polirev updated cases 1st sem 2014-2015 (judicial branch) (1) (repaired)

8/10/2019 Polirev Updated Cases 1st Sem 2014-2015 (Judicial Branch) (1) (Repaired)

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V. Judicial Department

A. Concepts

1. Judicial power

*The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the

exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by

law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.

The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect

to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides,

nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower

courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts

of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and

enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of

the Government.

On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the

power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an

interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax

court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction

to issue writs of certiorari in these cases. -The City of Manila vs. Judge Grecia-Cuerdo, etal., G.R. No. 175723, February 4, 2014. FC#95

2. Judicial review

Judicial review; review of executive policy. Petitioner here seeks judicial review of a

question of Executive policy, which the Court ruled is outside its jurisdiction. Despite the

definition of judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, the

determination of where, as between two possible routes, to construct a road extension is

not within the province of courts. Such determination belongs exclusively to the Executive

branch.Barangay Captain Beda Torrecampo v. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage

System, et al., G.R. No. 188296. May 30, 2011. FC

*To doubt is to sustain. The constitutionality of a law will be sustained if the issue can be

determined without having to decide its validity. -Mirasol vs. CA, G.R. No. 128448,

February 1, 2001. cd

*Justiciable question A definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of

parties having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law through the

application of a law. -Cutaran vs. DENR, G.R. No. 134958, January 31, 2001. FC

*Justiciability Requirements:

#1. That there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute;

#2. That the interests of the parties be adverse;

#3. That the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power;

and


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#4. That the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the

complainant. -Justice Nachura, Separate Opinion,De Castro vs. JBC, G.R. No.

191002, March 17, 2010. CD

a) Operative fact doctrine

*Declaration of unconstitutionality; doctrine of operative fact. An unconstitutional act is

not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no

office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The doctrine of operative fact is

an exception this rule. It applies as a matter of equity and fair play, and nullifies the effects

of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a

determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences that

cannot always be ignored. It applies when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose

an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. The doctrine cannot be

applied to this case, as to hold otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner who was illegally

dismissed from employment and would allow his employer to profit from a violation of an

unconstitutional provision of law.Claudio S. Yap v. Thenamaris Ships Management andIntermare Maritime Agencies, Inc., G.R. No. 179532. May 30, 2011 FC

*Under this dictrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the

unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter

of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an admission

that the law is unconstitutional.

In keeping with the demands of equity, the Court can apply the operative fact

doctrine to acts and consequences that resulted from the reliance not only on a law or

executive act which is quasi-legislative in nature but also on decisions or orders of the

executive branch which were later nullified. -Hacienda Luisita, Inc. vs. Presidential Agrarian

Reform Council, et al., G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011. CD

b) Moot questions

*An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy

because the issues involved have become academic or dead, as when subsequent events

have overtaken the petition and the Court has nothing left to resolve. -Gonzales vs.

Narvasa, G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000. CD

c) Political question doctrine

*political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be

decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary

authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government." Thus, if

an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary

action by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to

be a political question. In the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr,

"[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a

textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political

department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;

or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for

non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution

without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an

unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the

potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments


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on the one question. -Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. G.R. No. 157584, April

2, 2009. CD

B. Safeguards of Judicial independence

*Under the Judiciarys unique circumstances, independence encompasses the idea that

individual judges can freely exercise their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the

judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the discharge of its constitutional functions free

of restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for those imposed by the

Constitution itself. Thus, judicial independence can be "broken down into two distinct

concepts: decisional independence and institutional independence." Decisional

independence "refers to a judges ability to render decisions free from political or popular

influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law." On the other hand,

institutional independence "describes the separation of the judicial branch from the

executive and legislative branches of government." Simply put, institutional independence

refers to the "collective independence of the judiciary as a body."

x x x

One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each particular judge

and seeks to insure his or her ability to decide cases with autonomy within the constraints

of the law. A judge has this kind of independence when he can do his job without having to

hear or at least without having to take it seriously if he does hear criticisms of his

personal morality and fitness for judicial office. The second concept is institutional judicial

independence. It focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a branch of government

and protects judges as a class.

A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence are

preserved - wherein public confidence in the competence and integrity of the judiciary is

maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority. An erosion of this

confidence threatens the maintenance of an independent Third Estate. Recognizing the vital

role that the Judiciary plays in our system of government as the sole repository of judicial

power, with the power to determine whether any act of any branch or instrumentality of the

government is attended with grave abuse of discretion, no less than the Constitution

provides a number of safeguards to ensure that judicial independence is protected and

maintained.

