RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, vs.

FEDERICO A. SERRA,

G.R. No. 203241

July 10, 2013

Facts:

Respondent Federico A. Serra (Serra) is the owner of a parcel of land. On 20 May 1975, Serra and petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy, wherein Serra agreed to lease his land to RCBC for 25 years. Serra further granted RCBC the option to buy the land and improvement (property) within 10 years from the signing of the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy.

On 4 September 1984, RCBC informed Serra of its decision to exercise its option to buy the property. However, Serra replied that he was no longer interested in selling the property. On 14 March 1985, RCBC filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against Serra (Specific Performance case) in the RTC Makati. The RTC Makati initially dismissed the complaint. However, in an Order dated 5 January 1989, the RTC Makati reversed itself and ordered Serra to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in favor of RCBC.

Serra appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). During the pendency of the appeal, Serra donated the property to his mother, who in turn sold the property to Hermanito Liok (Liok). A new land title was issued in favor of Liok. Thus, RCBC filed a Complaint for Nullification of Deed of Donation and Deed of Sale with Reconveyance and Damages against Liok, Ablao and Serra (Annulment case) before the RTC.

Meanwhile, the CA, and later the Supreme Court, affirmed the order of the RTC Makati in the Specific Performance case. In a Decision dated 4 January 1994, this Court declared that the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy was valid, effective, and enforceable. On 15 April 1994, the decision in the Specific Performance case became final and executory upon entry of judgment.

On 22 October 2001, the RTC Masbate ruled in favor of RCBC, declaring the donation in favor of Ablao and the subsequent sale to Liok null and void. In a Decision dated 28 September 2007, the CA affirmed the RTC Masbate decision. The CA held that the donation to Ablao was simulated and was done solely to evade Serra’s obligation to RCBC. Since Ablao had no right to transfer the property and Liok was not a buyer in good faith, the subsequent sale to Liok was likewise null and void.

Thus, Liok filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 182478, while Serra and Ablao filed a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 182664, before this Court. In separate Resolutions dated 30 June 2008 and 22 October 2008, which became final and executory on 27 August 20087 and 3 March 2009,8respectively, this Court found neither reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion on the CA’s part.

On 25 August 2011, RCBC moved for the execution of the decision in the Specific Performance case. RCBC alleged that it was legally impossible to ask for the execution of the decision prior to the annulment of the fraudulent transfers made by Serra. Thus, the period to execute by motion was suspended during the pendency of the Annulment case. On 22 September 2011, Serra filed his comment and opposition to the motion. Serra insisted that the motion for execution was already barred by prescription and laches, and that RCBC was at fault for failing to register as lien in the original title the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy.

In an Order dated 16 February 2012, the RTC Makati denied RCBC’s motion for execution. The RTC Makati opined that "[RCBC] should have asked for the execution of the deed of sale and have the same registered with the Registry of Deeds, so that even if [Serra] sold or transferred the subject property to any person the principle of caveat emptor would set in."9

In an Order dated 26 July 2012, the RTC Makati denied RCBC’s motion for reconsideration. Thus, RCBC filed this petition.

In a Resolution dated 3 December 2012, this Court granted RCBC’s Temporary Restraining Order against the implementation of the questioned Orders upon RCBC’s filing of a bond.

Issue:

Whether or not the court a quo erred in holding that petitioner RCBC is barred from having its 05 January 1989 decision executed through motion, considering that under the circumstances obtaining in this case, RCBC was unlawfully prevented by the respondent from enforcing the said decision.

Held:

The petition has merit.

The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within five years from the date of its entry or by an action after the lapse of five years and before prescription sets in.11 This Court, however, allows exceptions when execution may be made by motion even after the lapse of five years. These exceptions have one common denominator: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment obligor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.12

In Camacho v. Court of Appeals,13 we held that where the delays were occasioned by the judgment debtor’s own initiatives and for her advantage as well as beyond the judgment creditor’s control, the five-year period allowed for enforcement of the judgment by motion is deemed to have been effectively interrupted or suspended.

In the present case, there is no dispute that RCBC seeks to enforce the decision which became final and executory on 15 April 1994. This decision orders Serra to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in favor of RCBC. However, to evade his obligation to RCBC, Serra transferred the property to his mother Ablao, who then transferred it to Liok. Serra’s action prompted RCBC to file the Annulment case. Clearly, the delay in the execution of the decision was caused by Serra for his own advantage. Thus, the pendency of the Annulment case effectively suspended the five-year period to enforce through a motion the decision in the Specific Performance case. Since the decision in the Annulment case attained finality on 3 March 2009 and RCBC’s motion for execution was filed on 25 August 2011, RCBC’s motion is deemed filed within the five-year period for enforcement of a decision through a motion.

This Court has reiterated that the purpose of prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments is to prevent parties from sleeping on their rights.

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA,

vs.GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE

REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY.

G.R. No. 198680

July 8, 2013

Facts:

On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins,4 filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.8

In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.9 Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.10

On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order,11 finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration,12 this did not mean that they could already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the documentary evidence he submitted.

The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Petitioners sought direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.

Held:

The petition has no merit.

As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the

decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property.This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action.

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,23 or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

A determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper special proceeding.

CITY OF CEBU, vs.

APOLONIO M. DEDAMO, JR.,

G.R. No. 172852

January 30, 2013

Facts:

The present controversy is an off-shoot of Civil Case for eminent domain over two (2) parcels of land owned by spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo (Spouses Dedamo), filed by the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City.

During the pendency of the case, or on December 14, 1994, the petitioner and Spouses Dedamo entered into a Compromise Agreement whereby the latter agreed to part with the ownership of the parcels of land in favor of the former in consideration of P1,786,400.00 as provisional payment and just compensation in an amount to be determined by a panel of commissioners.

Forthwith, the panel was constituted and a report was submitted to the RTC recommending the sum ofP20,826,339.50 as just compensation. The report was adopted and approved by the RTC in its Order dated December 27, 1996. The RTC Order was affirmed by the CA and then by the Court.

When the said decision became final and executory on September 20, 2002, the case was remanded for execution to the RTC, before which, a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution was filed by Spouses Dedamo on April 4, 2003. On May 16, 2003, the RTC granted the motion and ordered the issuance of the writ.

The Spouses Dedamo passed away and they were substituted in the case by herein respondent. On December 23, 2003, the petitioner paid the respondent the sum of P19,039,939.50 which is the difference between the just compensation due and the provisional payment already made.

On March 24, 2004, the respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion before the RTC to order the petitioner to pay interest on the just compensation computed from the time of actual taking of the lands.

On April 30, 2004, the RTC denied the motion and ruled that it can no longer amend a final and executory judgment that did not specifically direct the payment of legal interest. Adamant, the respondent sought recourse before the CA asserting that the petitioner is liable to pay: (a) 12% legal interest on the unpaid balance of the just compensation computed from the time of actual taking of the property up to the date of payment of just compensation; and (b) 12% legal interest from the time the decision awarding just compensation became final and executory on September 20, 2002 until its satisfaction on December 23, 2003.

In its Decision dated November 30, 2005, the CA rejected the respondent’s first claim since the issue was belatedly raised during the execution stage and after the judgment of just compensation attained finality. Nonetheless, the CA found the respondent’s second contention meritorious. The CA awarded legal interest accruing from the time the RTC Order dated December 27, 1996 awarding just compensation was affirmed with finality by the Supreme Court up to the time of full payment thereof in line with the ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals6 that when a court judgment awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, it shall earn legal interest of 12% per annum reckoned from such finality until satisfaction.

The CA effectively reiterated the above decision when it denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent’s entitlement to 12% legal interest awarded is barred by res judicata.

Held:

The petition is denied on the ground of res judicata in the mode of conclusiveness of judgment.

Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already settled in a previous case.

The adjudication in G.R. No. 172942 has become binding and conclusive on the petitioner who can no longer question the respondent’s entitlement to the 12% legal interest awarded by the CA. The Court’s determination in G.R. No. 172942 on the reckoning point of the 12% legal interest is likewise binding on the petitioner who cannot re-litigate the said matter anew through the present recourse.

Thus, the judgment in G.R. No. 172942 bars the present case as the relief sought in the latter is inextricably related to the ruling in the former.

BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE RAMISCAL, JR.,vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. Nos. 172476-99

September 15, 2010 

Facts:          Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with the rank of Brigadier General, when he served as President of the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) from 5 April 1994 to 27 July 1998.

         During petitioner’s term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees of AFP-RSBS approved the acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land situated in General Santos City for development as housing projects. AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and   Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, as attorney-in-fact of the 12 individual vendors,[5]executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale over the subject property, at the agreed price of P10,500.00 per square meter. Petitioner forthwith caused the payment to the individual vendors of the purchase price of P10,500.00 per square meter of the property.

          Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same property. The unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only P3,000.00 per square meter instead of the actual purchase price of P10,500.00 per square meter. On 24 September 1997, Flaviano presented the unilateral deeds of sale for registration. The unilateral deeds of sale became the basis of the transfer certificates of title issued by the Register of Deeds of General Santos City to AFP-RSBS.

On 18 December 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first district of South Cotabato, which includes General Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a complaint-affidavit[7] against petitioner, along with 27 other respondents, for     (1) violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and (2) malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public documents. The case was docketed as Case No. OMB-3-98-0020.

          After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman, in its 20 January 1999 Resolution, found petitioner probably guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and falsification of public documents.

         On 28 January 1999, the Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12 informations for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and 12 informations for falsification of public documents against petitioner and several other co-accused. Petitioner filed 2 motions for reconsideration.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP) recommended that petitioner be excluded from the informations. On review, the Office of Legal Affairs (OMB-OLA), recommended the contrary, stressing that petitioner participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the subject property. The OMB-Military adopted the memorandum of OMB-OSP recommending the dropping of petitioner’s name from the informations.

         A panel of prosecutors[16] was tasked to review the records of the case. After thorough review, the panel of prosecutors found that petitioner indeed participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the property at the price of P10,500.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors posited that petitioner could not feign ignorance of the execution of the unilateral deeds of sale, which indicated the false purchase price of P3,000.00 per square meter.  The panel of prosecutors concluded that probable cause existed for petitioner’s continued prosecution.

On 26 February 2006, petitioner was arraigned. For his refusal to enter a plea, the Sandiganbayan entered in his favor a plea of not guilty. On 9 March 2006, petitioner filed a motion to set aside his arraignment[20] pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion.

Issue:

Whether or not Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him

Held:

Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001,[22] sanction the immediate filing of an information in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even during the pendency of a motion for reconsideration.  Section 7, Rule II of the Rules, as amended, provides:

Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration. –

a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution shall be allowed, the same to be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may be, with corresponding leave of court in cases where the information has already been filed in court;

b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing of the corresponding information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of the motion. (Emphasis supplied)

If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of the corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of the information.

The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily in matters not provided under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman or the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, thus:

          Sec. 11. Suspension of arraignment. – Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:

          (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.

         (b) There exists a prejudicial question; and

         (c)  A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.[25]

Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for suspension of arraignment obtained in this case. Thus, theSandiganbayan committed no error when it proceeded with petitioner’s arraignment, as mandated by Section 7 of RA 8493.

G.R. No. 203335               February 11, 2014

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR.,

vs.THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE

INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION.

Facts:

Petitioners herein assailed pertinent provision of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.

Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system

Issues:

Whether or not the following sections of the cybercrime law are constitutional:a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;l. Section 8 on Penalties;m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); andu. Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions.

Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel.

Held:

Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system without right is constitutional

Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the people and should thus be struck down.

The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct,1 useful in determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class

disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.2 Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.3

In the cases before it, the Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer system of another without right.

Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including transmission of viruses is constitutional

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.7 But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism,8 the act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents.

All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect9 or the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they instill such kind of fear is to render the state powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct.10 Here, the chilling effect that results in paralysis is an illusion since Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil that it seeks to punish and creates no tendency to intimidate the free exercise of one’s constitutional rights.

Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring domain name over the internet in bad faith to the prejudice of others is constitutionaland valid

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause12 in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device. For example, supposing there exists a well known billionaire-philanthropist named "Julio Gandolfo," the law would punish for cyber-squatting both the person who registers such name because he claims it to be his pseudo-name and another who registers the name because it happens to be his real name. Petitioners claim that, considering the substantial distinction between the two, the law should recognize the difference.

But there is no real difference whether he uses "Julio Gandolfo" which happens to be his real name or use it as a pseudo-name for it is the evil purpose for which he uses the name that the law condemns. The law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.

Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child pornography is valid and conditional

It seems that the above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 200931 (ACPA) to cover identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit child pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPA’s definition of child pornography

already embraces the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Notably, no one has questioned this ACPA provision.

Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is rational basis for such higher penalty.32 The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.

Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or misuse of identifying information belonging to another is valid and constitutional

Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.

Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the "Zones of Privacy." The Court explained in "In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon"15 the relevance of these zones to the right to privacy:

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized men," but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."

Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable searches16 and seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication and correspondence.17 In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.18

The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship, his residence address, his contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if any, his occupation, and similar data.19 The law punishes those who acquire or use such identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of law.

Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that journalists would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the news to secure information about him that could be published. But this is not the essence of identity theft that the law seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of identity information must be intended for an illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring and disseminating information made public by the user himself cannot be regarded as a form of theft.

Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or consideration is constitutional and valid.

Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution.21 They express fear that private communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done "for favor" in cyberspace. In common usage, the term "favor" includes "gracious kindness," "a special privilege or right granted or conceded," or "a token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn conspicuously."22 This meaning given to the term "favor" embraces socially tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement agencies into the bedrooms of married couples or consenting individuals.

The understanding of those who drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of "engaging in a business" is necessary to constitute the illegal cybersex.24 The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam.25

The subject of Section 4(c)(1)—lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity—is not novel. Article 201 of the RPC punishes "obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows." The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 penalizes those who "maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography."26 The law defines prostitution as any act, transaction, scheme, or design involving the use of a person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange for money, profit, or any other consideration.27

The case of Nogales v. People28 shows the extent to which the State can regulate materials that serve no other purpose than satisfy the market for violence, lust, or pornography.29 The Court weighed the property rights of individuals against the public welfare. Private property, if containing pornographic materials, may be forfeited and destroyed. Likewise, engaging in sexual acts privately through internet connection, perceived by some as a right, has to be balanced with the mandate of the State to eradicate white slavery and the exploitation of women.

The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a construction that makes it apply only to persons engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer system as Congress has intended.

Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of unsolicited commercial communications is void and unconstitutional

The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as "spam.

Firstly, the government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads reduce the "efficiency of computers." Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age of computers, have already been receiving such unsolicited ads by mail. These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such ads. What matters is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their recipients always have the option to delete or not to read them.

To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection.36 The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.

Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Penal Code is constitutional Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original author of the post; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it.

Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of "presumed malice" even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of "actual malice" as a basis for conviction.38 Petitioners argue that inferring "presumed malice" from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.

Petitioners would go further. They contend that the laws on libel should be stricken down as unconstitutional for otherwise good jurisprudence requiring "actual malice" could easily be

overturned as the Court has done in Fermin v. People39 even where the offended parties happened to be public figures.

The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.40

There is "actual malice" or malice in fact41 when the offender makes the defamatory statement with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.42 The reckless disregard standard used here requires a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice.43

The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such element is required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First National Conference on Land Transportation). Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of "malice" to convict the author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a public figure. Society’s interest and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.

But the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article.

Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes as VA L I D and CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on SystemInterference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel.

Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a person’s image with just one click of the mouse. Scurrilous statements can spread and travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover, cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives, and friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a person’s reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms.62

If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.63 The terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages.64 Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.

When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of the doctrine must be carefully delineated. As Justice Antonio T. Carpio explained in his dissent in Romualdez v.

Commission on Elections,65 "we must view these statements of the Court on the inapplicability of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as appropriate only insofar as these doctrines are used to mount ‘facial’ challenges to penal statutes not involving free speech."

In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional right can raise any constitutional ground – absence of due process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or vagueness. Here, one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. It prohibits one from assailing the constitutionality of the statute based solely on the violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.66

But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute.

The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence.

Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless consummated.71 In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.

But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5 should be permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the exercise of the freedom of expression.

The crime of willfully attempting to commit any of these offenses is for the same reason not objectionable. A hacker may for instance have done all that is necessary to illegally access another party’s computer system but the security employed by the system’s lawful owner could frustrate his effort. Another hacker may have gained access to usernames and passwords of others but fail to use these because the system supervisor is alerted.72 If Section 5 that punishes any person who willfully attempts to commit this specific offense is not upheld, the owner of the username and password could not file a complaint against him for attempted hacking. But this is not right. The hacker should not be freed from liability simply because of the vigilance of a lawful owner or his supervisor.

Petitioners of course claim that Section 5 lacks positive limits and could cover the innocent.73 While this may be true with respect to cybercrimes that tend to sneak past the area of free expression, any attempt to commit the other acts specified in Section 4(a)(1), Section 4(a)(2), Section 4(a)(3), Section 4(a)(4), Section 4(a)(5), Section 4(a)(6), Section 4(b)(1), Section 4(b)(2), Section 4(b)(3), and Section 4(c)(1) as well as the actors aiding and abetting the commission of such acts can be identified with some reasonable certainty through adroit tracking of their works. Absent concrete proof of the same, the innocent will of course be spared.

Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when crimes defined under the Revised Penal Code are committed with the use of information and communications technologies is valid and constitutional.

Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and communications technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.

Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of:

1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as

2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

When two different laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one does not bar prosecution of the other although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. With the exception of the crimes of online libel and online child pornography, the Court would rather leave the determination of the correct application of Section 7 to actual cases.

Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of publication.75 Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.76

The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPA’s scope so as to include identical activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed, ACPA’s definition of child pornography in fact already covers the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Thus, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes is constitutional.

The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear proportionate to the evil sought to be punished. The power to determine penalties for offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded simply because at some prior time the act or omission was but an element of another offense or might just have been connected with another crime.77 Judges and magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify or revise their range as determined by the legislative department.

Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time is void

Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, "with due cause," to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time. Petitioners point out that the phrase "due cause" has no precedent in law or jurisprudence and that whether there is due cause or not is left to the discretion of the police. Replying to this, the Solicitor General asserts that Congress is not required to define the meaning of every word it uses in drafting the law.

Indeed, courts are able to save vague provisions of law through statutory construction. But the cybercrime law, dealing with a novel situation, fails to hint at the meaning it intends for the

phrase "due cause." The Solicitor General suggests that "due cause" should mean "just reason or motive" and "adherence to a lawful procedure." But the Court cannot draw this meaning since Section 12 does not even bother to relate the collection of data to the probable commission of a particular crime. It just says, "with due cause," thus justifying a general gathering of data. It is akin to the use of a general search warrant that the Constitution prohibits.

Due cause is also not descriptive of the purpose for which data collection will be used. Will the law enforcement agencies use the traffic data to identify the perpetrator of a cyber attack? Or will it be used to build up a case against an identified suspect? Can the data be used to prevent cybercrimes from happening?

The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint. While it says that traffic data collection should not disclose identities or content data, such restraint is but an illusion. Admittedly, nothing can prevent law enforcement agencies holding these data in their hands from looking into the identity of their sender or receiver and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to extortion from certain bad elements in these agencies.

Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with specified communications." But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The power is virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing whatever specified communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals to privacy.

The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these technologies be written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the Constitution guarantees.

Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to require service providers to preserve traffic data and subscriber information as well as specified content data for six months is valid and consttutional.

The data that service providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the same.

Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a court-issued warrant is valid and constitutional.

The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a subpoena. Petitioners’ objection is that the issuance of subpoenas is a judicial function. But it is well-settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial function. Executive agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers.98

Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function usually lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions.

Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination of computer data under a court-issued warrant is valid andconstitutional

Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure the proper collection, preservation, and use of computer system or data that have been seized by virtue of a court warrant. The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of the person from whom they were taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely supplements them.

Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously preserved computer data after the expiration of the prescribed holding periods is valid and constitutional.

As already stated, it is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he

wanted them preserved, he should have saved them in his computer when he generated the data or received it. He could also request the service provider for a copy before it is deleted.

Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data is invalid and unconstitutional.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in one’s papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control and disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant.

The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19 operates as a restriction on the freedom of expression over cyberspace. Certainly not all forms of speech are protected. Legislature may, within constitutional bounds, declare certain kinds of expression as illegal. But for an executive officer to seize content alleged to be unprotected without any judicial warrant, it is not enough for him to be of the opinion that such content violates some law, for to do so would make him judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one.100

Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear and present danger rule.101 Section 19, however, merely requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made to apply in relation to any penal provision. It does not take into consideration any of the three tests mentioned above.

The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of the constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to cybercrime investigations is constitutional andvalid

Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is that the mere failure to comply constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard to situations where non-compliance would be reasonable or valid.

But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1829,102 Section 20 necessarily incorporates elements of the offense which are defined therein. If Congress had intended for Section 20 to constitute an offense in and of itself, it would not have had to make reference to any other statue or provision.

P.D. 1829 states:

Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

x x x.

Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done "knowingly or willfully." There must still be a judicial determination of guilt, during which, as the Solicitor General assumes, defense and justifications for non-compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court.

Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) and Section 26(a) that defines the CICC’s Powers and Functions are valid and constitutional

In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.1avvphi1 The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.

Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect cyber environment and organization and user’s assets.104 This definition serves as the parameters within which CICC should work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.

Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to "prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation."105 This policy is clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been considered as sufficient.

DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

G.R. No. 192123

March 10, 2014

Facts:

Gerald Albert Gercayo was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body.

On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team. During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma lasted for two weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move.

Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila against the attending physicians. Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s Office filed an information solely against Dr. Solidum. On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. Upon motion of Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella to reconsider their solidary liability, the RTC excluded them from solidary liability as to the damages, modifying its decision. On January 20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum. Dr. Solidum filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied his motion on May 7, 2010.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Dr. Solidum’s acquittal would exempt him from civil liability.

2. Whether or not Ospital ng Maynila is civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum

Held:

The appeal is meritorious.

The acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him from civil liability.But we cannot now find and declare him civilly liable because the circumstances that have been established here do not present the factual and legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence.

Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we have to address the unusual decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of expressly holding Ospital ng Maynila civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum.

In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. It is puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower

courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind of industry." The term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry. However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and humanitarian work. Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here), the execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.

CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, vs.

PHILLIP R. SALVADOR.

G.R. No. 191240

July 30, 2014

Facts:

Respondent Phillip Salvador and his brother Ramon Salvador were charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code in an Information.

Upon their arraignment, respondent and his brother Ramon pleaded not guilty4 to the offense charged. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

Petitioner Cristina B. Castillo met respondent through a common friend and had told her that his friends, Jinggoy Estrada and Rudy Fernandez, were engaged in the freight and remittance business and that Jinggoy even brought him to Hong Kong and Singapore to promote the former's business. Petitioner eventually met respondent’s brother and manager to talk about the matter of engaging in a freight and remittance business. Respondent enticed petitioner to go to Hong Kong, Bangkok and Palau to see for herself the viability of such business and Ramon suggested to use respondent’s name to attract the overseas contract workers.

Respondent promoted their prospective business. In their trips, petitioner paid for all the travel expenses and even gave respondent US$10,000.00 as pocket money for the Hong Kong trip and another US$10,000.00 for the Bangkok trip. Petitioner also paid for the travel expenses in Palau and even gave respondent US$20,000.00.

Petitioner and respondent fell in love and petitioner trusted him very much. In December 2001, she, accompanied by her mother, Zenaida G. Bondoc (Zenaida), and Ramon, went to Hong Kong and had the Phillip Salvador Freight and Remittance International Limited registered on December 27, 2001. She agreed with respondent and Ramon that any profit derived from the business would be equally divided among them and thatrespondent would be in charge of promotion and marketing in Hong Kong,while Ramon would take charge of the operations of business in the Philippines and she would be financing the business.

The petitioner handed the amount of US$100,000.00 as capital for the actual operation to respondent in May 2002 at her mother’s house in Las Piñas City, which was witnessed by her disabled half-brother Enrico B. Tan (Enrico). She also gave respondent P100,000.00 in cash to be given to Charlie Chau, who is a resident of Hong Kong, as payment for the heart-shaped earrings she bought from him while she was there. Respondent and Ramon went to Hong Kong in May 2002. However, the proposed business never operated as respondent only stayed in Hong Kongfor three days. When she asked respondent about the money and the business, the latter told her that the money was deposited in a bank.23 However, upon further query, respondent confessed that he used the money to pay for his other obligations.24 Since then, the US$100,000.00 was not returned at all.

Petitioner did not ask for a receipt for the US$100,000.00 she gave to respondent as it was for the operational expenses of a business which will be for their future, as all they needed to do was to get married. She further testified that after the US$100,000.00 was not returned, she still deposited the amount ofP500,000.00 in respondent’s UCPB bank account and also to Ramon’s bank accounts. And while respondent was in the United States in August 2003, she still gave him US$2,000.00.

Petitioner’s mother, Zenaida, and brother, Enrico Tan, corroborated her petitioner's claims.

