80249021 52824589 civil procedure digests

8/11/2019 80249021 52824589 Civil Procedure Digests

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Civil Procedure DIGESTED CASES University of Santo Tomas Faculty of Civil Law


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Jurisdiction 2 Page


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CIVIL PROCEDURE JURISDICTION NAVALES V. ABAYA FACTS: Petitioners consisting of more than three hundred junior officers and enl isted men, mostly from the eliteunits of the AFP who all took part in a failed coup attempt in Oakwood Suites, Makati, filed a writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court questioning the jurisdiction of the Judge Advocate General in fil ing charges against them for violations of the Articles of War Sections 67, 96, and 97. The Regional Trial Courtacquitted 290 of the original 331 soldiers who participated in the mutiny. Peti

tioners contend that the Judge Advocate General due to the fact that their participation in the mutiny was not service connected . The present petitions for prohibition and for habeas corpus were then filed wi th the Supreme Court. Acting on the prayer for the issuance of temporary restrai ning order in the petition for prohibition, the Supreme Court directed the parti es to observe the status quoprevailing before the filing of the petition. Wheth er or not the Regional Trial Court can divest the military courts of jurisdictio n. ISSUE: HELD: RA 7055 provides that "Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Pe nal Code,other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless o f whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties which ma y be na

tural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, exc ept when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is se rvice-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court-martial: Prov ided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, ord eror direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts." As used in this Section, service-connected cr imes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Article s72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended. In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take intoconsideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government ordinances. The second paragraph of the abovep rovision explicitly specifies what are considered service-connected crimes or off enses under Commonwealth Act 408 (CA 408), as amended, also known as the Artic

les of War. Section 1 of RA 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the foregoing offenses. In view of the clear mandate of RA 7055, the Regional T rial Court cannot divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction overthos e charged with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96 and 97 of the Articlesof W ar, as these are specifically included as service-connected offenses or crimes und er Section 1 thereof. Pursuant to the same provision of law, the militarycourts have jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses. There was no factual and legal basis for the Regional Trial Court to rule that violations of said articles of the Articles of War were committed in furtherance of coup d'etat and, as such, abs orbed by the latter crime. It bears stressing that, after a reinvestigation, the Panel of Prosecutors found no probable cause for coup d'etat against Navales, et al., and recommended the dismissal of the case against them. The trial court app roved the recommendation and dismissed the case as against Navales et al. There is, as yet, no evidence on record that the Navale et al., committed theviolatio ns of Articles 63, 64, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War in furtherance of coup d'etat. In fine, in making the sweeping declaration that these charges were not se rvice-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the crimeof coup d'eta t, the RTC (Branch 148) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.Such declara tion is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and doesnot exist.


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CIVIL PROCEDURE JURISDICTION EMILIO La'o v. Republic FACTS: Government Service Insurance System GSIS is the registered owner of three parcels of land with a five-storey building and other improvements thereon. GSI S entered into a lease-purchase agreement with the Republic through the office o f the Government CorporateCounsel (OGCC). The lease was vitiated by force as th e term was clearly in advantage of the OGCC. GSIS filed for nullification of the contract contending the former President Marcos used his influence to perfect t he lease agreement. The O

GCC contended, among other things that the Regional Tri al Court did not have jurisdiction as the alleged transactions were under the ju risdiction of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Executive Order No. 9. ISSUE: HELD: While it is true that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case maybe raise d at any stage of theproceedings. It is nevertheless settled that a party may b e barred from raisingit on the ground of estoppel. After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision it is improper and too late for a party to question thejurisdiction of the court. A party who has invoked jurisdi ction to secure affirmative relief cannot be permitted afterwards to deny the sa me jurisdiction toescape liability. Thus petitioner is estopped from questionin g the jurisdictionof the courts below. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. 4 Page


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CIVIL PROCEDURE JURISDICTION TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY FACTS: Petitioner filed for recovery of a sum of money from respondent Sibongaha noy. Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. Judgmen t was in favor of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued against the def endant. Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash thewrit but was denied, appealed to CA without raising t he issue on lack of jurisdiction. CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss

on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferi or courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interes t. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the case to SC since it has ex clusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior c ourt is in issue. ISSUE: Whether or not surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction ofthe trial court for the first time upon appeal. HELD: The C ourt believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this pl ea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss rais ing the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time. A party may be esto pped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reaso ns. Thus we spea

k of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily su bmitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too l ate for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirab le practice"of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adv erse. : Other merits on the appeal. The surety insists that the lower court shou ld have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was i ssued without the summary hearing. In the case at bar, the surety had been notif ied of the plaintiffs motion for execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety s counsel was present in cou rt when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave hima period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed th at perio

d to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court The orders appeale d fromare affirmed. 5 Page


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CIVIL PROCEDURE JURISDICTION MODESTA CALIMLIM AND LAMBERTO MAGALI vs. HON. PEDROA. RAMIREZ and FRANCISCO RAM OS Judgment for a sum of money and a writ of execution was rendered in favor of Ind ependent Mercantile Corporation against a certain Manuel Magali. The Notice of L evy made on a parcel of land registered in the name of "Domingo Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim", specified that the saidlevy was only against "all rights, title, action, interest and participation ofthe defendant Manuel Magali over t he parcel of land described in this title."

However, when the Sheriff issued the final Deed of Sale, it was erroneously stated therein that the sale was with re spect to "the parcel of land described in this title" and not only over the righ ts and interest of Manuel Magali in the same. The execution of the said final De ed of Sale was annotated at the back of said title. Petitioner Modesta Calimlim, surviving spouse of Domingo Magali, filed a petition with the respondent Court praying for the cancellation of the TCT.An opposition to the said petition was filed by Independent Mercantile Corporation. After the parties submitted their r espective Memoranda, the respondent Court issued an Order dismissing the petitio n. The herein petitioners did not appeal the dismissal of the petition as they f iled for the cancellation of the TCT.Instead, they filed a complaint praying fo r the cancellation of the conveyancesand sales that had been made on the proper ty previously registered in the name

of Domingo Magali, herein private responden t Francisco Ramos who claimed to have bought the property from Independent Merca ntile Corporation. Private respondent Francisco Ramos failed to obtain a title o ver the property in his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim annota ted on the title thereof at theinstance of the herein petitioners. Private resp ondent Francisco Ramos filed aMotion to dismiss on the ground that the same is barred by prior judgment or bystatute of limitations. Resolving the said Motion , the respondent Court, dismissed Civil Case on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment. A Motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by th e respondent Judge. A secondMotion for reconsideration was similarly denied. IS SUE: HELD: Whether or not the dismissal of civil case can be annulled and set as ide. FACTS: It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceedi ng which was taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the sa me irrespecti

ve of the attendant circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppe l requires knowledge or consciousness of the facts upon which it is based. The s ame thing is true with estoppel by conduct which may be asserted only when it is shown, among others, that the representation must have been made with knowledge of the facts and that the party to whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the matter. The inequity of barring the petitioners from vindicating their righ t over their property in the Civil Case is rendered more acute in the face of th e undisputed fact that the property in question admittedly belonged to the petit ioners,and that the title in the name of the private respondent was the result of an error committed by the Provincial Sheriff in issuing the deed of sale in t he execution proceeding. The 6 Page


