
mu
nica
tions
from
the
con
trol
ro
om, T
SC
, and
EO
F to
the
NR
C
hea
dqua
rter
s an
d r
egi
onal
offi
ce
EO
Cs
(incl
udi
ng e
sta
blis
hm
ent
of
the
Em
erge
ncy
Re
spon
se
Dat
a S
yste
m (
ER
DS
) b
etw
een
th
e on
site
com
pute
r sy
stem
and
th
e N
RC
Ope
ratio
ns C
ente
r.)
[F.1
.f]
NO
TE
: Tie
r 1
of th
e U
S-A
PW
R
Des
ign
Con
trol
Doc
um
ent
(D
CD
), R
ev.
0, a
ddre
sses
this
E
P P
rogr
am
Ele
me
nt in
the
fo
llow
ing
Des
ign
Com
mitm
ent
s (D
C):
•T
able
.2.7
.6.1
0-1,
DC
#3
•T
able
2.1
0-1
, DC
#4
36.
2 A
test
of t
he a
s-b
uilt
com
mun
icat
ions
sys
tem
will
be
per
form
ed.
NO
TE
: Fo
r com
mun
icat
ions
fro
m
the
cont
rol r
oom
, and
TS
C, a
nd
EO
F to
the
NR
C h
ead
quar
ters
a
nd r
egio
nalR
egio
n IV
offi
ce
EO
Cs
(inc
lud
ing
esta
blis
hmen
t o
f th
e E
RD
S [o
r its
su
cce
sso
r sy
stem
] bet
we
en th
e on
site
co
mpu
ter
syst
em a
nd th
e N
RC
O
pera
tions
Cen
ter)
,Tie
r 1
of th
e U
S-A
PW
R D
esi
gn C
ontr
ol
Do
cum
ent (
DC
D),
Rev
. 0,
add
ress
es th
e fo
llow
ing
Insp
ectio
ns, T
ests
, A
naly
seis
: •
Tab
le.2
.7.6
.10-
1, D
C #
3•
Tab
le 2
.10-
1, D
C #
4
36.2
A
rep
ort e
xist
s an
d co
nclu
des
that
co
mm
unic
atio
ns
are
esta
blis
hed
from
the
EO
F to
th
e N
RC
hea
dqu
arte
rs a
nd
Reg
ion
IV o
ffice
EO
Cs.
NO
TE
: Fo
r co
mm
unic
atio
ns
from
th
e co
ntro
l roo
m, a
nd T
SC
, and
E
OF
to th
e N
RC
he
adqu
arte
rs
and
re
gion
alR
egi
on IV
offi
ce
EO
Cs
(incl
udin
g es
tabl
ish
men
t of
the
ER
DS
[or
its
succ
esso
r sy
stem
] bet
wee
n th
e on
site
co
mpu
ter
syst
em a
nd th
e N
RC
O
per
atio
ns
Ce
nter
),T
ier
1 of
the
U
S-A
PW
R D
esig
n C
ontr
ol
Doc
ume
nt (
DC
D),
Rev
. 0,
add
ress
es th
e fo
llow
ing
Acc
epta
nce
Crit
eria
on:
•T
able
.2.7
.6.1
0-1,
DC
#3
•T
abl
e 2.
10-1
, DC
#4
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
7 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
Rev
isio
n 1
57
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
47.0
Pu
blic
Ed
uca
tio
n a
nd
In
form
atio
n
10 C
FR
50.
47(b
)(7)
– In
form
atio
n is
m
ade
ava
ilab
le to
the
pub
lic o
n a
pe
riodi
c ba
sis
on h
ow th
ey w
ill b
e
notif
ied
an
d w
hat
thei
r in
itia
l act
ion
s sh
ould
be
in a
n e
me
rgen
cy (
e.g.
, lis
teni
ng to
a lo
cal b
road
cast
sta
tion
and
rem
ain
ing
indo
ors)
, the
pr
inci
pal p
oin
ts o
f con
tact
with
the
new
s m
edia
for
diss
em
inat
ion
of
info
rmat
ion
dur
ing
an
em
erge
ncy
(in
clu
ding
the
phy
sica
l lo
catio
n or
lo
catio
ns)
are
est
abl
ish
ed in
ad
vanc
e, a
nd p
roce
dur
es fo
r co
ordi
nate
d di
sse
min
atio
n o
f in
form
atio
n to
the
pub
lic a
re
esta
blis
hed.
47.1
Th
e lic
ense
e ha
s pr
ovid
ed
spac
e w
hich
ma
y be
use
d fo
r a
limite
d nu
mb
er o
f the
ne
ws
me
dia
at th
e E
OF
. [G
.3.b
]
47.
1 A
n in
spec
tion
of t
he
Join
t In
form
atio
n C
ent
er w
ill b
e pe
rfor
me
d to
ver
ify th
at s
pace
is
pro
vide
d fo
r a
limite
d n
um
ber
of
the
new
s m
edia
.
47.1
A r
epor
t exi
sts
that
con
firm
s tT
he J
oint
Info
rmat
ion
Cen
ter
has
spac
e fo
r ap
pro
xim
atel
y 75
m
edia
per
sonn
elbe
en lo
cate
d in
th
e G
ranb
ury
City
Ha
ll at
116
W.
Brid
ge S
tree
t, G
ranb
ury,
TX
.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
8 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
58
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
58.0
Em
erg
ency
Fac
iliti
es a
nd
Eq
uip
men
t
10 C
FR
50.
47(b
)(8
) –
Ade
qua
te
emer
genc
y fa
cilit
ies
and
eq
uip
me
nt
to s
uppo
rt th
e em
erg
ency
re
spon
se
are
prov
ided
an
d m
ain
tain
ed.
5 8.1
Th
e lic
ense
e ha
s es
tabl
ish
ed a
tech
nica
l sup
port
ce
nter
(T
SC
) an
d on
site
op
era
tions
sup
port
cen
ter
(OS
C).
[H.1
]
NO
TE
: For
the
TS
C, T
ier
1 o
f th
e U
S-A
PW
R D
esig
n C
ontr
ol
Doc
umen
t (D
CD
), R
ev. 0
, ad
dre
sses
this
EP
Pro
gram
E
lem
ent i
n th
e fo
llow
ing
De
sign
C
omm
itmen
ts (
DC
):•
Tab
le 2
.5.4
-2, D
C #
1•
Tab
le.2
.7.6
.10-
1, D
C #
4•
Tab
le 2
.9-1
, DC
#7k
•T
able
2.1
0-1
, DC
s #1
, 2,
3•
Tab
le 2
.7.5
.4-3
, DC
#8
•T
able
2.7
.6.1
0-1,
DC
s #1
, 2
and
3•
Tab
le 2
.5.4
-2, D
C #
1
58.
1.1
NO
TE
: For
the
TS
C, T
ier
1 o
f th
e U
S-A
PW
R D
esig
n
Co
ntro
l Doc
umen
t (D
CD
), R
ev.
0, a
ddre
sses
the
follo
win
g In
spec
tions
, Tes
ts,
Ana
lyse
s:
•T
able
2.5
.4-2
, DC
#1
•T
able
.2.7
.6.1
0-1,
DC
#4
•T
able
2.9
-1, D
C #
7k
•T
able
2.1
0-1,
DC
s #
1, 2
, 3•
Tab
le 2
.7.5
.4-3
, DC
#8
•T
able
2.7
.6.1
0-1,
DC
s #1
, 2
and
3•
Tab
le 2
.5.4
-2, D
C #
1
58.
1.2
An
insp
ectio
n of
the
a
s-b
uilt
OS
C w
ill b
e pe
rfor
med
.
58.1
.1 F
or
the
TS
C, T
ier
1 o
f th
e U
S-A
PW
R D
esig
n C
ontr
ol
Doc
ume
nt (
DC
D),
Rev
. 0,
add
ress
es th
e fo
llow
ing
Acc
epta
nce
Crit
eria
: •
Ta
ble
2.5.
4-2,
DC
#1
•T
abl
e.2.
7.6.
10-1
, DC
#4
•T
abl
e 2.
9-1
, DC
#7k
•T
abl
e 2.
10-1
, DC
s #1
, 2, 3
•T
abl
e 2.
7.5.
4-3,
DC
#8
•T
abl
e 2.
7.6.
10-1
, DC
s #1
, 2
and
3•
Ta
ble
2.5.
4-2,
DC
#1
58.1
.2.1
A r
epo
rt e
xist
s th
at
conf
irms
tThe
OS
C w
as
in a
has
bee
n lo
cate
dio
n se
para
tely
fro
m
the
cont
rol r
oom
and
TS
C.
58.1
.2.2
A r
epo
rt e
xist
s th
at
conf
irms
tha
t OS
C v
oice
cC
omm
unic
atio
n eq
uip
men
t is
in
stal
ledh
as b
een
prov
ided
in th
e O
SC
, and
voi
ce tr
ansm
issi
on
and
re
cept
ion
are
have
be
en
acco
mpl
ishe
d w
ith:.
•C
ontr
ol R
oom
•T
SC
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
9 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
59
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
58.2
Th
e lic
ense
e ha
s es
tabl
ish
ed a
n e
me
rgen
cy
ope
ratio
ns fa
cilit
y (E
OF
). [H
.2]
58.
2 A
n in
spec
tion
of t
he
EO
F
will
be
perf
orm
ed.
58.2
.1 A
re
port
exi
sts
that
co
nfirm
s tT
he
EO
F h
asd
at l
east
24
3 s
qua
re m
eter
s (2
,62
5 sq
uare
fee
t).
