digests for family law

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G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964 BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant CASE FACTS: Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left a note for Wassmer stating the marriage to be postponed as his mother opposes it and that he is leaving. On September 3, 1954, he sent a telegram stating that nothing has changed, that he is returning and that he apologizes. Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. Wassmer sued him for damages. Velez filed no answer and was declared in default and was rendered to pay for damages. The defendant now asserts that the judgment against him is contrary to law for the reason that there is no provision in the New Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. ISSUE: Whether or not a “mere breach of a promise to marry” is an actionable wrong. DECISION: A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. However, the invitations have been sent, the apparel for the important occasion have been purchased, the matrimonial bed (with accessories) have been bought, and bridal showers were given and gifts were received. To formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the New Civil Code. APPLICABLE LAW AND RATIONALE: Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides that “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to

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Cases for Family Law

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G.R. No. L-20089December 26, 1964BEATRIZ P. WASSER, plaintif-appellee, vs. !RAN"IS"# $. %ELEZ, defendant-appellant"ASE !A"TS& Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set eptem!er ", #$%" as the !ig da&. 'n eptem!er (, #$%" Velez left a note for Wassmer stating the marriage to !e postponed as his mother opposes it and that he is leaving. 'n eptem!er ), #$%", he sent a telegram stating that nothing has changed, that he is returning and that he apologizes. *hereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. Wassmer sued him for damages. Velez +led no answer and was declared in default and was rendered to pa& for damages. *he defendant now asserts that the ,udgment against him is contrar& to law for the reason that there is no provision in the -ew .ivil .ode authorizing an action for !reach of promise to marr&.ISS'E& Whether or not a /mere !reach of a promise to marr&0 is an actiona!le wrong.DE"ISI#N& 1 mere !reach of promise to marr& is not an actiona!le wrong. 2owever, the invitations have !een sent, the apparel for the important occasion have !een purchased, the matrimonial !ed 3with accessories4 have !een !ought, and !ridal showers were given and gifts were received. *o formall& set a wedding and go through all the preparation and pu!licit&, onl& to wal5 out of it when the matrimon& is a!out to !e solemnized, is 6uite diferent. *his is palpa!l& and un,usti+a!l& contrar& to good customs for which defendant must !e held answera!le in damages in accordance with 1rticle (# of the -ew .ivil .ode.APPLI"ABLE LAW AND RATI#NALE& 1rticle (# of the -ew .ivil .ode provides that /an& person who willfull& causes loss or in,ur& to another in a manner that is contrar& to morals, good customs or pu!lic polic& shall compensate the latter for the damage.0G.R. No. 198(80#c)ober 16, 201*REP'BLI" #! T+E P+ILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. LIBERT, D. ALBI#S, 7espondent."ASE !A"TS& 'n 'cto!er ((, (88", Fringer, an 1merican citizen, and 1!ios were married !efore the 9etropolitan *rial .ourt in 9andalu&ong cit&, evidenced with a .erti+cate of 9arriage. 'n :ecem!er ;, (88;, 1l!ios +led with the 7*. a petition fordeclaration of nullit& of her marriage with Fringer. he alleged that immediatel& after their marriage, the& separated and never lived as hus!and and wife !ecause the& never reall& had an& intention of entering into a married state or compl&ing with an& of their essential marital o!ligations. he descri!ed their marriage as one made in ,est and, therefore, null and void a! initio. *he testimon& of 1l!ios stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to ena!le her to ac6uire 1merican .itizenship< that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pa& him the sum of =(,888.88.ISS'E& Whether or not a marriage declared as sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also legall& void and ine>istent.DE"ISI#N& *he court declared the marriage !etween Fringer and 1l!ios valid and su!sisting. 1l!ios claims that their marriage was a marriage in ,est. 1 marriage in ,est is a pretended marriage, legal in form !ut entered into as a ,o5e, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understandingthat the parties would not !e !ound. 9arriages in ,est are void a! initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, !ut for a complete a!sence of consent. 2owever, the court did not consider the respondent?s marriage analogous to a marriage in ,est. 1l!ios and Fringer had an undenia!le intention to !e !ound in order to create the ver& !ond necessar& to allow the respondent to ac6uire 1merican citizenship. 'nl& a genuine consent would allow them to further their o!,ective, considering that onl& a valid marriage can properl& support an applicationfor citizenship. *here was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, al!eit for a limited purpose. @enuine consent was, therefore, clearl& present. Furthermore, there is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the .onstitution or law declares, such as the ac6uisition of foreign citizenship. *he right to marital privac& allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost an& wa& the& see +t, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. *hus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, mone&, status, and title, provided that the& compl& with all the legal re6uisites, are e6uall& valid. Aove, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract is not the onl& valid cause for marriage. 