civil law review i case digests

7/23/2019 Civil Law Review I Case Digests

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW I- LLB4402(2010-2011)Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan

CASE DIGEST

IN

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I

Prof. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan

SUBMITTED BY:IV - LLB-4402

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SURNAME CASES ASSIGNED for DIGEST1ABRINA TANADA V. TUVERA to VAN DORN V. ROMILLO2AQUILINO QUITA V. CA to LLORENTE V. CA3BACARRA VELAYO V. SHELL CO. PHILS to RCPI V. CA4BAET MERALCO V. CA to REYES V. LIM5BANOCAG NDC V. MADRIGAL to SPS. PAHANG V. METROBAN!BARIA ABACAN V. NUI to REPUBLIC V. CA"BERMUDO SILVERIO V. REPUBLIC to REPUBLIC V. ORBECIDO#BUESER$ AM ATEN%A V. BRILLANTES to CHING MING TSOI V. CA&BUESER$ 'M REPUBLIC V. MOLINA to (ERRARIS V. (ERRARIS

1)CARLOS %AMORA V. %AMORA to CALISTERIO V. CALISTERIO11DAVID REPUBLIC V. NOLASCO to 'IMENE% V. REPUBLIC12DAYA OCAMPO V. (LORENCIANO to PELAYO V. LAURON13DE GU%MAN ILUSORIO V. ILUSORIO to ESTONINA V. CA14DISTURA AYALA INVESTMENT V. CA to RELUCIO V. LOPE%15GARCIA HOMEO*NERS SAVINGS BAN V. DAILO to SAGUID V. REY1!GENUINO HONTIVEROS V. RTC$ BR.25 ILOILO to PATRICIO V. DARIO III1"GEREMIA ANDAL V. MACARAIG to CABATANIA V. REGODOS1#GON%AGA SAYSON V. CA to AGUSTIN V. PROLLAMANTE1&GON%ALES IN RE CHANGE O( NAME O( 'ULIAN LIN to TAMARGO V. CA2)GUILLERMO LAHOM V. SIBULO to SANTOS V. CA21GUTIERRE% PERE% V. CA to ATO V. IAC22LAYSON REPUBLIC V. GU%MAN to EVADEL REALTY V. SORIANO23MALABANAN NA%ARENO V. CA to HEIRS O( ROMAN SORIANO V. CA24MARTINE% SERASPI V. CA to DBP V. CA25MENDO%A VILLANUEVA V. CA to REPUBLIC V. SILIM2!MOLINA QUILALA V. ALCANTARA to DIONISIO V. ORTI%2"NEPOMUCENO ROMAN CATHOLIC V. CA to CITY O( ANGELES2#PATAUEG REPUBLIC V. CA to DC HOLDINGS V. CA2&PIO ARUEGO V. CA to BUGNAO V. UBAG3)RADOVAN BAGTAS V. PAGUIO to NERA V. RIMANDI31RODRIGUE% CANEDA V. CA to A%NAR V. GARCIA32RONQUILLO UNSON V. ABELLA to CANI%A V. CA33SACRAMENTO PECSON V. CORONEL to ROSALES V. ROSALES34SIT'AR (RANCISCO V. AL(ONSO to DE PAPA V. CAMACHO35TELOG LLORENTE V. RODRIGUE% to DIA% V. IAC3!TOLENTINO DELA PUERTA V. CA to SARITA V. CANDIA3"TORRES ABLLENA DE BACAYO V. BORROMEO to SANCHE% V. CA3#YAMAT NA%ARENO V. CA to BICARME V. CA

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TABLE O( CONTENTS

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I. PRELIMINARY TITLE

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II. HUMAN RELATIONS 15

III. PRE'UDICIAL QUESTION 2&

IV. CIVIL PERSONALITY 35

V. CITI%ENSHIP 3!VI. MARRIAGE 3&

VII. VOID MARRIAGES 51

VIII. PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY 53

I/. VOIDABLE MARRIAGES "3

/. LEGAL SEPARATION ""

/I. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

BET*EEN HUSBAND AND *I(E #2

/II. PROPERTY RELATIONS #5

/III. THE (AMILY AS AN INSTITUTION 1)#

/IV. PATERNITY AND (ILIATIOIN 11!

/V. ADOPTION 13!

/VI. PARENTAL AUTHORITY 143

/VII. CASES IN PROPERTY 152

/VIII. CASES IN SUCCESSION 1&3

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10 TAADA VS. TUVERAG.R. No. L!3&15. Ar 24$ 1

Dotr6-7The publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of dueprocess. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specificallyinformed of its contents.

(+t87The petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause thepublication in the Official Gaette !arious presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,proclamations, eecuti!e orders, letters of implementation and administrati!e orders.The respondents contend that the publication in the Official Gaette is not a requirement for the effecti!ity of thelaws where the laws pro!ide for their own effecti!ity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential

issuances in question contain special pro!isions as to the date that they are to take effect, publication in theOfficial Gaette is not indispensable for their effecti!ity based on #rticle $ of the %i!il %ode.The interpretation of the respondent is in accord with the %ourt&s construction of said article. In a long line ofdecisions, the %ourt has ruled that publication in the Official Gaette is necessary in cases where the legislationitself does not pro!ide for an effecti!ity date ' for the date of publication is material in determining its date ofeffecti!ity which is the ()thday following its publication ' but not when the law itself pro!ides for the date when itgoes into effect.

I889-7*hether there is still a need for publication of the presidential decrees with specified dates of effecti!ity.

H-:7+es, there is still a need for publication. #rticle $ does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Officila

Gaette, e!en if the law itself pro!ides for the date of its effecti!ity. ection ( of %# - pro!ides that0 ection (.There shall be published in the Official Gaette 1(2 all important legislati!e acts and resolutions of a public natureof the, %ongress of the 3hilippines4 1$2 all eecuti!e and administrati!e orders and proclamations, ecept such asha!e no general applicability4 12 decisions or abstracts of decisions of the upreme %ourt and the %ourt of

#ppeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published4 152 such documents orclasses of documents as may be required so to be published by law4 and 1)2 such documents or classes ofdocuments as the 3resident of the 3hilippines shall determine from time to time to ha!e general applicability andlegal effect, or which he may authorie so to be published.

The clear ob6ect of the abo!e'quoted pro!ision is to gi!e the general public adequate notice of the !arious lawswhich are to regulate their actions and conduct as citiens. *ithout such notice and publication, there would be nobasis for the application of the maim "ignorantia legis non ecusat." It would be the height of in6ustice to punishor otherwise burden a citien for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoe!er, not e!en aconstructi!e one.

The !ery first clause of ection I of %ommonwealth #ct - reads0 "There shall be published in the OfficialGaette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperati!e duty. That duty mustbe enforced if the %onstitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be gi!ensubstance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gaette. uch listing,to our mind, lea!es respondents with no discretion whatsoe!er as to what must be included or ecluded from suchpublication.

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The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.Ob!iously, presidential decrees that pro!ide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their !iolation or otherwiseimpose a burden or the people, such as ta and re!enue measures, fall within this category. Other presidentialissuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrati!e and eecuti!e ordersneed not be published on the assumption that they ha!e been circularied to all concerned.

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability"is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first beofficially and specifically informed of its contents.

The %ourt therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which ha!e not been published,shall ha!e no force and effect.

20 TAADA VS. TUVERAG.7. 8o. 9'-:() ;ecember $:, (:-

7>, the %ourt hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gaette all unpublished presidentialissuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall ha!e no binding force and effect.

$. 3etitioners are now mo!ing for a reconsideration/clarification of the aforementioned decision.

Issue0 (. *hether or not the clause ?@89> IT I OT=>7*I> 37OAI;>;B solely refers to the fifteen'dayperiod and not to the requirement of publication.

$. *hether or not the word ?9#*B refer to all laws or only to those of general application.

. *here should publication of said laws be madeC

=eld0(. The clause "unless it is otherwise pro!ided" refers to the date of effecti!ity and not to the requirement ofpublication itself, which cannot in any e!ent be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may makethe law effecti!e immediately upon appro!al, or on any other date, without its pre!ious publication.

