JOSE LINO LUNA vs. EULOGIO RODRIGUEZG.R. No. 13744. November 29, 1918DOCTRINE:

The rules and regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory before the election, but when it is sought to enforce them after the election, they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part. The various and numerous provisions of the Election Law were adopted to assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the government and not to defeat that object.

Facts:An election for the office of governor of the Province of Rizal was held on the 6th day of June, 1916. At said election Jose Lino Luna, Eulogio Rodriguez and Servando de los Angeles were candidates for said office. The election was closed, the votes cast were counted, and a return was made by the inspectors of said municipalities to the provincial board of Canvassers, who, after a canvass, proclaimed Eulogio Rodriguez, having received a plurality of said votes, as duly elected governor of said province. Jose Lino Luna presented a protest in the CFI and a new trial was ordered. Additional evidence was adduced. Judge McMahon found that the inspectors in Binangonan did not close the polls at 6 oclock p.m., and that a large number of persons voted after that time. The judge then directed that the total vote of Rodriguez be reduced, without ascertaining how many had been cast for Rodriguez and how many for Luna.

Issue:Whether or not the ballots cast after the hour fixed for closing were valid.

Held: The ballots were valid. The law provides that at all elections, the polls shall be open from seven oclock in the morning until six oclock in the afternoon. The polls should be open and closed in strict accord with said provisions. Voters who do not appear and offer to vote within the hours designated by the law should not be permitted to vote if the time for closing the polls has arrived. Upon the other hand, if the voter is prevented, during the voting hours, from voting, and is not permitted to vote by reason of the failure of the inspectors to do their duty, then, certainly, in the absence of some fraud, neither such votes nor the entire vote of the precinct should be annulled simply because some votes were cast after the regular hours. The ballot of the innocent voter should not be annulled and he should not be deprived of his participation in the affairs of his government when he was guilty of no illegal act or fraud. The election inspectors should be held to comply strictly with the law. If they violate the law, they should be punished and not the innocent voter.AKBAYAN-Youth vs Commission on Election

GR Nos. 147066 & 147179; 26 March 2001)

DOCTRINE: The right of suffrage is not at all absolute. The exercise of the right is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books, and other repositories of law. As to the substantive aspect, Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution provides for it. As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly, and peaceful election

FACTS: Petitioners - representing the youth sector - seek to direct theCommission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the May 14,2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to21. According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on orbefore the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189.On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584 denying thepetition. Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II(YOUTH) et al. filed before this Court the instant Petition forCertiorari and Mandamus.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC to conducta special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELECs imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14,2001 general elections.

2. Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the extension of the voters registration.1. HELD:

2. The petitions are bereft of merit. As to the procedural limitation, the act of registration is anindispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is part and parcelof the right to vote and an indispensable element in theelection process. Thus, contrary to petitioners argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right tovote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, maythen enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for theultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which isnot indifferent and so far removed from thepressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. Considering the circumstances where the writ of mandamus lies and the peculiarities of the present case, we areof the firm belief that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they are entitled tothe issuance of this extraordinary writ so as toeffectively compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of voters. For the determination of whether or not the conduct of a special registration of voters isfeasible, possible or practical within the remaining period before the actual date of election, involves the exercise of discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by mandamus.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitions forcertiorari and mandamus are hereby DENIED.

3. No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the regular election. The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration which is not a mere statutory requirement. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189s provision is explicit as to the prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset.

Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other pre-election matters because the additional voters from the special two day registration will have to be screened, entered into the book of voters, have to be inspected again, verified, sealed, then entered into the computerized voters list; and then they will have to reprint the voters information sheet for the update and distribute it by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections would have been overshot because of the lengthy processes after the special registration. In short, it will cost more inconvenience than good. Further still, the allegation that youth voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYAN-Youths pleading was attached any actual complaint from an individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact that the voters registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their pleading that they are asking an extension because they failed to register on time for some reasons, which is not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.

Yra vs AbanoDOCTRINE:

A candidate who was elected to the office of municipal president and who at the time of the election was registered as a voter of Manila and not of the municipality in which he was a candidate, is nevertheless eligible to the office, and proceedings in the nature ofquo warranto instituted by virtue of the provisions of section 408 of the Election Law, as amended, by the vice-president elect of the municipality, who challenged the right of the municipal president elect, to the position to which elected on the ground that the municipal president was ineligible, cannot be successfully maintained.