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Motion To Dismiss filed by the private respondent shall be deemed denied and therespondent Court is ordered to conduct further proceedings in the case. 7 Page


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CIVIL PROCEDURE JURISDICTION DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO Vs THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RODOLFO M. BELLAFLOR, and FRANCISCO TESORERO FACTS: Davao Light & Power Co., filed a complaint for damages against private re spondent Francisco Tesorerobefore the RTC praying for damages in the amount of P11,OOO,OOO.OO. Instead offiling its answer, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss claiming that: (a) the complaint did not state a cause of action; (b) the plaintiff s claim hasbeen extinguished or otherwise rendered moot and acad emic; (c) there was non-jo

inder of indispensable parties; and (d) venue was impr operly laid. Of these four grounds, the last mentioned is most material in the c ase at bar. The trial court issue a Resolution dismissing petitioner s complaint on the ground of improper venue. The plaintiff being a private corporation, und oubtedly Banilad, CebuCity is the plaintiff s principal place of business as al leged in the complaint, and which for purposes of venue, is deemed as its reside nce. Conversely, in the defendant s motion to dismiss, it alleged and submitted that the plaintiff's principal office is in Davao City, as stated in the Contract of Lease and anotherContract of Lease of Generating Equipment executed by the p laintiff with the NAPOCOR. The motion on the ground of improper venue was grante d and petitioner smotion for reconsideration was denied. The Court of Appeals r endered the assailed judgment, denied due course and dismissed the petition. The petitioner filed

the instant petition. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the venue wa s proper. It is private respondent s contention that the proper venue is Davao City, and n ot Cebu City. Private respondent argue that petitioner is estopped from claiming thatits residence is in Cebu City, in view of contradictory statements made by petitioner prior to the filing of the action for damages. It cannot be disputed thatpetitioner s principal office is in Cebu City, per its amended articles of incorporation and by-laws. Private respondent is not a party to any of the cont ractspresented. He is a complete stranger to the covenants executed between pet itioner and NAPOCOR, despite his protestations that he is privy thereto, on the rather flimsy ground that he is a member of the public for whose benefit the ele ctric generating equipment subject of the contracts were leased or acquired. We arelikewise not persuaded by his argument that the allegation or representation made by petitioner in either the complaints or answers it filed in several civi l

cases that its residence is in Davao City, should estop it from filing the dam age suit before the Cebu courts. Moreover, there is no showing that private respondent is a party in those civil cases or that he relied on such representationby petitioner. 9 Page


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CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS 10 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 JOSEFINA POTESTAS CABRERA vs. MARIANO T. TIANO FACTS: heirs. Since at the time of the sales his daughters Josefina and Crecencia did n otknow about the sale, they did not object to it. Crecencia and Josefina filed anaction for recovery of property against the ventee, Mariano Tiano. He was the nserved his summons and contended a special defense of prescription. He contended that it was not from the date of filing of the complaint but from the time ofservice of the summons that the prescription period interrupts. ISSUE: HELD: Wh

ether or not the prescription period stops at the time of the filing of the comp laint. Ciriaco Potestas, father of respondent sold a parcel of land without the consent of 3 of his Civil actions are deemed commenced from date of the filingand docketing of the complaint with the Clerk of Court, without taking into account the issuance and service of summons. Commencement of the suit prior to theexpiration of the pres criptive period, interrupts the prescription period. Prescription period commenc es at the time when the suit is filed. The established rule is that the commence ment of a suit prior to expiration period interrupts the running of the statute as to parties to the action. The contention that the period was not interrupted until after the defendant received the summons legal basis. 11 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 REPUBLIC V. KENRICH DEVELOPMENT CORP FACTS: This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick Development Corporation of a concrete perimeter fence around some parcels of land located b ehind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air Transportation Office. Parce ls of land were allegedly registered in the name of Alfonso Concepcion. The Soli citor General filed a complaint of cancellation of the TCT's against Kenrich Corpo ration. After numerous pretrial conferences the OSG moved to declare the defenda nt in default.

Kenrich contended that it filed an answer through Atty. Garlitos, its counsel which was denied by the lawyer. It was found that another person si gned for Atty.Garlitos. ISSUE: Whether or not an answer can be admitted despite the lack of signature by the counsel. HELD: Only the signature of either the pa rty himself or his counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is signed. Counsel's authority and duty to sign a pleading are personalto him. He may not delegate it to just any person. Procedural requ irements which have been labeled as mere technicalities have their own valid rai son d' eitre.Procedural rules are promulgated into law designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases and while the court related the rules from time to time, it must notlet it be the last bastion for erring litigants. 13 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 ADELFA S. RIVERA, CYNTHIA S. RIVERA, and JOSE S. RIVERA Vs FIDELA DEL ROSARIO FACTS: A complaint for rescission of a deed of sale was filed by herein responde nts, heirs of Fidela del Rosario, which was signed by thedeceased, which was fr audulently executed. They averred that Fidela signed thedeed wherein facts demo nstrate that she intended to sign a deed of mortgage. Petitioner contends that t he trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since that the proper docket fee was not properly assessed and paid. Responde

nts contend that they did not know that they paid the incorrect amount and faultthe clerk of court. ISSU E: HELD: Whether or not jurisdiction was properly acquired. This Court has ruled that the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fee vest a trial court with ju risdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. If the amountof doc ket fees paid is insufficient considering the amount of the claim, the clerk of court of the lower court involved or his duly authorized deputy has theresponsi bility of making a deficiency assessment. The party filing the case will be requ ired to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not automatically lost. it is be yond dispute that respondents paid the full amount of docket fees asassessed by the Clerk of Court. If petitioners believed that the assessment wasincorrect, they should have questioned it before the trial court. Instead, petit

ioners bela tedly question the alleged underpayment of docket fees through thispetition, at tempting to support their position with the opinion and certification of the Cle rk of Court of another judicial region. Needless to state, such certification ha s no bearing on the instant case. 19 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 Neypes v Court of Appeals FACTS: Neypes filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/o r reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC again st the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petiti oners' complaint on the groundthat the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal and, on the 15th day therea fter filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing t

he motion for reconsideration which petitioners recei ved on July 22, 1998. Fivedays later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a not ice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. The court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was recei ved by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsiderat ion but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15day reglementary periodto appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since thi s was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their mot ion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 , only five days had

elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period f or appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that t he 15-day period toappeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the d ay they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. Accordi ng to the appellate court, the order was the final order appealable under the Rule s. Whether or not it is proper to allow a fresh period to file an appeal in lieu of dismissal ofthe Motion for Reconsideraiton. To standardize the appeal perio ds provided inthe Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal thei r cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to filethe notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing amotion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted f rom receipt o

f the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsider ation (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. The SC thus he ld that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh per iod of 15days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denyin g their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41,Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken wit hin 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from a nother.It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily i mplies. 20 P a g e HELD: ISSUE :


