platonic piety- an essay toward the solution of an enigma

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Platonic Piety: An Essay toward the Solution of an Enigma

Author(s): W. Gerson RabinowitzSource: Phronesis, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1958), pp. 108-120Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181634 .

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PlatonicPiet:

An EssayToward he Solutionofan Enigma

W. GERSONRABINOWITZ

1

THE ONE dialogue of the Platonic corpusin which the concept of

piety is discussedas such and at any length at all is, of course, the

Euthyphro,nd it is this work - or, to put it more strictly perhaps,

it is the concept of piety adumbratedwithin the work - which consti-tutes the "enigma" f my title, for, unfortunately, he work itself does

not make it unambiguously lear whatmeaning,if any, Plato wished to

attachto 6o6atov. The Eithyphro,n fact, is one of the so-calledaporetic

dialoguesof definition,a dialogueto be distinguishedrom the dialogue

of exposition by its apparentailureto hit the truth, to answera question

satisfactorily, o arrive at an affirmative ndpositive result. In short, it is

a dialogueof searchwhich-beginsand ends with an apparentavowal of

ignorance concerning the meaningof piety; and the impression with

whichnmanyave eft off itsperusal s thatof a typicallyminor, "Socratic"dialogue- dramatic, earlycomposed, tentative, andnegative.

Negative and tentative as it is, it would be foolhardyto label what I

here propose to say about its central question a solution simpliciter:one

cannotclaim certaintyfor a findingwhich is to be discoveredexplicitly

formulatedas suchatno pointwithinthe dialogue,andwhich, moreover,

cannot be deduced therefrom without resort to the general hypothesis

that Plato's thoughtconstitutesa unified system, the concepts of which

interpenetrateand illuminate one another. Nevertheless, I hope to be

able to suggestthat there is reason for employingsuch an hypothesis n

connection with the Euthyphro,hat this reason is to be found within

the confines of the dialogue itself, and that, once the hypothesis is

accepted, the enigmaticqualityof the work will vanish nto clarity.

It will be recalled that the work opens with a certain Euthyphro

meeting Socratesat the stoa of the &pXowvat.e6hq.Each is soon to be

engagedin a trial: Socrates, it develops, is to be tried for impiety, for

beinga 7ronqg Oecov,a xacvoTotiZw nz-pLTX MOC whereby,t is alleged,he corruptsthe young; Euthyphro,contrary o the wishesof his family,is going to prosecute his own fatherfor murder, a man who through

neglect has permitted a homicide, a 7csX'n of Euthyphro's,to die.

His family think Euthyphro's act an impious one (v6a0tov yap stvat 'o

108



Aov 7rocptppovou semL-vxc); but Euthyphro himself knows better: he

has, he claims, exact knowledge of a 0'Lta, sa a ivcxTL,and of tra' Oetin general, and he will be glad to impart this knowledge to Socrates

(2A-SD).He first asserts that 6 !SaLovis what he is in fact going to do, to proceed

against the akatx6v no matter who he may be. Such action, however, is

simply an example of that To'r6o Eo, of that pta 8e'a, of that single

characteristic which all pious acts must possess if they are to be pious.

It is an account of this characteristic, which Socrates apparently does not

comprehend, that he wishes Euthyphro to impart to him (sD -6 E).

Accordingly, a second definition is offered - piety is that action whichis pleasing to the gods; and this is soon corrected to that which is

pleasing to all the gods, when Socrates points out that the gods of the

traditionalcultus GaToaCL&ouGL.. xxl 8a=povtoct M);Akot4 about what

is just and unjust, noble and base, good and evil (6E Io-9E).

This emended definition, according to which -r6 6aLov is o' OroypXe4,

is then subjected to a critical examination in which, perhaps for the

first time in the history of western thought, the distinction between

essential nature and accidental property is drawn. In brief, Socrates

shows that the piety of an act remains unaffected by the love which itspiety inspires in the gods. Its being pleasing to the gods and its piety

are, in fact, distinct characteristics which stand to one another in

the relation of =tOos to o6a[a, the act's piety entailing the love it

receives from the gods, but not vice-versa (9 E- i I B).

