MALAGA v. PENACHOS

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) published an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Petitioners Malaga and Najarro submitted their requirements at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. They were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late.

The petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them as pre-qualified bidders. A restraining order was issued prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such order in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. The trial court lifted the restraining order and declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of the subject law.

ISSUE:Whether ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD 1818

HELD & RATIO: The Administrative Code defines an instrumentality as any agency of the government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. The same Code describes a chartered institution as any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state.

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818. Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the award of the project.

DE LA LLANA v. ALBA

FACTS:In 1981, BP 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds therefore and for Other Purposes,” was passed. De la Llana assailed its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court, and not the Congress, can remove judges.

ISSUE:Whether the reorganization violates (1) the independence of the judiciary and (2) the security of tenure of justices and judges as provided for under the Constitution

HELD & RATIO:What is really involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from their services, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. Of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. It is a well-settled rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.

TIO v. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

FACTS:Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The law was also reinforced by PD 1994 which amended the National Internal Revenue Code. The amendment provides that “there shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.” The said law was brought about by the need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Tio countered that there is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by the Amendment and that there is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President.

ISSUE: Whether there is an undue delegation of power

HELD & RATIO: It cannot be successfully argued that the law contains an undue delegation of legislative power. The grant of authority, provided in the law, to the Board to “solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board” is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the direction and control of the Board.” That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the law as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.

US v. ANG TANG HO

FACTS:In 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, the Governor General issued EO 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The said order fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold rice to Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the order. The sale was done on August 6, 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged in violation of the said order. He was found guilty and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.

ISSUE: Whether there is undue delegation of power to the Governor General

HELD & RATIO: Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of EO 53. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. The said Act, as to the judgment of the Supreme Court, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

YNOT v. IMMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS:In 1980, Marcos issued EO 626-A which forbade the transportation and slaughtering of carabaos. Ynot transported 6 carabaos in a pumpboat from Masbate to Iloilo and was caught by the police. His carabaos were immediately confiscated. He filed a case for replevin before the RTC. The carabaos were returned to him upon filing of a bond of P12,000.00. After hearing, the court sustained the confiscation. Since Ynot could no longer produce the carabaos, the bond was ordered confiscated. Ynot appealed to the IAC which upheld the decision of the RTC. Ynot appealed to the Supreme Court contending that, among others, EO 626-A is unconstitutional for there is an improper exercise of legislative power

ISSUE:Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional

HELD & RATIO:There is an invalid delegation of legislative power due to the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. In this case, their options are apparently boundless. Only the officers named can supply the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen, and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion.

MARCOS v. MANGLAPUZ

FACTS: Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into exile. In his deathbed, he has signified his wish to return to the Philippines. But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family. Hence, this petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

ISSUE:Whether the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos to the Philippines

HELD & RATIO:The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light of constitutional provisions, it must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. Such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

It is found by the Court that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, that there exist factual bases for the President's decision. Hence, this act cannot be said to have been done arbitrarily or capriciously. Further, the ponencia (the coups, the communist threat, peace and order issues especially in Mindanao, Marcos loyalists plotting) bolsters the conclusion that the return of Marcos will only exacerbate the situation in the country.

CARIÑO v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

FACTS:In 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided to stage rallies in order for their grievances to be heard. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was then investigated, and Secretary Carino ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Carino.

ISSUE: Whether CHR has the power to try, decide and determine certain cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights

HELD & RATIO: The Court declares the CHR to have no such power. It was not meant by the Constitution to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the CHR in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate (i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact) as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA 4850 in order to execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns. PD 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same. EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term “Laguna de Bay Region.” Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction and authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters. The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cage and fish pen operations and the indiscriminate grant of fish pen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with fish pens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake. The LLDA then served notice to the general public that aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA are declared illegal and shall be subject to demolition.

ISSUE:Whether LLDA has jurisdiction to issue permits for fishery privileges over the Laguna Lake region

HELD & RATIO:The LLDA charter, RA 4850, PD 813, and EO 927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges on municipal waters. The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. Accordingly, the LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a “cease and desist order” and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fish pens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.

RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE CORP. v. NLRC

FACTS:In 1977, respondent Coria was hired by petitioner as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. In 1978, he was made a permanent employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist. In the same year, without change in his position-designation, he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased. In 1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In 1983, he was made an inspector of the Fire Division.

On October 15, 1983, Coria was dismissed from work on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and the Labor Arbiter reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time.

