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EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

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Page 1: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Page 2: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTArticle VII

The scope of executive power is set forth in Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

EXECUTIVE POWER - The power to enforce

and administer the laws.

belongsPRESIDENT

Page 3: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Is the executive power of the president limited to those specified in

the Constitution? Marcos vs. Manglapus

Executive power is more than the sum of specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. It includes residual powers not specifically mentioned in the Constitution.

The Power involved is the President’s residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the president as the steward of the people.

Page 4: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

THE PRESIDENT

Who is the President?

The President is the Head of State and the Chief Executive. (He is the executive) He is the repository of all executive power.

Qualifications? Natural born citizen of the

Philippines Registered voter Able to read write At least 40 years of age on

the day of the election A resident of the

Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the election.

Page 5: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

The President shall be elected by direct vote of the people. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President (and Vice-President) shall be held on the second Monday of May.

Section 4, Article VII

Page 6: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

CANVASS OF ELECTION RETURNS Article VII, Section 4

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes. The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

Page 7: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Is the function of Congress in canvassing returns for presidential election ministerial?

YESThe congress does not have the power to inquire into or decide questions of alleged irregularities in the conduct of the election contest. Normally, as long as the election returns are duly certified and appear to be authentic, the Congress shall have no duty but to canvass the same and to proclaim as elected the person receiving the highest number of votes.

Page 8: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

LEGARDA VS DE CASTRO

The validity, authenticity and correctness of the SOVs and COCs are under the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualification of President and Vice-President is expressly vested in the PET in Section 4 Article VII of the Constitution. Included therein is the duty to correct manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs.

Page 9: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Does Section 18.5 R.A. 9189 (Absentee Voting Law)

empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list

representatives including the President and the Vice-President

constitutional?

Page 10: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate if the

outcome of the election will not be affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the

Commission is empowered to order the

proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has not

taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered

impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or

influence of the Commission.

Page 11: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Macalintal vs. Comelec Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning

candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency.

Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of president and vice-president.

Page 12: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

May a Joint Congressional Committee Canvass Election Returns for President?

Lopez v. SenateCongress may validly delegate the initial determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee so long as the decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint session of Both Houses of Congress voting separately.

Page 13: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Pimentel vs. Joint Canvassing Committee

Congress may continue the canvass even after the final adjournment of its session. The final adjournment of Congress does not terminate an unfinished presidential canvass. Adjournment terminates legislation but not the non-legislative functions of Congress such as canvassing of votes.

Page 14: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

Page 15: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Can Susan Roces, widow of Fernando Poe.Jr, intervene and/or substitute

for him, assumingarguendo that the protest could survive his

death?

No. The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of the PET Rules. It provides that only the 2nd and 3rd placer may contest the election. The Rule

effectively excludes the widow of a losing candidate.

(Poe vs. Arroyo)

Page 16: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

THE VICE PRESIDENTWho is the Vice-President?

He is one whose function is to be on hand to act as President when needed or to succeed to the Presidency in case of permanent vacancy to the office. The President may also appoint him as cabinet member whose appointment needs no confirmation.

Qualifications & Election

The Vice - President has the same qualifications as that of the President

The Vice-President is elected in the same manner as the President

Page 17: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Vacancy and Presidential Succession

Vacancy Situations: Vacancy that occurs at the start of the

term of the President (Article VII, Section 7)

Vacancy that occurs during the term of the President (Article VII, Section 8)

Page 18: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Vacancy that Occurs at the Start of the Term

(Section 7)

REASON FOR VACANCY SUCCESSION

1. Failure to elect the President 1. The Vice-President becomes acting President until a President is elected.

2. Failure of the President-elect to qualify. 2. The Vice-President becomes acting President until a President qualifies.

3. Death or permanent disability of the President-elect.

3. The Vice-President-elect shall become the President.

4. When both the President and Vice-President shall not have been chosen or have failed to qualify or when both shall have died or become permanently incapacitated at the start of the term.

4. The Senate President or the Speaker in that order acts as President until a President or Vice- President qualifies.

5. When both the Senate President shall have died or become permanently incapacitated or failed to assume.

5. Congress shall enact as law as to who shall become the acting President

Page 19: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Vacancy that occurs during the term

(Section 8)

REASON FOR VACANCY SUCCESSION

1. When the incumbent President dies or is permanently disabled, is removed or resigns.

1. The vacancy created is thus permanent. The Vice- President becomes President.

2. When both the President and the Vice-President die, or are permanently disabled, are removed, or resign.

2. The Senate President or the Speaker-in that order shall act as acting president until the President and Vice President is elected.

3. When the Acting President dies, or is permanently incapacitated, or resigned.

3. Congress will determine by law who will act as President until a new President or Vice- President shall have elected and qualified.

Page 20: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

PERQUISITES

PERQUISITES:Section 6. The President shall have

an official residence. The salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be determined by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure.