With the rejection of this definition, an impasse is reached and an

interlude in the search for the content of TO- 6aLov ensues, in which

Euthyphro complains that he does not know now how to express what

he means: their definitions refuse to remain stable and slip away from

them. Socrates banteringly suggests that this instability of definition isthe result of Euthyphro's Daedalean skill. To which Euthyphro retorts

that it is really Socrates who, like a Daedalus, has been imparting

motion to the definitions so that they refuse to stay put. "Inthat case, "

replies Socrates, "I am probably a greater artist than Daedalus to this

extent: he only made his own creations move, whereas I move those of

other people as well." Yet, he continues, he would rather not: e3ouX6unlv

y&p &Mvot ro6q X6youq V?'VCLVOL aXLVYG)4( lap5iaOML [LRX)XoV 7 -Cp n

AcaXou aopLoc -sC& Tav'&Xou Xp yev'aO. He would give the

wisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus on top of that, for a

solid definition (i i B- E ).

The interlude having ended with these words, Socrates asserts that

lO9



he will now try to help Euthyphro o see how he (Euthyphro)should

instruct him (Socrates) 7rptro5 'aou.. He begins by explaining thedistinction between genus and species, and easily gains Euthyphro's

consent to the propositionthat the genus of piety is justice, that piety

is a kind of justice. What particularkind of justice piety is, however,

remainsto be answered: the specific differentia must be stated if the

requirementsof formal definitionare to be met. Euthyphrotherefore

answers that piety seems to him to be that kind of justice which is

OepoutneLo the gods. Socrates commendshim warmly for this answer,

but is not clear about the meaning of Oepnxsta. In the first place every

true OCpO7E'L implies an art or science. Secondly every OepmnetLXeither improvesthe object of its concern or helps, in an ancillaryway,

the object of its concern to produce some effect, to achieve some

gpyov. Piety cannot be the sort of art that improvesthe gods, for gods

cannot be improved by men. It must therefore be an ancillary art, an

u7nqpe?rTj-ntq,an art that helps the gods to achieve some act. But what

is this act, this 7r&yxomov'pyov, this utterly wonderful and noble act,

which the gods are helped to achieve through the instrumentalityof

man s piety? Ecat , X 01pta-e.T nE Oeoz? U1tYpVTLX1 L TLYO4 pyou

&7repyMa[OCv't=plCTX? XV&V

; iXOTVy& 6'n

olaOX, Z'=taipT&

yeOC?Z XAXLG'n 9X; el&VOC &vOpvrnV... ?CI 87 7tpO6 AL6 t C7rO 'cOTV

exe7LVo6 7CaXyXOV E'pyOV 8 OL OSO'LOb?pyok0VTCL 7 'LM)PeOC xp@"COL;

( iIE-I 3EI i).

This questionEuthyphroails to answer.He shirksthe issue by replying

that the works of the godsare 7roXX&odOLXa. But Socratespresseshim.

The activities of generalsand of farmersare 7to?&xocl ctX?aoo; yet

they each havesome principal ask to achieve,so x cy'aXatov pyov.

What is so xs%aCocLovf the ?pyopao of the gods? Again Euthyphro

evades the point. It would be a work of great magnitude, he says, to

learn &xptPc6q6V'rocoJ3ocM'?Xs. But he will say this: that piety

consists in knowinghow to speakand act in a mannergratifying o the

gods, in prayerand sacrifice.This is the knowledge and such are the

acts which preserve the welfare of the state. Again, however, Socrates

persistsin keepingin the foreground he definition of piety as an art or

science that is ancillary o the gods' achievementof some principalact.

He refers to his questionaboutthe natureof this act asthe chief questionhe has asked('orXS oto0VJv Np6T9), and he chidesEuthyphrofor havingturned aside at the very point at which he was face to face at

1 The iterationof 6 XZCP&XCxLovere (r4B9) and the shift to a denotationdifferent rom

that which the term bears at i4A Io seem significant.See p. I I9, note 3, infra.