3ublication is indispensable in e!ery case, but the legislature may in its discretion pro!ide that the usual fifteen'day period shall be shortened or etended. #n eample, as pointed out by the present %hief Dustice in hisseparate concurrence in the original decision, is the %i!il %ode which did not become effecti!e after fifteen daysfrom its publication in the Official Gaette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not applybecause it was "otherwise pro!ided. "

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason isthat such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that aresupposed to go!ern the legislature could !alidly pro!ide that a law be effecti!e immediately upon its appro!alnotwithstanding the lack of publication Eor after an unreasonably short period after publicationF, it is not unlikelythat persons not aware of it would be pre6udiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure tocomply with but simply because they did not know of its eistence.

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It must be noted at this point the conclusi!e presumption that e!ery person knows the law, which of coursepresupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to ha!e any legal 6ustification at all. It is no lessimportant to remember that ection - of the ill of 7ights recognies "the right of the people to information onmatters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislati!eenactments of the go!ernment.

$. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all lawsrelate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.

Thus, all statutes, including those of local application and pri!ate laws, shall be published as a condition for theireffecti!ity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effecti!ity date is fied by thelegislature. %o!ered by this rule are0

a. 3residential decrees and eecuti!e orders promulgated by the 3resident in the eercise of legislati!epowers whene!er the same are !alidly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the%onstitution4

b. #dministrati!e rules and regulations, if their purpose is to enforce or implement eisting law pursuantalso to a !alid delegation4

c. %harter of a city4

d. %irculars issued by the Honetary oard if meant to ?fill in the detailsB of the %entral ank #ct which thatbody is supposed to enforce.

=owe!er, no publication is required for the following0

a. Interpretati!e regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel ofthe administrati!e agency and not the public4

b. 9etters of instructions issued by administrati!e superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to befollowed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties4

c. Hunicipal ordinances, which are co!ered by the 9ocal Go!ernment %ode.

. 3ublication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents ofthe laws, and publication is to be made in the Official Gaette as decided upon in the first Tanada case, howe!er,the %ourt made this pronouncement0

There is much to be said of the !iew that the publication need not be made in the Official Gaette,considering its erratic releases and limited readership. @ndoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation couldbetter perform the function of communicating, the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easilya!ailable, ha!e a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication isnot the one required or authoried by eisting law. #s far as we know, no amendment has been made of #rticle $of the %i!il %ode. The olicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we ha!e no information that it eists. Ifit does, it ob!iously has not yet been published.

#t any rate, the %ourt is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if wefind it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely tointerpret and apply the law as concei!ed and appro!ed by the political departments of the go!ernment inaccordance with the prescribed procedure. %onsequently, we ha!e no choice but to pronounce that under #rticle$ of the %i!il %ode, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gaett and not elsewhere, as arequirement for their effecti!ity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period pro!ided by thelegislature.

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30 PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT +6: SERVICES CORPORATION ; THE HON. SECRETARY O(LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT$ VIVENCIO DE MESA$ RODRIGO MIIN +6: CEDRIC LEYSONG.R. No. 1)3144. Ar 4$ 2))1

;octrine0#ll statutes, including those of local application and pri!ate laws, shall be published as a condition for theireffecti!ity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effecti!ity date is fied by thelegislature.%o!ered by this rule are presidential decrees and eecuti!e orders promulgated by the 3resident in the eerciseof legislati!e powers whene!er the same are !alidly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferredby the %onstitution0 #dministrati!e rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce orimplement eisting law pursuant to a !alid delegation.Interpretati!e regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of theadministrati!e agency and the public, need not be published. 8either is publication required of the so'called letterof instructions issued by the administrati!e superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by theirsubordinates in the performance of their duties

# against petitioner 3hilsa and its foreign principal, #l'=e6ailan.e!eral hearings were conducted before the 3O># =earing Officer. On the aspects of the case in!ol!ing moneyclaims arising from the employer'employee relations and illegal dismissal, the 3O># rendered a decision dated

#ugust (, (:, ordering respondent 3=I9# I8T>78#TIO8#9 39#%>H>8T #8; >7AI%> %O73O7#TIO8to pay complainants, 6ointly and se!erally with its principal #l J =e6ailan. #lmost simultaneous with thepromulgation of #ugust (, (: decision of the 3O># on pri!ate respondents money claim, 3O># issuedseparate Order dated #ugust $:, (: resol!ing the recruitment !iolation aspect of pri!ate respondents&complaint. In this order, 3O># found petitioner liable for three EF counts of illegal eaction, two E$F counts ofcontract substitution and one count of withholding or unlawful deduction from salaries of workers.mployment. =owe!er, publicrespondent ecretary of 9abor and >mployment affirmed en toto the assailed Order. 3etitioner filed a Hotion for7econsideration but this was likewise denied. =ence, the instant 3etition for %ertiorari.3etitioner insists, howe!er, that it cannot be held liable for illegal eaction as 3O># Hemorandum %ircular 8o. ((,eries of (:, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is !oid for lack ofpublication.

Issue0 *hether or not 3O># Hemorandum %ircular 8o. (( eries of (: is !oid for lack of publicationC

=eld0 +es, the said memorandum circular is !oid for lack of publication.

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In TaKada !s. Tu!era, the %ourt held, as follows0"*e hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and pri!ate laws, shall be published as acondition for their effecti!ity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effecti!ity date isfied by the legislature.%o!ered by this rule are presidential decrees and eecuti!e orders promulgated by the 3resident in the eerciseof legislati!e powers whene!er the same are !alidly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferredby the %onstitution0 #dministrati!e rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce orimplement eisting law pursuant to a !alid delegation.Interpretati!e regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of theadministrati!e agency and the public, need not be published. 8either is publication required of the so'called letterof instructions issued by the administrati!e superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by theirsubordinates in the performance of their duties."3O># Hemorandum %ircular 8o. $, eries of (: must likewise be declared ineffecti!e as the same was ne!erpublished or filed with the 8ational #dministrati!e 7egister. 3O># Hemorandum Order 8o. $, eries of (:pro!ides for the applicable schedule of placement and documentation fees for pri!ate employment agencies orauthority holders. @nder the said Order, the maimum amount which may be collected from prospecti!e # #dministrati!e %ircular 8o. $, eries of (: has not as yet been published orfiled with the 8ational #dministrati!e 7egister, the same is ineffecti!e and may not be enforced.The Office of the olicitor General argues howe!er that the imposition of administrati!e sanctions on petitionerwas based not on the questioned administrati!e circular but on #rticle $ and #rticle 5 EaF $ of the 9abor %ode.The argument is not meritorious. The said articles of the 9abor %ode were ne!er cited, much less discussed, inthe body of the questioned Orders of the 3O># and ecretary of 9abor and >mployment. In fact, the said Orderswere consistent in mentioning that petitionerLs !iolation of #dministrati!e %ircular 8o. $, eries of (: was thebasis for the imposition of administrati!e sanctions against petitioner. mployment.%onsidering that, as, pre!iously discussed, #dministrati!e %ircular 8o. $, eries of (: embodying such aschedule of fees ne!er took effect, there is thus no basis for the imposition of the administrati!e sanctions against

petitionerThe Office of the olicitor General likewise argues that the questioned administrati!e circular is not among thoserequiring publication contemplated by TaKada !s. Tu!era as it is addressed only to a specific group of personsand not to the general public.

#gain, there is no merit in this argument. The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group,namely pri!ate employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling inTaKada !s. Tu!era. In the case of 3hil. #ssociation of er!ice >porters !s. Torres, the administrati!e circularsquestioned therein were addressed to an e!en smaller group, namely 3hilippine and =ong Mong agenciesengaged in the recruitment of workers for =ong Mong, and still the %ourt ruled therein that, for lack of properpublication, the said circulars may not be enforced or implemented.Our pronouncement in TaKada !s. Tu!era is clear and categorical. #dministrati!e rules and regulations must bepublished if their purpose is to enforce or implement eisting law pursuant to a !alid delegation. The onlyeceptions are interpretati!e regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so'called letters of instructionsissued by administrati!e superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in theperformance of their duties. #dministrati!e %ircular 8o. $, eries of (: has not been shown to fall under any ofthese eceptions.

