digests - special civil actions

7/30/2019 Digests - Special Civil Actions

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S P E C I A L C I V I L A C T I O N S | 1

INTERPLEADER

OCAMPO v. TIRONA

FACTS:

Ocampo alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of land which he

bought from Rosauro Bretono

TCT is not yet in Ocampos name Tirona is a lessee occupying a portion of the said land

o In recognition of the right of ownership of Ocampo,

Tirano paid some monthly rentals dueo However, the subject land was declared under area of

priority development and hence, Tirona exercised her rightof first refusal pursuant to a presidential decree and inconnection thereto, will temporarily stop paying her monthlyrentals

Despite demand, Tirona refused to pay the rentals

Hence, a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by Ocampo

o In her Answer, Tirona asserted that LourdesRodriguez Yaneza actually owns the subject land

o In her amended answer, she further alleged that thecertificate of title was not ever registered under Ocamposname

MTC ruled in favor of Ocampo

o Ocampo filed a motion for execution pending appeal Upon appeal to RTC, Maria Lourdes Breton Mendiola filed a

motion with leave to file interventiono RTC denied her motion for intervention

o In her memorandum, Tirona, for the first time,

disclosed that Alipio Breton is the registered owner of thesubject land

o And upon his death, his children Rosauro and Maria

Lourdes Breton inherited the land;o Rosauro Breton executed a deed of conveyance and

waiver in favor Maria Lourdeso She alleged also that Ocampo could not acquire title

over the land in view of the said waivero Maria Lourder is her lessor and not Ocampo

RTC affirmed the MTC decision

CA set aside the RTC decision

ISSUE: WON THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE MUST PROPSER

AGAINST TIRONA

HELD: Unlawful detainer cases are summary in nature. The elements to

be proved and resolved in unlawful detainer cases are the fact of lease and

expiration or violation of its terms

The following facts support the conclusion that there was a violation of thelease agreement:

(1) Tirona, through Callejo Law Office, sent a letter dated 5 July 1995 whichstated that Tirona will temporarily stop paying her monthly obligation untilthe National Housing Authority has processed the pertinent papersregarding the amount due to Ocampo in view of PD 1517;29

(2) As of August 1995, Tirona has not paid her rent to Ocampocorresponding to April to August 1995;30and

(3) In a letter dated 7 August 1995, Ocampo demanded from Tirona unpaidrent payments.31

In view of these facts, we hold that Tirona is estopped from denying herpossession under a lease32 and that there was a violation of the leaseagreement. Thus, the MTC and RTC correctly ruled against Tirona.

The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference for MariaLourdes Breton-Mendiola. As a stakeholder, Tirona should have usedreasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court.Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo

against her before filing a bill of interpleader.37 An action fointerpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person towhom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property.38

The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who hasproperty whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligationto render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, orclaims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by theconflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who

claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled todemand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate amongthemselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or theother thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against adouble liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respectof one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigateamong themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the formerare styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading whichinitiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not across-complaint.

Ocampo has the right to eject Tirona from the subject land. All the elementsrequired for an unlawful detainer case to prosper are present. Ocamponotified Tirona that he purchased the subject land from Tironas lessorTironas continued occupation of the subject land amounted toacquiescence to Ocampos terms. However, Tirona eventually refused topay rent to Ocampo, thus violating the lease.

We GRANT the petition

DECLARATORY RELIEF

Alfredo Tano, et al. (100), & Airline Shippers Association Of Palawanpetitioners, vs. Gov. Salvador P. Socrates, Members of SanggunianPanlalawigan of Palawan, City Mayor Edward Hagedorn, Members oSangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa, All Members of BantayDagat, Members of Philippine National Police of Palawan, Provincial andCity Prosecutors of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, and All Judges ofPalawan, Regional, Municipal And Metropolitan, respondents.(G.R. No. 110249 | August 21, 1997)

FACTS: DAVIDE, JR., J.: Petitioners caption their petition as one foCertiorari, Injunction With Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,with Prayer foTemporary Restraining Order and pray that this Court: (1) DECLARE ASUNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) Ordinance No. 15-92 (1992) of theSangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa; (b) Office Order No. 23(1993) issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of Puerto PrincesaCity; and (c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, (1993) of theSangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan; (2) ENJOIN THE ENFORCEMENTthereof; and (3) RESTRAIN RESPONDENTS Provincial and CityProsecutors of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City and Judges of RegionaTrial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts inPalawan from assuming jurisdiction over and hearing cases concerning theviolation of the Ordinances and of the Office Order.

THE PETITION SHALL BE TREATED AS A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FORCERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION.

1. The Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 15-92whichtook effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: AN ORDINANCEBANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTEROUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONSPENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF, the fultext of which reads as follows:

Section 2. Purpose, Scope and Coverage. - To effectively free ouCity Sea Waters from Cyanide and other Obnoxious substanceand shall cover all persons and/or entities operating within andoutside the City of Puerto Princesa who are directly or indirectly inthe business or shipment of live fish and lobster outside the City.

Section 3. Definition of terms. - For purpose of this Ordinance thefollowing are hereby defined:
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D. ALL LIVE FISH - All alive, breathing not necessarily movingof all specie[s] use for food and for aquarium purposes.

E. LIVE LOBSTER - Several relatively, large marinecrustaceans of the genus Homarus that are alive and breathingnot necessarily moving.

Section 4. It shall be unlawful [for] any person or any businessenterprise or company to ship out from Puerto Princesa City to anypoint of destination either via aircraft or seacraft of any live fish and

lobsterEXCEPTsea bass, catfish, mudfish, and milkfish fries.

Section 5. Penalty Clause. - Any person/s and/or business entityviolating this Ordinance shall be penalized with a fine of not morethan P5,000.00 or imprisonment of not more than twelve (12)months, cancellation of their permit to do business in the City ORall of the herein stated penalties, upon the discretion of the court.

Section 6. If the owner and/or operator of the establishment foundviolating the provisions of this ordinance is a corporation or apartnership, the penalty prescribed in Section 5 hereof shall beimposed upon its president and/or General Manager or ManagingPartner and/or Manager, as the case maybe [sic].

Section 7. Any existing ordinance or any provision of anyordinance inconsistent with this ordinance is deemed repealed.

2. To implement, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issuedOffice Order No. 23-1993 which reads as follows:

In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No.PD426-14-74, otherwise known as AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANYPERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANYBUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION ORHAVING IN HIS POSSESSION ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH APERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYORSPERMIT and City Ordinance No. 15-92, you are hereby authorized anddirected to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoescontaining live fish and lobster being shipped out from the PuertoPrincesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port within thejurisdiction of the City to any point of destinations either via aircraft orseacraft.

Purpose: to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the requiredMayors Permit and the shipment is covered by invoice or clearance

issued by the local office of the BFAR and as to compliance with all otherexisting rules and regulations on the matter.

Any cargo containing live fish and lobster without the requireddocuments as stated herein must be held for proper disposition.

In the pursuit of this Order, you are hereby authorized to coordinate withthe PAL Manager, the PPA Manager, the local PNP Station and otheroffices concerned for the needed support and cooperation.

3. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan enacted Resolution No. 33(February 19, 1993) entitled: a resolution PROHIBITING theCATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLINGAND SHIPMENTOF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATICORGANISMS, to wit: family: scaridae (MAMENG), epine phelusfasciatus (SUNO). cromileptes altivelis (PANTHER ORSENORITA), lobster below 200 grams and spawning, tradacnagigas (TAKLOBO), pinctada margaritefera (MOTHER PEARL,

OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES), penaeusmonodon (TIGER PRAWN-BREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER),epinephelus suillus (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) and family:balistidae (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) for a PERIOD 5YEARS IN AND COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS,

WHEREAS studies disclose that only 5% of the corals of ourprovince remain to be in excellent condition as a habitat of marine coraldwelling aquatic organisms;

WHEREAS the destruction and devastation were principally due toillegal fishing activities like dynamite fishing, sodium cyanide fishing, useof other obnoxious substances and other related activities;

WHEREAS urgent need to protect and preserve the existence of theremaining corals and allow to reinvigorate and regenerate themselvesinto vitality within the span of 5 years;

WHEREAS, Sec. 468, Par. 1, Sub-Par. VI of R.A. 7160 empowers theSangguniang Panlalawigan to protect the environment and imposeappropriate penalties upon acts which endanger the environment suchas dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, among others.

Resolution No. 33, Series of 1993 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan andto enact Ordinance No. 2for the purpose, to wit:

Section II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS (RA 7160)

Section III. DECLARATION OF POLICY. - to protect and conserve themarine resources of Palawan not only for the greatest good of themajority of the present generation but with [the] proper perspective andconsideration of [sic] their prosperity, and to attain this end, theSangguniang Panlalawigan henceforth declares that it shall be unlawfufor any person or any business entity to engage in catching, gathering,possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwellingaquatic organisms in and coming out of Palawan Waters for a periodof 5 years;

Section IV. PENALTY CLAUSE. - Any person and/or business entityviolating this Ordinance shall be penalized with a fine of not more thanP5K, Philippine Currency, and/or imprisonment of 6 months to 12 monthsand confiscation and forfeiture of paraphernalia and equipment in favoof the government at the discretion of the Court;

4. The respondents implemented the said ordinances, therebyDEPRIVING ALL THE FISHERMEN of their only means olivelihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association oPalawan and other marine merchants from PERFORMING THEIRLAWFUL OCCUPATION AND TRADE;

5. Petitioners Alfredo Tanoet al., were even CHARGED CRIMINALLYin the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Cuyo-AgutayaMagsaysay; So were Petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim werecharged by the respondent PNP Puerto Princesa City;

WITHOUT SEEKING REDRESS from the concerned LGUs, prosecutorsoffice and courts, PETITIONERS DIRECTLY INVOKED SCs originajurisdiction by filing this petition (1993), contending :

First, the Ordinances DEPRIVED them of due process of law, theilivelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade.

Second, Office Order No. 23 contained NO REGULATION NOR

CONDITION the Mayor had the absolute authority to determinewhether or not to issue permit.

Third, as Ordinance No. 2 TOOK AWAY the right of petitionersfishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar aspetitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are concernedthey were UNDULY PREVENTED from pursuing their vocation andentering into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential tocarry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion.

Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 is NULL AND VOID, the criminal casesbased thereon against petitioners Tano and the others have to bedismissed.

In their comment (13 August 1993), public respondents defended thevalidity of Ordinance No.2, Series of 1993, as a VALID EXERCISE OF THEPROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS POWER UNDER THE GENERALWELFARE CLAUSE, and its specific power to protect the environment and

impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environmentsuch as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing undeSection 447 (a) (1) (vi), Section 458 (a) (1) (vi), and Section 468 (a) (1(vi), of the LGC. The Ordinance covered ONLY LIVE MARINE CORALDWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS which were enumerated in theordinance and excluded other kinds of live marine aquatic organisms nodwelling in coral reefs; besides THE PROHIBITIONwas for only 5 years toPROTECT AND PRESERVE the pristine coral and allow THOSEDAMAGED TO REGENERATE.

Respondents likewise maintained that THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OFDUE PROCESS (Public hearings were conducted, had a lawfupurpose, and employed reasonable means;) and EQUAL PROTECTIONCLAUSES of the Constitution (substantial distinction existed between afisherman who catches live fish with the intention of selling it live, and afisherman who catches live fish with no intention at all of selling it live : theformer uses sodium cyanide while the latter does not.


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Petitioners filed an Urgent Plea for the Immediate Issuance of a TRO (25October 1993) claiming that despite the pendency of this case, RTC ofPalawan was proceeding with CRIMINAL CASEagainst petitioners DaniloTano et al. for violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the SangguniangPanlalawigan of Palawan. Acting on said plea, SC issued a TRO directingJudge Angel Miclat of said court to cease and desist from proceeding withthe arraignment and pre-trial.

There are actually TWO SETS OF PETITIONERS in this case. The

FIRST is composed of Alfredo Tano, et al., who were criminallycharged with violating Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 33

and Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993,

The SECOND set of petitioners is composed ofthe rest of the petitionersnumbering seventy-seven (77), all of whom, except the AirlineShippers Association of Palawan -- an alleged private association ofseveral marine merchants -- are natural persons who claim to befishermen.

The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is, of course, to preventthe prosecution, trial and determination of the criminal cases until theconstitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they allegedly violated shallhave been resolved. The second set of petitioners merely claim that theybeing fishermen or marine merchants, they would be adversely affected bythe ordinances.

ISSUE:

Were theProvincial Ordinances unconstitutional? NO.

Should SC grant the certiorari and prohibition prayed for by the

petitioners? NO.HELD:AS TO THE FIRST SET OF PETITIONERS:

This special civil forCERTIORARI MUST FAIL on the ground of prematurityamounting to a lack of cause of action. There is no showing that the saidpetitioners have filed motions to quash the information therein and that thesame were denied. Even if the petitioners did file motions to quash, thedenial thereof would not forthwith give rise to a cause of action under Rule65 of the Rules of Court. The GENERAL RULE is that where a motion toquash is denied, the remedy is for the party aggrieved to go to trial withoutprejudice to reiterating special defenses involved in said motion, and if,after trial on the merits of adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefromin the manner authorized by law. And, even where in an exceptionalcircumstance such denial may be the subject of a special civil action for

certiorari, an MR must have to be filed to allow the court concerned anopportunity to correct its errors, unless such motion may be dispensed withbecause of existing exceptional circumstances. Finally, even if an MR hasbeen filed and denied, the remedy under Rule 65 is still UNAVAILABLEabsent any showing of the grounds provided for in Section 1 thereof. FOROBVIOUS REASONS, THE PETITION AT BAR DOES NOT, AND COULDNOT HAVE , ALLEGED ANY OF SUCH GROUNDS.

AS TO THE SECOND SET OF PETITIONERS

The instant petition is obviously one for DECLARATORY RELIEF, i.e ., for adeclaration that the Ordinances in question are a nullity ... for beingunconstitutional. Their PETITION MUST LIKEWISE FAIL, as this Court isnot possessed of original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory reliefeven if only questions of law are involved, it being settled that the SCmerely exercises appellate jurisdiction over such petitions.

II

While SC have concurrent jurisdiction with RTC and with the CA to issuewrits ofcertiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus andinjunction, such concurrence gives petitioners no unrestricted freedom ofchoice of court forum, so we held in People v. Cuaresma:

There is after all hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy isdeterminative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve asa general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions forthe extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicialhierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuanceof extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts shouldbe filed with the RTC, and those against the latter, with the CA.A DIRECT INVOCATION OF THE SUPREME COURTSORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THESE WRITS SHOULD

BE ALLOWED ONLY WHEN THERE ARE SPECIAL AND

IMPORTANT REASONS THEREFOR, CLEARLY ANDSPECIFICALLY SET OUT IN THE PETITION. This isestablished policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinatedemands upon the Courts time and attention which are better

devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and toprevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.

