Coles, John Mark F.Atty. DJ JimenezUST-CA 220 Summer ClassMay 13, 2013

CASE DIGESTS

Burgos vs Chief of Staff (133 SCRA 316)Petitioners: Jose Burgos, Sr., Jose Burgos, Jr., Bayani Soriano and J. Burgos Media Services, Inc.,vs.Respondents: The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, The Chief, Philippine Constabulary, The Chief Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command, The Judge Advocate General, Et al.

Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto E. Taada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

Facts:In this case, the petitioners question the validity of two (2) search warrants that were issued on December 7, 1982 by Judge Cruz-Pano of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal. These warrants were directed to law enforcement officers to search and seize the offices of the newspapers We Forum and Metropolitan Mail with the addresses No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City for allegedly publishing articles that incite subversion. The officers seized materials used in publishing such as office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books, and other written literature alleged to be in possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the We Forum newspaper. Due to the search and seizure, the offices were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. The petitioners pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized items.The Respondents contend that petitioners should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them before challenging its validity. Respondents also assail the petition on the grounds of laches or the failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. Respondents further state that since petitioner had already used as evidence some of the items seized in the search in a prior criminal case, he is stopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants.Petitioners submitted to the court the following reasons to nullify the questioned warrants:1. Respondent Judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as well as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 2. The search warrants pinpointed only one address which would be the former above mentioned address.3. Articles belonging to his co-petitioners were also seized although the warrants were only directed against Jose Burgos, Jr.4. Real properties were seized.5. The application along with a joint affidavit, upon which the warrants were issued, from the Metrocom Intelligence Security Group could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may be validly issued in accordance with Article IV Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution.Respondents justified the sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have been sequestered under Section 8 of the Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes sequestration of the property of any person engaged in subversive activities against the government in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense.Issue: Whether or not the two (2) search warrants were valid to justify the seizure of the items.Held:The court decided that the mistake in the address in the warrant was a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be reached set forth in the application. Although there was a typographical error, the purpose and intent to search two distinct places was evident in the issuance of the warrant.As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. In this case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.However, the court declared that the two warrants are null and void.Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.Babst v. National Intelligence Board (132 SCRA 316)Petitioners: Arlene Babst, Odette Alcantara, Ceres P. Doyo, Jo Ann Q. Maglipon, Domini Torrevillas Suarez, Lorna Kalaw-Tirol, Cielo Buenaventura, Sylvia Mayuga, Shiela S. Coronel, et al.vs.Respondents: National Intelligence Board, Special Committee No. 2, Brig. Gen. Wilfredo Estrada (ret.), Col. Renato Ecarma, NBI Asst. Director Ponciano Fernando, Col. Balbino Diego, Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Eustaquio Peralta, et al.

Facts:This was originally a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction which was superseded by the amended and supplemental petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by petitioners on March 3, 1983, seeking to prohibit the respondents (a) from issuing subpoenas or letters of invitation to petitioners and interrogating them, and (b) from filing libel suits on matters that have been the subject of inquiry by respondent National Intelligence Board (NIB).Petitioners are columnists, feature article writers and reporters of various local publications. At different dates since July, 1980, some of them have allegedly been summoned by military authorities who have subjected them to sustained interrogation on various aspects of their works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives. Typical of the letters received by the petitioners from respondent NIB is that addressed to petitioner Arlene Babst, dated December 20, 1982, this reads:Madam:

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, you are hereby requested to appear before this Special Committee at Philippine Army Officer's Clubhouse, Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila (sketch attached), 9:00 A.M., December 22, 1982, to shed light on confidential matters being looked into by this Committee.

Your failure to appear on the specified date and place shall be considered as a waiver on your part and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law.

