digests civil law (art 1-41)

8/9/2019 Digests Civil Law (Art 1-41)

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Missing: Soriano vs people and lbp vs pagayatanG.R. No. L-63915 (16 S!R" 6# "pril $% 19&5'aada vs. ')vera*"!'S:Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public ocials to publish, and/orcause the publication in the Ocial Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters ofinstructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation andadministrative orders, invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern asrecognized by the !"# constitution$+SS,:%hether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders is necessarybefore its enforcement$R,L+NG:&rticle ' of the (ivil (ode provides that )laws shall take e*ect after +fteen days following thecompletion of their publication in the Ocial Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided -he (ourthas ruled that publication in the Ocial Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislationitself does not provide for its e*ectivity date.for then the date of publication is material fordetermining its date of e*ectivity, which is the +fteenth day following its publication.but notwhen the law itself provides for the date when it goes into e*ect$ &rticle ' does not preclude thereuirement of publication in the Ocial Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of itse*ectivity$

-he publication of all presidential issuances )of a public nature or )of general applicability ismandated by law$ Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for +nes, forfeitures or penaltiesfor their violation or otherwise impose a burden or$ the people, such as tax and revenuemeasures, fall within this category$ Other presidential issuances which apply only to particularpersons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be publishedon the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned$Publication is, therefore, mandatory$ G$0$ 1o$ 2"32" 4une 3, '5#

1&G6&6&78&1G 9&0&:7-& 1G 87-7O 9&87G&87G, 71($, Petitioner, vs$97:7-&0; 8<071= 8=0>7(=8 . P<7:7PP71= >=-=0&18 &??&708 O??7(=, @=P&0-9=1- O? 1&-7O1&: @=?=18=, 0espondent$?&(-8AOn ' 4uly !3", by virtue of Proclamation 1o$ B'#, President (arlos P$ Garcia reserved parcels of land in the9unicipalities of Pasig, -aguig, ParaCaue, Province of 0izal and Pasay (ity for a military reservation$ -hemilitary reservation, then known as ?ort %illiam 9c6inley, was later on renamed ?ort &ndresDonifacio E?ort DonifacioF$ On '2 9ay !", President ?erdinand =$ 9arcos EPresident 9arcosF issuedProclamation 1o$ '52, amending Proclamation 1o$ B'#, which excluded a certain area of ?ort Donifacio andreserved it for a national shrine$ -he excluded area is now known as :ibingan ng mga Dayani, which is under theadministration of herein respondent 9ilitary 8hrine 8ervices

H Philippine >eterans &*airs Oce E988.P>&OF$ &gain, on " 4anuary !2, President 9arcos issuedProclamation 1o$ 'B", further amending Proclamation 1o$ B'#, which excluded barangays :owerDicutan, Ipper Dicutan and 8ignal >illage from the operation of Proclamation 1o$ B'# and declared it open fordisposition under the provisions of 0epublic &ct 1os$ E0$&$F '"B and "#5$ &t the bottom of Proclamation 1o'B", President 9arcos made a handwritten addendum, which readsA JP$8$H -his includes %estern Dicutan E8G@$F ?erdinand =$ 9arcosJ' -he crux of the controversy started when Proclamation 1o$ 'B" was published in the Ocial Gazette on #?ebruary !2, without the above.uoted addendum$ ;ears later, President (orazon ($ &uino issuedProclamation 1o$ "' which substantially reiterated Proclamation 1o$ 'B", as published, but this time excluded

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:ots and ' of %estern Dicutan from the operation of Proclamation 1o$ B'# and declared the said lots open fordisposition under the provisions of 0$&$ '"B and "#5$ -hrough the years, informal settlers increased andoccupied some areas of ?ort Donifacio including portions of the :ibingan ng mga Dayani$ -hus, Drigadier Genera?redelito Dautista issued General Order 1o$ #'# creating -ask ?orce Dantay E-?DF, primarily to prevent furtherunauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at ?ort Donifacio$ On '" &ugust !!!,members of petitioner 1agkakaisang 9aralita ng 8itio 9asigasig, 7nc$ E19897F +led a Petition with the(ommission on 8ettlement of :and Problems E(O8:&PF$ -hus, on 8eptember '55, (O8:&P issued a0esolution granting the Petition and declaring the portions of land in uestion alienable and disposable, with&ssociate (ommissioner :ina &guilar.General dissenting$ -he (O8:&P ruled that the handwritten addendumof President 9arcos was an integral part of Proclamation 1o$ 'B", and was therefore, controlling$ -he intentionof the President could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others$ <erein respondent 988.P>&O +led a 9otion for 0econsideration, which was denied by the (O8:&P$ 988.P>&O +led a Petition with the(ourt of &ppeals seeking to reverse the (O8:&P 0esolutions$ -he (ourt of &ppeals ?irst @ivision rendered theassailed @ecision granting 988.P>&OKs Petition,Doth 19897 and %D:O&7 appealed the said @ecision$7ssueA %hether or not the handwritten addendum was considered published also at the time theProclamation was published$<=:@A1o$ (onsidering that petitioners were occupying :ots # and " of %estern Dicutan EsubLect lotsF, their claims wereanchored on the handwritten addendum of President 9arcos to Proclamation 1o$ 'B"$ -hey allege that theformer President intended to include all %estern Dicutan in the reclassi+cation of portions of ?ort Donifacio asdisposable public land when he made a notation Lust below the printed version of Proclamation 1o$ 'B"$<owever, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation 1o$ 'B" waspublished in the Ocial Gazette$ -he resolution of whether the subLect lots were declared as reclassi+ed anddisposable lies in the determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President 9arcos has the forceand e*ect of law$ 7n relation thereto, &rticle ' of the (ivil (ode expressly providesA &0-$ '$ :awsshall take e*ect after +fteen days following the completion of their publication in the OcialGazette, unless it is otherwise provided$ -his (ode shall take e*ect one year after suchpublication$ Inder the above provision, the reuirement of publication is indispensable to give e*ect to thelaw, unless the law itself has otherwise provided$ -he phrase Junless otherwise providedJ refers to a di*erente*ectivity date other than after +fteen days following the completion of the lawKs publicationin the Ocial Gazette, but does not imply that the reuirement of publication may be dispensed with$ -he issueof the reuirement of publication was already settled in the landmark case -aCada v$ <on$ -uvera$ (ourt cannotrely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation 1o$ 'B" as published$ %ithout publication, thenote never had any legal force and e*ect$ ?urthermore, under 8ection 'B, (hapter , Dook 7 of the&dministrative (ode, Jthe publication of any law, resolution or other ocial documents in the OcialGazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority$J -hus, whether or not President 9arcos intended toinclude %estern Dicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative$ 8imply put, the courts may not speculate as to

the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing in the law$" -his (ourt cannot rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently, there is none$ 7n Pagpalain <aulers, 7nc$v$ <on$ -raLano,2 we ruled that Junder &rticle 2 of the (ivil (ode, MLudicial decisions applying or interpreting the lawsor the (onstitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines$M -his does not mean, however, thatcourts can create law$ -he courts exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting it$ -o allow otherwise would beviolative of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply orinterpret the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will notarrogate unto itself the task of legislating$J -he remedy sought in these Petitions is not Ludicial interpretation, butanother legislation that would amend the















law Nto include petitionersM lots in the reclassi+cation$

retors% +n.% v. NLR!

*ats:7n 8eptember !"!, =rectors recruited ?lorencio Durgos to work as 8ervice (ontract @river in8audi &rabia for ' months with a salary of 3 and an allowance of 3 per month$ Durgoswill also be entitled a bonus of ooo if after the '.month period, he renews/extends hiscontract without availing his vacation or home leave <is contract was approved by the 9inistryof :abor and =mployment$<owever, the contract was not implemented$ 7n @ecember !"!, =rectors noti+ed Durgos thatthe position of 8ervice @river was no longer available$ On @ecember B, !"!, they executedanother contract changing his position from driver to laborer with a salary of 53 and anallowance of 53 per month$ -his contract was not submitted to the 9:=$On @ecember !"!, Durgos left the country and worked at =rectors Duraidah 8ports (omplexproLect in 8audi &rabia as a laborer$ <e received a monthly salary and allowance of '5$ Durgosrenewed his contract after one year and his salary and allowance were increased to '#$Durgos returned to Philippines on &ugust !2$ <e then invoked his +rst employment contract$<e demanded the di*erence between his salary and allowance in teh said contract and theamount paid to him$On 9arch !2', Durgos +led wiht the :abor &rbiter a complaint for underpayment of wages andnon.payment of overtime pay and bonus$%hile his case was still in conciliation stage, =O "!" creating PO=& was established 8ec BEaF of=F "!" vested the PO=& with Joriginal and exclusive Lurisdiction over all cases including moneyclaims, involving employer.employee relationship arising out of or by virtue of any law orcontract involving ?ilipino workers for overseas employment$J@espite =O "!", :abor &rbiter proceeded to try the case and rendered Ludgement in favor ofDurgos$ 7n view of =O "!", =rectors uestioned the Lurisdiction of the :& in 1:0($ 1:0( dismissedthe petitionerMs appeal and upheld the :&Ms Lurisdiction$

+ss)e:%hether or not =O "!" applies retroactively to a*ect pending cases, including the complaint +ledby Durgos$

/eld:1o$ -he rule is that Lurisdiction over the subLect matter is determined by the law in force at thetime of the commencement of the action$ On 9arch #, !2', at the time private respondent+led his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential @ecree 1o$ !and Presidential @ecree 1o$ #! which vested the 0egional Oces of the 9inistry of :abor andthe :abor &rbiters with Joriginal and exclusive Lurisdiction over all cases involving employer.employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving ?ilipinoworkers for overseas employment$J &t the time of the +ling of the complaint, the :abor &rbiter

had clear Lurisdiction over the same$G$0$ 1o$ B"!B, 4an$ '5, '55B B'5 8(0& #B!*"!'SQ &rturo 9aruez entered into a (ontract to 8ell with -ransamerican 8ales and=xpositions E-8=F whereby 9aruez is to buy a 3'$3 s$m$ lot in @iliman, R( witha #.story townhouse unit denominated as Init 1o$ 5 for a total consideration of P255,555Q On 9ay '', !2!, -8= obtained a loan from ?=D-( for P",35,555 and mortgagedthe property covered by -(- 1o$ 3'3B Ewhich includes in it Init 1o$ 5Fo FEBTC relied on TSE’s representation that all requisite permits and licenses from thegovernment agencies concerned were complied withQ -8= failed to pay the loan and ?=D-( foreclosed the 0=9