I 10



last with an adequate definition. Still, as asker, he must follow where the

replies of his interlocutor lead him: if piety consists in knowing howto sacrifice and how to pray to the gods, then it ought to be a science of

putting requests and giving returns to them. "A really first-rate compre-

hension of my meaning!" Euthyphro exclaims at this. "Yes", replies

Socrates, "and the reason why I understand you so well is that I am an

XLOUp qg . . . aq qao CXp LcnpOaeXy tov voiv auq,Tc'- OU xcqtcd

7r6ZZLr 0Tt &VZn ( 13 E l 2 -I4 D 6).

In using these words at I4D4- 6, Socrates seems to be saying that he is

quick to grasp Euthyphro's meaning because of his earnest desire to

master Euthyphro's science of theology, because of the close attentionhe pays to it. The result of this close attention to Euthyphro's words, he

seems to be saying, is this: that nothing said by Euthyphro will be lost

upon him. Nevertheless, there is a puzzle in this sentence which has not

heretofore been noticed. The result clause, (COT? oV xoa.[al neazarL

ocv ? , means literally "so that whatever you say will not fall

to the ground", i.e., will not be rendered invalid. All commentators, so

far as I know, have taken this clause to mean "so that nothing which you

(Euthyphro) say will be lost or thrown away upon me (Socrates)", but

there is no warrant in the Greek for the words "upon me". Their gra-tuitous addition becomes understandable only when one realizes that

sense seems to vanish without them, that sense seems to vanish if Plato

here makes Socrates say that, as a result of his close attention to

Euthyphro's words and wisdom, whatever Euthyphro says will be

rendered valid. The puzzle, in short, is generated by the collocation of

the result clause with the idiomaticsenseof -rpoaexcoTOv voUv,, for there

can be no causal relation, it would seem, between Socrates' mere

attention to them and the validity of Euthyphro's definitions. I shall have

occasion later to return to this point and to other ambiguities within the

passage.

To finish the resume - if that service of men to the gods that is piety

is to put requests and to give return to them, then right requests ought

to concern what men need from the gods, and right return what the

gods need from men. But, while there is no good for men which they

do not derive from the gods, what good or benefit do the gods receive

from men? "Gratification", says Euthyphro, "what pleases them", with

this reply completing the circle to the full and returning to the position

which Socrates has already refuted. We are thus no closer, apparently,

to a knowledge of what piety is at the close of the dialogue than we were

at its outset. The result of the investigation is negative; but Socrates, at

I I I



least, is not content with having proved Euthyphro an ignoramus in the

very sphere in which he claimed competence. "We must begin again,then, he says in the epilogue, "andask, what is piety? For syciO7tplv

&vaLciOCVV ?tQt.9X7tQtLXLXa&. a BX?C [LE &x?0 & 7V l

Tp07r(d irpoaxcow 'r6vv0o5V 6Ot [c,CXLar0C UV et7t 'MV oexv - "Some

other time," is Euthyphro's final rejoinder. "I've got in engage-

ment, and I really must be off." - "What a thing to do, my friend," says

Socrates. "You've dashed my hopes, you know. I was so hoping that

I'd learn from you the nature of piety and impiety and thus clear myself

of Meletus' indictment. I'd have told him that you had enlightened me

(ao?po... yTyovx) as to the meaning of ra&Oeo and that, in conse-quence, I was no longer going to make ad hocjudgments about them out

of ignorance or make innovations regarding them, and that the rest of

my life would be better as a result. " (I4D6-i6A).

So the dialogue ends, negatively, on the face of it, and yet a work

relatively rich in motive. There can be little doubt, as Shorey has

suggested, that the purposes of the Euthyphro, ike those of every other

Platonic dialogue, are complex, are, in fact, "its entire content: the

favorable contrast of Socrates with Euthyphro, the satire on popular

religion, the lesson in elementary logic, the hint, perhaps, of the theoryof ideas, the deeper problem of the relations of religion and morality,the difficulty, perhaps the impossibility, for finite minds of defining

without contradictions our relations and service to the infinite that we

apprehend as God." 1 There is an additional motive as well, however,

which is not listed in such a catalogue. This is precisely the persistent

attempt to come to grips with the nature of piety, which runs through

the entire length of the dialogue, giving it its unity and structure. To all

appearance, this is the major motive. On the face of it, Plato is striving

to make clear a concept of piety; and, on the face of it, he fails. But does

he really fail?