The Election Law makes use of the terms "qualified voter in this municipality" and "qualified elector therein." To be a qualified voter does not necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter. It is sufficient to the candidate to posses all the qualifications prescribed in section 431 and none of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a candidate failed to register as an elector in the municipality does not deprive him of the right to become a candidate and to be voted for.

One may be a qualified voter without exercising the right to vote. Registering does not confer the right; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of the right. registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right.

Facts:Respondent Maximo Abano is a native of Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the proper age, he transferred to Manila to study. While temporarily residing in Manila, Abano registered as a voter there. Shortly after qualifying as amember of the bar andafter the death of his father, Abano returned to Meycauayan to live there. From May 10, 1927, up to present, Abano has considered himself a resident of Meycauayan. When the 1928 elections were approaching, he made anapplication for cancellation of registration in Manila dated April 3, 1928,but this application was rejected by the city officials for the reason that it was not deposited in the mails on or before April 4, 1928. Nevertheless Abano presented himself as a candidate for municipal president of Meycauayan in the 1928 elections and was elected by popular vote tothat office. Petitioner Marcos Yra assails the eligibility of Abano on the ground that he had not been a resident of Meycauayan for at least one year previous to the election.Issue:Is the non-eligibility of the respondent to hold amunicipal office for the reason that he was not a qualified voter in his municipality, connoting that he was not a qualified elector therein, sufficient to nullify his election?Held:No.Ratio Decidendi:One of the qualifications required by law of a person who announces his candidacy is that he must be a duly qualified elector. The Executive Bureau has held that the term "qualified" when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter. To become a qualified candidate a person does not need to register as an elector. It is sufficient that he possesses all the qualifications prescribed in section 431 and none of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a candidate failed to register as an elector in the municipality does notdeprive him of the right to become a candidate tobe voted for. Furthermore, the law of Kentucky provides that "No person shall be eligible to anyoffice who is not at time of his electiona qualified voter of the city and who has not resided therein three years preceding his election." It was said that "The act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter. . . . One may be a qualified voterwithout exercising the right to vote. Registering does not confer the right; it is but acondition precedent to the exercise of the right."The distinction is between a qualified elector and the respondent is such, and a registered qualified elector and the respondent is such although not in his homemunicipality. Registration regulates the exercise of the right ofsuffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. It should not be forgotten that the people of Meycauayan have spoken and their choice to be their local chief executive is the respondent. The will of the electorate should be respectedAsistio vs. AguirreG.R. No. 191124 April 27, 2010

DOCTRINE: Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) abona fideintention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose.There must beanimus manendicoupled withanimus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actualFacts: Private respondent Echiverri filed a Petition for Exclusion of Voter from the permanentlistofvotersofCaloocanCitybeforetheMeTCpresidedbyJudgeMalabaguio. He alleged that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City and was no longer residing in the address stated in his CoC for Mayor in the 2010 Elections. Malabaguio rendered a decision directing the Election Registration Board to remove the name of Asistion from the list of permanent voters of Caloocan City.Echiverri then filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification on the grounds that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City and that he had been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Asistio filed his Notice of Appeal and paid the required appeal fees through postal money orders on Feb.10,2010. Echiverri filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal on the ground of failure to file the required appeal fees. Judge Aguirre granted the motion for failing to pay the docket fees essential for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the appeal. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Asistio should be excluded from the permanent list of voters ofCaloocan City for failure tocomply with the residency required by law.

Held:The SupremeCourtruledthat from the provisions of Section117 of BP 881and Section 9 of RA 8189, the residency requirement of voter is at least 1 year residence in the Philippines and at least 6 months in the place where the person proposes or intends to vote. Residence as used in the law prescribing the qualifications forsuffrageisdoctrinallysettledtomeandomicile.Domiciledenotesafixedpermanent residence where, when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. To successfully effect a transfer of domicile one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the place of residence; (3) acts which correspond with that purpose. Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since birth and his family is also known to be among theprominentpoliticalfamiliesinCaloocan.Heevenservedasa2nd district representative in Caloocan and sought also election as City Mayor in 2007. Taking these circumstances into consideration, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified and continues to qualify as a voter of Caloocan City.Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300

DOCTRINE:If a person retains his domicile of origin for purposes ofthe residence requirement, the 1 year period is irrelevant because wherever he is, he is a resident of his domicile of origin. Second, if a person reestablishes a previously abandoned domicile, the 1 year requirement must be satisfied.Facts:March 8, 1995 Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor.