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Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal maybe filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 or der denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appe al period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The origin al period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirem

ent for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes signifi cant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsi deration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision i s given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and /or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch a nd to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise a spire to deliver justice fairly. 21 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 2 HEIRS OF DOLLETON V. FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT INC. Petitioners Heirs filed for quieting of title and/or recovery of ownership and p ossession with preliminary injunction/restraining order and damages against resp ondentsFil-Estate Management Inc. They claimed that they have been in open, exc lusive, and notorious possession of parcels of land for more than 90 years until Fil-Estate forcibly ousted them. Fil-Estate contended that that have in their p ossession numerous certificates covering the parcels of land and can only be att acke

d collaterally pursuant to PD 1529. The respondents also filed a motion to d ismiss on the grounds that the petitioners do not have a cause of action the RTC dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner. ISSUE: HELD: The elementary te stfor failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the suffic iency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendant. This Court is convinced that each of the Complaints filed by petitioners sufficiently stated a cause of action. The Complaints alleged that petitioners are theo wners of the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. As owners thereof, they have the right to remain in peaceful possession of the said properties an

d, if deprived thereof, they may recover the same. The petitioners are in open,co ntinuous and notorious possession of the disputed parcels of land for more than 90 years. The rule of civil procedure provides the elements of a cause of action ; 1) a right in favor of a plaintiff. 2) An obligation on the part of the defend ant to violate such right. 3) an act or omission on the part of defendant of the right of the plaintiff which constitutes such right. Whether or not thereis a sufficient cause of action. FACTS: 23 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 2 SPOUSES JUAN J. DIAZ and ELIZABETH L. DIAZ vs. JOSE DIAZAction for a sum of money was filed before the Regional Trial Court of by private respondent Jose Diaz against petitioners Juan and Elizabeth Diaz. The complain t stemmed from a property bought in Greenhills by Elizabeth Diaz. It was bought with money of a previous sale of lot both co-owned by Jose and Elizabeth. TheGr eenhills property was effectively and partly held in trust by Elizabeth for Jose . Jose demands P2 million for his part of the lot taking into account the cu

rren t value of the lot. Elizabeth Diaz filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause o f action. Petitioners maintain that private respondent s Complaint failedto sta te a cause of action as it contained mere averments of facts and conclusions of law that neither establish any right or claim on the part of private respondent nor constitute wrongful acts or omissions violative of his right. ISSUE:HELD: W hether or not there constitutes a sufficient cause of action. FACTS: Ithas been consistently ruled that a complaint states a cause of action when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the corr elative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendan tin violation of said legal right. In the case at bar, the connection which petitioners seek can readily be found by an examination of the Complaint in its entirety. In his Complaint, private respondent alleged that he was entitled to rec

e ive P15,000.00 as his share in the sales proceeds of the Mandaluyong property.H e thereafter claimed that, with his knowledge and without his objection, thesam e P15,000.00 was used by his brother in paying for the Greenhills property.Havi ng allowed his brother to use his money, private respondent demanded the return of the present equivalent of his contribution following the sale of the Greenhil ls property but the said demand was rejected. Hypothetically admitting these all egations, private respondent s Complaint satisfies all the elements of acause o f action. 24 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 2 Zepeda Vs China Banking Spouses Zepeda obtained a loan from respondent China Bank and subsequently faile d to uphold their obligations with said loan. Allegedly they approached the bank and negotiated a restructuringof the loan, which was said to have been granted . However; there were no documents to prove this. Respondent bank then proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose their property where itself emerged as the highest bidder. The petitioners failedto redeem the property. Petitioners argued the f oreclosure proceedings should

have been annulled due to the bank failing to comp ly with the posting and publication requirements of the law. Additionally, they claimed the real estate mortgage and promissory note was signed in blank, with n o copy furnished to them. Respondent's motion for dismissal was denied. Hence it f iled a special answer withaffirmative defenses, including a set of 20 questions , which were never answered by the Petitioners. The Trial Court denied China Ban ks affirmative defenses as well as its motion to expunge the complaint for being premature. The CA ruledin favor of respondent on the reasons of Zepedas acting in bad faith when ignoring the hearings of the court, and China Bank's affirmativ e defenses, failed to answer the 20 questions, and that the complaint failed to show cause of action. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not spouses' complaint contained the sufficient cause of action. FACTS: An action is formal statement of the operative facts which gives ris

e to a remed ial right. Thus upon only the concurrence of the 3 requisites is their sufficien t cause of action. We find allegations of the complaint sufficientto establish a cause of action. Thus, the Spouses have sufficient cause of action. 25 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 2 GERONIMO QUADRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Quadra, the Chief Legal Officer of respondent Philippine Charity Sweepsta kes Office (PCSO) when he organized and actively participated in the activities of Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Employees Association (CUGCO), an organization composed of the rank and file employees of PCSO, and then later, the Associatio n of Sweepstakes Staff Personnel and Supervisors (CUGCO) (ASSPS [CUGCO]). He was administrativelycharged before the Civil Service Commission with violation of Civil Service Law

and Rules for neglect of duty and misconduct and/or conduct pr ejudicial to theinterest of the service. The CSC found Quadra guilty and summar ily dismissed him. Quadra filed a petition for reinstatement together with damag es to the Courtof Industrial Relations. The PCSO moved to dismiss the case on t he grounds that it has no jurisdiction over PCSO and that the complaint lacked a valid cause of action. The case remained in the CIR until it was established. S ubsequent theNLRC labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Quadra. The PCS O contendedthat the filing of the case with CIR tantamount to splitting cause o f action. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not there was a splitting of the cause of acti on. The court agrees with the petitioner that the filing of a petition for damages b eforeCIR did not constitute a splitting of a cause of action under the Rules of Court. Splitting a cause of action is the act of dividing a single cause of act ion,

claim or demand into two parts, and bringing such suit for one of such part s only, only intending to reserve the rest for another separate action. The purp ose of the rule is to avoid harassment and vexation of the defendant and the mul tiplicity of suits. Thus, Quadra did not split the cause of action when it filedthe case in CIR. 26 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 2 Flores v. Mallare-Philipps FACTS: Respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of j urisdiction since the amountof the demand was only P11,643.00 and refused to pa y representing cost of trucktires which he purchased on credit. Fernando Calion allegedly indebted to petitioner joined in moving for the dismissal of the comp laint on the ground of lackof jurisdiction. Counsel for petitioner opposed the Motion to Dismiss. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdict ion. Petitioner appealed b

y certiorari from the order of Judge Mallare-Phillipps who dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. ISSUE: HELD: In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Sec tion 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdiction al test. Needless to state, if the causes of action are separate and independent , their joinder in onecomplaint is permissive and not mandatory, and any cause of action where the amount of the demand is twenty thousand pesos or less may be the subject of a separate complaint filed with a metropolitan or municipal tria l court. In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictio nal test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful s crutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for t he reason that the

claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction. No. order appea led from is affirmed Whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of jur isdiction 29 P ag e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 3 PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS 30 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE SALONGA Rule 3 vs. WARNER BARNES FACTS: Westchester Fire Insurance Company of New York entered into a contract with Tina J. Gamboa for the shipment of one case of rayon yardage. U pon arrival, it was discovered that there were a shortage of 1,723.12 pesos on t he shipment from San Francisco, California,on steamer Clovis Victory, to Manila . Consignee, Jovito Salonga, demanded fromAmerican President Lines agents of th e ship Clovis Victory, demanding settlement, and when apparently no action was t aken on this claim, plaintiff demanded p