III

SC opts to resolve this case on its merits considering that the lifetime of the

challenged Ordinances is about to end. THESE ORDINANCES WEREUNDOUBTEDLY ENACTED IN THE EXERCISE OF POWERS UNDER

THE NEW LGC RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION AND PRESERVATIONOF THE ENVIRONMENT AND ARE THUS NOVEL AND OF PARAMOUNTIMPORTANCE. No further delay then may be allowed in the resolution othe issues raised.

It is of course settled that laws ( including ordinances enacted by locagovernment units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrowthis presumption. IN SHORT, THE CONFLICT WITH THE CONSTITUTIONMUST BE SHOWN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. Where doubt existseven if well founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. TODOUBT IS TO SUSTAIN.

SC finds petitioners contentions baseless and so hold that THE FORMERDO NOT SUFFER FROM ANY INFIRMITY, BOTH UNDER THECONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE LAWS.

The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article XII reads:

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in itsarchipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economiczone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipinocitizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization onatural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fishfarming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers inrivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide:

SEC. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the

commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedomof initiative and self-reliance.

SEC. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistencefishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferentiause of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inlandand offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen throughappropriate technology and research, adequate financialproduction, and marketing assistance, and other services. TheState shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources.The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds osubsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkersshall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization ofmarine and fishing resources.

There is absolutely NO SHOWING THAT ANY OF THE PETITIONERSQUALIFIES AS A SUBSISTENCE OR MARGINAL FISHERMAN.

A MARGINAL FISHERMAN is an individual engaged in fishing whosemargin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existingprice levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gatheringthe fish, while a SUBSISTENCE FISHERMAN is one whose catch yieldsbut the irreducible minimum for his livelihood. The LGC (R.A. No. 7160defines a MARGINAL FARMER OR FISHERMAN as an individuaengaged in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale,barter or exchange of agricultural or marine products produced by himselfand his immediate family. NOTHING IN THE RECORD SUPPORTS AFINDING THAT ANY PETITIONER FALLS WITHIN THESE DEFINITIONS.

Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right tosubsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protecthe nations marine wealth. The provision recognizes that the State mayallow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistencefishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. Section 149of the LGC of 1991:


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SEC. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. -- x x x

(b) The sangguniang bayan may:

(1) Grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster,mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within adefinite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by it:

Provided, however, That duly registered organizations andcooperatives of marginal fishermen shall have preferential right

to such fishery privileges ....

In a Joint Administrative Order No. 3(April 1996), the Secretary of DA andthe DILG prescribed the guidelines on the preferential treatment of smallfisherfolk relative to the fishery right mentioned in Section 149 . THIS CASE,HOWEVER, DOES NOT INVOLVE SUCH FISHERY RIGHT.

RE SECTION 7 OF ARTICLE XIII: it speaks not only of the use ofcommunal marine and fishing resources, BUT OF THEIR PROTECTION,DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSERVATION. The ordinances in question aremeant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the endthat their enjoyment by the people may be guaranteed not only for thepresent generation, but also for the generations to come.

The PREFERENTIAL RIGHT of subsistence or marginal fishermen to theuse of marine resources is NOT AT ALL ABSOLUTE. In accordance withthe REGALIAN DOCTRINE, marine resources belong to the State, and,pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XI I of the Constitution,their exploration, development and utilization ... shall be under the fullcontrol and supervision of the State. Moreover, their mandated protection,development, and conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers ofthe Constitution, imply CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS ON WHATEVER RIGHTOF ENJOYMENT THERE MAY BE IN FAVOR OF ANYONE.

MR. RODRIGO: So, once one is licensed as a marginalfisherman, he can go anywhere in the Philippines and fish in anyfishing grounds.

MR. BENGZON: Subject to whatever rules and regulations andlocal laws that may be passed, may be existing or will bepassed..

Davide wont miss the chance to cite his ponencia in Oposa v. Factoran,this Court declared:

While the right to balanced and healthful ecology is to be found underthe Declaration of Principles the State Policies and not under the Billof Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civiland political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to adifferent category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less thanself-preservation and self-perpetuation - aptly and fittingly stressed bythe petitioners - the advancement of which may even be said topredate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, THESEBASIC RIGHTS NEED NOT EVEN BE WRITTEN IN THECONSTITUTION FOR THEY ARE ASSUMED TO EXIST FROM THEINCEPTION OF HUMANKIND. If they are now explicitly mentioned inthe fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded FEAR OFITS FRAMERS THAT UNLESS THE RIGHTS TO A BALANCED ANDHEALTHFUL ECOLOGY AND TO HEALTH ARE MANDATED ASSTATE POLICIES BY THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF, THEREBYHIGHLIGHTING THEIR CONTINUING IMPORTANCE ANDIMPOSING UPON THE STATE A SOLEMN OBLIGATION TO

PRESERVE THE FIRST AND PROTECT AND ADVANCE THESECOND , THE DAY WOULD NOT BE TOO FAR WHEN ALL ELSEWOULD BE LOST NOT ONLY FOR THE PRESENT GENERATION,but also for those to come - generations which stand to inherit nothingbut parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

THE RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY CARRIESWITH IT A CORRELATIVE DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM IMPAIRING THEENVIRONMENT ...

Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization asexpressly mandated by the Constitution. Devolution refers to the act bywhich the National Government confers power and authority upon thevarious local government units to perform specific functions andresponsibilities.

One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC onDEVOLUTION IS THE ENFORCEMENT OF FISHERY LAWS INMUNICIPAL WATERS INCLUDING THE CONSERVATION OFMANGROVES. This necessarily includes enactment of ordinances toeffectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters.

The term MUNICIPAL WATERS, in turn, include not only streams, lakesand tidal waters within the municipality, not being the subject of privateownership and not comprised within the national parks, public forest, timberlands, forest reserves, or fishery reserves, but also marine waters included

between two lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline frompoints where the boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the sea alow tide and a third line parallel with the general coastline and fifteenkilometers from it. Under P.D. No. 704, the marine waters included inmunicipal waters is limited to three nautical miles from the general coastlineusing the above perpendicular lines and a third parallel line.

These fishery laws include: (1) P.D. No. 704; (2) P.D. No. 1015 whichauthorizes the establishment of a closed season if necessary foconservation or ecological purposes; (3) P.D. No. 1219 which provides fothe exploration, exploitation, utilization, and conservation of coral resources(4) R.A. No. 5474, as amended by B.P. Blg. 58, which makes it unlawful foany person, association, or corporation to catch or cause to be caught, selloffer to sell, purchase, or have in possession any of the fish specie calledgobiidae or ipon during closed season; and (5) R.A. No. 6451 whichprohibits and punishes electrofishing, as well as various issuances of theBFAR.

To those specifically devolved insofar as the control and regulation ofishing in municipal waters and the protection of its marine environment areconcerned, must be added the following:

1. Issuance of permits to construct fish cages within municipal waters;2. Issuance of permits to gather aquarium fishes within municipal waters;3. Issuance of permits to gather kapis shells within municipal waters;4. Issuance of permits to gather/culture shelled mollusks w/n muni waters;5. Issuance of licenses to establish seaweed farms within municipawaters;6. Issuance of licenses to establish culture pearls within municipal waters;7. Issuance of auxiliary invoice to transport fish and fishery products; and8. Establishment of closed season in municipal waters.

These functions are covered in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April1994 between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interiorand Local Government.

Parenthetically, SC wishes to add that these Ordinances find full supporunder R.A. No. 7611, otherwise known as the Strategic Environmental Plan(SEP) for Palawan Act (19 July 1992). This statute adopts aCOMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE SUSTAINABLEDEVELOPMENT OF PALAWAN COMPATIBLE WITH PROTECTING ANDENHANCING THE NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENDANGEREDENVIRONMENT OF THE PROVINCE.