Page 21: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

PROHIBITIONS AND INHIBITIONSPROHIBITIONS:

1. Shall not receive increase compensation during the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. (Section 6)

2. Shall not receive any other emoluments from the government or any other source during their tenure. (Section 6)

3. Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, shall not hold any other employment during their tenure. (Section 13)

Page 22: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Civil Liberties Union vs. ES

• Executive Order No. 284 • Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary

functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.

Page 23: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Article VII, Section 13

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. x x x

Page 24: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Article IX-B, Section 7

No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

• Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Page 25: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Civil Liberties Union vs. ES

• Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB?

Page 26: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Civil Liberties Union vs. ES

• All other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions. However, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

Page 27: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Civil Liberties Union vs. ES

• The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials.

Page 28: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Public Interest Centre vs. Elma

• The action seeks to declare as null and void the concurrent appointments of respondent Magdangal B. Elma as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) for being contrary to Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. Sec. 13., Article VII.

Page 29: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Public Interest Centre vs. Elma

• It is evident that even Section 13, Article VII does not sanction this dual appointment. Appointment to the position of PCGG Chairman is not required by the primary functions of the CPLC, and vice versa. The primary functions of the PCGG Chairman involve the recovery of ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family and associates, the investigation of graft and corruption cases assigned to him by the President, and the adoption of measures to prevent the occurrence of corruption.

Page 30: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Public Interest Centre vs. Elma

• On the other hand, the primary functions of the CPLC encompass a different matter, that is, the review and/or drafting of legal orders referred to him by the President. And while respondent Elma did not receive additional compensation in connection with his position as CPLC, he did not act as either CPLC or PGCC Chairman in an ex-officio capacity. The fact that a separate appointment had to be made for respondent Elma to qualify as CPLC negates the premise that he is acting in an ex-officio capacity.

Page 31: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

PROHIBITIONS AND INHIBITIONSPROHIBITIONS

5. Shall not directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries during their tenure.

6. Strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office during their tenure.

Page 32: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

PROHIBITIONS AND INHIBITIONSPROHIBITIONS

7. May not appoint spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree as Member of Constitutional Commissions or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Under Secretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

• Note: Nos. 1-6 above applies to the President. 1-5 applies to the Vice-President. 3-5 applies to Members of Cabinet, their deputies or assistants.

Page 33: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Executive Privilege

• The right of the president and high-level executive branch officers to withold information from Congress, the Courtsm and ultimately, the public. (Senate vs. Ermita)

Page 34: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Information Subject of Executive Privilege

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Presidential Communications Privilege

• First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.

Page 36: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Presidential Communications Privilege

• Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet.

Page 37: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Presidential Communications Privilege

• Third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Page 38: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Only the president may invoke it

Page 39: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY Is presidential immunity constitutionally

conferred? Estrada vs. Desierto – the 1935 Constitution does not

contain any provision on presidential immunity from suit. It was in the 1973 Constitution, Section 17, Article VII that it was first constitutionally provided. Such provision on immunity was however, omitted in the 1987 Constitution. But this does not mean that the president does not enjoy immunity. Presidents do still enjoy immunity from suit during his term.

In Re: Saturnino Bermudez, 1986

Page 40: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

Page 41: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTArticle VII

The scope of executive power is set forth in Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

EXECUTIVE POWER - The power to enforce

and administer the laws.

belongs PRESIDENT

Page 42: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

• Appointing Power• Power of Control• Military Power• Pardoning Power• Borrowing Power• Diplomatic Power• Budgetary Power • Informing Power

• Article VII, Section 16• Article VII, Section 17• Article VII, Section 18• Article VII, Section 19• Article VII, Section 20• Article VII, Section 21 • Article VII, Section 22• Article VII, Section 23

Page 43: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Is the executive power of the president limited to those specified in

the Constitution? Marcos vs. Manglapus

Executive power is more than the sum of specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. It includes residual powers not specifically mentioned in the Constitution.

The Power involved is the President’s residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the president as the steward of the people.

Page 44: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

APPOINTING POWERArticle VII, Section 16

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

Page 45: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

APPOINTING POWERDefinition of Appointment.

Appointment is the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office.

It is distinguished from designation in that the latter simply means the imposition of additional duties, usually by law, on a person already in the public service.

It is also different from the commission in that the latter is the written evidence of the appointment.

Page 46: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Nature of Appointing Power

Page 47: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

EXECUTIVE IN NATURE

Appointing power is executive in nature. (Government v. Springer) Indeed, the filling up of an office created by law is the implementation or execution of law.

Since appointment to office is an executive function, the clear implication is that the legislature may not usurp such function. The legislature may create an office and prescribe the qualifications of the person who may hold the office, but it may neither specify who shall be appointed to such office nor actually appoint him.

Page 48: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

NON-DELEGABILITY

Facts: The Minister of Tourism designate petitioner as general manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority. When a new Secretary of Tourism was appointed, the President designated [him] as a general manager of the PTA on the ground that the designation of petitioner was invalid since it is not made by the President as provided for in PD 564. Petitioner claimed that his removal was without just cause.