March 23, 1995 Montejo, incumbent of and candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC, alleging that Marcos did not meet the residency requirement.

March 29, 1995 Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy in the COMELECs head office in Intramuros claiming that her error in the first certificate was the result of an honest misrepresentation and that she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.

April 24, 1995 COMELEC Second Division by a vote of 2-1 came up with a Resolution that found Montejos petition for disqualification meritorious, Marcos corrected certificate of candidacy void, and her original certificate cancelled.

May 7, 1995 COMELEC en banc denied Marcos Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution drafted on April 24.

May 11, 1995 COMELEC issued another Resolution allowing Marcos proclamation to the office should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes. However, this was reversed and instead directed that the proclamation would be suspended even if she did win.

May 25, 1995 In a supplemental petitition, Marcos declared that she was the winner of the said Congressional election.

Issues/ Held/Ratio:(1)WON plaintiff had established legal residency required to be a voter, and thus candidate, of the first district of Leyte.Yes. It is the fact if residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which out to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement (as intended by the framers of the constitution)2. The confusion of the honest mistake made when filed her Certificate of Candidacy can be attributed to the fact that the entry for residence is immediately followed by the entry for the number of years and months in the residence where the candidate seeks to hold office immediately after the elections. This honest mistake should not be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District. The instances (i.e. when Marcos lived in Manila and Ilocos after marrying her husband) used by the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos were only actual residences incurred during their marriage; and as such, she was required to change residences and apply for voters registration in these cited locations. When she got married to the late dictator, it cannot be argued that she lost her domicile of origin by operation of law stated in Article 110 of the CC3 and further contemplated in Article 1094 of the same code. It is the husbands right to transfer residences to wherever he might see fit to raise a family. Thus, the relocation does not mean or intend to lose the wifes domicile of origin. After the death of her husband, her choice of domicle was Tacloban, Leyte as expressed when she wrote the PCGG chairman seeking permission to rehabilitate their ancestral house in Tacloban and their farm in Olot, Leyte.

(2)WON COMELEC the proper jurisdiction in disqualifying the plaintiff under Article 78 of the Omnibus Election Code had already lapsed, thereby transmitting jurisdiction to the House of Representatives.Yes. The mischief in petitioners contention lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period. In any event, Sections 6 As discussed during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution by Mr. Nolledo and Mr. Davide, and Mrs. Rosario and Mr. De Los Reyes in the RECORD OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVETION July 22, 1986.The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Sec. 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Sec. 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

(3)WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) had jurisdiction over the question of the petitioners qualifications after the elections.

No. The HRETs jurisdiction of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.

Puno, J. (Concurring):All her life, Marcos domicile of origin was Tacloban. When she married the former dictator, her domicile became subject to change by law and the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the CC. She has been in Tacloban since 1992 and has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both places are within the First Congressional District of Leyte.

Francisco, J. (Concurring):Residence for election purposes means domicile. Marcos has been in Tacloban since 1992 and has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both places are within the First Congressional District of Leyte.

Romero, J. (Separate):Womens rights as per choosing her domicile after husbands death is evident in this case. Marcos living in Leyte is sufficient to meet the legal residency requirement.

Vitug, J. (Separate):It seems unsound to vote for someone who has already been declared disqualified. The Court refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunal on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. Voted for dismissal.

Mendoza, J. (Concurring):The issue is whether or not the COMELEC has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. It has none and the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in an appropriate forum (not necessarily COMELEC, but the HRET).

Padilla, J. (Dissenting):Provisions in the Constitution should be adhered to. The controversy should not be blurred by academic disquisitions. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding the petitioner disqualified. And the law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted.

Regalado, J. (Dissenting):A woman loses her domicile of origin once she gets married. The death of her husband does not automatically allow her domicile to shift to its original. Such theory is not stated in any of the provisions of law.