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ettled is the rule that when a doctrine of this %ourt is o!erruled and a different !iew is adopted, the new doctrineis applied prospecti!ely, and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faiththereof Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory in6unction was issued by the trial court with gra!e abuse ofdiscretion.

lena Aillegas and Ted Hagallanes, thru their mothers, Aictoria Aillegasand Dacinta Hagallanes, respecti!ely, filed before the 7egional Trial %ourt, 8ational %apital Dudicial 7egion,ranch $(, a petition for in6unction and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory in6unction againstpetitioners @nciano 3aramedical %ollege, Inc., Hirando %. @nciano, r., ;ominador antos, >ditha Hora, ;r.>!elyn Horal and 9aureana Aitug, they alleged therein that0(. On Duly (::, the abo!e'named students initiated a petition proposing to the school authorities theorganiation of a student council in the school. They solicited support of their petition from the studentry by askingthe students to endorse the same with their signatures. They were able to get at least ( signatures.$. On #ugust (, (::, the students were summoned to the Office of ;r. Horal and were admonishednot to proceed with the proposal because, according to her, the school does not allow and had ne!er allowedsuch an organiation.. On October $, (::, in compliance with an announcement to see the ;ean of 8ursing, the abo!e'named students met with ;ean Aitug and ;r. Horal who informed them that they would be barred from enrollment

for the second semester because the school does not allow their students to put up a student council. ;r. Horalad!ised them to get their =onorable ;ismissal.5. On 8o!ember -, (::, the students again approached ;r. Horal who informed them that they wereno longer allowed to enroll because they are allegedly members of the 8ational @nion of tudents of the3hilippines E8@3F and the 9eague of


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=eld0 8o, the 8on doctrine should not be applied to the instant case. @nder the then pre!ailing #lcua doctrinewhich was promulgated on Hay $, (:, the contract between them and pri!ate respondents was !alidlyterminated upon the end of the first semester of school year (::'(::.

#lthough said doctrine was later abandoned in 8on, et al. !. ;ames II, et al., supra, this case was promulgatedmuch later, or on Hay $, (::, when the termination of the contract between them had long become faitaccompli. ettled is the rule that when a doctrine of this %ourt is o!erruled and a different !iew is adopted, thenew doctrine is applied prospecti!ely, and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted onthe faith thereof. Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory in6unction was issued by the trial court with gra!e abuseof discretion.The ruling in the 8on case should not be gi!en a retroacti!e effect to cases that arose before its promulgation onHay $, (::, as in this case, which was filed on #pril (-, (::. If it were otherwise, it would result in oppressionto petitioners and other schools similarly situated who relied on the ruling in the #lcua case, promulgated on Hay$, (:, which recognied the termination of contract theory.The contract between the parties was !alidly terminated upon the end of the first semester of school year (::'(::, or in October, (::. This is the status quo. The trial court gra!ely abused its discretion in issuing the writ ofpreliminary mandatory in6unction which ordered petitioners to allow pri!ate respondents "to enroll for the firstsemester of school year (::'((:." (- Guided by the %apitol case, certainly, this writ will not restore the statusquo but will go a step backward, then restore the condition preceding the status quo. 3ri!ate respondents do notpossess any clear legal right to re'enroll, corollarily, petitioners are not obliged legally to re'admit them.

50 C9 ; Ar-+6o U6;-r8t=G.R. No. L1512"> M+= 3)$ 1&!1


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!0 P-o- ;8 '+?6+55 SCRA !)"


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3etitioner is a citien of the 3hilippines while pri!ate respondent is a citien of the @nited tates. They weremarried in =ongkong in (:N$. #fter the marriage, they established their residence in the 3hilippines. They begottwo children born on #pril 5, (:N and ;ecember (, (:N), respecti!ely. The parties were di!orced in 8e!ada,@nited tates, in (:$ and petitioner has re'married also in 8e!ada, this time to Theodore Aan ;orn. In (:,pri!ate respondent filed suit against petitioner alleging the petitioner&s business in >rmita Ethe Galeon hopF is acon6ugal property of the parties and prayed that pri!ate respondent be declared with right to manage saidproperty. 3etitioner mo!ed to dismiss the petition on the ground that the cause of action is barred by pre!ious

6udgement in the di!orce proceedings before the 8e!ada %ourt. The %ourt below denied the motion to dismisssince the property in!ol!ed is located in the 3hilippines so that the ;i!orce ;ecree had no bearing in this case.The denial is now the sub6ect of this certiorari proceeding.

Issue0 *hether the foreign di!orce on the parties has affected the alleged con6ugal property in the 3hilippinesC

=eld0 It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in #rticle () of the %i!il %ode, only 3hilippinenationals are co!ered by the policy against absolute di!orces the same being considered contrary to our conceptof public police and morality. =owe!er, aliens may obtain di!orces abroad, which may be recognied in the3hilippines, pro!ided they are !alid according to their national law. In this case, the di!orce in 8e!ada releasedpri!ate respondent from the marriage from the standards of #merican law, under which di!orce dissol!es themarriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, pri!ate respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. =e would ha!e nostanding to sue in the case below as petitionerLs husband entitled to eercise control o!er con6ugal assets. #s heis bound by the ;ecision of his own countryLs %ourt, which !alidly eercised 6urisdiction o!er him, and whosedecision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said %ourt from asserting hisright o!er the alleged con6ugal property.

To maintain, as pri!ate respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married topri!ate respondent and still sub6ect to a wifeLs obligations under #rticle (:, et. seq. of the %i!il %ode cannot be

6ust. 3etitioner should not be obliged to li!e together with, obser!e respect and fidelity, and render support topri!ate respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to con6ugal property.he should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of 6ustice are to be ser!ed.

#0 QUITA ;8. CAG.R. No. 124#!2$ D--


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#t the time


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3resentation solely of the di!orce decree is insufficient, proof of its authenticity and due eecution must also bepresented. @nder ections $5 and $) of 7ule ($, a writing or document may be pro!en as a public or officialrecord of a foreign country by either E(F an official publication or E$F a copy thereof attested by the officer ha!inglegal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the 3hilippines, such copy must be EaF accompanied bya certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the 3hilippine foreign ser!ice stationed in theforeign country in which the record is kept and EbF authenticated by the seal of his office.*ith regard to


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ince the intrinsic !alidity of the pro!ision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determinedunder Teas 9aw, the 3hilippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of #mos ellis.

130 TESTATE ESTATE O( BOHANAN ;8. BOHANANG.R. No. L121)5$ '+69+r= 3)$ 1&!)


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=eld0 8O&s will is !alid. Article 17 The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other publicinstruments shall be go!erned by the laws of the country in which they are eecuted. In this case, whether the willwas eecuted in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to 3hilippine law. In fact, the willwas duly probated. The trial court should not that %ongress did not intend to etend the same succession Esystemof legitimeF to foreign nationals.

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II. HUMAN RELATIONS

150 AL(REDO M. VELAYO ;8. SHELLG.R. No. L"#1"$ Oto?-r 31$ 1&5!.

(ACTS%#9I, a domestic airline corporation, met with its creditors to inform them that the corporation was on the !erge ofinsol!ency and had to stop operations. To ensure payment of their claims against %#9I, the creditors agreed thatit would be ad!antageous not to present suits against %#9I but to stri!e for a fair pro'rata di!ision of its assets,although %#9I announced that in case of non'agreement of the creditors on a pro'rata di!ision of the assets, itwould file insol!ency proceedings. 7ight after the meeting, defendant hell 3hilippines, one of %#9I&s creditorswho was present in the meeting and who agreed to the pro'rata di!ision, assigned its credit to its sister company,hell @#. hell @# then filed with a %alifornia court an action for collection of the assigned credit and appliedfor a writ of attachment against %#9I&s ;ouglas %')5 plane which was in %alifornia. 3rior to the meeting withcreditors, %#9I had already offered the plane to hell 3hilippine but the offer was re6ected. Aelayo, as assignee ofthe other creditors of %#9I, filed this action for damages against defendant hell 3hilippines. =e claims that thatfraudulent assignment of hell 3hilippines& credit to hall @# pre6udiced the other creditors and was contrary tothe agreed pro'rata di!ision of assets.