Very truly yours, (SGD.) WILFREDO C. ESTRADABrig. General, AFP (Ret.)Petitioners argue that the proceeding or interrogation mentioned above in the letter is a violation of the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of expression since it has the effect of imposing guidelines and norms on mass media that are restrictive. Petitioners further argue that the proceedings are a punitive deal or subsequent punishment for lawful publications and because of that they amount to a system of censorship which curtails the free flow of information and petition and opinion, indispensable to the right of the people to know matters of public concern guaranteed the Constitution. Finally they claim that such coercive invitations constitute intrusions into spheres of individual liberty.The respondents countered by claiming that no issue of jurisdiction exists since they do not pretend to exercise jurisdiction over the petitioners. They claim that the letter that was sent to the petitioners were neither subpoenas nor summonses, but mere invitations to dialogue which were completely voluntary, without any compulsion employed to them if they decline the offer. The dialogues themselves were designed simply to elicit information and exchange of ideas. Respondents contended that the that the expression of personal preferences and opinions by members of the respondent Board is not equivalent to the imposition of norms and guidelines to be followed by petitioners. Finally, they argued that the petition filed is moot and academic because the proceedings before NIB Special Committee No. 2 (which conducted the interrogations) have already been ordered terminated by General Fabian C. Ver in his capacity as Director General and Chairman of the NIB, and said proceedings have in fact been terminated.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the present petition has become moot and academic due to the termination of the order. 2. Whether or not the issuance of letters of invitations to dialogues and the subsequent interrogations that are conducted curtail the constitutional provision of freedom of expression.

Held:The Court ruled that the present petition was moot and academic. Considering that the proceedings have been ordered terminated and the acts sought to be prohibited have been abated, the petition has become moot and academic.Even though the petition was declared moot and academic, the Court decided that a mere invitation to attend a hearing which a person may refuse is not illegal; however, an invitation which has an appearance of coercion is constitutionally objectible.Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily assume a different appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the country has just emerged from martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted and the designated interrogation site is a military camp, the same can easily be taken, not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as an authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril, especially where, as in the instant case, the invitation carries the ominous seaming that failure to appear . . . shall be considered as a waiver . . . and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law. Fortunately, the NIB director general and chairman saw the wisdom of terminating the proceedings and the unwelcome interrogation.

New York Times Co. v. United States (404 US 713)Facts:The newspapers The New York Times and the Washington Post published excerpts from a top secret study of the Vietnam War conducted by the Department of Defense. The study revealed great detail United States policy towards Indochina including information about military operations and secret diplomatic negotiations. The government filed suit in the federal district courts and obtained an injunction in some instances, prohibiting the further publication of the materials, on the grounds that further publication would endanger the lives of United States troops and interfere with national security. The petitioners argued that the order of barring the publication of the study is a direct violation of the First Amendment of the US Constitution because it infringes the freedom of the press.

Issue: Was the restraining order halting the publication of the study done by the Department of Defense in violation of the First Amendment of the US Constitution?

Held:The court declared that the restraining order violates the First Amendment. Any prior restraint on speech comes before the Supreme Court of the United States under a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality. The government bears the burden of showing that such restraint is justified. The government did not meet its burden here.The court decided that a free press was established to bear the secrets of the Government and thereby keep the public informed. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively accomplish this purpose. The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of an informed representative style government provides no real security. The court also argued that although the disclosures at issue may have a serious impact, that is no reason for sanctioning a prior restraint. The primary purpose of the First Amendment of the Constitution was to prohibit the practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing information.

Chavez v. Gonzales, et al., G.R. No. 168338Petitioner: Francisco Chavezvs.Respondent: Raul M. Gonzales, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and National Telecommunications Commission