'ther considerations, not precluded !& law, ma& validl& support a marriage. *herefore, so long as all the essential and formal re6uisites prescri!ed !& law are present, and it is not void or voida!le under the grounds provided !& law, it shall !e declared valid. APPLI"ABLE LAW AND RATI#NALE& 'nl& the circumstances listed under 1rticle "; of the same .ode ma& constitute fraud, namel&, 3#4 non- disclosure of a previousconv#ctwn involving moral turpitude< 3(4 concealment !& the wife of a pregnanc& !&another man< 3)4 concealment of a se>uall& transmitted disease< and 3"4 concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homose>ualit&. -o other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Bntering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not 6ualif& under an& of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under 1rticle "C 3)4, the ground of fraud ma& onl& !e !rought !& the in,ured or innocent part&. Dn the present case, there is no in,ured part& !ecause 1l!ios and Fringer !oth conspired to enter into the sham marriage.G.R. No. 1-4994. ./0e 28, 200-.#,"EL,N PABL#-G'ALBERT#, petitioner, vs. "RISANT# RA!AELIT# G'ALBERT# %, respondentG.R. No. 1-62-4../0e 28, 200-"RISANT# RA!AELIT# G. G'ALBERT# %, petitioner, 12. "#'RT #! APPEALS, e). 34., respondents"ASE !A"TS&'n 9arch #(, (88(, .risanto 7afaelito @. @ual!erto V +led !efore the 7egional *rial .ourt of ParaEa6ue .it& a petition for declaration of nullit& of his marriage to Fo&cel&n :. Pa!lo @ual!erto, with an ancillar& pra&er for custod& pendente lite of their almost "-&ear-old son, minor 7afaello 3the child, for !revit&4, whom Fo&cel&n allegedl& too5 awa& with her from the con,ugal home and his school when she decided to a!andon .risanto. :espite eforts e>erted !& .risanto, he has failed to see his child.7enato antos, President of Gnited ecurit& Aogistic testi+ed that he was commissioned !& .risanto to conduct surveillance on Fo&cel&n and came up with theconclusion that she is having les!ian relations. *he +ndings of 7enato antos were corro!orated !& .herr& Batistel, a house helper of the spouses who stated that the mother does not care for the child as she ver& often goes out of the house and on one occasion, she saw Fo&cel&n slapping the child.*he trial court awarded the custod& of the minor pendente lite to .risanto. Fo&cel&n thereafter +led a 9otion :ismiss with an ancillar& pra&er to lift the award of custod&pendente lite !ut she did not present an& evidence to support her motion.ISS'E& Whether or not homose>ualit& dis6uali+es a mother from having custod& of a minor child.DE"ISI#N& *he court grants the custod& of the child to Fo&cel&n. When love is lost !etween spouses and the marriage inevita!l& results in separation, the !itterest tussle is often over the custod& of their children.*he .ourt is now tas5ed to settle the opposing claims of the parents for custod& pendente lite of their child who is less than seven &ears of age.*here !eing no suHcient proof of an& compelling reason to separate the minor from his mother, custod& should remain with her. *he mother has !een declared unsuita!le to have custod& of her children in one or moreof the following instancesI neglect, a!andonment, unemplo&ment, immoralit&, ha!itual drun5enness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanit& or aJiction with a communica!le disease. e>ual preference or moral la>it& alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence.-ot even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has !een unfaithful to her hus!and would render herun+t to have custod& of her minor child. *o deprive the wife of custod&, the hus!andmust clearl& esta!lish that her moral lapses have had an adverse efect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the ofending spouse from e>ercising proper parental care.APPLI"ABLE LAW AND RATI#NALE& 1rticle (#) of the Famil& .ode provides that /Dn case of separation of the parents, parental authorit& shall !e e>ercised !& the parent designated !& the .ourt. *he .ourt shall ta5e into account all relevant considerations, especiall& the choice of the child over seven &ears of age, unless the parent chosen is un+t.0 G.R. No. 111180No1ember 16, 199-DAISIE T. DA%ID, petitioner, vs. "#'RT #! APPEALS, RA#N R. %ILLAR, respondents."ASE !A"TS& Petitioner :aisie *. :avid wor5ed as secretar& of private respondent 7amon 7. Villar, a !usinessman in 1ngeles .it&. Private respondent is a married manand the father of four children, all grown-up. 1fter a while, the relationship !etween petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, .hristopher F., was !orn on 9arch $, #$K% to them. .hristopher F. was followed !& two more children. *he relationship !ecame 5nown to private respondentLs wife when :aisie too5 .hristopher F, to VillarLs house at Villa *eresa in 1ngeles .it&. 1fter this, the children of :aisie were freel& !rought !& Villar to his house as the& were eventuall& accepted !& his legal famil&.Dn the summer of #$$#, Villar as5ed :aisie to allow .hristopher F., then si> &ears of age, to go with his famil& to Boraca&. :aisie agreed, !ut after the trip, Villar refused to give !ac5 the child. Villar said he had enrolled .hristopher F. at the 2ol& Famil& 1cadem& for the ne>t school &ear.'n Ful& )8, #$$#, :aisie +led a petition for ha!eas corpus on !ehalf of .hristopher F.