5 8.2
.2.1
A r
epor
t exi
sts
that
co
nfirm
s tT
he E
OF
me
ets
the
follo
win
g h
abi
tab
ility
crit
eria
:•
EO
F is
con
stru
cted
to m
eet
Te
xas
Bu
ildin
g C
ode
•P
rote
ctio
n fa
ctor
(fr
om d
irect
ra
diat
ion
expo
sure
) of
gre
ater
th
an o
r eq
ual
to 5
in a
reas
w
here
dos
e as
sess
men
ts,
com
mun
ica
tions
, and
dec
isio
n m
akin
g ta
ke p
lace
•V
entil
atio
n sy
stem
has
is
olat
ion
with
HE
PA
filte
rs•
A b
acku
p E
OF
is lo
cate
d w
ithin
10
to 2
0 m
iles
of th
e T
SC
8.2.
2.2
The
bac
kup
EO
F is
lo
cate
d w
ithin
10
to 2
0 m
iles
of
the
TS
C.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
10 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
60
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
58.2
.3 F
or th
e E
OF
, Tie
r 1
of th
e U
S-A
PW
R D
esig
n C
ontr
ol
Doc
ume
nt (
DC
D),
Rev
. 0,
addr
esse
s th
e fo
llow
ing
Acc
epta
nce
Crit
eria
: •
Ta
ble
2.5.
4-2,
DC
#1
•T
abl
e.2.
7.6.
10-1
, Ite
ms
#2, 3
•T
abl
e 2.
9-1
, Ite
m #
7l.
•T
abl
e 2.
10-1
, Ite
m #
4N
ote:
EO
F c
omm
unic
atio
ns w
ith
the
cont
rol r
oom
, TS
C, t
he N
RC
he
adq
uar
ters
an
d R
egio
n IV
of
fice
EO
Cs
and
Sta
te a
nd lo
cal
age
ncie
s ar
e ad
dres
sed
in
Acc
epta
nce
Crit
eria
6.1
.2 a
nd
6.2.
2.
8.2.
4 T
he m
eans
hav
e be
en
esta
blis
hed
in th
e E
OF
to
acqu
ire, d
ispl
ay,
and
eva
lua
te
radi
olog
ical
, met
eoro
log
ical
, an
d pl
ant s
yste
m d
ata
pert
inen
t to
dete
rmin
ing
offs
ite p
rote
ctiv
e
mea
sure
s
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
11 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
61
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
69.0
Acc
iden
t A
sse
ssm
ent
10 C
FR
50.
47(b
)(9
) –
Ade
qua
te
met
hods
, sys
tem
s, a
nd
equ
ipm
ent
for
asse
ssin
g an
d m
onito
ring
actu
al
or p
oten
tial o
ffsite
con
sequ
enc
es o
f a
radi
olo
gic
al e
mer
genc
y co
nditi
on
are
in u
se.
69.1
Th
e m
ean
s ex
ist t
o pr
ovid
e in
itia
l and
co
ntin
uing
rad
iolo
gica
l as
sess
men
t thr
oug
hout
the
co
urse
of a
n ac
cide
nt. [
I.2]
69.
1 A
test
of t
he e
me
rgen
cy
pla
n w
ill b
e co
nduc
ted
by
per
form
ing
an e
xerc
ise
or
drill
to
verif
y th
e ca
pab
ility
to p
erf
orm
ra
diol
ogic
al a
sses
smen
t.
69.1
A r
epo
rt e
xist
s an
d co
nclu
des
that
con
firm
s an
ex
erci
se o
r dr
ill h
as b
een
acco
mpl
ishe
d in
clud
ing
use
of
sele
cted
mon
itorin
g pa
ram
eter
s id
ent
ified
in th
e E
AL
s in
E
mer
gen
cy P
lan
Ap
pe
nd
ix 1
, S
ecti
on
5, t
o as
sess
sim
ula
ted
deg
rade
d p
lan
t and
initi
ate
prot
ectiv
e ac
tion
s in
acc
ord
ance
w
ith th
e fo
llow
ing
crite
ria:
A. A
ccid
ent
Ass
essm
ent a
nd
Cla
ssifi
catio
n1.
Initi
atin
g co
nditi
ons
iden
tifie
d, E
ALs
par
amet
ers
dete
rmin
ed, a
nd th
e em
erge
ncy
corr
ect
ly
clas
sifie
d th
roug
hout
the
dri
ll.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
12 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
62
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
69.1
(co
ntin
ued)
B. R
adi
olog
ica
l Ass
essm
ent
and
Con
trol
1. O
nsite
rad
iolo
gica
l sur
veys
pe
rfor
med
an
d sa
mpl
es
colle
cte
d.2.
Rad
iatio
n ex
posu
re to
em
erge
ncy
wor
kers
m
onito
red
and
cont
rolle
d.3.
Fie
ld m
oni
torin
g te
ams
asse
mbl
ed a
nd d
eplo
yed.
4. F
ield
team
dat
a co
llect
ed
and
dis
sem
ina
ted.
5. D
ose
proj
ect
ions
de
velo
ped.
6. T
he d
eci
sion
wh
ethe
r to
is
sue
radi
opr
otec
tive
dru
gs to
Lu
min
ant e
mer
gen
cy
wor
kers
mad
e.7.
Pro
tect
ive
actio
n
reco
mm
end
atio
ns d
evel
ope
d an
d c
om
mun
icat
ed to
ap
pro
pria
te a
uth
oriti
es.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
13 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
63
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
69.2
Th
e m
ean
s ex
ist t
o de
term
ine
the
sou
rce
term
of
rele
ase
s o
f rad
ioac
tive
mat
eria
l w
ithin
pla
nt s
yste
ms,
an
d th
e m
agn
itud
e of
the
rele
ase
of
radi
oac
tive
ma
teria
ls b
ase
d o
n pl
ant s
yste
m p
aram
eter
s an
d ef
fluen
t mo
nito
rs. [
I.3]
69.
2 A
n an
aly
sis
of e
me
rgen
cy
pla
n im
plem
entin
g p
roce
dure
s w
ill b
e pe
rfor
med
.
6 9.2
A
rep
ort
exis
ts t
hat
conf
irms
a m
etho
dolo
gyT
he
mea
ns h
as
been
est
ablis
hed
to
dete
rmin
e th
e so
urce
term
of
rele
ases
of r
adio
activ
e m
ater
ials
w
ithin
pla
nt s
yste
ms
a nd
the
m
agni
tud
e o
f th
e r
ele
ase
of
rad
ioa
ctiv
e m
ate
rials
ba
sed
on p
lant
sys
tem
pa
ram
eter
s an
d e
fflu
ent
mo
nito
rs..
6 9.3
Th
e m
ean
s ex
ist t
o co
ntin
uou
sly
asse
ss th
e im
pact
of
the
rele
ase
of r
adi
oact
ive
m
ate
rials
to
the
envi
ronm
ent,
acco
untin
g fo
r th
e re
latio
nshi
p be
twee
n ef
fluen
t mo
nito
r re
adin
gs, a
nd o
nsite
and
offs
ite
expo
sure
s a
nd c
onta
min
atio
n fo
r va
riou
s m
eteo
rolo
gica
l co
nditi
ons.
[I.4
]
69.
3
An
anal
ysis
of e
mer
genc
y p
lan
impl
emen
ting
pro
cedu
res
will
be
perf
orm
ed.
69.3
A r
epor
t exi
sts
that
con
firm
s a
met
hod
olo
gyT
he m
ean
s ha
s be
en
prov
ided
to c
ontin
uou
sly
asse
ss t
he im
pact
of
the
rele
ase
of
radi
oa
ctiv
e
mat
eria
ls to
the
en
viro
nm
ent,
ac
coun
ting
fore
stab
lish
the
rela
tions
hip
bet
wee
n e
fflue
nt
mon
itor
read
ing
s, a
nd o
nsite
and
of
fsite
exp
osur
es a
nd
cont
amin
atio
n fo
r va
rious
m
eteo
rolo
gica
l co
nditi
ons
.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
14 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
64
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
69.4
Th
e m
ean
s ex
ist t
o ac
quire
an
d e
valu
ate
met
eoro
logi
cal
info
rmat
ion.
[I.5
]
69.
4 A
n in
spec
tion
of t
he c
ontr
ol
roo
m, T
SC
, and
EO
F w
ill b
e p
erfo
rme
d to
ver
ify th
at th
e fo
llow
ing
me
teor
olo
gica
l dat
a is
a
vaila
ble:
-W
ind
spe
ed (
at 1
0 m
an
d 6
0 m
)-
Win
d d
irect
ion
(at 1
0 m
an
d -
60
m)
-A
ir te
mpe
ratu
re (
at 1
0 m
and
6
0 m
)
69.4
A r
epor
t exi
sts
that
con
firm
s tT
he s
peci
fied
met
eoro
logi
cal
data
was
ava
ilab
le a
t the
con
trol
ro
om, T
SC
, and
EO
F.
9.4.
2 T
he m
ean
s e
xist
to p
rovi
de
th
e sp
ecifi
ed m
eteo
rolo
gica
l dat
a to
the
offs
ite N
RC
cen
ter
and
the
S
tate
of T
exa
s E
OC
.
69.5
Th
e m
ean
s ex
ist t
o m
ake
rapi
d a
sse
ssm
ent
s of
act
ual
or
pote
ntia
l ma
gnitu
de
and
loca
tions
of a
ny
rad
iolo
gica
l ha
zard
s th
rou
gh li
qui
d or
ga
seo
us r
ele
ase
pat
hway
s,
incl
udi
ng a
ctiv
atio
n, n
otifi
catio
n m
ean
s, fi
eld
team
co
mp
ositi
on,
tran
spor
tatio
n, c
omm
unic
atio
n,
mo
nito
ring
equi
pmen
t, a
nd
estim
ate
d d
eplo
yme
nt ti
mes
. [I.8
]
69.
5 A
n an
aly
sis
of e
me
rgen
cy
pla
n im
plem
entin
g p
roce
dure
s w
ill b
e pe
rfor
med
.