ISSUE7 *ON S@- P@6-8$ t+6, +:;+6t+,- of t8 6o-:,- of t@- -8t-6- of CALI8 +r+6- 6t@- US$ +t-: 6 ?+: f+t@ 6 +88,66, t8 r-:t to t8 88t-r o8;>; # %#T%='#99 37OAIIO8 ;+ I 37OAI;>;


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1!0 A?-68o6 E6t-rr8-8 Coror+to6 ;8. CAG.R. No. ##!&4$ '+69+r= 11$ 1&&3

(ACTS73etitioner #lbenson >nterprises deli!ered to Guaranteed Industries, located at $-N A. Hapa t. ta.Hesa,Hanila, mild steel plates. #s part payment, #lbenson was gi!en a check drawn against the account of >.9.*oodworks. =owe!er, when the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored because of lack of funds.This led #lbenson to trace the origin. This led them to a certain >ugenio altao. They made afterwards anetra6udicial demand to pri!ate respondent altao. ut he denied that he signed on the check becauseGuaranteed Industries was already ineistent. This led #lbenson to file a criminal complaint for !iolation of 3 $$.=owe!er, it was later found out that his namesake, >ugenio altao III, his son, was the one who manages >.9.*oodworks located on the ground floor of the altao uilding. 8e!ertheless, #ssistant


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Thus, Tobias filed a ci!il case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious and abusi!e acts of petitioner.

ISSUE7 *@-t@-r or 6ot -tto6-r 8@o9: 6:-


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ISSUE7 *@-t@-r or 6ot r;+t- r-8o6:-6t 8 ,9t= of +?98- of r,@t8 or @-t@-r r;+t- r-8o6:-6t6t-6:-: to r-F9:- or 6F9r- -tto6-r @-6 t r-F-t-: -tto6-r8 off-r +6: f-: t@- +to6 foro-to6.

HELD7 8o. It is an elementary rule in 6urisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the burden of pro!ing badfaith rests upon the party alleging the same. In the case at bar, petitioner has failed to pro!e bad faith on the partof pri!ate respondent.

3ri!ate respondent was dri!en by legitimate reasons for re6ecting petitioner&s offer and instituting the action forcollection before the trial court. #s pointed out by pri!ate respondent. The corporation had its own ?cash positionto protect in order to pay its own obligationsB. %learly, this would be inimical to the interests of any enterprise,especially profit'oriented one like pri!ate respondent. It is plain to see that this is a case of an eercise of rights,not an abuse thereof. #s such, pri!ate respondent has not acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs orpublic policy as to !iolate #rticle $( of the %i!il %ode.

Arnel P. Bacarra

1&0 M*SS ;8. At T@-+t-r

G.R. No. 14")"!$ '96- 1"$ 2))4

(ACTS7On eptember $$, (:, four employees of the respondent #ct Theater, Inc., namely, 7odolfo Tabian, #rmando

#guilar, #rnel %oncha and Hodesto 7uales, were apprehended by members of the Sueon %ity police force forallegedly tampering a water meter in !iolation of 3.;. 8o. 5(, as amended by .3. lg. N-. On account of theincident, the respondent&s water ser!ice connection was cut off. %onsequently, the respondent filed a complaintfor in6unction with damages against the petitioner H*.

In the ci!il case, the respondent alleged in its complaint filed with the court a quo that the petitioner actedarbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously, in cutting off the respondent&s water ser!ice connection without priornotice. ;ue to lack of water, the health and sanitation, not only of the respondent&s patrons but in the surroundingpremises as well, were ad!ersely affected. The respondent prayed that the petitioner be directed to pay

damages.

The petitioner insists that in cutting off the respondent&s water ser!ice connection, the petitioner merely eercisedits proprietary right under #rticle 5$: of the %i!il %ode, which pro!ides that the owner or lawful possessor of athing has the right to eclude any person from the en6oyment and disposal thereof.

ISSUE7 *hether or not the petitioner !alidly eercised its right under #rticle 5$: of the %i!il %ode.

HELD7 8o, the petitioner did not !alidly eercise its right under #rticle 5$: of the %i!il %ode. # right is a power,pri!ilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law, or recognied as a result of longusage, constituti!e of a legally enforceable claim of one person against the other. %oncededly, the petitioner, asthe owner of the utility pro!iding water supply to certain consumers including the respondent, had the right toeclude any person from the en6oyment and disposal thereof. =owe!er, the eercise of rights is not withoutlimitations. =a!ing the right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to be eercised.*hen a right is eercised in a manner, which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrongis committed for which actor can be held accountable. In this case, the petitioner failed to act with 6ustice and gi!ethe respondent what is due to it when the petitioner unceremoniously cut off the respondent&s water ser!iceconnection.

Arnel P. Bacarra

2)0 C+ro ;8. V+


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(ACTS77espondent 9eonora Aalmonte is a wedding coordinator. Hichelle del 7osario and Don ierra engaged herser!ices for their church wedding. #t about 50 p.m. on that day, Aalmonte went to the Hanila =otel where thebride and her family were billeted. *hen she arri!ed, se!eral persons were already there. #mong those presentwas petitioner oledad %arpio, an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up for the occasion.

#fter reporting to the bride, Aalmonte went out of the suite. he proceeded to the Haynila 7estaurant where thereception was to be held. he paid the suppliers, ga!e the meal allowance to the band, and went back to thesuite. @pon entering the suite, Aalmonte noticed the people staring at her. It was at this 6uncture that petitionerallegedly uttered the following words to Aalmonte0 "Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mongbag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha." 3etitioner then ordered one of theladies to search Aalmonte&s bag.It turned out that after Aalmonte left the room to attend to her duties, petitionerdisco!ered that the pieces of 6ewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost.

The bags and personal belongings of all the people inside the room were searched. Aalmonte was allegedlybodily searched, interrogated and trailed by a security guard throughout the e!ening. 9ater, police officers arri!edand inter!iewed all persons who had access to the suite and fingerprinted them including Aalmonte. ;uring all thetime Aalmonte was being interrogated by the police officers, petitioner kept on saying the words "iya lang ang

lumabas ng kwarto." Aalmonte&s car which was parked at the hotel premises was also searched but the searchyielded nothing.

#fter a futile attempt for a formal apology, Aalmonte filed a suit for damages against %arpio.

The trial court rendered dismissed Aalmonte&s complaint for damages. It ruled that when petitioner soughtin!estigation for the loss of her 6ewelry, she was merely eercising her right and if damage results from a personeercising his legal right, it is damnum absue in!uria.

The %# re!ersed, holding that petitioner&s !erbal assault upon Aalmonte was done with malice and in bad faithsince it was made in the presence of many people without any solid proof ecept petitioner&s suspicion. uchunfounded accusation entitles Aalmonte to an award of moral damages for she was publicly humiliated, deeplyinsulted, and embarrassed.

ISSUE7 S@o9: V+


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other purpose in mind but to pre6udice respondent. %ertainly, petitioner transgressed the pro!isions of #rticle (: inrelation to #rticle $( for which she should be held accountable.

Arnel P. Bacarra

210 RCPI VS CAG.R No. L44"4#$ A9,98t 2&$ 1!

(ACTS73laintiff'respondent 9oreto ;ionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him not onlywounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment and affected ad!ersely his business as wellbecause other people ha!e come to know of said defamatory words. ;efendant'corporation as a defense, allegesthat the additional words in Tagalog was a pri!ate 6oke between the sending and recei!ing operators and that theywere not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did not form part of the telegram and that the Tagalogwords are not defamatory. The telegram sent through its facilities was recei!ed in its station at 9egaspi %ity.8obody other than the operator manned the teletype machine which automatically recei!es telegrams beingtransmitted. The said telegram was detached from the machine and placed inside a sealed en!elope and

deli!ered to plaintiff, ob!iously as is. The additional words in Tagalog were ne!er noticed and were included in thetelegram when deli!ered.

The trial court ruled that in fa!or of the plaintiff holding that the liability of petitioner'company'employer ispredicated on #rticles (: and $ of the %i!il %ode. The %ourt of #ppeals affirmed the decision, upon appeal.

