People v. Perfecto, G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922

FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero, discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion – edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an article against the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code – provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be applied in the case at bar?

HELD: No.

REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However, the Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the change of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked provision of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.

Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77, May 31, 1982(En Banc), J. Makasiar

Facts: When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. Judge Elias B. Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte became final on June 8, 1863 for lack of an appeal, a project of partition was submitted to him which he later approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto was complainant Bernardita R. Macariola.One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot according to the decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria Asuncion. Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. wherein Judge Asuncion was the president.Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil Case No. 4234 in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with "acts unbecoming a judge" alleging that Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a decision dismissing the complaints against Judge Asuncion.After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, she recommended on her decision dated March 27, 1971 that Judge Asuncion be exonerated.

Issue: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E which he previously decided in a Civil Case No. 3010 and his engagement in business by joining a private

corporation during his incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an "act unbecoming of a judge"?

Ruling: No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not constitute of an "act unbecoming of a judge." But he is reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to operate, the sale or assignment of the property during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E on March 6, 1965, the in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Hence, the lot in question was no longer subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010.

SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and later on from the US to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce, consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent Judge Asuncion.

Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019 because the business of the corporation in which respondent participated had obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office.

SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its incorporation realizing that their interest contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

JAVELLANA VS THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY50 SCRA 30; March 31, 1973Ponente: Concepcion, C.J

FACTS:On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a prohibition case to restrain respondents from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed constitution not found in the present constitution. Javellana maintained that the respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing proposed constitution and that the president is without power to proclaim the ratification of the constitution. Similar actions were filed by Vidal Tan, Gerardo Roxas, among others. Petitioners pray for the nullification of Proclamation 1102 (Citizens Assemblies) and any order, decree, and proclamation which are similar in objective.

ISSUES:1. Is the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 justiciable?2. Was the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention ratified validly in compliance to applicable laws?3. Was the proposed Constitution acquiesced by the people?4. Are the petitioners entitled relief?

5. Is the proposed Constitution in force?

HELD:Whether a constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to an existing constitution is a judicial question as it is the absolute duty of the judiciary to determine whether the Constitution has been amended in the manner required by the constitution. The Constitution proposed by the 1971 Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV section 1 of the 1935 Constitution which provides only one way for ratification (election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and only with qualified voters). Due to the environmental and social conditions in the Philippines (i.e. martial law) the Court cannot honestly say that the people acquiesced to the proposed Constitution. The majority ruled to dismiss the cases as the effectivity of the proposed Constitution is the basic issue posed by the cases which considerations other than judicial are relevant and unavoidable. The new constitution is in force as there are not enough votes to say otherwise.

GREGORIO PERFECTO vs. BIBIANO L. MEER[G.R. No. L-2348. February 27, 1950.]

Facts: In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon hissalary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he instituted this action inthe Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for thereason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.

Issue:Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution thereof?

Held:Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of judges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here ; and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution of the judges' compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them. This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon buying gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real property, they pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official stipend—that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the fundamental charter. Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and block encroachmentsupon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges —personal and therefore waivable—but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposedin the public interest (Evans vs. Gore).

ENDENCIA VS DAVID

93 Phil 696 August 31 1953 [Salaries of Judges Tax Exemption]

FACTS:

Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges Endencio and Jugo’s salaries. A case was filed. However, upon construing Article VIII Section 9 of the constitution, it shows that judicial officers are exempt from paying tax from their salaries and thus considered that the deduction of salaries from the said judges as a violation from the compensation received by judicial officers.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

RULING:

No, the Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income taxes in judicial officers is considered as against the provisions given by the Article VIII Sec 9 of the Constitution. The compensation shall not be diminished during their continuance of their service. Section 13 of RA 590 stated that no salary received by any public officer of the republic shall be exempted from paying its taxes. This specific part of RA 590 is in contrary with what is Article VIII Sec 9 has provided.

NITAFAN VS CIR

G.R. No. 78780 July 23 1987 [Salaries of the members of Judiciary, Tax Exemption]

FACTS:

Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed judges of the RTC, NCR, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.

They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."

ISSUE: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.

HELD:

No. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of non-diminution´ of salaries of judicial officers. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income has been reduced in accepting service in government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

D E C I S I O N

(En Banc)

BELLOSILLO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match the bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”

II. THE ISSUES

1. Whether §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;

2. Assuming §10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;

3. Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution; and

4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]

1. YES, §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.

Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is

no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

xxx xxx xxx

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents’ claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.

3. YES, GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, it is mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a “state action.” In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered “state action” covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a “public function;” (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of “state action.” Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the

highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

xxx xxx xxx

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

Aquino v. Enrile59 SCRA 183

FACTS:The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and detained by the military by virtue of Proclamation 1081. The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General Order No.2 of the President "for being participants or for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force..." General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the power he assumed by virtue of Proclamation 1081 placing the entire country under martial law.

ISSUES:1) Is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the power to declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry?; and2) Is the detention of the petitioners legal in accordance to the declaration of martial law?