Respondent denied that petitioner gave him US$10,000.00 whenhe went to Hong Kong and Bangkok. In July 2001, after he came back from the United States, petitioner had asked him

and his brother Ramon for a meeting. During the meeting, petitioner brought up the money remittance business, but Ramon told her that they should make a study of it first.44 He was introduced to Roy Singun, owner of a money remittance business in Pasay City.45 Upon the advise of Roy, respondent and petitioner, her husband and Ramon went to Palau in August 2001.46 He denied receiving US$20,000.00 from petitioner but admitted that it was petitioner who paid for the plane tickets.47 After their Palau trip, they went into training at Western Union at the First World Center in Makati City.48 It was only in December 2001 that Ramon, petitioner and her mother went to Hong Kong to register the business, while he took care of petitioner’s children here.49 In May 2002, he and Ramon went back to Hong Kong but deniedhaving received the amount of US$100,000.00 from petitioner but then admitted receipt of the amount of P100,000.00 which petitioner asked him to give to Charlie Chau as payment for the pieces of diamond jewelry she got from him,50 which Chau had duly acknowledged.51 He denied Enrico’s testimony that petitioner gave him the amount of US$100,000.00 in his mother’s house.52 He claimed that no remittance business was started in Hong Kong as they had no license, equipment, personnel and money to operate the same.53 Upon his return to the Philippines, petitioner never asked him about the business as she never gave him such amount.54 In October 2002, he intimated that he and petitioner even went to Hong Kong again to buy some goods for the latter’s boutique.

Ramon testified that it was his brother respondent who introduced petitioner to him. He learned of petitioner’s plan of a remittance business in July 2001 and even told her that they should study it first.59 He was introduced to Roy Singun who operates a remittancebusiness in Pasay and who suggested that their group observehis remittance business in Palau. After their Palau trip, petitioner decided to put up a similar business in Hong Kong and it was him who suggested to use respondent’s name because of name recall.60 It was decided thathe would manage the operation in Manila and respondent would be in charge of promotion and marketing in Hong Kong, while petitioner would be in charge of all the business finances.61 He admitted that he went to Hong Kong with petitioner and her mother to register said business and also to buy goods for petitioner’s boutique.62 He said that it was also impossible for Chau to offer a part of his office building for the remittance business because there was no more space to accommodate it.63 He and respondent went to Hong Kong in May 2002 to examine the office recommended by Chau and the warehouse of Rudy Fernandez thereatwho also offered to help.64 He then told Chau that the remittance office should be in Central Park, Kowloon, because majority of the Filipinos in Hong Kong live there.65 He concluded that it was impossible for the business to operate immediately because they had no office, no personnel and no license permit.66 He further claimed that petitioner never mentioned to him about the US$100,000.00 she gave to respondent,67 and that he even traveled again with petitioner to Bangkok in October 2002, and in August 2003.68 He denied Enrico’s allegation that he saw him at his mother’s house as he only saw Enrico for the first time in court.69

On April 21, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision where accused PHILLIP SALVADOR is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of US$100,000.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency. With respect to accused RAMON SALVADOR, he is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.

Respondent appealed his conviction to the CA. The CA rendered its Decision reversing the decision of the RTC.

Petitioner files the instant petition on the civil aspect of the case alleging that the trial court was correct in convicting the respondent so that even if the Court of Appeals decided to acquit him it should have at least retained the award of damages to the petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is exempt from civil liability.

Held:

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor

omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act oromission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." x x x.75

A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Said the CA:

The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the crime as charged had been committed by appellant, the general presumption, "that a person is innocent of the crime or wrong, stands in his favor. The prosecution failed to prove that all the elements of estafa are present in this case as would overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant. For in fact, the prosecution's primary witness herself could not even establish clearly and precisely how appellant committed the alleged fraud. She failed to convince us that she was deceived through misrepresentations and/or insidious actions, in venturing into a remittance business. Quite the contrary, the obtaining circumstance inthis case indicate the weakness of her submissions.76

Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, respondent is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.

LILY LIM, vs.

KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO.

G.R. No. 175256

August 23, 2012

Facts:

In February 1999, FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator of a cement manufacturing plant, issued several withdrawal authorities9 for the account of cement dealers and traders, Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt. These withdrawal authorities state the number of bags that the dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw from the plant. Each withdrawal authority contained a provision that it is valid for six months from its date of issuance, unless revoked by FRCC Marketing Department.

Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their administrative manager, Gail Borja (Borja), sold the withdrawal authorities covering 50,000 bags of cement to Co for the amount of P 3.15 million or P 63.00 per bag.10 On February 15, 1999, Co sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim allegedly at the price of P 64.00 per bag or a total of P 3.2 million.11

Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the cement bags from FRCC on a staggered basis. She successfully withdrew 2,800 bags of cement, and sold back some of the withdrawal authorities, covering 10,000 bags, to Co.

Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified the matter with Co and Borja, who explained that the plant implemented a price increase and would only release the goods once Lim pays for the price difference or agrees to receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim objected and maintained that the withdrawal authorities she bought were not subject to price fluctuations. Lim sought legal recourse after her demands for Co to resolve the problem with the plant or for the return of her money had failed.

The criminal case

An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion was filed against Co before Branch 154 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The accusatory portion thereof reads:

On or about between the months of February and April 1999, in San Juan, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, with intent to defraud Lily Lim, with grave abuse of confidence, with unfaithfulness, received in trust from Lily Lim cash money in the amount of P2,380,800.00 as payment for the 37,200 bags of cement, under obligation to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to said Lily Lim, but far from complying with his obligation, misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own personal use and benefit the said amount of P 2,300,800.00 [sic] and despite demands, the accused failed and refused to return said amount, to the damage and prejudice of Lily Lim in the amount of P 2,380,800.00.

Contrary to Law.12

The private complainant, Lily Lim, participated in the criminal proceedings to prove her damages. She prayed for Co to return her money amounting to P 2,380,800.00, foregone profits, and legal interest, and for an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.13

On November 19, 2003, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 154, rendered its Order14 acquitting Co of the estafa charge for insufficiency of evidence. The criminal court’s Order reads:

The first and second elements of the crime of estafa [with abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1(b)] for which the accused is being charged and prosecuted were not established by the prosecution’s evidence.

x x x x

In view of the absence of the essential requisites of the crime of estafa for which the accused is being charged and prosecuted, as above discussed, the Court has no alternative but to dismiss the case against the accused for insufficiency of evidence.15

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the accused is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa charged against him under the present information for insufficiency of evidence.

Insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned, however, set this case for the reception of his evidence on the matter on December 11, 2003 at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the morning.

SO ORDERED.16

After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the Pasig City RTC also relieved Co of civil liability to Lim in its December 1, 2004 Order.17 The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered holding the accused CHARLIE CO not civilly liable to the private complainant Lily Lim.

SO ORDERED.18

Lim sought a reconsideration of the above Order, arguing that she has presented preponderant evidence that Co committed estafa against her.19

The trial court denied the motion in its Order20 dated February 21, 2005.

On March 14, 2005, Lim filed her notice of appeal21 on the civil aspect of the criminal case. Her appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 and raffled to the Second Division of the CA.

The civil action for specific performance

On April 19, 2005, Lim filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before Branch 21 of the RTC of Manila. The defendants in the civil case were Co and all other parties to the withdrawal authorities, Tigerbilt, Fil-Cement Center, FRCC, Southeast Asia Cement, and La Farge Corporation. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-112396, asserted two causes of action: breach of contract and abuse of rights. Her allegations read:

ALLEGATIONS COMMONTO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION

x x x x

23. Charlie Co obligated himself to deliver to Lily Lim 50,000 bags of cement of P 64.00 per bag on an x-plant basis within 3 months from the date of their transaction, i.e. February 15, 1999. Pursuant to said agreement, Lily Lim paid Charlie Co P 3.2 Million while Charlie Co delivered to Lily Lim FR Cement Withdrawal Authorities representing 50,000 bags of cement.

24. The withdrawal authorities issued by FR Cement Corp. allowed the assignee or holder thereof to withdraw within a six-month period from date a certain amount of cement indicated therein. The Withdrawal Authorities given to Lily Lim were dated either 3 February 1999 or 23 February 1999. The Withdrawal Authorities were first issued to Tigerbilt and Fil-Cement Center which in turn assigned them to Charlie Co. Charlie Co then assigned the Withdrawal Authorities to Lily Lim on February 15, 1999. Through these series of assignments, Lily Lim acquired all the rights (rights to withdraw cement) granted in said Withdrawal Authorities.

25. That these Withdrawal Authorities are valid is established by the fact that FR Cement earlier allowed Lily Lim to withdraw 2,800 bags of cement on the basis thereof.

26. However, sometime 19 April 1999 (within the three (3)-month period agreed upon by Charlie Co and Lily Lim and certainly within the six (6)-month period indicated in the Withdrawal Authorities issued by FR Cement Corp.), Lily Lim attempted but failed to withdraw the remaining bags of cement on account of FR Cement’s unjustified refusal to honor the Withdrawal Authorities. x x x

x x x x

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:BREACH OF CONTRACT

30. Charlie Co committed and is therefore liable to deliver to Lily Lim 37,200 bags of cement. If he cannot, then he must pay her the current fair market value thereof.

31. FR Cement Corporation is also liable to deliver to Lily Lim the amount of cement as indicated in the Withdrawal Authorities it issued. xxx FR Cement Corporation has no right to impose price adjustments as a qualification for honoring the Withdrawal Authorities.

32. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borja as the original holders/ assignees of the Withdrawal Authorities repeatedly assured Lily Lim that the same were valid and would be honored. They are liable to make good on their assurances.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

33. Charlie Co’s acts of falsely representing to Lily Lim that she may be able to withdraw the cement from FR Cement Corp. caused Lily Lim to incur expenses and losses. Such act was made without justice, without giving Lily Lim what is due her and without observing honesty and good faith, all violative of the law, more specifically Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Such willful act was also made by Charlie Co in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, in violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code.

34. FR Cement Corporation’s unjust refusal to honor the Withdrawal Authorities they issued also caused damage to Lily Lim. Further, FR Cement Corporation’s act of withholding the 37,200 bags of cement despite earning income therefor constitutes as an unjust enrichment because FR Cement Corporation acquired income through an act or performance by another or any other means at the expense of another without just or legal ground in violation of Article 22 of the Civil Code.

35. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borja’s false assurances that Lily Lim would be able to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags of cement caused Lily Lim to incur expenses and losses. x x x Moreover, Fil-Cement Center admitted receiving payment for said amount of cement, thus they are deemed to have come into possession of money at the expense of Lily Lim without just or legal ground, in violation of Article 22 of the Civil Code.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES and

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT22

Lim prayed for Co to honor his contractual commitments either by delivering the 37,200 bags of cement, making arrangements with FRCC to allow Lim to withdraw the cement, or to pay for their value. She likewise asked that the defendants be held solidarily liable to her for the damages she incurred in her failed attempts to withdraw the cement and for the damages they inflicted on her as a result of their abuse of their rights.23

Motions to dismiss both actions

In reaction to the filing of the civil complaint for specific performance and damages, Co filed motions to dismiss the said civil case24 and Lim’s appeal in the civil aspect of the estafa case or CA-G.R. CV No. 85138.25 He maintained that the two actions raise the same issue, which is Co’s liability to Lim for her inability to withdraw the bags of cement,26 and should be dismissed on the ground of lis pendens and forum shopping.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals Second Division in CA-G.R CV No. 85138

The appellate court (Second Division) favorably resolved Co’s motion and dismissed Lim’s appeal from the civil aspect of the estafa case. In its Resolution dated October 20, 2005, the CA Second Division held that the parties, causes of action, and reliefs prayed for in Lim’s appeal and in her civil complaint are identical. Both actions seek the same relief, which is the payment of the value of the 37,200 bags of cement.27 Thus, the CA Second Division dismissed Lim’s appeal for forum shopping.28 The CA denied29 Lim’s motion for reconsideration.30

Lim filed the instant petition for review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 175256.

Ruling of the Manila Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 05-112396

Meanwhile, the Manila RTC denied Co’s Motion to Dismiss in an Order31 dated December 6, 2005. The Manila RTC held that there was no forum shopping because the causes of action invoked in the two cases are different. It observed that the civil complaint before it is based on an obligation arising from contract and quasi-delict, whereas the civil liability involved in the appeal of the criminal case arose from a felony.

Co filed a petition for certiorari,32 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93395, before the appellate court. He prayed for the nullification of the Manila RTC’s Order in Civil Case No. 05-112396 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.33

Ruling of the Court of Appeals Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395

The CA Seventeenth Division denied Co’s petition and remanded the civil complaint to the trial court for further proceedings. The CA Seventeenth Division agreed with the Manila RTC that the elements of litis pendentia and forum shopping are not met in the two proceedings because they do not share the same cause of action.34

The CA denied35 Co’s motion for reconsideration.36

Co filed the instant Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 179160.