ISSUE7 *@-t@-r or 6ot -tto6-ro


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3ri!ate respondents Isaac %ha!es and Duana O. %ha!es, husband and wife, filed the complaint for damages,together with their children, Isaac %ha!es Dr. and 7osendo %ha!es. Isaac r. #nd Isaac Dr. and 7osendo weremembers of the 3hilippine ar4 Isaac r. #nd Isaac Dr. were practicing lawyers and 7osendo was a legal officer atthe #gricultural 3roducti!ity %ommission. Duana O. %ha!es was a public school teacher.3ri!ate respondents became the customer of petitioner H>7#9%O in the year (:). #t or about the end of Harch,(:-), petitioner +ambao went to the residence of pri!ate respondents and presented two o!erdue bills, one forDanuary (( to


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the plaintiff suffered losses does not gi!e rise to a right to reco!er damages. To warrant the reco!ery of damages,there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to theplaintiff therefrom. *rong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, sincedamages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the in6ury caused by a breach or wrong. There is a materialdistinction between damages and in6ury. In6ury is the illegal in!asion of a legal right4 damage is the loss, hurt, orharm which results from the in6ury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damagesuffered. Thus, there can be damage without in6ury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the resultof a !iolation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absue in!uria. In order that a plaintiff maymaintain an action for the in6uries of which he complains, he must establish that such in6uries resulted from abreach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff R a concurrence of in6ury to the plaintiff and legalresponsibility by the person causing it.In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal in6ury. %ontrary to the claim of pri!aterespondents, petitioners could not be said to ha!e !iolated the principle of abuse of right. In order that theprinciple of abuse of right pro!ided in #rticle $( of the %i!il %ode can be applied, it is essential that the followingrequisites concur0 E(F The defendant should ha!e acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs orpublic policy4 E$F The acts should be willful4 and EF There was damage or in6ury to the plaintiff. The act ofpetitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a !alid eercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary tomorals, good customs or public policy. The law recognies in the owner the right to en6oy and dispose of a thing,without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose

and fence their property. #rticle 5 of the %i!il %ode pro!ides that ?EeF!ery owner may enclose or fence his landor tenements by means of walls, ditches, li!e or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment toser!itudes constituted thereon.B

#t the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not sub6ect to any ser!itudes. There was no easement ofway eisting in fa!or of pri!ate respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that pri!ate respondents had noeisting right o!er the said passageway is confirmed by the !ery decision of the trial court granting a compulsoryright of way in their fa!or after payment of 6ust compensation. It was only that decision which ga!e pri!aterespondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed acorresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the eercise of said right.

240 GASHEM ;8. COURT O( APPEALSG.R. No. &"33!. (-?r9+r= 1&$ 1&&3.

(ACTS7On $N October (:N, pri!ate respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court acomplaint for damages against the petitioner for the alleged !iolation of their agreement to get married. healleges in said complaint that0 she is $$ years old, single,


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apartment4 he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he disco!ered that shehad decei!ed him by stealing his money and passport.

#fter trial on the merits, the lower court, applying #rticle $( of the %i!il %ode, rendered a decision fa!oring thepri!ate respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorneyLs fees.The decision is anchored on the trial courtLs findings and conclusions that EaF petitioner and pri!ate respondentwere lo!ers, EbF pri!ate respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable !irtue who readily submits toseual ad!ances, EcF petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry pri!aterespondent, EdF because of his persuasi!e promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, EeFby reason of that deceitful promise, pri!ate respondent and her parents R in accordance with


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#rticle $( fills that !acuum. It is e!en postulated that together with #rticles (: and $ of the %i!il %ode, #rticle $(has greatly broadened the scope of the law on ci!il wrongs4 it has become much more supple and adaptable thanthe #nglo'#merican law on torts.In the light of the abo!e laudable purpose of #rticle $(, *e are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a manLspromise to marry is in fact the proimate cause of the acceptance of his lo!e by a woman and his representationto fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proimate cause of the gi!ing of herself unto him in a seualcongress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle schemeor decepti!e de!ice to entice or in!eigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the seual act, could 6ustifythe award of damages pursuant to #rticle $( not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud anddeceit behind it and the willful in6ury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, howe!er,that such in6ury should ha!e been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.In the instant case, respondent %ourt found that it was the petitionerLs "fraudulent and decepti!e protestations oflo!e for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her !irtue and womanhood to him and to li!e withhim on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud anddeception on appellantLs part that made plaintiffLs parents agree to their daughterLs li!ing'in with him preparatory totheir supposed marriage." In short, the pri!ate respondent surrendered her !irginity, the cherished possession ofe!ery single


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(ACTS77espondents were lessees of a parcel of land, owned by one Harta 7eyes, located at Halate, Hanila.7espondents had built their houses on the land which, o!er the years, underwent continuous impro!ements. #fterthe demise of Harta, the land was inherited by her son Aictor 7eyes. ometime in (:-, Aictor informedrespondents that, for being lessees of the land for more than twenty E$F years, they would ha!e a right of firstrefusal to buy the land. ometime in the early part of (::, without the knowledge of respondents, the landoccupied by them was sold to petitioner %ynthia Ortega who was able to ultimately secure title to the property inher name.On ( Hay (::, respondents filed with the 7egional Trial %ourt of Hanila a suit for the ";eclaration of 8ullity ofthe ale," made in fa!or of petitioner %ynthia Ortega predicated upon their right of first refusal.The Office of the uilding Official issued a resolution ordering the demolition of the houses of respondents. Thefollowing day %ynthia Ortega, together with her father and co'petitioner, Aicente 7ellosa, hired workers tocommence the demolition of respondentsL houses. ;ue to the timely inter!ention of a mobile unit of the *estern3olice ;istrict, the intended demolition did not take place following talks between petitioner 7ellosa and counselwho pleaded that the demolition be suspended since the order sought to be implemented was not yet final andeecutory. On (( ;ecember (::, respondents filed their appeal contesting the order of the Office of the uildingOfficial. On ($ ;ecember (::, petitioners once again hired workers and proceeded with the demolition ofrespondentsL houses.

7espondents filed %i!il %ase before the 7egional Trial %ourt of Hanila, praying that petitioners be ordered to paymoral and eemplary damages, as well as attorney&s fees, for the untimely demolition of the houses.The 7T% dismissed the complaint of respondents and instead ordered them to pay petitioners moral damages.The %ourt of #ppeals re!ersed the decision of the trial court and ordered petitioners to pay respondents of moraldamages, eemplary damages and #ttorneyLs fees.

ISSUE7 *@-t@-r or 6ot t@-r- 8 + r-


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On Duly (, (:N, 3=I7O sent word to 8#3O%O7 that industrial disputes might soon plague #ustralia, theshipmentLs point of origin, which could seriously hamper 3=I7OLs ability to supply the needed coal.


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because in this case, the action is proscribed by the %onstitution or the parties are in pari delicto. This is foundedon the general principles of public policy. It must be remembered that #lfred knew all along that he wasdisqualified from purchasing lands. =is contention that he entered into the transaction because he was epectingthat he and >derlina will get married in the future is not a !alid one. =e also knew that he cannot get married to>derlina because he still had a !alid eisting marriage with Teresita antos.

2#0 REYES ;8. LIMG.R. No. 134241$ A9,98t 11$ 2))3

(ACTS73etitoner 7eyes and pri!ate respondent 9im entered into a %ontract to sell a parcel of land located in


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#fter a while, respondent was surprised to recei!e from the @ ;epartment of Treasury, Internal 7e!enue er!iceE@ I7F, a 8otice of !entually, respondentdemanded from petitioner reimbursement for the amounts it paid to the @ I7. ut petitioner refused despiterepeated demands. =ence, respondent filed with the 7egional Trial %ourt complaint against petitioner forreimbursement and damagesthe 7T% rendered a ;ecision in fa!or of respondent and against petitioner. The trial court found, among others,that e!en before the sale, petitioner knew that 8%3 had ta liabilities with the @ I7, yet it did not informrespondent about it.@pon appeal, the %ourt of #ppeals rendered a ;ecision affirming the trial court&s 6udgment with modification.=ence this petition.

I@>0*hether or not petitioner is legally bound to reimburse respondent for the amounts it paid corresponding to theformer&s ta liabilities to the @ I7.

=>9;0

The case at bar calls to mind the principle of un6ust enrichment J 8emo cum alterius detrimento locupletari potest.8o person shall be allowed to enrich himself un6ustly at the epense of others. This principle of equity has beenenshrined in our %i!il %ode, #rticle $$ of which pro!ides0?#rt. $$. >!ery person who through an act or performance by another or by any other means, acquires or comesinto possession of something at the epense of the latter without 6ust or legal ground, shall return the same tohim.BDustice and equity thus oblige that petitioner be held liable for 8%3&s ta liabilities and reimburse respondent forthe amounts it paid. It would be un6ust enrichment on the part of petitioner to be relie!ed of that obligation.