It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives opurposes: (1) to establish a closed season for the species of fish oaquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years, and (2) toprotect the corals of the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa andthe Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishingactivities.

The accomplishment of the FIRST OBJECTIVE IS WELL WITHIN THEDEVOLVED POWER TO ENFORCE FISHERY LAWS in municipal waters

which allows the establishment of closed seasons. The devolution of suchpower has been expressly confirmed in the MOA between the DA and theDILG.

The realization of the SECOND OBJECTIVE FALLS WITHIN BOTH THEGENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE OF THE LGC AND THE EXPRESSMANDATE THEREUNDER TO CITIES AND PROVINCES TO PROTECTTHE ENVIRONMENT AND IMPOSE APPROPRIATE PENALTIES for actswhich endanger the environment.

THE PUBLIC PURPOSE AND REASONABLENESS OF THEORDINANCES MAY NOT THEN BE CONTROVERTED.


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The DISSENTING OPINION of Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo relies uponthe lack of authority on the part of the Sangguniang Panlungsod on thetheory that the subject thereof is within the jurisdiction and responsibility ofthe BFAR, that, in any event, the Ordinance is unenforceable for lack ofapproval by the Secretary of the DENR.

FALSE. The jurisdiction and responsibility of the BFAR under P. D. no. 704,over the management, conservation, development, protection, utilizationand disposition of all fishery and aquatic resources of the country is not all-encompassing. That all municipal or city ordinances and resolutions

affecting fishing and fisheries and any disposition thereunder shall besubmitted to the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources forappropriate action and shall have full force and effect only upon hisapproval.

Second, it must at once be pointed out that the BFAR is no longer under theDENR.

Therefore, IT IS INCORRECT TO SAY THAT THE CHALLENGEDORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF PUERTO PRINCESA IS INVALID ORUNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT APPROVED BY THESECRETARY OF THE DENR. If at all, the approval that should be soughtwould be that of the Secretary of the DA (not DENR) of municipalordinances affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal waters has beendispensed with in view of the following reasons:

(1) Section 534 (Repealing Clause) of the LGC expressly repeals oramends Section 16 and 29 of P.D. No. 704 insofar that they areinconsistent with the provisions of the LGC.

(2) As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause of theLGC, local government units have the power, inter alia, to enactordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balancedecology. It likewise specifically vests municipalities with thepower to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and imposerentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriateordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonoussubstances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methodsof fishing; and to prosecute other methods of fishing; and toprosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishinglaws. Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, thesangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawiganthe duty to enact ordinances to [p]rotect the environment andimpose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger theenvironment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of

destructive fishing and such other activities which result inpollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or ofecological imbalance.

In closing, SC COMMENDS THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OFTHE CITY OF PUERTO PRINCESA AND SANGGUNIANGPANLALAWIGAN OF THE PROVINCE OF PALAWAN FOR EXERCISINGTHE REQUISITE POLITICAL WILL TO ENACT URGENTLY NEEDEDLEGISLATION TO PROTECT AND ENHANCE THE MARINEENVIRONMENT, THEREBY SHARING IN THE HERCULEAN TASK OFARRESTING THE TIDE OF ECOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION. We hope thatother local government units shall now be roused from their lethargy andadopt a more vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of ourlegacy to future generations. At this time, the repercussions of any furtherdelay in their response may prove disastrous, if not, irreversible.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and thetemporary restraining order issued on is LIFTED.

G.R. No. 160208 June 30, 2008

RAFAEL R. MARTELINO, BARCHELECHU S. MORALES, ROSELYN S.CACHAPERO, REYNALDO R. EVANGELISTA, CESAR B.

YAPE, LEONORA R. PARAS, SEGUNDINA I. IBARRA, RAQUEL G.HALNIN, ZAMORA I. DIAZ, and ARTHUR L. VEGA, petitioners,

vs.NATIONAL HOME MORTGAGE FINANCE CORPORATION and HOME

DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, respondentsFACTS:

Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition withurgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction

filed before the RTC of Caloocan City against the NHMFC and HDMFand Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo.

Petitioners alleged that they obtained housing loans from respondentswho directly released the proceeds to the subdivision developerShelter Philippines, Inc. (Shelter).o However, Shelter failed to complete the subdivision according to

the subdivision plan. Petitioners spent their own resources toimprove the subdivision roads and alleys, and to install individuawater facilities.

o Respondents failed to ensure Shelters completion of the

subdivision.o Respondents ignored their right to suspend amortization

payments for Shelters failure to complete the subdivisioncharged interests and penalties on their outstanding loansthreatened to foreclose their mortgages and initiated foreclosureproceedings against petitioner Rafael Martelino.

o Hence, they prayed that respondents be restrained from

foreclosing their mortgages.

The RTC set the PI hearing, but said order, including the summonsand petition, were served only on the NHMFC and Sheriff CastilloSubsequently, the RTC ordered that a writ of preliminaryinjunction be issued restraining the respondents fromforeclosing the mortgages on petitioners houses.

RTCs RULING: In dismissing the case, the RTC ruled that theissue of non-completion of the subdivision should have beenbrought before the HLURB. It also ruled that no judiciadeclaration can be made because the petition was vague. The

RTC assumed that the subject of the petition was Republic Act No8501 (Housing Loan Condonation Act of 1998) which was cited bypetitioners. But the RTC pointed out that petitioners failed to statewhich section of the law affected their rights and needed judiciadeclaration. Moreover, the RTC noted that respondents stilforeclosed their mortgages, a breach of said law which renderedthe petition for declaratory relief improper. The proper remedywas an ordinary civil action.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Order.

ISSUES: Whether or not (1) The preliminary injunction order against the HDMF is valid NO(2) The petition for declaratory relief and prohibition was properly

dismissed NO

RULING:Preliminary Injunction

We affirm the RTC and Court of Appeals ruling that the preliminaryinjunction order is not valid against the HDMF. 5, Rule 58 of theRules of Court expressly states that No preliminary injunction shall begranted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person soughto be enjoined.

In the case at bar, petitioners even admit that the HDMF was not

notified of the PI hearing. Petitioners do not contest the lower courtsruling that the July 9, 1998 Order cannot apply to the HDMF. Themerely contend and insist that HDMF voluntarily submitted to theRTCs jurisdiction. However, such contention is immaterial becausethe issue involved is the validity of the PI order absent a notice ohearing for its issuance to the HDMF.

Declaratory Relief and Prohibition

The ruling that the Petition for Declaratory Relief and Prohibition is

improper is correct, because the Petition must be filed before theoccurrence of breach or any violation. Under 1, Rule 63, a personmust file a petition for declaratory relief before breach or violation of adeed, will, contract, other written instrument, statute, executive orderregulation, ordinance or any other governmental regulation.

However, petitioners had already suspended payment oamortizations. Clearly giving the HDMF a right to foreclose themortgage for failure to pay the debt secured by the mortgagePetitioners actual suspension of payments defeated the purposeof the action to secure an authoritative declaration of theisupposed right to suspend payment, for their guidance.o Thus, the RTC could no longer assume jurisdiction over the

action for declaratory relief because there was an occurrence obreach before filing the action.

PURPOSE OF THE ACTION: Secure an authoritative statement o

the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deedcontract, etc. for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance andnot to settle issues arising from its alleged breach.


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WHEN TO FILE THE ACTION: It may be entertained only BEFORE

the breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract to which itrefers. Where the law or contract has already been contravened priorto the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court can no longerassume jurisdiction over the action.