HELD:5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence, not subject to judicial inquiry, while 4 Justices held that the issue is a justiciable one. However, any inquiry by this Court in the present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law has become moot and academic. Implicit in the state of martial law is the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation, which is to suppress invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against imminent danger thereof. The preservation of society and national survival takes precedence. The proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to in this case.

Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC140 SCRA 455January 7, 1986

FACTS: 11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election.Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional “resignation” did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.”The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.

ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections

HELD: The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.

The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.

Lawyers league vs. aquino

FACTS: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.

On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:

Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.

The Court further held that:

The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;

It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and

The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ

Facts:In a petition for declaratory relief with no respondents, petitioner asked the court if the provision of the Section 5 Article XVIII of the 1986 Constitution, to wit: “The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992,” refers to the then-incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel or the previously-elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino.

After the election of February 7, 1986 where Marcos and Tolentino were declared the winners, Aquino and Laurel were installed into the position last February 25, 1986 after the infamous People Power Revolution. The next regular election for the President and Vice-President was held last May 2, 1992.

Issue:Whether the aforecited article applies to the then-incumbent President and Vice-President, or the previously elected President and Vice-President.

Held:The petition was hereby dismissed outright for:

1. Lack of jurisdiction. Court has no jurisdiction over petition for declaratory relief. Rules of Court states that it is the RTC (Regional Trial Courts) who has the jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. Also, incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.

2. Lack of cause of action on the part of petitioner. Petitioner had no personality to use, and his allegation was manifestly gratuitous. The legitimacy of the Aquino government was not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge, and the people have made judgment.

In Re Letter of Associate Justice Reynato Puno

Facts: Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals (CA), wrote a letter dated Nov. 14, 1990 addressed to the Supreme Court about the correction of his seniority ranking in the CA. It appears from the records that petitioner was first appointed as associate justice of the CA on June 20, 1980 but took his oath of office on Nov. 29, 1982. The CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." He was then appointed as appellate justice and later accepted an appointment to be a deputy minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. In Edsa

Revolution in Feb. 1986 brought about reorganization of the entire government including the judiciary. A Screening Committee was created. When Pres. Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No. 33, as an exercise of her legislative power, the Screening Committee assigned the petitioner to rank no. 11 from being the assoc. justice of the NEW CA. However, the petitioner's ranking changed from no. 11, he now ranked as no. 26. He alleges that the change in his seniority ranking would be contrary to the provisions of issued order of Pres. Aquino. The court en banc ranted Justice Puno's request. A motion for consideration was later filed by Campos and Javelliano who were affected by the change of ranking. They contend that the petitioner cannot claim such reappointment because the court he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.

Issue: Whether the present CA is a new court or merely a continuation of the CA and IAC that would negate any claim to seniority enjoyed by the petitioner existing prior to said EO No. 33.

Held: The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the people power. A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it as as sudden, radical, and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence. A government as a result of people's revolution is considered de jure if it is already accepted by the family of nations or countries like the US, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and others. In the new government under Pres. Aquino, it was installed through direct exercise of the Filipino power. Therefore, it is the present CA that would negate the claims of Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking.

De Leon v. Esguerra Case Digest

De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987(En Banc), J. Melencio-HerreraFacts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.

Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.

Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay

officials to six years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.

Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

EFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)Facts:

Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s Initiative for Reforms,Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to liftthe term limits of elective officials, through People’s Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII,Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power todirectly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors.Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizableby the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpinfiled this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and theDelfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision onpeople’s initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed byCongress. No such law has been passed; (2) The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to theConstitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it isoutside the power of people’s initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative onamendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions onthe conduct of such initiative.(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or anamendment of the Constitution.

Held:

Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementinglegislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right,the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation.The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on theconduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule thatwhat has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). Thedelegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rulesand regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people’s initiative.The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guaranteeof equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revisioncannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Court’s decision in the above Issue, the issueof whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.

Lambino Vs. Comelec Case Digest

Lambino Vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 174153

Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group’s petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a people’s initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.

TOLENTINO VS COMELECG.R. No. L-34150; October 16, 1971Ponente: Barredo, J.FACTS:After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held on November 10, 1970, the convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. On the early morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to amend Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution, lowering the voting age to 18. On September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971. Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC and prayed that Organic Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be null and void.

ISSUE:1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?

HELD:1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue whether or not a resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a justiciable one and thus subject to judicial review. The jurisdiction is not because the Court is superior to the Convention but they are both subject to the Constitution. 2. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single amendment in Organic Resolution No. 1 violated Sec. 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which states that all amendments must be submitted to the people in a single election or plebiscite. Moreover, the voter must be provided sufficient time and ample basis to assess the amendment in relation to the other parts of the Constitution, not separately but together.

SANIDAD VS COMELEC73 SCRA 333; October 12, 1976Ponente: Martin, J

FACTS:On September 27, 1976, Pablo Sanidad and Pablito Sanidad petitioned for prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, as well as PD. 1031. Petitioners contend that the president has no power to propose amendments to the new constitution, as such, the referendum plebiscite has no legal basis.

ISSUE:1. Is the case at bar justiciable?2. Does the president have authority to propose amendments to the Constitution?

3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed sufficient and proper submission?