DIGEST BY7 'IHAN A.M. BANOCAG

3)0 ROY PADILLA$ (ILOMENO GALDONES$ ISMAEL GON%ALGO +6: 'OSE (ARLEY BEDENIA ;8. COURTO( APPEALS

G.R. No. L3&&&& M+= 31$ 1


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I@>0 whether or not the respondent court committed a re!ersible error in requiring the petitioners to pay ci!ilindemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.

=>9;0The etinction of the ci!il action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers eclusi!ely to ci!il liability edelicto founded on #rticle ( of the 7e!ised 3enal %ode. E>lcano !. =ill, NN %7# :4 Airata !. Ochoa, ( %7#5N$F. In other words, the ci!il liability which is also etinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the ci!il liabilityarising from the act as a crime.>tinction of the penal action does not carry with it etinction of the ci!il, unless the etinction proceeds from adeclaration in a final 6udgment that the fact from which the ci!il might arise did not eist. In other cases, the personentitled to the ci!il action may institute it in the Durisdiction and in the manner pro!ided by law against the personwho may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.The 6udgment of acquittal etinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declarationthat the facts from which the ci!il might arise did not eist. Thus, the ci!il liability is not etinguished by acquittalwhere the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt E38 !. %atipon, : 3hil. $-F as only preponderance ofe!idence is required in ci!il cases4 where the court epressly declares that the liability of the accused is notcriminal but only ci!il in nature E;e Guman !. #l!ia, :- 3hil. ))4 3eople !. 3antig, supraF as, for instance, in thefelonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relati!es who thereby incur only ci!il liabilityEee #rt. $, 7e!ised 3enal %odeF4 and, where the ci!il liability does not arise from or is not based upon the

criminal act of which the accused was acquitted E%astro !. %ollector of Internal 7e!enue, 5 %7# (:4 ee7egalado, 7emedial 9aw %ompendium, (: ed., p. -$F. #rticle $: of the %i!il %ode also pro!ides that0*hen the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been pro!ed beyondreasonable doubt, a ci!il action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. uch action requiresonly a preponderance of e!idence. @pon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bondto answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.If in a criminal case the 6udgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In theabsence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the tet of the decision whether or not theacquittal is due to that ground.There is nothing contrary to the %i!il %ode pro!ision in the rendition of a 6udgment of acquittal and a 6udgmentawarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. # 6udgment of acquittal operatesto etinguish the criminal liability. It does not, howe!er, etinguish the ci!il liability unless there is clear showingthat the act from which ci!il liability might arise did not eist.

# separate ci!il action may be warranted where additional facts ha!e to be established or more e!idence must beadduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be 6ust asefficacious or e!en more epedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decidedfor further hearings on the ci!il aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separateaction. These do not eist in this case. %onsidering moreo!er the delays suffered by the case in the trial,appellate, and re!iew stages, it would be un6ust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separateci!il action to be filed.*ith this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent %ourt of #ppeals did not err in awarding damages despitea 6udgment of acquittal.*=>7>, we hereby #;.


31


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III. PRE'UDICIAL QUESTION

310 DONATO VS. LUNA1!) SCRA 4410;oes a criminal case for bigamy suspend the ci!il case of annulment of marriage on the ground that the latterconstitutes a pre6udicial questionC

=>9;0

The requisites of a pre6udicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. I must be noted that the issue before theD;7% touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinati!e of petitioner ;onatoLs guilt orinnocence in the crime of bigamy.


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I@>0whether or not the administrati!e case between the pri!ate parties in!ol!ing the lot sub6ect matter of the e6ectmentcase constitutes a pre6udicial question which would operate as a bar to said e6ectment case.

=>9;0# pre6udicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logicalantecedent of the issue in!ol!ed in said case and the cogniance of which pertains to another tribunal.Thedoctrine of pre6udicial question comes into play generally in a situation where ci!il and criminal actions arepending and the issues in!ol!ed in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must be pre'empti!ely resol!ed in the ci!il case before the criminal action can proceed. Thus, the eistence of a pre6udicialquestion in a ci!il case is alleged in the criminal case to cause the suspension of the latter pending finaldetermination of the former.The essential elements of a pre6udicial question as pro!ided under ection ), 7ule ((( of the 7e!ised 7ules of%ourt are0 1a2 the ci!il action in!ol!es an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal action4 and1b2 the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.The actions in!ol!ed in the case at bar being respecti!ely ci!il and administrati!e in character, it is ob!ious thattechnically, there is no pre6udicial question to speak of. >qually apparent, howe!er, is the intimate correlationbetween said two 1$2 proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of pri!ate respondents to e6ect petitionerfrom the disputed portion depends primarily on the resolution of the pending administrati!e case. , the instant petition is hereby G7#8T>;. %i!il %ase 8o. $)$- of the then Hunicipal %ourt ofHalabon, 7ial is hereby ordered ;IHI>;. 8o %osts.O O7;>7>;.


330 ISABELO APA$ MANUEL APA +6: LEONILO 'ACALAN ;8. HON. RUMOLDO R. (ERNANDE%$ HON.CELSO V. ESPINOSA$ +6: SPS. (ELI/BERTO TIGOL$ 'R. +6: ROSITA TAGHOY TIGOLG.R. No. 1123#1 M+r@ 2)$ 1&&5

33


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7>;.


340 BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE334 SCRA 1)!

34


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350 SPOUSES ANTONIO S. PAHANG +6: LOLITA T. PAHANG ;8. HON. AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL$ Pr-8:6,'9:,- of R-,o6+ Tr+ Co9rt Br+6@ 5!$ M+6:+9- Ct=$ DEPUTY SHERI(($ R-,o6+ Tr+ Co9rtBr+6@5! +6: METROPOLITAN BAN +6: TRUST COMPANYG.R. No. 14#5&5$ '9= 12$ 2))4

'Officio heriff infa!or of the respondent and was registered with the 7egister of ;eeds.the respondent wrote the petitioners that the one'year redemption period of the property would epire on Danuary$N, (:::. Instead of redeeming the property, the petitioners filed, a complaint for annulment of etra6udicial saleagainst the respondent bank and the heriff.

#fter the epiration of the one'year redemption period, the respondent consolidated its ownership o!er theforeclosed property. %onsequently, T%T 8o. 55-- was issued by the 7egister of ;eeds in its name. On Duly $,

(:::, the respondent filed a 3etition for *rit of 3ossession.I@>0whether or not the complaint of the petitioners in %i!il %ase 8o. H#8'5)5 for annulment of etra6udicial sale is apre6udicial question to the petition of the respondent bank for the issuance of a writ of possession in 97% %ase8o.=>9;0The contentions of the petitioners ha!e no merit.

# pre6udicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issuein!ol!ed therein, and the cogniance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into play in asituation where a ci!il action and a criminal action are both pending and there eists in the former an issue thatmust be preempti!ely resol!ed before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoe!er the issue raised inthe ci!il action is resol!ed would be determinati!e 6uris et de 6ure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in thecriminal case. The rationale behind the principle of pre6udicial question is to a!oid two conflicting decisions.

In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for #nnulment of >tra6udicial ale is a ci!il action and therespondent&s petition for the issuance of a writ of possession of 9ot 8o. '#, lock (, 3sd'N'$(5(, T%T 8o.55-- is but an incident in the land registration case and, therefore, no pre6udicial question can arise from theeistence of the two actions.It bears stressing that the proceedings in a petition and/or motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, afterthe lapse of the statutory period for redemption, is summary in nature.The trial court is mandated to issue a writ ofpossession upon a finding of the lapse of the statutory period for redemption without the redemptioner ha!ingredeemed the property. It cannot be !alidly argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it merelycomplied with its ministerial duty to issue the said writ of possession.I8 9IG=T O< #99 T=> GOI8G, the petition is ;>8I>; ;@> %O@7>. The assailed decision of the %ourtof #ppeals is #7>;.