*he 7*. rendered ,ustice in favor of :aisie, stating that the rightful custod& of the minor .hristopher F. *. :avid is here!& given to the natural mother.*he .1 reversed on appeal holding that 2a!eas .orpus was not proper and that the 6uestion of custod& of a minor child ma& !e decided in a 2a!eas .orpus case contemplates a situation where the parents are married to each other !ut are separated.ISS'E& Whether or not the remed& of 2a!eas .orpus properDE"ISI#N& Dt is indeed true, as the .ourt of 1ppeals o!served, that the determination of the right to the custod& of minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each other. Dt does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in an& other situation. Dn the case at !ar, .hristopher F. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private respondent 7amon 7. Villar, was married to another woman other than the childLs mother. 1s such, pursuant to 1rt. #C; of the Famil& .ode, .hristopher F. is under the parental authorit& of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a conse6uence of such authorit&, is entitled to have custod& of him. ince, admittedl&, petitioner has !een deprived of her rightful custod& of her child !& private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of ha!eas corpus. *he fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child ma& !e a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, !ut not for giving him custod& of the child. Gnder 1rt. (#) of the Famil& .ode, Mno child under seven &ears of age shall !eseparated from the mother unless the court +nds compelling reasons to order otherwise.M -or is the fact that private respondent is well-of a reason for depriving petitioner of the custod& of her children, especiall& considering that she has !een a!le to rear and support them on her own since the& were !orn. *hat she receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is not a point against her. .ooperation, compassion, love and concern for ever& mem!er of the famil& are characteristics of the close famil& ties that !ind the Filipino famil& and have made it what it is.APPLI"ABLE LAW AND RATI#NALE& 1rticle (#) of the Famil& .ode provides that /Dn case of separation of the parents, parental authorit& shall !e e>ercised !& the parent designated !& the .ourt. *he .ourt shall ta5e into account all relevant considerations, especiall& the choice of the child over seven &ears of age, unless the parent chosen is un+t.0 1lso, the +rst sentence of 1rticle #C; of the Famil& .odeapplies to this case, which provides that /Dllegitimate children shall use the surnameand shall !e under the parental authorit& of their mother, and shall !e entitled to support in conformit& with this .ode.0G.R. No. 18-064 .30/3r5 16, 2012SP#'SES ARA"ELI #LI%A-DE ESA and ERNEST# S. DE ESA, Petitioner, vs. SP#'SES "LA'DI# D. A"ER#, .R., e).34., 7espondents."ASE !A"TS& *he petitioners ,ointl& purchased a parcel of land situated at -o. ) For!es treet, 9ount .armel 2omes u!division, D!a, 9e&caua&an, Bulacan, which was formerl& covered !& *ransfer .erti+cate of *itle 3*.*4 -o. *-C;.C(% 394 issued !& the 7egister of :eeds of 9e&caua&an, Bulacan and registered under 1raceli?s name, on 1pril #C, #$K" while the& were still merel& coha!iting !efore their marriage. 1 house was later constructed on the su!,ect propert&, which the petitioners thereafter occupied as their famil& home after the& got married sometime in Fanuar& #$KC.ometime in eptem!er #$KK, :e 9esa o!tained a loan from .laudio :. 1cero, Fr. worth P#88,888.88, which was secured !& a mortgage over the su!,ect propert&. :ue to failure of pa&ment, 1cero +led a complaint and was granted.'n 9arch #%, #$$), a writ of e>ecution was issued and herif amonte levied upon the propert& !& selling it on pu!lic auction. *he certi+cate of sale was issued to .laudio, and was leased on the petitioners and a certain Fuanito 'liva. *he& then defaulted on the pa&ment again so 1cero +led a complaint for e,ectment. 'n Ful& #$$$, 9*. rendered a decision favoring the 1cero?s and ordering the petitioners to vacate the propert&.On 'cto!er ($, #$$$, the petitioners +led against the respondents a complaint to nullif& *.* -o. *-((#C%% 394 and other documents with damages with the 7*. of 9alolos, Bulacan. *herein, the petitioners asserted that the su!,ect propert& is a famil& home, which is e>empt from e>ecution under the Famil& .ode and, thus, could not have !een validl& levied upon for purposes of satisf&ing the 9arch #%, #$$) writ of e>ecution.ISS'ES& Whether or not the the lower courts erred in refusing to cancel .laudio?s *orrens title *.* -o. *-((#C%% 394 over the su!,ect propert&.DE"ISI#N& *he court +nds that the .1 did not err in dismissing the petitioners? complaint for nulli+cation of *.* -o. *-((#C%% 394. *he su!,ect propert& is a famil& home, however the famil& home?s e>emption from e>ecution must !e set up and proved to the herif !efore the sale of the propert& at pu!lic auction. Dt is evident that appellants did not assert their claim of e>emption within a reasona!le time.APPLI"ABLE LAW AND RATI#NALE& *he foregoing rules on constitution of famil& homes, for purposes of e>emption from e>ecution, could !e summarized as followsIFirst, famil& residences constructed !efore the efectivit& of the Famil& .ode or !efore 1ugust ), #$KK must !e constituted as a famil& home either ,udiciall& or e>tra ,udiciall& in accordance with the provisions of the .ivil .odein order to !e e>empt from e>ecutionempt from e>ecution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as an& of its !ene+ciaries actuall& resides thereintra ,udiciall& constituted as a famil& home prior to the efectivit& of the Famil& .ode, !ut were e>isting thereafter, are considered as famil& homes !