F'RIC)RI EY 1(ACCELERATED RIDS PROCESSING

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9506010461 DOC.DATE: 95/05/26 NOTARIZED: NOFACIL:50-220 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Niagara Powe

AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION* Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATIONNRC — No Detailed AffiliationGiven

SUBJECT: Part 21 rept re deficient Wyle Lab Rept 17655-ARY-1.l,usedto establish svc life of various Agastat GP series relays.Sub'gastat GP relays replaced & PM/surveillance testingactivities estasblished,strengthened, enhanced or rewritten.

DISTRIBUTION CODE'E19T COPIES RECEIVED'LTR + ENCL l SIZETITLE: Part 21 Rept (50 DKT)

NOTES:

DOCKET05000220

RECIPIENTID CODE/NAME

PD1-1 PD

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COPIESLTTR ENCL

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COPIESLTTR ENCL

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NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE iVASTE! CONTACTTHE DOCUMENTCONTROLDESK, ROOIvI Pl-37 (EXT. 504-2083 ) TO ELlihIIVATEYOUR NAME PRO~IDISTRIBUTIONLISTS I'OR DOCUMENTS YOU DON"I'EED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIREDTOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR ~ ENCL 16

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IH1Y-26-95 FRI,I3'TII LICEHSIH FAII HO, 3T161400 P. 02

U TENCMSURE1

7 F E 0

PART I - REPORTING

NINE MILEPOINT UNIT~ (affected unit)

TYPE OF CONDlTION

DER NO. - - 7TR F 0 R~

A. ~mi~i'. D~efec

1, Basic Component

a. Structure

b. System

1 ~ Deviation

2. Other Condition

c. Component

d. Design

e. Inspection

f. Testing

1. Atomic Energy Act

2. Rule

3. Regulation

4. Order

g. Consulting Service {Q 5. I.icense

2. Other Condition

DESCRIPTION: W L rt 76v io . trela ~f nd o e ci

Y- wl w~ edt c i ce fe f

PART G - EVALUATiONCHECKLIST

A deviation related to a Basic Component or a failure to comply shall be evaluated to determine if itpresents a substantial safety hazard. A condition is a substantial safety hazard ifit causes a majorreduction in the degree of protection to the public. Criteria for determining substantial safety hazardsinclude: a) Moderate exposure to or release of licensed material,') Major degradation of essentialsafety-related equipment; and c) Major deficiencies involving design, construction, inspection, test oruse of license facilities or materials {see NUREG-302).

0

(

NLAP-PRO-]40„,, 9506010461 9'50526'; PDR:» ADDCK 05000220,'8 .'DR

REV Ol004799

The following check list is used to determine ifa major reduction in safety exists. Ifthe answer

is "yes" to any of the following, it may be reportable per 10 CFR Part 21 and requires furtherevaluation.

t .,4

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th)Y'-28-g5'FRI,}3:41 LICEHSII FRII HO, 3401400y Y,UB

ENCLOSURE 1 (continued)

PART II - EVALUATIONCHECKLIST (continued)

CONSEQUENCE

Exposures received in excess of 10CFR20 limits forimmediate notification.

NO

2. Exposure of an individual in an unrestricted area inexcess of 10CFR20 limits.

Release of radioactive material to an unrestricted areain excess of 10CFR20 limits.

4, Exceeding a safety limit as defined in the facilitytechnical specifications.

X

A condition which could disable or prevent operationof a system rciluired for safe shutdown, emergencycore cooling, post accident containment heat removal orpost accident containment atmosphere cleanup.

6. A condition which could disable or reduce the safetymargins for the reactor coolant pressure boundary, coreor reactor internals, functions or operation.

A condition which could disable or prevent operationof the spent fuel storage pool cooling and storageincluding the fuel racks.

A condition which could disable or prevent operationof redundant Class IB electrical systems, includingelectric and mechanical devices and circuitry.

9. A condition which could disable or prevent operationof the reactivity control systems; that is, control rods,control rod drives, and boron injection systems.

10. A condition which could disable or prevent operationof radioactive waste systems that could recreate offsitedoses greater than Part 100.

A condition which could disable or prevent operationof the primary and secondary containment.

-2-NLAP-!RG-l40

RSV 01

t4

PAY-28-% FRI'13'41 LIGEHSIIO FRX HO, 340IROO V UIl

ENCLOSURE 1 (continued)

PART H - EVALUATIONCHECKLIST (continued)

12.

CONSEQUENCE

A condition which could disable or prevent operationof structures, components, or systems whose continuedfunction is not required, but whose failure could reduceor disable systems that are required.

13. A condition involving the security system which couldcause a substantial safety hazard.

14, Other deviations in Basic Components or failures tocomply which cause a substantial safety hazard.

15. A condition that creates an unrevlewed safety question{10CFR50,59).

16. A condition which does not meet a rule, regulation,license or order and creates a substantial safety hazard.

PART Hl - EVALUATfON (to be checked by Nuclear Licensing){check applicable category)

{ ) Condition does not meet criteria for a potential defect or failure to comply because {attach additionalsheets as necessary):

() Condition does not involve a substantial safety hazard because {attach additional sheets as necessary):

(/) Condition involves a potential substantial safety hazard (attach additional sheets as necessary):

{) Condition does not meet criteria for Potential Defect or Failure to Comply, but is reportable underlOCFR50.9.

0%799NLAP-1RG-14O

RGV 01

,NN-26-9i FR[. 13'l2 LICEHSI FtIII HC. 349140 P,05

ENCLOSURE 1 (continued)

PLANT: Wne e P DER NO.