69.5
A
rep
ort
exis
ts t
hat
conf
irms
a m
etho
dolo
gyT
he
mea
ns h
as
been
est
ablis
hed
to
prov
ide
rapi
d a
sse
ssm
ent
of t
he
actu
al o
r po
ten
tial m
agni
tude
an
d lo
catio
ns
of a
ny r
adio
log
ical
ha
zard
s th
rou
gh li
qui
d o
r ga
seou
s re
lea
se p
athw
ays.
69.6
Th
e ca
pab
ility
exi
sts
to
dete
ct a
nd m
easu
re r
adio
iodi
ne
conc
entr
atio
ns in
air
in th
e p
lum
e
expo
sure
EP
Z, a
s lo
w a
s 10
-7
μC
i/cc
(mic
rocu
ries
per
cubi
c ce
ntim
eter
) u
nde
r fie
ld
cond
ition
s. [I
.9]
69.
6 A
test
of L
umin
ant f
ield
su
rve
y in
stru
men
tatio
n w
ill b
e pe
rfor
me
d to
ver
ify th
e ca
pabi
lity
to d
etec
t airb
orn
e co
ncen
trat
ion
s a
s lo
w a
s 1
E-0
7 m
icro
curie
s pe
r cu
bic
ce
ntim
eter
s.
69.6
A r
epo
rt e
xist
s an
d co
nclu
des
that
con
firm
s in
stru
men
tatio
n us
ed fo
r m
onito
ring
I-1
31 to
det
ect
airb
orne
con
cent
ratio
ns a
s lo
w
as 1
E-0
7 m
icro
curie
s p
er c
ubi
c ce
ntim
eter
s ha
s be
en
prov
ide
d.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
15 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15C
TS
-011
74
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
65
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
69.7
The
me
ans
exis
t to
est
ima
te
inte
gra
ted
dos
e fr
om
the
pr
oje
cted
and
act
ual d
ose
rate
s,
and
for
com
parin
g th
ese
es
timat
es w
ith th
e E
PA
pr
otec
tive
actio
n gu
ides
(P
AG
s).
[I.10
]
69.
7 A
n a
naly
sis
of e
mer
gen
cy
pla
n im
plem
entin
g p
roce
dure
s w
ill b
e pe
rfor
med
to v
erify
that
a
met
hodo
logy
is p
rovi
ded
to
esta
blis
h m
eans
for
rela
ting
con
tam
inat
ion
leve
ls a
nd
airb
orne
ra
dioa
ctiv
ity le
vels
to
dose
rat
es a
nd g
ross
ra
dio
act
ivity
me
asur
emen
ts fo
r th
e fo
llow
ing
isot
opes
– K
r-88
, R
u-1
06, I
-131
, I-1
32, I
-133
, I-
134
, I-1
35, T
e-1
32, X
e-1
33,
Xe-
135
, Cs-
134
, Cs-
137,
C
e-1
44.
69.7
A r
epor
t exi
sts
tha
t con
firm
s tT
he m
eans
for
rela
ting
cont
amin
atio
n le
vels
and
ai
rbor
ne r
adio
activ
ity le
vels
to
dose
rat
es a
nd g
ross
ra
dioa
ctiv
ity m
easu
rem
ents
for
the
spec
ifie
d is
otop
es h
as
been
es
tabl
ishe
d to
mak
e ra
pid
asse
ssm
ents
of a
ctua
l or
pote
ntia
l mag
nitu
de a
nd
loca
tions
of a
ny
rad
iolo
gica
l ha
zard
s th
rou
gh li
qui
d o
r ga
seou
s re
lea
se p
athw
ays.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
16 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
Rev
isio
n 1
66
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
710
.0 P
rote
ctiv
e R
esp
on
se
10 C
FR
50.
47(b
)(1
0) –
A r
ang
e o
f pr
otec
tive
actio
ns h
as
been
de
velo
ped
for
the
plu
me
exp
osur
e
EP
Z fo
r em
erge
ncy
wo
rke
rs a
nd th
e pu
blic
. In
deve
lop
ing
this
ran
ge o
f ac
tions
, con
sid
erat
ion
has
bee
n gi
ven
to e
vacu
atio
n, s
helte
ring
, and
, as
a s
upp
lem
ent t
o th
ese,
the
prop
hyla
ctic
use
of p
otas
sium
io
did
e (K
I), a
s ap
pro
pria
te.
Gu
idel
ine
s fo
r th
e c
hoi
ce o
f pr
otec
tive
actio
ns d
uri
ng a
n
emer
genc
y, c
onsi
sten
t with
Fe
dera
l gu
idan
ce, a
re d
eve
lop
ed a
nd in
pl
ace
, and
pro
tect
ive
actio
ns fo
r th
e
ing
estio
n ex
pos
ure
EP
Z a
ppro
pria
te
to th
e lo
cale
ha
ve b
een
dev
elo
ped.
710.
1 T
he m
eans
exi
st to
wa
rn
and
ad
vise
ons
ite in
divi
dua
ls o
f an
em
erge
ncy,
incl
udin
g th
ose
in
area
s co
ntro
lled
by th
e o
pera
tor,
in
clu
ding
:[J.1
]a.
em
plo
yee
s no
t ha
ving
em
erge
ncy
ass
ignm
ents
;b.
vis
itors
;c.
con
trac
tor
and
con
stru
ctio
n
pers
onne
l; an
dd.
oth
er
per
sons
who
may
be
in
the
publ
ic a
cces
s a
reas
, on
or
pass
ing
thro
ugh
the
site
, or
with
in th
e ow
ner
co
ntro
lled
area
.
710
.1 A
test
of t
he o
nsite
w
arn
ing
and
com
mun
ica
tions
ca
pab
ility
will
be
perf
orm
ed
dur
ing
a d
rill o
r ex
erci
se.
7 10
.1.1
A r
epo
rt e
xist
s an
d co
nclu
des
that
co
nfirm
s th
at,
durin
g a
drill
or
exe
rcis
e,
notif
icat
ion
and
inst
ruct
ion
s w
ere
prov
ided
to o
nsite
wor
kers
and
vi
sito
rs, w
ithin
the
Pro
tect
ed
Are
a, o
ver
the
pla
nt p
ublic
an
noun
cem
ent s
yste
m.
710
.1.2
A r
epo
rt e
xist
s an
d co
nclu
des
that
co
nfirm
s th
at,
durin
g a
dril
l or
exer
cise
, aud
ible
w
arni
ngs
wer
e pr
ovi
ded
to
ind
ivid
ual
s o
utsi
de th
e P
rote
cte
d A
rea,
but
with
in th
e O
wn
er
Con
trol
led
Are
a.
710
.1.3
A r
epo
rt e
xist
s an
d co
nclu
des
that
co
nfirm
s th
at,
durin
g a
drill
or
exe
rcis
e,
ind
ivid
ual
s w
ithin
Squ
aw C
reek
P
ark
wer
e no
tifie
d by
Squ
aw
Cre
ek P
ark
pers
onne
l of t
he
app
ropr
iate
pro
tect
ive
res
pon
se.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
17 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15C
TS
-011
74
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
67
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
11.0
Ra
dio
log
ical
Exp
os
ure
Co
ntr
ol
10 C
FR
50.
47(b
)(1
1) –
Mea
ns fo
r co
ntro
lling
rad
iolo
gica
l exp
osur
es,
in a
n e
me
rgen
cy, a
re e
sta
blis
hed
fo
r em
erg
ency
wor
kers
. The
mea
ns
for
con
tro
llin
g ra
dio
logi
cal
expo
sure
s sh
all i
nclu
de e
xpos
ure
guid
elin
es c
onsi
sten
t with
EP
A
Em
erg
ency
Wo
rke
r a
nd L
ifesa
ving
A
ctiv
ity P
AG
s.
11.1
The
me
ans
exis
ts to
pro
vide
on
site
rad
iatio
n pr
ote
ctio
n. [K
.2]
11.
1 A
n a
naly
sis
of s
ite
pro
cedu
res
will
be
perf
orm
ed.
11.1
Site
pro
cedu
res
prov
ide
the
mea
ns fo
r o
nsite
rad
iatio
n pr
otec
tion
.
11.2
The
me
ans
exis
ts to
pro
vide
24
-ho
ur-p
er-d
ay
cap
abili
ty to
de
term
ine
the
dose
s re
ceiv
ed b
y em
erge
ncy
pe
rson
nel a
nd
ma
inta
in d
ose
reco
rds.
[K.3
]
11.
2 A
n a
naly
sis
of e
mer
gen
cy
pla
n pr
oce
dure
s w
ill b
e p
erfo
rme
d.
11.2
Em
erge
ncy
pla
n pr
oced
ures
pro
vid
e th
e m
ean
s fo
r 24
- h
our-
per-
day
cap
abi
lity
to
dete
rmin
e th
e do
ses
rece
ive
d by
em
erge
ncy
per
sonn
el a
nd
mai
ntai
n do
se r
ecor
ds.
11.3
Th
e m
ean
s ex
ists
to
deco
nta
min
ate
relo
cate
d on
site
an
d e
me
rgen
cy p
erso
nne
l, in
clu
ding
was
te d
ispo
sal.
[K.5
.b,
K.7
]
11.
3 A
n a
naly
sis
of e
mer
gen
cy
pla
n pr
oce
dure
s w
ill b
e p
erfo
rme
d.
11.3
Em
erge
ncy
pla
n pr
oced
ures
pro
vid
e a
me
ans
to
deco
ntam
inat
e re
loca
ted
onsi
te
and
em
erg
ency
per
sonn
el,
incl
udin
g w
aste
dis
posa
l.
11.4
The
me
ans
exis
ts to
pro
vide
on
site
an
d co
ntam
inat
ion
con
trol
m
eas
ures
. [K
.6]
11.