Davide, Jr. J. (Dissenting):A writ of certiorari may only be granted if a government branch or agency has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The COMELECs resolutions are within the scope and jurisdiction of this particular agencys powers. In agreement with Regalado, re: womans domicile.Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 608 SCRA 733Doctrine: The Constitution does not require congressional candidate to be a property owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at least a year prior to election day-to use property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office, which property requirement would be unconstitutionalFACTS and HELD:

July 6, 2007 Petitioner Jesus L. Vicente filed a petition for quo warranto against Danilo Ramon S. Fernandez (HRET Case No. 07-034) on the ground that respondent lacked the residency requirement of one year in the First District of Laguna as provided in Sec. 6, Article VI, of the Constitution.

In all of Fernandezs previous certificates of candidacy (1998, 2001 and 2004 elections), he declared under oath that his permanent residence is Pagsanjan. However, it was only in the 2007 elections that Fernandez claimed to have changed his residence to Sta. Rosa City . The petitioner in the quo warranto case, Vicente, knew for a fact that Fernandez never resided in Sta. Rosa, being a resident of that place himself.

Dec. 16, 2008 - The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) declared Fernandez ineligible for the office of representative of the first district of Laguna for lack of residence in the district and ordered him to vacate his office.

April 30, 2009 The HRET, in Resolution No. 09-080, denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Fernandez on Dec. 22, 2008 due to the absence of new issues or arguments that have not been resolved in the 2008 decision. On the same day, the HRET decision became final and executory which was entered in the book of entries of judgment.

May 11, 2009 The HRET final decision unseating Fernandez was entered in the bodys book of entries of judgment. The Secretary of the Tribunal furnished the House of Representatives a copy of the decision and was received by the Office of the Secretary General on the same day.

May 21, 2009 The HRET, in denying petitioners urgent motion for issuance of a writ of execution, said such writ from the tribunal is not a required document for enforcement of the Dec. 16, 2008 decision, and a notice of judgment to the House of Representatives suffices for the House Speaker to order the Secretary General to execute the decision. In a meeting held on May 21, the tribunal said it has already sent notice on May 11, 2009 to the Office of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, who shall execute the judgment.

In the same Resolution No. 09-101, the HRET cited Rule 96 of the HRET Rules of Procedure, it is not the tribunal but the Speaker of the House of Representatives, through the Secretary General, who shall execute the final and executory decision unless a temporary restraining order is issued by the Supreme Court.

June 9, 2009 - Atty. Sixto Brilliantes, on behalf of petitioner Vicente, requested the House Speaker and Secretary General in a letter to instantly implement and enforce the final and executory decision of the HRET by disallowing Fernandez from further representing himself as member of the House of Representatives of the first legislative district of Laguna, be removing and delisting his name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. In the same letter, Brilliantes informed the House that Fernandez filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO before the Supreme Court. Fernandez did not furnish the House a copy of the petition.

Since no temporary restraining order, status quo or injunctive order has been issued by the Supreme Court, the decision of the HRET remains final and executory. HRET decisions are not appealable to the Supreme Court, the tribunal being the sole judge of all contests relating the election, returns, and qualifications of House members. Mere filing of a petition for certiorari and prohibition does not stay a final and executory decision of the HRET.

The only recourse given by the judicial system is to question the HRET decision via a special civil action of certiorari to the Supreme Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A petition for certiorari is not an appeal and its mere filing does not prevent the HRET decision from becoming final and executory, unless the SC issues a TRO.

June 30, 2009 - Brilliantes in his letter to the House leadership, emphasized that for each day that Fernandez is allowed to misrepresent the people of the first district of Laguna, injustice is being perpetrated, especially because a person who has been declared ineligible by a tribunal continues to benefit from the position, monetary or otherwise. Brilliantes simply asks Nograles to recognize the authority of the HRET bestowed by law and to perform his legal duty and obligation by executing the judgment and having Fernandez removed from the rolls.

Atty. Brilliantes has sent a total of four letters to the House Speaker and Secretary General, reminding them of their duty and obligation to enforce the final and executory decision of the HRET. The letters remain unheeded to date.

Maruhom vs COMELEC

DOCTRINE:

At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply the laws relating to elections; literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked provision or the ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters obvious choice.In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms.

Maruhom challenges in her Petition the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in declaring her registration in Marantao void. She asserts that Section 2, Article IX(c) of the Constitution prohibits the COMELEC from assuming jurisdiction or deciding issues involving the right to vote. Section 33 of Republic Act No. 8189, or the Voters Registration Act of 1996 (VRA), confers upon the MTCs and MeTCs original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of inclusion and exclusion of voters in their respective cities or municipalities.