TITLE: %'e Re o

DESCRIPTION OF CONDITION: Niagara Mohawk has determined that the service life establishedfor various Agastat GP Series relays was based on a deficient Wyle Laboratories report. Specifically,a service life of 26.3 years for these relays was implemented by Niagara Mohawk based on WyleLaboratories Report 17655-ARY-1.1, Revision A, dated March 31, 1988, As indicated in this report,the activation energy used in calculating the life of the relay bobbin material (i.e., Zytel 101) was1.17 eV, which was based on the materials electrical characteristics. To have been conservative, thecalculation should have been based on the activation energy of the mechanical properties of the Zytelmaterial. An activation energy of 0.84 eV is typically used for aging when the application/failureparameter is mechanical. Consequently, the calculated service life and the relay change outfrequency, (which is based on the service life), were non-conservative. Accordingly, significantdegradation of any or all of the subject relays could have occurred resulting in the Agastat GP relaysbecoming inoperable. The subject Agastat Gp relays were located in various Nine Mile Point Unit 1

systems including the Core Spray System, Reactor Protection System and ATWS/ARISystem. Thesubject relays and their specific function are tabulated in Attachment 1 to this evaluation.

In summary, use ofWyle Report 1765S-ARY-L1 resulted in the calculation of a non-conservativeservice life, and consequently a non-conservative change out frequency of various Agastat GP relays.These, relays are located in essential NMPl systems and their degradation and subsequent failurecould have rendered the systems inoperable.

EVALUATION: The potential existed for the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Core Spray System to havebecome inoperable assuming the failure of certain normally energized Agastat GP relays. A Part 21notification to the NRC is required ifthe condition would have resulted in a substantial safety hazard.Criteria for determining ifa substantial safety hazard exists includes a major degradation of essentialsafety related equipment. A loss of core spray would be considered a major degradation of essentialequipment. Therefore, although it is unlikely that multiple core spray Agastat GP relays would failsimultaneously due to agc related degradation, the potential existed and a Part 21 notification isrequired. In addition, failure scenarios involving other relays identified on Attachment 1, couM haveaffected the ability of the plant to SCRAM.

RECON'LMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (if reportable): Immediate corrective action was toreplace the subject Agastat GP relays. Further corrective actions were, in part, to establish,strengthen, enhance or rewrite preventive maintenance/surveinance testing activities by September 1,1995 for inspection and replacement of the subject relays.

0%799 4NLAP-tRG-140

Rov 01

HAY-26-95'FRI k3:4Z L I GENS II FAl( HO, 3t|Sl400 ~

PLANT; i i P 'n

TITLE: % e

ENCLOSURE 1 {continued)

DER NO, - 2

EVALUATIONPREPARED BY:nature Date

CONCURRENCE BY: Z g2 9)General Supe r els and Analya Date

CONCURRENCE BY: ,~C.< A n LJ.V~ (.~~Manager Engineering Date

EVALUATIONREVIE%'EDBY'upervisor Li e i g Support D te

CONCURRENCE BY:Manager Licensing Date

(%799JALAP-IRG-14o

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HRX-29-99 EHI }3'42 LIGEHSIH FRX HO, 349I400

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1K83

1K84

2K83

2K84

120VAC

120VAC

120YAC

120 VAC

120VAC

120 VAC

120VAC

120 YAC

CORE SPRAY/RPS

CORE SPRAY/RPS

CORE SPRAYIRPS

CORE SPRAY/RPS

CORE SPRAY/RPS

CORE SPRAY/RPS

CORE SPRAY/RPS

E CORE SPRAY/RPS

.nOFF &EBPPN

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CORE SPRAYINJECTION

CORE SPRAYINJECTION

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8311

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8311

8311

8311

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A K121C

C K121D

C K121A

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120VAC

120 VAC

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CORE SPRAY/RPS

CORE SPRAY/RPS

CORE SPRAY IV40-01 8311

CORE SPRAY IV40.09 8311

CORE SPRAY IV40-10 8311

A K121B 120 VAC E CORE SPRAY/RPS CORE SPRAY IV40 11 8311

A

D

K158

K15C

K15D

KSB

K5C

K5D

K13A

K13B

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24VDC

24VDC

24VDC

24VOC

24VDC

24YDC

24YDC

24VDC

24YDC

24VOC

24YDC

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CORE SPRAY/RPS

CORE SPRAY'RPS

CORE SPRAYIRPS

CORE SPRAY/RPS

CORE SPRAY/RPS

CORE SPRAY/RPS

CORE SPRAY/RPS

CORE SPRAY/RPS

CORE SPRAY/RPS

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CORE SPRAY/RPS

CORE SPRAYPFRMISSIYE i365PSI

CORE'SPRAYPERMISSIVE <365PSI

CORE SPRAYPERMISSIVE <385PSI

CORE SPRAYPERMISSIVE <365PSI

DRYWELLHIGH'RESSURE

DRYNIELLHIGHPRESSURE

DRYWELLHIGHPRESSURE

QRYWELL.HIGHPRESSURE

. LO-LO RX LEVEL

10-LO RX LEVEL

I O-LO RX LEVEL

LO-LO RX LEYEL

783

783

783

783

783

783

783

783

783

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K38C 24VDC

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K39A 24VDC

K3SB 24VDC

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ATS TROUBLE

ATS TROUBLE

ATS TROUBLE

ATS TROUBLE

ATS TROUBLE

ATS TROUBLE

ATS TROUBLE

ATS TROUBLE I IGHT

ATS TROUBLE L!QHT

ATS TROUBLE LIGHT

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783

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783

783

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783

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K1G 24VDC

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K7A 24VDC

K7B 24VDC

K7C 24VDC

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KBA 24VDC

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