ayment thereof from Warner, Barnes and C o., Ltd., as agent of the insurance company in the Philippines to pay him the ex cess amount. In the meantime, AmericanPresident Lines agreed to pay to the plai ntiff the amount under its liabilityin the bill of lading, and when this offer was rejected, the claim was finally settled. As a result, the amount claimed in the complaint as the ultimate liability of the defendant under the insurance con tract was reduced. The trial court held that defendant, as agent of Westchester Fire Insurance is responsible upon the insurance claim subject to the suit. ISSU E: HELD: It is claimed that this action should have been filed against its princ ipal, the Westchester Fire Insurance. This point is also well taken. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that "every action must be prosecuted in t he name of the real party in interest." A corollary proposition to this rule is that an action must be brought ag

ainst the real party in interest, or against a party which may be bound by the judgment to be rendered therein. The real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or t he "party entitled to the availsof the suit" In the case at bar, the defendant issued upon in its capacity as agent of Westchester Fire Insurance in spite of t he fact that the insurance contract has not been signed by it. As we have said, the defendant did not assume any obligation thereunder either as agent or as a p rincipal. It cannot, therefore, be made liable under said contract, and hence it can be said that this case was filed against one who is not the real party in i nterest Whether or not the defendant is the real party in interest. 31 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 EDUARDO RAYO v. METROBANK FACTS: Midas Diversified Exportobtained loans from Metrobank. To secure the pay ment OF the loan, a mortgage was executed in favor of Metrobank over three parce ls of land When Midas failedto pay, Metrobank extrajudicially foreclosed the re al estate mortgage. At the bidding, Metrobank acquired the property. Metrobank p osted a bondrecquired for the issuance of a writ of possession. Rayo, a coassign ee of the property filed an action for nullification of the sale. Metrobank oppo sed for the motion conten

ding that he is not a real party in interest. ISSUE: HE LD: Initially, it is recognized herein petitioner as the co-assignee of the subj ect real properties. However, while petitioner would be injured by the judgment in this suit, the petitioner has no present substantial interest to institute th e annulment of judgment proceedings and nullify the order granting the writ of p ossession. Rayo wouldnot be injured by the judgment. An ex-parte application fo r a writ of possession not a strictly judicial process contemplated in Article 4 43 of the New CivilCode. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of possession. Whether or not petitioner has a legal personality in the s uit. 32 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 Hon. Carlos Fortich Vs Hon Renato Corona FACTS: This caseconcerns the motion for reconsideration of the court's resolution dated November17, 1998 and motion to refer the case to the Court en banc. In p revious case, the Court voted two-two on the separate motions for reconsideratio n as a resultof which the decision was affirmed. The Court noted in a resolutio n dated January 27, 1999 that the movants have no legal personality to seek redr ess before the Court as their motion to intervene was already denied and that th e motion to

refer the case to the Court en banc is akin to a second MR which is prohibited.In this motion, both respondents and intervenors prayed that the cas e be referred to the Court en banc inasmuch as their earlier MR was resolved by a vote oftwo-two, the required number to carry a decision under the Constitutio n was notmet. ISSUE: Whether or not the referral to the court en banc partakes of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration. HELD: It is affirmative. T he contention, therefore, that the Resolution of November 17, 1998 did not dispo se of the earlier MR of the Decision dated April 24, 1998 is flawed. Consequentl y, thepresent MR necessarily partakes of the nature of a second motion for reco nsideration which, according to the clear and unambiguous language of Rule 56, S ection 4, in relation to Rule 52, Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedur e,is prohibited. True, there are exceptional cases when this Court may entertai n

a second motion for reconsideration, such as where there are extraordinarily p ersuasive reasons. Even then, we have ruled that such second MRs must be filed with express leave of court first obtained. In this case, not only did movants fail to ask for prior leave of court, but more importantly, they have been unableto show that there are exceptional reasons for us to give due course to their se cond motions for reconsideration. Stripped of the arguments for referral of this incident to the Court en banc, the motions subject of this resolution are nothi ng more but rehashes of the motions for reconsideration which have been denied i n the Resolution of November 17, 1998. To be sure, the allegations containedthe rein have already been raised before and passed upon by this Court in the said R esolution. 33 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE RAMON P. ARON vs. Heirs of Alfredo REALON Rule 3 Roman Realon was the owner of two parcels of land which was inherited by Alfredo Realon and hissiblings. Sometime in 1979, Alfredo executed a contract to sell his undivided portion of the lot to petitioner. He also obliged himself to execu te a deed of final sale. However Alfredo failed to register the sale. To secure the balance ofthe purchase price Aaron, mortgaged the property to the remaining heir. AlfredoRealon died and his successors were unaware about the sale. Engr. Ilaban filed,

the attorney-infact of Aron, filed a case for consignation agains t the heirs of Realon. The Realon's countered by contending that undue influence w as present at the execution of the sale and that the balance of the price due in the contract to sell was not paid. Aaron contended that the contract to sell wa s superseded by the deeds of the sale with mortgage. In respond the Realon's conte nded thateven the other heirs did not receive the proceeds from the contract to sell allegedly executed by Alfredo. The Regional Trial Court held that there wa s fraud present. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the other heirs of Alfredo are the real parties in interest. FACTS: The settled rule is that every action must be prosecutedand defended in the nam e of the real party in a fiduciary capacity. The beneficiary must be deemed as t he real party in interest. Thus the presence of all the indispensible party is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial p

ower. The plaintiff is man dated to implead all indispensable party and in the absence of one render all su bsequent judgment voids. Failure to include the other heirs as indispensible par ties in the complaint to nullify the contract to sell is fatal to the complaint. 34 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR v. HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN Paciencia Regala owns a fishpond, which her Attorney-in-Fact Faustino Mercado le ased to Eduardo Lapid for a three years. Lessee in turn sub-leased the fishpond to Rafael Lopez during the last seven months of the original lease. Ernesto Sale nga was hired by Eduardo Lapid as fishpond watchman. In the sub-lease, Rafael Lo pez rehiredrespondent Salenga. Ernesto Salenga sent the demand letter to Rafael Lopez andLourdes Lapid for unpaid salaries and non-payment of the share in the harvest. S

alenga file a Complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudic ation Board (PARAB). Pending resolution of the agrarian case, the instant case w as instituted by petitioner Antonio Baltazar, an alleged nephew of Faustino Merc ado, through a Complaint-Affidavit against private respondents before the Office of theOmbudsman for violation of RA 3019. Petitioner maintains that respondent Ilao, Jr. had no jurisdiction to hear and act on DARAB Case No. 552-P filed by respondent Salenga as there was no tenancy relation between respondent Salenga a nd Rafael L. Lopez, and thus, the complaint was dismissible on its face. ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to pursue the instant petition . Whether or not the Ombudsman likewise erred in reversing his own resolution. FACTS:The "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injuredby the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Th

e Complaint-Affidavit filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, there is no ques tion on his authority and legal standing. Faustino Mercado, is an agent himself and as such cannot further delegate his agency to another. An agent cannot deleg ate to another the same agency. Re-delegation of the agency would be detrimental to the principal as the second agent has no privity of contract with the former . In the instant case, petitioner has no privity of contract with PacienciaRega la, owner of the fishpond and principal of Faustino Mercado. The nature ofthe c ase is determined by the settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. Respondent Salenga's complaint and its attachment clearly spells out the jurisdictional allegations thathe is an agricultural tenant in possession of the fishpond and is about to be ejected from it, clearly, respondent Ilao, Jr. could not be faulted in assuming jurisdic tion as said allegations characterize an agricultural dispute. A defense