HELD:The issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent assembly is a justiciable question since it is not the wisdom but the constitutional authority of the president to perform such act is in question. The president has the authority to propose amendments as the governmental powers are generally concentrated to the president in times of crisis. The time for deliberation of the referendum-plebiscite questions, 3 weeks, is not too short especially since the questions are issues of the day and the people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law.

Summary of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).

Facts

On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office.

The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but they were not delivered before the expiration of Adams’s term as president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of Adams’s term.

William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jefferson’s Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus “…to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.”

Issues

Does Marbury have a right to the commission?

Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?

Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void?

Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution?

Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?

Holding and Rule (Marshall)

Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.

The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executive’s constitutional power of appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from the person possessing the power has been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury became effective when signed by President Adams.

Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy.The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.

Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. The President, by signing the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.

Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void.

It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.

No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution.

The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without substance.

No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.

To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.

It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.

Disposition

Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesn’t get the commission.

See Ex Parte McCardle for a constitutional law case brief holding that that the Constitution gives Congress the express power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)

Facts:

Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s Initiative for Reforms,Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through People’s Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At thehearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of people’s initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.

Issues:(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.

(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution.

Held:

Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementinglegislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation.

The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people’s initiative.

The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect otherprovisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Court’s decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner

of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis.

HELD:

1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.

Summary of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962).

Facts

Charles Baker (P) was a resident of Shelby County, Tennessee. Baker filed suit against Joe Carr, the Secretary of State of Tennessee. Baker’s complaint alleged that the Tennessee legislature had not redrawn its legislative districts since 1901,

in violation of the Tennessee State Constitution which required redistricting according to the federal census every 10 years. Baker, who lived in an urban part of the state, asserted that the demographics of the state had changed shifting a greater proportion of the population to the cities, thereby diluting his vote in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Baker sought an injunction prohibiting further elections, and sought the remedy of reapportionment or at-large elections. The district court denied relief on the grounds that the issue of redistricting posed a political question and would therefore not be heard by the court.

Issues

Do federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a legislative apportionment?

What is the test for resolving whether a case presents a political question?

Holding and Rule (Brennan)

Yes. Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a legislative apportionment.

The factors to be considered by the court in determining whether a case presents a political question are:

Is there a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department (i.e. foreign affairs or executive war powers)?

Is there a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue?

The impossibility of deciding the issue without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.

The impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.

Is there an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made?

Would attempting to resolve the matter create the possibility of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question?

The political question doctrine is based in the separation of powers and whether a case is justiciable is determined on a case by cases basis. In regards to foreign relations, if there has been no conclusive governmental action regarding an issue then a court can construe a treaty and decide a case. Regarding the dates of the duration of hostilities, when there needs to be definable clarification for a decision, the court may be able to decide the case.

The court held that this case was justiciable and did not present a political question. The case did not present an issue to be decided by another branch of the government. The court noted that judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause were well developed and familiar, and it had been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine if an act is arbitrary and capricious and reflects no policy. When a question is enmeshed with any of the other two branches of the government, it presents a political question and the Court will not answer it without further clarification from the other branches.

See Brown v. Board of Education for a constitutional law case brief featuring an interpretation and application of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in an opinion involving segregation in public schools.

Nixon vs. US

Facts. The special prosecutor in the Watergate scandal subpoenaed the tape recordings of conversations involving the President and his advisers regarding the scandal. The President’s counsel moved to quash the subpoena citing Article II of the United States Constitution (the “Constitution”) and its grant of privilege to the President. The President’s counsel also argued it was a non-justiciable question because it was a disagreement between parts of the executive branch.Issue. Is the President’s Article II constitutional privilege absolute?

Held. The President’s executive privilege is not absolute and must bend to Amendment 4 and Amendment 5 requirements of speedy and fair trials and of the ability of defendants to face their accusers.Courts are not required to proceed against the President as if the President was any other individual.

Courts should review communications claimed to be privileged in camera (by the judge only in chambers).

Discussion. The Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme Court”) had to balance the executive privilege against the rights of citizens to face their accusers and to have a speedy and fair trial. The Court made the point that the President is not a normal citizen, and therefore should receive great deference regarding executive claims of privilege. However, executive privilege is not absolute and must be balanced against the right of the accused in criminal proceedings. The Court took great care to limit its opinion because it was delving into a political dispute between the President and Congress, something the Supreme Court is loath to do.

Goldwater vs. Carter

Facts. President Carter terminated a treaty with Taiwan, and a few Congressional members felt that this deprived them of their Constitutional function. However, no Congressional action was ever taken. The Senate considered a resolution that would require the President to get Senate approval before any mutual defense treaty could be terminated, but there was no final vote on the resolution.

Issue. Is this issue of whether a President can terminate a treaty without Congressional approval a non-justiciable political question?

Held. Yes. Whether or not a President can terminate a treaty closely involves his foreing relations authority and therefore is not reviewable by the Supreme Court.

Dissent. Even though the Court cannot review political questions, the court has the power to review whether or not a particular branch of government has exclusive decision-making power over an issue.Concurrence. This issue was not ripe because the Senate never tried to invoke a resolution against it. Were it ripe, however, the issue would be justiciable because it would require an interpretation of the Constitution. Even though the Supreme Court cannot hear purely political questions, it can review cases to determine if the interpretation of the Constitution is correct.