ISSUE:Whether NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner’s appeal on technicality

HELD & RATIO:The petition is dismissed. Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission provides that (1) the decisions or orders of the Labor Arbiter shall be final and executory, unless appealed to the NLRC by any or both of the parties within 10 calendar days from receipt of notice thereof; and (2) no motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained. The employer (petitioner) received a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the NLRC, the motion for extension was denied and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time.

It is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Based on the provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has become final and executory.

CRUZ v. YOUNGBERG

FACTS:Cruz brought a petition before the CFI of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, Youngberg, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of 10 large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. Cruz attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippines. He also asserted that the sole purpose of the enactment was to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases in the country. The respondent asserted that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The CFI dismissed the complaint, but the petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. Youngberg contended that even if the law be declared unconstitutional by the fact alleged by the petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner cannot be allowed to import cattle from Australia for the reason that, while Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 (Administrative Code) would automatically become effective.

ISSUE:Whether the lower court erred in not holding that the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers

HELD & RATIO:No. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. There is no unlawful delegation of legislative power in the case at bar.

ARANETA v. GATMAITAN

FACTS:The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, between the provinces of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn the operation of trawls in the said area and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the League prayed that the President ban the operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In response to the pleas, the President issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was amended by EO 66 apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing during the typhoon season only. Subsequently, EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22.

Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction praying that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Fisheries be enjoined from enforcing said EO and to declare the same null and void. The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation and held that the EOs 22 and 66 are invalid.

ISSUE:Whether the said EOs were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislative power unduly delegated to the President

HELD & RATIO:Yes. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing device like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of seafood, and to that end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations and such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued EO 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.

PEOPLE v. MACEREN

FACTS:On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated AO 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz using a device or equipment to catch fish thru electric current which thereby destroy any aquatic animals within its current reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace. The municipal court quashed the complaint and the CFI affirmed such dismissal.

ISSUE:Whether the regulation penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission is valid

HELD & RATIO:No. The court held that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 because the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary and the Commissioner are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.

BAUTISTA v. JUINIO

FACTS:LOI 869 was issued in 1979 to respond to the protracted oil crisis dating back to 1974, banning the use of private motor vehicles with H and EH plates on weekends and holidays from 12 am Saturday to 5:00 am Monday, or 1 am of holiday to 5:00 am of the day after the holiday; but exempting service, truck, diplomatic, consular corps, and tourist cars. Pursuant thereto, Juinio, then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications and Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued MC 39, imposing "the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the above-specified vehicles" found violating such LOI. MC 39 does not impose the penalty of confiscation but merely that of impounding, fine, and for the third offense that of cancellation of certificate of registration and for the rest of the year or for 90 days, whichever is longer. Bautista questioned the validity of LOI 869 and MC 39 through a prohibition proceeding with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:Whether LOI 869 and MC 39, banning certain vehicles from using the motorways in specified time, are constitutional and/or valid

HELD & RATIO:A regulatory measure enjoys a presumption of constitutionality or a presumption that such an act falls within constitutional limitations. Herein, as to LOI 869, the determination of the mode and manner through which the objective of minimizing the consumption of oil products and measures conducive to energy conservation (e.g. require and establish taxi stands equipped with efficient telephone and communication systems, strict implementation and observance of cargo truck hours on main arteries, strict observance of traffic rules) are left to the discretion of the political branches. The question before the Court is limited to whether or not LOI 869 as implemented by MC 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights. On the other hand, as to MC 39, while the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification. To apply that portion of MC 39 would be ultra vires. It must likewise be made clear that a penalty even if warranted can only be imposed in accordance with the procedure required by law.

MACEDA v. ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD

FACTS:Because of the outbreak of the conflict on the Persian Gulf, private respondents oil companies filed with the ERB their applications on oil price increases, and the ERB granted provisional increase. Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition seeking to nullify this provisional increase. He claims that the increase in prices has to undergo the requirements of notice and hearing, however in this case the requirements were not complied with, and therefore Maceda claims he was deprived of due process.

In the same order which authorized the provision increase, the ERB set the applications for hearing with due notice to all interested parties. Petitioner failed to appear at said hearing and at the second hearing. The notice of hearing was also published in newspapers of general circulation. Hearing for presentation of the evidence commences and the ERB outlined the procedure to be observed in the reception of evidence– that the oppositors and the board must have all the evidence-in-chief to be placed on record first then the examination and the cross-examination will come later. Maceda claims that this order of relaxed procedure for presentation of proof resulted in a denial of due process because it deprived him of finishing his cross-examination of the witnesses.