#1. The Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from depriving the Supreme Court of its

jurisdiction, as enumerated in Section 5, Article VII of the Constitution, or from passing a

law that undermines the security of tenure of the members of the judiciary;

#2. The Constitution also mandates that the judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy; and

#3. The Constitution grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts

and judicial personnel. Jurisprudence has characterized administrative supervision as

exclusive, noting that only the Supreme Court can oversee the judges and court personnel'scompliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may

intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

#4. The Constitution protects as well the salaries of the Justices and judges by prohibiting

any decrease in their salary during their continuance in office, and


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#5. The Constitution ensures their security of tenure by providing that "Members of the

Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they

reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their

office." With these guarantees, justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by

any fear of reprisals brought on by their judicial action. They can act inspired solely by

their knowledge of the law and by the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting

influence of base or unworthy motives.

Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy and its independence,

the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when

and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and

court personnel within the parameters of the Courts granted power; they determine the

terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.

In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG

Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority to

determine the manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Anykind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and

availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also

encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme

Court En Banc to manage the Judiciarys own affairs.

-Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by

the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31,

2012. NONE

C. Judicial restraint

*Judicial Restraint A theory of judicial interpretation that encourages judges to limit the

exercise of their own power in certain cases.

As a judicial stance, it is anchored on a heightened regard for democracy. Deference

to the majority rule constitutes the flagship argument of judicial restraint which

emphasizes that in democratic governance, majority rule is a necessity principle. It nudges

the judge who considers democracy as an intrinsic and fundamental value to grant that the

discretion of the legislature is large and that he cannot correct any act or enactment thatcomes before the court solely because it is believed to be unwise. Adherents of judicial

restraint warn that under certain circumstances, the active use of judicial review has a

detrimental effect on the capacity of the democratic system to function effectively. -Justice

Puno, concurring and dissenting opinion, Francisco vs. House of Representatives, G.R. No.

160261, November 10, 2003. FC

D. Appointments to the Judiciary

*The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President's

mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whosenames will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the

JBC. -De Castro vs. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010.

Francisco Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013. CD-

The 1987 Constitution allows only one (1) member of a bicameral Congress to sit in the

Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). This, according to the Supreme Court in a majority

decision penned by J. Mendoza and promulgated last April 16, 2013, was the intention of


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the framers of the Constitution who conceived of the JBC as an independent body

representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process to recommend

nominees to the President in order to rid such process of partisan political activities, and

carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this wise:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of

the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the

Secretary of Justice, anda representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, arepresentative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, retired Member of the Supreme

Court, and a representative of the private sector.

The majority cannot accede to the argument of respondents that allowing only one

representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral

nature, and that the failure of the framers to make the proper textual adjustment where

there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight. According to the

majority, every language in the Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately chosen

and that in opting to use the singular letter a to describe representative of Congress, the

Filipino people through the framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat

in the JBC. There could not have been any plain oversight in the wordings of the provision

since the other provisions of the 1987 Constitution were amended accordingly with the

shift to a bicameral legislative body (e.g., Sections 4, 8 and 18 of Article VII where

corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter would be handled and voted

upon by the two Houses of Congress), and this Court has no power to add another member

by judicial construction.

According to the majority, it is clear that the framers were not keen on adjusting the

provision on congressional representation in the JBC because (i) it was not in the exerciseof its primary function to legislate, considering that the JBC was created to support the

executive power to appoint and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a

contributory non-legislative function, and (ii) there was no need to recognize the dichotomy

of each House and to consider the interplay between the two Houses in their participation

in the JBC because there is no interaction required between these two Houses in the

screening and nomination of judicial officers. Thus, in providing for the membership of the

JBC, the framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the

interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of government.

And the argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of

Representatives in the JBC and vice versa is misplaced because any member of Congress is

constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress.

The majority went on to cite various authorities who, having perused the records of the

Constitutional Commission, are of the view that to allow Congress to have two

representatives with one vote each is to negate the principle of equality among the three

branches of government, the interpretation of two votes for Congress would give Congress

more influence in the appointment of judges and would also increase the number of JBC

members to eight, which could lead to a voting deadlock and is a clear violation of the seven

enumerated members in the Constitution, and no parallelism can be drawn between therepresentative of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its legislative and

constituent powers under the Constitution while the latter justifies the separateness of

the two Houses as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when Congress

interacts with the other two co-equal branches of government.

E. Supreme Court


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*Primus Inter Pares (first among equals) The Latin maxim indicates that a person is the

most senior of a group of people sharing the same rank or office. The phrase has been used

to describe the status, condition or role of the Chief Justice in many supreme courts

around the world. - (De Castro vs. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010,Carpio-Morales,

J. Dissenting Opinion)

*Any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety (90) days from occurrence

thereof. - The usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall - an imperative,

operating to impose a duty that may be enforced should not be disregarded. Thereby,

section 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a

Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The

failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution. -De Castro

vs. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010.