Upon Co’s motion,37 the Court resolved to consolidate the two petitions.38

Kou Co Ping’s arguments

Co maintains that Lim is guilty of forum shopping because she is asserting only one cause of action in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 (the appeal from the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 116377) and in Civil Case No. 05-112396, which is for Co’s violation of her right to receive 37,200 bags of cement. Likewise, the reliefs sought in both cases are the same, that is, for Co to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement or its value to Lim. That Lim utilized different methods of presenting her case – a criminal action for estafa and a civil complaint for specific

performance and damages – should not detract from the fact that she is attempting to litigate the same cause of action twice.39

Co makes light of the distinction between civil liability ex contractu and ex delicto. According to him, granting that the two civil liabilities are independent of each other, nevertheless, the two cases arising from them would have to be decided using the same evidence and going over the same set of facts. Thus, any judgment rendered in one of these cases will constitute res judicata on the other.40

In G.R. No. 179160, Co prays for the annulment of the CA Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395, for a declaration that Lim is guilty of forum shopping, and for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-112396.41

In G.R. No. 175256, Co prays for the affirmation of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 (which dismissed Lim’s appeal from the trial court’s decision in Criminal Case No. 116377).42

Lily Lim’s arguments

Lim admits that the two proceedings involve substantially the same set of facts because they arose from only one transaction.43 She is quick to add, however, that a single act or omission does not always make a single cause of action.44 It can possibly give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender – (1) ex delicto or civil liability arising from crimes, and (2) independent civil liabilities or those arising from contracts or intentional torts. The only caveat provided in Article 2177 of the Civil Code is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission.45 Because the law allows her two independent causes of action, Lim contends that it is not forum shopping to pursue them.46

She then explains the separate and distinct causes of action involved in the two cases. Her cause of action in CA-G.R CV No. 85138 is based on the crime of estafa. Co violated Lim’s right to be protected against swindling. He represented to Lim that she can withdraw 37,200 bags of cement using the authorities she bought from him. This is a fraudulent representation because Co knew, at the time that they entered into the contract, that he could not deliver what he promised.47 On the other hand, Lim’s cause of action in Civil Case No. 05-112396 is based on contract. Co violated Lim’s rights as a buyer in a contract of sale. Co received payment for the 37,200 bags of cement but did not deliver the goods that were the subject of the sale.48

In G.R. No. 179160, Lim prays for the denial of Co’s petition.49 In G.R. No. 175256, she prays for the reversal of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138, for a declaration that she is not guilty of forum shopping, and for the reinstatement of her appeal in Criminal Case No. 116377 to the CA.50

Issue

Did Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance and damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa?

Held:

A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender51  (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,-52 and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on "an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort53). It may also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries").

The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense.54 If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action.55 The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares that "the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist."56

On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be pursued independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code.

Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.57 As explained in Cancio, Jr. v. Isip:58

One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In the instant case, it must be stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual.

In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa cases against the offender did not amount to forum-shopping. Although the cases filed by [the offended party] arose from the same act or omission of [the offender], they are, however, based on different causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.59

Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other sources of obligations are authorized by law to proceed independently of each other, the resolution of the present issue hinges on whether the two cases herein involve different kinds of civil obligations such that they can proceed independently of each other. The answer is in the affirmative.

The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been instituted together with the criminal action.60

On the other hand, the second action, judging by the allegations contained in the complaint,61 is a civil action arising from a contractual obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse of rights). In her civil complaint, Lim basically alleges that she entered into a sale contract with Co under the following terms: that she bought 37,200 bags of cement at the rate of P 64.00 per bag from Co; that, after full payment, Co delivered to her the withdrawal authorities issued by FRCC corresponding to these bags of cement; that these withdrawal authorities will be honored by FRCC for six months from the dates written thereon. Lim then maintains that the defendants breached their contractual obligations to her under the sale contract and under the withdrawal authorities; that Co and his co-defendants wanted her to pay more for each bag of cement, contrary to their agreement to fix the price at P 64.00 per bag and to the wording of the withdrawal authorities; that FRCC did not honor the terms of the withdrawal authorities it issued; and that Co did not comply with his obligation under the sale contract to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to Lim. From the foregoing allegations, it is evident that Lim seeks to enforce the defendants’ contractual obligations, given that she has already performed her obligations. She prays that the defendants either honor their part of the contract or pay for the damages that their breach has caused her.

Lim also includes allegations that the actions of the defendants were committed in such manner as to cause damage to Lim without regard for morals, good customs and public policy. These allegations, if proven, would constitute tortious conduct (abuse of rights under the Human Relations provisions of the Civil Code).

Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves only the obligations arising from contract and from tort, whereas the appeal in the estafa case involves only the civil obligations of Co arising from the offense charged. They present different causes of action, which under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and independent"62 from each other. Both cases can proceed to their final adjudication, subject to the prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177 of the Civil Code.63

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, vs.

MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

G.R. No. 172060

September 13, 2010

Facts:

On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court.

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

The RTC Quezon City issued an Order holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision.

Issue:

Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

Held:

The petition has no merit.

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action.

There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. A prejudicial question is defined as:

x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse."13 The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder14 or homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 197788February 29, 2012

SERENO, J.:

FACTS: Rodel Luz, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City was driving without helmet, which promptedPO2 Emmanuel L. Altezahim to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance. He invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station. While he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket. He asked the accused to open it; he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.

He was charged and the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs committed on 10 March 2003. Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision. Petitioner filed under Rule 45 questioning the legality of the SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU. Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid arrest that leads to warrantless search

HELD:

There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest.

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been “under arrest.” There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time.

Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.

The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in “plain view;” (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a “stop and frisk” search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.  None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.

It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in “plain view.” It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner’s pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent.

GEORGE ANTIQUERA y CODES, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

G.R. No. 180661

December 11, 2013

Facts:

Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasay City charged the accused George Codes Antiquera* and Corazon Olivenza Cruz with illegal ·possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. The prosecution evidence shows that at around 4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004, PO1 Gregorio Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and two civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle were conducting a police visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush out of house number 107-C and immediately boarded a jeep.

Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the house from where the men came and peeked through the partially opened door. PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter. Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil and an improvised burner. They sat facing each other at the living room. This prompted the police officers to enter the house, introduce themselves, and arrest Antiquera and Cruz.4

While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry box atop a table. It contained an improvised burner, wok, scissors, 10 small transparent plastic sachets with traces of white crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and seven unused strips of aluminum foil. The police officers confiscated all these and brought Antiquera and Cruz to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police in Pasay City for further investigation and testing

RTC rendered a Decision8 that found accused Antiquera and Cruz guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a Decision affirming in full the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding accused Antiquera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia based on the evidence of the police officers that they saw him and Cruz in the act of possessing drug paraphernalia.

Held:

Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." This is an arrest in flagrante delicto.13 The overt act constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.14

But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.

1. The the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry for help from it.

2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it.

Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.16 Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused.17

One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.18

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.

DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON,"

G.R. No. 200304

January 15, 2014

Facts:

The case before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 31, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04201. Said decision affirmed with modification the Joint Decision2 dated August 6 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-164174 and 98-164175, which convicted the appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs under Sections 15 and 16 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

The Prosecution’s Case

The prosecution’s version of the events was primarily drawn from the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo.

P/Insp. Fajardo testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential informant went to their office and reported that a certain Donald Vasquez was engaged in illegal drug activity. This alias Don supposedly claimed that he was an employee of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). According to the informant, alias Don promised him a good commission if he (the informant) would present a potential buyer of drugs. P/Insp. Fajardo relayed the information to Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Pepito Domantay, the commanding officer of their office. P/Insp. Fajardo was then instructed to form a team and conduct a possible buy-bust against alias Don. She formed a team on the same day, which consisted of herself, PO2 Trambulo, PO1 Agravante, PO1 Pedrosa, PO1 Sisteno, and PO1 De la Rosa. P/Insp. Fajardo was the team leader. With the help of the informant, she was able to set up a meeting with alias Don. The meeting was to be held at around 9:00 p.m. on that day at Cindy’s Restaurant located in Welcome Rotonda. She was only supposed to meet alias Don that night but she decided to bring the team along for security reasons.17

At about 9:00 p.m. on even date, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went to the meeting place with the informant. The members of her team positioned themselves strategically inside the restaurant. The informant introduced P/Insp. Fajardo to alias Don as the buyer of shabu. She asked alias Don if he was indeed an employee of the NBI and he replied in the affirmative. They agreed to close the deal wherein she would buy 250 grams of shabu forP250,000.00. They also agreed to meet the following day at Cindy’s Restaurant around 10:00 to 11:00 p.m.18

In the evening of April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went back to Cindy’s Restaurant. Alias Don was already waiting for her outside the establishment when she arrived. He asked for the money and she replied that she had the money with her. She brought five genuine P500.00 bills, which were inserted on top of five bundles of play money to make it appear that she had P250,000.00 with her. After she showed the money to alias Don, he suggested that they go to a more secure place. They agreed for the sale to take place at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998 in front of alias Don’s apartment at 765 Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. The team proceeded to the Western Police District (WPD) Station along U.N. Avenue for coordination. Afterwards, the team held their final briefing before they proceeded to the target area. They agreed that the pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to scratch her hair, which would signify that the deal had been consummated and the rest of the team would rush up to the scene. The team then travelled to the address given by alias Don.19

When the team arrived at the target area around 1:15 a.m. on April 3, 1998, the two vehicles they used were parked along the corner of the street. P/Insp. Fajardo and the informant walked towards the apartment of alias Don and stood in front of the apartment gate. Around 1:45 a.m., alias Don came out of the apartment with a male companion. Alias Don demanded to see the money, but P/Insp. Fajardo told him that she wanted to see the drugs first. Alias Don gave her the big brown envelope he was carrying and she checked the contents thereof. Inside she found a plastic sachet, about 10x8 inches in size, which contained white crystalline substance. After checking the contents of the envelope, she assumed that the same was indeed shabu. She then gave the buy-bust money to alias Don and scratched her hair to signal the rest of the team to rush to the scene. P/Insp. Fajardo identified herself as a narcotics agent. The two suspects tried to flee but PO2 Trambulo was able to stop them from doing so. P/Insp. Fajardo took custody of the shabu. When she asked alias Don if the latter had authority to possess or sell shabu, he replied in the negative. P/Insp. Fajardo put her initials "JSF" on the genuine P500.00 bills below the name of Benigno Aquino. After the arrest of the two suspects, the buy-bust team brought them to the police station. The suspects’ rights were read to them and they were subsequently booked.20

P/Insp. Fajardo said that she found out that alias Don was in fact the appellant Donald Vasquez. She learned of his name when he brought out his NBI ID while he was being booked. P/Insp. Fajardo also learned that the name of the appellant’s companion was Reynaldo Siscar, who was also arrested and brought to the police station. P/Insp. Fajardo explained that after she gave the buy-bust money to the appellant, the latter handed the same to Siscar who was present the entire time the sale was being consummated. Upon receiving the buy-bust money placed inside a green plastic bag, Siscar looked at the contents thereof and uttered "okey na to." P/Insp. Fajardo marked the drug specimen and brought the same to the Crime Laboratory. She was accompanied there by PO2 Trambulo and PO1 Agravante. She handed over the drug specimen to PO1 Agravante who then turned it over to P/Insp. Taduran, the forensic chemist on duty. The police officers previously weighed the drug specimen. Thereafter, the personnel at the crime laboratory weighed the specimen again. P/Insp. Fajardo and her team waited for the results of the laboratory examination.21

P/Insp. Fajardo further testified that the six plastic bags of shabu seized during the buy-bust operation were actually contained in a self-sealing plastic envelope placed inside a brown envelope. When the brown envelope was confiscated from the appellant, she put her initials "JSF" therein and signed it. She noticed that there were markings on the envelope that read "DD-93-1303 re Antonio Roxas y Sunga" but she did not bother to check out what they were for or who made them. When she interrogated the appellant about the brown envelope, she found out that the same was submitted as evidence to the NBI Crime Laboratory. She also learned that the appellant worked as a Laboratory Aide at the NBI Crime Laboratory. She identified in court the six plastic sachets of drugs that her team recovered, which sachets she also initialed and signed. P/Insp. Fajardo also stated that after the appellant was arrested, PO2 Trambulo conducted a body search on the two suspects. The search yielded 12 more plastic sachets of drugs from the appellant. The 12 sachets were varied in sizes and were contained in a white envelope. P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials and signature on the envelope. As to the 12 sachets, the same were initialed by P/Insp. Fajardo and signed by PO2 Trambulo.22