Q ?=D-( won as the highest bidder EP3$" 9F in the auction saleQ 9aruez has already paid P55,555 when he stopped payment since theconstruction of his townhouse slackenedQ 9aruez instituted a case with the Oce of &ppeals, &dLudication, and :egal&*airs EO&&:&F of the <:I0D and he wono -he mortgage was deemed unenforceableo Ordered ?=D-( to compute and allow 9aruez to continue payment of amortizationso Ordered 0@ of R( to cancel the annotations of the mortgage indebtednesso Ordered 0@ of R( to cancel the annotation of the (erti+cate of 8ale in favorof ?=D-(Q ?=D-( +led a Petition for 0eview but was deniedQ ?=D-( appealed the decision to the Oce of the President but was deniedQ ?=D-( +led a Petition for review to (& under 0ule B# but was deniedQ <ence this Petition for 0eview under 0ule B3+SS,S 0 "RG,MN'S2N te 4ortgage ontrat violated Se. 1& o 7 958% ene% void insoar astird persons are onerned/L7+NG 0 R"'+ 7!+7N7+ S 8ec$ 2 of P@ !3" providesAo N1o mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developerwithout prior written approval of the &uthority$ 8uch approval shall not begranted unless it is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall beused for the development of the condominium or subdivision proLect ande*ective measures have been provided to ensure such utilization$ -he loanvalue of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined and thebuyer thereof, if any, shall be noti+ed before the release of the loan$ -hebuyer may, at his option, pay his installment for the lot or unit directly to themortgagee who shall apply the payments to the corresponding mortgageindebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for, with a viewto enabling said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit promptly after fullpayment thereofKQ -hat the subLect of the mortgage loan was the entire land and not the individualsubdivided lots, does not take the loan beyond the coverage of 8ec$ 2$ Indeniably,the lot was also mortgaged when the entire parcel of land, of which it was a part,was encumbered$Q -he case of P1D vs$ Oce of the President provides that P@ !3" was intended toprotect innocent lot buyers from scheming subdivision developers$Q &s between the small lot owners and the gigantic +nancial institutions, which thedevelopers deal with, it is obvious that the law, as an instrument of social Lustice,must favor the weak$o Danks are presumed to have conducted the usual Ndue diligenceK checkingand ascertainingo 8mall lot owners are powerless to discover the attempt of the land developer

to hypothecate the property being sold tot hemQ etitioner;s arg)4ent tat it <as an innoent 4ortgagee la=s 4erito &s a general rule, when there is nothing on the certi+cate of title toindicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, the purchase isnot reuired to go beyond the titleo <owever, where the purchaser or mortgagee has knowledge of a defect orlack of title in the vendor, or that he was aware of sucient facts to inducea reasonably prudent man to inuire into the status of the property inlitigation, he must go beyond the titleQ Petitioner should have considered that it was dealing with a town hose proLect thatwas already in progresso & reasonable person should have been aware that, to +nance the proLect,



sources of funds could have been used other than the loan, which wasintended to serve the purpose only partiallyo <ence, there was a need to verify whether any party of the property wasalready the subLect of any other contract involving buyers or potentialbuyersQ 7n granting the loan, the bank should not have been content merely with a cleantitle, considering the presence of circumstances indicating the need for a thoroughinvestigation of the existence of buyers like respondentQ <aving been wanting in care and prudence, the bank cannot be deemed to be aninnocent mortgageeQ -he bank should not have relied on -8=Ks representations and it must have reuiredthe submission of certi+ed true copies of those documents and veri+ed theirauthenticity through its own independent e*ort$?=:7P= O$ 9&GD&1I&, (&0:O8 @= :& (0IS, 0=9; &01&7S, D7::; &01&7S, 0O::; &01&7S,@O971GO 8&:&0@&, 4I:7O (&<7:7G and 17(&1O0 :&DI=1, vs$ 07S&:71O I;G$0$ 1o$ 55#$ 9ay , '553

?actsA &s a +nal conseuence of the +nal and executory decision of the 8upreme (ourt whicharmed with modi+cation the decision of the 1:0(, hearings were conducted to determine theamount of wage di*erentials due the eight petitioners$ -he petitioners +led a 9otion for 7ssuanceof %rit of =xecution$ 0izalino Iy +led a 9anifestation reuesting that the cases be terminatedand closed, stating that the Ludgment award as computed had been complied with to thesatisfaction of petitioners$ 8aid 9anifestation was also signed by the eight petitioners$ -ogetherwith the manifestation is a 4oint &davit dated 9ay 3, !!" of petitioners, attesting to thereceipt of payment from respondent and waiving all other bene+ts due them in connection withtheir complaint$ On October '5, !!", six of the eight petitioners +led a 9anifestation reuestingthat the cases be considered closed and terminated as they are already satis+ed of what theyhave received from respondent$ -ogether with said 9anifestation is a 4oint &davit in the localdialect, of the six petitioners attesting that they have no more collectible amount fromrespondent and if there is any, they are abandoning and waiving the same$

7ssuesA $ %hether or not the +nal and executory Ludgment of the 8upreme (ourt could besubLect to compromise settlementT'$ %hether or not the petitionersK adavit waiving their awards in the labor case executedwithout the assistance of their counsel and labor arbiter is valid$

<eldA $ -here is no Lusti+cation to disallow a compromise agreement, solely because it wasentered into after +nal Ludgment$ -he validity of the agreement is determined by compliancewith the reuisites and principles of contracts, not by when it was entered into$ Petitionersvoluntarily entered into the compromise agreement$ (ircumstances also reveal that respondenthas already complied with its obligation pursuant to the compromise agreement$ <aving alreadybene+ted from the agreement, estoppel bars petitioners from challenging it$'$ -he presence or the absence of counsel when a waiver is executed does not determine itsvalidity$ -here is no law reuiring the presence of a counsel to validate a waiver$ -he test is

whether it was executed voluntarily, freely and intelligentlyT and whether the consideration for itwas credible and reasonable$ %here there is clear proof that a waiver was wangled from anunsuspecting or a gullible person, the law must step in to annul such transaction$ 7n the presentcase, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that their consent had been vitiated$

*.*. !R,> 0 !.% +N!. vs. /R !NS'R,!'+N !RR"'+NG.R. No. 1&85$1 Mar 1% $?1$

*ats:

8ometime in '55B, ??((7 entered into a contract with the @epartment of Public %orks and<ighways E@P%<F for the construction of the 9agsaysay >iaduct, known as the :ower &gusan



@evelopment ProLect$ On &ugust !, '55B, ??((7, in turn, entered into a 8ubcontract &greementwith <0 (onstruction (orporation E<0((F for the supply of materials, labor, euipment, tools andsupervision for the construction of a portion of the said proLect called the =ast Dank :evee and(ut.O* (hannel in accordance with the speci+cations of the main contract$ Pursuant to the8ubcontract &greement, <0(( would submit to ??((7 a monthly progress billing which the latterwould then pay, subLect to stipulated deductions, within #5 days from receipt thereof$

-he parties agreed that the reuests of <0(( for payment should include progress

accomplishment of its completed works as approved by ??((7$ &dditionally, they agreed toconduct a Loint measurement of the completed works of <0(( together with the representativeof @P%< and consultants to arrive at a common uantity$ -hereafter, <0(( commenced theconstruction of the works pursuant to the 8ubcontract &greement$ <owever, before the proLectwas completed, <0(( pursuant to the arbitration clause in the subcontract agreement +led withthe (onstruction 7ndustry &rbitration (ommission a complaint praying that ??(7 pay the overdueapplication plus legal interests they have not paid$ ??((7 maintained that <0(( failed to complywith the condition stated under the 8ubcontract &greement for the payment of the latterKsprogress billings, i$e$ Loint measurement of the completed works, and, hence, it was Lusti+ed innot paying the amount stated in <0((Ks progress billings$

+ss)e:%hether or not ??((7 is already barred from contesting <0((Ks valuation of the completed

works having waived its right to demand the Loint measurement reuirement$

R)ling: -he 8upreme (ourt held that ??((7 had waived its right to demand for a Loint

measurement of <0((Ks completed works under the 8ubcontract &greement$ ?urther, on accountof its failure to demand the Loint measurement of <0((Ks completed works, had e*ectivelywaived its right to ask for the conduct of the same as a condition sine ua non to <0((Kssubmission of its monthly progress billings$ Dasically, the instant issue calls for a determinationas to which of the partiesK respective valuation of accomplished works should be given credence$??((7 claims that its valuation should be upheld since the same was the result of a measurementof the completed works conducted by it and the @P%<$

On the other hand, <0(( maintains that its valuation should be upheld on account of??((7Ks failure to observe the Loint measurement reuirement in ascertaining the extent of itscompleted works$ ??((7 admits that in all three instances where it paid <0(( for its progressbillings, it never reuired compliance with the aforeuoted contractual provision of a prior Lointuanti+cation$ 8uch repeated omission may reasonably be construed as a waiver by ??((7 of itscontractual right to reuire compliance of said condition and it is now too late in the day to soimpose it$ &rticle of the (ivil (ode expressly provides that )rights may be waived unless thewaiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs$ -he tribunalcannot see any such violation in this case$

*irst Metro vs ste del Sol

GR No. 11&11% 15 Nove4ber $??1369 S!R" 99

*"!'S ?97( granted =ste del 8ol a loan to +nance a sports/resort complex in 9ontalban, 0izalInder the agreement, the interest was U pa based on the diminishing balance$ 7n case ofdefault, an acceleration clause was provided and the amount due is subLect to '5U one.timepenalty on the amount due and such amount shall bear interest at the highest rate permitted bylaw$ respondent executed a 0=9, individual continuing suretyship and an underwritingagreement whereby ?97( shall underwrite the public o*ering of one P'5,555 common shares ofrespondentKs capital stock for one.time underwriting fee of P'55,555$ ?or failure to pay itsobligation, ?97( caused the foreclosure of the 0=9$ &t the public auction, ?7( was the highest



bidder$ Petitioner +led to collect for alleged de+ciency balance against respondents since it failedto collect from the sureties, plus interest at 'U pa$ the trial court ruled in favor of ?97($0espondents appealed before the (& which held that the fees provided for in the Inderwritingand (onsultacy &greements were mere subterfuges to camouVage the excessively usuriousinterest charged$ -he (& ordered ?97( to reimburse petitioner representing what is ue topetitioner and what is due to respondent$

+SS, %hether or not the interests are lawful

/L7 1o$ an apparently lawful loan is usurious when it is intended that additionacompensation for the loan be disguised by an ostensibly unrelated contract for the payment bythe borrower for the lenderKs services which re of little value or which are not in fact to berendered$ &rticle !3" clearly providesA contracts and stipulations, under any cloak or devicewhatever, intended to circumvent the law agaistn usury shall be void$ -he borrower may recoverin accordance with the laws on usury$

(ase -itleA 9&1O:O P$ 8&98O1, petitioner, vs$ <O1$ 0=;1&:@O D$ @&%&;, in his capacityas Presiding

4udge, 0egional -rial (ourt of Ruezon (ity, Dranch !5, P=OP:= O? -<= P<7:7PP71=8 and(&-=0P7::&0, 71($, respondents$ EG$0$ 1os$ 553B.33, 4uly ', '55BF ?actsA-he petitioner, owner/proprietor of 7--7 8hoes/9ano 8hoes 9anufactuirng(orporation,allegedly sold or o*ers the sale of garment product using the trademark W(aterpillarXto the preLudice of (aterpillar, 7nc$, private respondent in this case$ -he respondent +led the casewiththe 0-($ -he petitioner uestioned the Lurisdiction of the trial court over the o*ensechargedcontending that the case should be +led with the 9-( because violation of unfaircompetition is penalized with imprisonment not exceeding years under 0& "!$7ssueA%hichcourt has Lurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of intellectual propertyrightsY0uling of the (ourtA-he 8( held that under 8ection # of the 7P(, actions for unfair competitionshall be brought before the proper courts with appropriate Lurisdiction under existing laws$ -helaw contemplatedin 8ection # of 7P( is 0& otherwise known as the -rademark :aw$ 8ection'" of the-rademark :aw provides that Lurisdiction over cases for infringement of registeredmarks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or representation, islodged with the(ourt of ?irst 7nstance Enow 0egional -rial (ourtF$ 8ince 0& "! is a general lawand 7P( inrelation to -rademark :aw is a special law, the latter shall prevail$ &ctions for unfaircompetitiontherefore should be +led with the 0-($

!MM+SS+NR * +N'RN"L R@N, vs. R+M'NG. R. No. 16$155 ")g)st $&% $??8

*ats:On &pril B, '555, the -axpayer +led its petition for review claiming refund based on its

+nal adLusted return +led on &pril B, !!2, (ounting #3 days a year pursuant to &rticle # ofthe (ivil (ode, the (-& found that the petition was +led beyond the two year respective period

euivalent to "#5 days for +ling the claim under 8ection ''! of the 170(, ruling that the petitionwas +led "# days after the +ling of the return$On &ppeal, the (& reversed the (-& and ruledthat &rticle # of the (ivil (ode did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year$

+ss)e:%hether or not the (ourt of &ppeals erred in reversing the (-&$

R)ling: -he 8( armed the (&Ms reversal but ruled that the basis for the reversal is =O '!' of the

&dministrative (ode of !2", a more recent law, which provides that a year is composed of 'calendar months$



8ection # provides that a )year shall be understood to be ' calendar months$ Dotharticle # of the (ivil (ode and 8ection # of the &dministrative (ode of !2" deal with the samesubLect matter Z the computation of legal periods$ Inder the (ivil (ode, a year is euivalent to#3 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year$ Inder the &dministrative (ode of !2",however, a year is composed of ' calendar months and the number of days is irrelevant$ -hereobviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the(ivil (ode and the &dministrative (ode of !2"$ ?or this reason, the 8upreme (ourt held that8ection #, (hapter >777, Dook 7 of the &dministrative (ode of !2", being the more recent law,governs the computation of legal periods$