ISSUE: Is the challenge on Maruhoms registration, an issue on the right to vote and thus, beyond COMELEC jurisdiction?

HELD: The present case is not about her being denied her right to register as a voter, but is all about her making false material representations in her COC, which would warrant the cancellation of the same. The resolutions of the COMELEC en banc merely defeated Maruhoms intent to run for elective office, but it did not deprive her of her right to vote. Although Maruhoms registration in Marantao is void, her registration in Marawi still subsists. She may be barred from voting or running for mayor in the former, but she may still exercise her right to vote, or even run for an elective post, in the latter.It is settled that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a petition filed under Section 78 of the OEC.[21] In the exercise of such jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the COC.ANTONIO B. GUNSI, SR.,Petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COMMISSIONERS, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DATU ISRAEL SINSUAT,Respondents.

DOCTRINE: A person who has not duly accomplished an application for registration is not a registered voter. xxx The application for registration shall contain three specimen signatures of the applicant.D E C I S I O N

NACHURA,J.:At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 651of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Antonio B. Gunsi Sr. (Gunsi) challenging the June 9, 2005 Resolution2of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc which affirmed the October 11, 2004 Order3of the COMELEC Second Division.

The undisputed facts:

On January 9, 2004, private respondent Datu Israel Sinsuat (Sinsuat) filed a petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of the certificate of candidacy (COC) of Gunsi in connection with the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections. Essentially, Sinsuat sought the disqualification of Gunsi for Mayor of South Upi, Maguindanao, alleging, that: (a) Gunsi was not a registered voter in the Municipality of South Upi, Maguindanao since he failed to sign his application for registration; (b) Gunsis name was inserted illegally in the List of Applicants and Voters by Alice Lim, Acting Election Officer of South Upi, Maguindanao; and (c) the unsigned application for registration has no legal effect.

In refutation, Gunsi asseverated that his failure to sign his application for registration did not affect the validity of his registration since he possesses the qualifications of a voter set forth in Section 116 of the Omnibus Election Code as amended by Section 9 of Republic Act 8189.

On March 12, 2004, after hearing, the Investigating Officer and Provincial Election Supervisor III, Lintang H. Bedol, issued a resolution recommending Gunsis disqualification to run for Municipal Mayor of South Upi, Maguindanao on the ground that he is not a registered voter of the municipality. Bedol pointed out that the signature in the application for registration is indispensable for its validity as it is an authentication and affirmation of the data appearing therein.

On August 2, 2004, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution,4to wit:

Although this case has become moot and academic since [Sinsuat] had been proclaimed as the winning candidate for the position of Mayor of South Upi, Maguindanao, in connection with the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, [w]e, however, cannot allow the irregularities accompanying [Gunsis] registration as raised by [Sinsuat] in his petition.

The absence of [Gunsis] signature in his application for registration casts serious doubt in its preparation and execution. It also renders the authenticity of the document questionable. In Dalumpines v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court ruled that "the absence of the signature of the contracting parties on the deed itself casts serious doubt in the preparation and execution of the deed."

In addition, the inclusion of [Gunsis] name in the Election Registration Boards Certified List of Applicants for Registration appears to have been added irregularly as the last name in a list of applicants arranged alphabetically.

WHEREFORE, considering that [Gunsi] lost in the election for the position of Mayor of South Upi, Maguindanao and the fact that [Sinsuat] was duly proclaimed as Mayor of South Upi, Maguindanao on May 16, 2004, there being only one respondent, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for being moot and academic.

The Law Department, however, is directed to investigate the alleged irregularities herein mentioned for possible violation of election laws and to file the necessary information as the evidence warrants.

SO ORDERED.5Subsequently, the same division of the COMELEC issued the herein assailed Order6clarifying the August 2, 2004 Resolution, thus:

In the light, however, of the pending pre-proclamation case docketed as SPC 04-247, filed by herein respondent, and the resolution issued by the [COMELEC] (First Division) annulling the proclamation of [Sinsuat], the possibility that a re-canvassing of the election returns of the Municipality of South Upi, Maguindanao is becoming more certain. Therefore, the ruling of the [COMELEC] (Second Division) dismissing the present petition for disqualification against herein respondent for being moot and academic becomes ineffective for the fact that, as argued by [Sinsuat] in his manifestation and clarification, his proclamation has been annulled by the [COMELEC] (First Division).