This question, which must have been debated at least as early as the

first century A.D., when Thrasyllus of Alexandria, in dividing Plato's

works into tetralogies and in classifying each, in part, by philosophical

method and purpose, must have put it to himself in order to reach the

conclusion that the Euthyphrowas a peirastic dialogue of search, was

raised anew in modern times by Schleiermacher, in the introduction to

his translation of the dialogue. There he observed that "man kann im

Euthyphron weder eine fortschreitende Berichtigung der allgemeinsten

ethischen Ideen nachweisen, noch auch, wenn man bei dem einzelnen

1 P. Shorey, WhatPlatoSaid (Chicago, X933), 78-79.

I I 2



Begriff stehen bleiben will, der den unmittelbaren Gegenstand der

Untersuchung ausmacht, finden sich hier solche indirekte Andeutungen,welche den aufmerksamen Leser hinreichend mit der Ansicht des Ver-

fassers bekannt machen; sondern sowol die Beschranktheit des Zwekks

als die bloss skeptische Behandlung des gegenstandes liegt hier ganz

deutlich zu Tage." 1 Yet, only i6 years later Socher was to find in the

work just th-ose "indirekte Andeutungen", pointing to positive doctrine,

whose existence Schleiermacher had denied ;2 and with the publication

in Bonitz's PlatonischeStudien of a lecture on the interpretation of the

Euthyphrowhich had been delivered before the Berlin Academy of

Science in I 872, a position was taken which all proponents of a positiveinterpretation have utilized since, with but minor degrees of alteration.3

In this lecture Bonitz maintained and reinforced Socher's view that the

key to the dialogue and the solution to the problem of Platonic piety

lay in the one question, put by Socrates at I3E I 0- I I and again at

i4A9-io, which Euthyphro fails to answer.

Since Bonitz's day, no scholar who has attempted to understand the

Euthyphro as been able to avoid taking the one stand or the other. While

neither view has prevailed at the expense of the other 4, I shall here

contend that the more plausible position is that of those who assume a

I F. Schleiermacher, Platons Werkc, Ersten Theiles, Zweiter Band, Dritte Auflage

(Berlin, i8S5), 37. The first edition of the work was published in I8o4.

2 J. Socher, Ucber Platons Schrften (Munich, 1820), 62: "'Gott dienen ist Religion:

giebt es einen Zweck der Gottheit, ein erhabenes Werk, zu dessen Vollfiihrung sie die

Menschen als Mitarbeiter aufruft? Welches ist dieses?' Hier liegt der Schiussel!" cf.

Ibid., 6i: "Gew6hnlich, sagt Schleiermacher bei einer. andern Gelegenheit, legt er

[i.e., Plato] den negativen Resultaten den Schliissel zur positiven Kenntniss bei: ergreife

ihn, und schliess dir selbst auf! "

3 H. Bonitz, Platonische tudien, Dritte Auflage (Berlin, i 886), 2 2 7-242. Fot those who had

anticipated Bonitz in finding positive results in the dialogue - notably, Stallbaum andSusemihl himself - see F. Susemihl, Dic GenetischeEntivickelung er PlatonischenPhilosophic,

ErsterTheil (Leipzig, I8SS), I 17-I I9.4 Among the positivists are to be found, for example: J. Adam (Platonis Euthyphro

[Cambridge, 1890], xii-xvii); W. A. Heidel ("On Plato's Euthyphro,"TAPA 31 [1900],

163-I8 I); T. Gomperz (GrcekThinkersEnglish transl. London, I905], vol. II, 3?8-367);

H. Raeder (Platons PhilosophischeEntwickelungLeipzig, 1905], 127-130); H. von Arnim

(Platos Jugenddialoge [Leipzig-Berlin, 1914], 141-I54); Wilamowitz (Platon [Berlin,

19I9], vol. II, 76-8I); and P. Friedlander Platon [Berlin, 1971, vol. 11,7?-84). The

negativists include: B. Jowett (The Dialogues of Plato Translated nto English, II, 67-73);

M. Croiset (Platon. Oeuvres Completes[Paris, Societe d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres,"

1946], 1,4 I81-I83); L. Robin (Platon [Paris, 19351, 4I and 254.-255); J. Burnet(Plato's Euthyphro,Apologyof Socrates,and Crito [Oxford, 1924], S7); and P. Shorey (op.

cit., 78-80). cf. E. Zeller, Die Philosophieder Griechen,II. i,5 193, note i and479.