Ising this, the petition was +led on the last day of the 'Bth month from the day thetaxpayer +led its +nal adLusted return$ ::=@O >8$ ::=@O)@ismissed =mployee to claim G878 0eimbursement PO1=1-=A 4ustice 1&(<I0&, '55?&(-8APetitioner :ledo +led an administrative case to her husband,respondent &tty$ :ledo, charging him withimmorality, abandonment, and conduct unbecoming of a publicocial$7n the investigation, it was established that &tty$ :ledo had left his family to live with another womanwithwhom he also begot children, and that he failed to provide support for his family$0-( rendered a decisiondismissing &tty$ :ledo from service and forfeiture of all his retirement bene+tsand leave credits$&few years havepassed, &tty$ :ledoKs son wrote a letter to (4 Panganiban relating that his father hadbeen bedridden after su*ering a severe stroke and acute renal failure, and that he had been abandonedby hismistress, and had been under his care$ <e appealed to the court to reconsider its decisionspecially the forfeiture of leave credits, which money would be used to pay for his fatherKsmedicalexpenses$ <e alsoasked the (ourt for retroactive application of the (ourtKs ruling subseuent to hisfatherKsdismissal,wherein the (ourt ruled that despite being dismissed from the service, governmentemployees are entitled tothe monetary euivalent of their leave credits since these were earned priorto dismissal$-reating the letter asmotion for reconsideration, the court granted the same$?urther, &tty$ :ledoKs son wrote another letter and askedfor Ludicial clemency in connection with hisfatherKs claim for refund of the latterKs personal contributions to G878$

-he G878 Doard said that (esar is not entitled to the refund of his personal contributions oftheretirement premiums because Jit is the policy of the G878 that an employee/member who hadbeendismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement bene+ts cannot recover the retirementpremiumshe has paid unless the dismissal provides otherwise$J788I=8A%/1 a government employee, dismissed from theservice for cause, be allowed to recover the personalcontributions he paid to the Government 8ervice 7nsurance

8ystem EG878F0I:71GA-he court granted &tty$ :ledoKs sonKs petition and directed G878 to return to &tty$ :ledo his ownpremiums and voluntary deposits, if any, plus interest of three percent per annum, compoundedmonthly$-hecourt re.examined the laws governing the G878$8ection EdF of (ommonwealth &ct 1o$ 2, as amendedreadsAEdF Ipon dismissal for cause or on voluntary separation, he shall be entitled only to hisownpremiums and voluntary deposits, if any, plus interest of three per centum per annum,compoundedmonthly$-wo laws were passed amending (ommonwealth &ct 1o$ 2$ -hese are P@ B and 0& 2'!$-herepealing clause of P$@$ 1o$ B readsA8ection B2$ 0epealing (lause$



&ll laws or parts of law speci+cally inconsistent herewith shall beconsidered amended or repealedaccordingly$On the other hand 0$&$ 1o$ 2'!Ks repealing clause statesA 8=($ #$ 0epealing (lause$ H&ll laws and any other law or parts of law speci+cally inconsistentherewith are hereby repealed ormodi+ed accordinglyA Provided, -hat the rights under existinglaws, rules and regulations vested upon oracuired by an employee who is already in theservice as of the e*ectivity of this &ct shall remain in forceand e*ectA Provided, further, -hatsubseuent to the e*ectivity of this &ct, a new employee or an employee whohas previouslyretired or separated and is reemployed in the service shall be covered by theprovisions of this&ct$?ollowing the decision in 9ecano vs$ (O&, the court classi+ed the twoclauses as implied repeals andruled that none of the said laws substituted the provision of8ection EdF of the (ommonwealth &ct1o$ 2$ -herefore, the said act should apply to theinstant case$

G$0$ 1o$ 3!2 ?ebruary , '5 D&;&1 9I1&, as represented by 0ep$ 8&-I0 O(&9PO, 0ep$ (078P71 D=:-0&1, and 0ep$ :7S&:$9&S&,Petitioner,vs$&:D=0-O 0O9I:O, in his capacity as =xecutive 8ecretary, and D:&8 ?$ OP:=, in his capacityas8ecretary of ?oreign &*airs,0espondents$>=:&8(O, 40$, 4$A ?actsAPetitioner Dayan 9una is a duly registered party.list group established to represent themarginalized sectorsof society$ 0espondent Dlas ?$ Ople, now deceased, was the 8ecretary of?oreign &*airs during the period materialto thiscase$ 0espondent &lberto 0omulo was impleadedin his capacity as then =xecutive 8ecretary$0ome 8tatute of the 7nternational (riminal (ourt$ <aving a keydeterminative bearing on this case is the 0ome 8tatuteestablishing the 7nternational (riminal (ourt E7((F withthe power to exercise its Lurisdiction over persons for themostserious crimes of international concern and shall becomplementary to the national criminal Lurisdictions-heserious crimes adverted to cover those considered graveunder international law, such as genocide, crimesagainsthumanity, war crimes, and crimes ofaggression$On @ecember '2, '555, the 0P, through (harge d[&*aires=nriue &$ 9analo, signedthe 0ome 8tatute which, by itsterms,is subLect to rati+cation, acceptance or approval bythesignatory states$ &s of the +ling of the instant petition, only !' out of the #! signatory countriesappear to havecompleted the rati+cation, approval and concurrence process$ -he Philippines isnot among the !'$7ssueA %hether or not the 0P.I8 1on 8urrender &greement is void ab initio for contracting obligations thatare eitherimmoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of internationallaw$<eldA 1o$ Petitioner urges that the&greement be struck down as void ab initio for imposingimmoral obligationsand/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles ofinternational law$ -he immoral aspectproceedsfrom the fact that the &greement, as petitionerwould put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibilityfor unimaginable atrocities that deeply

shock the conscience of humanityT it precludes our country from deliveringan &merican criminal tothe 7(($-he above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position, which, as alreadydiscussed, contends thatthe 0P, by entering into the &greement, virtually abdicated itssovereignty and in theprocess undermined its treatyobligations under the 0ome 8tatute, contraryto international law principles$-he (ourt is not persuaded$ 8uce it to state in this regard thatthe non.surrender agreement, as aptly described bythe 8olicitor General, is an assertion by thePhilippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law$-he agreement is arecognition of the primacy and competence of the countrys Ludiciary to try o*enses underitsnational criminal laws and dispense Lustice fairly and Ludiciously$ Petitioner, labors under theerroneous impressionthat the &greement would allow ?ilipinos and &mericans committing highcrimes of international concern to escapecriminal trial and punishment$ -his is manifestlyincorrect$ Persons who may have committed acts penalized underthe 0ome 8tatute can be



prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the I8T or with the consent of the 0P orthe I8,before the 7((, assuming that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to the 0ome8tatute havebeen met$Perspective wise, what the &greement contextually prohibits is thesurrender by either party of individuals tointernational tribunals, like the 7((, without the consentof the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crimeunder its existing laws$ %ith thisview, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal Lurisdiction pursuant to the non.surrender agreement overan o*enseconsidered criminal by both Philippine laws and the 0ome 8tatute7nternational&greementsT treaties and executive agreements$ Inder international law, there is no di*erencebetweentreaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding e*ects on the contractingstates concerned, as long as thenegotiating functionaries have remained within their powers$<owever, a treaty has greater )dignity than anexecutive agreement, because its constitutional ecacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behindit the authority of the President, the 8enate, and the peopleT a rati+ed treaty, unlike an executiveagreement, takes precedence over anyprior statutory enactment$ Petitioner, in this case, arguesthat the 1on.8urrender &greementbetween the Philippinesand the I8 is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of atreatyT hence, it must be duly concurred inby the 8enate$ Petitioner relies on the case,(ommissioner of (ustoms v$ =astern 8ea -rading, in which the (ourtstatedA international agreements involving political issues or changes of nationalpolicy and those involvinginternational arrangements of a permanent character usually take theform of treatiesT while those embodyingadLustments of detail carrying out well establishednational policies and traditions and those involving arrangementsof a more or less temporarynature take the form of executive agreements$ &ccording to petitioner, the subLect of the &greementdoes not fall under any of the subLect.categories that are enumerated in the =astern 8ea -radingcase thatmay be covered by an executive agreement, such as commercial/consular relations,most.favored nation rights,patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal andnavigation arrangements and settlement of claims$ -he8upreme (ourt held, however, that thecategorization of subLect matters that may be covered by internationalagreements mentioned in=astern 8ea -rading is not cast in stone$ -here are no hard and fast rules on the proprietyofentering, on a given subLect, into a treaty or an executive agreement as an instrument ofinternational relations$-he primary considerationin the choice of the form of agreement is the partiesK intent and desire to craft aninternational agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests$ -he matterof form takes a back seat when it comes to e*ectiveness and binding e*ect of the enforcementof a treaty or an executive agreement, asthe parties in either international agreement each laborunder the pacta sunt servandaprinciple$

7nternational &greementsT limitations on sovereignty$ -he 0P, by entering into the &greement, does thereby abdicateits sovereignty, abdication being done by its waiving or abandoning itsright to seek recourse through the 0ome8tatute of the 7(( for erring &mericans committinginternational crimes in the country$ &s it were, the &greementis but a form of armance and con+rmation of the PhilippinesK national criminal Lurisdiction$1ational criminal Lurisdiction being primary, it is always the responsibility and within the prerogative of the 0Peither to prosecutecriminal o*enses eually covered by the 0ome 8tatute or to accede to the

Lurisdiction of the 7(($ -hus, the



Philippines may decide to try )persons of the I8, as the term is understood in the &greement, under our nationalcriminal Lustice systemT or it may opt not to exercise its criminal Lurisdictionover its erring citizens or over I8)persons committing high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal Lurisdictionof the 7(( overthem$ 7n the same breath, the I8 must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with respect to )persons of the0P committing high crimes within I8 territorial Lurisdiction$ Dy their nature, treaties andinternational agreementsactually have a limiting e*ect on the otherwise encompassing andabsolute nature of sovereignty$ Dy their voluntaryact, nations may decide to surrender or waivesome aspects of their state power or agree to limit the exercise of theirotherwise exclusive andabsolute Lurisdiction$ -he usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender may bethegreater bene+ts derived from a pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to grantthe sameprivileges or immunities to the other

'+NG vs. @L>-'+NGG.R. No. 16656$ Mar 31% $??9

*ats:On October ', !!#, after being married for more than 2 years to petitioner and while theiryoungest child was only two years old, (armen +led a veri+ed petition before the 0-( of (ebu(ity for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on &rticle # of the ?amily (ode$ 8heclaimed that DenLamin su*ered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebrationof their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter$

On 4anuary !, !!2, the lower court rendered its decision declaring the marriage betweenpetitioner and respondent null and void$ -he 0-( gave credence to @r$ OnateKs +ndings and theadmissions made by DenLamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to bepsychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage$

On October !, '555, the petitioner appealed to the (&, reversing the trial courtKsdecision$

+ss)e:%hether or not the (& correctly ruled that the reuirement of proof of psychological

incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on &rticle # of the ?amily(ode has been realized

R)ling:1o$ Dy the very nature of case involving the application of &rticle #, it is logical and

understood to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding thepsychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, Luridical antecedent,

gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity$ <owever, such opinions, while highlyadvisable, are not conditions in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage$ &t best,courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining themerits of a given case$ 7n fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a +ndingof psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the personconcerned need not be resorted to$ -he trial court, as in any other given case presented beforeit, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties butalso on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings$

Dut where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional andexpert opinion of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a partyKs alleged



psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and according, beweighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage$

-he petition for review on certiorari is granted$

!MM+SS+NR * +N'RN"L R@N, vs. R+M'N RR' GR,% +N!.G.R. No. 16$155 ")g)st $&% $??8

*ats:On &pril B, !!2 Primetown Property Group$ 7nc$ +led its +nal adLusted return$ On 9arch

, !!! Gilbert ;ap, vice chair of Primetown Property Group$ 7nc$, +led for the refund or taxcredit of income tax paid in !!"$ <owever, it was not acted upon$ -hus Primetown +led apetition for review but the (ourt of -ax &ppeals dismissed it claiming that it was +led beyond thetwo.year reglementary period provided by section ''! of the 1ational 7nternal 0evenue (ode$

-he (ourt of -ax &ppeals further argued that in 1ational 9arketing (orp$ vs$ -ecson the 8upreme(ourt ruled that a year is eual to #3 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leapyear$