Page 49: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

NON-DELEGABILITY

• Held: The appointment or designation of petitioner by the Minister of Tourism is invalid. It should be pointed out that appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which cannot be delegated. Even if it be assumed that the power could be exercised by the Minister of Tourism, it could be recalled by the President, for the designation was provisional. (Binamira v. Garrucho)

Page 50: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Necessity of Discretion

Discretion is an indispensable part in the exercise of power of appointment. Congress may not, therefore, enact a statute which would deprive the President of the full use of his discretion in the nomination and appointment of persons to any public office.

Page 51: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Necessity of Discretion

The SC held that the statute unlawfully limits executive discretion in appointments when it provides for the drawing of lots as a means to determine the districts to which judges of first instance should be assigned by the Chief Executive. Congress may not limit the President’s choice to one because it will be an encroachment on the Prerogative of the President. (Bermudez v. Secretary, 1999)

Page 52: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Necessity of Discretion

• Question: The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 provides, “All provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary.” Is the absence of recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President fatal to the appointment of a prosecutor?

Page 53: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Flores vs. Drilon

• The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992,"

Page 54: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Flores vs. Drilon

• (d) Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority (emphasis supplied).

Page 55: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Flores vs. Drilon

• As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some office or trust,“ or "[t]he selection or designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge the duties of the same.

Page 56: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Flores vs. Drilon

• As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some office or trust,“ or "[t]he selection or designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge the duties of the same.

• The selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office.

Page 57: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Flores vs. Drilon

• The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power .

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Flores vs. Drilon

Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Once the power of appointment is conferred on the President, such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint.

The provision is unconstitutional.

Page 59: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Classification of Appointmentin relation to the Power of C.A.

REGULAR A regular appointment is one made by

the President while Congress is in session; takes effect only after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and once approved, continues until the end of the term of the appointee.

Page 60: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Classification of Appointmentin relation to the Power of C.A.

AD INTERIM Ad interim appointment is one made by

the President while Congress is in recess; takes effect immediately until revoked by the Commission on Appointments.

Page 61: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

2nd par. Of Section 16, Article VII

• The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointment shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until its next adjournment.

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Classification of Appointment in relation to the Power of C.A.

AD INTERIMQuestion: Suppose the ad interim appoint was by-

passed by the Commission on Appointments either because of lack of time or failure of CA to organize, may the appointment of the appointee be extended by the issuance of new appointment?

Answer: Yes, because there is no final decision yet. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment. (Matibag v. Benipayo, 2002)

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OFFICIALS TO BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT

1. Those officials whose appointment are vested in him by the Constitution.

a. Heads of executive departmentsb. Ambassadors and other public

ministersc. Officers of AFP from the rank of

colonel or navy captaind. Justices and Judges of Lower

Courtse. The regular members of JBC,

chairmen and members of constitutional commissions, Ombudsman and its Deputies

f. Sectoral Representatives

Page 64: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

OFFICIALS TO BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT

2. Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.3. Any other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by the Constitution

Page 65: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

APPOINTMENTS WHICH NEED CONFIRMATION BY CA

Those enumerated in the 1st sentence of Section 16: (Sarmiento vs. Mison)

1. Heads of executive departments 2. Ambassadors, other public ministers and

consuls 3. Officers of the armed forces from rank of

colonel or naval captain 4. Those other officers whose appointments are

vested in him in the Constitution.

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May Congress require other appointments to be confirmed by

Commission on Appointments?

Page 67: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

Calderon vs. Carale

• Carale involved R.A. No. 6715 which required that the Chairman and Commissioners of NLRC be appointed by the President with the confirmation of the CA. The court reiterated its ruling in Mison saying that the list in the first sentence of Section 16 of those appointments is exclusive, adding that the list may not be expanded by statutory legislation.

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LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER TO APPOINT

Article VII, Section 14Appointments extended by an Acting President shall

remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President, within ninety days from his assumption or re-assumption of office.

Article VII, Section 15Two months immediately before the next presidential

elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

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LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER TO APPOINT

READ:1. In RE: Appointment of Mateo Valenzuela,

2. De La Rama vs. Court of Appeals

3. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council

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POWER OF REMOVAL

It is implied from his power to appoint. Being executive in nature, it is implied from the

constitutional provision vesting the executive power in the President.

It may be implied from his function to take care that laws be properly executed; for without it, his orders for law enforcement might not be effectively carried out.

The power may be implied from the President’s control over the administrative departments, bureaus, and offices of the government.

Page 71: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

May the President validly remove all officials he appointed?

Answer: As a general rule, the power to remove may be implied from the power to appoint. However, the President cannot remove officials appointed by him where the Constitution prescribes certain methods for separation of such officers from public service. In cases where the power of removal is lodged in the President, the same may be exercised only for cause as may be provided by law, and in accordance with the prescribed administrative procedure.

Page 72: Polirev Lecture by Judge Gito

BAR QUESTION In December 1988, while Congress was in recess, A was

extended an ad interim appointment as Brigadier General of the Philippine Army, in February 1989. When Congress was in session, B was nominated as Brigadier General of the Philippine Army. B's nomination was confirmed on August 5, 1989 while A's appointment was confirmed on September 5, 1989.