It is therefore, incumbent upon the [COMELEC] (Second Division) to issue a categorical ruling based on its finding as already articulated in the August 2, 2004 resolution.

x x x x

In accordance with the above finding of the [COMELEC] (Second Division) it is [o]ur resolve that [petitioner] Antonio B. Gunsi, Sr. is disqualified to run as Mayor of South Upi, Maguindanao for being a non-registered resident of the same municipality.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [COMELEC] (Second Division), hereby, clarifies its August 2, 2004 resolution by declaring that, in accordance with the findings of the [COMELEC] (Second Division) in the promulgated resolution, [petitioner] Antonio B. Gunsi, Sr. is hereby DISQUALIFIED to run as Mayor of South Upi, Maguindanao for being a non-registered resident of the same.

SO ORDERED.7Upon motion for reconsideration of Gunsi, the COMELEC En Banc issued the herein assailed Resolution:8A perusal of the motion for reconsideration would show that the respondent failed to raise any new material issue. All matters raised in the Motion had already been traversed and resolved in the Recommendation of Provincial Election Supervisor Lintang Bedol dated March 12, 2004 and the Resolution of this Commission (Second Division) promulgated last August 2, 2004 as clarified by its Order dated October 11, 2004.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION is hereby DENIED. The ORDER dated October 11, 2004 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.9Hence, this petition imputing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC. Gunsi posits the following issues for our resolution:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COMMISSION HAS JURISDICTION OVER CASES INVOLVING THE RIGHT TO VOTE.

GRANTING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE HONORABLE COMMISSION HAS JURISDICTION, WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE SECOND DIVISION CAN CLARIFY ITS RESOLUTION AFTER SIXTY-NINE (69) DAYS FROM ITS PROMULGATION OR AFTER IT HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

GRANTING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE HONORABLE COMMISSION HAS JURISDICTION, WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COMMISSION COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS WHICH IS TANTAMOUNT TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

GRANTING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE HONORABLE COMMISSION HAS JURISDICTION, WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COMMISSION IS CORRECT WHEN IT DISQUALIFIED [GUNSI] TO RUN AS MAYOR OF SOUTH UPI, MAGUINDANAO FOR BEING A NON REGISTERED RESIDENT OF THE SAME DUE TO HIS INADVERTENT FAILURE TO AFFIX HIS SIGNATURE OVER HIS HANDWRITTEN NAME IN THE SPACE PROVIDED THEREFOR IN HIS APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION PERSONALLY FILLED UP, SWORN TO AN ADMINISTERING OFFICER AND DULY FILED WITH THE COMELEC.10At the outset, we note that the term of office of Mayor of South Upi, Maguindanao, for which position Gunsi was disqualified by the COMELEC to run as a candidate had long expired on June 30, 2007 following the last elections held on May 14 of the same year. The expiration of term, therefore, is a supervening event which renders this case moot and academic.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.11The rule, however, admits of exceptions. Thus, courts may choose to decide cases otherwise moot and academic if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; or fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evasive of review.12None of the foregoing exceptions calling for this Court to exercise jurisdiction obtains in this instance.

In any event, upon a perusal of the merits or lack thereof, the petition is clearly dismissible.

Gunsi insists that he possessed the qualifications to run for Mayor of South Upi, Maguindanao; specifically, he claims that he was a registered voter at the time he filed his COC. Gunsi is adamant that his mere failure to affix his signature to the application for registration, which he accomplished personally before Joel Ellano, COMELEC Administering Officer, did not necessarily invalidate his application for registration. Consequently, Gunsi maintains that he is a registered voter, especially considering that his name appears in the Registry List of Voters. In all, Gunsi avers that his COC should not have been cancelled; ultimately, he should not have been disqualified from running as Mayor of South Upi, Maguindanao.