I 13



positive concept of piety in the work, a concept to which Plato was

himself committed and which was consciously meant by him to berecognizedas at least distinct from all conventionalnotions of the day,even if it were not understood n full. On the issueof the content of this

notion, however, I must part companywith these scholars.Here, and

here alone, I may claim to be advancing omethingnew.

11

Thereare severalreasonswhy one is justified n seekingpositivedoctrine

in the dialogue.The Euthyphroallsnaturally nto two sectionsseparated

from one anotherby an interlude. It has long been recognized that thisdevice of interlude is Plato'sway of warningthe readerthat everything

that has preceded is prefatory and that, if positive doctrine is to be

found, it is to be soughtin the secondpart. This is the case, for example,

with the Phaceowhose major interlude, followingthe objections leveled

by Simmiasand Cebesagainst he immortalityof the soul, sets the scene

for the introduction of the theory of ideas as ultimate causes of all

characteristicswhich come to focus in phenomenain space-time; the

elaborateinterlude of the Protagoras,n which Plato not only parodies

the sophists Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias, but even involvesSocratesin a long and fantastic nterpretationof a piece of Simonidean

verse that is itself a parodyof contemporarypractice in literary criti-

cism, similarlysets the stage for the proof of the homogeneity of the

virtues in intelligence and knowledge; andthe case is similaragairn ith

the Phaedrus nd the Theaetetus,ach of which has a long interlude that

functions in just this sort of way. Now, up to the interlude, every

attempt to define piety in the Euthyphronds in negation, every defi-

nition seems to slipaway ike one of Daedalus'moving statues.We note,

moreover, that these definitionsare the ones which havebeen advancedby Euthyphro, that Socrates up to this point has confined himself

chieflyto criticizingwhat Euthyphrovolunteers as his own ideas. In the

interlude, however, Euthyphro s reduced to a confession of incompe-

tence; and, from this point on, Socrates,after stating his earnest desire

to detain the definitions, that is, to reach one that is adequate,plays a

different role. He is no longer chiefly critical, but now leads Euthyphro

step by step to the notion of piety as Oepxciv'Cmo the gods. We note

that he warmly congratulatesEuthyphro or havingreached this insight,

and, what seems to me to be of extreme significance,he himselfneverabandons his way of looking at piety even though Euthyphro s quite

incapableof elaboratingon it and at the dialogue's end returns to the

I 14



the Republic'sidea of good into it, some seeing this concept in the

7yyxcXo0v gpyov of the gods, others equating it with the gods them-selves, others, again, making the gods and their 'epyov he subjective-

objective content of the idea of good. For such impletion of the defi-

nition blinks not nmerely the fact that no definite sign or clue can be

found within the dialogue to indicate that Plato intends Oeo' or epyov

tco'v O6v to be identified with the idea of good, but, what is more

important, the fact that no evidence exists within the entire Platonic

corpusto suggest that Oeos ever denoted the idea of good or the causal

agent thereof. As Professor Cherniss has demonstrated1, it is voii

that constitutes deity or the essential characteristic of deity for Plato- the voiJg that rules "necessity" through persuasion in the ordering of

the universe in the Timaeus 48A), that is Pcxeug oPJOCvoi3 xoc. ynq

in the Philebus (28C), and and that is CyxpQCr4gOCa-pcOve xOLOacov

,Xcov s there are in the universe, of which it is the &LoxexoacpJXW,in the Laws (966E). Moreover, "deity, as vo5q, is not causally inde-

pendent and so cannot be the 'ultimate reality'. It must, in fact, since

it is vok, exist in soul, and consequently must be intermediate between

the ideas and phenomena... The Republic shows both that voi3 is

causally dependent upon the ideas and why Plato insists that it can existonly in soul. As there is vision in the eyes as soon as they are turned

upon objects lighted by the sun, so is there vo5q in the soul as soon as

it rests upon the intelligibles illuminated by the truth and reality

Ideal [Goodj, consciously conceived as God," is equally silent about the epistemonic

content of that service. The same is true of Gomperz (op. cit., 361-362: "The work of

the gods is the good, and to be pious is to be the organ of their will, as thus directed"),