1. Who is deemed more senior of the two, A or B? 2. Suppose Congress adjourned without the Commission

on Appointments acting on both appointments, can A and B retain their original ranks of colonel?

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ANSWER• 1) A is senior to B. In accordance with the ruling in

Summers vs. Ozaeta. 81 Phil. 754, the ad interim appointment extended to A is permanent and is effective upon his acceptance although it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

• 2) If Congress adjourned without the appointments of A and B having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, A cannot return to his old position. As held in Summers vs. Qzaeta, 81 Phil. 754, by accepting an ad interim appointment to a new position, A waived his right to hold his old position. On the other hand, since B did not assume the new position, he retained his old position.

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BAR QUESTION (2003)

• What is the nature of an "acting appointment" to a government office? Does such an appointment give the appointee the right to claim that the appointment will, in time, ripen into a permanent one? Explain.

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ANSWER

• According to Sevilla v. Court of Appeals. 209 SCRA 637 [1992], an acting appointment is merely temporary. As held in Marohombsar v. Alonto, 194 SCRA 390 [1991], a temporary appointment cannot become a permanent appointment, unless a new appointment which is permanent is made. This holds true unless the acting appointment was made because of a temporary vacancy. In such a case, the temporary appointee holds office until the assumption of office by the permanent appointee.

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BAR QUESTION (1991)• On 3 May 1992, while Congress is on a short recess for the

elections, the president appoints Renato de Silva to the rank of General (4-star) in the Armed Forces. She also designates him as Chief of Staff of the AFP. He immediately takes his oath and assumes that office, with the rank of 4-star General of the AFP.

• When Congress resumes its session on 17 May 1992, the Commission on Appointments informs the Office of the President that it has received from her office only the appointment of De Silva to the rank of 4-star General and that unless his appointment to the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP is also submitted, the Commission will not act on the matter. The President maintains that she has submitted to the Commission all that the Constitution calls for.

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ANSWER (1991)

(1) Who is correct? The President is correct. Under Presidential

Decree No. 360, the grade of four-star general is conferred only upon the Chief of Staff. Hence, the appointment of Renato de Silva as a four-star general must be deemed to carry with it his appointment as Chief of Staff of the AFP.

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ANSWER

(2) Did Gen. de Silva violate the Constitution in immediately assuming office prior to a confirmation of his appointment? Gen. Renato de Silva did not violate the Constitution when

he immediately assumed office before the confirmation of his appointment, since his appointment was an ad interim appointment. Under Article VI I, Sec. 16 of the Constitution, such appointment is immediately effective and is subject only to disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or as a result of the next adjournment of the Congress.

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ANSWER• (3) Are the appointment and designation valid?

The appointment and designation of Gen. de Silva are valid for reasons given above. However, from another point of view they are not valid because they were made within the period of the ban for making appointments. Under Article VII, Sec. 15 the President is prohibited from making appointments within the period of two (2) months preceding the election for President and Vice President. The appointment in this case will be made on May 3, 1992 which is just 8 days away from the election for President and Vice President on May 11, 1992. For this reason the appointment and designation of Gen. de Silva are after all invalid.

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POWER OF CONTROL

Article VII, Section 17 The President shall have control of all

the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

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Control

The power of an officer to alter or modify or

nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance

of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of

the latter.

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Supervision

It means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that

subordinate officer performs their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, then the former may take such

action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform

these duties.

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POWER OF CONTROLCONTROL SUPERVISION

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act.

Supervision does not cover the authority to lay down the rules. Supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed.

If rules are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone, redone by his subordinate or he may decide to do it himself.

If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or redone but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. (Drilon v. Lim)

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Jurisprudential Illustrations

Araneta vs. GatmaitanDrilon v. LimBlaquera vs. AlcalaAng-Angco vs. CastilloVillaluz vs. ZaldivarDadole vs. COANamarco vs. Arca

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DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY

The acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively, the acts of the Chief Executive” (Villena v. Sec. of Interior)

Put simply, when a department secretary makes a decision in the course of performing his or her official duties, the decision, whether honorable or disgraceful, is presumptively the decision of the President, unless he quickly and clearly disowns it.

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DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY

When is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency not applicable?Qualified political agency does NOT apply if

the President is required to act in person by law or by the Constitution.

Example: The power to grant pardons must be exercised personally by the President.

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MILITARY POWER

Article VII, Section 18IT INCLUDES:

The power to command the Armed Forces of the Philippines

The power to suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus

The power to declare martial law

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MILITARY POWER

What is the sequence of graduated military powers of the President?Section 18 grants the President, as Commander in-

Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are:

the calling out powerthe power to suspend the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpusthe power to declare martial law.

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LIMITATION ON MILITARY POWER

He may call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion only.

The grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the proclamation of martial law are now limited only to invasion or rebellion.

The duration of such suspension or proclamation shall not exceed sixty days, following which it shall be automatically lifted.