The Dismissal of the Petition was Improper

If the petition for declaratory relief and prohibition was vague,dismissal is not proper because the respondents may ask formore particulars. Notably, the NHMFC never assailed the supposedvagueness of the petition in its motion to dismiss nor did it ask formore particulars before filing its answer. When the RTC also set thepre-trial conference and ordered the parties to submit their pre-trialbriefs, it even noted that the issues had already been joined.Petitioners fairly stated also the necessary ultimate facts, except thattheir action for declaratory relief was improper.

The RTC made an assumption that RA No. 8501 was the subjectmatter of the case. But while the petition mentioned the law, thedeclaration that petitioners sought was not anchored on any of itsprovisions. The petition only stated that despite the effectivity of saidlaw, respondents still acted in bad faith and with undue haste inthreatening petitioners with foreclosures, instead of encouraging themto avail of its benefits.

COMMENTO: The Condonation Act took effect, but instead ofapplying for condonation and for the restructuring of their loans,Petitioners filed an erroneous petition before the RTC (siguro akala

nila automatic unyay, wala na silang utang!). On the other hand,the RTC was incorrect on the point that the case should have beenfiled before HLURB. The jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and decidecases is determined by the nature of the cause of action, the subjectmatter or property involved and the parties. In this case, the petitionfor declaratory relief and prohibition did not involve an unsound realestate business practice, or a refund filed by subdivision buyersagainst the developer, or a specific performance case filed by buyersagainst the developer.

Conversion of the Petition for Declaratory Relief and Prohibition toOrdinary Action

GENERAL RULE: 6, Rule 63 allows the course of action .

However, petitioners failed to specify the ordinary action they desired. TheCourt cannot assume that they seek annulment of the mortgages andfurther, the issue was not raised before the RTC. Therefore, the CAproperly refused to entertain the issue as it cannot be raised for the

first time on appeal.

Conversion of Petition for Declaratory Relief to an Action forProhibition

GENERAL RULE: In De La Llana, etc., et al. v. Alba, etc., et al., theCourt considered a petition erroneously entitled Petition forDeclaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition as an action forprohibition. The case involved the constitutionality ofBP Blg. 129, itwas held that: that if the petition has far-reaching implications andit raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated asone for prohibition.

Under the circumstances, action for prohibition is stil limproper. PROHIBITION is a remedy against proceedings that arewithout or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,there being no appeal or other plain, speedy adequate remedy in theordinary course of law. But here, the petition did not even imputelack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion committed byrespondents and Sheriff Castillo regarding the foreclosure

proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailedDecision and Resolution of the appellate court are AFFIRMED.

[G.R. No. L-24153. February 14, 1983.]

TOMAS VELASCO, LOURDES RAMIREZ, SY PIN, EDMUNDO UNSON,APOLONIA RAMIREZ and LOURDES LOMIBAO, as component

members of the STA. CRUZ BARBERSHOP ASSOCIATION, in theirown behalf and in representation of the other owners of barbershops

in the City of Manila, petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. ANTONIO J.VILLEGAS, City Mayor of Manila, HON. HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, Vice-

Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Municipal Board in relation toRepublic Act 4065, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA

and EDUARDO QUINTOS SR., Chief of Police of the City of Manila,respondents-appellees.

FACTS: Petitioners filed a suit for declaratory relief challenging theconstitutionality of Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila contending thatit amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of theimeans of livelihood without due process of law.

The assailed ordinance provides that: "It shall be prohibited foany operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massagingcustomers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barbe

shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barbershop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the roomswhere massaging is conducted is the same person."

As noted in the appealed order, petitioners-appellants admittedthat criminal cases for the violation of this ordinance had been previouslyfiled and decided. The lower court, therefore, held that a petition fodeclaratory relief did not lie, its availability being dependent on there beingas yet no case involving such issue having been filed.

Hence, petitioners appeal from an order of the lower courdismissing a suit for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality basedon Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that iamounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their meansof livelihood without due process of law. The assailed ordinance is wordedthus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conductthe business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacenroom or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within thesame building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator ofthe barber shop and the rooms where massaging is conducted is the sameperson." As noted in the appealed order, petitioners-appellants admittedthat criminal cases for the violation of this ordinance had been previouslyfiled and decided. The lower court, therefore, held that a petition fodeclaratory relief did not lie, its availability being dependent on there beingas yet no case involving such issue having been filed.

ISSUE: WoN the suit has merit.

HELD: NO.

The attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out inthe brief of respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. Theobjectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able to impose payment ofthe license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic undeOrdinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely differenmeasure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and(2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the

construction of separate rooms for massage of customers." This Court hasbeen most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfareclause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Courthrough Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such aclause, which "delegates in statutory form the police power to amunicipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide applicationby municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particulacircumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it iswell to recall, is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence." As it wasthen, so it has continued to be. There is no showing, therefore, of theunconstitutionality of such ordinance.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court is affirmedNo costs.

CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS

[G.R. No. 148288. August 12, 2005.]ROSEMARIE BALBA, petitioner, vs. PEAK DEVELOPMENT INC. and

MA. ISABEL VASQUEZ, respondents.

REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; NECESSITY

TO DELVE INTO FACTUAL ISSUES TO RESOLVE GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in reversing the

factual findings in the case instead of ruling only on "errors of jurisdiction,"

as befits a judgment in a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition

The flaw in petitioner's reasoning lies in the failure to appreciate that it is

sometimes necessary to delve into factual issues in order to resolve

allegations of grave abuse of discretion as a ground for the special civi

action of certiorari and prohibition. Furthermore, the conflicting views of the

LA and the NLRC on the factual issues or the insufficiency of the evidence

supporting the respective allegations of the parties, warranted the review


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thereof by the CA, at the very least to determine the existence of grave

abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Nevertheless, this Court agrees with petitioner that the CA erred in

concluding that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

The case in the Court of Appeals (CA) was a petition for certiorari and

prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking

the nullification of the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission

(NLRC) dated July 20, 1999 in NLRC NCR CA No. 018421-99 (NLRC Case

No. 05-03253-96), entitled "Rosemarie G. Balba v. Peak Development, Inc.,

et al." and its Resolution dated November 29, 1999 denying the motion for

reconsideration.

FACTS:

On April 17, 1996, a memorandum was issued by the respondent

placing complainant, Rosemarie Balba (hired as Systems

Administration Personnel) under preventive suspension, and at the

same time, requiring the complainant to explain why no disciplinary

action should be taken against her for insubordination, negligence and

incompetence, for the following cited acts or omissions, to wit:

1. Failure to promptly implement and/or comment on the

recommendation of the internal auditor despite clear

instruction . . . ;

2. Failure to promptly produce appropriate studies

required by management (E-VAT study);3. Implementation of clearly insufficient basic office

procedure;

4. Failure to follow general off ice pol icies and

procedures.

Subsequently, another memorandum was issued requiring

complainant to explain why despite being a managerial employee, she

collected overtime pay for alleged overtime services rendered on April

3, 4 and 9, 1996.

To both memoranda, complainant submitted her written explanations.

Finding the complainant's explanations as unsatisfactory, the

respondent terminated the complainant's services on the ground of

loss of trust and confidence.

BALBA charges the respondents of illegal suspension, illegal

dismissal, nonpayment of service incentive leave pay, 13th month

pay, cash conversion of her vacation leave, and damages.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal for lack

of merit, and [on the] money claims, the respondent company is

hereby ordered to pay complainant the sum of P7,500.00 as

proportionate 13th month pay for 1996. All other money claims are

denied for want of merit.