ISSUE:Whether Maceda was deprived of dues process

HELD & RATIO:Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies, such as the ERB which in matters of rate or price fixing is considered as exercising a quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, function. As such administrative agency, it is not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings. In fact, Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing Hearings Before the ERB provides that — These Rules shall govern pleadings, practice and procedure before the Energy Regulatory Board in all matters of inquiry, study, hearing, investigation and/or any other proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Board. However, in the broader interest of justice, the Board may, in any particular matter, except itself from these rules and apply such suitable procedure as shall promote the objectives of the Order.

PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION v. DECS

FACTS:In 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by DECS submitted a report entitled "Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees." The report favorably recommended to the DECS the following courses of action with respect to the Government's policy on increases in school fees. DECS took note of the report and issued an Order authorizing the 15% to 20% increase in school fees. Petitioner sought for reconsideration on the ground that increases were too high. Thereafter, the Order was modified reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%. Petitioner still opposed the increases.

Petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, filed an instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring the questioned Department Order unconstitutional. The thrust of the Petition is that the said Order was issued without any legal basis. The petitioner also maintains that the questioned Order was issued in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution inasmuch as the petitioner was not given due notice and hearing before the Order was issued.

ISSUE:Whether DECS has the power to prescribe school fees

HELD & RATIO:Yes. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law.The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. The Court believes that Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS is in the exercise of its legislative function. The assailed Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the country for school year 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:In 1993, the President of the Philippines issued a Memorandum creating a Task Force to investigate the tax liabilities of manufacturers engaged in tax evasion scheme, such as selling products through dummy marketing corporations to avoid payment of correct internal revenue tax, to collect from any tax liabilities discovered from such investigation and to file the necessary criminal actions against those who may have violated the tax code. The task force was composed of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a representative of the Department of Justice and a representative of the Executive Secretary. The Commissioner issued a Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 reclassifying best selling cigarettes bearing the brands “Hope”, “More” and “Champion” as cigarettes of foreign brands subject to a higher rate of tax without notice of hearing to Fortune Tobacco Corporation who sells the mentioned brands. Fortune questioned the validity of the re-classification of said brands as violative of its right to due process and equal protection of law. Parenthetically, the Court of Appeals ruled that the reclassification made by the Commissioner is of “doubtful legality” and enjoined its enforcement.

ISSUE:Whether RMC 37-93 is valid despite the lack of notice of hearing to Fortune Tobacco Corporation

HELD & RATIO:CIR may not disregard legal requirements in the exercise of its quasi-legislative powers which publication, filing, and prior hearing. When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. But when, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, the agency must accord, at least to those directly affected, a chance to be heard, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.

The BIR not simply interpreted the law. Verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored.

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA v. BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION

FACTS:Petitioner is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators. They filed the petition seeking to declare the nullity of MC 77-42 of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT). The assailed memorandum order provides for the phasing out and discontinuance in the operation of dilapidated taxis or taxis of Model 1971 and earlier. Pursuant to the said memorandum, the BLT issued Implementing Circular No. 52 instructing Regional Directors, the MV Registrars and other personnel of the BLT, all within the National Capital Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances.

ISSUE:Whether the assailed memorandum orders were invalid exercise of police power

HELD & RATIO:No. Section 2 of Presidential Decree 101 grants the Board of Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. As enunciated in the BOT circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, safety and general welfare of the people.

US v. PANLILIO

FACTS: The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the putting in quarantine of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. It is alleged that the accused illegally and without being authorized to do so, and while quarantine against the said carabaos exposed to rinderpest was still in effect, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were quarantined and drove them from one place to another. The accused contends that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760 ISSUE: Whether the accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture HELD & RATIO: No. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of Act No. 1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, be punished. However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawful are Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The orders of the Bureau, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way therein. However, the accused did violate Art. 581, par. 2 of the Penal Code which punishes any person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemic disease among animals.

HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION v. DEFENSOR

FACTS:Petitioner is a homeowners association represented by its president, Apolinario. Prior to the passage of RA 9207, a number of presidential issuances authorized the creation and development of what is now known as the National Government Center (NGC). Former President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC. Thereafter, then President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein. In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248, authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the government’s socialized housing program. President Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law RA 9207.