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LIMITATION ON MILITARY POWER

Within forty-eight hours after such suspension or proclamation, the President shall personally or in writing report his action to the Congress. If not in session, Congress must convene within 24 hours.

The Congress may then, by majority votes of all its members voting jointly, revoke his action. The revocation may not set aside by the President.

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LIMITATION ON MILITARY POWER

By the same vote and in the same manner, the Congress may, upon initiative of the President, extend his suspension or proclamation for a period to be determined by the Congress if the invasion or rebellion shall continue and the public safety requires extension.

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LIMITATION ON MILITARY POWER

The action of the President and the Congress shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court which shall have the authority to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of such action. This matter is no longer considered a political question and may be raised in an appropriate proceeding by any citizen. Moreover, the Supreme Court must decide the challenge within thirty days from the time it is filed.

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LIMITATION ON MILITARY POWER

Martial law does not automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the operation of the Constitution. The civil courts and the legislative bodies shall remain open. Military courts and agencies are not conferred jurisdiction over civilians where the civil courts are functioning.

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LIMITATION ON MILITARY POWER

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons facing charges of rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

Any person arrested for such offenses must be judicially charged therewith within three days. Otherwise shall be released.

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Problem: The President prevented a General of AFP from testifying before the Senate. Despite having been prevented from testifying, said General testified in violation of the directive of the President contending that he was just complying with the sub poena issued by the Senate. May such general be subjected to a Court Marcial?

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF

• Answer: Since the President is commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces she can demand obedience from military officers. Military officers who disobey or ignore her command can be subjected to court martial proceeding. Thus, for instance, the President as Commander in Chief may prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry. A military officer who disobeys the President’s directive may be made to answer before a court martial. (Gudani vs. Senga)

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF

• Question: What is the remedy of the Senate or Congress for that matter?

• Answer: The Congress may make use of remedies under the law to compel attendance. The President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. (Gudani vs. Senga)

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CALLING OUT POWER

A. Most Benign Power of Section 18. Diminution of any constitutional rights through the

suspension of the privilege of the writ or the declaration of martial law is deemed as “strong medicine” to be used sparingly and only as a last resort, and for as long as only truly necessary. Thus, the invocation of the “calling out” power stands as a balanced means of enabling a heightened alertness in dealing with the armed threat, but without having to suspend any constitutional or statutory rights or cause the creation of any new obligations.

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CALLING OUT POWER

B. Vests No New Constitutional or Statutory Powers. For the utilization of the “calling out” power alone cannot

vest unto the President any new constitutional or statutory powers, such as the enactment of new laws. At most, it can only renew emphasis on the duty of the President to execute already existing laws without extending a corresponding mandate to proceed extra-constitutionally or extra-legally. Indeed, the “calling out” power does not authorize the President or the members of the Armed Forces to break the law.

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CALLING OUT POWER

C. Declaration of State of Rebellion.Declaration of the state of rebellion is within the

calling-out power of the President. When the President declares a state of emergency or a state of rebellion her action is merely a description of the situation as she sees it but it does not give her new powers. The declaration cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. (Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085 February 3, 2004.)

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CALLING OUT POWER

C. Generally not Subject to Judicial Review.While the Court considered the President’s “calling-

out” power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom and that it cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or substitute its own, it stressed that “this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. (IBP v. Zamora)

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BAR QUESTION (2006)

• What do you mean by the "Calling-out Power" of the President under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution?

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ANSWER

• Under Article VII, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution, whenever it becomes necessary, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, may call out the armed forces to aid him in preventing or suppressing lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

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SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

What is the writ of habeas corpus?The writ of habeas corpus is a writ directed to the

person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, to submit to, and receive whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in hi behalf.

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SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

What is the privilege of writ of habeas corpus?It is the right to have an immediate

determination of the legality of the deprivation of physical liberty.

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SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

What is the meaning of the suspension privilege of writ of habeas corpus?Suspension of the privilege does not suspend the writ

itself, but only it’s privilege. This means that when the court receives an application for the writ, and it finds the petition in proper form, it will issue the writ as a matter of course, If the return to the writ shows that the person in custody was apprehended and detained in areas where the privilege of the writ has been suspended or for crimes mentioned in the executive proclamation, the court will suspend further proceedings in the action.

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SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

General Limitations on the Power to Suspend the Privilege.1. Time limit of 60 days2. Review and possible revocation by

Congress3. Review and possible nullification by

SC

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SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

To Whom ApplicableThe suspension of the privilege of

the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

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SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

GROUNDS

InvasionRebellion

When public safety requires

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SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Role of CongressCongress convenesCongress may revokeCongress may extend

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SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Role of Supreme CourtThe Supreme Court may review, in an

appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

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MARTIAL LAW

Definition of Martial Law:Martial law in its strict sense refers to that law

which has application when civil authority calls upon the military arm to aid it in its civil function. Military arm does not supersede civil authority.