Raeder (op. cit., 130: "Der Dialog schliesst... ohne dass eine geniugende Definition

der Fr6mmigkeit erreicht wird; doch zeigt es sich hier wie bei friiheren Definitions-

versuchen, dass eine richtige Definition nur unter der Bedingung zustande kommenkann, dass das Gute als Zweck erfasst wird"), and Friedlander (op. cit., 82: "Und wenn

Sokrates fragt, welches denn das Hauptstiick dieses vielen Sch6nen sei, das die Gotter

wirken, und keine Antwort erhalt, so ahnen wir, dass der platonische Sokrates darauf

die Antwort hatte: 'das Gute'; wir wissen aber auch, wie hoch ihm dieses Gute steht,

und dass es vor Euthyphron nicht ausgesprochen werden konnte, ohne missverstanden

oder enttweiht zu werden"). von Arnim would appear to be an exception, for he says

(Op. cit., 149) that Plato "sie [i.e., piety] als eineELt-fl.LV) u7np?j;rLz' Ozot; et4 -r

reXd0cu 7rOLe!V lcxX TOV MVOpO7tcov4uy& auffasste." The sentence which immediatelyfollows this, however, shows that he too did not hold the definition to entail the concept

of a distinct science: "So ware sie auch nur eine Anwendung italics mine.- WGR] der

it7rLaV on &o5 yOoA3."1 H. Cherniss, Aristotle'sCriticismof Plato and the Academy Baltimore, 1944), Appendix

Xi, 603-6io.

I I6



emanating fromn he idea of good as light does from the sun (go8 B-D).

Similarly in the Timaeus, although at the beginning it is said that the

demiurge constructed voi5 within soul (30B), it is later explained that

voi5 is the result in the soul of the soul's 'contact' with the ideas

(37A-C). For Plato, then, voi54 is not an 'entity' but is just the soul's

ability (cf. Republic So8 E) to 'see' the ideas or the state in the

soul (i.e., v6&jaLq,Republic riiD, Timaeus52A) producedby sight of

them. "1

It is the knowledge of this equation between deity and voi3c, vouched

for as it is by the evidence of the dialogues, which alone enables one to

answer without resort to conjecture the question shirked by Euthyphro;

for if the function of vo05in the first of its two senses must be, and can

only be, the realization of itself in the second - if it is the function of

vo05 to become vo67aL4, - then the "work" of the gods, a atyxoaXov

epyov indeed, can only be the apprehension of the Platonic ideas.

Moreover, it is only on the condition that Plato had already conceived

of this equation at the time of composition of the Euthyphrohat one can

complete the definition of piety by allowing to it its full epistemonic

content; for if the gods are vo5qand their function is the apprehension

of ideas, then it follows that the only art capable of aiding them to

perform this function must be that Platonic art of philosophical dialectic

which enables vo5 - TOptL '4 6 6'pymvov 4 xcTLav0acvt

excroq - to twist around and away from phenomenal process to the

end that it may confront the ideas (Republic 518 C-D). Thus, if the

equation between deity and vo54is accepted as a relation which is valid

for the Euthyphro, very term in its enigmatic definition will be immedi-

ately accounted for by a precise denotation for which evidence exists in

the Platonic dialogues; the alternative to acceptance of this equation, on

the otlher hand, for those who would find positive doctrine in the work,

has in fact been, and can only continue to be, a conjectural reconstruction

of that doctrine which in every case must fail to account for its epi-

stemonic content.