The testimony of PO2 Trambulo corroborated that of P/Insp. Fajardo’s. PO2 Trambulo testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential informant reported to them about the illegal drug activities of alias Don. P/Supt. Domantay then tasked P/Insp. Fajardo to form a buy-bust team. P/Insp. Fajardo was able to set up a meeting with alias Don at Cindy’s Restaurant in Welcome Rotonda, Quezon City. At that meeting, PO2 Trambulo saw P/Insp. Fajardo talk to alias Don. P/Insp. Fajardo later told the members of the team that she convinced alias Don that she was a good buyer of shabu and the latter demanded a second meeting to see the money. After the initial meeting, P/Insp. Fajardo briefed P/Supt. Domantay about what happened. PO2 Trambulo stated that on April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo was furnished with five genuine P500.00 bills together with the boodle play money. P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials in the genuine bills below the name "Benigno Aquino, Jr." Afterwards, the team left the office. When they arrived at Cindy’s Restaurant past 10:00 p.m., alias Don was waiting outside. P/Insp. Fajardo showed the boodle money to alias Don and after some time, they parted ways. P/Insp. Fajardo later told the team that alias Don decided

that the drug deal would take place in front of alias Don’s rented apartment on Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. After an hour, the team went to Valdez St. to familiarize themselves with the area. They then proceeded to the WPD station to coordinate their operation. Thereafter, P/Insp. Fajardo conducted a final briefing wherein PO2 Trambulo was designated as the immediate back-up arresting officer. The agreed pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to scratch her hair to indicate the consummation of the deal. PO2 Trambulo was to signal the same to the other members of the team.23

The buy-bust team went to the target area at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998. P/Insp. Fajardo and the informant walked towards the direction of alias Don’s apartment, while PO2 Trambulo positioned himself near a parked jeepney about 15 to 20 meters from the apartment gate. The rest of the team parked their vehicles at the street perpendicular to Valdez St. Later, alias Don went out of the gate with another person. PO2 Trambulo saw alias Don gesturing to P/Insp. Fajardo as if asking for something but P/Insp. Fajardo gestured that she wanted to see something first. Alias Don handed P/Insp. Fajardo a big brown envelope, which the latter opened. P/Insp. Fajardo then handed to alias Don a green plastic bag containing the buy-bust money and gave the pre-arranged signal. When PO2 Trambulo saw this, he immediately summoned the rest of the team and rushed to the suspects. He was able to recover the buy-bust money from alias Don’s male companion. Upon frisking alias Don, PO2 Trambulo retrieved 12 pieces of plastic sachets of suspected drugs. The same were placed inside a white envelope that was tucked inside alias Don’s waist. PO2 Trambulo marked each of the 12 sachets with his initials "CVT" and the date. The police officers then informed the suspects of their rights and they proceeded to the police headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.24

As regards the brown envelope that alias Don handed to P/Insp. Fajardo, the latter retained possession thereof. The envelope contained six pieces of plastic bags of white crystalline substance. When they got back to their office, the team reported the progress of their operation to P/Supt. Domantay. The arrested suspects were booked and the required documentations were prepared. Among such documents was the Request for Laboratory Examination of the drug specimens seized. PO2 Trambulo said that he was the one who brought the said request to the PNP Crime Laboratory, along with the drug specimens.25

P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito, the forensic chemist, testified on the results of her examination of the drug specimens seized in this case. She explained that P/Insp. Macario Taduran, Jr. initially examined the drug specimens but the latter was already assigned to another office. The results of the examination of P/Insp. Taduran were laid down in Physical Science Report No. D-1071-98. P/Insp. Dequito first studied the data contained in Physical Science Report No. D-1071-98 and retrieved the same from their office. She entered that fact in their logbook RD-17-98. She then weighed the drug specimens and examined the white crystalline substance from each of the plastic sachets. She examined first the specimens marked as "A-1," "A-2," "A-3," "A-4," "A-5" and "A-6." P/Insp. Dequito’s examination revealed that the white crystalline substances were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.26She also examined the contents of 12 heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets that also contained crystalline substances. The 12 plastic sachets were marked "B-1" to "B-12." The white crystalline powder inside the 12 plastic sachets also tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. P/Insp. Dequito’s findings were contained in Physical Science Report No. RD-17-98.27

The prosecution, thereafter, adduced the following object and documentary evidence: (1) photocopies of the five original P500.00 bills28 used as buy-bust money (Exhibits A-E); (2) Request for Laboratory Examination29 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit F); (3) Initial Laboratory Report30 dated April 3, 1998, stating that the specimen submitted for examination tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (Exhibit G); (4) Court Order31 dated September 2, 1998 (Exhibit H); (5) Physical Sciences Report No. D-1071-9832 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit I); (6) Drug specimens A-1 to A-6 (Exhibits J-O); (7) Big brown envelope (Exhibit P); (8) Small white envelope (Exhibit Q); (9) Drug specimens B-1 to B-12 (Exhibits R-CC); (10) Physical Sciences Report No. RD-17-9833 (Exhibit DD); (11) Joint Affidavit of Arrest34 (Exhibit EE); (12) Play money (Exhibit FF); (13) Booking Sheet and Arrest Report35(Exhibit GG); (14) Request for Medical Examination36 (Exhibit HH); (15) Medico Legal Slip37 of Donald Vasquez (Exhibit II); and (16) Medico Legal Slip38 of Reynaldo Siscar (Exhibit JJ).

The Defense’s Case

As expected, the defense belied the prosecution’s version of events. The appellant’s brief39 before the Court of Appeals provides a concise summary of the defense’s counter-statement of facts. According to the defense:

Donald Vasquez was a regular employee of the NBI, working as a Laboratory Aide II at the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. His duties at the time included being a subpoena clerk, receiving chemistry cases as well as requests from different police agencies to have their specimens examined by the chemist. He also rendered day and night duties, and during regular office hours and in the absence of the laboratory technician, he would weigh the specimens. As subpoena clerk, he would receive subpoenas from the trial courts. When there is no chemist, he would get a Special Order to testify, or bring the drug specimens, to the courts.

On 1 April 1998, Donald Vasquez took his examination in Managerial Statistics between 6:00 to 9:00 o’clock p.m. Thereafter, he took a jeepney and alighted at Stop and Shop at Quiapo. From there, he took a tricycle to his house, arriving at 9:45 o’clock that evening, where he saw Reynaldo Siscar and Sonny San Diego, the latter a confidential informant of the narcotics agents.

On 3 April 1998, at 1:45 o’clock in the morning, Donald’s household help, Anatolia Caredo, who had just arrived from Antipolo that time, was eating while Donald was asleep. She heard a knock on the door. Reynaldo Siscar opened the door and thereafter two (2) men entered, poking guns at Reynaldo. They were followed by three (3) others. The door to Donald’s room was kicked down and they entered his room. Donald, hearing noise, woke up to see P./Insp. Fajardo pointing a gun at him. He saw that there were six (6) policemen searching his room, picking up what they could get. One of them opened a cabinet and got drug specimens in [Donald’s] possession in relation to his work as a laboratory aide. The drugs came from two (2) cases and marked as DD-93-1303 owned by Antonio Roxas, and DD-96-5392 owned by SPO4 Emiliano Anonas. The drug specimen contained in the envelope marked as DD-93-1303 was intended for presentation on 3 April 1998. Aside from the drug specimens, the policemen also took his jewelry, a VHS player, and his wallet containing P2,530.00.

Angelina Arejado, Donald’s neighbor, witnessed the policemen entering the apartment and apprehending Donald and Reynaldo from the apartment terrace.40 (Citations omitted.)

The defense then offered the following evidence: (1) NBI Disposition Form41 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit 1); (2) Sworn Statement of Idabel Bernabe Pagulayan42 (Exhibit 2); (3) Photocopy of the buy-bust money43 (Exhibit 3); (4) List of Hearings44 attended by Donald Vasquez (Exhibit 4); (5) Authorization Letter45 prepared by Acting Deputy Director Arturo A. Figueras dated March 27, 1998 (Exhibit 5); and (6) List of Evidence46 taken by Donald Vasquez from 1996-1998 (Exhibit 6).

The Decision of the RTC

On August 6, 2009, the RTC convicted the appellant of the crimes charged. The RTC gave more credence to the prosecution’s evidence given that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of the police officers was not overcome. The trial court held that the appellant did not present any evidence that would show that the police officers in this case were impelled by an evil motive to charge him of very serious crimes and falsely testify against him. Also, the trial court noted that the volume of the shabu involved in this case was considerable, i.e., 247.98 grams and 4.03 grams for illegal sale and illegal possession, respectively. To the mind of the trial court, such fact helped to dispel the possibility that the drug specimens seized were merely planted by the police officers. Furthermore, the RTC ruled that the positive testimonies of the police officers regarding the illegal drug peddling activities of the appellant prevailed over the latter’s bare denials.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant was merely framed up by the police, the trial court pointed out that:

[T]he accused should have reported the said incident to the proper authorities, or asked help from his Acting Chief [Idabel] Pagulayan from the NBI to testify and identify in Court the xerox copy of the Disposition Form which she issued to the accused and the Affidavit dated April 17, 1998 (xerox copy) executed by her or from Mr. Arturo A. Figueras, Acting Deputy Director, Technical Services of the NBI to testify and identify the Letter issued by the said Acting Deputy Director in order to corroborate and strengthen his testimony that he was indeed authorized to keep in his custody the said shabu to be presented or turned over to the Court as evidence, and he should have filed the proper charges against those police officers who were responsible for such act. But the accused did not even bother to do the same. Further, the pieces of evidence (Disposition Form, Affidavit of [Idabel] Pagulayan and Letter dated March 27, 1998 issued by Acting Deputy Director) presented by the accused in Court could not be given weight and credence considering that the said persons were not presented in Court to identify the said documents and that the prosecution has no opportunity to cross-examine the same, thus, it has no probative value.47

The trial court, thus, decreed:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Crim. Case No. 98-164174, finding accused, DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 15, Art. III in Relation to Sec.

2 (e), (f), (m), (o), Art. I of R.A. No. 6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P5,000,000.00; and 2. In Crim. Case No. 98-164175, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 16, Art. III in Relation to Sec. 2 (e-2) Art. I of R.A. 6425 as Amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS and a fine of FOUR THOUSAND (P4,000.00) PESOS.

The subject shabu (247.98 grams and 4.03 grams, respectively) are hereby forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to deliver and/or cause the delivery of the said shabu to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), upon the finality of this Decision.48

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals

On appeal,49 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the appellant. The appellate court ruled that the prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu. The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo on the conduct of the buy-bust operation was found to be clear and categorical. As the appellant failed to adduce any evidence that tended to prove any ill motive on the part of the police officers to falsely charge the appellant, the Court of Appeals held that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties on the part of the police officers had not been controverted in this case.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision stated:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The August 6, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41 of the City of Manila in Criminal Cases No. 98-164174-75, finding appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes of Violation of Section 15 and Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 98-164175, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional in its medium period, as maximum.50

The Ruling of the Court

The appellant appealed his case to this Court to once again impugn his conviction on two grounds: (1) the purported illegality of the search and the ensuing arrest done by the police officers and (2) his supposed authority to possess the illegal drugs seized from him.51 He argues that the police officers did not have a search warrant or a warrant of arrest at the time he was arrested. This occurred despite the fact that the police officers allegedly had ample time to secure a warrant of arrest against him. Inasmuch as his arrest was illegal, the appellant avers that the evidence obtained as a result thereof was inadmissible in court. As the corpus delicti of the crime was rendered inadmissible, the appellant posits that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant further insists that he was able to prove that he was authorized to keep the drug specimens in his custody, given that he was an employee of the NBI Forensic Chemistry Laboratory who was tasked with the duty to bring drug specimens in court.

After an assiduous review of the evidence adduced by both parties to this case, we resolve to deny this appeal.

At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. We reiterated in People v. Tampis52 that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction."53 Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 11354 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. We held in People v. Cabugatan55 that:

This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. (Citation omitted.)

Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of his arrest and the subsequent search upon his person.

We now rule on the substantive matters.

To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, the following elements should be satisfactorily proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.56 As held in People v. Chua Tan Lee,57 in a prosecution of illegal sale of drugs, "what is material is proof that the accused peddled illicit drugs, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti." On the other hand, the elements of illegal possession of drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.58

In the case at bar, the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo established that a buy-bust operation was legitimately carried out in the wee hours of April 3, 1998 to entrap the appellant. P/Insp. Fajardo, the poseur-buyer, positively identified the appellant as the one who sold to her six plastic bags of shabu that were contained in a big brown envelope for the price of P250,000.00. She likewise identified the six plastic bags of shabu, which contained the markings she placed thereon after the same were seized from the appellant. When subjected to laboratory examination, the white crystalline powder contained in the plastic

bags tested positive for shabu. We find that P/Insp. Fajardo’s testimony on the events that transpired during the conduct of the buy-bust operation was detailed and straightforward. She was also consistent and unwavering in her narration even in the face of the opposing counsel’s cross-examination.