Discussion. In the arena of foreign affairs, the Court has held issues to be political questions even though many Justices believe these issues relate to the interpretation of the Constitution, and are therefore reviewable. The Court places a great emphasis on establishing a single, unified voice for the nation on foreign affairs is

Estrada V. Arroyo

G.R. No. 146738

FACTS: Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for

judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

HELD:

FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions.

The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section II of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . .”

The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions.

SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President.

The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time.

The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelop to clear his name.

"If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.

"The President says. “Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don’t want any more of this – it’s too painful. I’m tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)

"I just want to clear my name, then I will go.”

The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said “x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.” “ Ayoko na” are words of resignation.

During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after transition period.

His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as

President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of’ the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.

THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President.

Section 11 of Article VII provides that “Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions.” Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.

The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75 which states: “RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION’S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.” The Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 which states: “RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO’S NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES”

Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit.

The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. On February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.” Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. The debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him.

The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure” but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.

Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.

FIFTH: Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.

Brillantes vs. Concepcion, GR 163193, June 15, 2004

FACTS: Congress enacted RA 8436 authorizing COMELEC to use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation the results of national and local elections. COMELEC subsequently approved Resolution 6712 adopting the policy that the precinct election results of each city and municipality shall be immediately transmitted electronically in advance to the COMELEC in Manila.Petitioners in this case questioned, among others, the Constitutionality of the quickcount as being pre-emptive of the authority vested in Congress to canvass the votes for the President and Vice-President under Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.ISSUE: Can the COMELEC conduct “unofficial” tabulation of presidential election results based on a copy of the election returns?RULING: No. The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President. The contention of the COMELEC that its tabulation of votes is not prohibited by the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 8436 as such tabulation is “unofficial,” is puerile and totally unacceptable. If the COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the President and Vice-President, the COMELEC is, with more reason, prohibited from making an “unofficial” canvass of said votes

LIM vs. PACQUING

G.R. 115044, January 27, 1995

Facts:

On 15 September 1994, respondent Associated Development Corporation (ADC) fileda petition for prohibition seeking to prevent GAB from withdrawing the provisional authoritythat had been granted them to operate jai-alai. ADC's franchise was invalidated by PD No.771, which expressly revoked all

existing franchises to operate all forms of gambling facilitiesissued by local governments.Respondent contends that Ordinance No. 7065 authorized the Mayor to allow ADC to operate Jai-Alai in the City of Manila. ADC also assails the constitutionality of PD No. 771 as violativeof the equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether ADC has a valid franchise to operate the Jai-Alai de Manila.

Held:

PD No. 771 is a valid exercise of the

inherent

police power of the State. Gambling isessentially antagonistic and self-reliance. It breeds indolence and erodes the value of good,honest and hard work. It is, as very aptly stated by PD No. 771, a vice and a social ill whichgovernment must minimize (if not eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic development. Jai-alai is not a mere economic activity which the law seeks to regulate. It is essentiallygambling and whether it should be permitted and, if so, under what conditions are questionsprimarily for the lawmaking authority to determine, talking into account national and localinterests. Here, it is the police power of the State that is paramount. On the alleged violationof the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, it should beremembered that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simple contract but rather it is moreimportantly, a mere privilege specially in matters which are within the government's powerto regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the police power. Thus, a gamblingfranchise is always subject to the exercise of police power for the public welfare.ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai therefore, it may not operateeven if it has a license from the Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila.

BOARD OF OPTOMETRY VS. COLET

G.R. No. 122241, July 30 1996

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 8050, entitled “An Act Regulating the Practice of Optometry Education, Integrating Optometrists, and for Other Purposes,” otherwise known as the Revised Optometry Law of 1995, was approved into law on 7 June 1995.

On 31 July 1995, the private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a petition for declaratory relief and for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. Private respondents alleged in their petition that:

1. There were surreptitious and unauthorized insertion and addition of provisions in the Reconciled Bill which were made without the knowledge and conformity of the Senate panel;2. R.A. No. 8050 derogates and violates the fundamental right of every Filipino to reasonable safeguards against deprivation of life, liberty and property without due process of law;3. R.A. No. 8050 derogates and violates the principle against undue delegation of legislative power;4. R.A. No. 8050 suppresses truthful advertising concerning optical goods and services in violation of the guaranty of freedom of speech and press; and5. R.A. No. 8050 employs vague ambiguous terms in defining prohibitions and restrictions, hence, it falls within the ambit of void-for-vagueness doctrine which safeguards the guaranty of due process of law.

When the petition (docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74770) was examined, it was found out that it merely listed the names of the alleged presidents as well as their profession and home addresses of Optometry Practitioner Association of the Philippines (OPAP); Cenevis Optometrist Association (COA); Association of Christian-Muslim Optometrist (ACMO); and Southern Mindanao OptometristAssociation of the Philippines (SMOAP). They failed to indicate the details as to the juridical personality and addresses of these alleged associations, except for Acebedo Optical Co., Inc.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the private respondents have locus standi to question theconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8050; and

Whether or not they have a valid cause of action for either declaratory relief or prohibition.