We are not convinced. Gunsis arguments are annihilated by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189,13The Voters Registration Act of 1996, which explicitly provides in pertinent part:

SECTION 10. Registration of Voters. A qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides to be able to vote in any election. To register as a voter, he shall personally accomplish an application form for registration as prescribed by the Commission in three (3) copies before the Election Officer on any date during office hours after having acquired the qualifications of a voter.

x x x x

x x x The application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures of the applicant, clear and legible rolled prints of his left and right thumbprints, with four identification size copies of his latest photograph, attached thereto, to be taken at the expense of the Commission.14In stark contrast are the prevailing circumstances of Gunsis application for registration:

1. Only a photocopy15of Gunsis application for registration was submitted in evidence before Investigating Officer Bedol as the original thereof was purportedly lost. The photocopy of the document clearly shows that Gunsi failed to sign parts 2 and 3 thereof. The administering officer, Joel Ellano, likewise did not sign part 3 of said document. These parts refer to the oath which Gunsi should have taken to validate and swear to the veracity of the contents appearing in the application for registration.1avvphi12. Joel Ellano was not presented by Gunsi to corroborate his claim that his failure to sign the application was merely due to inadvertence. Surprisingly, Gunsi chose to present, as witness, Alice Lim, Acting Election Officer of South Upi, Maguindanao, who admitted that she received an unsigned letter furnishing her a copy of Gunsis unsigned application for registration and that she did not bother requiring Gunsi to accomplish in full the application for registration in order to complete the List of Voters.16Lim likewise admits to inserting Gunsis name in the List of Voters based on the photocopy of an unsigned application for registration which she had previously seen. Hence, the listing of the Applicants for Registration and the Lists of Voters which are alphabetically arranged with Gunsis name inserted thereat.173. The testimonies of Noraida Enero, Rowena Unson and Abdullah Mato, Municipal Treasurer of Upi, members of the Election Registration Board of South Upi, Maguindanao, who all categorically stated that they did not encounter Gunsis application for registration.18Plainly, from the foregoing, the irregularities surrounding Gunsis application for registration eloquently proclaim that he did not comply with the minimum requirements of RA No. 8189. This leads to only one conclusion: that Gunsi, not having demonstrated that he duly accomplished an application for registration, is not a registered voter. In short, the cancellation of Gunsis COC by the COMELEC and his consequent disqualification from running as Mayor of South Upi, Maguindanao, was correct.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The COMELEC Order and Resolution dated October 11, 2004 and June 9, 2005 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Domino vs COMELEC[G.R. No. 134015.July 19, 1999]Facts:Juan Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani in the May 1998 elections. However, private respondents filed with the COMELEC a petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. They alleged that the petitioner is neither a resident nor a registered voter of the Province of Sarangani where he seeks election.

The COMELEC Second Division disqualified the petitioner as candidate and ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. The votes cast for Domino were counted and he got the highest number of votes. So, he filed a motion for reconsideration but denied by the COMELEC en banc.

Issues:1. Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner.

2. Whether or not petitioner is a resident of Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately preceding the May 1998 election

Ruling:1. Yes, the COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Section 78 Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. It is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to determine whether false representations as to the material facts were made in the certificate of candidacy including the residence requirement.

2. No, the term residence as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as domicile which gives the intention to reside in a fixed place and personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilucos Sur but acquired his domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City.

Domino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999

Domino is running for representative of Province of Sarangani but is disqualified for lack of compliance with the 1-yr. residence requirement. Before this, Domino was declared by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in an exclusion proceedings that he was a resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City. Domino contends that the MTC decision is conclusive upon the COMELEC. But the Supreme Court held otherwise because any fact established in an inclusion or exclusion proceedings only applies to that election and not to elections thereafter held. The decision of the MTC does not preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of the candidates qualification, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency requirement.

The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in character. xxx Although the court in inclusion or exclusion proceedings may pass upon any question necessary to decide the issue raised including the question of citizenship and residence of the challenged voter, the authority to order the inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters necessarily carries with it the power to inquire into and settle all matters essential to the exercise of said authority. However, except for the right to remain in the list of voters or for being excluded therefrom for the particular election in relation to which the proceedings had been held, a decision in an exclusion or inclusion proceeding, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata. In this sense, it does not operate as a bar to any further action that a party may take concerning the subject passed upon in the proceeding. Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be conclusive on the voters political status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter in any other election.

The petitioner contended that he already established his new domicile in Sarangani by leasing a house and lot located therein. However, the Court is unsatisfied with it. The lease contract may be indicative of Dominos intention to reside in Sarangani, however, it does not produce the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of his original domicile.