Apart from her description of the events that led to the exchange of the drug specimens seized and the buy-bust money, P/Insp. Fajardo further testified as to the recovery from the appellant of another 12 pieces of plastic sachets of shabu. After the latter was arrested, P/Insp. Fajardo stated that PO2 Trambulo conducted a body search on the appellant. This search resulted to the confiscation of 12 more plastic sachets, the contents of which also tested positive for shabu. The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo was amply corroborated by PO2 Trambulo, whose own account dovetailed the former’s narration of events. Both police officers also identified in court the twelve plastic sachets of shabu that were confiscated from the appellant.

In People v. Ting Uy,59 the Court explains that "credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by prosecution witnesses especially so when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary." In the instant case, the appellant failed to ascribe, much less satisfactorily prove, any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to why they would falsely incriminate him. The appellant himself even testified that, not only did he not have any misunderstanding with P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo prior to his arrest, he in fact did not know them at all.60In the absence of evidence of such ill motive, none is presumed to exist.61

The records of this case are also silent as to any measures undertaken by the appellant to criminally or administratively charge the police officers herein for falsely framing him up for selling and possessing illegal drugs. Such a move would not have been a daunting task for the appellant under the circumstances. Being a regular employee of the NBI, the appellant could have easily sought the help of his immediate supervisors and/or the chief of his office to extricate him from his predicament. Instead, what the appellant offered in evidence were mere photocopies of documents that supposedly showed that he was authorized to keep drug specimens in his custody. That the original documents and the testimonies of the signatories thereof were not at all presented in court did nothing to help the appellant’s case. To the mind of the Court, the evidence offered by the appellant failed to persuade amid the positive and categorical testimonies of the arresting officers that the appellant was caught red-handed selling and possessing a considerable amount of prohibited drugs on the night of the buy-bust operation.

It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, the Court will not disturb the trial court’s assessment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses since the RTC was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial. Settled too is the rule that the factual findings of the appellate court sustaining those of the trial court are binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.62

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the appellant of the crimes charged.

RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLOvs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

G.R. No. 185128

January 30, 2012

Facts:

Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC and around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of September 13, 1997, the same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to petitioner.

Upon arrival, somebody shouted "raid," which prompted them to immediately disembark from the jeep they were riding and went directly to petitioner's house and cordoned it. The structure of the petitioner's residence is a two-storey house and the petitioner was staying in the second floor. When they went upstairs, they met petitioner's wife and informed her that they will implement the search warrant. But before they can search the area, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place.

They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and closely guarded the place where the subject ran for cover. SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned with two barangay tanods.

In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner named Dolly del Castillo, searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Consequently, the articles that were confiscated were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The contents of the four (4) heat- sealed transparent plastic packs were subjected to laboratory examination, the result of which proved positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.

Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner, charging him with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended. The Information5 reads:

That on or about the 13th day of September 1997, at about 3:00 p.m. in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there have in his possession and control four (4) packs of white crystalline powder, having a total weight of 0.31 gram, locally known as "shabu," all containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without license or prescription from any competent authority.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

During arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty.7 Subsequently, trial on the merits ensued.

To prove the earlier mentioned incident, the prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, PO2 Milo Arriola, and Forensic Analyst, Police Inspector Mutchit Salinas.

The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of petitioner, Jesusa del Castillo, Dalisay del Castillo and Herbert Aclan, which can be summarized as follows:

On September 13, 1997, around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner was installing the electrical wirings and airconditioning units of the Four Seasons Canteen and Beauty Parlor at Wacky Bldg., Cabancalan, Cebu. He was able to finish his job around 6 o'clock in the evening, but he was engaged by the owner of the establishment in a conversation. He was able to go home around 8:30-9 o'clock in the evening. It was then that he learned from his wife that police operatives searched his house and found nothing. According to him, the small structure, 20 meters away from his house where they found the confiscated items, was owned by his older brother and was used as a storage place by his father.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the Information. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC. After the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the CA, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari under Rule.

Issues:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE RULES OF COURT AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE VIS-A-VIS VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANT NO. 570-9-1197-24;

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON THE FLOOR OF THE NIPA HUT OR STRUCTURE ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, NOT ONLY BECAUSE THE SAID COURT SIMPLY PRESUMED THAT IT WAS USED BY THE PETITIONER OR THAT THE PETITIONER RAN TO IT FOR COVER WHEN THE SEARCHING TEAM ARRIVED AT HIS RESIDENCE, BUT ALSO, PRESUMING THAT THE SAID NIPA HUT OR STRUCTURE WAS INDEED USED BY THE PETITIONER AND THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER WERE FOUND THEREAT. THE SUBJECT FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER ARE FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE; and

3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENT OF "POSSESSION" AS AGAINST THE PETITIONER, AS IT WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER. HAD THE SAID COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE ELEMENT IN QUESTION, IT COULD HAVE BEEN ASSAYED THAT THE SAME HAD NOT BEEN PROVEN.10

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment dated February 10, 2009, enumerated the following counter-arguments:

I

SEARCH WARRANT No. 570-9-11-97-24 issued by Executive Judge Priscilla S. Agana of Branch 24, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is valid.

II

The four (4) packs of shabu seized inside the shop of petitioner are admissible in evidence against him.

III

The Court of Appeals did not err in finding him guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs.11

Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant, considering that SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, the police officer who applied for it, had no personal knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of drugs during a test-buy operation conducted prior to the application of the same search warrant. The OSG, however, maintains that the petitioner, aside from failing to file the necessary motion to quash the search warrant pursuant to Section 14, Rule 127 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, did not introduce clear and convincing evidence to show that Masnayon was conscious of the falsity of his assertion or representation.

Anent the second argument, petitioner asserts that the nipa hut located about 20 meters away from his house is no longer within the "permissible area" that may be searched by the police officers due to the distance and that the search warrant did not include the same nipa hut as one of the places to be searched. The OSG, on the other hand, argues that the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only against government authorities and not to private individuals such as the barangay tanod who found the folded paper containing packs of shabu inside the nipa hut.

As to the third argument raised, petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut. Nevertheless, the OSG dismissed the argument of the petitioner, stating that, when prohibited and regulated drugs are found in a house or other building belonging to and occupied by a particular person, the presumption arises that such person is in possession of such drugs in violation of law, and the fact of finding the same is sufficient to convict.

This Court finds no merit on the first argument of petitioner.

The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.12 According to petitioner, there was no probable cause. Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.13 A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction.14 The judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula,15and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard.16 The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court, therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination.17 Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.18 A review of the records shows that in the present case, a substantial basis exists.

With regard to the second argument of petitioner, it must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.19 In the present case, Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-2420 specifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an

invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of petitioner's constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. The OSG argues that, assuming that the items seized were found in another place not designated in the search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual, the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure being applicable only against government authorities. The contention is devoid of merit.

It was testified to during trial by the police officers who effected the search warrant that they asked the assistance of the barangay tanods, thus, in the testimony of SPO3 Masnayon:

The fact that no items were seized in the residence of petitioner and that the items that were actually seized were found in another structure by a barangay tanod, was corroborated by PO2 Arriola, thus:

Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities who effected the searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines persons in authority and agents of persons in authority as:

x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.

A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.

The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the function of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority. Section 388 of the Local Government Code reads:

SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and members who may be designated by law or ordinance and charged with the maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and property, or the maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay member who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in authority.

By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence. Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the barangay tanod who found the confiscated items is considered a private individual, thus, making the same items admissible in evidence, petitioner's third argument that the prosecution failed to establish constructive possession of the regulated drugs seized, would still be meritorious.

Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court since the latter has the unique opportunity to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying,24 unless attended with arbitrariness or plain disregard of pertinent facts or circumstances, the factual findings are accorded the highest degree of respect on appeal25 as in the present case.

It must be put into emphasis that this present case is about the violation of Section 16 of R.A. 6425. In every prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential

elements must be established: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.26

In People v. Tira,27 this Court explained the concept of possession of regulated drugs, to wit:

This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.28

While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under appellant’s control or possession.29 The CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found.30 The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession. The CA, in its Decision, noted a resolution by the investigating prosecutor, thus:

x x x As admitted by respondent's wife, her husband is an electrician by occupation. As such, conclusion could be arrived at that the structure, which housed the electrical equipments is actually used by the respondent. Being the case, he has control of the things found in said structure.31

In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution do not also provide proof as to the ownership of the structure where the seized articles were found. During their direct testimonies, they just said, without stating their basis, that the same structure was the shop of petitioner.32 During the direct testimony of SPO1 Pogoso, he even outrightly concluded that the electrical shop/nipa hut was owned by petitioner, thus:

The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs.35 With the prosecution's failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner's control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the status of the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.36 Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.371âwphi1

FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, Petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.

G.R. No. 172035

July 4, 2012

BRION, J.:

Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other local officials [3] of Koronadal City, South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao charging the petitioner, among others, with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, in connection with the consultancy services for the architectural aspect, the engineering design, and the construction supervision and management of the proposed Koronadal City public market (project). Ombudsman filed the corresponding informations with the Sandiganbayan. The information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads:

...a high ranking public officer in his capacity as former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato, xxx acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits and advantages to said [accused], by inviting them to participate in the prequalification of consultants to provide the Detailed Architectural & Engineering Design and Construction Supervision and Management of the proposed Koronadal Public Market, without causing the publication of said invitation in a newspaper of general circulation, thereby excluding other consultants from participating in said prequalification.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but such was also denied, prompting him to file this certiorari petition to challenge the validity of his suspension order.

The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering his suspension despite the failure of the information to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages by the petitioner was made through “manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.” He alleges that the phrases “evident bad faith” and “manifest partiality” actually refers not to him, but to his co-accused, rendering the information fatally defective.

Issue:

Whether the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing renders invalid the suspension order against the petitioner.

Held:

We dismiss the petition for failure to establish any grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the assailed resolutions. The pre-suspension order is valid.

While the suspension of a public officer under this provision is mandatory, the suspension requires a prior hearing to determine "the validity of the information" filed against him, "taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an elective public official even before his conviction." The accused public official’s right to challenge the validity of the information before a suspension order may be issued includes the right to challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the filing of an information against him, and (ii) propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts charged do not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code.

In Luciano v. Mariano41 that the petitioner relied upon, the Court required, "by way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension," that –

(c) …upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to quash the information or challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension should it uphold the validity of the information or withholding such suspension in the contrary case.

(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him.

The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of the information so that the trial court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its validity.1âwphi1That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash.42

While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings against him,43 Luciano likewise emphasizes that no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its conduct.44 With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in mind, the absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a suspension order.

In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan,45 the Court considered the opposition of the accused (to the prosecution’s motion to suspend pendente lite) as sufficient to dispense with the need to actually set the prosecution’s motion for hearing. The same conclusion was reached in Juan v. People,46 where the Court ruled:

In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the validity of the Informations that had been filed against petitioners, we believe that the numerous pleadings filed for and against them have achieved the goal of this procedure. The right to due process is satisfied nor just by an oral hearing but by the filing and the consideration by the court of the parties' pleadings, memoranda and other position papers.

Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted.47 It is well settled that "to be heard" does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists.48

Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere preventive measure whose duration shall in no case exceed ninety (90) days,55 the adequacy of the opportunity to contest the validity of the information and of the proceedings that preceded its filing vis-à-vis the merits of the defenses of the accused cannot be measured alone by the absence or presence of an actual hearing. An opportunity to be heard on one’s defenses, however unmeritorious it may be, against the suspension mandated by law equally and sufficiently serves both the due process right of the accused and the mandatory nature of the suspension required by law.

G.R. No. 199877               August 13, 2012PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA, Accused-Appellant.VILLARAMA, JR.,*

D E C I S I O N

REYES, J.:

On June 14, 2001, an Information charging Lara with robbery with homicide was filed with the RTC.

Following Lara’s plea of not guilty, trial ensued. The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses: Enrique Sumulong (Sumulong), SPO1 Bernard Cruz (SPO1 Cruz) and PO3 Efren Calix (PO3 Calix).