4 A
n a
naly
sis
of s
ite
pro
cedu
res
will
be
perf
orm
ed.
11.4
Site
pro
cedu
res
prov
ide
the
mea
ns fo
r o
nsite
con
tam
inat
ion
cont
rol m
easu
res.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
18 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
68
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
12.0
Med
ica
l an
d P
ub
lic H
ealt
h S
up
po
rt
10 C
FR
50.
47(b
)(1
2) –
A
rra
nge
me
nts
are
mad
e fo
r med
ical
se
rvic
es fo
r co
nta
min
ated
, inj
ured
in
div
idu
als.
12.1
Arr
ang
em
ent
s ha
ve b
een
im
ple
me
nted
for
loca
l and
ba
ckup
hos
pita
l an
d m
edi
cal
serv
ices
hav
ing
the
cap
abili
ty fo
r ev
alu
atio
n of
rad
iatio
n ex
posu
re
and
up
take
. [L.
1]
12.
1 A
n a
naly
sis
of le
tters
of
agr
eem
ent w
ill b
e pe
rfor
med
.12
.1 A
rran
gem
ents
hav
e be
en
impl
em
ent
ed w
ith L
ake
Gra
nbu
ry
Med
ica
l Cen
ter
(LG
MC
) in
G
ranb
ury,
Tex
as a
nd
the
Tex
as
Hea
lth H
arr
is M
etho
dis
t Hos
pita
l C
lebu
rne
(For
mer
ly W
alls
R
egio
nal H
ospi
tal)
in C
lebu
rne,
T
exa
s fo
r ev
alua
tion
of r
adia
tion
expo
sure
and
up
take
.
12.2
The
mea
ns e
xist
s fo
r on
site
fir
st a
id c
apab
ility
. [L
.2]
12.
2 A
n a
naly
sis
of e
mer
gen
cy
pla
n pr
oce
dure
s w
ill b
e p
erfo
rme
d.
12.2
Ons
ite p
roce
dure
s p
rovi
de
for
ons
ite fi
rst a
id c
apab
ility
.
12.3
Arr
ang
em
ent
s ha
ve b
een
im
ple
me
nted
for
tran
spo
rtin
g vi
ctim
s of
ra
diol
ogic
al a
ccid
ent
s,
incl
udi
ng c
ont
amin
ated
inju
red
indi
vidu
als,
from
the
site
to
offs
ite m
edic
al s
uppo
rt fa
cilit
ies.
[L
.4]
12.
3 A
n a
naly
sis
of le
tters
of
agr
eem
ent w
ill b
e pe
rfor
med
.12
.3 A
rran
gem
ents
hav
e be
en
impl
em
ent
ed fo
r tr
ansp
ortin
g vi
ctim
s of
rad
iolo
gic
al a
ccid
ent
s,
incl
udin
g co
ntam
ina
ted
inju
red
ind
ivid
ual
s, fr
om th
e si
te to
of
fsite
med
ical
sup
por
t fac
ilitie
s.
13.0
Exe
rcis
es a
nd
Dri
lls
10 C
FR
50.
47(b
)(1
3) –
Gen
era
l pl
ans
for
reco
very
and
ree
ntry
are
de
velo
ped.
Not
use
d. P
rovi
ded
for
cons
iste
ncy
with
Reg
. Gu
ide
1.20
6 T
able
C.II
.1-B
1 E
me
rgen
cy P
lan
ning
—G
ener
ic
Insp
ectio
n, T
est
, An
alys
is, a
nd
Acc
ept
ance
Crit
eria
(E
P-I
TA
AC
) IT
AA
C n
umbe
ring
sche
me.
No
t use
d. P
rovi
ded
for
con
sist
enc
y w
ith R
eg. G
uide
1
.20
6 T
abl
e C
.II.1
-B1
Em
erge
ncy
Pla
nnin
g—G
ener
ic
Insp
ect
ion,
Tes
t, A
naly
sis,
an
d A
ccep
tan
ce C
riter
ia (
EP
-IT
AA
C)
ITA
AC
nu
mb
erin
g sc
hem
e.
Not
use
d. P
rovi
ded
for
cons
iste
ncy
with
Reg
. Gui
de
1.20
6 T
able
C.II
.1-B
1
Em
erge
ncy
Pla
nni
ng—
Ge
neric
In
spec
tion
, Te
st, A
nal
ysis
, and
A
ccep
tanc
e C
riter
ia (
EP
-IT
AA
C)
ITA
AC
num
berin
g sc
hem
e.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
19 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
69
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
814
.0 E
xerc
ises
an
d D
rills
10 C
FR
50.
47(b
)(1
4) –
Per
iodi
c ex
erci
ses
are
(will
be)
con
duct
ed
to
eval
uate
ma
jor
port
ion
s o
f em
erge
ncy
resp
onse
cap
abili
ties,
pe
riodi
c dr
ills
are
(w
ill b
e)
cond
ucte
d to
de
velo
p a
nd m
ain
tain
ke
y sk
ills,
and
def
icie
nci
es id
entif
ied
as
a r
esu
lt o
f exe
rcis
es
or
drill
s ar
e (w
ill b
e) c
orr
ect
ed.
814.
1 Li
cens
ee c
ondu
cts
a
full-
part
icip
atio
n e
xerc
ise
to
eval
uat
e m
ajo
r po
rtio
ns
of
emer
gen
cy r
esp
onse
ca
pab
ilitie
s, w
hich
incl
udes
pa
rtic
ipa
tion
by e
ach
Sta
te a
nd
loca
l age
ncy
with
in th
e p
lum
e ex
posu
re E
PZ
, an
d ea
ch S
tate
w
ithin
the
inge
stio
n c
ontr
ol E
PZ
. [N
.1]
814
.1 A
full-
part
icip
atio
n e
xerc
ise
(tes
t) w
ill b
e c
ondu
cted
w
ithin
the
spec
ified
tim
e pe
riods
o
f App
end
ix E
to 1
0 C
FR
Par
t 5
0.
814
.1.1
.1 A
rep
ort e
xist
s an
d co
nclu
des
that
con
firm
s an
ex
erci
se w
as
con
duct
ed w
ithin
th
e sp
ecifi
ed
time
perio
ds o
f A
ppe
ndix
E to
10
CF
R P
art 5
0,
onsi
te e
xerc
ise
obj
ect
ive
s w
ere
m
et, a
nd th
ere
wer
e no
un
corr
ect
ed o
nsite
exe
rcis
e de
ficie
ncie
s.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
20 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15C
TS
-011
74
Rev
isio
n 1
70
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
814
.1.1
.2 A
rep
ort e
xist
s an
d co
ndlu
des
that
con
firm
s th
e fo
llow
ing
exe
rcis
e ob
ject
ive
s w
ere
satis
fied
by
mee
ting
the,
in
clud
ing
spec
ific
perf
orm
ance
acce
ptan
ce c
riter
ia,
add
ress
ed e
ach
of t
he fo
llow
ing
Em
erge
ncy
Pla
nni
ng
(EP
) P
rogr
am E
lem
ents
:-
Em
erge
ncy
Cla
ssifi
catio
n-
Not
ifica
tion
and
Em
erge
ncy
C
omm
unic
atio
ns-
Em
erge
ncy
Pub
lic
Info
rmat
ion
-E
mer
gen
cy F
acili
ties
and
E
quip
men
t-
Acc
iden
t Ass
essm
ent
-P
rote
ctiv
e R
espo
nse
and
P
rote
ctiv
e A
ctio
n
Rec
omm
enda
tion
s-
Rad
iolo
gica
l Exp
osu
re
Con
trol
-R
ecov
ery
an
d R
e-E
ntry
A.
Acc
iden
t Ass
essm
ent a
nd
Cla
ssifi
catio
n
1. D
emon
stra
te th
e a
bilit
y to
id
ent
ify in
itiat
ing
con
ditio
ns,
de
term
ine
em
erge
ncy
act
ion
le
vel (
EA
L) p
ara
met
ers,
and
co
rrec
tly c
lass
ify th
e em
erge
ncy
thro
ugho
ut th
e ex
erci
se.
Per
form
ance
Crit
eria
:
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
21 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
71
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
a.D
eter
min
e th
e co
rrec
t em
erge
ncy
clas
sific
atio
n le
vel b
ased
on
even
ts
whi
ch w
ere
in p
rog
ress
, co
nsid
erin
g p
ast e
vent
s an
d th
eir
imp
act o
n th
e
curr
ent c
ondi
tions
, with
in
15 m
inu
tes
from
the
tim
e th
e in
itia
ting
cond
ition
(s)
or E
AL
is id
entif
ied
.
B. N
otifi
catio
ns
1. D
emon
stra
te th
e a
bilit
y to
al
ert
, not
ify a
nd
mo
biliz
e si
te
emer
genc
y re
spon
se p
ers
onne
l.
Per
form
ance
Crit
eria
:
a.C
ompl
ete
the
des
ign
ated
ac
tion
s in
acc
ord
ance
w
ith e
mer
genc
y p
lan
pr
oce
dure
s an
d p
erfo
rm
the
ann
ounc
em
ent
with
in
15 m
inu
tes
of th
e in
itia
l ev
ent c
lass
ifica
tion
for
an
Ale
rt o
r h
ighe
r.
b.M
obili
ze s
ite e
mer
gen
cy
resp
ond
ers
in
acco
rdan
ce w
ith
emer
genc
y p
lan
pr
oce
dure
s w
ithin
15
min
utes
of t
he in
itial
ev
ent c
lass
ifica
tion
for
an
Ale
rt o
r h
ighe
r.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
22 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
72
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
2. D
emon
stra
te th
e a
bilit
y to
no
tify
resp
onsi
ble
Sta
te, l
oca
l go
vern
men
t age
nci
es b
egin
nin
g no
late
r th
an 1
5 m
inut
es a
nd th
e N
RC
no
late
r th
an 6
0 m
inut
es
afte
r d
ecla
ring
an e
mer
genc
y.