The consciousness of the need to be clear about the meaning of any

term Plato might use, which the Euthyphrobespeaks not only in its

insistence throughout upon clear comprehension of the denotation of

tr 6aLovbut also in its suggestion at 3E IO-14C3 that the definition

as it stands will remain deficient so long as the denotation of the epyov

1 Cherniss, op. cit., 606-607. The last statement is not an exclusive disjunction. It isclear from the passages cited by Cherniss that Plato conceived of voi3q both as 8U"Va1LLq

andas Nvipyem.

I 17



of the gods is not made explicit ', it bespeaks in particular for Oso'in

its epilogue. There, afterevery effort at definitionhas ended in failure,Socrates s madefinallyandironicallyto lamentthe fact that Euthyphro

has not enlightenedhim, not as to the meaningof T6 0aLov,be it noted,

but as to the meaningof t& Oet? - a strangelamentationto make, and a

point of striking significancefor the interpretationof the dialogue,

when one recalls that not once in the entire conversationhas either

party to it addressedhimself to the particularquestion, rt e'trLT6 O?ZoV.

The condition for the answer to this question, no less than that for the

answer to the question concerning the teachability of virtue in the

Meno, s that a prior question be answered; and, for the Euthyphro,tis this prior question, -L Eatv 6 GO4, and its answer, vo5i, which

(rather than the question concerningthe spyovof the gods) constitute

the key to the solution of the enigma.

It may be objected, of course, that to accept for the Etuthyphron

equation that is demonstrablyvalid only for the Republic,Philebus,

Timaeus, nd Laws s quite unnecessary,and even anachronistic.So to

object, however, is to overlook the fact that, long before the time of

composition of the Euthyphro, naxagorasof Clazomenaehad already

conceived of, and had published, his view of vok as 6o&otxoruzW-VCxod. lt&vTcv 'rLo;s2, if not as the identical of Oeo', as the doxo-

graphical tradition asserts.3 Moreover, to object so is to overlook

evidence provided by the Euthyphrotself. It will be recalled that, when

at i4D4-6 Socrates ironically assuresEuthyphro hat he will save the

validity of all the definitions by applyingvo5qthereto, we noted a

puzzle in the sentencegeneratedby the collocationof the result clause

1 To be noted, too, is what Plato makes Socrates say at 9E, after Euthyphro has defined

-r 6a8Lovas 6 csv 7rcv-rcot Oeol (pLt)aLv. So defined, r 6&atovs tro Oro9LXc.

Socrates' critique of this definition is based upon his clarjfication of the meaning of thisterm: it is an adjective which, in the last analysis, denotes merely a =aOo4 f Tr66tov,

and as such it cannot be equated with the oUatLoof the latter. What I wish to emphasize

here is not the demonstration of the inadequacy of the definition as such, but rather the

demonstration of Plato's consciotisnesshat the denotation of a term must be understood if

the validity or lack of validity of the definition in which the term appears is to be

ascertained. Ovxo5v kmaxo6,tAev oZ TO-ro, cX EUOIcppav, - says Socrates, - et xc&5@s

Xkye-rL, i IpCv xot oTrw, v -re aluTrv & xo8rey[eOm xxat -rv &Xhw &a

?6Vov c -rcq L gxe" oura, >YXC(pOUVVTECXLV; j aX)(T7rov -rt ?kyct 6 hey&w;

(9E4-7) The same consciousness of the necessity of clarifying a definition's terms is to

be seen at 3 A-D, where OrpTretoc -rv OEv is refined to its immediate denotation,

upenxi -rot Oeog. N.B. x 3A I^2: :v y&p OepOMEL'V iS7ro JUVJ.L 'VLVOw oVOFL&4M.