asserte d in an answer or motion to dismiss is not to be considered in resolvingthe iss ue on jurisdiction as it cannot be made dependent upon the allegationsof the de fendant. The instant petition is denied for lack of merit, and the Order and Mem orandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor are affirmed. HELD: 35 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 MACLARING LUCMAN vs. ALIMATAR MALAWI et al. FACTS: Afterthe failure of elections, respondents remained in office in a holdo ver capacitypursuant to the provisions of sec. 1 of R.A. No. 6676 and COMELEC r esolution no. 2888. Respondents attempted to open their respective barangay s IR A s bank account, eventually, they allowed to open but not allowed to withdraw o wing to the absence of the requisite Accountant s advise. They filed a special c ivil action for mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction t o compe

l petitioner to allow them to open and maintain deposit accounts and to w ithdraw. Respondents Pangcoga, Sarip, Cadar, Macarambon and Usman testified duri ng the trial that they were duly elected chairpersons and testified further the refusal of the petitioner to allow the withdrawal despite of documents presented . RTC rendered a decision commanding petitioner to pay respondents except Alimat arMalawi who failed to testify, the IRA s of their respective barangays even wi thout accountant s advice. CA affirmed the decisions. ISSUES: Whether or not res pondents have the causes of actions against the petitioner. Whether or not respondents have the legal personality to institute the petition for mandamus. HELD:The relationship being contractual in nature, mandamus is therefore not an available remedy since mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractua l obligations. Furtheremore, respondents have no legal personality to institut

e petition since the funds for which the bank accounts were created belong to the barangay headed by respondents. The case at bar was not initiated by the baranga ys themselves. Neither did the barangay chairmen file the suit in representation of their respective barangays. Only the barangays are the only lawful recipient s of these funds 36 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 ELPIDIO S. UY Vs COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Petitioner and Public Estates Authority, as a single proprietorship doing busine ss in the nameof Edison Development executed a landscaping and construction agr eement in Heritage Park, Taguig. A few months after, alleging a huge discrepancy between the report and actual progress of the site terminated the project,Uy fi led a complaint for recovery of the spent funds which was granted by the Regiona l Trial Court against PEA. Heritage filed a petition for injunction against Uy c ontending t

hat the Regional Trial Court did not acquirejurisdiction over the cas e since Heritage was not impleaded ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not Heritage is an in dispensible party. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court s act ion in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of thecase can b e had. The party s interest in the subject matter of the suit and inthe relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that his legal pr esence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. Through a deed of assignment, PEA ceased to be the project manager and assigned its rights to Heri tage. Thus PEA is no longer a party-in-interest. Instead, it is nowprivate resp ondent HPMC, as the assignee, who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgm ent in the suit. In its absence, there cannot be a resolution ofthe dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete or equi

table. We thus reiterate that HPMC is an indispensable party. 37 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO vs. HERBERT MARKUS EMIL SCHEER Respondent was granted a permanent resident status card by the Bureau of Immigra tion and Deportation. The BID received information that Scheer was wantedby the German Federal Policeand that a warrant of arrest had been issued againsthim. The BID obtained custody of Scheer for deportation proceeding. Scheer hasfiled a petition for certiorari, questioning the legal standing of the Immigration Com missioner. He contends that the commissioner has no authority to decide w

hether an alien may stay or not. The Regional Trial Court rendered a judgment annulling the summary deportation proceedings. Domingo, the commissioner of Immigration c ontends that the judgment is void because the Board of Commissioners were not im pleaded in the complaint filed. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the Board of Commiss ioners is an indispensible party. FACTS: The respondent was arrested and detained on the basis of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC. The petitioner caused the arrest of the respondent in obedien ce to the said Deportation Order. Thus, the BOC is an indispensible party. Secti on 7 of Rule 3 requires indispensible parties to be joined as plaintiffs and def endants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable partiesto the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain r eal finality. The However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a gro und for the dismissal of

an action. Parties may be added by order of the court o n motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. 38 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 VICTORIANA BORLASA vs. VICENTED POLISTICO FACTS: An action was instituted by petitioner against respond ent in the Court of First Instance for the purpose of securing the dissolution o f a voluntary association namedTuruhan Polistico & Co., and to compel the defen dants to account for and surrender the money and property of the association in order that its affairs may be liquidated and its assets applied according to law . The trial judge having sustained a demurrer for defect of parties and the plai ntiffs electing not to amend,

the cause was dismissed, and from this order an ap peal was taken by the plaintiffs to this court. ISSUE: HELD: To require all memb ers to appear would be quite impossible. Hence, some members must be made to sue but only in behalf of allthe members who are not around and it is impracticabl e to bring them all to thecourt. A number of them may sue for the benefit of al l. Whether or not a suitin behalf of some members proper. 39 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 MARIBETH CORDOVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HON. JUDGE RICARDO TORNILLA FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Cou rt against private respondents, spouses Romeo and Marietta Laguardia, and Judge Ricardo F. Tornilla, along with the Sheriff and his deputies. Cordova failed to include a certificate of forum shopping. The complaint, however, did not include the certification against forum shopping required. It was only su

bsequently tha t petitioner submitted the certification in compliance with the circular and thu s, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss. The RTC dismissed the comp laint for lack of merit and for failure to prosecute. ISSUE: Whether or not ther e was substantial compliance in the requirements. HELD: the requirement under Administrative Circular No. 04-94 for a certificate of non-forumshopping is mandatory. The subsequent compliance with this requirem ent does not excuse a party's failure to comply therewith in the first instance. I n those cases where the Court excused non-compliance with the certificate requir ement, special circumstances or compelling reasons existed, which made the stric t application of the circular clearly inequitable. In this case, however, petiti oner's action hardly justifies a deviation from the mandatory nature of the aforequoted provision. Hence, petitioner's complaint was clearly dismissible on the gro und of

forum shopping. 40 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 EPIFANIO SAN JUAN, JR. vs. JUDGE RAMON A. CRUZ FACTS: Loreto San Juan executed a last will and testament naming Oscar Casa as one of t hedevisees. Upon Loreto's death, Atty. Teodorcio Aquino petitioned for a probate inthe will. On the pendency of the proceeding, Oscar Casa died intestate. Aquin osubstituted Casa in the proceeding. The probate court denied the substitution contending that Aquino was not an executor or administrator of Casa's estate. Petitioner heir emphasized that it is only in the absence of an executor or administ

rator that the heirs may be allowed by the court to substitute the deceased part y. He averred that the purported heirs simply agreed among themselves to appoint a representative to be substituted for the deceased, which is contrary to ther equirement of a prior hearing for the court to ascertain who the rightful heirs are. Petitioner, filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. ISSU E: HELD: Whether or not substitution is permitted in the proceedings. The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointmen t ofan administrator of his estate, because from the very moment of his death, theystepped into his shoes and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee of the de ceased Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior appointment of an administrator or executo r of the estate of Oscar Casa is not necessary for his heirs to acquire legal ca pacity to be substituted as representatives of the estate. Said heirs may design a