Sumulong testified that on May 31, 2001, 9:00 AM, he withdrew the amount of P230,000.00 from the Metrobank-Mabini Branch, Pasig City todefray the salaries of the employees of San Sebastian and while at around 10:30 AM, while the pickup he was riding was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, Lara suddenly appeared at the front passengerside of the pick-up and pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na ang pera, iyong bag, nasaan?"; Bautista, one of those who accompanied him told him not to give the bag. He threw the bag in Bautista's direction and Bautista alighted from the pick-up and ran. Seeing Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his gun. He then ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of San Sebastian to relay the incident and when he wentback to where the pick-up was parked, he went to the rear portion of the vehicle and saw blood on the ground; He was informed by one bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag was taken away from him; On June 7, 2001, while on his way to Pasig City, he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel, Pasig City and he alerted the police and Lara was thereafter arrested. At the police station, he, Atie and Manacob (other companions atpickup) identified Lara as the one who shot and robbed them of San Sebastian's money.

SPO1 Cruz testified that around 7:55 PM on June 7, 2001, Sumulong went to the police station and informed him that he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street. Four police officers and Sumulong went to Dr. Pilapil Street where they saw Lara, who Sumulong identified and they thenapproached Lara and invited him for questioning. At the police station, Lara was placed in a line-up where he was positively identified by Sumulong, Manacob and Atie; and after being identified, Lara was informed of his rights and subsequently detained.

PO3 Calix testified that on May 31, 200, he was informed of a robbery that took place and he, together with 3 other police officers, proceeded tothe crime scene wherein upon arriving one of the police officers who were able to respond ahead of them, handed to him 11 pieces of empty shells and 6 deformed slugs of a 9mm pistol; As part of his investigation, he interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the police station; and before Bautista died, he was able to interview Bautista at the hospital where the latter was brought after the incident.

In his defense, Lara stated that on May 31, 2001, he was at his house, digging a sewer trench while his brother, Wilfredo, was constructing a comfort room which was corroborated by his sister, Edjosa Manalo and neighbor, Simplicia Delos Reyes. On June 7, 2001 and at around 7:00 in the evening, while he was at the house of one of his cousins, police officers arrivedand asked him if he was Arturo Lara and after confirming that he was Arturo Lara, the police officers asked him to go with them to the Barangay Hall. He voluntarily went with them and while inside the patrol car, one of the policemen said,"You are lucky, we were able to caught you in your house, if in another place we will kill you". He was brought to the police station and not the barangay hall as he was earlier told where he was investigated forrobbery with homicide and when he told the police that he was at home when the subject incident took place, the policechallenged him to produce witnesses but when his witnesses arrived at the station, one of the police officers told themto come back the following day. While he was at the police line-up holding a name plate, a police officer told Sumulong and Atie, "Ituru nyo na

yan atuuwi na tayo"; and when his witnesses arrived the following day, they were told that he will be subjected to an inquest.

On October 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Lara of robbery with homicide. The RTC rejected Lara’s defense of alibi.

On appeal, Lara pointed out that the police line-up is part of custodial investigation and his right to counsel had already attached. Third, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The CA affirmed Lara’s conviction. That Lara was supposedly arrested without a warrant may not serve as a ground to invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction considering its belated invocation. Any objections to the legality of the warrantless arrest should have been raised in a motion to quash duly filed before the accused enters his plea; otherwise, it is deemed waived. Further, that the accused was illegally arrested is not a ground to set aside conviction duly arrived at and based on evidence that sufficiently establishes culpability:

Issue:

Whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in the police line-up is inadmissible because Lara stood therein without the assistance of counsel;

Held:

This Court resolves to deny the appeal.

Contrary to Lara’s claim, that he was not provided with counsel when he was placed in a police line-up did not invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction. That he stood at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel did not render Sumulong’s identification of Lara inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation. As this Court previously ruled in People v. Amestuzo:22

The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. This was settled in the case of People vs. Lamsing and in the more recent case of People vs. Salvatierra. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process. This is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up.23 (Citations omitted)

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

G.R. No. 151258

February 1, 2012

Facts:

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).

On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days.

Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites."

On the morning of their second day, the neophytes were made to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation.

After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members10 Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent mumblings. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans.

Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried. On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.

On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.13 A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.

On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual participation.

On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.16 Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.17 On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 9015318 reversed the trial court’s Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.19

Issues:

Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;

Held:

The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.52 This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays.53 The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.54 In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.55 The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed.56 Also to be considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.57

We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal.58 As a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double jeopardy.59 As we have previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is capricious, certiorari lies.60 The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof.61 Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from attaching.62

We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CA’s dismissal of the case against accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial. The court held thus:

An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the following factors contributed to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case.

What is glaring from the records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order requiring the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was complied with. It appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of the trial court because the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion.

It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner Saruca’s motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon x x x.63(Emphasis supplied)

This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera.64 On 29 November 1993, they were all arraigned.65 Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.66

The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition of cases .

From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused Escalona et al.’s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the records that would show that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.

G.R. No. 185230               June 1, 2011

JOSEPH C. CEREZO, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JULIET YANEZA, PABLO ABUNDA, JR., and VICENTE AFULUGENCIA,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul the July 11, 2008 Decision1 and the November 4, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99088, which reversed and set aside the October 24, 20063 and the February 26, 20074 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 92.

The RTC Orders revived Criminal Case No. Q-03-115490, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., Oscar Mapalo and Vicente Afulugencia," after the same was dismissed in an earlier Order.

The Facts

On September 12, 2002, petitioner Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for libel against respondents Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., and Vicente Afulugencia (respondents), as well as Oscar Mapalo (Mapalo).5

Finding probable cause to indict respondents,6 the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office (OP-QC) filed the corresponding Information against them on February 18, 2003 before the RTC.7

Respondents thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Re-evaluate Prosecution’s Evidence before the OP-QC.8

In its resolution dated November 20, 2003, the OP-QC reversed its earlier finding and recommended the withdrawal of the Information.9 Consequently, a Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information was filed before the RTC on December 3, 2003. During the intervening period, specifically on November 24, 2003, respondents were arraigned. All of them entered a "not guilty" plea.10

In deference to the prosecutor’s last resolution, the RTC ordered the criminal case dismissed in its Order dated March 17, 2004, viz.:

Settled is the rule that the determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the Public Prosecutor who is vested with quasi-judicial discretion in the discharge of this function. Being vested with such power, he can reconsider his own resolution if he finds that there is reasonable ground to do so. x x x.

More so, the Court cannot interfere with the Public Prosecutor’s discretion to determine probable cause or the propriety of pursuing or not a criminal case when the case is not yet filed in Court, as a general rule. However, if the same criminal case has been filed in Court already, the Public Prosecutor can still interfere with it subject to the approval of the Court. In the case of Republic vs. Sunga, et al., the Supreme Court held that while it has been settled in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed after the complaint or information has been filed in court, nonetheless any motion of the offended party for the dismissal of the criminal case, even if without objection of the accused, should first be referred to the prosecuting fiscal and only after hearing should the court exercise its exclusive authority to dismiss or continue with the prosecution of the case. The Court, therefore, after hearing and conferring with the fiscal, can dismiss the case if convinced that there is [no] reason to continue with the prosecution [of] the same. As in this case, the Court finds merit [in] the motion of the Public Prosecutor.11

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said Order, arguing that the November 20, 2003 OP-QC resolution has not yet attained finality, considering that the same was the subject of a Petition for Review filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ).12 The RTC deferred action on the said motion to await the resolution of the DOJ.13

On June 26, 2006, the Secretary of Justice promulgated his resolution reversing and setting aside the OP-QC’s November 20, 2003 resolution, and directing the latter to refile the earlier Information for libel.14

On October 24, 2006, the RTC issued its first assailed Order granting petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, conformably with the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, thus:

Considering the findings of the Department of Justice reversing the resolution of the City Prosecutor, the Court gives favorable action to the Motion for Reconsideration. In the same manner as discussed in arriving at its assailed order dated 17 March 2004, the Court gives more leeway to the Public Prosecutor in determining whether it has to continue or stop prosecuting a case. While the City Prosecutor has previously decided not to pursue further the case, the Secretary of Justice, however, through its resolution on the Petition for Review did not agree with him.

The Court disagrees with the argument raised by the accused that double jeopardy sets in to the picture. The order of dismissal as well as the withdrawal of the Information was not yet final because of the timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration. The Court[,] therefore, can still set aside its order. Moreover, there is no refiling of the case nor the filing of a new one. The case filed remains the same and the order of dismissal was merely vacated because the Court finds the Motion for Reconsideration meritorious.

WHEREFORE, finding the Motion for Reconsideration meritorious, the Order dated 17 March 2004 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE.

Let the arraignment of accused Oscar Mapalo and pre-trial [of] the other accused be set on 06 December 2006 at 8:30 in the morning.

SO ORDERED.15

Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied in the RTC’s second assailed Order dated February 26, 2007.16

Relentless, respondents elevated their predicament to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, arguing in the main that the RTC Orders violated their constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Ruling of the CA

The appellate court found the RTC to have gravely abused its discretion in ordering the reinstatement of the case. The CA annulled the impugned RTC Orders, ruling that all the elements of double jeopardy exist. There was a valid Information sufficient in form and substance filed before a court of competent jurisdiction to which respondents had pleaded, and that the termination of the case was not expressly consented to by respondents; hence, the same could not be revived or refiled without transgressing respondents’ right against double jeopardy.

The CA further found that the DOJ Secretary improperly took cognizance of the Petition for Review because DOJ Department Order No. 223 mandates that no appeal shall be entertained if the accused has already been arraigned or, if the arraignment took place during the pendency of the appeal, the same shall be dismissed.17

Petitioner interposed the instant appeal when his motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied.18

Issue:

Whether there was a valid termination of the case so as to usher in the impregnable wall of double jeopardy.

Held:

The petition is impressed with merit.

Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the court. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice.20 It is the court’s bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion.21 While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.

In this case, it is obvious from the March 17, 2004 Order of the RTC, dismissing the criminal case, that the RTC judge failed to make his own determination of whether or not there was a prima facie case to hold respondents for trial. He failed to make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. The RTC judge blindly relied on the manifestation and recommendation of the prosecutor when he should have been more circumspect and judicious in resolving the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information especially so when the prosecution appeared to be uncertain, undecided, and irresolute on whether to indict respondents.

By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The said Orders were thus stained with grave abuse of discretion and violated the complainant’s right to due process. They were void, had no legal standing, and produced no effect whatsoever.23

This Court must therefore remand the case to the RTC, so that the latter can rule on the merits of the case to determine if a prima facie case exists and consequently resolve the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information anew.1awphil

It is beyond cavil that double jeopardy did not set in. Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.24

Since we have held that the March 17, 2004 Order granting the motion to dismiss was committed with grave abuse of discretion, then respondents were not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case. Ergo, the fifth requisite which requires the conviction and acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the case without the approval of the accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in.

FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS and CARMELITA C. LLAMAS, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BRANCH 66 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN MAKATI CITY and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

G.R. No. 149588

September 29, 2009

Facts:

On August 16, 1984, petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati with, as aforesaid, the crime of "other forms of swindling" in the Information,.

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision3 on June 30, 1994, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two months and to pay the fine of P18,085.00 each.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. The appellate court further denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The Court denied the same for petitioners’ failure to state the material dates. Since it subsequently denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on June 28, 2000,7 the judgment of conviction became final and executory.

With the consequent issuance by the trial court of the April 19, 2001 Warrant of Arrest,8 the police arrested, on April 27, 2001, petitioner Carmelita C. Llamas for her to serve her 2-month jail term. The police, nevertheless, failed to arrest petitioner Francisco R. Llamas because he was nowhere to be found.9

On July 16, 2001, petitioner Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of the warrant of arrest, raising for the first time the issue that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.10

There being no action taken by the trial court on the said motion, petitioners instituted, on September 13, 2001, the instant proceedings for the annulment of the trial and the appellate courts’ decisions.

Issue:

Whether or not the remedy of annulment of judgement can be availed of.

Held:

The Court denies the petition.

In People v. Bitanga,13 the Court explained that the remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases, thus —

Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, limits the scope of the remedy of annulment of judgment to the following:

The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in a criminal case. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not permit such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from the enumeration of the provisions of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which have suppletory application to criminal cases. Section 18, Rule 124 thereof, provides:

Sec. 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. – The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the

Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.

There is no basis in law or the rules, therefore, to extend the scope of Rule 47 to criminal cases.

Here, petitioners are invoking the remedy under Rule 47 to assail a decision in a criminal case. Following Bitanga, this Court cannot allow such recourse, there being no basis in law or in the rules.

G.R. No. 184760               April 23, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.PATERNO LORENZO y CASAS, Defendant-Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

PEREZ, J.:

Assailed in this appeal via Notice of Appeal is the 14 June 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR HC No. 02184 which affirmed the 05 October 2005 Decision2 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, in Criminal Case Nos. 6991-93, finding accused-appellant Paterno Lorenzo y Casas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.3

Accused-appellant was arrested and charged following a buy-bust operation.