3!0 ABACAN ;8. NORTH*ESTERN UNIVERSITY$ INCG.R. No. 14)""". Ar #$ 2))5

change %ommission E>%F %ase 8o. ($':-')5-:, which is an action filed by the ?8icolas factionB to nullify the

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election of the directors of 8@I belonging to the ?%astro factionB and >% %ase 8o. ($':-'))(( which is acounter'suit initiated by the ?%astro factionB seeking the nullification of se!eral board resolutions passed by the?8icolas faction.B

On ;ecember (:, (::-, >% =earing Officer 7olando G. #ndaya, Dr., issued an Order authoriing the?%astro factionB and the Hetropolitan ank 9aoag %ity branch to withdraw the amount of 3$.)H from the accountof 8@I with said bank. Hetrobank thru 3etitioner #bacan, complied and released 3(.5 H in fa!or of the ?%astrofaction.B The ?8icolas factionB then initiated a criminal complaint for estafa against the ?%astro factionB as well asthe petitioners herein who are officers of Hetrobank, howe!er the criminal case was later dismissed insofar aspetitioners are concerned.

8icolas faction filed a suit for damages against %astro faction and petitioner on the ground that thecorporate funds of 8@I deposited with said bank in the sum of 3(.5 H was withdrawn without the knowledge,consent or appro!al of 8@I to the gra!e and serious damage and pre6udice of the latter.

Harieta +. 3alanca filed a motion to dismiss alleging that >% %ase 8o. ($':-')5-: must takeprecedence o!er the ci!il case since it is a logical antecedent to the issue of standing in said case. 3etitionersthen prayed for the dismissal of the complaint in %i!il %ase 8o. (($:-'(5 against them, or in the alternati!e, tohold in abeyance the proceedings therein until after the final determination of >% %ase 8o. ($':-')5-:.=owe!er, 8@I a!ers that the rule on pre6udicial question finds no application between the ci!il complaint belowand the case before the >% as the rule presupposes the pendency of a ci!il action and a criminal action4 ande!en assuming arguendo that the issues pending before the >% bear a similarity to the cause of action below,

the complaint of 8@I can stand and proceed separately from the >% case inasmuch as there is no identity in thereliefs prayed for.

I@>0*hether or not there is pre6udicial question in this case.

7@9I8G0+es. %onsidering the rationale behind the principle of pre6udicial question, being to a!oid two conflicting

decisions, prudence dictates that we apply the principle underlying the doctrine to the case at bar.# pre6udicial question is that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the

issue in!ol!ed therein and the cogniance of which pertains to another tribunal. The pre6udicial question must bedeterminati!e of the case before the court but the 6urisdiction to try and resol!e it must be lodged in another courtor tribunal.

In the case at bar, the question of which between the %astro and the 8icolas factions are the de 6ureboard of directors of 8@I is lodged before the >%. The complaint before the 7T% of 9aoag meanwhile allegesthat petitioners, together with their co'defendants, comprised of the ?%astro faction,B wrongfully withdrew theamount of 3(.5 H from the account of 8@I with Hetrobank. Horeo!er, whether or not 7oy 8icolas of the ?8icolasfactionB is a duly elected member of the oard of 8@I and thus with capacity to institute the herein complaint inbehalf of the 8@I depends on the findings of the >% in the case pending before it. It would finally determinewhether %astro, et al. legally withdrew the sub6ect amount from the bank and whether 8icolas lawfully initiated thecomplaint in behalf of herein respondent 8@I. It is petitioners& claim, and we agree, that the presence or absenceof their liability for allowing the withdrawal of 3(.5 H from the account of 8@I with Hetrobank in fa!or of the?%astro factionB is reliant on the findings of the >% as to which of the two factions is the de 6ure board. ince thedetermination of the >% as to which of the two factions is the de 6ure board of 8@I is crucial to the resolution ofthe case before the 7T%. =ence, the trial court should suspend its proceedings until the >% comes out with itsfindings.

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IV. CIVIL PERSONALITY

3"0 A6to6o G-98 ;. Co9rt of A-+8No. L1!43&. '9= 2)$ 1&!1

;octrine0 ince an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal in6ury or death pertains primarily to theone in6ured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child onaccount of the in6uries it recei!ed, no such right of action could deliberately accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact,e!en if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was etinguished by its pre'nataldeath, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked of 6uridical personality under #rticle5 of the %i!il %ode, which epressly limits such pro!isional personality by imposing the condition that the childshould be subsequently ali!e.

7eyes, D9, D.9>%4 and lastly EF on !en after learning of the third abortion, theappellee does not seem to ha!e taken interest in the administrati!e and criminal cases against the appellant. =isonly concern appears to ha!e been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he suedfor 3),. damages and 3,. attorneyLs fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances ofrecord, was clearly eaggerated.

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It is unquestionable that the appellantLs act in pro!oking the abortion of appelleeLs wife, without medicalnecessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too se!erely condemned4and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not ecuse it. ut the immorality or illegality of the actdoes not 6ustify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, ha!e no factual or legal basis.

V. CITI%ENSHIP

3#0 M-r+:o ;8. M+6+6oG.R. No. 135)#3. M+= 2!$ 1&&&

;octrine0;ual citienship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrentapplication of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by thesaid states. ;ual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, bysome positi!e act, loyalty to two or more states. *hile dual citienship is in!oluntary, dual allegiance is the resultof an indi!idual&s !olition.

rnesto . Hercado and pri!ate respondent >duardo . Hanano were candidates for !ice mayor of the%ity of Hakati in the Hay ((, (:: elections. The other one was Gabriel A. ;aa III.The proclamation of pri!ate respondent was suspended in !iew of a pending petition for disqualification filed by acertain >rnesto Hamaril who alleged that pri!ate respondent was not a citien of the 3hilippines but of the @nitedtates.%OH>9>% granted the petition of Hamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of pri!aterespondent on the ground that he is a dual citien and, under W5EdF of the 9ocal Go!ernment %ode, persons withdual citienship are disqualified from running for any electi!e position.The respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the ureau of Immigration under #lien%ertificate of 7egistration 8o. '(-$ and alleged that he is a


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to ?dual allegiance.B %onsequently, persons with mere dual citienship do not fall under this disqualification.@nlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be sub6ect to strict process with respect to the terminationof their status, for candidates with dual citienship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates ofcandidacy, they elect 3hilippine citienship to terminate their status as persons with dual citienship consideringthat their condition is the una!oidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his #merican citienship, effecti!ely remo!ing anydisqualification he might ha!e as a dual citien.y declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a


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#s likewise obser!ed by the %ourt of #ppeals, we take it that the 7epublic&s failure to cite this error amounts to arecognition that this case properly falls under 7ule ( of the 7e!ised 7ules of %ourt considering that theproceeding can be appropriately classified as ad!ersarial.Instead, in its first assignment of error, the 7epublic a!ers that respondent did not comply with the constitutionalrequirement of electing


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VI. MARRIAGE

4)0 B+o,?o, ;8. CAG.R. No. #35 M+r@ "$ 1&&"


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%ontract between herself and the deceased.;efendant'appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally'adopted son of #lfredo. In support of his claim,he presented an Order dated ( Duly (:-( issued by then 3residing Dudge Dose 9. Hoya, %


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barred. 'he court con&ounded the e%ecution and the contents o& the document. It is the contents, . . . which maynot be pro!e1n2 by secondary e!idence when the instrument itself is accessible. 3roofs of the eecution are notdependent on the eistence or non'eistence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs precedeproofs of the contents0 due eecution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction ofsecondary e!idence of the contents.The %ourt of #ppeals, as well as the trial court, tried to 6ustify its stand on this issue by relying on 2im 'anhu #.(amolete.(-ut e!en there, we said that "marriage may be pro!e1n2 by other competent e!idence."(N

Truly, the eecution of a document may be pro!en by the parties themsel!es, by the swearing officer, bywitnesses who saw and recognied the signatures of the parties4 or e!en by those to whom the parties ha!epre!iously narrated the eecution thereof.(The %ourt has also held that "1t2he loss may be shown by any personwho 1knows2 the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha1s2 made, in the 6udgment of the court, a sufficienteamination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by theperson in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it4 or who has made any otherin!estigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument 1has2 indeed 1been2 lost."(:

In the present case, due eecution was established by the testimonies of #dela 3ilapil, who was present duringthe marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the e!ent. The subsequent loss was shown by thetestimony and the affida!it of the officiating priest, Honsignor +llana, as well as by petitionerLs own declaration incourt. These are rele!ant, competent and admissible e!idence. ince the due eecution and the loss of themarriage contract were clearly shown by the e!idence presented, secondary e!idence R testimonial and

documentary R may be admitted to pro!e the fact of marriage.The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage contract were certain irregularitiessuggesting that it had fraudulently been obtained.$>!en if we were to agree with the trial court and to disregardthe reconstructed marriage contract, we must emphasie that this certificate is not the only proof of the unionbetween ;r. Dacob and petitioner.7espondent 3edro 3ilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining to (:N) in the ooks ofHarriage of the 9ocal %i!il 7egistrar of Hanila and in the 8ational %ensus and tatistics Office E8%OF.$-=e findsit quite "biarre" for petitioner to ha!e waited three years before registering their marriage. $NOn both counts, heproceeds from the wrong premise. In the first place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for recordpurposes does not in!alidate the marriage.$In the second place, it was not the petitioner&s duty to send a copy ofthe marriage certificate to the ci!il registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the solemniing officer.$:

The basis of human society throughout the ci!ilied world is . . . of marriage. Harriage in this 6urisdiction is notonly a ci!il contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply

interested. %onsequently, e!ery intendment of the law leans toward legaliing matrimony. Persons dwellingtogether in apparent matrimon$ are presumed, in the absence o& an$ counterpresumption or e#idence special tothe case, to be in &act married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were notwhat they thus hold themsel!es out as being, they would be li!ing in the constant !iolation of decency and of law.