Martial law in the Philippines is imposed by the Executive as specifically authorized and within the limits set by the Constitution

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MARTIAL LAW

GROUNDS

InvasionRebellion

When public safety requires

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MARTIAL LAW

General Limitations on Martial Law1. Time limit of 60 days2. Review and possible revocation by

Congress3. Review and possible nullification by

SC

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MARTIAL LAW

Proclamation of martial law does not: 1. Suspend the operation of the Constitution2. Supplant the functioning of the civil courts

or legislative assemblies3. Authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on

military courts and agencies over where civil courts are able to function

Automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

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MARTIAL LAW

So what is the power of the President during Martial Law?

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MARTIAL LAW

Role of CongressCongress convenesCongress may revokeCongress may extend

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MARTIAL LAW

Role of Supreme CourtThe Supreme Court may review, in an

appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

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BAR QUESTION (2006)

• The President issued a Proclamation No. 1018 placing the Philippines under Martial Law on the ground that a rebellion staged by lawless elements is endangering the public safety. Pursuant to the Proclamation, suspected rebels were arrested and detained and military tribunals were set up to try them. Robert dela Cruz, a citizen, filed with the Supreme Court a petition questioning the validity of Proclamation No. 1018.

• Does Robert have standing to assail Proclamation No. 1018?

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ANSWER

• Yes, Robert has standing. Under Article VIII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law. As citizen therefore, Robert may file the petition questioning Proclamation No. 1018.

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BAR QUESTION (2006)

• In the same suit, the Solicitor General contends that under the Constitution, the President as Commander-in-Chief, determines whether the exigency has arisen requiring the exercise of his power to declare Martial Law and that his determination is conclusive upon the courts. How should the Supreme Court rule?

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ANSWER

• The Supreme Court should rule that his determination is not conclusive upon the courts. The 1987 Constitution allows a citizen, in an appropriate proceeding, to file a petition questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of said proclamation. Moreover, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitate safeguards by Congress and review by the Supreme Court (IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000).

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BAR QUESTION (2006)

• The Solicitor General argues that, in any event, the determination of whether the rebellion poses danger to public safety involves a question of fact and the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. What should be the ruling of the Court?

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ANSWER

• Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution specifically grants the Supreme Court the power to review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law. Thus, in the matter of such declaration, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion; and (2) public safety must require it. The Supreme Court cannot renege on its constitutional duty to determine whether or not the said factual conditions exist (IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000).

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BAR QUESTION (2006)

• Finally, the Solicitor General maintains that the President reported to Congress such proclamation of Martial Law, but Congress did not revoke the proclamation. What is the effect of the inaction of Congress on the suit brought by Robert to the Supreme Court?

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ANSWER

• The inaction of Congress has no effect on the suit brought by Robert to the Supreme Court as Article VIII, Section 18 provides for checks on the President's power to declare martial law to be exercised separately by Congress and the Supreme Court. Under said provision, the duration of martial law shall not exceed sixty days but Congress has the power to revoke the proclamation or extend the period. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has the power to review the said proclamation and promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

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PARDONING POWER(Executive Clemency)

Article VII, Section 19Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise

provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

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PARDONING POWER(Executive Clemency)

Forms of Executive Clemency1. Reprieves2. Commutations3. Pardons 4. Remission of fines5. Forfeitures6. Amnesty

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Limits on Executive Clemency

Constitutional Limitations1. It cannot be exercised in cases of impeachment2. Reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remission

of fines and forfeitures can be given only “after conviction by final judgment;

3. A grant of amnesty must be with the concurrence of a “majority of all the Members of Congress”

4. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of COMELEC.

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Limits on Executive Clemency

Other Limitations1. A pardon cannot be extended to a person

convicted of legislative contempt or civil contempt.

2. Pardon cannot also be extended for the purpose of absolving the pardonee of civil liability, including judicial costs.

3. Pardon will not restore offices forfeited

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Pardon

What is pardon?Act of grace which exempts the

individual on whom it is bestowed form the punishment which the law inflicts for the crime he has committed.

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Pardon

Pardon is an act of graceBecause pardon is an act of grace, no legal power

can compel the executive to give it. It is an act of pure generosity of the executive and it is his to give or to withdraw before it is completed.

Congress has no authority to limit the effects of the President’s pardon, or to exclude from its scope any class of offenders. Courts may not inquire in to the wisdom or reasonableness of any pardon granted by the President

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Classification of Pardon

1. Plenary- Extinguishes all the penalties imposed upon the offender, including accessory disabilities.

2. Partial-Does not extinguish all th penalties.

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Classification of Pardon

3. Absolute- One extended without any strings attached.

4. Conditional- One under which the convict is required to comply with certain requirements.

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Points on Conditional Pardon

A. Pardonee may reject conditional pardon. Where the pardon is conditional, the offender has the right to reject the same since he may feel that the condition imposed is more onerous than the penalty sought to be remit.

B. Condition must be lawful. It is necessary that the condition should not be contrary to any provision of law.

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Points on Conditional Pardon

C. Condition must be co-extensive with the duration of the penalty. The condition of the pardon shall be co-extensive with the penalty remitted. Hence, if the condition is violated after the expiration of the remitted penalty, there can no longer be violation of the conditional pardon.