HELD:

1. Only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, and every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Under Article 44 of the Civil Code, an association is

considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members. By failing to provide juridical details in their petition, they cannot therefore claim that they are juridical entities. Consequently, they are deemed to be devoid of legal personality to bring an action.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court - a real party in interest is a party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

2. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory. It cannot be disputed that there is yet no actual case or controversy involving all or any of the private respondents on one hand, and all or any of the petitioners on the other, with respect to rights or obligations under R.A. No. 8050. This is plain because Civil Case No. 95-74770 is for declaratory relief. The private respondents have not sufficiently established their locus standi to question the validity of R.A. No. 8050. The conclusion then is inevitable that the respondentJudge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the implementation of R.A. No. 8050.

MARIANO, JR. VS. COMELEC, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 10, 2011

G.R. No. 118627; 242 SCRA 213, March 7, 1995 (Constitutional Law – Requirements in challenging the constitutionality of the law)

FACTS: Petitioners suing as tax payers, assail a provision (Sec 51) of RA No. 7859 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati) on the ground that the same attempts to alter or restart the “3-consecutive term” limit for local elective officials disregarding the terms previously served by them, which collides with the Constitution (Sec 8, Art X & Sec 7, Art VI).

ISSUE: Whether or not challenge to the constitutionality of questioned law is with merit.

HELD: No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well-delineated. They are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Fernandez v. Torres ||

J. Feliciano GR No. 102940 November 6, 1992

Doctrine:

Mere speculation/apprehension does not constitute a justiciable controversy. Courts do not sitto adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest.

Facts:

There was a public agitation for a total ban on deployment of Filipino entertainers abroad due tothe growing number of complaints from entertainers and relatives about the exploitative workingconditions, harassment, forcible detention, physical injuries, rape and even death suffered by female performing artists and entertainers abroad. The First National Tripartite Conference for the Protection ofOverseas Entertainers, attended by representatives from the government and the labor sectors, was heldon November 18, 1991. The outcome of such was the DOLE Circular No. 01-91 (dated November 20,1991) entitled

“Prescribing Additional Requirements, Conditions and Procedures for the Deployment ofPerforming Artists”

. Petitioners Fernandez, et.al. wish to prohibit and restrain the DOLE and POEA fromenforcing and implementing Item No. 1 of the aforementioned circular, citing it to be arbitrary, oppressiveand discriminatory against performing artists ages 18-22, who would otherwise be qualified for overseasemployment, hence it violates the equal protection clause and due process clause of the Constitution.

*For reference, Item No. 1 of the aforementioned circular states: "

1. No Filipino entertainer shall be deployedoutside the Philippines except for legitimate performing artists consisting of musicians, singers and members ofdance troupes. In all cases, the performing artists must have a track record of legitimate and reputable performancein the Philippines for at least one year. In no case shall the performing artist be below 23 years old. The Secretaryof Labor and Employment may, for justifiable reasons, exempt performing artists from coverage hereof .”

Issue:

Whether or not the petition at bar presents a justiciable controversy

Ruling:

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the petition does not present a justiciablecontroversy. Petitioners have failed to show the first requisite of judicial inquiry (i.e. the existence ofactual case or controversy) hence the Court is resolved to DISMISS the petition.

Ratio:

Requisites for judicial review/judicial inquiry:

In actions involving constitutional issues, the firmlysettled rule is that a constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by the courts unless thefollowing requirements of judicial inquiry are met:[1]the existence of an actual case or controversy;[2the party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial interest in theresolution thereof;[3]the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and[4]that the resolution of the constitutional issue must, be indispensable for the finaldetermination of the controversy the DOLE circular does not establish an absolute and comprehensive prohibition of the deployment abroad of entertainers below 23 years of age. Item No.1 provides that the Sec. of Labor &employment may exempt someone from the coverage of this law for justifiable reasons. Grounds for such exemption are provided for in a set of Administrative Guidelines Implementing Dept. Circular No. 01-91

The Court is not compelled to indulge in speculation that public respondent would deny any and allapplications for exemption for coverage of DOLE circular No. 01-91. It is presumed thatadministrative orders and regulations are entitled to the presumption of constitutionality and, thatofficial duty has been or will be regularly performed.

"Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of oneof petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy.

” (Phil. Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education)

Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid the problem may be. This is especially true where the issues reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into

play regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion.' (Rice vs. Sioux City)

LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC vs RAMOS Case Digest

LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. VICTOR O. RAMOS, Secretary Department of Environment and Natural Resources; HORACIO RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); RUBEN TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.

G.R. No. 127882, 27 January 2004, En Banc (Carpio-Morales, J.)

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.

FACTS: RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.

Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.

In January 2001, WMC - a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company - sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.

EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of Australian investments.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.

Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a ―service contract‖ that permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.

HELD:

First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional

RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.

Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that ―All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.‖ The same section also states that, ―the exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.

Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country‘s natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.

The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or other forms of assistance‖ in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only ―technical and financial assistance.‖ The management and the operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in the nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase ―financial and technical agreements‖ in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.

The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation‘s mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.

The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine natural resources.

When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with them.

Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.

Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract

The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a service contract.

Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract area.‖ Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.

These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down.