te one or some of them as their representative before the trial court. The second paragraph of Section 17 Rule 3 is explicit. The heirs may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor ora dministrator. The pronouncement in Law v. Court of Appeals is an exception where a legal representative after unreasonable delay. Thus, Aquino cannot substitute Casa. Proper parties for substitution are the heirs. 41 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 GLICERIO R. BRIOSO vs. SALVADORA RILI-MARIANO Spouses Salvadora Rili-Mariano and Leonardo C. Mariano repurchased a property th rough theLand Bank of the Philippines hey previously sold to Glicerio Brioso un der a pacto de retro sale. Despite repeated demands, however, Glicerio refused t o deliver the entire property to the Spouses Mariano. The spouses filed a case f or recovery against Brioso. The occupants of the land, heirs of Brioso, contende d thatthe Mariano's lost their standing on the property since Glicerio Brioso, as signe

d the deed of the house to his son. Brioso's also contended that Land Bank sh ouldbe impleaded. ISSUE: Whether there was a valid substitution of deceased Gli cerio Non-compliance with the rule on substitution of a deceased party renders t heproceedings and judgment of the trial court infirm because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs o nwhom the trial and the judgment would be binding. In other words, a party s right to due process is at stake. In the instant case, it is true that the trial court, after receiving a notice of Glicerio s death, failed to order the appearan ce of his legal representative or heirs. Instead, the trial court issued an Orde r merely admitting respondents motion for substitution. There was no court orde r for Glicerio s legal representative to appear, nor did any such legal represen tative ever appear in court to be substituted for Glicerio. Neither did the

resp ondents ever procure the appointment of such legal representative, nor didGlice rio s heirs ever ask to be substituted for Glicerio. Clearly, the trial court fa iled to observe the proper procedure in substituting Glicerio. As a result, cont rary to the Court of Appeals decision, no valid substitution transpiredin the present case. HELD: FACTS: 42 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 ISMAEL MATHAY vs. CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST COMPANY FACTS: Petitioners filed a case for a class suit against Consolidated Mines Inc. .They were former stock holders of the company. Consolidated Mines sent a board resolution requiring stockholders to signify to a special subscription which au thorized a loan of the company to Metrobank. The parties in the suit contended that the consolidated mines fraudulently filed a certification to the loan. Consolidated mines questions Mathay et al's capacity to institute a class suit. ISSUE:

HELD: Whether or not petitioners have the capacity to institute a class suit. The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are accordingly: (1) that the subject matter of the controversy be one of common or general interest to many persons, and (2) that such persons be so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all to the court. An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether the suit is or is not a class quit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or otherpleading initiating the class action should allege the existence of the necessar y facts, to wit, the existence of a subject matter of common interest, and thee xistence of a class and the number of persons in the alleged class, 3 in order t hat the court might be enabled to determine whether the members of the classare so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court,

to contrast the number appearing on the record with the number in the class andto determine whether claimants on record adequately represent the class and thesub ject matter of general or common interest By the phrase subject matter pertains to the physical facts. The thing real or personal and not the delict committed. Th us, petitioners do not have the capacity to institute a class suit. 43 P ag e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. HON. VIVENCIOM. RUIZ FACTS: Petitioner is the duly registered owner of several adjacent parcels of la nd. Pedro del Rosario filed a class suit on behalf of 104 other residents seekin g the titles of petitioner to be held null and void. Inocencio Bernardo et al al so filed a classs suit against the same petitioner s construction offences and high walls, roads, streets and canals on the land in dispute. ISSUE:HELD: Wheth er or not the class suits were proper. A class suit is not proper in

this case as such presupposes a common and general interest by several plaintiffs in a single specific thing under Section 12, Rul e 3 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, it cannot be maintained when each of th ose impleaded as alleged plaintiffs "has only a special or particular interest i n the specific thing completely different from another thing in which the defend ants have a like interest." It is not a case where one or more may sue for the b enefit of all or where the representation of class interest affected by the judg ment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party In the case at bar, aclass suit would not lie because each of the defendants h as an interest only inthe particular portion of the land he is actually occupyi ng, and not in the portions individually occupied by the other defendants. They do not have a commonor general interest in the subject matter of the controvers y 44 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 NEWSWEEK, INC., petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FACTS: Private respondents, incorporated sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual sugar planters,filed Civ il Case No. 15812 in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalfof all su garcane planters in the province of Negros Occidental, against petitioner and tw o of petitioners non-resident Newsweek correspondents Fred Bruning and Barry Ca me. The complaint alleged that petitioner and the other defendants c

ommitted lib el against them by the publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in the Feb ruary 23, 1981 issue of petitioner s weekly news magazine Newsweek. The article supposedly portrayed the island province of Negros Occidental as aplace dominat ed by big landowners or sugarcane planters who not only exploitedthe impoverish ed and underpaid sugarcane workers/laborers, but also brutalizedand killed them with impunity. Complainants therein alleged that said article,taken as a whole , showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and/o r misrepresentation of facts intended to put them (sugarcane planters) in bad li ght, expose them to public ridicule, discredit and humiliation here in the Phili ppines and abroad, and make them objects of hatred, contemptand hostility of th eir agricultural workers and of the public in general. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or n ot a class suit is proper. The class suit is not proper. I

n the case of Corpuz and Cuaderno, the court has ruled that in order to maintaina libel suit, it is essential that the victim mu st be identifiable. For a defamation to be directed at a particular class, it is essential that the allegationmust be so sweeping and all embracing that an ind ividual can prove that a defamatory statement is directed to him. The disputed p ortion not the articles which he claims to be libelous was never pointed out. 45 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE OPOSA Rule 3 vs. FACTORAN FACTS: A Civil Case was filed before Regional Trial Court. The principal plainti ffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. The original defendant was the Honorable Ful gencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Environment and Natural Resources Secretary. His s ubstitution in this petition by thenew Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala , was subsequently ordered upon proper motion. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers class suit and alleges

that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use an d enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country s virgin tropic al rainforests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally co ncerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them allbefore the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." Conse quently, it is prayed for thatjudgment be rendered, ordering defendant to cance l all existing timber licenseagreements in the country. Factoran filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint stating the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and the issue is a political question which properly pertains to the legisl ative or executive branches.Subsequently, respondent Judge issued an order gran ting the motion to dismiss.