& operation of law and are prospectivel& entitled to the !ene+ts accorded to a famil& home under the Famil& .ode.1lso, ection )8 of 7ule )$ of the 7ules of .ourt provides that /1 redemptioner mustproduce to the oHcer, or person from whom he see5s to redeem, and serve with hisnotice to the oHcer a cop& of the ,udgment or +nal order under which he claims the right to redeem, certi+ed !& the cler5 of the court wherein the ,udgment or +nal order is entered, or, if he redeems upon a mortgage or other lien, a memorandum ofthe record thereof, certi+ed !& the registrar of deeds, or an original or certi+ed cop&of an& assignment necessar& to esta!lish his claim< and an aHdavit e>ecuted !& him or his agent, showing the amount then actuall& due on the lien.0A.. No. T.-92-(21 Se6)ember *0, 1994.'%, N. "#S"A, e). 34., complainants, vs.+#N. L'"I# P. PALA,PA,#N, .R., e).34., respondents"ASE !A"TS& .omplainants Fuv& -. .osca, Bdmundo B. Peralta, 7amon .. am!o, and 1pollo Villamora, are tenographer D, Dnterpreter D, .ler5 DD, and Process erver, respectivel&, of the 9unicipal *rial .ourt of *inam!ac, .amarines ur. 7espondents Fudge Aucio P. Pala&pa&on, Fr. and -elia B. Bsmeralda-Baro& are respectivel& the Presiding Fudge and .ler5 of .ourt DD of the same court..omplainants allege that respondent ,udge solemnized marriages even without the re6uisite marriage license. *hus, the following couples were a!le to get married !& the simple e>pedient of pa&ing the marriage fees to respondent Baro&, despite the a!sence of a marriage license, viz.I 1lano P. 1!ellano and -ell& Bdralin, Francisco elpo and Fulieta .arrido, Bddie *erro!ias and 9aria @acer, 7enato @ama& and 9aricris Belga, 1rsenio a!ater and 9argarita -acario, and amm& Boca&a and @ina Bismonte. 1s a conse6uence, their marriage contracts did not reNect an& marriage license num!er. Dn addition, respondent ,udge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason !eing that he allegedl& had to wait for the marriage license to !e su!mitted !& the parties which was usuall& several da&s after the ceremon&. 7espondent Fudge Pala&pa&on, Fr. contends that the marriage !etween 1lano P. 1!ellano and -ell& Bdralin falls under 1rticle )" of the .ivil .ode, hence it is e>emptfrom the marriage license re6uirement. 1ccording to him, he gave strict instructionsto complainant am!o to furnish the couple a cop& of the marriage contract and to +le the same with the civil registrar, !ut the latter failed to do so and that in order to solve the pro!lem, the spouses su!se6uentl& formalized their marriage !& securing a marriage license and e>ecuting their marriage contract, a cop& of which was +led with the civil registrar. *he other +ve marriages were not illegall& solemnized !ecause the marriage contracts were not signed !& him and the& did not contain the date and place of marriage. 2e claims that copies of the marriage contracts are in the custod& of complainant am!o and that the alleged marriage ofFrancisco elpo and Fulieta .arrido, Bddie *erro!ias and 9aria Bmma @aor, 7enato @ama& and 9aricris Belga, and of 1rsenio a!ater and 9argarita -acario were not cele!rated !& him since he refused to solemnize them in the a!sence of a marriage license. *he marriage of am& Boca&a and @ina Bismonte was cele!rated even without the re6uisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order to avoid em!arrassment to their guests !ut that, at an& rate, he did not sign their marriage contract which remains unsigned up to the present.ISS'E& Whether or not the marriages solemnized !& Fudge Pala&pa&on were valid.DE"ISI#N& 'n the charge regarding illegal marriages the Famil& .ode pertinentl& provides that the formal re6uisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license e>cept in the cases provided for therein. .omplementaril&, it declares that the a!sence of an& of the essential or formal re6uisites shall generall& render the marriage void a! initio and that, while an irregularit& in the formal re6uisites shall not afect the validit& of the marriage, the part& or parties responsi!le for the irregularit& shall !e civill&, criminall& and administrativel& lia!le.APPLI"ABLE LAWS AND RATI#NALE& 1rticle )3(4 of the Famil& .ode provides that one of the re6uisites of marriage is a valid marriage license e>cept in the cases provided for in .hapter ( of the same code. 1rticle " of the same code also applies to the case at !ar as it states that the a!sence of an& of the essential or formal re6uisites shall render the marriage void a! initio.G.R. No. 104818 Se6)ember 1(, 199*R#BERT# D#ING#, petitioner, vs. "#'RT #! APPEALS 307 DELIA S#LEDAD A%ERA re6re2e0)e7 b5 8er A))or0e5-90-!3c) #ISES R. A%ERA, respondents"ASE !A"TS& private respondent :elia oledad 1vera and petitioner 7o!erto :omingo were married on -ovem!er ($, #$C; at the O9.1 Oouth .enter Bldg., as evidenced !& a 9arriage .ontract 7egistr& -o. #(CCP-C; with 9arriage Aicense -o. "$$$8); issued at .armona, .avite. Gn5nown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Bmerlina dela Paz on 1pril (%, #$;$ which marriage is valid and still e>isting. he came to 5now of the prior marriage onl& sometime in #$K) when Bmerlina dela Paz sued them for !igam&. Furthermore, when she came home from audi during her one-month leave from wor5, she discovered that 7o!erto coha!ited with another woman and had !een disposing some of her properties which are administered !& 7o!erto. 