ISSUE:Whether petition for prohibition is an improper remedy because the writ of prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a quasi-legislative function

HELD & RATIO:The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by RA 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

OPLE v. TORRES

FACTS:On December 12, 1996, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System." It was published in 4 newspapers of general circulation. Senator Blas F. Ople, as a Senator, taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), filed instant petition against then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies who, as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of Administrative Order 308.

ISSUE:Whether the President can issue an Administrative Order for the adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System, independent of a legislative act

HELD & RATIO:AO 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy. As said order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law. The Order is a law, negating claims that it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under it, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. AO 308 does not merely implement the Administrative Code of 1987, but establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. The authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws. AO 308 was beyond the power of the President to issue.

PSDSA v. DE JESUS

FACTS:RA 9155, Governance of Basic Education Act 2001, was promulgated, stating that each regional office of the Department of Education (DepEd) shall have a director, an assistant director, and an office staff for program promotion and support, planning, administrative and fiscal services. A division, on the other hand, is headed by a schools division superintendent. The office of the schools district supervisor has been retained under the law. Each district is headed by a school district supervisor and an office staff for program promotion. On the school level, an Elementary School Principal (ESP) was designated as school head for all public elementary schools; and a Secondary School Principal (SSP) for high schools or a cluster thereof. The ESP and the SSP serve as both instructional leaders and administrative managers.

DepEd Secretary De Jesus issued DECS Office Order No. 1, which constitutes the IRR of RA 9155. The Public Schools District Supervisor Association (PSDSA) allege that provisions of the IRR are invalid because they “extended or expanded and modified” the provisions of RA 9155. They argue that the said law should be read in harmony with other “existing educational laws.”

ISSUE:Whether the assailed provisions in the IRR issued by respondent Secretary are invalid

HELD & RATIO:The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. The IRR of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature. It bears stressing, however, that administrative bodies are allowed under their power of subordinate legislation to implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details. All that is required is that the regulation be germane to the objectives and purposes of the law; that the regulation does not contradict but conforms with the standards prescribed by law. Moreover, as a matter of policy, the Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction.

SYQUIA v. BOARD OF POWER AND WATER WORKS

FACTS:Ruiz, Enriquez and Moses filed 3 separate complaints with Board of Power and Waterworks charging Syquia as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments with the offense of selling electricity without permit or franchise and alleging that Syquia billed them for their electricity consumption in excess of the Meralco rates. In her answer, Syquia questioned the jurisdiction of the Board, saying that she is not engaged in the sale of electric power but merely passes to the apartment tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric current bills in accordance with their lease contracts.

ISSUE:Whether the Board has jurisdiction over the complaints filed against Syquia

HELD & RATIO:The Board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by respondents against petitioner. Respondent Board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner’s contractual relations with respondents-complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise. Respondents’ complaints against being charged the additional cost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants give rise to a question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction. The Board in resolving the complaints against petitioner and requiring her to absorb the additional rising costs of electricity consumed for the common areas and elevator service even at a resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year arrogated the judicial function. Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and void.

GLOBE WIRELESS v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

FACTS:Private respondent Antonio Arnaiz sent a message to Maria Diaz in Spain through the telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Dumagete and was transmitted to Manila. The message, however, was not delivered to the addressee. After being informed of said fact, Arnaiz sent a complaint to the Public Service Commissioner a letter-complaint. In its answer, petitioner denied liability but questioned PSC’s jurisdiction over the subject matter. After hearing, the PSC found petitioner responsible for the unsatisfactory service complained of and ordered it to pay a fine.

ISSUE: Whether PSC has jurisdiction to discipline and impose fine upon petitioner

HELD & RATIO: No. The Public Service Act vested in the PSC jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties. However, Section 5 of RA 4630, the legislative franchise under which petitioner was operating, limited respondent Commission’s jurisdiction over petitioner only to the rate which petitioner may charge the public. The negligence imputed to public respondent had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of very limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF LAWYERS v. AGRAVA

FACTS:Respondent Director of the Philippine Patent Office issued a circular announcing an examination schedule for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippine Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to said circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified. Petitioners contend that one who has passed the bar exams and licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is duly qualified to practice before the said office.

On the other hand, respondent Director maintains that the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training.

ISSUE: Whether the appearance before the Philippine Patent Office is included in the practice of law

HELD & RATIO: Yes. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. The practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles.

Furthermore, the Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the said office, without further examination or other qualification.