The NLRC partially GRANTED the appeal, to the effect that

complainant-appellant was illegally discharged; and that respondent-

appellee Company is DIRECTED to pay her separation pay in lieu of

reinstatement equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of

service, one (1) year backwages and attorney's fee equivalent to ten

percent (10%) of her total award of labor standards benefits pursuant

to Article III of the Labor Code, computed as follows:

Her appeal to CA was denied. On a motion for reconsideration, the CA

proceeded to review the FACTUAL FINDINGS of the NLRC, in view of

its conflict with those of the Labor Arbiter (LA). Accordingly, the CA set

aside its first Decision and entered a new one reversing the NLRC

decision and reinstating and affirming in toto the LA's decision.

Petitioner first argues that the CA erred in reversing the factual

findings in the case instead of ruling only on "errors of jurisdiction,"

as befits a judgment in a special civil action for certiorari and

prohibition.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in reviewing the factual findings of the NLRC in

pet for certiorari (RULE 65)

HELD: NO. See Syllabus

NEW FRONTIER SUGAR CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 39, ILOILO CITY and EQUITABLE

PCI BANK, Respondents.

FACTS:

New Frontier Sugar Corporation (petitioner) is a domestic corporation

engaged in the business of raw sugar milling. Foreseeing that i

cannot meet its obligations with its creditors as they fell due, petitione

filed a Petition for the Declaration of State of Suspension of Payments

with Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan under the Interim Rules

of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (2000) some time in Augus

2002. Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the

RTC issued a Stay Order dated August 20, 2002, appointing Manue

B. Clemente as rehabilitation receiver, ordering the latter to put up a

bond, and setting the initial hearing on the petition.

One of petitioners creditors, the Equitable PCI Bank (responden

bank), filed a Comment/Opposition with Motion to Exclude Property

alleging that petitioner is not qualified for corporate rehabilitation, as i

can no longer operate because it has no assets left.

The RTC issued an Omnibus Order terminating the proceedings and

dismissing the case. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion but this was

denied by the RTC

Petitioner then filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari

which was denied and affirmed the orders assailed by the petitioner.

In dismissing the petition, the CA sustained the findings of the RTC

that since petitioner no longer has sufficient assets and properties to

continue with its operations and answer its corresponding liabilities; it

is no longer eligible for rehabilitation.

The CA also ruled that even if the RTC erred in dismissing thepetition, the same could not be corrected anymore because wha

petitioner filed before the CA was a special civil action for certiorar

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal.

ISSUE W/N THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BEFORE IT AS "IMPROPER,

APPEAL?

HELD:

The CA correctly ruled that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy when i

filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court.

Certiorari is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors o

judgment. I t is an original and independent action that was not part of the

trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained

of. More importantly, since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action fo

certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory orderof the lower cour

prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any

plain, speedy or adequate remedy. A petition for certiorari should be filed

not later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution

and a motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a

petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct

the alleged errors.

The Omnibus Order dated January 13, 2003 issued by the RTC is a fina

order since it terminated the proceedings and dismissed the case before


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the trial court; it leaves nothing more to be done. As such, petitioners

recourse is to file an appeal from the Omnibus Order.

In this regard, A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC promulgated by the Court on

September 4, 2001 provides that a petition for rehabilitation is considered a

special proceeding given that it seeks to establish the status of a party or a

particular fact. Accordingly, the period of appeal provided in paragraph 19

(b) of the Interim Rules Relative to the Implementation of Batas Pambansa

Blg. 129 for special proceedings shall apply. Under said paragraph 19 (b),the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being

required.

However, it should be noted that the Court issued A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC on

September 14, 2004, clarifying the proper mode of appeal in cases

involving corporate rehabilitation and intra-corporate controversies. It is

provided therein that all decisions and final orders in cases falling under the

Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of

Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No.

8799 shall be appealed to the CA through a petition for review under Rule

43 of the Rules of Court to be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the

decision or final order of the RTC.

In any event, as previously stated, since what petitioner filed was a petition

for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules, the CA rightly dismissed thepetition and affirmed the assailed Orders.

Bugarin v. Palisoc

FACTS:

A complaint for ejectment was filed by private respondents Cecilia

Palisoc and Marina Mata

o The court (MeTC) ruled in favor of private respondents

o The court asked the petitioners to vacate the premises

Petitioner appealed to RTC

o Private respondents moved for execution pending appeal

o RTC affirmed with modification the decision of the lower court

o

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with opposition to theissuance of writ of execution.

o RTC denied the motion

o The writ of execution pending appeal was issued

o Petitioner moved to defer the implementation of writ of execution

o Private respondents filed a motion to the issuance of a special

order of demolition

o Thereafter, a supplemental motion was filed by the petitioners

contending that Section 28 of RA 7279 was not complied with.

o RTC declared the decision denying petitioners appeal final and

executory and remanded the records to MeTC

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with

prayer for preliminary injunction before the CA

MeTC set the Motion for the Issuance of Special Order of

Demolition for hearing

o The court granted said motion and asked the petitioners tovacate the premises

o Petitioner filed a motion to quash and recall the order of

demolition

o MeTC denied the motion

Hence, this petition

ISSUE: WON certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner.

HELD: Under Section 19,10 Rule 70 of the Revised Rules on Civil

Procedure, a judgment on a forcible entry and detainer action is

immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor, and

the courts duty to order the execution is practically ministerial.11 The

defendant may stay it only by (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a

supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental o

reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during

the pendency of the appeal.

Once the Regional Trial Court decides on the appeal, such decision is

immediately executory under Section 21,13 Rule 70, without prejudice to an

appeal, via a petition for review,before the Court of Appeals or Supreme

Court.14

However, petitioners failed to file a petition for review. Records show

that petitioners received on March 12, 2003 the RTC decision denying

their motion for reconsideration. They had until March 27, 2003 to file

a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. Instead, they filed a

petition for certiorari and prohibition on April 10, 2003. In said petition

which is still pending, petitioners contended that the RTC committed

grave abuse of discretion in affirming the MeTC decision and insisted

that the latter court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.

The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the

merits in the instant case is appeal. This holds true even if the erro

ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction

over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or

grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the

decision. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits

the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter

remedy is that "there should be no appeal."15

Clearly, petitioners petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was

filed as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. Certiorari is not and

cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is

available but was lost through fault or negligence .16Thus, the filing o

the petition for certiorari did not prevent the RTC decision from becoming

final and executory.17 The RTC acted correctly when it remanded the case

to the court of origin in the order dated April 11, 2003.

Camutin vs. Potente

Facts: Petitioners were the owners of a parcel of land situated in Cavite as

evidenced by TCT s under their name. Upon Petitioners return to the PH

they discovered that Respondents erected a house and warehouse on their

land. The parties agreed that respondents will pay rent but they failed to do

so. Respondents do not want to vacate the lot despite demand. In the

meantime, Petitioners sold the lot to a third party.

Respondents filed before the RTC a complaint for partition agains

petitioners alleging that they have a right over half of the property by virtue

of an acknowledgement of rights executed by petit ioners deceased mother

Petitioners filed a complaint with the barangay to have the respondents

warehouse removed. During the conference the parties agreed to wait for

the outcome of the complaint for partition in the RTC.

Petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondents

before the MTC. The MTC, noting the pendency of the partition case before

the RTC and treating the parties agreement in the barangay as an amicable

settlement, issued an order indefinitely suspending the unlawful detaine

case.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC but it

was denied for being a prohibited pleading. In the meantime, the MTC

dismissed the unlawful detainer case for lack of barangay conciliation

proceedings.

Issue: WON the RTC should have ruled on the petition for certiorari instead

of dismissing it for being a prohibited pleading?