+ss)e:%hether or not the respondentKs petition was +led within the two.year reglementary

period$

R)ling: -he 8upreme (ourt held that the petition was +led within the two.year reglementary

period because &rticle # of the 1ew (ivil (ode that provides that a year is composed of #3years is repealed by =xecutive Order '!' or the &dministrative (ode of the Philippines$ Inder=xecutive Order '!', a year is composed of ' calendar months$

=IG=17O 0$ 0=;=8, Loined by -79O-<; 4O8=P< 9$ 0=;=8, 9&$ G0&(7& 8$ 0=;=8,0O9&1 G&D07=:9$ 0=;=8, and 9&$ &1G=:& 8$ 0=;=8, petitioners,vs$:7D0&@& ?$ 9&I07(7O EdeceasedF and :=O17@& ?$ 9&I07(7O, respondents$ 1ovember 'B, '55 G$0$ 1o$ "3525?&(-8A$ =ugenio owns a parcel of land in -uro, Docaue, Dulacan EB,3'" suare meters, more or less, andcovered by a

-(- ... property was adLudicated to =ugenio by virtue of an extraLudicial settlementamong the heirs followingthe death of his parentsF$'$ :ibrada ?$ 9auricio E:ibrada, @=(=&8=@F and her daughter :eonida ?$ 9auricio E:eonidaF+led a complaint before the @&0&D of 9alolos, Dulacan alleging that theyKre the legal heirs ofGodofredo 9auricio who was the lawful and registered tenant of =ugenio throughhis predecessors.in.interest to the subLect landE that from !# until his death in 9ay

!!B,Godofredo had been working on the subLect land and introduced improvements consisting of fruit.bearing trees, seasonal crops, a residential house and other permanent improvementsT thatthrough fraud,deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, =ugenio caused the preparation of adocument denominated as 6asunduandated '2 8eptember !!B to eLect respondents from thesubLect property, and had the same notarized by1otary Public 9a$ 8arah G$ 1icolas in Pasig,9etro 9anilaT that :ibrada never appeared before the 1otary PublicTthat :ibrada was illiterateand the contents of the 6asunduanwere not read nor explained to herT that =ugenio took undueadvantage of the weakness, age, illiteracy,ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of :ibrada inthe execution of the 6asunduan



rendering it void for lack of consentT and that =ugenio had beenemploying all illegal means to eLect respondentsfrom the subLect propertyF$#$ :eonida and :ibrada prayed for the declaration of nullity of the 6asunduanand for an order for =ugenio to maintain and place them in peaceful possession and cultivation of thesubLect property$B$ &ccording to =ugenioA GodofredoKs occupation of the subLect premises was based on the formerKsmere tolerance and accommodation$ =ugenio denied signing a tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any personto sign such an agreement$ <e maintained that :ibrada, accompanied by arelative, voluntarily axed hersignature to the 6asunduanand that she was fully aware of thecontents of the document$ 9oreover, :ibrada receivedP35,555$55 from=ugenio on the same day of the execution of the 6asunduan$ =ugenio also uestioned the Lurisdiction of the @&0&D sincethe principal relief sought by respondents is theannulment of the contract, over which Lurisdictionis vested on the regular courts$Provincial &dLudicatorHGodofredo was the tenant of =ugenio, and :ibrada, being the survivingspouse, should have peaceful possessionof the land$@&0&D . 9auricios are former tenants of 8pouses 0eyes$(& . armed the decision and resolution ofthe @&0&D$\\\ O1 &PP=&:, :eonidaKs legal standing as a party was also assailed by =ugenio$=ugenio submittedthat the complaint was renderedmoot with the death of :ibrada, GodofredoKs sole compulsoryheir$ =ugenio contended that :eonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and :ibrada, thus, not a legal heir$788I=A%O1 =ugenio can uestion the +liation of :eonida in a case regarding land dispute$<=:@A 1O$ 0&-7OA %e are in full accord with the (ourt of &ppeals when it ruled that =ugenio cannot collaterallyattack thestatus of :eonida in the instant petition$7t is settled law that +liation cannot be collaterally attacked$ %ell.knowncivilista@r$ &rturo 9$

-olentino, in his book )(ivil (ode of the Philippines, (ommentaries and 4urisprudence, noted that theaforecited doctrine is rooted from the provisions of the (ivil (ode of the Philippines$ <e explained thusA-helegitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateralissue in another action for adi*erent purpose$ -he necessity of an independent actiondirectly impugning the legitimacy is more clearlyexpressed in the 9exican code Earticle##3F which providesA )-he contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirsmust be made by proper complaint before the competent courtT any contest made in anyother way is void$

-his principle applies under our ?amily (ode$ &rticles "5 and "of the code con+rm this view, because they refer to )the action to impugn thelegitimacy$ -his action can bebrought only by thehusband or his heirs and within the periods +xed in the present articles$7n Draza v$ (ity (ivil0egistrarof <imamaylan (ity, 1egros Occidental,the (ourt stated thatlegitimacy and +liation can be uestioned only in a direct action seasonably +led by theproper party, andnot through collateral attack$-he same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also bemade subLect to a collateralattack$ 7n 0eyes v$ 8otero,this (ourt reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedentKs estate$



?urthermore, in &ustria v$ 0eyes,the (ourt declaredthat the legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate actionbrought for that purpose and cannot be subLect to collateral attack

:71& (&:7:&P.&89=0O1 v$ @=>=:OP9=1- D&16 O? -<= P<7:7PP71=8 G$0$ 1o$ 3"##5 1ovember'#, '5 ?&(-8A

-he thrust of the petitionerNs suit is that @DP accorded to her a preferentialright to repurchase the property covered by -(- 1o$ B"$ <er version follows$ 7n &ugust !2',the petitioner negotiated with @DP to buy back the property covered by -(- 1o$ B" byo*ering P3,555$55 as downpayment$ <er o*er wasreLected by an executive ocer of @DPNs &cuired &ssets @epartment, who reuiredher to pay the full purchase price of P33,355$55 for the property within ten days$]^ 8he returnedto @DP with the amount, only to be told that @DP would not sell back only one lot$ Deing made tobelieve that the lot covered by -(- 1o$ B" would be released after paying two amortizationsfor the other lot E-(- 1o$ 5!'!F, however, she signed the deed of conditional sale coveringboth lots for the total consideration of P3",555$55$ %hen she later on reuested the release ofthe property under -(- 1o$ B" after paying two uarterly amortizations, @DP did notapprove the release$ 8he continued paying the amortizations until she had paid PB5,555$55 in all,at which point she sought again the release of the lot under -(- 1o$ B"$ @DP still denied herreuest, warning that it would rescind the contract should her remaining amortizations

(ontractsbe still not paid$ On &ugust ", !23, @DP rescinded the deed of conditional sale over herobLections$ On 1ovember '3, !2", @DP sold the lot covered by -(- 1o$ B" to respondentPablo (ruz via a deed of absolute sale$ -he petitioner conseuently +led a complaint for therescission of the sale to (ruz on 4anuary #5, !2"$ 1otwithstanding their knowledge of herpending suit against (ruz, respondents =merenciana (abantog and =ni 8$P$ &tienza still boughtthe property from (ruz$ <ence, (abantog and &tienza were impleaded as additional defendantsby amendment$788I=A%hether or not article ##' is applicable to the acts of the petitionerY<=:@A1o, -he petitioner would have us consider that she had not given her full consent to the deed ofconditional sale on account of her lack of legal and technical knowledge$ 7n e*ect, she pleads forthe application of &rticle ##' of the (ivil (ode, which providesA &rticle ##'$ %hen one of theparties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistakeor fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof havebeen fully explained to the former$ 7t is uite notable that the petitioner did not specify which ofthe stipulations of the deed of conditional sale she had diculty or de+ciency in understanding$<er generalized averment of having been misled should, therefore, be brushed aside as nothingbut a last attempt to salvage a hopeless position$ Our impression is that the stipulations of thedeed of conditional sale were simply worded and plain enough for even one with a slightknowledge of =nglish to easily understand$ -he petitioner was not illiterate$ 8he had appeared tothe trial court to beeducated, its cogent observation of her as _lettered` Esupra, at p$ " hereofF being based



on how she had composed her correspondences to @DP$ <er testimony also revealed that shehad no diculty understanding =nglish$ -hereby revealed was her distinctive ability tounderstand written and spoken =nglish, the language in which the terms of the contract shesigned had been written$ (learly, &rticle ##' of the (ivil (ode does not apply to the petitioner

!"N!+ vs. +S+G.R. No. 13398& Nove4ber 1$% $??$

*ats: -he accused, =merencia7sip, was charged with # counts of violation of D$P$ '', also known

as the Douncing (hecks :aw and # cases of =stafa$ One of the D$P$ '' cases was dismissed dueto it being deposited before !5 days from the date written on the check$ -he other two cases ofD$P$ '' were +led with the 0egional -rial (ourt of Guagua, Pampanga and were then dismisseddue to the failure of the prosecution to prosecute the crime$

9eanwhile the three cases of =stafa were +led with the 0egional -rial (ourt of Pampanga$&fter failing to present its second witness, the prosecution dismissed the =stafa case$ -heprosecution reserved its right to +le a separate civil action from the said criminal cases$ -hecourt granted the reservation$ -he criminal case of =stafa was then dismissed without preLudiceto the civil action$ On @ecember 3, !!", petitioner +led the instant case for the collection ofthe sum of money, seeking to recover the amount of the check subLect to the =stafa cases$0espondent then +led a motion to dismiss the complaint contending that the petition is alreadybarred by the doctrine of 0es 4udicata$

+ss)e:%hether or not the respondents can +le a separate civil action regardless of the dismissal

of the criminal case of estafa$

R)lingA -he 8upreme (ourt ruled that the civil action can prosper$ -he reservation for civil action

was made by the prosecution on time$ &ccording to 8ection , 0ule of the 0ules on (riminalProcedure states that civil liability is deemed instituted with the criminal case unless there is areservation of the right to +le a separate civil action$

7n the case at bar, the complaint is clearly based on culpa contractual$ -he cause of actionwas the breach of the respondentKs breach of the contractual obligation$ =vidently, the petitionerwas seeking to make good the value written on the checks in exchange for cash$ -he case wasnot anchored the criminal aspect of estafa but on the civil aspect of culpa contractual$ &s such, itis distinct and independent from the estafa case +led against the o*ender and may proceedregardless of the result of the criminal proceedings$

:G ?oods v$ &graviador E'55F -he (ase 0eview on certiorari of a decision of the (& on '3 &pril '55# arming an order of Dacolod 0-(,

which in turndenied the petitionersK motion to dismiss an action for damages arising from a vehicular accidentinstituted by the>alleLera spouses$

-he ?actsOn ?ebruary ', !!, (harles >allereLa, a ".year old son of the >alleLera spouses, was hit by a?ord ?iera vanowned by :G ?oods (orporation E:G ?oodsF and driven by their employee, >incent1orman ;eneza y ?errer$(harles died as a result of the accident$&n information for recklessimprudence resulting to homicide was +led against the driver before the Dacolod9-(($ Deforethe trial could be concluded, however, the accused driver committed suicide$ -he case wasthendismissed$On 4une '#, !!!, the spouses >alleLera +led a complaint for damages against :G?oods alleging that asemployers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and



supervision of their employees$7n their defense, :G ?oods denied liability by claiming to haveexercised such diligence and prayed for dismissal forlack of cause of action$ &lso in their motionto dismiss, they argued that the complaint was a claim for subsidiaryliability against an employerunder &5#3, 0P( and, as such, there must +rst be a Ludgment of conviction againsttheir driverto hold them liable$ 8ince such conditionwas not ful+lled due to the latterKs death, they argued, thespouses had no cause of action$-he trial court denied the motion for lack of merit$ &lso, it deniedthe motion for reconsideration of the matter$ :G?oods then went on certiorari to the (& alleginggrave abuse of discretion of the part of the trial Ludge$-he (&, however, armed the 0-(decision ruling that the complaint by the spouses does not purport to be basedon subsidiaryliability since the basic elements of such liability, such as conviction and insolvency of theaccusedemployee, were not even alleged in said complaint$ 7t then said that the complaintpurports to exact responsibilityfor fault or negligence under &'", ((, which is entirely separateand distinct from civil liability arising fromnegligence under the &5#, 0P($ :iability under &'25,(( is direct and immediate, and not conditioned upon priorrecourse against the negligentemployee or showing of insolvency$