GUEVARRA v. COMELEC

FACTS:Petitioner was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having published in the Sunday Times an article which tended to interfere with and influence the COMELEC and its members in the adjudication of a controversy then pending. The article pertained to the contracts entered into by COMELEC regarding the requisitioning and preparation of ballot boxes to be used in the elections. Petitioner appeared and filed a motion to quash upon the ground, among others, that the Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article. The COMELEC denied the motion to quash but granted petitioner a period of 15 days within which to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC has the power to conduct contempt proceedings

HELD & RATIO: No. Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between several dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by our Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.

ANG TIBAY v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

FACTS:Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of members of National Labor Union (NLU). NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not valid as it is not within the Collective Bargaining Agreement. They also alleged that there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay: NLU and National Worker’s Brotherhood (NWB). They further contend that NWB is dominated by Toribio himself hence he favors it over NLU. NLU prays for a new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before, as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR).

ISSUE:Whether there has been a due process of law

HELD & RATIO:The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter, controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the NWB, the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law. The SC further held that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION

FACTS:Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from tax evasion to wire-tapping to conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez was then wanted in the US. The US government, pursuant to the RP-US extradition treaty requested to have Jimenez be extradited there. Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint against him as well as the extradition request by the USA. The DOJ sec refused to provide him copy thereof advising that it is still premature to give him so and that it is not a preliminary investigation hence he is not entitled to receive such copies. Jimenez sued the DOJ Sec and the lower court ruled in favor of Jimenez.

ISSUE: Whether Jimenez is deprived of due process

HELD & RATIO: The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower court. The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power:

(1) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (2) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes

indicated are not extraditable; and(3) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or the offense is a military

one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation.

Hence, said process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative body’s quasi-judicial power.

ABEJO v. DELA CRUZ

FACTS:The case involves the question of who, between the RTC and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), has jurisdiction over the dispute between the principal stockholders of the corporation Pocket Bell, namely, the spouses Abejos and the purchaser, Telectronics of their 133,000 minority shareholdings and of 63,000 shares registered in the name of Virginia Braga and covered by five stock certificates endorsed in blank by her, and the spouses Bragas, erstwhile majority stockholders. With the said purchases, Telectronics would become the majority stockholder.

Telectronics requested the corporate secretary of the corporation, Norberto Braga, to register and transfer to its name, and those of its nominees the total 196,000 Pocket Bell shares in the corporation's transfer book, cancel the surrendered certificates of stock and issue the corresponding new certificates of stock in its name and those of its nominees. Norberto Braga refused to register the transfer of shares in the corporate books, asserting that the Bragas claim preemptive rights over the 133,000 Abejo shares and that Virginia Braga never transferred her 63,000 shares to Telectronics but had lost the five stock certificates representing those shares. The Bragas assert that the RTC has jurisdiction over the dispute as against the SEC, while the Abejos claim the contrary.

ISSUE:Whether the SEC has jurisdiction over the dispute

HELD & RATIO:The Court ruled that the SEC has jurisdiction over the dispute. The need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become indispensable. Thus, the Corporation Code (BP 178) specifically vests the SEC with the rule-making power in the discharge of its task of implementing the provisions of the Code and particularly charges it with the duty of preventing fraud and abuses on the part of controlling stockholders, directors and officers.

BERNARDO v. ABALOS

FACTS: Respondent Benjamin Abalos, Sr. was the mayor of Mandaluyong City and his son, Benjamin Abalos Jr. was a candidate for city mayor of the same city for the May 1998 elections. Petitioners herein interposed that respondents conducted an all-expense-free affair at a resort in Quezon Province for the Mandaluyong City public school teachers, registered voters of the said city and who are members of the Board of Election Inspectors therein. The said affair was alleged to be staged as a political campaign for Abalos Jr., where his political jingle was played all throughout and his shirts being worn by some participants. Moreover, Abalos Sr. also made an offer and a promise to increase the allowances of the teachers. In this regard, petitioners filed a criminal complaint with the COMELEC against Abalos Sr. and Abalos Jr. for vote buying, further alleging that they conspired with their co-respondents in violating the Omnibus Election Code. Pursuant to the recommendation of the Director of the Law Department of the COMELEC, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE: Whether the petition before the Supreme Court must be given due course without the petitioners first submitting a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC

HELD & RATIO: No. The Court ruled that a petition for certiorari can only be resorted to if there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the instant case, it was said that filing of the motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC is the most expeditious and inexpensive recourse that petitioners can avail of as it was intended to give the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. As the petitioners then did not exhaust all the remedies available to them at the COMELEC level, it was held that their instant petition is certainly premature. Significantly, they have not also raised any plausible reason for their direct recourse to the Supreme Court. As such, the instant petition was ruled to fail.

INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES v. CA

FACTS: Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED). It was also granted a coal operating contract in the so-called “Giporlos Area.” IEI was later advised that in line with the objective of rationalizing the country’s coal supply-demand balance, the logical coal operator in the area would be Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI assigned and transferred to MMIC its rights in the area but later filed an action for rescission with damages against MMIC for failure of the latter to comply with its obligations. IEI prayed that the Energy Minister approve the return of the contract from MMIC to IEI. Strangely enough, Mr. Jesus S. Cabarrus is the President of both IEI and MMIC. Trial Court ordered the rescission and declared the continued efficacy of the coal contract in favor of IEI and ordered the BED to issue its written affirmation of the contract and to give due course to IEI’s application. CA reversed the decision and ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action considering that under PD 1206, it is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation and development of coal blocks. ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should apply in this case HELD & RATIO: Yes. It has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of the BED are threshed out and determined.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

FACTS:Salazar was employed by GSIS as a casual laborer. She became permanent with a designation of stenographer. She was then promoted to Confidential Technical Assistant Aide. Her record however revealed that she was appointed to the position of Confidential Executive Assistant in the office of then GSIS President and General Manager Cruz on a permanent status. She was then promoted to Technical Assistant III, the position she held when her services were terminated by the newly appointed President and General Manager of the GSIS for the reason that her position was co-terminous with the term of the appointing authority. Salazar filed a petition for reconsideration with the GSIS Board of Trustees, which was denied later on. She then filed a petition for reconsideration of the denial with the Review Committee, which referred the same to the Merit Systems Promotion Board and the CSC. The CSC directed her immediate reinstatement with back salaries. The Board however affirmed her termination. Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration of the Board's order and manifested that the Commission already resolved her petition. The Board then set aside its previous Order. The GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the board and stated that the CSC is a higher administrative appellate body on matters concerning the removal of officers and employees from the service. Hence, the Board cannot in any manner modify or alter the determinations and actions of the CSC. GSIS appealed but the CSC denied the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether the CSC has jurisdiction over the case

HELD & RATIO: No. PD 1409 creating the Merit Systems Board provides that the Board has the function to “hear and decide cases brought before it by officers and employees who feel aggrieved by the determination of appointing authorities involving appointment, promotion, transfer, detail, reassignment and other personnel actions, as well as complaints against any officers in the government arising from abuses or violations of the merit system.” When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. PD 1409 clearly provides that the Merit Systems Board shall take cognizance of appeals from parties aggrieved by decisions of appointing officers involving personnel action. The Commission therefore cannot take original cognizance of the cases specified under Sec. 5 of PD 1409, except in the cases specified under Section 9 (j) of the Civil Service Decree which directly gives it such power.

PAAT v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:The truck of private respondent de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel while on its way to Bulacan because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest product found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Layugan ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the owner to explain. De Guzman failed to submit required explanation. The DENR Regional Executive Director Baggayan sustained Layugan’s action for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents brought the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against petitioner Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied their motion.

ISSUE:Whether the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine

HELD & RATIO:No. The Court has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action.

A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.

VALMONTE v. BELMONTE

FACTS:Valmonte wrote Belmonte, requesting to be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a loan on guaranty of Imelda Marcos and also to be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Belmonte referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS), Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion "that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts." Apparently not having yet received the reply of Tiro, Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." Valmonte filed an action invoking his right to information and prayed that Belmonte be directed to furnish them with their requested documents.

ISSUE:Whether Valmonte may access GSIS records pertaining to behest loans secured by Marcos in favor of certain members of the opposition in the Batasang Pambansa

HELD & RATIO:Governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Yet, like all constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. People’s right to information is limited to “matters of public concern” and is further “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”

The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. Considering the nature of its funds, it is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that its transactions were above board.