Per
form
ance
Crit
eria
:
a.T
rans
mit
info
rmat
ion
in
acco
rdan
ce w
ith
app
rove
d em
erg
ency
pl
an
proc
edur
es n
o la
ter
than
15
min
ute
s a
fter
even
t cla
ssifi
catio
n.
b.T
rans
mit
info
rmat
ion
in
acco
rdan
ce w
ith
app
rove
d em
erg
ency
pl
an
proc
edur
es, n
o la
ter
than
60
min
ute
s a
fter
last
tr
ans
mitt
al fo
r a
follo
w-u
p no
tific
atio
n to
Sta
te a
nd
loca
l aut
horit
ies.
c.T
rans
mit
info
rmat
ion
in
acco
rdan
ce w
ith
emer
genc
y p
lan
pr
oce
dure
s no
late
r th
an
60 m
inu
tes
afte
r ev
ent
clas
sific
atio
n fo
r an
initi
al
notif
icat
ion
of th
e N
RC
.
3. D
emon
stra
te th
e a
bilit
y to
w
arn
or
advi
se o
nsite
indi
vid
uals
of
em
erg
ency
con
diti
ons.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
23 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
73
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
Per
form
ance
Crit
eria
:
a.In
itiat
e no
tific
atio
n o
f on
site
indi
vid
uals
with
in
15 m
inu
tes
of n
otifi
catio
n.
C. E
mer
genc
y R
espo
nse
1. D
emon
stra
te th
e c
apa
bilit
y to
di
rect
and
con
tro
l em
erge
ncy
op
era
tions
.
Per
form
ance
Crit
eria
:
a.C
omm
and
and
con
trol
is
dem
ons
tra
ted
by
the
Con
trol
Roo
m in
the
ear
ly
pha
se o
f the
em
erg
ency
, an
d th
e te
chni
cal s
upp
ort
cent
er (
TS
C)
with
in 6
0 m
inut
es o
f dec
lara
tion
of
an A
lert
or
high
er
emer
genc
y cl
assi
ficat
ion.
2. D
emon
stra
te th
e a
bilit
y to
tr
ans
fer
em
erg
ency
dire
ctio
n fr
om
the
cont
rol r
oom
(si
mu
lato
r)
to th
e T
SC
upo
n a
ctiv
atio
n.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
24 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
74
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
Per
form
ance
Crit
eria
:
a.T
urn
over
brie
fings
are
co
nduc
ted
in a
ccor
danc
e w
ith e
mer
genc
y p
lan
pr
oce
dure
s.
b.D
ocum
ent
atio
n of
tr
ans
fer
of d
utie
s is
co
mpl
eted
in a
ccor
danc
e w
ith e
mer
genc
y p
lan
pr
oce
dure
s.
4. D
emon
stra
te th
e a
bilit
y to
pe
rfor
m a
ssem
bly
and
ac
cou
nta
bilit
y fo
r a
ll on
site
in
div
idu
als
with
in 3
0 m
inut
es o
f an
em
erg
ency
re
quiri
ng
prot
ecte
d ar
ea a
sse
mbl
y an
d ac
cou
nta
bilit
y.
Per
form
ance
Crit
eria
:
a.P
rote
cte
d ar
ea (
PA
) pe
rso
nnel
ass
em
bly
and
ac
cou
nta
bilit
y co
mpl
ete
d w
ithin
30
min
utes
of a
n em
erge
ncy
requ
iring
pr
otec
ted
area
ass
em
bly
and
acc
oun
tab
ility
.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
25 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
75
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
D. E
mer
genc
y R
espo
nse
Faci
litie
s
1. D
emon
stra
te a
ctiv
atio
n of
the
op
era
tiona
l su
ppo
rt c
ente
r (O
SC
), a
nd fu
ll fu
nctio
nal
op
era
tion
of th
e T
SC
and
EO
F
with
in 6
0 m
inut
es d
ecla
ratio
n of
A
lert
or
hig
her
em
erg
ency
cl
assi
ficat
ion.
Per
form
ance
Crit
eria
:
a.T
he
TS
C, E
OF
an
d O
SC
ar
e ac
tivat
ed w
ithin
abo
ut
60 m
inu
tes
of th
e in
itia
l no
tific
atio
n.
2. D
emon
stra
te th
e a
deq
uacy
of
equ
ipm
ent,
secu
rity
pro
visi
ons,
an
d h
abita
bili
ty p
reca
utio
ns fo
r th
e T
SC
, OS
C a
nd E
OF
as
app
ropr
iate
.
Per
form
ance
Crit
eria
:
a.E
mer
gen
cy e
qui
pme
nt in
th
e em
erge
ncy
resp
onse
fa
cilit
ies
as s
peci
fied
in
emer
genc
y p
lan
pr
oce
dure
s w
as a
vaila
ble
to e
mer
gen
cy
resp
ond
ers.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
26 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
76
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
b.T
he S
ecur
ity S
hift
S
upe
rvis
or im
ple
men
ts
and
follo
ws
app
licab
le
emer
genc
y p
roce
dure
s.
c.T
he
TS
C O
n-S
ite
Rad
iolo
gica
l Ass
essm
ent
Coo
rdin
ato
r im
plem
ents
de
sign
ated
re
spon
sibi
litie
s in
ac
cord
ance
with
em
erge
ncy
pla
n
proc
edu
res
if a
n on
site
/offs
ite r
ele
ase
has
oc
curr
ed.
3. D
emon
stra
te th
e a
deq
uacy
of
com
mun
ica
tions
for
all
emer
genc
y su
ppor
t re
sour
ces.
Per
form
ance
Crit
eria
:
a.E
mer
gen
cy r
espo
nse
faci
lity
pers
onne
l are
abl
e
to o
pera
te
com
mun
icat
ion
syst
ems
in a
ccor
dan
ce w
ith
emer
genc
y p
lan
pr
oce
dure
s.
b.C
lear
prim
ary
and
bac
kup
co
mm
unic
atio
ns li
nks
are
es
tabl
ishe
d a
nd
mai
ntai
ned
for
the
dura
tion
of th
e e
xerc
ise.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
27 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
77
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
E. R
adio
logi
cal A
sses
smen
t and
C
ontro
l
1. D
emon
stra
te th
e a
bilit
y to
ob
tain
ons
ite r
adio
log
ical
su
rvey
s an
d sa
mpl
es.
Per
form
ance
Crit
eria
:
a.R
adia
tion
Pro
tect
ion
T
ech
nici
ans
dem
onst
rate
th
e ab
ility
to o
btai
n ap
pro
pria
te in
stru
me
nts
(ran
ge a
nd ty
pe)
and
pe
rfor
m s
urv
eys.
b.A
irbor
ne
sam
ples
are
ta
ken
in a
ccor
dan
ce w
ith
emer
genc
y p
lan
pr
oce
dure
s.
2. D
emon
stra
te th
e a
bilit
y to
co
ntin
uous
ly m
oni
tor
and
co
ntro
l ra
diat
ion
exp
osur
e to
em
erg
ency
w
orke
rs.
Per
form
ance
Crit
eria
:
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
28 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
78
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
a.E
mer
gen
cy w
orke
rs a
re
issu
ed s
elf
rea
ding
do
sim
ete
rs w
hen
radi
atio
n le
vels
re
quire
, an
d e
xpos
ures
are
co
ntro
lled
to 1
0 C
FR
Pa
rt
20 li
mits
(un
less
the
Em
erge
ncy
Coo
rdin
ato
r au
tho
rizes
em
erge
ncy
lim
its).
b.E
xpos
ure
reco
rds
are
avai
labl
e.
c.E
mer
gen
cy w
orke
rs
incl
ude
Sec
urity
and
pe
rso
nnel
with
in a
ll em
erge
ncy
faci
litie
s.
3. D
emon
stra
te th
e a
bilit
y to
as
sem
ble
and
de
ploy
fiel
d
mon
itorin
g te
ams
with
in 6
0 m
inut
es fr
om
the
deci
sion
to d
o so
.
Per
form
ance
Crit
eria
:
a.O
ne
Fie
ld M
onito
ring
team
is r
eady
to b
e
dep
loye
d w
ithin
15
- 30
m
inut
es o
f the
ir ar
rival
on
site
. In
ad
ditio
n, a
n of
fsite
mon
itorin
g te
am
mus
t be
able
to b
e di
spat
ched
with
in 5
5-70
m
inut
es o
f an
Ale
rt o
r hi
ghe
r em
erge
ncy
clas
sific
atio
n.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
29 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
79
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
4. D
emon
stra
te th
e a
bilit
y to
co
llect
an
d di
ssem
ina
te fi
eld
te
am d
ata.
Per
form
ance
Crit
eria
:
a.F
ield
team
col
lect
s da
ta
for d
ose
rate
and
airb
orn
e ra
dioa
ctiv
ity le
vels
in
acco
rdan
ce w
ith
emer
genc
y p
lan
pr
oce
dure
s.
b.F
ield
team
com
mun
icat
es
data
to th
e T
SC
and
/or
EO
F in
acc
orda
nce
with
em
erge
ncy
pla
n
proc
edu
res.
5. D
emon
stra
te th
e a
bilit
y to
de
velo
p do
se p
roje
ctio
ns.
Per
form
ance
Crit
eria
:
a.T
ime
ly a
nd a
ccur
ate
dose
pr
ojec
tions
are
per
form
ed
in a
ccor
dan
ce w
ith
emer
genc
y p
lan
pr
oce
dure
s.