City of Los Angeles vs. Lyons

Brief Fact Summary. Adolph Lyons (Lyons) was pulled over by a Los Angeles police officer for a traffic violation. He offered no resistance, and without provocation, the police officer seized Lyons and placed him in a chokehold, rendering Lyons unconscious.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A plaintiff who wants to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court must allege an “actual case or controversy.” Further, the injury complained of by plaintiff must be immediate. Past exposure to illegal conduct does not, by itself, show a present case or controversy.

Facts. In 1976, Lyons was pulled over by a Los Angeles police officer for a traffic violation. Although Lyons offered no resistance, the officer asked him to step out of the car, and proceeded to place Lyons in a chokehold, rendering Lyons unconscious. Lyons sued the municipality and sought damages and injunctive relief in District Court for the Central District of California. He asked the court to issue an injunction preventing the police department from using chokeholds in the future unless circumstances were to result in death or serious bodily injury if force was withheld. The District Court entered such an injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The municipality appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue. Does this case present an “actual case or controversy” that can be determined by the Supreme Court?If so, does Lyons have standing to seek injunctive relief against the municipality of Los Angeles?

Held. This case does not present an “actual case or controversy” as required in the Constitution under Article III. Past illegal conduct, by itself, is insufficient to establish an actual case or controversy for injunctive relief. Even though Lyons was injured by the police in the past, this act alone does not establish that Lyons is threatened with immediate injury or that he will be pulled over and placed in a chokehold again.Lyons did not have standing to bring this case to the Supreme Court. In order to have standing, a plaintiff must show 1) an actual or likely injury in fact, 2) that the injury is sufficiently concrete and individually affects the plaintiff, 3) that the challenged action is the “cause in fact” of the injury, and 4) that the Court will be able to redress the injury by its decision. In this case, injunctive relief against the municipality may or may not address the injury suffered by Lyons. He could seek damages for any injuries he sustained from the chokehold (i.e. hospital bills, etc.), but he did not have standing to enforce an injunction where it was not clear if others would be placed in a chokehold in the future. Furthermore, it was speculative, at best, that Lyons himself would be placed in a chokehold in the future, and therefore injunctive relief would not clearly redress any potential injury.

Dissent. Lyons did have standing to bring a claim for injunctive relief against the municipality because he did present an actual case or controversy and had suffered damages relating to the chokehold. Standing has always depended on whether a plaintiff has a “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy”. The Dissent explained that Lyons’ request for injunctive relief was coupled with his claim for damages based on past injury. Because he has an actual claim for

damages, he need not rely solely on the threat of future injury to establish his personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.

Discussion. Past exposure to illegal conduct does not, by itself, establish a present case or controversy, and therefore cannot meet the Article III Constitutional requirement of “actual case or controversy.”

G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006 [Legislative Department - Power to Declare War and Delegate Emergency Power]

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,†� and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.

RULING:

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion”

Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”

Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.”

PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.

First Provision: Calling Out Power.

The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)

President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.

To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:

SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Third Provision: The Power to Take Over

Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare“a state of national emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.

Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.

Summary of DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 94 S. Ct. 1704, 40 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1974).

Facts

Petitioner DeFunis, a white applicant to the University of Washington law school, sued the Board of Regents of the University of Washington in state court after he was denied admission. DeFunis alleged that the law school discriminated against applicants of certain races and ethnicities, including whites, by admitting minority applicants with significantly lower undergraduate grades and LSAT scores. DeFunis maintained that his rejection was predicated on racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The District Court granted DeFunis injunctive relief and ordered the law school to admit him. When DeFunis was in his second year of law school, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed, holding that the admissions policy was not unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of the United States granted DeFunis’ petition for a writ of certiorari and stayed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington pending final disposition of the case.

The case came before the Supreme Court of the United States for a full hearing when DeFunis was in his final year of law school. Although the law school assured that it would allow DeFunis to graduate regardless of the Court’s decision, both parties contended that mootness did not exist to block formal adjudication of the matter.

Issue

Can a case be adjudicated when subject matter jurisdiction is lacking due to mootness, if adjudication of the suit would resolve an important social issue?

Holding and Rule

No. When a federal court’s determination of a legal issue is no longer necessary to compel the result originally sought, the case is moot and federal courts lack the power to hear it.

The constitutional basis of the mootness doctrine is found in Article III of the Constitution which requires the existence of a case or controversy. Thus, a real and live controversy must exist at every stage of review.

The court held that when the original controversy has disappeared prior to development of the suit, it is deemed moot and a trial must not proceed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. That a matter deemed moot leaves an important social issue unresolved is of no consequence.

Dissent (Douglas)

Due to the social significance of the issue involved in this case, this matter should be adjudicated despite its apparent mootness.

Dissent (Brennan)

Because of the social significance of the issue involved in this case, failure to adjudicate this matter now will only result in a future duplication of the court effort.

See Brown v. Board of Education for a constitutional law case brief involving an issue of race based discrimination in which the Supreme Court held that segregation is unconstitutional for violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Warth vs. Seldin

Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiffs claimed that a local zoning ordinance excluded persons of low and moderate income from living in a certain community. Defendants responded by claiming that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A plaintiff must generally allege a specific “case or controversy” between herself and the defendant in order to have standing.