The respondent Judge ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would impair contracts. Plaintiffs thus filed the instant spe cial civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court asking for rescission and setting aside the dismissal order since the respondent Judge grav ely abused his discretionin dismissing the action. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not a class suit was the proper course of action taken. The civil case is indeed a class suit. The case however has a special and novel element. The personality of the minors to sue for thesucceeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as a balanced a nd healthful ecology is concerned. Every generation has a responsibility to pres erve the ecology. The minors' right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time the performance of the obligation to ensure the protection of the rights o r the generations to come. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all ci

tizens of the Philippines. Co nsequently, since the parties are so numerous, itbecomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare t hat the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the fi ling of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Cour t are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latte r being but an incident to the former. 46 P ag e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 4 VENUE OF ACTIONS 47 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY Rule 4 v. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL FACTS: Petitioner filed an action in the Court of First Instance for the condemn ation ofcertain real estate. Petitioner alleged in its complaint that it was au thorized by law to construct a railroad line from Paniqui to Tayug in the Provin ce ofTarlac, and that it is for the purpose of condemning lands for the constru ctionfor such line that the action was brought. After filing and duly serving t he complaint on the defendants, who were persons having interest in the land in ques

tion, Petitioner, pending determination of the action, took possession of an d occupied the lands described in the complaint, built its line, and put the sam ein operation. A week before the date set for hearing of the case, Petitioner g ave notice to the defendants that it would move for a dismissal of the action onthe ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, since ithad just ascertained that the lands actually were situated in Nueva Ecija, instead of the Province of Tarlac. The trial court dismissed the action upon such ground presented by Petitioner. From such pronouncement, this appeal was taken. IS SUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over lands HELD: It was the intention of the Philippine Commission to give to the Courts of First Instance the most perfect and complete jurisdiction possible over the subject matters men tioned in connection therewith. Such jurisdiction is not made to depend upon

loc ality. There is no suggestion of limitation. The jurisdiction is universal.The law provides simply that certain actions affecting real estate "shall be brought in the province where the land, or some part thereof, is situated." The prohibi tion here is clearly directed against the one who begins the action and lays the venue. The court, before the action is commenced, has nothing to do with either . The plaintiff does both. Only when that is done does the section begin to oper ate effectively so far as the court is concerned. The prohibition is nora limit ation on the power of the court but on the rights of the plaintiff. It is not to take something from the court but to grant something to the defendant.Its word ing clearly deprives the court of nothing which it had, but gives the defendant, as against the plaintiff, certain rights which he did not have. It establishes a relation not between the court and the subject, after, but between the plainti ff and the defendant. It relates not to jurisdiction but to trial. It

touches co nvenience, not substance. It simply gives to defendant the unqualified right, if he desires it, to have the trial take place where his land lies andwhere, prob ably, all of his witnesses live. Its object is to secure to him a convenient tri al. 48 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 4 POLYTRADE CORPORATION v. VICTORIANO BLANCO FACTS: Petitioner initiated a suit for collection of money against Victoriano Bl anco, in theCourt of First Instance of Bulacan of the place where the latter re sided. Blanco filed a motion to dismiss the action on the ground of improper ven ue since, he claims, according to the contract, suit may be lodged in the courts of Manila.This Motion was denied by the CFI of Bulacan and rendered judgment a gainst Victoriano. ISSUE: Whether or not venue was properly laid in Bulacan HELD : Accordi

ng to Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on venue of personal actions triable by courts of first instance and this is one provides that such " actionsmay be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants residesor may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides , at the election of the plaintiff." Qualifying this provision in Section 3 of t he same Rule which states that venue may be stipulated by written agreement "By written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transf erredfrom one province to another." No such stipulation appears in the contract s covering the first two causes of action. The general rule set forth in Section 2 (b), Rule 4, governs, and as to said two causes of action, venue was properly laid in Bulacan, the province of defendant s residence. The stipulation adverte d to is only found in the agreements covering the third and fourth causes of act io

n. An accurate reading, however, of the stipulation, "The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila," does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant. The plain meaning is that the parties m erely consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the venue are totally absent therefrom. We cannot read into that clause that plaintiff and defendant bound themselves to file suits with respect to the last two transactions in question only or exc lusively in Manila. For, that agreement did not change or transfer venue. It sim ply is permissive. The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as trib unals to which they may resort. They did not waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4. Renuntiationon praesumitur. 51 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 4 UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION v. ALBERT LIM FACTS: Petitioner corporation sold to Albert Lim grocery products in the totalin g more than P800 thousand pesos. After tendering partial payments, Lim refused t o settle hisobligation despite repeated demands from Universal Robina. This pro mpted the latter to file with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, a complai nt againstLim for a sum money. A month after the case was instituted, the RTC i ssued anOrder dismissing the complaint motu proprio on grounds of lack of juris diction

and improper venue. Universal Robina accordingly filed an amended compla int alleging that the parties agreed that the proper venue for any dispute relat ive tothe transaction is Quezon City. The trial court granted the motion and ad mitted the amended complaint. Summons was served on Lim thereafter, however, the latter failed to file an answer within the prescribed period. The trial court, uponmotion of Universal Robina, declared Lim in default and allowed the former to present evidence ex parte. However, the trial court, still unsure whether ven ue was properly laid, issued an Order directing Universal Robina to file memoran dumof authorities on whether it can file a complaint in Quezon City. Still unde cided concerning the venue of actions, the trial court dismissed the complaint o nthe ground of improper venue. ISSUE: Whether or not improper venue is a properground for dismissal. HELD: Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial cour

t to have taken a procedural short-cut by dismissing motu proprio the complainton the ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined inthe rules of court to take its proper course. Although we are for the speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and fairness take primary importance. The ends of justice require that respondent trial court faithfully adhere to th e rules of procedure to afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well , the right to be heard on his cause. Rules of Court explicitly provide thatimp roper venue not impleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the answer is deemed wa ived. Thus, a court may not dismiss an action motu proprio on the ground ofimpr oper venue as it is not one of the grounds wherein the court may dismiss an acti on motu proprio on the basis of the pleadings. A trial court may not motupropri o dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue, thus: Dismissingthe comp laint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate

course of action at this stage of the proceedings, particularly as venue, in inferior cou rts as well as in the courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived expressl y or impliedly. Where the defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a mot ion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and all ows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or i n a special action be permitted to belatedly challenge the wrong venue, which is deemed waived. 52 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 4 PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC. v. KLAUS SCHONFELD FACTS: Private respondent was hired as a Sector Manager of Pacicon Philippines, Inc., a subsidiary of Pacific Consultants International in the Philippines, to c onsult in services for water and sanitation in the Philippines. PacificConsulta nts transmitted a Letter of Employment to respondent, who accepted thesame whil e making a few minor modifications. Contract states that in case of any question or dispute arising between parties, the proper venue for such action

would be t he Court of Arbitration in London. Respondent was issued an Alien Employment Per mit by the Department of Labor and Employment, which permit was applied for by P PI, and went on to serve for over a year. Upon notice of termination from Pacifi c, respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegaldismissal. Pa cific argued that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over thecase, as respon dent was an alien, and that according to the contract of employment, the London Court would be the proper venue, or the Court in Tokyo, Japan where Pacific Cons ultants held office, or even in Canada, which was respondent's home state. The Lab or Arbiter, as well as the NLRC gave due course to the petition to dismiss filed by Pacific Consultants and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of App eals reversed. ISSUE: Whether or not a clause in a contract can validly limit th e venue of an action. In the instant case, no restrictive wo

rds like were stated in the contract. It cannot be said that the court of arbitration in London is a n exclusive venue to bring forth any complaint arising outof the employment con tract. The settled rule on stipulations regarding venueisthat while they are co nsidered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a ru le, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. Theyshould be considered me rely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive.If the intention of the p arties were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and c ategorically expressing their purpose and design thatactions between them be li tigated only at the place named by them. Pacific Consultants contend that Schonf eld should have filed his Complaint in his place ofpermanent residence, or wher e Pacific Consultant holds its principal office, a

t the place where the contract of employment was signed, in London as stated intheir contract. By enumerating possible venues where Schonfeld could have filedhis complaint, however, Pacifi c Consultants itself admitted that the provisionon venue in the employment cont ract is indeed merely permissive. HELD: 53 P a ge