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Points on Conditional Pardon

D. When the condition is that the recipient of the pardon should not violate any of the penal laws, who determines whether penal laws have been violated? Must the recipient of pardon undergo trial and be convicted for the new offenses? The rule that is followed is that the acceptance of the conditions of the pardon imports the acceptance of the condition that the President will also determine whether the condition has been violated. (Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272)

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Limitations on the Exercise of Pardon

Constitutional Limitations1. A pardon cannot be extended to a person

convicted of legislative contempt or civil contempt.2. Pardon cannot also be extended for the purpose

of absolving the pardonee of civil liability, including judicial costs.

3. Pardon will not restore offices forfeited or property or interests vested in others in consequence of the conviction and judgment.

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Limitations on the Exercise of Pardon

Other Limitations1. It cannot be exercised in cases of impeachment2. Reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remission

of fines and forfeitures can be given only “after conviction by final judgment;

3. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of COMELEC.

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Effects of Pardon

A. As to punitive consequences and fines in favor of government. Pardon relieves a party from all punitive

consequences of his criminal act. Pardon will have the effect of remitting fines and forfeitures which otherwise will inure to the interests of the government itself.

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Effects of Pardon

B. As to civil liabilities pertaining to private litigants. Pardon will not relieve the pardonee of

the civil liability and such other claims, as may pertain to private litigants.

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Effects of Pardon

C. As Regards Reinstatement i. One who is given pardon has no demandable right

to reinstatement. He may however be reappointed. (Monsanto v. Factoran, 1989) (Once reinstated, he may be given his former rank.) See Sabello v. Dept. of Education, 1989)

ii. However, if a pardon is given because he was acquitted on the ground that he did not commit the crime, then reinstatement and backwages would be due. (Garcia v. COA, 1993)

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AMNESTY

Definition Grant of general pardon to a class of political

offenders either after conviction or even before the charges are filed. It is the form of executive clemency which under the Constitution may be granted by the executive only with the concurrence of the legislature.

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PARDON vs. AMNESTY

PARDON AMNESTY

1. Addressed to ODINARY offenses 1. Addressed to POLITICAL Offenses

2. Granted to INDIVIDUALS 2. Granted to a CLASS of Persons

3. Conditional pardon must be accepted 3. Need not be Accepted

4. Private act of the President 4. A public act, subject to judicial notice

5. Pardon looks forward.Only penalties are extinguished. Civil indemnity is not extinguished.

5. Amnesty looks backward Extinguishes the offense itself

6. Only granted after conviction of final Judgment

6. Maybe granted before or after conviction

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BAR QUESTION (2005)

• Bruno still had several years to serve on his sentence when he was conditionally pardoned by the President. Among the conditions imposed was that he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines." Bruno accepted all of the conditions and was released. Shortly thereafter, Bruno was charged with 2 counts of estafa. He was then incarcerated to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence following the revocation by the President of the pardon.

• Bruno's family filed a petition for habeas corpus, alleging that it was error to have him recommitted as the charges were false, in fact, half of them were already dismissed. Resolve the petition with reasons.

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ANSWER• The petition should not be given due course. The grant of pardon

and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are PURELY EXECUTIVE ACTS which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carried with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. Where the President opts to revoke the conditional pardon given, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefore by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, is a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny. (Torres v. Gonzales, July 23, 1987)

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BAR QUESTION (1995)

• Lucas, a ranking member of the NDF, was captured by policemen while about to board a passenger bus bound for Sorsogon. Charged with rebellion he pleaded not guilty when arraigned. Before trial he was granted absolute pardon by the President to allow him to participate in the peace talks between the government and the communist rebels.

• (1) Is the pardon of the President valid? Explain.• (2) Assuming that the pardon is valid, can Lucas

reject it? Explain.

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ANSWER

• A. The pardon is not valid. Under Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, pardon may be granted only after conviction by final Judgment.

• B. Yes, Lucas can reject the pardon As held in United States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150 and Burdick vs. United States, 274 U.S. 480. acceptance is essential to complete the pardon and the pardon may be rejected by the person to whom it is tendered, for it may inflict consequences of greater disgrace from those it purports to relieve.

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BAR QUESTION (1997)• Governor A was charged administratively with

oppression and was placed under preventive suspension from office during the pendency of his case. Found guilty of the charge, the President suspended him from office for ninety days. Later, the President granted him clemency by reducing the period of his suspension to the period he has already served. The Vice Governor questioned the validity of the exercise of executive clemency on the ground that it could be granted only in criminal, not administrative, cases. How should the question be resolved?

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ANSWER• The argument of the Vice Governor should be rejected. As held

in Llamas vs. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844. the power of executive clemency extends to administrative cases. In granting the power of executive clemency upon the President, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution does not distinguish between criminal and administrative cases. Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution excludes impeachment cases, which are not criminal cases, from the scope of the power of executive clemency. If this power may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would have been unnecessary to exclude impeachment cases from this scope. If the President can grant pardons in criminal cases, with more reason he can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are less serious.