6. D
emon
stra
te th
e a
bilit
y to
m
ake
the
deci
sio
n w
heth
er
to
issu
e ra
dio
pro
tect
ive
dru
gs (
KI)
to
ons
ite e
mer
genc
y w
ork
ers
.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
30 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
80
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
Per
form
ance
Crit
eria
:
a.K
I is
take
n (s
imul
ate
d)
if th
e es
timat
ed
dose
to th
e
thyr
oid
will
exc
eed
25
re
m c
om
mitt
ed d
ose
eq
uiv
ale
nt (
CD
E).
7. D
emon
stra
te th
e a
bilit
y to
de
velo
p ap
prop
riate
pro
tect
ive
ac
tion
rec
omm
enda
tion
s (P
AR
s)
and
not
ify a
ppro
pria
te a
utho
ritie
s no
late
r th
an 1
5 m
inut
es a
fter
deve
lopm
ent
.
Per
form
ance
Crit
eria
:
a.T
ota
l effe
ctiv
e do
se
equ
ival
ent
(T
ED
E)
and
CD
E d
ose
pro
ject
ion
s fr
om
the
dose
as
sess
men
t com
pute
r co
de a
re c
om
par
ed in
ac
cord
ance
with
em
erge
ncy
pla
n
proc
edu
res.
b.‘P
AR
s ar
e de
velo
ped
no
late
r th
an 1
5 m
inut
es
afte
r d
ata
ava
ilabi
lity.
c.P
AR
's a
re tr
ansm
itted
via
vo
ice
or fa
x n
o la
ter
than
15
min
ute
s af
ter
even
t cl
assi
ficat
ion
and/
or P
AR
de
velo
pme
nt.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
31 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
81
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
F. P
ublic
Info
rmat
ion
1. D
emon
stra
te th
e c
apa
bilit
y to
de
velo
p an
d di
ssem
inat
e c
lear
, ac
cura
te, a
nd ti
mel
y in
form
atio
n
to th
e ne
ws
med
ia in
acc
orda
nce
w
ith E
PP
s.
Per
form
ance
Crit
eria
:
a.T
he
Join
t In
form
atio
n C
ente
r (J
IC)
is a
ctiv
ated
w
ithin
60
min
utes
fo
llow
ing
the
decl
arat
ion
of
a S
ite A
rea
Em
erge
ncy
or h
ighe
r cl
assi
ficat
ion
or
follo
win
g th
e E
mer
genc
y C
oord
ina
tor’s
or
JIC
D
irect
or’s
inst
ruct
ion
to
do s
o.
b.F
ollo
w-u
p in
form
atio
n is
pr
ovid
ed to
the
new
s m
edia
, du
ring
sche
dul
ed
new
s co
nfer
ence
s an
d m
edia
brie
fing
s.
2. D
emon
stra
te th
e c
apa
bilit
y to
es
tabl
ish
and
effe
ctiv
ely
ope
rate
ru
mor
con
trol
in a
coo
rdin
ated
fa
shio
n.
Per
form
ance
Crit
eria
:
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
32 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
82
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
a.C
alls
are
ans
wer
ed in
a
timel
y m
ann
er
with
the
corr
ect i
nfor
mat
ion,
in
acco
rdan
ce w
ith
emer
genc
y p
lan
pr
oce
dure
s.
b.C
alls
are
re
turn
ed o
r fo
rwar
ded,
as
app
ropr
iate
, to
de
mo
nstr
ate
re
spon
sive
ness
.
c.R
umor
s ar
e id
ent
ified
and
ad
dre
ssed
in a
ccor
dan
ce
with
em
erge
ncy
pla
n
proc
edu
res.
G. E
valu
atio
n
1. D
emon
stra
te th
e a
bilit
y to
co
nduc
t a p
ost-
exe
rcis
e cr
itiq
ue,
to d
eter
min
e ar
eas
re
quiri
ng
impr
ove
me
nt a
nd
corr
ectiv
e ac
tion
.
Per
form
ance
Crit
eria
:
a.A
n ex
erci
se ti
me
line
is
deve
lope
d, fo
llow
ed b
y an
eva
luat
ion
of th
e ob
ject
ives
.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
33 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
83
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
b.S
ign
ifica
nt p
robl
ems
in
achi
evin
g th
e ob
ject
ives
ar
e di
scu
sse
d to
en
sure
un
der
sta
ndin
g of
why
ob
ject
ives
wer
e no
t fu
lly
achi
eved
.
c.R
ecom
men
datio
ns fo
r im
prov
em
ent
in
non
-obj
ect
ive
are
as a
re
disc
usse
d.
814
.1.2
.1 A
rep
ort e
xist
s an
d co
ndlu
des
that
con
firm
s on
site
em
erge
ncy
resp
onse
pe
rson
nel
wer
e m
obili
zed
to fi
ll em
erge
ncy
resp
onse
pos
itio
ns a
nd th
ere
wer
e no
unc
orre
cted
ons
ite
exer
cise
de
ficie
ncie
s.
814
.1.2
.2 A
rep
ort e
xist
s an
d co
nclu
des
that
con
firm
s on
site
em
erge
ncy
resp
onse
pe
rson
nel
perf
orm
ed th
eir
assi
gne
d
resp
onsi
bilit
ies
as p
rovi
ded
in
Sec
tion
B o
f the
Co
ma
nche
Pea
k U
nits
3 a
nd 4
Co
mb
ined
Lic
ense
A
pplic
atio
n E
me
rgen
cy P
lan
and
th
ere
we
re n
o u
ncor
rect
ed o
nsite
ex
erci
se d
efic
ienc
ies.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
34 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15C
TS
-011
74
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
84
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
14.1
.3 A
re
port
exi
sts
and
co
nclu
des
that
the
exer
cise
was
co
mpl
ete
d w
ithin
the
spec
ifie
d tim
e pe
riods
of A
ppen
dix
E to
10
CF
R P
art
50,
offs
ite e
xerc
ise
ob
ject
ives
wer
e m
et, a
nd th
ere
ar
e no
un
corr
ecte
d de
ficie
ncie
s or
a li
cen
see
cond
ition
req
uire
s of
fsite
de
ficie
ncie
s to
be
add
ress
ed p
rior
to o
pera
tion
abo
ve 5
% o
f rat
ed p
ower
.
15.0
Rad
iolo
gic
al E
me
rge
nc
y R
esp
on
se T
rain
ing
10 C
FR
50
.47(
b)(1
5) –
Ra
dio
logi
cal
emer
genc
y re
spon
se tr
aini
ng is
pr
ovid
ed to
tho
se w
ho m
ay b
e ca
lled
upo
n to
ass
ist i
n an
em
erge
ncy.
15.
1 S
ite-s
pec
ific
emer
gen
cy
resp
onse
trai
ning
has
be
en
prov
ided
for
thos
e w
ho m
ay b
e ca
lled
upo
n to
pro
vide
ass
ista
nce
in th
e e
vent
of a
n e
me
rgen
cy.
[O.1
]
15.
1 A
n in
spec
tion
of t
rain
ing
reco
rds
will
be
perf
orm
ed.
15.1
Site
-spe
cific
em
erge
ncy
resp
onse
trai
nin
g ha
s b
een
prov
ide
d fo
r lo
cal f
ire
depa
rtm
ents
, law
enf
orce
men
t, am
bula
nce,
and
ho
spita
l pe
rson
nel
.
16.0
Res
po
ns
ibili
ty f
or
the
Pla
nn
ing
Eff
ort
: D
eve
lop
men
t ,
Per
iod
ic R
evie
w, a
nd
Dis
trib
uti
on
of
Em
erg
en
cy P
lan
s
10 C
FR
50.
47(b
)(1
6) –
R
espo
nsib
ilitie
s fo
r p
lan
deve
lopm
ent a
nd
revi
ew a
nd
for
dist
ribu
tion
of e
me
rgen
cy p
lans
are
es
tabl
ishe
d, a
nd p
lann
ers
are
pr
oper
ly tr
aine
d.
16.1
Th
e em
erge
ncy
res
pons
e pl
ans
have
bee
n fo
rwar
ded
to a
ll or
gan
izat
ion
s an
d ap
pro
pria
te
indi
vidu
als
with
re
spon
sibi
lity
for
impl
em
ent
atio
n of
the
pla
ns.
[P.5
]
16.
1 A
n in
spec
tion
of t
he
dis
trib
utio
n le
tter
will
be
per
form
ed.
16.1
The
Com
anch
e P
eak
Nuc
lear
Po
wer
Pla
nt U
nit 3
& 4
C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
n E
me
rgen
cy
Pla
n w
as fo
rwar
ded
to th
e T
exas
G
ove
rnor
’s D
ivis
ion
of
Em
erge
ncy
Man
age
men
t, th
e
Hoo
d C
oun
ty J
udge
and
the
Som
erve
ll C
oun
ty J
udg
e.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
35 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Rev
isio
n 1
85
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
10 -
ITA
AC
an
d P
rop
ose
d L
icen
se C
on
dit
ion
s
17.0
Im
ple
me
nti
ng
Pro
ced
ure
s
10 C
FR
Par
t 50,
App
. E.V
– N
o le
ss
than
180
da
ys b
efor
e th
e sc
hedu
led
da
te fo
r in
itial
load
ing
of fu
el f
or a
co
mbi
ned
lice
nse
unde
r p
art 5
2 o
f th
is c
hap
ter,
the
app
lican
t’s o
r lic
ense
e’s
deta
iled
imp
lem
entin
g pr
oced
ures
for
its e
mer
gen
cy p
lan
shal
l be
subm
itte
d to
the
Com
mis
sion
.
17.1
The
lice
nse
e h
as s
ubm
itted
de
taile
d im
ple
men
ting
pr
oced
ures
for
its e
mer
gen
cy
plan
no
less
than
180
day
s p
rior
to fu
el lo
ad.