Facts. The Plaintiffs were various organizations and individuals residing in Rochester, New York (Rochester). The Plaintiffs brought suit against the town of Penfield, New York (Penfield) and members of Penfield’s Zoning, Planning, and Town Boards (Defendants). Plaintiffs contended that Penfield’s zoning ordinance effectively excluded persons of low and moderate income from living in the town, in contravention of constitutional and statutory rights. The lower federal courts held that none of the Plaintiff’s had standing.

Issue. Have the Plaintiff’s established that a “case or controversy” exists between themselves and the Defendants within the meaning of Article III of the United States Constitution (Constitution), in order to have standing?

Held. Yes. Judgment affirmed.In order for a federal court to have jurisdiction, the plaintiff himself must have suffered “some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively legal action.” Additionally, standing will generally not be found when:a “generalized grievance” is shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizensa plaintiff attempts to claim relief on the legal rights of third parties.Congress may create standing for individuals through statutes who would otherwise lack standing, so long as the plaintiff alleges a distinct and palpable injury to himself.In the present case, the Plaintiffs claimed the enforcement of zoning ordinances against third parties had the effect of precluding the construction of housing suitable to their needs. For standing, a plaintiff must allege that the challenged

practices affect him specifically and that court intervention would personally benefit the plaintiff.In order for an organization to have standing, it must claim that all or any one of its members are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action. Plaintiffs in this case fail to do so.

Dissent. The Plaintiffs have submitted a sufficient pleading to avoid a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The majority’s opinion is based instead on the merits of the claim.

Discussion. The purpose of the standing requirement is to prevent the courts from being forced to adjudicate abstract questions of wide public significance, which could better be determined in other forums.

Craig vs. Boren

Brief Fact Summary. Oklahoma State maintained different drinking ages between men and women for the consumption of 3.2% alcohol beer. The Appellant, Craig (Appellant), now alleges that this difference violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution).

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Gender-based classifications must satisfy intermediate scrutiny requirements to pass constitutional muster.

Facts. The State of Oklahoma prohibited the sale of “nonintoxicating” 3.2% alcohol beer to men under the age of 21 and women under the age of 18. Suit was brought against the State, alleging the law violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

Issue. Does the Oklahoma statute violate the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution?

Held. Yes. Appeals Court ruling reversed and remanded.Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) argues that case precedent dictates that an intermediate level of scrutiny should be applied in analyzing the statute. Specifically, the gender-based classification must serve an important government objective and be substantially related to the achievement of such objective.The District Court unequivocally found that the objective to be served by the statute is increased traffic safety. J. Brennan is not persuaded by the Appellees’, Craig and others (Appellees), statistics that the statute closely serves the stated objective. As such, it is not constitutional.

Dissent. Justice William Rehnquist (J. Rehnquist) dissents on two levels. He believes that rational basis analysis is the appropriate level of scrutiny for gender-based classification. Furthermore, he believes that the intermediate scrutiny applied by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is so “diaphanous and elastic” as to encourage judicial prejudice.

Discussion. Craig v. Boren establishes intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate level of review for gender-based classification. Intermediate scrutiny is distinguished from strict scrutiny at both the objective and means levels. Important government objectives (intermediate) v. compelling government objectives (strict) and substantially related (intermediate) v. narrowly tailored (strict).

Tatad v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997

D E C I S I O N

(En Banc)

PUNO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Petitioners assailed §5(b) and §15 of R.A. No. 8180, the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996.

§5(b) of the law provided that “tariff duty shall be imposed . . . on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%) . . .” On the other hand, §15 provided that “[t]he DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable . . .”

Petitioners argued that §5(b) on tariff differential violates the provision of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.

They also contended that the phrases “as far as practicable,” “decline of crude oil prices in the world market” and “stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar” are ambivalent, unclear and inconcrete since they do not provide determinate or determinable standards that can guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil industry.

Petitioners also assailed the President’s E.O. No. 392, which proclaimed the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry in February 1997. They argued that the Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in the implementation of full deregulation.

Finally, they asserted that the law violated §19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition

II. THE ISSUES

1. Did §5(b) violate the one title-one subject requirement of the Constitution?

2. Did §15 violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power?

3. Was E.O. No. 392 arbitrary and unreasonable?

4. Did R.A. No. 8180 violate §19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition?

III. THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED the petition. It DECLARED R.A. No. 8180 unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void.]

1. NO, §5(b) DID NOT violate the one title-one subject requirement of the Constitution.

As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title-one subject rule. [T]he title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. [S]ection 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum.

2. NO, §15 DID NOT violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power.

Two tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to execute laws does not involve the abdication of the power to make law itself. We delineated the metes and bounds of these tests in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. VS. POEA, thus:

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President --- he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

Petitioners contend that the words “as far as practicable,” “declining” and “stable” should have been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn submission deserves scant consideration. The dictionary meanings of these words are well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines “practicable” as meaning possible to practice or perform, “decline” as meaning to take a downward direction, and “stable” as meaning firmly established. The fear of petitioners that these words will result in the exercise of executive discretion that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not more general standards in other cases.