-he 7ssue%hether the cause of action of the >alleLera spouses is founded on (( or 0P($

-he 0uling -he case is a negligence suit brought under &'", (( to recover damages primarily from :G?oods as employersresponsible for their negligent driver pursuant to &'25, (($ -he obligationimposed by &'" is demandable notonly for oneMs own acts or omissions, but also for those ofpersons for whom one is responsible$ -hus, theemployer is liable for damages caused by hisemployees$

-he 0atio ?irst$ 1othing in the allegations in the complaint suggests that the :G ?oods are being made toaccount for theirsubsidiary liability under &rticle 5# of the 0evised Penal (ode$ Plus, thecomplaint did not even aver the basicelements for the subsidiary liability of an employer undersaid provision 8econd$ %hile not explicitly stated that the suit was for damages based on uasi.delict, it allegedgross fault andnegligence on the part of the driver and the failure of :G ?oods, as employers, toexercise due diligence in theselection and supervision of their employees$ 7t was further allegedthat :G ?oods is civilly liable for thenegligence/imprudence of their driver since they failed toexercise the necessary diligence reuired of a goodfather of the family in the selection andsupervision of their employees, which diligence, if exercised, could haveprevented the vehicularaccident that resulted to the death of their ".year old son$-hird$ 8ection ', 0ule ', of the !!"0ules of (ivil Procedure de+nes cause of action as the Jact or omission bywhich a party violatesthe right of another$J 8uch act or omission gives rise to an obligation which may come fromlaw,contracts, uasi contracts, delicts or uasi.delicts$(orollarily, an act or omission causing damageto another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the partof the o*ender, i$e$, F civilliability ex delicto, and 'F independent civil liabilities, such as those EaF not arising froman act oromission complained of as felony Ee$g$, culpa contractual or obligations arising from lawT theintentionaltortsTB and culpa auiliana3FT or EbF where the inLured party is granted a right to +le

an action independent anddistinct from the criminal action$ =ither of these two possible liabilitiesmay be enforced against the o*ender$8tated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs havea choice between an action to enforce the civil liabilityarising from culpa criminal under &rticle55 of the 0evised Penal (ode, and an action for uasi.delict EculpaauilianaF under &rticles'" to '!B of the (ivil (ode$-his is illustrated in &, (( providing that civil obligationarising from criminal o*enses shall be governed bypenal laws subLect to the provision of &'""and of the pertinent provision of (hapter ', Preliminary -itle on<uman 0elation, and of -itle >777of this Dook, regulating damages$ -his means that &'"" provides an alternativeremedy for theplainti*$ -he choice is with the plainti*$?ourth$ Inder &rticle '25 of the (ivil (ode, the liabilityof the employer is direct or immediate, not conditionedupon prior recourse against the negligentemployee and a prior showing of insolvency$ -his was the recourse of the spouses since there



was no conviction in the criminal case against the driver$?ifth$ :G ?oods has been alleging thatJthey had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of ]their^employees$J -hisdefense is an admission that indeed the petitioners acknowledged the private respondentsMcauseof action as one for uasi.delict under &'25, (($8ixth$ 8ince it is as if there was no criminal caseto speak of due to its premature termination, the fact that therewas no prior reservation made toinstitute a separate civil action is of no moment$

<eirs of =duardo 8imon EPetitionerF vs=lvin (han and (ourt of &ppeals E0espondentFG0$ 1O$3"3B"?ebruary '#, '5?actsA7n 4uly !!" the (ity Prosecutor of 9anila +led a criminal casein the 9etropolitan -rial (ourt of 9anila charging =duardo 8imon of violating DP''$8ometime in@ecember !!, 8imon issued to =lvin (han a :andbank check with a declared amount ofP##,555$ -he accuse did not have sucient fund in his account to fund the check he issued,contrary to the information he had given to the respondent$ @espite notice insuciency of hisaccounts funds, the petitioner failed to pay the respondent the value of the check within 3 days afterreceiving the notice$-hree years later on # &ugust '555, =lvin (han commenced in the 9-( inPasay (ity a (ivil &ction for the collection of the principal amount of P ##,555$55$On " &ugust'555, 8imon +led an urgent 9otion to @ismiss with application to change plainti*

s attachmnent bond for damages on the ground of litis pendentia asa conseuence of thependency of another action between parties for the same cause$-he plainti* countered theargument of 8imon by pointing out he did not make any allegation as to the exact amount of hisclaim in the criminal case, consitituting an implied right to initiate civil action$ -he Plainti* alsocited 0ule 8ection ', exception to +le separate civil action during the pendency of a criminalcase under &rt$ #, #', ##, #B, and '"" of the ((P$ -he case falls under&rt$ ## of the ((P$On '#October '555, the 9(-( in Pasay (ity granted 8imon

s urgent 9otion to @ismiss with application to charge plainti* s attachment bond for damages$ On # 4uly '55, the 0-( of Pasay (ity upheld 9(-(

s dismissal of (hans initiated (ivil (ase$(han appealed to the (& by petition for review with the following issueT%hetheror not the 0-( erred in the dismissal of his case on the ground of litis pendetia$-he (&overturened the decision of the 0-( with following legal basisT -hough the (& recognized thatcivil case cannot anymore initiated following the +lling of a criminal case, the following case fallsunder the exception under 0ule sec$ '$ -he case remanded to the trial court for furtherproceedings$8imon appealed to the 8upreme (ourt for petition for review$7ssue/7ssuesA$ %hetheror not (hans (ivil action to recover the amount of the bounced check as an independent civil action$'$

%hether or not new 8upreme (ourt circular pertaining to DP'' can be appliedretroactively$0ulingA-he 8( set aside the decision promulgated by the (ourt of &ppeals on 4une'3, '55'$ ?urthermore, the 8( reinstate the decision rendered on October '#, '555 by the9etropolitan -rial (ourt, Dranch B3, in Pasay (ity$$81 Li4 vs. one 7e Leon 9artinG$0$ 1o$ :.''33B, &ugust '!, !"3*"!'SPlainti*.appellant 4ikil -aha sold to a certain -imbangcaya of Palawan a motorlaunch named 9/: J8&1 0&?&=:J$ & year later -imbangcaya +led a complaintwith the Oce of the Provincial ?iscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale 4ikil

-aha forcibly took away the motor launch from him$



&fter conducting a preliminary investigation, ?iscal Ponce de :eon in his capacity as&cting Provincial ?iscal of Palawan, +led with the (?7 of Palawan thecorresponding information for 0obbery with ?orce and 7ntimidation upon Personsagainst 4ikil -aha$ ?iscal Ponce de :eon, upon being informed that the motor launchwas in Dalabac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial (ommander of Palawan reuestinghim to direct the detachment commander.in Dalabac to impound and take custodyof the motor launch$?iscal Ponce de :eon reiterated his reuest to the Provincial (ommander toimpound the motor launch, explaining that its subseuent sale to a third party,plainti*.appellant :im, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same$8o, upon order of the Provincial (ommander, defendant.appellee 9addela, seizedthe motor launch J8&1 0&?&=:J from plainti*.appellant @el+n :im andimpounded it$Plainti*.appellant :im pleaded with 9addela to return the motor launch but thelatter refused$ :ikewise, 4ikil -aha through his counsel made representations with?iscal Ponce de :eon to return the seized property to plainti*.appellant :im but?iscal Ponce de :eon refused, on the ground that the same was the subLect of acriminal o*ense$&ll e*orts to recover the motor launch going to naught, plainti*s.appellants :imand 4ikil -aha+led with the (?7 of Palawan a complaint for damages againstdefendants.appellees ?iscal ?rancisco Ponce de :eon and 9addela, alleging that on9addela entered the premises of :im without a search warrant and then and theretook away the hull of the motor launch without his consentT that he e*ected theseizure upon order of ?iscal Ponce de :eon who knew fully well that his oce wasnot vested with authority to order the seizure of a private property+SS,S 0 "RG,MN'S2N deendants are ivilly liable to plaintiAs or da4ages allegedly s)Aered byte4 granting tat te seiB)re o te 4otor la)n <as )nla<)l./L7+NG 0 R"'+ 7!+7N7+N! 7 LN L+"CL ,N7R "R'. 3$. 7*N7"N' M"7LL"!"NN' C L+"CL S+N!&s to whether or not they are entitled to damages, plainti*s.appellants anchor theirclaim for damages on &rticles #' and ''! of the 1ew (ivil (ode which provide inpart as followsA &0-$ #'$ &ny public ocer or employee, or any private individual,who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes orimpairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable tothe latter for damages, E!F -he rights to be secure in oneMs person, house, papers,and e*ects against unreasonable searches and seizuresPursuant to the foregoing provision, a person whose constitutional rights have beenviolated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public oceror employee responsible therefor$ 7n addition, exemplary damages may also beawarded$ 7n the instant case, plainti*.appellant :im claimed that he purchased themotor launch from 4ikil -aha in consideration of P#,555$55, having given P',555$55as advanced paymentT that since its seizure, the motor launch had been moored at

Dalabac Day and because of exposure to the elements it has become worthless at thetime of the +ling of the present actionT that because of the illegality of the seizure of the motor launch, he su*ered moral damages and that because of the violation of their constitutional rights they were constrained to engage the services of a lawyerwhom they have paid for attorneyMs [email protected] ?iscal Ponce de :eon wanted to wash his hands of the incidentby claiming that Jhe was in good faith, without malice and without the slightestintention of inVicting inLury to plainti*.appellant, 4ikil -ahaJ when he ordered theseizure of the motor launch$ %e are not prepared to sustain his defense of goodfaith$ -o be liable under &rticle #' of the 1ew (ivil (ode it is enough that there wasa violation of the constitutional rights of the plainti*s and it is not reuired thatdefendants should have acted with malice or bad faith$



-he very nature of &rticle #' is that the wrong may be civil or criminal$ 7t is notnecessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith$ -o make such areuisite would defeat the main purpose of &rticle #' which is the e*ectiveprotection of individual rights$ Public ocials in the past have abused their powerson the pretext of Lusti+able motives or good faith in the performance of their duties$Dut defendant.appellee Orlando 9addela cannot be held accountable because heimpounded the motor launch upon the order of his superior ocer$ %hile asubordinate ocer may be held liable for executing unlawful orders of his superiorocer, there are certain circumstances which would warrant 9addelaMs exculpationfrom liability$ -he records show that after ?iscal Ponce de :eon made his +rstreuest to the Provincial (ommander on 4une 3, !' 9addela was reluctant toimpound the motor launch despite repeated orders from his superior ocer$Petition granted. Decision of egional Trial Court evived and a!rmed.!oD)ango vs. !" PanganibanG$0$ 1o$ !#!2, 4uly ', !!! #5! 8(0& 5'*"!'SPetitioner =duardo (oLuangco is a known businessman.sportsman owning severalracehorses which he entered in the sweepstakes races$ 8everal of his horses won$Petitioner sent letters of demand to private respondents P(8O and P(8O (hairman?ernando (arrascoso, 4r$ for the collection of the prizes due him$<owever, the respondent said that the demanded prizes are being withheld onadvice of (ommissioner 0amon @iaz of the P(GG after private respondent(arrascoso sought the latter a clari+cation of the extent and coverage of theseuestration order issued against the properties of petitioner$-he seuestration order was in pursuance of =O ', issued by President &uino,freezing all assets and properties in the Philippines of the 9arcoses, their friends,subordinates, and business associates$& case was +led before the 0-(, which ruled in favor of petitioner$ Ipon appeal tothe (&, it was reversed$+SS,S 0 "RG,MN'S2N te a<ard or no4inal da4ages against respondent !arrasoso% Er. is<arranted by evidene and la<F/L7+NG 0 R"'+ 7!+7N7+ S. '+'+NR;S R+G/' ' '/ ,S * /+S RR' "S,N7,L +M77.Private respondent (arrascoso may still e held liable under &rt$ #' of the (ivil (ode,which providesAo &rt$ #'$ &ny public ocer, or any private individual, who directly orindirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairsany of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable tothe latter for damagesA-he right against deprivation of property without due process of lawT%hile private respondent (arrascoso may have relied upon the P(GGKs

instructions, he could have further sought the speci+c legal basis therefor$& little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issuedspeci+cally for the seuestration of the racehorse winnings of petitioner$-he issuance of a seuestration order reuires the showing of a prima facie case anddue regard for the reuirements of due process$-he withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issuedseuestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without dueprocess of law$&rt$ ''' of the (ivil (ode authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plainti* whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plainti* for any losssu*ered$