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BAR QUESTION (1993)

• The National Unification Commission has recommended the grant of absolute and unconditional amnesty to all rebels. There is the view that it is not necessary for the rebels to admit the commission of the crime charged, it being enough that the offense falls within the scope of the amnesty proclamation following the doctrine laid down in Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642. In other words, admission of guilt is not a condition sine qua non for the availment of amnesty. Is this correct? Explain.

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ANSWER

• The view that it is not necessary for rebels to admit the commission of the crime charged in order to avail themselves of the benefits of amnesty is not correct. As stated in Vera v. People, 7 SCRA 156, the doctrine laid down in Borrioquinto vs. Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642 has been overturned. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime. It is inconsistent for someone to seek for forgiveness for a crime which he denies having committed. (People vs. Pasilan, 14 SCRA 694).

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BARROWING POWERArticle VII, Section 20

The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law.

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BARROWING POWER

• Problem: The financing program for foreign loans instituted by the President extinguished portions of the country’s pre-existing loans through either debt buyback or bond-conversion. The buy-back approach essentially pre-terminated portions of public debts while the bond conversion scheme extinguished public debts through the obtention of a new loan by virtue of a sovereign bond issuance, the proceeds of which in turn were used for terminating the original loan. Petitioners contend that buyback or bond conversion are not authorized by Article VII, Section 20.

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BARROWING POWER• Answer: The language of the Constitution is simple and clear

as it is broad. It allows the President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous than others. This Court may not ascribe to the Constitution the meanings and restrictions that would unduly burden the powers of the President. The plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be construed in a sense that will allow the full exercise of the power provided therein. It would be the worst kind of judicial legislation if the courts were to construe and change the meaning of the organic act. (Constantino vs. Cuisa)

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BAR QUESTION (1994)• The President of the Philippines authorized the

Secretary of Public Works and Highways to negotiate and sign a loan agreement with the German Government for the construction of a dam. The Senate, by a resolution, asked that the agreement be submitted to it for ratification. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs advised the Secretary of Public Works and Highways not to comply with the request of the Senate. – Is the President bound to submit the agreement to the

Senate for ratification?

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ANSWER

• No, the President is not bound to submit the agreement to the Senate for ratification. Under Section 20, Article VII of the Constitution, only the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board is required for the President to contract foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.

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DIPLOMATIC POWER

Article VII, Section 21No treaty or international

agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

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DIPLOMATIC POWERWhat are the diplomatic powers of the

President?1. The power to negotiate treaties and

international agreements;2. The power to appoint ambassadors and other

public ministers, and consuls;3. The power to receive ambassadors and other

public ministers accredited to the Philippines;

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DIPLOMATIC POWERWhat are the diplomatic powers of the

President?4. The power to contract and guarantee foreign loans

on behalf of the Republic;5. The power to deport aliens.6. The power to decide that a diplomatic officer who

has become persona non grata be recalled.7. The power to recognize governments and withdraw

recognition

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DIPLOMATIC POWERWhen concurrence is needed?

Concurrence of at leas 2/3 of all the members of Senate is need for the validity and effectivity of:1. Treaties of whatever kind, whether

bilateral or multilateral.2. International Agreements (that which

are permanent and original)

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DIPLOMATIC POWERWhen concurrence is not needed?

Less formal types of international agreements; Agreements which are temporary or are mere implementations of treaties or statutes do not need concurrence.

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DIPLOMATIC POWER

Pimentel vs. ErmitaThe power to ratify is vested in the President subject to

the concurrence of Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in his behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by the Court via a writ of mandamus.

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DIPLOMATIC POWER

TREATY EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT

1. International agreements which involve political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character take the form or a Treaty

1. international agreements involving adjustment of details carrying out well established national policies and traditions and involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executive Agreements

2. In treaties, formal documents require ratification

2. executive agreements become binding through executive action.

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BAR QUESTION (2003)• An Executive Agreement was executed between the

Philippines and a neighboring State. The Senate of the Philippines took it upon itself to procure a certified true copy of the Executive Agreement and, after deliberating on it, declared, by a unanimous vote, that the agreement was both unwise and against the best interest of the country. Is the Executive Agreement binding (a) from the standpoint of Philippine law and (b) from the standpoint of international law? Explain

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ANSWER• (a) From the standpoint of Philippine law, the Executive

Agreement is binding. According to Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading. 3 SCRA 351 [1961], the President can enter into an Executive Agreement without the necessity of concurrence by the Senate.

• (b) The Executive Agreement is also binding from the standpoint of international law. This is because from the standpoint of international law, it is immaterial whether the state commitment is in the form of treaty or executive agreement. If the state agreed to be bound, either by means of treaty or executive agreement , then it is binding under international law.

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BUDGETARY POWER

Article VII, Section 22The President shall submit to the Congress,

within thirty days from the opening of every regular session as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.

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INFORMING POWER

Article VII, Section 23The President shall address the

Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it at any other time.