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CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 6 KINDS OF PLEADINGS 54 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 6 PRO-LINE SPORTS CENTER v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. FACTS:Petitioner instituted a criminal case against Universal Athletics and Ind ustrial Products, Inc. for Unfair Competition, claiming that the latter was manu facturing fake Spalding balls. A search warrant was issued after having been duly applied for, and during the search, machineries and equipment used in the manufa cture of said fake balls were placed under judicial custody. However, the case w asdismissed with finality since the element of actual sale to the public of suc h

goods was not proven by Pro-Line. After dismissal, Universal filed a civil suit for damages against Pro-Line for alleged malicious and baseless prosecution, citing the application for the search warrant, the actual search, and the seizure of the equipment of Universal, among other grounds. Pro-Line naturally denieda ll allegations in the complaint. Further, it also filed a counterclaim for damag es based mainly on the unauthorized and illegal manufacture by Universal of fake Spalding balls. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the claim of Universal, while dismissing at the same time Pro-Line's counter claim. ISSUE: Whether or not the counterclaim should be sustained. HELD: Counterclaim for damages by the Pro-Line based on the illegal and unauthorized manufacture of "Spalding" balls certainly constitutes an independent cause ofac tion which can be the subject of a separate complaint for damages against Un

iver sal. However, this separate civil action cannot anymore be pursued as it isalre ady barred by res judicata, the judgment in the criminal case (against Universal ) involving both the criminal and civil aspects of the case for unfair competiti on. To recall, petitioner ProLine, upon whose initiative the criminal action for unfair competition against respondent Universal was filed, did not institute a separate civil action for damages nor reserve its right to do so. Thus the civil aspect for damages was deemed instituted in the criminal case. No better manife station of the intent of petitioner to recover damages in the criminalcase can be expressed than their active participation in the prosecution of thecivil asp ect of the criminal case through the intervention of their private prosecutor. O bviously, such intervention could only be for the purpose of recovering damages or indemnity because the offended party is not entitled to representthe People of the Philippines in the prosecution of a public offense. A counterc

laim partak es of the nature of a complaint and/or a cause of action against theplaintiffs. It is in itself a distinct and independent cause of action, so thatwhen proper ly stated as such, the defendant becomes, in respect to the matterstated by him , an actor, and there are two simultaneous actions pending betweenthe same part ies, where each is at the same time both a plaintiff and defendant. A countercla im stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules, as if it we re an independent action. 55 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 6 FELIPE YULIENCO v. COURT OF APPEALS and ADVANCE CAPITAL CORPORATION FACT: An action for collection of a sum of money based on promissorynotes was f iled by private respondent against petitioner in the Regional TrialCourt. Petit ioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia since another c ase between the same parties was then being tried in the RTC of Makati. Private respondent claims that the two cases are not the same, in that they involve diff erent causes of action, i.e. different promissory notes. The tria

l court agreed with private respondent. On petition for certiorari, prohibitionand/or injuncti on, Yulienco claimed private respondent is barred from instituting the case file d with the Quezon City RTC since it should have been filed as acompulsory count erclaim in the Makati case. Private respondent, for its part,maintains that the two cases are distinct and separate from each other since theQuezon City case is an ordinary collection suit, while the Makati case is for injunction, and tha t the two cases involve different promissory notes. The Courtof Appeals denied said petition and affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the suit for collection of money was proper. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defendi ng party may have against an opposing party. The Makati case is basically an inj unction suit, a petition for prohibition. On the other hand, the Quezon City sui t is

an ordinary action for collection of sums of money. In the former, Yulienco essentially seeks to prohibit or enjoin the disposition and/or sale of his prop erty, the proceeds of which will answer for his unpaid obligations to ACC. Promi ssory notes are also involved in that case but they are specifically identified asdifferent, and are intimately related to or secured by the real estate mortga ges. In the Quezon City case, ACC simply seeks to collect from YULIENCO his unpa id monetary obligations covered by specific but unsecured Promissory Notes. Needless to say, they are not the promissory notes subject of the first action. Neither are they substantially, intimately and reasonably relevant to nor even remot ely connected with the promissory notes and the cause of action in the injunctio n suit. Simply put, the promissory notes in both cases differ from and are not r elated to each other. There is, therefore, a dissimilarity in the subject matter of both cases arising from separate and distinct transactions and necessari

ly r equiring different evidence to support the divergent claims. More importantly, t he "one compelling test of compulsoriness" i.e., the logical relationshipbetwee n the claim and counterclaim, does not apply here. To reiterate, there isno log ical relationship between Yulienco s petition for injunctive relief andACC s co llection suit, hence separate trials of the respective claims of the parties wil l not entail a substantial duplication of effort and time as the factual and/or legal issues involved, as already explained, are dissimilar and distinct. 56 P a g e


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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 6 CONSUELO V. CALO v. AJAX INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED Petitioner ordered from Ajax International, Inc. several feet of John Shaw wire rope. Upon delivery of the wire rope, petitioner found out that it was short of 30 feet, which prompted her to communicate with Ajax for either completion of de livery or account adjustment in view of the undelivered wire rope. Petitioner di dnot receive any response from Ajax, and instead, a complaint was filed for col lection of sum of money was against her by one Adolfo Benavides (Benavides), who

claimed to have acquired the outstanding credit account of petitioner from Ajax. Subsequently, a judgment by default was entered, and a writ of execution was issued against petitioner. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus wa s applied for which was granted and the case was remanded for further proceeding s. Petitioner then filed a complaint against Ajax asking for completion of deliv ery or that she be relieved from paying for the 300 feet of wire rope whichrema ined undelivered, which complaint included a prayer for damages. Ajax movedfor dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject of the present suit was int imately related to the case between Benavides and petitioner, which motionwas g ranted by the court, which found Calo's claim to be a compulsory counter-claim, wh ich should be filed in the Benavides case. ISSUE: Whether or not the claim is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim The dismissal of the complaint

by the c ourt because of the pendency of the Benavides case is based on the supposition t hat former's claim is a compulsory counter-claim that should be filed inthe latte r case. There is no question that it arises out of the same transaction which is the basis of Benavides' complaint and does not require the presence ofthird part ies over whom the municipal court could not acquire jurisdiction. However, Calo s claim is not a compulsory counterclaim in the Benavides case for the simple re ason that the amount thereof exceeds the jurisdiction of the municipal court. Th e rule that a compulsory counterclaim not set up is barred, when applied to the municipal court, presupposes that the amount involved is within the said court s jurisdiction. As noted, it would come to the absurd situation where a claim mus t be filed with the municipal court which it is prohibited from taking cognizanc e of, being beyond its jurisdiction. Besides, the reason underlying the rule, wh ich is to settle all related controversies in one sitting only,

does not obtain. For, even if the counterclaim in excess of the amount cognizable by the inferio r court is set up, the defendant cannot obtain positive relief. The Rules allow this only for the defendant to prevent plaintiff from recovering from him. This means that should the court find both plaintiff s complaint and defendant s coun terclaim (for an amount exceeding said cour

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