Held: Yes, however in the case at bar the petition was dismissed for being

moot and academic.
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Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no

appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course

of law. While a petition for certiorari is not allowed against any interlocutory

order issued by the court in the unlawful detainer or ejectment case, in the

case at bar, the filing of a petition for certiorari challenging the MTCs

Orders dated 5 June 2007 and 16 August 2007 cannot be deemed a

dilatory remedy resorted to by petitioners. On the contrary, sustaining the

MTCs orders would unnecessarily and unfairly delay the unlawful detainer

case, a result contrary to the rules objective of speedy disposition of cases.

Petitioners could also not appeal from the orders of the MTC because these

only ordered the indefinite suspension and archiving of the case. The case

was not resolved on the merits so there is actually no decision from which

petitioners can appeal. Thus, the RTC could have validly ruled on the

petition for certiorari instead of dismissing it on the ground that it is a

prohibited pleading.

However, the MTCs revival of the unlawful detainer case and its

subsequent dismissal thereof on the grounds aforestated have rendered the

resolution of the present petition for review superfluous and unnecessary. In

their petition for review, petitioners seek the nullification of the RTCs orders

and the subsequent recall of the MTCs orders suspending the proceedings

in the unlawful detainer case and archiving it. The suspension of the

unlawful detainer case has apparently been lifted and the case has been

decided. There is thus no more need for the Court to decide the present

petition on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for being moot and

academic.

SO ORDERED.

EPIFANIO LALICAN,petitioner, vs. HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA,

Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City and PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DOCTRINE: Certiorari may be issued only where it is clearly shown that

there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of

positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act

at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in anarbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.

In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction

and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's

findings and conclusions.

FACTS:

On July 23, 1991, an information forviolation of Section 68 of P.D. No.

705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, was filed by the City

Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against petitioner Epifanio

Lalican, Ruben Benitez, Allan Pulgar and Jose Roblo before the

Regional Trial Court of that city. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 9543,

the information reads:

o "That on or about the 9th day of February, 1991, at Sitio Cadiz,

Barangay Bacungan, City of Puerto Princesa, Philippines, and within

the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,

without lawful authority or permit, conspiring and confederating

together and mutually helping one another, did then and there

willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession,

custody and control 1,800 board feet of assorted species and

dimensions of lumber on board two (2) passenger jeeps, with a

value of Fourteen Thousand Pesos (14,000.00), Philippine

Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the

amount aforestated.

At their arraignment on August 9, 1991, all the accused pleaded no

guilty to the crime charged.

On August 23, 1991, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the

information on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute

an offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 refers to "timbe

and other forest products" and not to "lumber," and asserting tha

"timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is sawed into beams, planks o

boards, petitioner alleged that said decree "does not apply to'lumber.'" He added that the law is "vague and standardless" as it does

not specify the authority or the legal documents required by existing

forest laws and regulations. Hence, petitioner asserted that the

information should be quashed as it violated his constitutional rights to

due process and equal protection of the law.

The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it

is not for the courts to determine the wisdom of the law nor to se

out the policy of the legislature which deemed it proper that the

word "timber" should include "lumber" which is a "product o

derivative after the timber is cut."

The lower court, guided by the principles that penal laws should be

construed strictly against the state and that all doubts should be

resolved in favor of the accused, issued an Order quashing theinformation. It held that the distinction between "timber" and "lumber" is

not artificial nor a matter of semantics as the law itself distinguishes the

two terms. Sec. 3(q) of P.D. No. 705 classifies "timber" as a fores

product while Sec. 3(aa) thereof considers "lumber" as a finished wood

product. Adding that unlicensed cutting, gathering and/or collecting o

"timber" is penalized under Sec. 68 while sale of "lumber" withou

compliance with grading rules established by the government i

prohibited by Sec. 79, the lower court categorically stated that:

The prosecution filed a motion for the reconsideration of this Order

pointing out that under the Primer on Illegal Logging of the Department o

Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), timber is not just any piece o

wood for it may consist of squared and manufactured timber or one

which has been sawn to pieces to facilitate transportation o

hauling. It stressed that to consider a person who had made lumberout of timber as not criminally liable is an absurd interpretation o

the law.

Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration contending that the

DENR primer's definition of "timber" is erroneous because the law itsel

distinguishes "timber" from "sawn lumber." The non-inclusion of "lumber"

in Sec. 68 could only mean a clear legislative intent to exclude

possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized under that section.

Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the Presiding Judge

of Branch 49 inhibited himself from taking cognizance of Criminal Case

No. 9543. The case was subsequently assigned to Branch 52.

On June 10, 1992, the lower court issued Order setting aside the

quashal Order of the previous judge . It declared that from the law

itself, it is evident that what is sought to be penalized is not the

possession, without the required legal documents, of timber only bu

also of "other forest products." It stated that even if lumber is no

timber, still, lumber is a forest product and possession thereo

without legal documents is equally prohibited by the law which includes

"wood" in the definition of forest products.

Petitioner sought the reconsideration of this Order but the lower court

denied it. Hence, the instant petition arguing that the lower court gravely

abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the

quashal order and in denying his motion for reconsideration on the

ground that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 neither specifies nor includes

"lumber" in the phrase "timber or other forest products."


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ISSUE: W/N there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction.

RULING: The petition is devoid of merit.

Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 which

was issued on July 25, 1987 by then President Corazon C. Aquino,

provides for it.

o Punished then in this section are: (a) the cutting, gathering, collection,

or removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein

mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of timber or other

forest products without the legal documents as required under existing

forest laws and regulations.

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest

raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or

common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New

International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as 'timber or logs

after being prepared for the market.' Simply put, lumber is

a processed log or timber.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words

and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and

common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without

the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,

as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed

timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere

debemus."

To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec.

68 would certainly emasculate the law itself.

The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely abuse its

discretion in denying the quashal of the information. The petition simply

has no legal basis. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and

whimsical exercise of power.

Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an

information is denied . That the appropriate recourse is to proceed to

trial and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction , as well as

the denial of the motion to quash, is impelled by the fact that a denial

of a motion to quash is an interlocutory procedural aspect which

cannot be appealed nor can it be the subject of a petition forcertiorari.

The remedies of appeal and certiorariare mutually exclusive and not

alternative or successive.

While it is true that the rights of an accused must be favored in the

interpretation of penal provisions of law, it is equally true that when the

general welfare and interest of the people are interwoven in the

prosecution of a crime, the Court must arrive at a solution only after a fair

and just balancing of interests.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition forcertiorariand prohibition is hereby

DISMISSED. The lower court is enjoined to proceed with dispatch in the

prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9543. This Decision is immediately

executory. Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 167434 February 19, 2007

SPOUSES RAMON M. NISCE and A. NATIVIDAD PARAS- NISCE,Petitioners

vs.EQUITABLE PCI BANK, INC., Respondent

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS:

Equitable PCI Bank as creditor-mortgage filed a petition for extra-judiciaforeclosure of the real estate mortgage contract executed by the Ramonand Natividad Nisce over two parcels of land.

These mortgage contracts were executed by the spouses to secure thei

obligation under Promissory Note including a Suretyship Agreemenexecuted by Natividad. The Ex- Officio Sheriff set the sale at publicauction.

The Nisce spouses filed before the RTC for Nullity of SuretyshipAgreement, damages and legal compensation with prayer for injunctiverelief against the Bank and the Ex-Officio Sheriff.