Facts:Respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had the copies of the Hello Garci election fraud scandal compact discs and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that those who are in possession or airing the said tapes were committing an offense and is subject to arrest. Finally, he ordered the National Bureau of Investigation to go after the media organizations who found to have caused the spread, playing, and printing of the contents of a tape.Meanwhile the respondent NTC warned in a press release all radio stations and TV network owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that they shall not use their stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation. The NTC stated that the continuous airing or broadcast of the Hello Garci taped conversations by radio and TV stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority. It warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments.Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and the Board of Directors of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas. NTC allegedly assured the KBP that the press release did not violate the constitutional freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, and the right to information. The dialogue also resulted in the releasing of a joint-statement which stated, among others, that the supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled responsibly.Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC, praying for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, as extraordinary legal remedies, to annul void proceedings, and to prevent the unlawful, unconstitutional and oppressive exercise of authority by the respondents.Alleging that the acts of respondents are violations of the freedom of expression and of the press, and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, petitioner specifically asked this Court: For the nullification of acts, issuances, and orders of respondents committed or made since June 6, 2005 until the present that curtail the publics rights to freedom of expression and of the press, and to information on matters of public concern specifically in relation to information regarding the controversial taped conversion of President Arroyo and for prohibition of the further commission of such acts, and making of such issuances, and orders by respondents.Respondents denied that the acts transgress the Constitution, and questioned petitioners legal standing to file the petition. Among the arguments they raised as to the validity of the fair warning issued by respondent NTC, is that broadcast media enjoy lesser constitutional guarantees compared to print media, and the warning was issued pursuant to the NTCs mandate to regulate the telecommunications industry. It was also stressed that most of the television and radio stations continue, even to this date, to air the tapes, but of late within the parameters agreed upon between the NTC and KBP.Issues: 1. Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press? 2.Did the mere press statements and releases of respondents DOJ Secretary Gonzales and the NTC constitute \ a form of prior restraint based on content therefore curtailing the constitutional provision of the freedom of the speech, of expression, and of the press and the right to information?Held:The court held that a purported violation of the law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Act will not justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. The great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar however are confused and confusing, and respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a complete version and the other, an altered version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the whos and the hows of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the tapes different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which, even if violated, have only an adverse effect on a persons private comfort but does not endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and without more, cannot support suppression of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine compliance with the clear and present danger test, the Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all means, violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.In accordance with the press releases and the statements made by the respondents, the court held that their actions did constitute to a form of content-based prior restraint which is a violation of the constitution.It is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an act does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non-formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.

Shenck v. United States (249 US 247)Petitioner: Charles Shenckvs.Respondent: United StatesFacts:The Petitioner was the Secretary of the Socialist Party of America and was responsible for printing, distributing, and mailing materials to prospective military draftees during World War I. The flyers consisted of 2 pages that implored the draftees to Assert Your Rights and stand up against the draft. The Respondent, the United States, charged the petitioner with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917 by encouraging insubordination in the military and indicted and convicted Shenck. Petitioner appealed to the US Supreme Court arguing that the court decision violated his First Amendment rights.Issue: Is the Petitioners expression of his opinion of the draft protected speech under the First Amendment of the US Constitution?Held:The Supreme Court held that petitioners conviction was constitutional and that his expression of opinion of the draft was not protected by the First Amendment because the nation was at war. According to the Court, when a nation is at war, many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right." In other words, the court held, the circumstances of wartime permit greater restrictions on free speech than would be allowed during peacetime.

Gonzales v. COMELEC (27 SCRA 836)Petitioners: Arsenio Gonzales, Felicisimo R. Cabigaovs.Respondent: Commission on ElectionsFacts:RA 4880 took effect on June 17, 1969 prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional grounds. The basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the said act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Taada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association. He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions. Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state.Issue: Does RA 4880 curtail the basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association which are protected by the Constitution?Held:The court decided that the RA 4880 abridges the freedom of speech, free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association. They cited the case of Cabansag vs Fernandez where there are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the clear and present danger rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author of the act Taada clearly explained, such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country.The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. In the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command.J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing (125 SCRA 553)Petitioner: Jose Benedicto Luna Reyesvs.Respondent: Manila Mayor Ramon BagatsingFacts:Retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit from the respondent Mayor of Manila Bagatsing for the use of the empty field in front of the Luneta Grandstand and Roxas Boulevard in front of the U.S. Embassy on October 26, 1983, from 2 to 5 p.m. The petitioners were sponsoring an International Conference for General Disarmament, World Peace, and the Removal of all Foreign Military Bases and proposed a March for Philippines Sovereignty and Independence, participated in by foreign and Philippines delegates. The march was to proceed from the Luneta to the gate of the U.S. Embassy where a short program would be held. The respondent Mayor refused the permit (1) because his office was in receipt of police intelligence reports which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time at the place applied for and (2) because Ordinance No. 7295, in accordance with the Vienna Convention, prohibits rallies or demonstrations within a radius of 500 feet from any foreign mission or chancery. The petitioner filed a case against the respondent Mayor believing that the denial of issuance of the permit violates his constitutional right to free speech and to peaceably assemble and that the rally would not violate Ordinance No. 7295.Issues: 1. Does holding a rally in front of the U.S. Embassy a violation of Ordinance 7295? 2. Does the action of denying the permit abridges the constitutional right of free speech and to peaceably assemble?Held:The court granted the petition. The Supreme Court granted the mandatory injunction of petitioner allowing the proposed march and rally. The court found out that there is no showing that the distance between the chancery and the gate is less than 500 feet. And even if it were, the ordinance would not be conclusive because it still must be measured against the requirement of the Constitution .The court also declared that there was no clear and present danger of a substantive evil to a legitimate public interest that would justify the denial of the exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and to peaceably assemble.

BAYAN v. Ermita ( 488 SCRA 226)Petitioners: BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), GABRIELA, Fr. Jose Dizon, Renato Constantino, Jr., Froyel Yaneza, and Fahima Tajarvs.Respondents: Eduardo Ermita, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor Lito Atienza, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Gen. Arturo M. Lomibao, NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. Vidal Querol, and Western Police District Chief Gen. Pedro Bulaong.Facts:Four rallies held by the petitioner BAYAN party list held on Sept. 20, Oct. 4, 5, and 6, 2005 is at issue as these demonstrations were violently dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained as they were apprehended by the police. Another petitioner, KMU party list asserts that their right to peaceably assembly were affected by Batasan Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of Calibrated Pre-emptive Response being followed to be implemented. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along Espaa Avenue in front of the UST and going towards Mendiola Bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested.All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the no permit, no rally policy and the CPR policy announced on Sept. 21, 2005.

Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought.

Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication.

KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane. As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is pre-emptive, that the government takes action even before the demonstrators can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.

Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. It is content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies. According to Manila Mayor Atienza the R.A. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880. and that the permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.

Issue: Does the BP No. 880 and the CPR Policy violate the constitutional right of the people to peaceably assemble?

Held:There is no question that the constitutional right of the people to peaceably assemble is directly affected by the BP No. 880. The BP is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all demonstrators and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.In the case of the Calibrated Pre-emptive Response policy, the court declared that it has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as it is a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, this was declared null and void. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments are directed to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law.

Nestle Phils. v. Sanchez (154 SCRA 542) Petitioner: Nestle Philippines, Inc.vs.Respondents: Hon. Augusto S. Sanchez, Minister of Labor and Employment and the Union of Filipro EmployeesFacts:During the period July 8-10, 1987, Union of Filipro Employees, and Kimberly Independent LaborUnion for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia, intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since 17 June 1981 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loudspeakers. These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained. Thus, on 10 July 1987, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unionsthe opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony Avelino, Lito Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union leaders of Union of Filipro Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs. Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr. and Antonio Gonzales, union leaders of Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on 14 July 1987 at 10:30 a.m. and there to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with. On the appointed date and time, the individuals appeared before the Court, represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, in the absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, who was still recuperating from an operation. Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court for the acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He likewise manifested to the Court that he had explained to the picketers why their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under the circumstances. He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Timog Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), anunregistered loose alliance of about 75 unions in the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly Independent Labor Union. To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the citation and that they will abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the Court required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect, which respondents complied with on 17 July 1987.Issue: Whether or not the respondents should be cited for contempt for their continued picketing at the Supreme Courts premises.Held:The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies." Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference." The acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of the Court, but equally a violation of the right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large. Still, the individuals cited, who are non-lawyers, are not knowledgeable in the intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. The incident should therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their members.