-he court may also award nominal damages in every case where a property right hasbeen invaded$$8& Li<ay<ay @iBons-!ato vs. *ort)ne 'obao !orpation ;1&0=88&1-7&GO,

4$AG$0$ 1o$ B#5! 4une !, '55"*"!'SPetitioner, the (ommissioner of 7nternal 0evenue issued 09( #".!# whichsubLected cigarette brands J(hampion,J J<ope,J and J9ore,J to 33U ad valoremtax$0espondent company +led a petition for review with the (ourt of -ax &ppeals,which ultimately ruled that 09( #".!# as defective, invalid and unenforceable$ 8uchpronouncement was armed by the (& and the 8(, for being an invalidadministrative issuance$-hereafter, respondent +led with the 0-( a complaint for damages againstpetitioner in her private capacity, under &rticle #', considering that the issuance of the 09( violated the constitutional right of the respondent against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to eual protection of the laws$PetitionerMs motion to dismiss was denied by the 0-(, and eventually the case got tothe 8(, wherein it is contended that it is 8ection #2, Dook 7 of the &dministrative(ode which should be applied$ Inder this provision, liability will attach only whenthere is a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence$+SS,S+s petitioner liable in is2er private apaity or ats done in onnetion <it tedisarge o te )ntions o is2er oHeF7oes "rtile 3$ o te N!!% or Se 3&% Coo= + o te "d4in !ode so)ld governin deter4ining <eter te instant o4plaint states a a)se o ationF/L7+NG 0 R"'+ 7!+7N7+etitioner in te ase at bar is liable or da4ages.&lthough the general rule provides that a public ocer is not liable for damageswhich a person may su*er arising from the Lust performance of his ocial dutiesand within the scope of his assigned tasks, there are exceptions to such,EF where said public ocer acted with malice, bad faith, or negligenceT orE'F where the public ocer violated a constitutional right of the plainti*$

-he second exception is clearly applicable in the instant case$"rtile 3$ is te governing provision in deter4ining <eter or notrespondentsI o4plaint ad a valid a)se o ation.&rticle #' was patterned after the JtortJ in &merican law$ Presence of good motive,or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which isotherwise an invasion of anotherKs legal rightT that is, liability in tort is not precludedby the fact that defendant acted without evil intent$ -he clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct cause of action in the nature of tort forviolation of constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent of thedefendant$%hile the (ivil (ode, speci+cally, the (hapter on <uman 0elations is a general law,

&rticle #' of the same (hapter is a special and speci+c provision that holds a publicocer liable for and allows redress from a particular class of wrongful acts that maybe committed by public ocers$(ompared thus with 8ection #2 of the &dministrative (ode, which broadly dealswith civil liability arising from errors in the performance of duties, &rticle #' of the(ivil (ode is the speci+c provision which must be applied in the instant caseprecisely +led to seek damages for violation of constitutional rights$-he complaint in the instant case was brought under &rticle #' of the (ivil (ode$(onsidering that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action based on &rticle#' of the (ivil (ode, the failure to speci+cally allege the same will not amount tofailure to state a cause of action$ -he courts below therefore correctly denied themotion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, since it is



enough that the complaint avers a violation of a constitutional right of the plainti*$Petition denied$

-e vs$ (ourt of &ppeals

?actsA• &rthur -e and :iliana (hoa were married on 8eptember B, !22 in civil rites$ -hey did not

live together after the marriage, and later on, (hoa gave birth to a girl on &pril ', !2!• 9ay '5, !!5, -e contracted a second marriafe with 4ulieta 8antilla• (hoa +led an adavit on 4une !!5, and +led a charge of bigamy with the 0-( on &ugust

!!5• 4uly '5, !!5, -e +led in 0-( an action for annulment of their marriage, alleging that (hoa

concealed her pregnancy to another man at the time of their marriage, and she waspsychologically incapacitated to perform marital obligations

• 1ov 2, !!5, (hoa also +led with the P0( Eprofessional regulation commissionF for therevocation of the engineering licenses of 8antella and -e, on grounds of acting immorallyby living together and marrying, despite the fact that petitioner was still married to her, aswell as act of falsi+cation, by stating in -eKs marriage contract that he is still single$

• -e accused 0-( for showing antagonism and animosity on part of his counsel during thehearings of this case$ <e claims that the original copy of marriage contract between him

and (hoa was not presented, and the signatures were not properly identi+ed, as well asthe fact that the marriage contract between him and 8antella was not presented as well• -e +led a case in (& alleging grave abuse of discrertion on part of 0-( forA

o showing antagonism and animosity on part of his counsel during the hearings of thiscase

o violating reuirements of due process by denying petitioners demurrer to evidenceeven before the +ling of such

o disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate guidelines for Ludgespromulgated by 8(

o ruling that in a criminal case, only prima facie evidence is sucient for conviction of accused

•

(& upheld the 0-(s decision, on grounds that -e failed to show any concrete evidence thatthe 0-( preLudged the case$

7ssueA @id the 0-( and (& gravely abused discretion and committed an error in law in not holdingthe demurrer to evidenceY <eldA 8( held that there was no abuse in discretion on part of the Ludge of 0-(, for they were notdeprived of fair and impartial trial$ -he denial by the Ludge of petitioners motion to suspend thecriminal proceedings are in accordance with the law and Lurisprudence$ 8( also states that 0-( based its denial of demurrer on two groundsA +rst, (hoa and her

counsel established a prima facie case for bigamy against petitioner, and second, petitionersallegation of demurrer were insucient to Lustify the grant of the same$ 8( also clari+es that bydenying of demurrer of petitioner of demurrer doesnKt mean that he is pronounced as liable forthe case$ -es petition is denied for lack of merit Sa4son vs 7a<ayEG0 1o 553B.33, 4uly ', '55BF

?actsA -he petitioner allegedly sold or o*ers the sale of garment product using the trademark



)(aterpillar to the preLudice of its previous user, private respondent in this case$ -he respondent+led the case to the 0-($ -he petitioner contended that the case should be +led with the 9-(because violation of unfair competition is penalized with an imprisonment not exceeding yearsunder 0& "!$

7ssueA%here do you +le a suit for unfair competitionY

<eldA -he 8( held that under 8ec # of the 7P(, actions for unfair competition shall be brought beforethe proper courts with appropriate Lurisdiction under existing laws$ -he law contemplated in 8ec# of 7P( is the -rademark :aw$ 8ec '" of -rademark :aw states that action for unfaircompetition shall be +led with the (?7 Enow 0-(F$ 8ince 0& "! is a general law and 7P( inrelation to -rademark law is a special law, the latter shall prevail$ &ctions for unfair competitiontherefore should be +led with the 0-($

Migty !orporation vs NE Gallo inersEG0 1o 3B#B', 4uly B, '55B, (oronaF

?actsA0espondent manufacture wines and uses the trademark )Gallo for its product$ On the otherhand, the petitioner is a manufacturer of cigarette and also uses )Gallo in its products$

7ssueA7s there infringementY

<eldA&t the time the cause of action accrued in this case, the 7P( was not yet enacted so the relevantlaws used were the -rademark :aw and the Paris (onvention$

-he 8( held that there was no infringement$ -he use of the respondent of the mark )Gallo for itswine products was exclusive in nature$ -he court mentioned two types of confusion in -rademark7nfringementA

(onfusion of Goods H when an otherwise prudent purchaser is induced to purchase one productin the belief that he is purchasing another, in which case defendantKs goods are then brought asthe plainti*Ks and its poor uality reVects badly on the plainti*Ks reputation$(onfusion of Dusiness H wherein the goods of the parties are di*erent but the defendantKsproduct can reasonably Ethough mistakenlyF be assumed to originate from the plainti*, thusdeceiving the public into believing that there is some connection between the plainti* anddefendant which, in fact, does not exist$

7n determining the likelihood of confusion, the (ourt must considerAEaF the resemblance between the trademarksT

EbF the similarity of the goods to which the trademark is attachedTEcF the likely e*ect on the purchaserT andEdF the registrantKs express or implied consent and other fair and euitable considerations$

7n this case, the 8( employing the dominancy test, concluded that there is no likelihood ofconfusion$ -hey materially di*er in color scheme, art works and markings$ ?urther, the two goodsare not closely related because he products belong to di*erent classi+cations, form, compositionand they have di*erent intended markets or consumers$

@reamwork (onstruction, 7nc$ vs (leofe 4aniola and <on$ &rthur ?amini, G0 1o 2B2, 4une

#5, '55!



?&(-8

Petitioner, +led a (omplaint &davit against private respondent with the Oce of the (ity

Prosecutor of :as PiCas (ity for violation of Datas Pambansa Dilang ''$ &fterwards, private

respondent, together with her husband, +led a complaint against petitioner for the rescission of

an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages$ -hereafter,

private respondent +led for a 9otion to 8uspend proceedings alleging that for the rescission of

an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages$

788I=

%O1 the court seriously erred in not perceiving grave abuse of discretion on the part of the

inferior court when the latter ruled to suspend proceddings in (riminal (ase 1os$ 3333B. on

the basis o f )preLudicial uestion in (ivil (ase 1o$ :P.5.5!"$]

0I:71G

Private respondent cites &rticle # of the (ivil (ode$ -he (ourt does not agree with private

respondentKs argument that a preLudicial uestion exists when the civil action is +led eitherbefore the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action and

that there is an apparent conVict in the provisions of the 0ules of (ourt and the (ivil (ode in that

the latter considers a civil case to have presented a preLudicial uestion even if the criminal case

preceded the +ling of the civil case$

it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a )change in phraseology by amendment of a

provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it

originally had$7n the instant case, the phrase, )previously instituted, was inserted to ualify the

nature of the civil action involved in a preLudicial uestion in relation to the criminal action$ -his

interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of )subseuent directly before the term

criminal action$ -here is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to ualify the

relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal

action$

&dditionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that )a statute should be construed not

only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subLect

matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system$-his principle is consistent with

the maxim, interpretare et concordare leges legi"us est optimus interpretandi modus or every

statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of

Lurisprudence$]"^7n other words, every e*ort must be made to harmonize seemingly conVicting

laws$ 7t is only when harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to choosing which lawto apply$

7n the instant case, &rt$ # of the (ivil (ode and 8ec$ " of 0ule of the 0ules of (ourt are

susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law$ -he phrase

)previously instituted civil action in 8ec$ " of 0ule is plainly worded and is not susceptible of

alternative interpretations$ -he clause )before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may

proceed in &rt$ # of the (ivil (ode may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to

suspend the criminal action may be +led during the preliminary investigation with the public

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/184861.htm#_ftn11

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/184861.htm#_ftn11



prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the

case$

-his interpretation would harmonize all the mentioned laws$ -hus, under the principles of

statutory construction, it is this interpretation of &rt$ # of the (ivil (ode that should govern in

order to give e*ect to all the relevant provisions of law$

=01=8-O @&%8O1, =- &:$ v$ 0=G78-=0 O? @==@8 O? Ruezon (ity =- &:$8eptember !!2-hecase revolves around the issue of whether 8ec$ 52 of P@ 3'! E:and 0egistration &ctF applies inthe instant case where a contract to sell is involved$ -he +rst buyer, :ouis @awson,di edwithout hav ing + n ished pay ing the who le amount , which ob l igat ion wasassumed bypetitioners, his heirs$ -he 0-( and (& refused the cancellation of the certi+cate inthe name of :ouis @awson and issuance of a new title in the name of petitioners$-he 8( allowedthe application of 8ec 52 of P@ 3'! contending that this is a case of acontract to se ll andnot a contract of sale$ 7n the case of 8alazar v$ (&, in a contract of sale, thetitle tothe property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing soldT in a contact tosell,ownership is by agreement, reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to thevendee until fullpayment of the purchase price$ -hus, since :ouis @awson was unableto pay the whole price,which was completely paid by petitioners, the property did not becomepart of the estate of :ouis@awson$ Partition is therefore not the proper remedy to determine theownership of the lot whose title had not been vested in :ou is @awson during his life timeas his death caused the loss of his Luridical personality, which is the +tness to be the subLectof legal relations$!ontinental Steel v. Montano% G.R. No. 1&$&36% tober 13% $??9?&(-8A <ortillano, an employee of petitioner (ontinental 8teel, +led a claim for Paternity :eave,Dereavement :eave and @eath and &ccident 7nsurance for dependent, pursuant to the (D&$ -heclaim was for <ortillanoKs unborn child who died$ <ortillanoKs wife had a premature delivery whileshe was on her #2th week of pregnancy$ -he female fetus died during the labor$ -he companygranted <ortillanoKs claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave anddeath bene+ts$ <ortillano claimed that the provision in (D8 did not speci+cally state that thedependent should have +rst been born alive or must have acuired Luridical personality$Petitioner argued that the said provision of (D& did not contemplate death of an unborn child ora fetus without legal personality$ -hey also claimed that there are two elements for theentitlement of the bene+tA F deathT and 'F status of legitimate dependent$ 1one which existedin <ortillanoKs case$ -hey further contend that the only one with civil personality could die, basedon &rt B5.B' of (ivil (ode$ <ence, according to petitioner, the unborn child never died$ :abor&rbiter 9ontana argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the verymoment he/she was conceived$ Petitioner appealed to (& but (& armed :abor &rbiterKsdecision$ <ence, this petition$