The spouses alleged the following:

o They had requested the bank to set off the peso equivalent of theiobligation against their US Dollar Account with PCI Capital AsiaLimited, a subsidiary of the Bank;

o The Bank accepted their offer and requested for an estimate of thebalance of their account;

o They complied with the Banks request; and that they were

surprised when they received a letter from the Bank demandingpayment of their account, and later a petition for extrajudiciaforeclosure.

o They insist that the suretyship agreement is null and void on theground that: it was executed without the knowledge and consent oRamon Nisce, who is by law the administrator of the conjugapartnership; the surety agreement did not rebound to the benefit ofthe conjugal partnership and therefore did not bind the same; andassuming that the suretyship contract was valid and binding, anyobligation arising therefrom is not covered by plaintiffs real estatemortgage which were constituted to secure the payment of certainspecific obligations only.

o Since they and the Bank are creditors and debtors with respect to

each other, their obligations should have been offset by legacompensation to the extent of their account wi th the Bank.

The Bank filed an Amended Petition with the office of the ExecutiveJudge for extrajudicial foreclosure. In its answers, the Bank alleged thathe spouses had no cause of action for legal compensation sine PCCapital was a different corporation with a separate and distincpersonality.

In 1994, the Equitable Banking Corporation and the PCIB were mergedunder the corporate name Equitable PCI Bank.

The RTC granted the spouses Nisces plea for a writ of preliminaryinjunction, declaring that that justice would be best served if a writ opreliminary injunction would be issued to preserve the status quo.

BANKS CONTENTION: The Bank opted not to file a motion foreconsideration of the order and instead assailed the trial courts ordebefore the CA via petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules oCourt. The Bank alleged that the spouses Nisce had failed to prove therequisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and thus, theRTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the preliminaryinjunction.

SPOUSES CONTENTION: pointed out that the Bank failed to file a

motion for reconsideration of the trial courts order, a condition sine quanon to the filing of a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules oCourt. Moreover, the error committed by the trial court is a mere error ofjudgment not correctible by certiorari; hence, the petition should havebeen dismissed outright by the CA .

RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: CA granted the petitioned andnullified the RTC order. The appellate court declared that a petitionforcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be fileddespite the failure to file a MR, particularly in instances where the

issue raised is one of law; where the error is patent; the assailedorder is void, or the questions raised are the same as those alreadyruled upon by the lower court. According to the appellate court, theissue raised before it was purely one of law: whether the loan account ofthe spouses was extinguished by legal compensation. Thus, a motion fothe reconsideration of the assailed order was not a prerequisite to apetition forcertiorariunder Rule 65.

ISSUES:

5.1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN TAKINGCOGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THEBANKS FAILURE TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITHTHE TRIAL COURT.


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5.2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTEDREVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT PREMATURELY RULED ON THEMERITS OF THE MAIN CASE.5.3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDINGTHAT RESPONDENT JUDGE HAD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION INISSUING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND A WRIT OFPRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN FAVOR OF THE SPOUSES NISCE.

RULING:

The Petition in the Court of Appeals is not Premature

The general rule is that before filing a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65of the Rules of Court, the petitioner is mandated to comply with acondition precedent: the filing of a motion for reconsideration of theassailed order, and the subsequent denial of the court a quo.

A petition forcertiorariis an extraordinary remedy and should be filed

only as a last resort. The filing of a MR is intended to afford the publicrespondent an opportunity to correct any actual error attributed to it byway of re-examination of the legal and factual issues.

However, the rule is subject to the exceptions:(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has

no jurisdiction;(b) where the questions raised in the certiorariproceeding have

been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are thesame as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;

(c)where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the questionand any further delay would prejudice the interests of theGovernment or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action isperishable;

(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsiderationwould be useless;

(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there isextreme urgency for relief;

(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgentand the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;

(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack ofdue process;

(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitionerhad no opportunity to object; and

(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest isinvolved.

The Order of the trial court granting petitioners plea for a writ ofpreliminary injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretionamounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction and thus a nullity. If thetrial court issues a writ of preliminary injunction despite the absence ofproof of a legal right and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, the writ isa nullity.

Petitioners Are Not Entitled to a Writ of Preliminary ProhibitoryInjunction

3, Rule 58 provides the requisites that must be established in orderfor a preliminary injunction to be granted.

Injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of the partiessubstantive rights and interests. The sole aim of a preliminaryinjunction is to preserve the status quo within the last actual statusthat preceded the pending controversy until the merits of the case canbe heard fully. A petition for a preliminary injunction is an equitableremedy, and one who comes to claim for equity must do so with cleanhands.

The plaintiff praying for a writ of preliminary injunction must furtherestablish that he or she has a present and unmistakable right to beprotected; that the facts against which injunction is directed violatesuch right; and there is a special and paramount necessity for the writto prevent serious damages. In the absence of proof of a legalright and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, an order for theissuance of a writ of preliminary injunction will be nullified. Thus,where the plaintiffs right is doubtful or disputed, a preliminaryinjunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damagewithout proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for apreliminary injunction.

However, to establish the essential requisites for a preliminaryinjunction, the evidence to be submitted by the plaintiff need not beconclusive and complete. Such evidence need only be a samplingintended merely to give the court an evidence of justification for apreliminary injunction pending the decision on the merits of the case,

and is not conclusive of the principal action which has yet to bedecided.

[COMMENTO: I think the case is more of an Oblicon/Corp case. Thediscussion regarding Certiorari is very limited, so I included the issueregarding Injunction. To simplify, the Bank filed a Petition foCertiorari to assail the Order granting the Injunction. The Courupheld CAs nullification of the RTC order because it was issued with

GAD (WHY oh WHY with GAD ). The Bank clearly has the righunder the contract to foreclose and sell because of the Spousesfailure to pay the loan. The Spouses were not able to prove oovercome the burden that PCI Capital and Equitable are one andthe same.The Spouses have dollar accounts with PCI Capital, a subsidiary othe Bank and they maintain that their dollar deposit should be setofagainst their account with the Bank against their loan accountMainly, they think they are entitled to the Writ kasi parang isang entitylang daw si PCI Capital and Equitableso setoff na lang! Un ung

gusto nila mangyari. But NO, CANNOT be ]

PCI Capital is a subsidiary of respondent Bank. Even then, PCCapital [PCI Express Padala (HK) Ltd.] has an independent andseparate juridical personality from that of the respondent Bank, itsparent company; hence, any claim against the subsidiary is not aclaim against the parent company and vice versa. The evidence onrecord shows that PCIB, which had been merged with Equitable Bankowns almost all of the stocks of PCI Capital. However, the fact that acorporation owns all of the stocks of another corporation, taken aloneis not sufficient to justify their being treated as one entity.

Petitioners failed to adduce sufficient evidence to justify the piercing othe veil of corporate entity and render respondent Bank liable for theUS$20,000.00 deposit of petitioner Natividad Nisce as debtor.

Petitioners could have spared themselves the expenses andtribulation of a litigation had they just withdrawn their deposit from thePCI Capital and remitted the same to respondent. However, petitioneinsisted on their contention of setoff.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack omerit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs againspetitioners.

DAVID, et.al vs.RIVERA

G.R. Nos. 139913 & 140159 January 16, 2004

FACTS: Respondent Agustin Rivera claiming to be the owner of a portion

of land situated in Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed on May 10, 1994 a

Complaint for "Maintenance of Peaceful Possession before the Provincia

Adjudication Board (agrarian) of San Fernando, Pampanga agains

petitioners heirs of Spouses Cristino and Consolacion David.

Respondent Rivera averred that the petitioners had been harassing him to

vacate the subject land although it had already been given to him

sometime in 1957 by the parents of the petitioners as "disturbance

compensation ", in consideration of his renunciation of his tenuria

rights over the original 18-hectare farmholding.

For their part, the petitioners filed a Complaint for ejectment before the

MCTC of Mabalacat and Magalang, Pampanga. They alleged that the

respondent was occupying the subject land without paying rentals therefoand refused to vacate it despite repeated demands.

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