# presumption established by our %ode of %i!il 3rocedure is "that a man and woman deporting themsel!es ashusband and wife ha!e entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio R #lwayspresume marriage.This 6urisprudential attitude(towards marriage is based on theprima &acie presumption that a man and a womandeporting themsel!es as husband and wife ha!e entered into a lawful contract of marriage. $ Gi!en theundisputed, e!en accepted,fact that ;r. Dacob and petitioner li!ed together as husband and wife,5we find thatthe presumption of marriage was not rebutted in this case.

420 R-9? Of T@- P@6-8 ;. CAG.R. No. &232! '+69+r= 24$ 1&&2


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decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the %ourt of #ppeals, >ecuti!e Order 8o. $:, the


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certificate of li!e birth Ebirth certificateF. =is se was registered as "male." =e further alleged that he is a maletransseual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identifiedhimself with girls since childhood. del, as witnesses. On Dune 5, $, the trial court rendered a decision in fa!or ofpetitioner. Its rele!ant portions read0 3etitioner filed the present petition not to e!ade any law or 6udgment or anyinfraction thereof or for any unlawful moti!e but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible withhis present se. *hether or not se reassignment is a ground for change of entry in the birth certificateC

=>9;8o, there is no law legally recogniing se reassignment and its effect. The se of a person is determined at birth,!isually done by the birth attendant Ethe physician or midwifeF by eamining the genitals of the infant %i!il 7egister9aw E#ct N)F. If the determination of a person&s se made at the time of his or her birth is not attendant by error,the same is immutable and may not be changed by reason of a se reassignment surgery.

440 SY ;8. COURT O( APPEALSG.R. No. 12"2!3. Ar 12$ 2)))

9;0 8o. The marriage is not !alid on the ground that there is no marriage license.

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#lthough, the petitioner raises the issue for the first time on appeal the issue on lack of marriage license. Thepetitioner states that though she did not categorically state her petition for annulment of marriage before the trialcourt that the inconguinoty in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself wouldlead to the conclusion that her marriage to respondent was !oid from the beginning, she pointed out that thesecritical dates were contained in the documents she submitted before the %ourt.The marriage license was issued one year after the ceremony took place. =ence the marriage was celebratedwithout the marriage license.

3etition granted.

450 SEVILLA ;8. CARDENASG.R. No. 1!"!#4. '9= 31$ 2))!.

9;0 8o. It has been held by the %ourt that the certificates issued by the 9ocal %i!il 7egistrar were notsufficient as to in!alidate the marriage license no. $NNN:$ which had been secured by the parties. It could beeasily implied from the said statement that the Office of the 9ocal %i!il 7egistrar could not eert its best efforts tolocate and determine the eistence of Harriage 9icense 8o. $NNN:$ due to its "loaded workB and that they failedto locate the book in which the marriage license was entered. 9ikewise, both certifications failed to state withabsolute certainty whether or not such license was issued.

This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representati!e from the Office of the 9ocal %i!il 7egistrar ofan Duan, Hs. 3erlita Hercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person incharge of the said logbook had already retired.


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G.R. No. 14152#. Oto?-r 31$ 2))!

ditha #lcantara under #rticle - of the


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7es 6udicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites0 E(F the former 6udgment is final4 E$Fit is rendered by a court ha!ing 6urisdiction o!er the sub6ect matter and the parties4 EF it is a 6udgment or an orderon the merits4 and E5F there is R between the first and the second actions R identity of parties, of sub6ect matter,and of causes of action.

3etitioner does not dispute the eistence of the first three requisites. *hat is in issue is the presence of the fourthrequisite. In this regard, the test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whetherthe same e!idence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to themaintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or e!idence would sustain both, the two actions are consideredthe same, and a 6udgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.

ased on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by him seeking the declaration of nullityof his marriage are anchored on separate causes of action for the e!idence necessary to sustain the first petitionwhich was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is different from the e!idencenecessary to sustain the present petition which is anchored on the purported absence of a marriage license.

3etitioner, howe!er, forgets that he is simply in!oking different grounds for the same cause of action . y definition,a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party !iolates the right of another. In both petitions, petitioner

has the same cause R the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. *hat differs is the ground uponwhich the cause of action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the !arious aspects ofthe pi!otal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this contro!ersy, that is, the actual status of petitioner andrespondentLs marriage.


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6urisdiction in the Hunicipal %ircuit Trial %ourt of ta. Honica'urgos, urigao del 8orte. The wedding wassolemnied at the respondent 6udgeLs residence in the municipality of ;apa, which does not fall within his

6urisdictional area of the municipalities of ta. Honica and urgos, located some 5 to 5) kilometers away fromthe municipality of ;apa, urigao del 8orte.

7espondent 6udge seeks eculpation from his act of ha!ing solemnied the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, amarried man separated from his wife, and #rlyn ugenio ullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Dudge;emosthenes %. ;uquilla, HT% of asey, amar. In their affida!it, the affiants stated that they knew GasparTagadan to ha!e been ci!illy married to Ida ;. 3eKaranda in eptember (:4 that after thirteen years ofcohabitation and ha!ing borne fi!e children, Ida 3eKaranda left the con6ugal dwelling in Aalencia, ukidnon and

that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost se!en years, thereby gi!ing rise to the presumption thatshe is already dead.

I@>0(.*hether or not the 6oint affida!it is sufficient proof of the wifeLs presumpti!e deathC$.*hether or not the respondent 6udge erred when he solemnied the marriage outside his courtLs 6urisdictionC

=>9;0(. The upreme %ourt ruled that the 6oint affida!it is insufficient proof to declare wifeLs presumpti!e death.

#rticle 5( of the !en if the spouse present has a well'founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summaryproceeding for the declaration of presumpti!e death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, amandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the


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There is no proof that either umaylo or del 7osario was at the point of death or in the remote place. Horeo!er,the written request presented addressed to the respondent 6udge was made by only one party, Gemma del7osario.

One of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemniing officer." #rticle , which is a directorypro!ision, refers only to the !enue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of thesolemniing officer as pro!ided in the preceding pro!ision. 8on'compliance herewith will not in!alidate themarriage.

Dudges who are appointed to specific 6urisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and notbeyond. *here a 6udge solemnies a marriage outside his courtLs 6urisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in theformal requisite, which while it may not affect the !alidity of the marriage, may sub6ect the officiating official toadministrati!e liability.7espondent 6udgeLs 6urisdiction co!ers the municipalities of ta. Honica and urgos, he was not clothed withauthority to solemnie a marriage in the municipality of ;apa, urigao del 8orte.

The upreme %ourt finds respondent to ha!e acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicablein the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude thatrespondentLs failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law. Dudge ;omagtoy is @3>8;>;

for a period of - months.

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and #rlyn orga is considered bigamous and !oid, there being asubsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida 3eKaranda.

4#0 BESO ;8. DAGUMANA.M. No. &&1211$ '+69+r= 2#$ 2)))

0*hether or not the respondent is guilty of 8eglect of ;uty and #buse of #uthorityC

=>9;0+es. #s presiding 6udge of the H%T% ta. Hargarita Tarangnan'3agsan6an, amar, his authority to solemniemarriage is only limited to those municipalities un

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