788I=A %/1 only one with Luridical personality can die$<=:@A 1o$ -he reliance of (ontinental 8teel on &rticles B5, B and B' of the (ivil (ode for thelegal de+nition of death is misplaced$ &rticle B5 provides that a conceived child acuirespersonality only when it is born, and &rticle B de+nes when a child is considered born$ &rticleB' plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death$ -he issue of civil personality isirrelevant in this case$ &rts B5.B' do not provide at all de+nition of death$ :ife is not synonymousto civil personality$ One need not acuire civil personality +rst before s/he could die$ -he(onstitution in fact recognizes the life of the unborn from conception$

788I=A %/1 a fetus can be considered as a dependent$<=:@A ;es$ =ven an unborn child is a dependent of its parents$ -he fetus would have not reached#2.#! weeks without depending upon its mother$*rivaldo vs !o4ele 7igest <it additional ino

G.R. No. 1$?$95. E)ne $&% 1996J



E,"N G. *R+@"L7% petitioner% vs. !MM+SS+N N L!'+NS% and R",L R. L%

respondents.

KG.R. No. 1$3855. E)ne $&% 1996J

R",L R. L% petitioner% vs. !MM+SS+N N L!'+NS and E,"N G. *R+@"L7%

respondents.

On 9arch '5, !!3, private respondent 4uan G$ ?rivaldo +led his (erti+cate of (andidacy for the

oce of Governor of 8orsogon in the 9ay 2, !!3 elections$ On 9arch '#, !!3, petitioner 0aul

0$ :ee, another candidate, +led a petition with the (omelec praying that ?rivaldo Jbe disuali+ed

from seeking or holding any public oce or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the

Philippines,J and that his (erti+cate of (andidacy be cancelled$ On 9ay , !!3, the 8econd

@ivision of the (omelec promulgated a 0esolution granting the petition$

-he 9otion for 0econsideration +led by ?rivaldo remained unacted upon until after the 9ay 2,

!!3 elections$ 8o, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on

said date$ On 9ay , !!3, the (omelec en "anc armed the aforementioned 0esolution of the

8econd @ivision$

-he Provincial Doard of (anvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a

(erti+cate of >otes was issued showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for the

position of Governor of 8orsogonA

&ntonio <$ =scudero, 4r$ 3,55

4uan G$ ?rivaldo "#,BB5

0aul0$:ee 3#,#5B

7sagani P$ Ocampo ,!'3

On 4une !, !!3, :ee +led a EsupplementalF petition praying for his proclamation as the duly.

elected Governor of 8orsogon$

7n an orderdated 4une ', !!3, but promulgated according to the petition Jonly on 4une '!,

!!3,J the (omelec en "ane directed Jthe Provincial Doard of (anvassers of 8orsogon to

reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate 0aul :ee as the winning gubernatorial

candidate in the province of 8orsogon on 4une '!,!!3 x x x$J &ccordingly, at 2A#5 in the evening

of 4une #5,!!3, :ee was proclaimed governor of 8orsogon$

?rivaldo +led with the (omelec a new petition praying for the annulment of the 4une #5, !!3

proclamation of :ee and for his own proclamation$ <e alleged that on 4une #5, !!3, at 'A55 in

the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after Jhis petition for

repatriation under P$@$ "'3 which he +led with the 8pecial (ommittee on 1aturalization in

8eptember !!B had been granted$J &s such, when Jthe said order Edated 4une ', !!3F Eof the

(omelecF x x x was released and received by ?rivaldo on 4une #5, !!3 at 3A#5 oMclock in the

evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation Eof ?rivaldoF as governor x x



x$J 7n the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of #a"o vs. Comelec$ the >ice.

GovernorZ not :ee Z should occupy said position of governor$

On @ecember !, !!3, the (omelec ?irst @ivision promulgated the herein assailed 0esolution

holding that :ee, Jnot having garnered the highest number of votes,J was not legally entitled to

be proclaimed as duly.elected governorT and that ?rivaldo, Jhaving garnered the highest number

of votes, and having reacuired his ?ilipino citizenship by repatriation on 4une #5, !!3 under the

provisions of Presidential @ecree 1o$ "'3 is uali+ed to hold the oce of governor of 8orsogonJ$

7ssuesA $ 7s ?rivaldoMs JLudicially declaredJ disuali+cation for lack of ?ilipino citizenship a

continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of 8orsogon H

1O\

'$ %as the proclamation of :ee, a runner.up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing

LurisprudenceY .1O\

<eldA

$F

7t should be noted that our +rst ruling in G$0$ 1o$ 2"!# disualifying ?rivaldo was rendered in

connection with the !22 elections while that in G$0$ 1o$ 5B3B was in connection with the

!!' elections$ -hat he was disuali+ed for such elections is +nal and can no longer be changed$

7ndeed, deisions delaring te a)isition or denial o itiBensip annot govern a

personIs )t)re stat)s <it nality. 'is is bea)se a person 4ay s)bse)ently

rea)ire% or or tat 4atter lose% is itiBensip )nder any o te 4odes reogniBed

by la< or te p)rpose.

J=verytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a Ludicial or administrative

case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such

citizenship is generally not considered res %udicata$ hence it has to be threshed out again and

again, as the occasion demands$J

'$F ?rivaldo assails the validity of the :ee proclamation$ %e uphold him for the following reasonsA

First. -o paraphrase this (ourt in #a"o vs. C&'E#EC$ Jthe fact remains that e (Lee# <as not

te oie o te sovereign <ill% and in (quino vs. C&'E#EC$ Lee is a seond plaer% Lust

that, a second placer$J

J-he rule, therefore, isA te ineligibility o a andidate reeiving 4aDority votes does not

entitle te eligible andidate reeiving te neOt igest n)4ber o votes to be

delared eleted. " 4inority or deeated andidate annot be dee4ed eleted to te

oHe.

Second. &s we have earlier declared *rivaldo to ave seasonably re-a)ired is

itiBensip and inas4) as e obtained te igest n)4ber o votes in te 1995

eletions% ePnot Lee Pso)ld be prolai4ed. <ence, :eeMs proclamation was patently

erroneous and should now be corrected$



!N!L,S+N * '/ !,R'

7n sum, we rule that the itiBensip re)ire4ent in te Loal Govern4ent !ode is to be

possessed by an eletive oHial at te latest as o te ti4e e is prolai4ed and at

te start o te ter4 o oHe to <i e as been eleted. %e further hold P$@$ 1o$ "'3

to be in full force and e*ect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly

nor impliedly at any time, and ?rivaldoMs repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly

granted and thus valid and e*ective$ 9oreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of

the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it,

as well as his uniue situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political

aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given

retroactive e*ect as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was

stateless, he having given M up his I$ 8$ nationality$

-hus, in contemplation of law, e possessed te vital re)ire4ent o *ilipino itiBensip

as o te start o te ter4 o oHe o governor% and so)ld ave been prolai4ed

instead o Lee. *)rter4ore% sine is rea)isition o itiBensip retroated to")g)st 18% 199% is registration as a voter o Sorsogon is dee4ed to ave been

validated as o said date as <ell. -he foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our

holding that la= o te itiBensip re)ire4ent is not a ontin)ing disability or

dis)aliation to r)n or and old p)bli oHe. &nd once again, we emphasize herein our

previous rulings recognizing the (omelecMs authority and Lurisdiction to hear and decide petitions

for annulment of proclamations$

'is !o)rt as ti4e and again liberally and e)itably onstr)ed te eletoral la<s o

o)r o)ntry to give )llest eAet to te 4aniest <ill o o)r people% or in ase o

do)bt% politial la<s 4)st be interpreted to give lie and spirit to te pop)lar 4andate

reely eOpressed tro)g te ballot. ter<ise stated% legal nieties and

tenialities annot stand in te <ay o te sovereign <ill. (onsistently, we have heldA

)* * * +#,aws governing election contests must "e li"erall- construed to the end that the will of

the people in the choice of pu"lic o!cials ma- not "e defeated "- mere technical o"%ections

+citations omitted,.)

-he law and the courts must accord ?rivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in

deference to the popular will$ 7ndeed, this (ourt has repeatedly stressed te i4portane o

giving eAet to te sovereign <ill in order to ens)re te s)rvival o o)r de4oray. +n

any ation involving te possibility o a reversal o te pop)lar eletoral oie% tis!o)rt 4)st eOert )t4ost eAort to resolve te iss)es in a 4anner tat <o)ld give

eAet to te <ill o te 4aDority% or it is 4erely so)nd p)bli poliy to a)se eletive

oHes to be lled by tose <o are te oie o te 4aDority. -o successfully challenge

a winning candidateMs uali+cations, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility

is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility

and thereby giving e*ect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater

preLudice to the very democratic institutions and Luristic traditions that our (onstitution and laws

so zealously protect and promote$ 7n this undertaking, :ee has miserably failed$



7n ?rivaldoMs case, it would have been technically easy to +nd fault with his cause$ 'e !o)rt

o)ld ave re)sed to grant retroativity to te eAets o is repatriation and old

i4 still ineligible d)e to is ail)re to so< is itiBensip at te ti4e e registered

as a voter beore te 1995 eletions. r% it o)ld ave disp)ted te at)al ndings o

te !o4ele tat e <as stateless at te ti4e o repatriation and t)s old is

onse)ent d)al itiBensip as a dis)aliation ro4 r)nning or any eletive loal

position. C)t te real essene o D)stie does not e4anate ro4 )ibblings over

pat<or= legal teniality. +t proeeds ro4 te spiritIs g)t onsio)sness o te

dyna4i role o la< as a bri= in te )lti4ate develop4ent o te soial edie. -hus,

the (ourt struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh

anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial Lustice in the larger social context

consistent with ?rivaldoMs uniue situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life$

(oncededly, e so)gt "4erian itiBensip only to esape te l)tes o te

ditatorsip. "t tis stage% <e annot serio)sly entertain any do)bt abo)t is loyalty

and dediation to tis o)ntry. "t te rst opport)nity% e ret)rned to tis land% and

so)gt to serve is people one 4ore. 'e people o Sorsogon over<el4ingly voted

or i4 tree ti4es. /e too= an oat o allegiane to tis Rep)bli every ti4e e led

is ertiate o andiday and d)ring is ailed nat)raliBation bid. &nd let it not be

overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-ass)4e is nationalityo birt despite several legal set-ba=s spea= 4ore lo)dly% in spirit% in at and in

tr)t tan any legal teniality% o is ons)4ing intention and b)rning desire to re-

e4brae is native ilippines even no< at te ripe old age o &1 years. 8uch loyalty to

and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this (ourt of Lustice and

euity$ 9ortals of lesser mettle would have given up$ &fter all, ?rivaldo was assured of a life of

ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world$ Dut he opted, nay, single.

mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved land of birth$

/e tereore deserves every liberal interpretation o te la< <i an be applied in

is avor. "nd in te nal analysis% over and above *rivaldo i4sel% te indo4itable

people o Sorsogon 4ost ertainly deserve to be governed by a leader o teirover<el4ing oie.