MANGUBAT v. OSMEÑA

FACTS:

PROS. TABAO v. JUDGE LILAGAN

FACTS:Due to previous irregular and illegal shipments of tanbark from Bongao, agents of the NBI in Region 8 (NBI-EVRO #8) decided to verify the shipment’s accompanying documents as the M/L Hadija was unloading its cargo to its consignee, a certain Hernandez. The NBI agents found the documents irregular and incomplete, and the tanbark, the boat M/L Hadija, and three cargo trucks were seized and impounded. NBI-EVRO #8 Regional Director Caabay filed a criminal complaint for violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705, Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines, against the captain and crew of the M/L Hadija The complainant directed the seizure by the DENR of the M/L Hadija, its cargo, and the three trucks pending preliminary investigation of the case. DENR thus took possession of the aforesaid items. Hernandez filed in the RTC of Leyte a case for replevin to recover the items seized by the DENR. Respondent Judge Lilagan issued the writ and directed respondent Sheriff Aguilar to take possession of the items seized by the DENR and to deliver them to Hernandez. Complainant thus avers that replevin is not available where the properties sought to be recovered are involved in criminal proceedings for illegal logging.

ISSUE:Whether a writ of replevin is available where the properties sought to be recovered are involved in criminal proceedings

HELD & RATIO:No. The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment of tanbark, as well as the vessel on which it was loaded, were seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. It also states that the NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR “for official disposition and appropriate action.” These allegations would have been sufficient to alert respondent judge that the DENR has custody of the seized items and that administrative proceedings may have already been commenced concerning the shipment. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. Moreover, the plaintiff in the replevin suit who seeks to recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. The prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright.

ARROW TRANSPORTATION v. BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION

FACTS: Both petitioner and private respondent Sultan Rent-a-Car are domestic corporations. The former has in his favor a certificate of public convenience to operate a public utility auto-truck service from Cebu city to Mactan International Airport and vice versa. Private respondent filed a petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of a certificate of private respondent filed a petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience to operate a similar service on the same line. Without the required publication, the Board issued on order granting it provisional permit to operate on the line applied for. A motion for reconsideration was filed and for the cancellation of such provisional permit but without awaiting final action, this petition was filed on the ground that the issuance of provisional permit was patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or the controversy is ripe for judicial determination

HELD & RATIO: Yes. It is undeniable that at the time the petition was filed, there was pending with respondent Board a motion for reconsideration. Ordinarily, its resolution should be awaited. The Court was impelled to go into the merits of the controversy at this stage, not only because of the importance of the issue raised but also because of the strong public interest in having the matter settled.

KBMPBM v. DOMINGUEZ

FACTS: The Municipal Government of Muntinlupa, through its Mayor Carlos, entered into a contract with petitioner for the latter’s management and operation of its New Muntinlupa Public Market. The contract provides for a 25 year term renewable for a like period unless sooner terminated and/or rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties. Subsequently, Mayor Bunye, Carlos’ successor, claiming to be particularly scandalized by the 50-year term of the agreement, contrary to Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, and the patently inequitable rental, directed the review of the contract. Consequently, the Municipal Council approved a Resolution abrogating the contract.

Petitioner filed with the RTC of Makati a complaint for breach of contract, specific performance with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Municipality and its officers. The writ applied for was denied, the KBMBPM officers resisted the attempts of Bunye and company to complete the take-over. Thereafter, Perez, Gerneral Manager of KBMBPM, filed with the Ombudsman a complaint charging Bunye and his co-petitioners of harassment, oppression, abuse of authority and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for taking over the management of the public market.

Respondents Madriaga and Coronado, accompanied by the Bunye and the latters’ heavily armed men forcibly broke open the doors of the offices of petitioners purportedly to serve upon petitioners the Order of respondent Secretary of Agriculture and to implement the same by taking over and disbanding the incumbent Board of Directors of KBMBPM. Petitioners claim that the Order served on them was not written on the stationary of the Department, does not bear its seal and is a mere photocopy. Thus, petitioners filed a petition praying that respondents refrain, cease and desist from enforcing the questioned Order and that the order be declared null and void.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners needed to exhaust administrative remedies available

HELD & RATIO:No. The rule is well-settled that this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no need to appeal the decision to the Office of the President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. HERVILLA

FACTS:An action for Recovery of Possession and Damages was filed Hernane Hervilla against Dole involving Lots Nos. 3284, and 3283, GSS-269-D, each containing four hectares, more or less, situated at Polomolok, South Cotabato, now in the possession of defendant corporation as Administrator of the properties of National Development Corporation (NDC). Claimant Gabales sold to Hernane Hervilla all his rights and interest over a four-hectare land located in Polomolok, South Cotabato. Its adjoining occupant-claimant, Jabagat also sold his interest and rights to Hervilla over another four hectares of land, situated at Balisong, Bo. Kablon, Tupi [later plotted in Polomolok] South Cotabato. Undoubtedly, while adjoining each other, one of these is situated on Polomolok, South Cotabato, while the other is in Tupi, South Cotabato (the two lots were later plotted to be in Polomolok).