'n 9a& ($, #$$#, :elia +led a petition !efore the 7egional *rial .ourt of Pasig entitled M:eclaration of -ullit& of 9arriage and eparation of Propert&M against petitioner 7o!erto :omingo. Petitioner +led a 9otionto :ismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. *he marriage !eing void a! initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullit& is, therefore, superNuous and unnecessar&. Dt added that private respondent has no propert& which is in his possession.ISS'E& Whether or not a petition for ,udicial declaration of a void marriage is necessar&. Df in the aHrmative, whether the same should !e +led onl& for purposes of remarriage.DE"ISI#N& *here is no 6uestion that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent cele!rated while the formerLs previous marriage with one Bmerlina de laPaz was still su!sisting, is !igamous. 1s such, it is from the !eginning. Petitioner himself does not dispute the a!solute nullit& of their marriage.*he Famil& Aaw 7evision .ommittee and the .ivil .ode 7evision .ommittee which drafted what is now the Famil& .ode of the Philippines too5 the position that parties to a marriage should not !e allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such !e the fact !ut must +rst secure a ,udicial declaration of the nullit& of their marriage !efore the& can !e allowed to marr& again. *he court concluded that the pra&er for declaration of a!solute nullit& of marriage ma& !e raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. When a marriage is declared void a! initio, the law states that the +nal ,udgment therein shall provide for Mthe li6uidation, partition anddistri!ution of the properties of the spouses, the custod& and support of the common children, and the deliver& of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had !een ad,udicated in previous ,udicial proceedings.M 2ence, the petitioner?s suggestion that for their properties !e separated, an ordinar& civil action has to !e instituted for that purpose is !aseless. APPLI"ABLE LAWS AND RATI#NALE& 1rticle " of the Famil& .ode provides that /the a!solute nullit& of a previous marriage ma& !e invo5ed for purposes of remarriage on the !asis solel& of a +nal ,udgment declaring such previous marriage void.0 *he misconstruction of 1rt. "8 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term Msolel&M was in fact anticipated !& the mem!ers of the .ommittee.:ean @upit commented the word Monl&M ma& !e misconstrued to refer to Mfor purposes of remarriage.M Fudge :i& stated that Monl&M refers to M+nal ,udgment.M Fustice Puno suggested that the& sa& Mon the !asis onl& of a +nal ,udgment.M Prof. Baviera suggested that the& use the legal term Msolel&M instead of Monl&,M which the .ommittee approved.1rticle ")3(4 of the Famil& .ode provides that in cases of termination of the su!se6uent marriage, referred to in 1rticle "# of the same code, a!solute communit& of propert& or the con,ugal partnership, as the case ma& !e, shall !e dissolved and li6uidated, !ut if either spouse contracted said marriage in !ad faith, his or her share of the net pro+ts of the communit& propert& or con,ugal partnershippropert& shall !e forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilt& spouse !& a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse.G.R. No. 108(6* !ebr/3r5 1*, 199(REP'BLI" #! T+E P+ILIPPINES, vs. "#'RT #! APPEALS 307 R#RIDEL #LA%IAN# #LINA, respondents"ASE !A"TS& 7oridel 'laviano was married to 7e&naldo 9olina on #" 1pril #$K% in 9anila, and gave !irth to a son, 1ndre '. 9olina. 1fter a &ear of marriage, 7e&naldo showed signs of Mimmaturit& and irresponsi!ilit&M as a hus!and and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he s6uanderedhis mone&. 2e depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their +nances, resulting in fre6uent 6uarrels !etween them. ometime in Fe!ruar& #$K;, 7e&naldo was relieved of his ,o! in 9anila, and since then 7oridel had !een the sole !readwinner of the famil&. Dn 'cto!er #$K; the couple had a ver& intense 6uarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged. Dn 9arch #$KC, 7oridel resigned from her ,o! in 9anila and went to live with her parents in Baguio .it&. 1 few wee5s later, 7e&naldo left 7oridel and their child, and had since then a!andoned them. *he parties are separated-in-fact for more than three &ears. 'n #; 1ugust #$$8, 7oridel +led a veri+ed petition for declaration of nullit& of her marriage to 7e&naldo 9olina. ISS'E& Whether or not opposing or conNicting personalities should !e construed as ps&chological incapacit&.DE"ISI#N& *he upreme .ourt granted the petition. *he marriage of 7oridel 'laviano to 7e&naldo 9olina su!sists and remains valid. Dn the present case, there isno clear showing to us that the ps&chological defect spo5en of is an incapacit&. Dt appears to us to !e more of a MdiHcult&,M if not outright MrefusalM or MneglectM in the performance of some marital o!ligations. 9ere showing of Mirreconcila!le diferencesM and MconNicting personalitiesM in no wise constitutes ps&chological incapacit&. Dt is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsi!ilities and duties as married persons< it is essential that the& must !e shown to !e incapa!le of doing so, due to some ps&chological 3nor ph&sical4 illness. *he evidence adduced !& respondent merel& showed that she and her hus!and could not get along with each other. *here had !een no showing of the gravit& of the pro!lem< neither its ,uridical antecedence nor its incura!ilit&. *he e>pert testimon& of :r. ison showed no incura!le ps&chiatric disorder !ut onl& incompati!ilit&, not ps&chological incapacit&.APPLI"ABLE LAWS AND RATI#NALE& 1rticle ); of the Famil& .ode provides that /1 marriage contracted !