1. En banc and division cases

*It bears stressing that where, as in the present case, the Court En Banc entertains a casefor its resolution and disposition, it does so without implying that the Division of origin is

incapable of rendering objective and fair justice. The action of the Court simply means that

the nature of the cases calls for en banc attention and consideration. Neither can it be

concluded that the Court has taken undue advantage of sheer voting strength. It was

merely guided by the well-studied finding and sustainable opinion of the majority of its

actual membership that, indeed, subject cases are of sufficient importance meriting the

action and decision of the whole Court. It is, of course, beyond cavil that all the members of

this highest Court of the land are always embued with the noblest of intentions in

interpreting and applying the germane provisions of law, jurisprudence, rules and

Resolutions of the Court to the end that public interest be duly safeguarded and rule of

law be observed.

While it is true that the Court en banc exercises no appellate jurisdiction over its Divisions,

Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes opined in Firestone and concededly recognized that "[t]he

only constraint is that any doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court, either

rendered en banc or in division, may be overturned or reversed only by the Court sitting en

banc." -David Lu vs. Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et al., G.R. No. 153690, February 15, 2011. FC

2. Procedural rule-making

*The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous

charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress subsidiary and corrective power.

This glaring and fundamental omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary

of Justice17 that this Courts power to promulgate judicial rules "is no longer shared by

this Court with Congress":

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given

the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of

procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987

Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules

concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of

pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so

with the Executive. x x x x


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Any lingering doubt on the import of the textual evolution of Section 5(5) should be put to

rest with our recent En Banc ruling denying a request by the Government Service

Insurance System (GSIS) for exemption from payment of legal fees based on Section 39 of its

Charter, Republic Act No. 8291, exempting GSIS from "all taxes, assessments, fees, charges

or dues of all kinds." Reaffirming Echegarays construction of Section 5(5), the Court

described its exclusive power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure as

"one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence":

[T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court

concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or

modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence,

the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts

exclusive domain. -Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO), etc.

vs. Hon. Iluminada Cabato-Cortes, Executive Judge, RTC, Baguio City, G.R. No. 165922,

February 26, 2010. FC

3. Administrative supervision over lower courts

*The ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint

before his office against a judge; he must first indorse the case to the Supreme Court for

appropriate action. -Fuentes vs. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No. 124925,

October 23, 2001. FC

*Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is

indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded

by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed

of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the

conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of

X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action.

The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if

permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not

clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in

the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is

unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More

than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the

judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against theimpetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the

sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign

prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge

must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the

justness of his decision. -Dela Pea, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 177828,

February 13, 2009. FC

4. Original and appellate jurisdiction

*Section 4(7), Article VII provides that the Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole

judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or

Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. - The jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,

would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a

candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held. -Tecson vs.

COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004. CD


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*It is well settled that the jurisdiction to try a case is to be determined by the law in force at

the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.

Consonant with this principle, the time of commission is not material to determining which

court has jurisdiction. It stands to reason that administrative jurisdiction over petitioner

belongs to the Supreme Court, the action having been instituted by the CSC at the time

when petitioner was already a judicial employee. -Ampong vs. CSC, G.R. No. 167916,

August 26, 2008. FC

*Contempt Powers

*Contempt of court has been defined as a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the

court, such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into

disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during

litigation. -Inonog vs. Judge Ibay, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175, July 28, 2009. FC

a.) Direct contempt, which is summary, is committed in the presence of or so near a

court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including

disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to besworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when

lawfully required to do so. - Section 1, Rule 71, Rules of Court.

b.) Indirect contempt, on the other hand, is not commited in the presence of the

court. It is the failure to do something ordered done by the court or judge, such as

failure to appear at a hearing or in the use of disrespectful language in a pleading. A

direct contempt may be punished summarily while an indirect contempt can be

punished only after charge and hearing. -Zarate vs. Balderian

, A.M. No. MTJ-00-

1261, March 31, 2000. FC

*The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts as to preserve order in judicial

proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of justice. The courts must exercise the

power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a

safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they exercise. -Inonog vs. Judge Ibay,

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175, July 28, 2009.

F. Judicial privilege

*Does the privilege of filing of a pleading with correct and truthful allegations carries with itthe license to use abusive, offensive, menacing or otherwise improper language?

In this jurisdiction, it cannot be doubted that communications either written or oral

made in the course of judicial proceedings are classified as absolutely privileged

communications. However, this doctrine applies only in such cases where the

statement is relevant or pertinent or material to the case. In this respect,

respondents failed to convincingly demonstrate the materiality or relevance of such

statement like " Johnny Kh Uy has a track record of making a mockery of our

judicial system had, in fact confessed to "Bribery and Telling On" of judges, afterthe judges allegedly refused to give in to their "demands", by using illegally taped

conversation both actual and/or by telephone" in the appealed case involving

recovery of property and cancellation of title. Furthermore, if such fact is relevant,

why did the respondents make such fact known to the Court of Appeals only when

the appealed case has already been submitted for decision. Respondents timing

makes their claim of good intention a doubtful claim. It seems that the real intention


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is to influence the Court of Appeals in an improper way. -Johnny K.H. Uy vs. Atty.

Depasucat, et al., A.C. No. 5332, July 29, 2003.

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