17.
1 A
n in
spec
tion
of t
he
sub
mitt
al le
tter
will
be
perf
orm
ed.
17.1
Lu
min
ant h
as s
ubm
itted
de
taile
d em
erg
ency
pla
n
proc
edur
es fo
r th
e on
site
em
erge
ncy
pla
n, t
o th
e N
RC
, no
le
ss th
an 1
80
day
s pr
ior
to fu
el
loa
d.
Tab
le B
-1 (
Sh
eet
36 o
f 36
)E
me
rge
ncy
Pla
n I
nsp
ect
ion
s, T
es
ts,
An
alys
es,
and
Ac
cep
tan
ce
Cri
teri
a
Pla
nn
ing
Sta
nd
ard
EP
Pro
gra
m E
lem
ents
**In
spec
tio
ns,
Tes
ts, A
nal
yses
Acc
ep
tan
ce C
rite
ria
** R
efer
ence
s in
bra
cket
s co
rres
pon
d to
NU
RE
G-0
654
/FE
MA
-RE
P-1
, Rev
. 1 E
valu
atio
n C
riter
ia
CT
S-0
1174
RC
OL2
_13.
03-
15
CT
S-0
1174
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix C
Revision 186
PART 10 - APPENDIX C
PHYSICAL SECURITY HARDWARE
C.1 Design Description
1.b Access to vital equipment requires passage through at least two physical barriers.
2.a Physical barriers for the protected area perimeter are not part of vital area barriers.
2.b Penetrations through the protected area barrier are secured and monitored.
2.c Unattended openings of passable size that intersect a security boundary such as underground pathways must be protected by a physical barrier and monitored by intrusion detection equipment or provided with surveillance at a frequency sufficient to detect exploitation.
3.a Isolation zones exist in outdoor areas adjacent to the physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area that allow sufficient size for observation and assessment on either side of the barrier.
3.b Isolation zones are monitored with intrusion detection and assessment equipment that can provide detection and assessment of activities within the isolation zone.
3.c Areas where permanent buildings do not allow sufficient observation distance between the intrusion detection system and the protected area barriers (e.g., the building walls are immediately adjacent to, or are an integral part of the protected area barrier) are monitored with intrusion detection and assessment equipment that is designed to detect and assess the attempted or actual penetration of the protected area perimeter barrier before completed penetration of the barrier.
4.a The perimeter intrusion detection system (IDS) can detect penetration or attempted penetration of the protected area perimeter barrier and subsequent alarms annunciate concurrently in at least two continuously manned onsite alarms stations.
4.b The perimeter assessment equipment can provide video image recording with real-time and playback capability that can provide assessment of detected activities before and after each alarm annunciation at the protected area perimeter barrier.
4.c Intrusion detection and assessment equipment at the protected area perimeter remains operational from an uninterruptible power supply in the event of the loss of normal power.
CTS-01174
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix C
Revision 187
5. Isolation zones and exterior areas within the protected area are provided with illumination to permit observation of activities within exterior areas of the protected area.
6.b The external walls, doors, ceilings and floors in the secondary alarm station and the last access control function for access to the protected area are bullet resistant, to at least Underwriters Laboratories Ballistic Standard 752, "The Standard of Safety for Bullet-Resisting Equipment," Level 4, or National Institute of Justice Standard 0108.01, "Ballistic Resistant Protective Materials," Type III.
7. The vehicle barrier system is designed, installed, and located at the necessary standoff distance to protect against the design-basis threat vehicle bombs.
8.a Access control points are established to control personnel and vehicle access into the protected area.
8.b Access control points are designed and established with equipment to detect firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, and other items which could be used to commit radiological sabotage at the protected area personnel access points.
9. An access control system with a numbered photo identification badge system is designed and installed for use by individuals who are authorized access to protected areas and vital areas without escort.
10.b Unoccupied vital areas are locked and alarmed with activated intrusion detection systems that annunciate in the secondary alarm station.
11.a.ii Security alarm annunciation and video assessment information are available in the secondary alarm station concurrently with the central alarm station.
11.b.ii The secondary alarm station is located inside a protected area and the interior of the secondary alarm station is not visible from the perimeter of the protected area.
11.c.i The alarm system will not allow the status of a detection point, locking mechanism or access control device to be changed from the central alarm station without the knowledge and concurrence of the secondary alarm station operator.
11.c.ii The alarm system will not allow the status of a detection point, locking mechanism or access control device to be changed from the secondary alarm station without the knowledge and concurrence of the central alarm station operator.
CTS-01174
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix C
Revision 188
11.d Central and secondary alarm stations are designed, equipped, and constructed such that no single act, in accordance with the design basis threat of radiological sabotage, can simultaneously remove the ability of both the central and secondary alarm stations to: (1) detect and assess alarms (2) initiate and coordinate an adequate response to alarms (3) summon offsite assistance, and (4) provide effective command and control.
11.e Both the central and secondary alarm stations are constructed, protected, and equipped to the standards for the central alarm station.
13.b.ii Intrusion detection and assessment systems provide visual display and audible annunciation in the secondary alarm station.
15.b Emergency exits through the protected area perimeter are alarmed with intrusion detection devices and secured by locking devices that allow prompt egress during an emergency.
16.a.ii The secondary alarm station has conventional (land line) telephone service with local law enforcement authorities and a system for communication with the main control room.
16.b.ii The secondary alarm station is capable of continuous communication with security personnel.
16.c.ii Nonportable communications equipment in the secondary alarm station will remain operational from an independent power source in the event of loss of normal power.
C.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table C-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteriaITAAC for the site-specific physical security hardware.
CTS-01174
CTS-01174
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix C
Revision 189
Table C-1 (Sheet 1 of 7)Physical Security Hardware Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1.b Access to vital equipment requires passage through at least two physical barriers.
1.b Inspections will be performed of vital equipment locations.
1.b. Vital equipment is located such that access to the vital equipment requires passage through at least two physical barriers.
2.a Physical barriers for the protected area perimeter are not part of vital area barriers.
2.a Inspections of the protected area perimeter barriers will be performed.
2.a Physical barriers at the perimeter of the protected area are separated from any other barrier designated as a Vvital Aarea barrier.
2.b Penetrations through the protected area barrier aremust be secured and be capable of beingand monitored.
2.b Inspections will be performed of penetrations through the protected area barrier.
2.b Penetrations and openings of a passable size through the protected area barrier are secured and monitored by intrusion detection equipment.
2.c Unattended openings of passable size that intersect a security boundary such as underground pathways must be protected by a physical barrier and monitored by intrusion detection equipment or provided with surveillance at a frequency sufficient to detect exploitation.
2.c Inspections will be performed of unattended openings of passable size within the protected area barriers.
2.c Unattended openings of a passable size, (such as underground pathways) that intersect a security boundary (such as the protected area barrier), are protected by a physical barrier and monitored by intrusion detection equipment or provided with surveillance at a frequency sufficient to detect exploitation.
3.a Isolation zones exist in outdoor areas adjacent to the physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area that allow sufficient size for observation and assessment on either side of the barrier.
3.a Inspections of the isolation zones outdoor areas adjacent to the protected area perimeterphysical barrier will be performed.
3.a The isolation zones exist in outdoor areas adjacent to the physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area and allow 20 feet for observation and assessment of the activities of people on either side of the barrier.
CTS-01174
CTS-01174
CTS-01174
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix C
Revision 190
3.b Where permanent buildings do not allow a sufficient distance for observation on the inside of the protected area, the building walls are immediately adjacent to, or an integral part of, the protected area barrier, and the (license applicant specified) observation distance does not apply.Isolation zones are monitored with intrusion detection and assessment equipment that can provide detection and assessment of activities within the isolation zone.
3.b Inspections of the part of the building that constitutes the protected area will be performed.The intrusion detection equipment for monitoring the isolation zones will be inspected.
3.b Where permanent buildings do not allow a 20 feet distance on the inside of the protected area, the building walls are immediately adjacent to, or an integral part of, the protected area barrier and the 20 feet observation distance does not apply.Isolation zones are monitored by intrusion detection and assessment equipment capable of providing detection and assessment of activities within the isolation zone.
3.c Areas where permanent buildings do not allow sufficient observation distance between the intrusion detection system and the protected area barriers (e.g., the building walls are immediately adjacent to, or are an integral part of the protected area barrier) are monitored with intrusion detection and assessment equipment that is designed to detect and assess the attempted or actual penetration of the protected area perimeter barrier before completed penetration of the barrier.
3.c Inspections of the areas of the protected area perimeter barrier that do not have isolation zones will be performed.
3.c Areas where permanent buildings do not allow a minimum of 20 feet observation distance between the intrusion detection system and the protected area barrier (e.g., the building walls are immediately adjacent to, or are an integral part of the protected area barrier) are monitored with intrusion detection and assessment equipment that detect and assess attempted or actual penetration of the protected area perimeter barrier before completed penetration of the barrier.
4.a The Intrusionperimeter instrusion detection system (IDS) can detect penetration or attempted penetration of the protected area perimeter barrier and subsequent alarms annunciate concurrently in at least two continuously manned onsite alarms stations, (central and secondary alarm stations).
4.a Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests and inspections of the intrusion detection system will be performed.
4.a The intrusion detection systemIDS can detect penetration or attempted penetration of the protected area perimeter barrier before completed penetration of the barrier, and subsequent alarms annunciate concurrently in at least two continuously manned onsite alarms stations, (central and secondary alarm stations).
Table C-1 (Sheet 2 of 7)Physical Security Hardware Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.12-5CTS-01174
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix C
Revision 191
4.b Video image recording equipment with real-time and play-back capability provides the ability to assess detected assessment activities before and after each alarm annunciation within the isolation zone.The perimeter assessment equipment can provide video image recording with real-time and playback capability that can provide assessment of detected activities before and after each alarm annunciation at the protected area perimeter barrier.