& an& part& who, at the time of the cele!ration, was ps&chologicall& incapacitated to compl& with the essential marital o!ligations of marriage, shall li5ewise !e void even if such incapacit& !ecomes manifest onl& afterits solemnization.0 *he .ourt, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of 1rticle ); of the Famil& .ode, removing an& visages of it !eing the most li!eral divorce procedure in the worldI 3#4 *he !urden of proof !elongs to the plaintif< 3(4 the root cause of ps&chological incapacit& must !e medicall& or clinicall& identi+ed, alleged in the complaint, suHcientl& proven !& e>pert, and clearl& e>plained in the decision< 3)4 *he incapacit& must !e proven e>isting at the time of the cele!ration of marriage< 3"4 the incapacit& must !e clinicall& or medicall& permanent or incura!le< 3%4 such illness must !e grave enough< 3;4 the essential marital o!ligation must !e em!raced !& 1rticles ;K to C# of the Famil& .ode as regards hus!and and wife, and 1rticles ((8 to ((% of the same code as regards parents and their children< 3C4 interpretation made !& the -ational 1ppellate 9atrimonial *ri!unal of the .atholic .hurch, and 3K4 the trial must order the +scal and the olicitor-@eneral to appeal as counsels for the tate.G.R. No. L-2(9*0 No1ember 26, 19(0A'R#RA A. ANA,A, plaintif-appellant, vs. !ERNAND# #. PALAR#AN, defendant-appellee"ASE !A"TS& Plaintif 1urora and defendant Fernando were married on " :ecem!er #$%). :efendant Fernando +led an action for annulment of the marriage on C Fanuar& #$%" on the ground that his consent was o!tained through force and intimidation. 'n () eptem!er #$%$, ,udgement was rendered dismissing the complaint of Fernando, upholding the validit& of the marriage and granting 1uroraLs counterclaim. While the amount of the counterclaim was !eing negotiated Mto settle the ,udgment,M Fernando had divulged to 1urora that several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his. 1ccording to her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud, in o!taining her consent, within the contemplation of -o. " of 1rticle K% of the .ivil .ode.he pra&ed for the annulment of her marriage with Fernando on such ground.:efendant Fernando denied the allegation of the complaint and denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative. 2e averred that under no circumstancewould he live with 1urora, as he had escaped from her and from her relatives the da& following their marriage on " :ecem!er #$%). 2e denied having committed an&fraud against her. 2e counterclaimed for damages for the malicious +ling of the suit.:efendant Fernando did not pra& for the dismissal of the complaint !ut for its dismissal Mwith respect to the alleged moral damages.MISS'E& *he main issue is whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife !& her hus!and of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.DE"ISI#N& *he court agrees with the lower court that it is not. For fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which ma& !e a cause for its annulment, comes under 1rticle K%, -o. ", of the .ivil .ode. -on-disclosure of a hus!andLs pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment< and it is further e>cluded !& the last paragraph of the article, providing that Mno other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastit&M shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman ma& detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having !een there!& cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnl& given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which societ&, and not herself alone, is interested. *he lawma5erLs intent !eing plain, the .ourtLs dut& is to give efect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.G.R. No. L-12(90 A/:/2) *1, 1960.#EL .IENEZ, plaintif-appellee, vs. REEDI#S "A;IZARES, defendant, Re6/b49c o< )8e P89496690e2, intervenor-appellant"ASE !A"TS& Dn a complaint +led on C Fune #$%%, the plaintif Foel Fimenez pra&s fora decree annulling his marriage to the defendant 7emedios .aEizares contracted on) 1ugust, upon the ground that the oHce of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation. 2e alleged the condition of her genitals as descri!ed a!ove e>isted at the time of marriage and continues to e>ist. For that reason he left the con,ugal home two nights and one da&after the& had !een married. *he court summoned and gave a cop& to the wife !ut the latter did not +le an& answer.*he wife was ordered to su!mit herself to ph&sical e>amination and to +le a medical certi+cate within #8 da&s.he was givenanother % da&s to compl& or else it will !e deemed lac5 of interest on her part and therefore rendering ,udgment in favor of the petitioner.ISS'E& Whether or not the marriage in 6uestion ma& !e annulled on the strength onl& of the lone testimon& of the hus!and who claimed and testi+ed that his wife was and is impotent.DE"ISI#N& Dn the case at !ar, the annulment of the marriage in 6uestion was decreed upon the sole testimon& of the hus!and who was e>pected to give testimon& tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and see5s. Whether the wife is reall& impotent cannot !e deemed to have !een satisfactoril& esta!lished, !ecause from the commencement of the proceedings until the entr& of the decree she had a!stained from ta5ing part therein. 1lthough her refusal to !e e>amined or failure to appear in court show indiference on her part, &et from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or !e inferred !ecause women of this countr& are !& natureco&, !ashful and sh& and would not su!mit to a ph&sical e>amination unless compelled to !