3. YES, E.O. No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable.

A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be considered by the Department of Energy and the Office of the President,viz.: (1) the time when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining, and (2) the time when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF as a factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. On the contrary, the debates in Congress will show that some of our legislators wanted to impose as a pre-condition to deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund must not be in deficit. We therefore hold that the Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The misappreciation of this extra factor cannot be justified on the ground that the Executive department considered anyway the stability of the prices of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar. By considering another factor to hasten full deregulation, the Executive department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no power to make laws. To cede to the

Executive the power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress the principle of separation of powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency. In the cases at bar, the Executive co-mingled the factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of decline of the price of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine the weight given by the Executive department to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It could well be the principal consideration for the early deregulation. It could have been accorded an equal significance. Or its importance could be nil. In light of this uncertainty, we rule that the early deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.

4. YES, R.A. No. 8180 violated §19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

[I]t cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.

The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of R.A. No. 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost. The construction cost of storage facilities and the cost of inventory can thus scare prospective players. Their net effect is to further occlude the entry points of new players, dampen competition and enhance the control of the market by the three (3) existing oil companies.

Finally, we come to the provision on predatory pricing which is defined as “. . . selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors.” Respondents contend that this provision works against Petron, Shell and Caltex and protects new entrants. The ban on predatory pricing cannot be analyzed in isolation. Its validity is interlocked with the barriers imposed by R.A. No. 8180 on the entry of new players. The inquiry should be to determine whether predatory pricing on the part of the dominant oil companies is encouraged by the provisions in the law blocking the entry of new players. Text-writer Hovenkamp gives the authoritative answer and we quote:

xxx xxx xxx

The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will give a firm monopoly profits in the future. The monopoly profits will never materialize, however, if the market is flooded with new entrants as soon as the successful predator attempts to raise its price. Predatory pricing will be profitable only if the market contains significant barriers to new entry.

As aforediscussed, the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement are significant barriers which discourage new players to enter the market. Considering these significant barriers established by R.A. No. 8180 and the lack of players with the comparable clout of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX, the temptation for a dominant player to engage in predatory pricing and succeed is a chilling reality. Petitioners’ charge that this provision on predatory pricing is anti-competitive is not without reason.

[R.A. No. 8180 contained a separability clause, but the High Tribunal held that the offending provisions of the law so permeated its essence that it had to be struck down entirely. The provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing were among the principal props of R.A. No. 8180. Congress could not have deregulated the downstream oil industry without these provisions.]

Case Digest: Kilosbayan, Incorporated, et. al. vs. Teofisto Guingona, PCSO and PGMC

05 May 1994 G.R. No. 113375

Ponente: Davide, JR., J.

FACTS:

The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating on an online lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, with its affiliate, the International Totalizator Systems, Inc. became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. Considering the citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors. An open letter was sent to President Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of an online lottery system due to ethical and moral concerns, however the project pushed through.

ISSUES:

Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal standing); and

Whether the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light of Sec. 1 of R.A. 1169 as amended by B.P. Blg. 42.

RULING:

The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental importance to the public that the case demands. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic and moral well-being of the people. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition, and in the exercise of its sound discretion, the Court brushes aside the procedural barrier.

Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign.” The language of the section is clear that with respect to its franchise or privilege “to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities,” the PCSO cannot exercise it “in collaboration, association or joint venture” with any other party. This is the unequivocal meaning and import of the phrase. By the exception explicitly made, the PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of the methods mentioned, nor can it transfer, assign or lease such franchise.

KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO

G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.

FACTS:

In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

HELD:

NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

PHILCONSA vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994

Facts:

House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the “pork barrels” allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.

Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.

On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:

1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that “this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA.” And that “appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987.

2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s),

3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.

4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).

5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund,” which requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the “Specific Prohibition” which states that the said Modernization Fund “shall not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers”

6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds.

7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress.

Issue:

whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU’S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) are constitutional; whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional

Held:

The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.

The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.

In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the “one-fund policy” (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Management’s Procurement Service).

The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the

appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended — 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.

The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an “appropriate” provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item.

The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “use of Fund” for the AFP modernization program that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the “congressional or legislative veto.” However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.

Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.

The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.

Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU’s to be amended.

On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take “necessary and proper steps” to carry into execution the law. These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.

IBP VS ZAMORA

Posted by kaye lee on 11:27 PM

G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]

FACTS:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:

1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.

2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:

1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS VERA

FACTS:Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a motion for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court of United States for review, which was also denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).ISSUE:Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.RULING:Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.

The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office." The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces — and this is the actual situation now — appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system.

BAYAN v. ZAMORAG. R. No. 138570October 10, 2000

Facts:The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.

Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it by (2/3) votes.

Cause of Action:

Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not Section 21, Article VII.

Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:a) it must be a treaty,b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, andc) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.

ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?

HELD:Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will

find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.

The Constitution, makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent.” We find nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.

It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.

GONZALES VS. NARVASA

G.R. No. 140835, August 14 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing theconstitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order “to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.” Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds that it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 43

HELD:

The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he canestablish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining anypersonal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any “injury” in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislature’s powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCR’s activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.

Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. It is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is “appropriated” for its operational expenses “to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President.” Being that case, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation.