ARTICLE 7

BESO V. DAGUMAN 323 SCRA 566JAN 28, 2000

FACTS:

Respondent Juan Daguman, MCTC Judge of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan_Pagsanjan, Samar, solemnized the marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso to Bernardito Yman, on August 28, 1987, at the Judges residence in Calbayog City, Samar, or outside his jurisdiction, because complainant was to leave for abroad the same day as she was an OFW, and for several complications. After the wedding, Yman abandoned Beso for no apparent reason. In consequence to that, she then went to Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog to check their marriage contract, from which she learned that said marriage was not registered. Upon learning of the situation, she wrote to Judge Daguman, in which he responded that Yman took all the copies and he retained none.

ISSUES:

Whether or not respondent Judge is liable for solemnizing the marriage outside of his courts jurisdiction;

Whether or not respondent Judge is liable for negligently not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage in the office of the Local Civil Registry

HELD:

A marriage can be held outside the judges chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect but none of these instances were present in the case at hand.

Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should exercise extra care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in its solemnization, he is likewise commanded to observe extra precautions to ensure that the event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the Family Code that - It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate.ANTONIO MECANO V. COA GR No. 103982DEC 11, 1992

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Mecano, a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation, filed a petition for certoriari to nullify the decision of Commission of Audit (COA) in the 7th Indorsement denying him of reimbursement anchored on the provisions of Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) in the amount of Php 40,831.00.

Earlier, the petitioner was hospitalized because of cholecystitis and incurred the abovementioned amount. Under Sec. 699 of RAC, he is entitled to allowances in case of injury, sickness, death incurred in the performance of duty. Hence, the petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses to NBI Director Alfredo Lim forwarding the request to the Secretary of Justice. The request was returned due to the comments of the COA Chairman stating that the Administrative Code of 1987 already repealed the RAC being relied upon. The petitioner resubmitted the request asserting that the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the RAC, including Section 699. Director Lim transmitted the request to the Justice Secretary who recommended the payment to the COA Chairman. The COA Chairman again denied the request asserting the same reason and furthered that Section 699 was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. According to the COA Chairman, the claim may be filed with the Employees' Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987. Eventually, the request was again returned to Director Lim with an advice of elevating the matter in the Supreme Court if he so desires.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated the Revised Administrative Code including Section 699

HELD:

In determining whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent which is manifested in the incorporation of a repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and portions that are intended to be repealed. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.

Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

The repealing clause of the Administrative Code of 1987 is repeal by implication because it failed to identify which specific laws shall be repealed. The failure to indicate specific laws reveal that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws.

NAVARRO V. JUDGE DOMAGTOY 259 SCRA 129JUL 19, 1996

FACTS:

Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and ignorance of the law.

It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda and that they are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and been heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.

ISSUES: Whether or not Judge Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction Whether or not the marriages he solemnized were null and void

HELD:

Yes.Domagtoys defense is not tenable and he did display gross ignorance of the law. Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wifes presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to his former wife. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. On the second issue, the request to hold the wedding outside Domagtoys jurisdiction was only done by one party, the bride, NOT by both parties. More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction. Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

ARTICLE 8

People v Licera

FACTS:

In 1961, Rafael Licera was granted an appointment as secret agent of Governor Leviste. In 1965, accused was charged with illegal possession of firearms. The SC held that where at the time of his appointment, People v. Macarandang (1959) was applicable, which held that the appointment of a civilian as a "secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put[s] him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police" whom section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code exempts from the requirements relating to firearm licenses. Later People v. Mapa (1967) was decided and revoked the Macarandang rule, the earlier case should be held applicable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judicial decision in People v. Macarandang have the force and effect of law?

HELD:

Art. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not law, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the courts upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. The Macarandang rule the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction's legal system.

A new doctrine abrogating an old rule operates prospectively and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule.

Pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time of Licera's appointment as secret agent, which appointment included a grant of authority to possess the Winchester rifle, but as well at the time as of his apprehension, Licera incurred no criminal liability for possession of the said rifle, notwithstanding his non compliance with the legal requirements relating to firearm

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and Rafael Licera is hereby acquitted. Costs de oficio.

People v. Jabinal

FACTS:

The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas finding the accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The validity of the conviction was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Courts ruling in People vs. Mapa.

As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was without the requisite license a permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT appointed by the governor, and was likewise subsequently appended as Confidential Agent, which granted him the authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his official duties as peace officer. Relying on the Supreme Courts decision in People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero, the accused sought for his acquittal.

Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless decided otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero were reversed and subsequently abandoned in people vs. mapa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?

HELD:

The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.

The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, at the time appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

ARTICLE 9

Chu Juan v. Bernas

FACTS:

Plaintiff Chu Jan brought suit against the defendant when on their cockfight match, defendant Lucio Bernas was declared the winner. Each had put up a wager of P160 before the cockfight. Justice of peace court decided that bout was a draw. Defendant appealed to Court of First Instance praying judgment and ordering defendant to abide and comply with rules and regulations governing cockfights to pay P160 and return the other amount which s in safekeeping of Cockpit owner Tomas Almonte. Defendant denied allegations and moved to dismiss cost against plaintiff. Court of First Instance dismissed the appeal without special findings. On plaintiff's motion, an order ordering provincial treasurer and if possible, Municipal Treasurer of Tabacco to release Deposit of P160 and return to plaintiff Chu Jan. Proceedings was forwarded to Supreme Court by means of the proper bill of exceptions

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance ere in dismissing the case without findings since grounds for dismissal pronounced by lower court appealed from ere that court has always dismissed cases of this nature, that he is not familiar with the rules governing cockfights and duties of referees; that he does not know where to find the law and that he knows of no law that governs the right to plaintiff and defendants concerning cockfights.

HELD:

Ignorance of the court or lack of knowledge regarding law applicable to a case submitted to him for decision are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing them without deciding on the issue. Such excuse is less acceptable because foreseeing that a case may arise to which no law would be applicable, the Civil Code in 2nd paragraph of Art 6, provides that Customs of the place shal l be observed and in absence thereof, the general principles of law. Therefore, the judgment and order appealed from are reversed and to record of the proceedings shall remanded to court from when they came for due trial and judgment as provided by law. No special finding is made with regard to cost.

People v. Lorenzo Veneracion

FACTS:

In August 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide committed against a seven-year-old girl. The Presiding judge was Lorenzo Veneracion.

Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which treats of the crime of Rape with Homicide, the penalty imposable shall be death. However, Judge Veneracion refused to impose the death penalty but instead he sentenced the four accused to reclusion perpetua. The city prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the penalty of death be imposed upon the four accused but the judge refused to act.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Veneracion has the discretion to impose a lesser penalty than that imposed by law.

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the law mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose the proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. In this case, the judge must impose the death penalty. This is consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code (Article 9 thereof), which provides that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.

Instant petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death upon private respondents in consonance with respondent judge's finding that the private respondents in the instant case had committed the crime of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659.