Parreno vs COA

paulpaden5 4ul B, '5

(&8=A Parreno vs$ (O& G$0$ 1o$ '''B

-opicA Prospective and retrospective e*ect of laws$

?actsA a petition for certiorari assailing the 4anuary !, '55# decision and 4anuary #, '55B

resolution of the (O& +led by 'lt 8alvador Parreno EretF represented by his daughter$

8alvador Parreno served in the &?P for #' years and was retired on 4anuary !2'$ <e receivedpayment of his lump sum pension and started receiving his monthly pension in !23$ Petitioner

migrated to <awaii and became a naturalized &merican citizen$ 7n 4anuary '55, the &?P stopped

petitionerKs monthly pension in accordance with sec$ '" of P$@$ #2 which provides that a

retiree who loses his ?ilipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement

bene+ts terminated upon loss of ?ilipino citizenship$ Petitioner reuested for reconsideration but

&?P 4&GO denied his reuest$

Petitioner +led a claim before the (O& for the continuance of his monthly pension but on 4anuary

!, '55#, (O& denied his claim for lack of Lurisdiction$ (O& ruled that the issue at hand reuires

the courts as mandated by the constitution to determine the validity of the law reA P$@$ #2 sec$

http://www.wikispaces.com/user/view/paulpaden01

http://www.wikispaces.com/user/view/paulpaden01



'"$

Petitioner +led a motion for reconsideration but on 4anuary #, '55B, in its resolution (O& denied

the motion further ruling that even if assumed Lurisdiction over the claim, petitionerKs

entitlement to the retirement bene+ts he was previously receiving must necessarily cease upon

the loss of his ?ilipino citizenship in accordance with sec$ '" of P$@$ #2 as amended$

Petitioner argued that P$@$ #2, as amended applies prospectively and should apply only to

those who Loined the military service after its e*ectivity$

788I=A 7s the petitioner correct in maintaining that P$@$ #2, as amended applies prospectively

and should apply only to those who Loined the military service after its e*ectivityY

<=:@A ;es, petitioner is correct in saying that P$@$ #2 applies prospectively$ -here is no

uestion that P$@$ #2 as amended applies prospectively and it does not provide for its

retroactive application$ Dut in petitionerKs contention that it should only apply to those who

Loined the military service after its e*ectivity, he is wrong because P$@$ #2 as amended, is

about the new system of retirement and separation from service of military personnel, it should

apply to those who were in the service at the time of its approval$ 8ec$ ' of P$@$ #2, as

amended provides that, the decree shall apply to all military personnel in the service of the &?P$

P$@$ #2 as amended was signed into law on 8eptember 5, !"! while petitioner retired in

!2', which is long after the approval of P$@$ #2, as amended$ <ence, the provisions of P$@$

#2, as amended, apply to petitioner$

(ordora vs (omelec(arpio, 4A?&(-8A(ordora +led a complaint adavit before (omelec lawdepartment against -ambunting asserting that Gustavo -ambuntingmade false assertion in hiscerti+cate of candidacy by claiming that 1atural Dorn ?ilipino and resident before the election in'55and '55B$ (ordora alleged that -ambunting was not eligible to run for local public ocebecause -ambunting lacked thereuired citizenship and residency reuirements$(ordorapresented a certi+cation from the Dureau of 7mmigration which statedthat, in two instances,

-ambunting claimed that he is an &mericanA upon arrival in the Philippines on @ecember '555andupon departure from the Philippines on " 4une '55$ &ccording to (ordora, these traveldates con+rmed that -ambuntingacuired &merican citizenship through naturalization in<onolulu, <awaii on ' @ecember '555$-ambunting, on the other hand,maintained that he didnot make any misrepresentation in his certi+cates of candidacy$ -o refute (ordoraKs claim that

-ambunting is not a natural.born ?ilipino, -ambunting presented a copy of his birth certi+catewhich showed that he was born ofa ?ilipino mother and an &merican father$ -ambunting furtherdenied that he was naturalized as an &merican citizen$ -hecerti+cate of citizenship conferred by the I8 government after -ambuntingKs father petitionedhim through 718 ?orm 7.#5EPetition for 0elativeF merely con+rmed -ambuntingKs citizenship which he acuired at birth$ -ambuntingKs possession of an&merican passport did not mean that -ambunting is not a ?ilipino citizen$ -ambunting also tookan oath of allegiance on 21ovember '55# pursuant to 0epublic &ct 1o$ !''3 E0$&$ 1o$ !''3F, orthe (itizenship 0etention and 0eacuisition &ct of '55#$-he (omelec law departmentrecommended the dismissal of complaint because it failed to substantiate the charges$

-he(O9=:=(=n Dancarmed the +ndings and the resolution of the (O9=:=( :aw @epartment$ -he (O9=:=(=n Dancwasconvinced that (ordora failed to support his accusation against -ambunting by sucient andconvincing evidence$(ommissioner 8armiento wrote a separate opinion which concurred with the+ndings of the=n Danc0esolution$ (ommissioner8armiento pointed out that -ambunting could be considered a dualcitizen$ 9oreover, -ambunting e*ectively renounced his&merican citizenship when he +led hiscerti+cates of candidacy in '55 and '55B and ran for public oce$ Petitioner +led a 90but was



denied, hence, this petition$788I=A%hether or not -ambunting is natural born?ilipino$<=:@A-ambunting does not deny that he is born of a ?ilipino mother and an &mericanfather$ 1either does he deny that he underwentthe process involved in 718 ?orm 7.#5 EPetition for 0elativeF because of his fatherKs citizenship$ -ambunting claims thatbecause ofhis parentsK di*ering citizenships, he is both ?ilipino and &merican by birth$ (ordora, on the otherhand, insists that-ambunting is a naturalized &merican citizen$%e agree with (ommissioner 8armientoKs observation that -ambunting possesses dualcitizenship$ Decause of thecircumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for -ambunting to undergo thenaturalization process to acuire &mericancitizenship$ -he process involved in 718 ?orm 7.#5only served to con+rm the &merican citizenship which -ambunting acuiredat birth$ -hecerti+cation from the Dureau of 7mmigration which (ordora presented contained two trips where

-ambuntingclaimed that he is an &merican$ <owever, the same certi+cation showed nine othertrips where -ambunting claimed that he is?ilipino$ (learly, -ambunting possessed dual citizenshipprior to the +ling of his certi+cate of candidacy before the '55elections$ -he fact that

-ambunting had dual citizenship did not disualify him from running for public oce$@ual citizenshipis involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the di*erent laws oftwo or morestates, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states$ -hus, likeany other natural.born ?ilipino, it isenough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks publicoce to +le his certi+cate of candidacy and swear to the oath ofallegiance contained therein$@ual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the individualKs active participation in thenaturalization process$&&848states that, under 0$&$ 1o$ !''3, a ?ilipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another countryis allowed toretain his ?ilipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the 0epublic of thePhilippines$ -he act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizenKs foreigncitizenship G$0$ 1O$ 255B2 4I1= !, '55!@= GIS9&1 >8 (O9=:=(?&(-8A

-his is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary inLunction and temporary restrainingorderassails the 4une 3, '55" 0esolution of the ?irst @ivision of (O9=:=(, disualifying0O8=::=0 @= GIS9&1 fromrunning as vice.mayor in the 9ay B, '55" elections$Petitioner was anaturalized &merican$ <owever, on 4anuary '3, '55, he applied for dual citizenship under0&!''3$ Ipon approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the 0epublic of thePhilippines on8eptember , '55$ <aving reacuired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled toexercise full civil and political rights$&s such, uali+ed to run as vice.mayor of Guimba, 1ueva=ciLa$788I=A %hether or not petitioner is disuali+ed from running for vice.mayor of Guimba, 1ueva

=ciLa inthe 9ay B, '55" elections for having failed to renounce his &merican (itizenship inaccordance with0& !''3$<=:@A%e +nd that petitioner is disuali+ed from running for public oce in view of his failure torenounce his&merican citizenship$ 0& !''3 was enacted to allow reacuisition and retention ofPhilippine citizenship forA$ 1atural born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship byreason of their naturalization ascitizens of a foreign countryT'$ 1atural born citizens of thePhilippines who after the e*ectivity of the law, becomes citizens of aforeign country$-he lawprovides that they are not deemed to have reacuired or retained their Philippinecitizenship upontaking the oath of allegiance$Petitioners oath of allegiance and certi+cate of candidacy did notcomply with sectionE3F' of 0& !''3 which furtherreuires those seeking elective public oce inthe Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreigncitizenship$ Petitioner failedto renounce his &merican citizenshipT as such, he is disuali+ed from running for vicemayor



M"!"L+N'"L @S. !ML!G$0$ 1o$ 3"5#, 4uly 5 '55#

?&(-8ADefore the (ourt is a petition for certiorari and prohibition +led by 0omulo D$ 9acalintal, amember of the Philippine Dar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of 0epublic &ct 1o$!2! E-he Overseas &bsentee >oting &ct of '55#F su*er from constitutional in+rmity$ (laimingthat he has actual and material legal interest in the subLect matter of this case in seeing to it thatpublic funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner +led the instant petitionas a taxpayer and as a lawyer$788I=8AEF %hether or not 8ection 3EdF of 0epublic &ct 1o$ !2! violates the residency reuirement in8ection of &rticle > of the (onstitution$E'F %hether or not 8ection 2$3 of the same law violates the constitutional mandate under8ection B, &rticle >77 of the (onstitution that the winning candidates for President and the >ice.President shall be proclaimed as winners by (ongress$E#F %hether or not (ongress may, through the 4oint (ongressional Oversight (ommittee createdin 8ection '3 of 0ep$ &ct 1o$ !2!, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the7mplementing 0ules and 0egulations that the (ommission on =lections, promulgate withoutviolating the independence of the (O9=:=( under 8ection , &rticle 7.& of the (onstitution$<=:@AEF 1o$ 8ection 3 of 0& 1o$ !2! enumerates those who are disuali+ed voting under this &ct$ 7tdisuali+es an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country$<owever, an exception is provided i$e$ unless he/she executes, upon registration, anadavit prepared for the purpose by the (ommission declaring that he/she shall resume actuaphysical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than # years from approval ofregistration$ 8uch adavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in anothercountry$ ?ailure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant orpermanent resident from the 1ational 0egistry of &bsentee >oters and his/her permanentdisuali+cation to vote in absentia$

Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency reuirement in 8ection &rticle > of the(onstitution which reuires the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one yr, anda resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least months immediately precedingan election$

<owever, O8G held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that the (ourtmay have to discard that particular ruling$ Panacea of the controversyA &davit for without it, thepresumption of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain$ -he uali+ed ?ilipino abroad whoexecuted an adavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines and presumednot to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country$ 8ection 3 of 0& 1o$ !2!does not only reuire the promise to resume actual physical permanent residence in thePhilippines not later than # years after approval of registration but it also reuires the ?ilipinoabroad, %O1 he is a green card holder, a temporary visitor or even on business trip, must

declare that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country$ -hus, he/she must returnto the Philippines otherwise conseuences will be met according to 0& 1o$ !2!$

&lthough there is a possibility that the ?ilipino will not return after he has exercised his right tovote, the (ourt is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal or modify it ifsuch law is found to be impractical$ <owever, it can be said that the (ongress itself wasconscious of this probability and provided for deterrence which is that the ?ilipino who fails toreturn as promised stands to lose his right of su*rage$ &ccordingly, the votes he cast shall not beinvalidated because he was uali+ed to vote on the date of the elections$

E*pressum facit cessare tacitumA where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning, the (ourt isprevented from making it mean what the (ourt pleases$ 7n +ne, considering that underlying



intent of the (onstitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and intent of the framers,which is to grant ?ilipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad the unuestionable right toexercise the right of su*rage E8ection &rticle >F the (ourt +nds that 8ection 3 of 0& 1o$ !2! isnot constitutionally defective$

E'F ;es$ (ongress should not have allowed (O9=:=( to usurp a power that constitutionallybelongs to it$ -he canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates forPresident and >ice President for the entire nation must remain in the hands of (ongress as itsduty and power under 8ection B of &rticle >77 of the (onstitution$ (O9=:=( has the authority toproclaim the winning candidates only for 8enators and Party.list 0eps$

E#F 1o$ Dy vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the 7mplementing0ules 0egulations for 0& 1o$ !2!, (ongress went beyond the scope of its constitutionalauthority$ (ongress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the (O9=:=($Inder such a situation, the (ourt is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual silence indeclaring a provision of law unconstitutional$

digests civil law (art 1-41)

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