4.b Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests and inspections of the video assessment equipment will be performed.
4.b Video image recording equipment with real-time and play-back capability provide the ability to display activities before and after each alarm annunciation within the isolation zone.The perimeter assessment equipment is capable of video image recording equipment with real-time and play-back video image recording that provides assessment of detected activities before and after each alarm annunciation at the protected area perimeter barrier.
4.c Intrusion detection and assessment equipment at the protected area perimeter remains operableoperational from an uninterruptible power supply in the event of the loss of normal power.
4.c Tests, inspections or a combination of tests and inspections of the uninterruptible power supply will be performed.
4.c Intrusion detection and assessment equipment at the protected area perimeter remains operableoperational from an uninterruptible power supply in the event of the loss of normal power.
5. Isolation zones and exterior areas within the protected area are provided with illumination to permit observation of activities within exterior areas of the protected area.abnormal presence or activity of persons or vehicles.
5. Inspections or tests of the Iillumination in isolation zones and exterior areas of the protected will be performed.
5. Illumination in isolation zones and exterior areas within the protected area is 0.2 foot- candles measured horizontally at ground level or, alternatively, sufficient to permit observation and assessment.
6.b The external walls, doors, ceilings and floors in the secondary alarm station and the last access control function for access to the protected area are bullet resistant, to at least Underwriters Laboratories Ballistic Standard 752, "The Standard of Safety for Bullet-Resisting Equipment," Level 4, or National Institute of Justice Standard 0108.01, "Ballistic Resistant Protective Materials," Type III.
6.b Type test, analysis or a combination of type test and analysis of the external walls, doors, ceiling and floors in the secondary alarm station and the last access control function for access to the protected area will be performed.
6.b A report exists and concludes that the external walls, doors, ceilings, floors in the secondary alarm station and the last access control function for access to the protected area are bullet resistant, to at least Underwriters Laboratories Ballistic Standard 752, "The Standard of Safety for Bullet-Resisting Equipment," Level 4, or National Institute of Justice Standard 0108.01, "Ballistic Resistant Protective Materials," Type III to , UL752 (2006) Level 4.
Table C-1 (Sheet 3 of 7)Physical Security Hardware Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
CTS-01174
CTS-01174
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix C
Revision 192
7. The vehicle barrier system is installed and located at the necessary stand-off distance to protect against the DBT vehicle bombs.The vehicle barrier system is designed, installed, and located at the necessary standoff distance to protect against the design-basis threat vehicle bombs.
7. Inspections will be performed for the vehicle barrier system.Type test, inspections, and analysis will be performed for the vehicle barrier system.
7. The vehicle barrier system will protect against the DBT vehicle bombs based upon the stand-off distance for the system.A validated report reviewed in accordance with NUREG/CR-6190 exists and concludes that the vehicle barrier system will protect against the design-basis threat vehicle bombs based on the standoff distance for the system.
8.a Access control points are established to control personnel and vehicle access into the protected area.
8.a Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests and inspections of installed systems and equipment will be performed.
8.a Access control points exist for the protected area and are configured to control access and are equipped with locking devices, intrusion detection equipment and surveillance equipment consistent with the intended function.
8.b Access control points are designed and established with equipment to detect firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices, and other items which could be used to commit radiological sabotage at the protected area personnel access points.
8.b Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests and inspections of installed systems and equipment will be performed.
8.b The detection equipment at the protected area personnel access points is capable of detecting firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices.Detection equipment exists and is capable of detecting firearms, explosives, incendiary devices or other items which could be used to commit radiological sabotage at the protected area personnel access control points.
9. An security access control system with a numbered picturephoto identification badges system is designed and installed for use by individuals who are authorized access to protected areas and vital areas without escort.
9. Tests of the access control system with numbered picturephoto identification badges system will be performed.
9. The access authorization system utilizes numbered picture badges, and authorizes protected area access onlyThe access authorization system with a numbered photo identification badge system is installed and provides authorized access to protected and vital areas to those personnel with unescorted access authorization.
Table C-1 (Sheet 4 of 7)Physical Security Hardware Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
CTS-01174
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix C
Revision 193
10.b Unoccupied vital areas are locked and alarmed with activated intrusion detection systems that annunciate in the secondary alarm station.
10.b Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests and inspections of unoccupied vital areas intrusion detection equipment and locking devices will be performed.
10.b Unoccupied vital areas are locked and intrusion is detected and annunciated in the secondary alarm station.
11.a-2.ii Security alarm annunciation and video assessment information are available in the secondary alarm station concurrently in the secondary alarm stationwith the central alarm station.
11.a-2.ii Tests, inspections or a combination of tests and inspections of alarm annunciation and video assessment equipment will be performed.
11.a-2.ii Security alarm annunciation and video assessment equipment information is available concurrently in the secondary alarm station concurrently with the central alarm station.
11.b-2.ii The secondary alarm station is located inside a protected area and the interior of the secondary alarm station is not visible from the perimeter of the protected area
11.b-2.ii Inspections of the secondary alarm station locations will be performed.
11.b-2.ii The secondary alarm station is located inside a protected area and the interior of the secondary alarm station is not visible from the perimeter of the protected area.
11.c.i The alarm system will not allow the status of a detection point, locking mechanism or access control device to be changed from the central alarm station without the knowledge and concurrence of the secondary alarm station operator.
11.c.i Tests, inspections, or a combination of intrusion detection equipment and access control equipment will be performed.
11.c.i The alarm system will not allow the status of a detection point, locking mechanism or access control device to be changed from the central alarm station without the knowledge and concurrence secondary alarm station operator.
11.c.ii The alarm system will not allow the status of a detection point, locking mechanism or access control device to be changed from the secondary alarm station without the knowledge and concurrence of the central alarm station operator.
11.c.ii Tests, inspection, or a combination of tests and inspections of intrusion detection equipment and access control equipment will be performed.
11.c.ii The alarm system will not allow the status of a detection point, locking mechanism or access control device to be changed from the secondary alarm station without the knowledge and concurrence of the alarm station operator in the central alarm station operator.
Table C-1 (Sheet 5 of 7)Physical Security Hardware Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
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RCOL2_14.03.12-5CTS-01174
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix C
Revision 194
11.cd Central and secondary alarm stations are designed, and equipped, and constructed such that, in the event of a no single act, in accordance with the design basis threat of radiological sabotage, can simultaneously remove the ability of both the central and secondary alarm stations tothe design enables the survivability of equipment needed to maintain the functional capability of either alarm station to: (1) detect and assess alarms (2) initiate and coordinate an adequate response to alarms (3) summon offsite assistance, and (4) provide effective command and control.
11.cd Tests, inspections or a combination of tests and inspections of the central and secondary alarm stations will be performed.
11.cd Central and secondary alarm stations are designed, equipped and constructed such that , in the event of a no single act, in accordance with the design basis threat of radiological sabotage, the design enables the survivability of equipment needed to maintain the functional capability of either alarm station tocan simultaneously remove the ability of the central and secondary alarm stations to: (1) detect and assess alarms (2) initiate and coordinate an adequate response to alarms (3) summon offsite assistance, and (4) provide effective command and control.
11.de Both the central and secondary alarm stations are constructed, protected, and equipped to the standards for the central alarm station (stations need not be identical in design).
11.de Tests, inspections or a combination of tests and inspections of the central and secondary alarm stations will be performed.
11.de The central alarm station and secondary alarm station are constructed, protected, and equipped to the same standards for functional redundancy (stations need not be identical in design).
13.b-2.ii Intrusion detection and assessment systems are designed to provide visual display and audible annunciation in the secondary alarm station.
13.b-2.ii Tests will be performed on Iintrusion detection and assessment systems.
13.b-2.ii The intrusion detection system provides a visual display and audible annunciation of alarms in the secondary alarm station.
15.b Emergency exits through the protected area perimeter are alarmed with intrusion detection devices and secured by locking devices that allow prompt egress during an emergency.
15.b Tests, inspections or a combination of tests and inspections of emergency exits through the protected area perimeter will be performed.
15.b Emergency exits through the protected area perimeter are alarmed with intrusion detection devices and secured by locking devices that allow prompt egress during an emergency.
16.a-2.ii The secondary alarm station has conventional (land line) telephone service with local law enforcement authorities and a system for communication with the main control room.
16.a-2.ii Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests and inspections of the secondary alarm station communications capability with local law enforcement authorities and main control room will be performed
16.a-2.ii The secondary alarm station is equipped with conventional (land line) telephone service with local law enforcement authorities and has a system for continuous communication with the main control room.
Table C-1 (Sheet 6 of 7)Physical Security Hardware Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.12-5
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.12-5
CTS-01174
CTS-01174
CTS-01174
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 10 - ITAAC and Proposed License Conditions
Appendix C
Revision 195
16.b-2.ii The secondary alarm station is capable of continuous communication with security personnel.
16.b-2.ii Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests and inspections of the secondary alarm station continuous communication capabilities will be performed.
16.b-2.ii The secondary alarm station is capable of continuous communication with on-duty watchmen, armed security officers, watchmen or armed response individualsresponders, or other security personnel that have responsibilities within the physical protection program and during a contingency response events.
16.c.ii Nonportable communications equipment in the secondary alarm station will remain operational from an independent power source in the event of loss of normal power.
16.c.ii Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests and inspections of the nonportable communications equipment will be performed.
16.c.ii Nonportable communication devices (including conventional telephone systems) in the secondary alarm station are wired to an independent power supply that enables those systems to remain operable, without disruption, during the loss of normal power.
Table C-1 (Sheet 7 of 7)Physical Security Hardware Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
CTS-01174
RCOL2_14.03.12-5CTS-01174