People v. Godoy (243 SCRA 64)Facts:For separate resolution, as an incident arising from these criminal cases under automatic review by the court, is a complaint 1 filed by judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, to cite for indirect contempt Mauricio Reynoso, Jr., a columnist, and Eva P. Ponce de Leon, publisher and chairman of the editorial board, respectively, of the Palawan Times. His Honors plaint is based on an article written by respondent Reynoso, Jr. in his column, On the Beat, and published in the July 20, 1994 issue of said newspaper which is of general circulation in Puerto Princesa City.The said portions of the article complained has alleged contemptuous and malicious statements that can be enough to file a libel case. The complaint avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the administration of justice; that the article contains averments which are disrespectful, discourteous, insulting, offensive and derogatory; that it does not only cast aspersions on the integrity and honesty of complainant as a judge and on his ability to administer justice objectively and impartially, but is an imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed before him; and that the article is sub judice because it is still pending automatic review. Respondent Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. contends in his Comment 2 that his article does not intend to impede nor obstruct the administration of justice because the same was published after complainant had promulgated his decision in the case; that such publication will not affect or influence the review by the Supreme Court of the criminal case, considering that the Palawan Times is circulated only in the City of Puerto Princess and some parts of Palawan; that the comments made therein were made in good faith and in the exercise of the freedom of expression and of the press; that while the article may contain unfavorable comments about complainant, it cannot be considered as having the tendency to degrade or impede the administration of justice; and that the complaint, which is for contempt of a judge of a regional trial court, was erroneously filed with the Supreme Court contrary to Section 4, Rule 71 of the rules of Court. Respondent Eva P. Ponce de Leon, in her Comment 3 and Supplemental Comment, 4 asserts that the article is merely in reaction to the television interview given by complainant in the show, Magandang Gabi Bayan, last June 18, 1994 wherein the latter defended his decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 11640-41, entitled People vs. Godoy; that the article is no longer sub judice as the same was published only after complainant had rendered his decision and had already lost jurisdiction over the case; that the article cannot be considered contemptuous and defamatory in the absence of a clear and present danger that it will tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or ridicule the administration of justice; that it constitutes a valid exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press; that a reading of the subject article in its entirety will show that the same does not constitute contempt but, at most, is merely a fair criticism which did not intend to malign nor place him in disrepute in the performance of his functions; and that respondent Ponce de Leon cannot be held liable for contempt because she did not have either actual knowledge of, or Personal connection with, the authorship or publication of the allegedly contemptuous article, since she had just returned from the United States when the same was published.On the issue of whether the specified statements complained of are contumacious in nature, we are inclined, based on an overall perusal and objective analysis of the subject article, to hold in the negative. We have read and reread the article in its entirety and we are fully convinced that what is involved here is a situation wherein the alleged disparaging statements have been taken out of context. If the statements claimed to be contumelious had been read with contextual care, there would have been no reason for this contempt proceeding.Issue: Whether or not there can be contempt of court in case of post-litigation statements or publications.Held:In the case of In re Sotto, this Court had the opportunity to define the relation between the courts and the press, quoting there in the statements made by Judge Holmes in U.S. vs. Sullen, thus: The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this Court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.Hence, a person charged with contempt of court for making certain utterances or publishing writings which are clearly opprobrious may not, ordinarily, escape liability therefor by merely invoking the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press. Liberty of speech and the press must not be confused with an abuse of such liberties. Obstructing, by means of the spoken or written word, the administration of justice by the courts has been described as an abuse of the liberty of speech or the press such as will subject the abuser to punishment for contempt of court.Guaranties of free speech and a free press, as they appear in the Constitution, are frequently couched so as to impute responsibility for any abuse of the privilege, and it is sometimes recognized that with respect to whether an allegedly scandalous publication or utterance is to be treated as a contempt, a line must be drawn between those speeches or writings which are protected by the privilege of free speech and a free press and those which constitute an abuse of it.The right of freedom of the press is only a specific instance of the general right of freedom of speech; persons engaged in the newspaper business cannot claim any other or greater right than that possessed by persons not in that business.