& competent authorit&. *his the .ourt ma& do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. he is not charged with an& ofense. he is not !eing compelled to !e a witness against herself. MDmpotenc& !eing an a!normal condition should not !e presumed. *he presumption is in favor ofpotenc&.M*he lone testimon& of the hus!and that his wife is ph&sicall& incapa!le of se>ual intercourse is insuHcient to tear asunder the ties that have !ound them together as hus!and and wife.G.R. No. 16-80* Se6)ember 1, 2010SP#'SES RE$ AND "#N"EP"I#N AGGABA#, Petitioners, vs. DI#NISI# Z. PAR'LAN, .R. 307 A. ELENA PAR'LAN, 7espondents"ASE !A"TS& Dnvolved in this case are two parcels of land at BF 2omes, ParaEa6ue .it& and registered under *ransfer .erti+cate of *itle 3*.*4 -o. ;))C; and *.* -o. ;))CC in the name of respondents pouses 9aria Blena 1. Parulan 39a. Blena4 and :ionisio Q. Parulan, Fr. 3:ionisio4, who have !een estranged from one another.Dn Fanuar& #$$#, real estate !ro5er 9arta P. 1tanacio 31tanacio4 ofered the propert&to the petitioners, who initiall& did not show interest due to the rundown condition of the improvements, !ut 1tanacio?s persistence prevailed upon them. 'n Fe!ruar& (, #$$#, the& and 1tanacio met with 9a. Blena at the site of the propert&. :uring their meeting, 9a. Blena showed to them the following documents, namel&I 3a4 the owner?s original cop& of *.* -o. ;))C;< 3!4 a certi+ed true cop& of *.* -o. ;))CC< 3c4 three ta> declarations< and 3d4 a cop& of the special power of attorne& 3P14 dated Fanuar& C, #$$# e>ecuted !& :ionisio authorizing 9a. Blena to sell the propert&. Before the meeting ended, the& paid P(8,888.88 as earnest mone&, for which 9a. Blena e>ecuted a handwritten 7eceipt of Barnest 9one&, where!& the parties stipulated thatI 3a4 the& would pa& an additional pa&ment of P#)8,888.88 onFe!ruar& ", #$$#< 3!4 the& would pa& the !alance of the !an5 loan of the respondents amounting to P;%8,888.88 on or !efore Fe!ruar& #%, #$$#< and 3c4 the& would ma5e the +nal pa&ment of PC88,888.88 once 9a. Blena turned over the propert& on 9arch )#, #$$#.'n Fe!ruar& ", #$$#, the petitioners went to the 'Hce of the 7egister of :eeds and the 1ssessor?s 'Hce of ParaEa6ue .it& to verif& the *.*s shown !& 9a. Blena in the compan& of 1tanacio and her hus!and 3also a licensed !ro5er4. Following their veri+cation, the petitioners delivered P#)8,888.88 as additional down pa&ment on Fe!ruar& ", #$$#< and P;%8,888.88 to the Aos BaEos 7ural Ban5 on Fe!ruar& #(, #$$#, which then released the owner?s duplicate cop& of *.* -o. ;))CC to them.'n 9arch #K, #$$#, the petitioners delivered the +nal amount of PC88,888.88 to 9a.Blena, who e>ecuted a deed of a!solute sale in their favor. 2owever, 9a. Blena did not turn over the owner?s duplicate cop& of *.* -o. ;))C;, claiming that said cop& was in the possession of a relative who was then in 2ong5ong. he assured them that the owner?s duplicate cop& of *.* -o. ;))C; would !e turned over after a wee5. 'n 9arch #$, #$$#, *.* -o. ;))CC was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the petitioners.9a. Blena did not turn over the duplicate owner?s cop& of *.* -o. ;))C; as promised. Dn due time, the petitioners learned that the duplicate owner?s cop& of *.* -o. ;))C; had !een all along in the custod& of 1tt&. Ferem& Q. Parulan, who appeared to hold an P1 e>ecuted !& his !rother :ionisio authorizing him to sell !oth lots. *he spouses met with :ionisio?s !rother, 1tt&. Parulan on 9arch (%, #$$#, who told them that he is the one with the power to sell the propert&. 2e demanded PK88,888 for said propert& and gave the spouses onl& until 1pril %, #$$# to decide.2earing nothing more from the petitioners, 1tt&. Parulan decided to call them on 1pril %, #$$#, !ut the& informed him that the& had alread& full& paid to 9a. Blena. *hus, on 1pril #%, #$$#, :ionisio, through 1tt&. Parulan, commenced an action, pra&ing for the declaration of the nullit& of the deed of a!solute sale e>ecuted !& 9a. Blena, and the cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners !& virtue thereof. Dn turn, the petitioners +led on Ful& #(, #$$# their own action for speci+c performance with damages against the respondents. Both cases were consolidated for trial and ,udgment in the 7*..'n Ful& (;, (888, the 7egional *rial .ourt 37*.4, Branch #);, in 9a5ati .it& annulled the deed of a!solute sale e>ecuted in favor of the petitioners covering two parcels of registered land the respondents owned for want of the written consent of respondent hus!and :ionisio Parulan, Fr. *he .1 aHrmed the 7*. decision.ISS'E& Which !etween 1rticle #C) of the .ivil .ode and 1rticle #(" of the Famil& .ode should appl& to the sale of the con,ugal propert& e>ecuted without the consentof :ionisioRDE"ISI#N& *he sale was made on 9arch #K, #$$#, or after 1ugust ), #$KK, the efectivit& of the Famil& .ode. *he proper law to appl& is, therefore, 1rticle #(" of the Famil& .ode, for it is settled that an& alienation or encum!rance of con,ugal propert& made during the efectivit& of the Famil& .ode is governed !& 1rticle #(" of the Famil& .ode. Also, the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code should not apply because the other spouse held the administration over the conjugal property. *he& arguethat notwithstanding his a!sence from the countr& :ionisio still held the administration of the con,ugal propert& !& virtue of his e>ecution of the P1 in favor of his !rother. 