2 Phaedo97 B-C. cf. Laws966 E-967 B.

8 H. Diels, DoxographiGraeci (Berlin, 1929), 30 2b I - 1 2.

I 8



with 7tpoaco trv vo5v taken in its idiomatic and normal sense. It is

meaningless, we noted, for Plato thus to have implied a causal relationholding between Socrates' mere attention to them and the validity of

Euthyphro's definitions. It may now be pointed out, however, that it

would have been no less meaningless for Plato to have implied a causal

relation holding between the application of vo54 to the definitions and

their validity, unless he had already identified voi5 with the one term

common to them all.' The puzzle at i 4D 4-6 is therefore evidence for

Plato's conscious equation of vo-u and O6o. And what Plato makes

Socrates say at i g C I I -D 2, just before Euthyphro breaks off the conver-

sation altogether, buttresses this evidence. In this final appeal, Socratesambiguously describes himself as one who will not voluntarily give up

the process of search until he gain haOntL - in effect, as voi4 striving

to become v6TJaL4 and enjoins Euthyphro not to devalue him so

described.2 The alternative to such devaluation is for Euthyphro to

speak the truth about so 6atov.. And how is he to attain this truth? By

applying voiu3, at last, to every turn of definition.3

One question, perhaps, remains to be considered. If it is true that,

when he wrote the Euthyphro,Plato had already "developed" the concept

of deity which was to "reappear" in the Timaeus, Republic, Phaedrus,Philebus,and Laws, why did he not make it crystal-clear in the earlier

work? The reason, I venture to say, is an obvious one: had he wished to

declare that god is voi5 and genuine piety philosophy, in his sense of

the term, he would have been forced to write not a Euthyphro,but a

Republic and a Timaeus to support his views; nXt?Lovo4pyoi Ea-tv

MxpLP5; i&Vrx TaI3To 64 x? iL,OeZv, replies Euthyphro, quite

i For a similardouble entendregiven to 7rpoakXeLv6v vo5v by Plato, see Philebus 32 E:

... et=p 6v-C(Oq 0'Lt T6 hy6tkeVOV, 8LM&,pOeLpo0VaVLaV 'U-r6V &?Yn8)V, cVM(,?O tACOVW

8 0ov, V flu)-rat eetpoll?vo)v ftLre &VMa O.LkVWV1VVOqaG)VeV 7tppt, 'rtvc so-r0 Ctv

8et r6-re kv 1x&arotL ClvaL rot,; C6Olt, O'rav ot'urcotaxn; ac6apa 8& 7poo)cav 'rbv

voVv Eiiu. The fi; here asked about is revealed as vo54in 33B-C 3.2 The irony here is the same as thatof Phaedoi i 5B- I6A X cf. Alcibiades1 x32 B-I3 3 C.

3 A similarambiguity uggesting he consciousequationof vok3and Oe6qs to be seen

at x4B8-9: hadEuthyphroonly wishedto do so, he would have answeredthe xcpdaXtovof the questionsSocrates had asked; or, he would have stated the xeci&Xotov f those

aboutwhom ocrates had asked. The ambiguity of ebTc5 iv so' xe(P&'atov&v 7pC"3r(v

permits either of these interpretations. In the second, xEp&oXatov can mean either

"principal haracteristicof" or, takenliterally, "thatbelongingto the head, the upper

part of the body, of." The first of these senses is an obvious description of Wo%3,he

essentialcharacteristicof deity. The second is seeminglywithout sense, anddoes in factremain so, until one recalls that, for Plato, xcpaXris the habitation of votig,

''ro

Oetoa'-rouxcdt[epc'r&'rou tx-rjtg (Timaeus4sA).

i19



truthfully, to the question, T'L so6 xeyp.Xov ra'=L Tr 4yoa[

['c,v Oe7v]. Moreover, if Plato was to put his treatment of piety intothe synthetic, ironic, pseudo-historical form of Socrates' quest for it

from the lips of an unaffectedly orthodox and typically unreflecting

religionist - from the very sort of man, in short, whose narrow ortho-

doxy was responsible for his master's death, - he had to suppress dis-

cussion of the essential characteristic of deity which for him guaranteed

that true piety, like all other virtuous and intelligent activity, was in the

last analysis philosophy and the result of philosophy.

The monstrousness of the Athenians' treatment of Socrates, for Plato,

lay in this: that they had condemned and put to death for impiety aman who, as Plato saw it, had practiced the true piety of dialectic all

his life. And the hints of the Euthyphroecord this judgment for posterity

- for all, that is, capable of applying vouG hereto.

University of California.

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platonic piety- an essay toward the solution of an enigma

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