In Re: Emiliano P. Jurado (243 SCRA 299)Facts:Emiliano P. Jurado, a lawyer and journalist who writes in a newspaper of general circulation wrote about alleged improprieties and irregularities in the judiciary over several months. What was particularly given attention by the Supreme Court was his column entitled, "Who will judge the Justices?" that was referring to a report that six justices, their spouses, children and grandchildren (a total of 36 persons) spent a vacation in Hong Kong, and that luxurious hotel accommodations and all their other expenses were paid by a public utility firm and that the trip was arranged by the travel agency patronized by this public utility firm. This column was made amidst rumors that a Supreme Court decision favorable to the public utility firm appears to have been authored by a lawyer of the public utility firm. The Chief Justice issued an administrative order creating an ad hoc committee to investigate the said reports of corruption in the judiciary. A letter affidavit was also received from the public utility, denying the allegations in Jurado's column. The Supreme Court then issued a resolution ordering that the matter dealt with in the letter and affidavit of the public utility company be docketed and acted upon as an official Court proceeding for the determination of whether or not the allegations made by Jurado are true.

Issue: Whether or not the article written by Jurado constitute contempt of court.

Held:Jurado's actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate gross irresponsibility, and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he might cause to the name and reputation of those of whom he wrote. They constitute contempt of court, directly tending as they do to degrade or abase the administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function. The Court declares Atty. Jurado guilty of contempt of court and sentences him to pay a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00)The court underscores the importance of both the constitutional guarantee of free speech and the reality that there are equally important public interests which need on occasion to be balanced against and accommodated with one and the other. One such public interest is in the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community.

Re: Request for Live TV Coverage of the trail in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases against Former Pres. E. Estrada (356 SCRA 62)

Petitioners: Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez, Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas, Cesar Sarino, Renato Cayetano and Atty. Ricardo Romulovs.Oppositors: Joseph E. Estrada and Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Facts:The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting the Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo.

On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his experience with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to information may be served through other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage.

Issue: Whether or Not live media coverage of the trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be permitted by the court.

Held:Whether or Not live media coverage of the trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be permitted by the court. The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred to win. Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted about its individual settings nor made an object of publics attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only be evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial, it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public. Nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.

Re: Petition for radio and television coverage of the multiple murder cases againstMaguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, et al., A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC/A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC/A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC.

Facts:On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were killed on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. This tragic incident came to be known as Maguindanao massacre spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and additional charges of rebellion against 197 accused. Almost a year later on November 19 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media entities and members of the academe filed a petition before this court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in this criminal cases be allowed, recording devises be permitted inside the court room to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of device.

Issue: Whether or not the petition to cover the Maguindanao Massacre Trial in both radio and television is allowed.

Held:The Court partially grants pro hac vice petitioners prayer for a live broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to certain guidelines as enumerated. The present petition which asserts the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court. Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.

Mutuc v. COMELEC (36 SCRA 228)Petitioner: Amelito R. Mutucvs.Respondent: Commission on Elections

Facts:The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito Mutuc, a candidate for the position of a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers on 22 October 1970. Petitioner impugned the act of respondent as violative of his right to free speech. Respondent however contended that the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for candidates to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin. It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the phrase and the like.

Issue: Whether jingles falls down on the prohibited electoral propaganda gadgets of R.A. No. 6132.

Held:By virtue of Ejusdem Generis, general words following any enumeration must be of the same class as those specifically referred to. It did contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words and the like. For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.This is a curtailment of Freedom of Expression. The Constitution prohibits the abridgment of the freedom of speech. The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by respondent Commission, laudable as it may be, should not be sought at the cost of the candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest pursuit of his candidacy, but is to be fulfilled in the strict and effective implementation of the Act's limitation in section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by a candidate or by another person with his knowledge and consent.

National Press Club v. COMELEC (207 SCRA 1)Facts:Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election Issue. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.

Issue: Whether or not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 violates the constitutional provision of the freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press.

Held:The court decided that Section 11 (b) curtails the constitutional liberty of the freedom of speech, expression, and of the press. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period i.e., "during the election period." In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods.Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates.The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable.

Adiong v. COMELEC (207 SCRA 713)Petitioner: Blo Umpar Adiongvs.Respondent: Commission on Elections

Facts:COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 which provides that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas, prohibiting posting in "mobile" places, public or private. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the Resolution. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition.