Wilfredo Hervilla, claiming to be the successor-in-interest of his brother, Hernane Hervilla, filed free patent application over the lots. As claimant and occupant of Lots 3283 and 3284, GSS-269-D since 1945, de Pedro filed with the Bureau of Lands, Manila, his free patent application, having planted it to abaca, coffee, banana, corn and other seasonal crops, erecting therein a farm house. Then, de Pedro ceded all his rights to the NDC. Hervilla filed an ejectment suit against Dole. The lower court rendered a decision in favour of NDC and Dole, which was reversed by the Immediate Appellate Court.

ISSUE:Whether the Bureau of Lands is precluded, on the ground that the matter is subjudice, from issuing a free patent during the pendency of a case in court for recovery of possession

HELD & RATIO:No. The administration and disposition of public lands are committed by law to the Director of Lands primarily, and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Hervilla failed to exhaust administrative remedies, a flaw which, to our mind, is fatal to a court review. The decision of the Director of Lands has now become final. The Courts may no longer interfere with such decision

ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING v. FACTORAN

FACTS:Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation registered the location of its "Master VII Fr." mining claim. Private respondent Buqueron registered the declarations of location of his "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." mining claims. Atlas then registered the declarations of location of its "Carmen I Fr." to "Carmen V. Fr." Buqueron's "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." were surveyed and the survey plans thereof were duly approved by the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences. Petitioner filed an adverse claim against private respondent's mining claims on the ground that they allegedly overlapped its own mining claims.

The Director of Mines rendered a decision giving Buqueron the preferential right over the disputed mining claims. Atlas appealed to the Minister of Natural Resources who reversed the previous decision. On further appeal, the Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the President, reversed the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources and reinstated the decision of the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences.

ISSUE:Whether there was a valid location and discovery of the disputed mining claims

HELD & RATIO:The findings, although reversed by the Minister of Natural Resources, were affirmed by the Office of the President. Judicial review of the decision of an administrative official is of course subject to certain guide posts laid down in many decided cases. Thus, for instance, findings of fact in such decision should not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, but review is justified when there has been a denial of due process, or mistake of law or fraud, collusion or arbitrary action in the administrative proceeding, where the procedure which led to factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. None of such circumstances is present in the case at bar, which would justify the overturning of the findings of fact of the Director of Mines which were affirmed by the Office of the President. On the contrary, in accordance with the prevailing principle that "in reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing Court cannot re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence as if originally instituted therein, and receive additional evidence, that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned," the findings of fact in this case must be respected. As ruled by the Court, they will not be disturbed so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant.

CARPIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:In 1990, RA 6975 entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” was passed. Carpio, as a member of the bar and a defender of the Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said law for he figured that it only interferes with the control power of the president. He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission by limiting its power “to administrative control” over the PNP thus, “control” remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the NPC and the PNP were placed.

ISSUE: Whether the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA 6975

HELD & RATIO: The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, thus he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members. In short, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.”

Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government.

HEIRS OF EUGENIO v. ROXAS

FACTS:

INDUSTRIAL POWER SALES v. SINSUAT

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY v. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS

FACTS:The customs authorities found that the vessel carried on board an unmanifested cargo consisting of one television set, and respondent Collector of Customs sent a written notice to the operator of the vessel and the latter answered stating that the television set was not cargo and so was not required by law to be manifested. The operator requested an investigation and hearing but respondent finding the operator’s explanation not satisfactory imposed on the vessel a fine of P5,000.00, ordering said fine to be paid within 48 hours from receipt, with a threat that the vessel would be denied clearance and a warrant of seizure would be issued if the fine will not be paid.

NDC, as owner, and operator AV Rocha filed for special civil action for certiorari before the CFI of Manila against the respondent. Respondent contended that petitioners have not exhausted all available administrative remedies, one of which is to appeal to the Commissioner of Customs.

ISSUE:Whether the contention of respondent is correct

HELD & RATIO:The Court held in the negative. Respondent Collector committed grave abuse of discretion because petitioner NDC was not given an opportunity to prove that the television set involved is not a cargo that needs to be manifested. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the appeal to the administrative superior is not a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, as where it is undisputed that the respondent officer has acted in utter disregard of the principle of due process.