1lso, the petitioners? insistence that 1tt&. Parulan?s ma5ing of a counter-ofer during the 9arch (%, #$$# meeting rati+ed the sale merits no consideration. Gnder 1rticle #(" of the Famil& .ode, the transaction e>ecuted sans the written consent of :ionisio or the proper court order was void< hence, rati+cation did not occur, for a void contract could not !e rati+ed.APPLI"ABLE LAWS AND RATI#NALE& *he relevant part of 1rticle #(" of the Famil& .ode provides that >>> Dn the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise una!le to participate in the administration of the con,ugal properties, the other spouse ma& assume sole powers of administration. *hese powers do not include disposition or encum!rance without authorit& of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. Dn the a!sence of such authorit& or consent, the disposition or encum!rance shall !e void. >>>G.R. No. 106(20 Se6)ember 1-, 1994SP#'SES R#BERT# AND T+ELA A.ER#, petitioners, vs. T+E "#'RT #! APPEALS AND "LEENTE SAND, respondents"ASE !A"TS& Dn the will, decedent named as devisees, the followingI petitioners 7o!erto and *helma 1,ero, private respondent .lemente and, 9eriam . 1rong, Aeah and, Ailia and, Bdgar and, Fe and, Aisa . and, and :r. Fose 1,ero, r., andtheir children.'n Fanuar& (8, #$K), petitioners instituted p. Proc. -o. S-)C#C#, for allowance of decedentLs holographic will. *he& alleged that at the time of its e>ecution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue inNuence, andwas in ever& respect capacitated to dispose of her estate !& will. Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds thatI neither the testamentLs !od& nor the signature therein was in decedentLs handwriting< it contained alterations and corrections which were not dul& signed !& decedent< and, the will was procured !& petitioners through improper pressure and undue inNuence. *he petition was li5ewise opposed !& :r. Fose 1,ero. 2e contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in .a!ad!aran, 1gusan :el -orte. 2e claimed that said propert& could not !e conve&ed !& decedent in its entiret&, as she was not its sole owner.-otwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedentLs holographicwill to pro!ate. 'n appeal, said :ecision was reversed, and the petition for pro!ate of decedentLs will was dismissed. *he .ourt of 1ppeals found that, Mthe holographic will fails to meet the re6uirements for its validit&.M Dt held that the decedent did not compl& with 1rticles K#) and K#" of the -ew .ivil .ode. Dt alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed !ut not dated. Dt also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not !een authenticated !& decedent.ISS'E& Whether or not the .ourt of 1ppeals was correct in disallowing the pro!ate of the will !ased on the provisions of 1rt 1rt K#) and 1rt K#".DE"ISI#N& Dn the case at !ench, respondent court held that the holographic will of 1nne and was not e>ecuted in accordance with the formalities prescri!ed !& law. Dtheld that 1rticles K#) and K#" of the -ew .ivil .ode, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the pro!ate of said will. *his is erroneous. *he court cited ection $, 7ule C; of the 7ules of .ourt provides that will shall !e disallowed in an& of the following casesI3a4 Df not e>ecuted and attested as re6uired !& law< 3!4 Df the testator was insane, or otherwise mentall& incapa!le to ma5e a will, at the time of its e>ecution< 3c4 Df it was e>ecuted under duress, or the inNuence of fear, or threatsing his signature thereto.Dn the same vein, 1rticle K)$ of the -ew .ivil .ode readsI 1rt. K)$I *he will shall !e disallowed in an& of the following cases< 3#4 Df the formalities re6uired !& law have not !een complied with< 3(4 Df the testator was insane, or otherwise mentall& incapa!le of ma5ing a will, at the time of its e>ecution< 3)4 Df it was e>ecuted through force or under duress, or the inNuence of fear, or threats< 3"4 Df it was procured !& undue and improper pressure and inNuence, on the part of the !ene+ciar& or of some other person< 3%4 Df the signature of the testator was procured !& fraud< 3;4 Df the testator acted !& mista5e or did not intend that the instrument he signed should !e his will at the time of aH>ing his signature thereto.*hese lists are e>clusive< no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. *hus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to pro!ate, the onl& issues to !e resolved areI 3#4 whether the instrument su!mitted is, indeed, the decedentLs last will and testament< 3(4 whether said will was e>ecuted in accordance with the formalities prescri!ed !& law< 3)4 whether the decedent had the necessar& testamentar& capacit& at the time the will was e>ecuted< and, 3"4 whether the e>ecution of the will and its signing were the voluntar& acts of the decedent.1 reading of 1rticle K#) of the -ew .ivil .ode shows that its re6uirement afects thevalidit& of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, !ut not its pro!ate. Df the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot !e efectuated. uch failure, however, does not render the whole testament void. Ai5ewise, a holographic will can still !e admitted to pro!ate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of 1rticle K#". *hus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testatorLs signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself.*he lac5 of authentication will onl& result in disallowance of such changes. Dt is also proper to note that the re6uirements of authentication of changesand signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions 31rticles K#) and K#"4 separate from that which provides for the necessar& conditions for the validit& of the holographic will 31rticle K#84.APPLI"ABLE LAWS AND RATI#NALE& ection $ of the 7ules of .ourt provides that will shall !e disallowed in an& of the following casesI3a4 Df not e>ecuted and attested as re6uired !& lawecutionecuted under duress, or the inNuence of fear, or threats