Issue: Whether or not COMELECs prohibition is unconstitutional.

Held:The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. The preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. The so-called balancing of interests individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the other is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections. When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. The regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in its application, if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's opinion of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship.

Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC (357 SCRA 496)Facts:Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin respondent COMELEC from enforcing Section 5.4 of R.A. 9006 or the Fair Election Act which provides that surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election. Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to the voting process posed by election surveys. They point out that no similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. Consequently, they contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of election surveys which are relatively objective.Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of election survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of the electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to meet the evils sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness. Respondent claims that in National Press Club v. COMELEC, a total ban on political advertisements, with candidates being merely allocated broadcast time during the so-called COMELEC space or COMELEC hour was upheld by this Court. In contrast, according to respondent, it states that the prohibition in Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 is much more limited.

Issue: Are the COMELEC Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional?

Held:The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid and unconstitutional because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. It has been held that "mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.COMELEC v. ABS-CBN (323 SCRA 1)Facts:This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc Resolution No. 98-14191 dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body,"RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same."The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make an exit survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately."2 The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We directed the COMELEC to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

Issue:Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any other group, its agents or representatives from conducting exit polls during the May 11 elections.

Held:The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Hence, the COMELEC cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible elections. Quite the contrary, exit polls - properly conducted and publicized - can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of election-fixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec so as to minimize or suppress the incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing in any manner the fundamental rights of our people.

Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals et al., (259 SCRA 529)Petitioner: Iglesia ni Cristovs.Respondent: The Honorable Court of Appeals, Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television and Honorable Henrietta S. Mendoza

Facts:Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo of the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated X i.e., not for public viewing by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law because of petitioner INCs controversial biblical interpretations and its attacks against contrary religious beliefs. Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of Ang Iglesia ni Cristo on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV series indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs. Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues: 1. Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioners TV Program? 2. Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioners religious program?

Held:The court agrees with the Board in saying that it has the power to review petitioners TV Program. Petitioner contends that the term television program [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the respondent Board has the power to review and classify] should not include religious programs like its program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo. A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.The Court however reject petitioners postulate. Petitioners public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. The Court shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.With regards as to whether the Board gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioners religious program the Court voted yes. Any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for attacking either religions, especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the evidence . . . will show that the so-called attacks are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion.The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas. If the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court held: The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled that it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.

Estrada v. Escritor (429 SCRA 1)Complainant: Alejandro Estradavs.Respondent: Soleded S. Escritor

Facts:In a sworn letter-complaint, Alejandro Estrada, complainant, wrote to Judge Caoibes Jr. requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter of Las Pias, is living with a man not her husband. Judge Caoibes referred the letter to Escritor, who stated that there is no truth as to the veracity of the allegation and challenged Estrada, to appear in the open and prove his allegation in the proper court. Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference and Escritor move for inhibition to avoid bias and suspicion in hearing her case. In the conference, Estrada confirmed that he filed a letter-complaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct under the Revised Administrative Code against Escritor for that his frequent visit in the Hall of Justice in Las Pias learned Escritor is cohabiting with another man not his husband.Escritor testified that when she entered judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow since 1998. She admitted that shes been living with Luciano Quilapo Jr. without the benefit of marriage for 20 years and that they have a son. Escritor asserted that as a member of the religious sect known as Jehovahs Witnesses, and having executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness (which allows members of the congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations) jointly with Quilapo after ten years of living together, her conjugal arrangement is in conformity with her religious beliefs and has the approval of the congregation, therefore not constituting disgraceful and immoral conduct.

Issue: Whether or not Escritor is administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct.

Held:Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause, provided that it does not offend compelling state interests. The OSG must then demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case, with no iota of evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to show that the state adopted the least intrusive means. With the Solicitor General utterly failing to prove this element of the test, and under these distinct circumstances, Escritor cannot be penalized.

The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions in cases involving criminal laws of general application, and under these distinct circumstances, such conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for there is a case for exemption from the law based on the fundamental right to freedom of religion. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state.