On 12 September 2003, two (2) Informations were filed against accused-appellant Paterno Lorenzo y Casas (Lorenzo) charging him with violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the accusatory portions thereof reading.

Criminal Case No. 6992

That on or about the 10th day of September 2003 in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, direct custody and control a total of 2.04 grams of white crystalline substance contained in two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets which gave positive result to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.4

Criminal Case No. 6993

That on or about the 10th day of September 2003, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to another 0.20 gram of white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet which gave positive result to the test for Metamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.5

The cases were raffled to Branch 76 of the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 6992-93.

One Conrado Estanislao y Javier (Estanislao) was similarly charged in a different Information, which case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 6991. Estanislao was accused of possessing illegal drugs in violation of the provisions of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the Information containing the following averments:

Criminal Case No. 6994

That on or about the 10th day of September 2003, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, direct custody and control of 0.05 gram of white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet which gave positive result to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

On arraignment, both accused, with the assistance of counsel, entered ‘NOT GUILTY’ pleas.

The three (3) cases having been consolidated, joint trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented as its lone witness, Police Officer 1 (PO1) Noel P. Pineda, who was a member of the buy-bust team.

The evidence for the prosecution sought to establish that on 9 September 2003, upon a series of reports relayed by a confidential informant that a certain Paterno Lorenzo was peddling shabu in the Barangay Dulongbayan area, the team of PO3 Pineda embarked on a buy-bust operation against said drug peddler. Anticipating the operation, PO3 Pineda prepared two (2) pieces of marked P100.00 bills to be used as buy-bust money. At around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of the same day, PO3 Pineda, along with SPO1 Arellano and PO3 Tougan, proceeded to Barangay Dulongbayan and secretly met with their confidential informant. According to the confidential informant, he had not seen Lorenzo and raised the possibility that he was not in the area at the time. Assessing the situation, the police officers instructed the confidential informant to continue with his surveillance of the area and to inform them immediately if he comes across Lorenzo.

At around 1:00 o’clock in the morning of 10 September 2003, while PO1 Pineda and his companions were waiting at Gen. Luna Street, the confidential informant reported that Lorenzo was already at the Daangbakal, Dulongbayan I area and was selling prohibited drugs. Riding an unmarked vehicle, the team proceeded to where Lorenzo was. On their arrival, Lorenzo was talking to a man at the corner of Pulong Diablo and Daangbakal. PO3 Tougan stepped out of their vehicle and hid in a place where he was not visible to Lorenzo. PO3 Pineda stayed close to SPO1 Arellano, who was then hiding inside a tricycle near Lorenzo. While this was happening, the confidential informant approached Lorenzo for the transaction. Lorenzo and the confidential informant were approximately four (4) meters away from PO3 Pineda. Because PO3 Pineda knew who Lorenzo was and considering the place was illuminated, PO3 Pineda recognized the suspect. The confidential informant and Lorenzo were talking for about one minute, after which the informant gave the marked money to Lorenzo. After taking the marked money, Lorenzo handed the shabu to the informant. PO3 Pineda and SPO1 Arellano alighted from the tricycle and approached Lorenzo, and introduced themselves as police officers. They arrested Lorenzo.

Upon being arrested, Lorenzo was bodily searched and PO1 Pineda was able to retrieve the marked money and 2 other sachets of shabu from him. Seeing what had happened to Lorenzo, the man he was talking to and later on identified as a certain Estanislao, attempted to escape the police officers and ran, but he was soon accosted by PO3 Tougan. A search of his pockets yielded one (1) sachet of shabu.

After the buy-bust operation, Lorenzo and Estanislao were taken to the police station where the incident was recorded in the police blotter. The plastic sachets containing 2.04 and 0.20 grams of white crystalline substance bought from Lorenzo was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination. The results as contained in Chemistry Report no. D-1741-03E showed that the substance sold by Lorenzo was positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.6

Interposing the twin defenses of denial and frame-up, accused-appellant Lorenzo and Estanislao stood before the witness stand and presented their version of the facts.

Lorenzo was in his mountain bike on the way home to Dulongbayan sometime between 12:00 o’clock in the evening and 1:00 o’clock in the morning of 10 September 2003. Estanislao, who was also with him at the time, was riding in his motor cross style bike and was supposed to buy food at said place after playing ‘tong-its.’

While the two (2) were traversing Daangbakal and Delos Angeles Street, the chain on Estanislao’s bike went loose. During the time Estanislao was repairing his bike, PO3 Tougan, PO3 Pineda, and SPO1 Arellano, who were then on board an owner type jeepney, arrived and arrested Lorenzo and Estanislao. According to the police officers, they were to be brought to the Municipal Hall. The two (2) suspects protested, claiming not having done

anything wrong but the police officers continued with the arrest. It was later that they were informed that the arrest was for illegal drugs.

On 5 October 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting Lorenzo for illegal possession and sale of dangerous drugs, but acquitting Estanislao, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) Finding accused Paterno Lorenzo y Casas guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5, first paragraph, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Criminal Case No. 6993) or illegal selling of 0.20 gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).(b) Finding accused Paterno Lorenzo y Casas guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 11, second paragraph, No.3, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Criminal Case No. 6992) or illegal possession of 2.04 gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, and is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to Twelve years and six (months) as maximum and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).(c) Finding accused Conrado Estanislao y Javier, for violation of Section 11, second paragraph, sub paragraph 3, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, NOT GUILTY for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Detained accused Conrado Estanislao y Javier is ordered released from detention at the San Mateo Jail unless detained for some other lawful cause.

The plastic sachets of shabu subject matter of the instant cases are ordered forfeited in favor of the government and the Officer-In-Charge of the Court is hereby ordered to safely deliver or cause the safe delivery of the same to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition.7

Weighing the testimonies of the prosecution and defense witnesses, as well as the other evidence presented during trial, the trial court gave more veracity to the prosecution’s version that Lorenzo was caught in flagrante delicto selling illegal drugs to a poseur-buyer during a buy-bust operation. The trial court gave credence to the prosecution’s evidence in accordance with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions accorded to police officers. According to the trial court, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the buyer in the buy-bust operation and the seller, object and consideration, including the delivery of the shabu sold by Lorenzo and the payment of the buy-bust money.

Invoking his innocence, Lorenzo appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, questioning the procedure followed by the police operatives in the seizure and custody of the evidence against him.

On 14 June 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction rendered by the RTC, disposing to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby dismissed and the assailed October 5, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo Rizal, Branch 76, in Criminal Case Nos. 6991-93, is hereby AFFIRMED.

Pursuant to Section 13 (C), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by AM No. 00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004, which became effective on October 15, 2004. This judgment of the Court of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

Unyielding, Lorenzo appealed before this Court on Notice of Appeal,8 adopting the same arguments raised before the Court of Appeals:

I.THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 5 AND 11, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165; AND

II.THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S DEFENSE OF DENIAL.

The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.

In fact, if the prosecution fails to meet the required quantum of evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its behalf. In which case, the presumption of innocence shall prevail and, hence, the accused shall be acquitted. However, once the presumption of innocence is overcome, the defense bears the burden of evidence to show reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.

Whether the degree of proof has been met is largely left for the trial courts to be determined. Consistent with the rulings of this Court, it is but a fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the trial court and its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect, more so when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The exception is when it is established that the trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, will change the outcome of the case. Considering that what is at stake here is the liberty of accused-appellant, we have carefully reviewed and evaluated the records of the case and find it necessary to reverse the appellate court’s decision convicting accused-appellant.

Essentially, Lorenzo questions his conviction on the basis of reasonable doubt. The defense anchors its claim on the failure of the prosecution to adopt the required procedure under Section 21, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, on the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs. According to the defense, this alleged failure to follow proper procedure, i.e. inventory and photographing of the retrieved evidence, raises doubts as to whether the specimen examined by the forensic chemist and presented in court were indeed retrieved from accused-appellant. The defense also faults the police operatives for not having coordinated with the PDEA regarding the buy-bust.

Thus, for resolution by this Court is the sole issue of whether the prosecution discharged its burden of proving Lorenzo’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged.

We rule in the negative. The prosecution’s case fails for failure to establish the identity of the prohibited drug with moral certainty.

In order to successfully prosecute an accused for illegal sale of drugs, the prosecution must be able to prove the following elements: (1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.9 Material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale had actually taken place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.10 The term corpus delicti means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged.

On the other hand, in illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously

possessed the said drug. Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond doubt.

In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.

While buy-bust operations have been proven to be an effective way to flush out illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy, a buy-bust operation is susceptible to police abuse. Thus, courts have been mandated to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.

Taking the aforementioned into consideration, specific procedures relating to the seizure and custody of drugs have been laid down under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) for Republic Act No. 9165 and it is the prosecution’s burden to adduce evidence that these procedures have been complied with in proving the elements of the offense.

The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, among others, is provided under Section 21 (a), paragraph 1 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, to wit:

(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, which implements said provision, reads:

(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the express requirements. Indeed, the evident purpose of the procedure is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt of or innocence of the accused. Thus, the proviso stating that non-compliance with the stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers.

In People v. Sanchez,11 we clarified that this saving clause applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds.

Accused-appellant claims that no physical inventory and no photographing of the drugs took place. Non-compliance by the police operatives with the foregoing requirements in the instant case is fatal to the prosecution’s case. Although the prosecution recognized its failure to coordinate with the PDEA because of the urgency of the situation, it ignored the issue of

specifically identifying the prohibited drug at the point of confiscation. There is absolutely nothing in the records to show that the inventory and photography requirements, or their credible substitute to prove integrity and evidentiary value, were ever followed.

In People v. Lim,12 this Court held:

xxx any apprehending team having initial custody and control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia, should immediately after seizure and confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be any, and or his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with such a requirement raises a doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was actually recovered from the appellants. It negates the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the PAOC-TF agents.

In Bondad, Jr. v. People,13 where the prosecution did not inventory and photograph the confiscated evidence, this Court acquitted therein accused reasoning that failure to comply with the aforesaid requirements of the law compromised the identity of the items seized.

In People v. Ruiz,14 this Court acquitted accused due to the failure of the prosecution to comply with the procedures under Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR as no physical inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was taken under the circumstances required.

In People v. Orteza,15 the Court explained the implications of the failure to comply with Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, to wit:

In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.1avvphi1

The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the seized marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe the procedure and take custody of the drug.

More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies with regard to when and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the accused due to the prosecution's failure to indubitably show the identity of the shabu.

To reiterate, the flexibility offered by the IRR of Republic Act No. 9165 is coupled with the proviso that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items must be preserved.

Thus, in Malillin v. People,16 the Court explained that the "chain of custody" requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. The chain of evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and recording, and must exist from the time the evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence.17 Failure to prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly seized from accused is fatal to the prosecution’s case. There can be no crime of illegal possession or illegal sale of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be the prohibited drug.18

PO1 Pineda testified that it was their confidential agent who purchased the shabu from accused-appellant and that he only retrieved it from said informant. He further testified that he marked the retrieved sachet of shabu together with the two other sachets of shabu that were

allegedly seized from the accused, but it was not certain when and where the said marking was done nor who had specifically received and had custody of the specimens thereafter.

The Court also observes that the prosecution did not present the poseur-buyer who had personal knowledge of the transaction. The lone prosecution witness was at least four meters away from where accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer were. From this distance, it was impossible for him to hear the conversation between accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer.

The foregoing facts and circumstances create doubt as to whether the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from accused-appellant were the same ones that were released to Camp Crame and submitted for laboratory examination. We therefore find that this failure to establish the evidence’s chain of custody is damaging to the prosecution’s case.19

In sum, the totality of the evidence presented in the instant case failed to support accused-appellant’s conviction for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, since the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense.

Accordingly, the presumption of innocence should prevail.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated 14 June 2007 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02184, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant PATERNO LORENZO y CASAS is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken. Copies shall also be furnished the Director General, Philippine National Police, and the Director General, Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency, for their information.

SO ORDERED.JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

G.R. No. 185209               June 28, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.RENE BARON y TANGAROCAN, Appellant.REY VILLATIMA and alias "DEDONG" BARGO, Accused.

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

On July 19, 1995, an Information1 was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60, charging Rene Baron y Tangarocan (appellant), Rey Villatima (Villatima), and alias "Dedong" Bargo (Bargo) with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide committed against Juanito Berallo (Berallo).

Only the appellant was arrested. Appellant entered a plea of "not guilty" when arraigned. After the termination of the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.

The Prosecution’s Version

Culled from the evidence presented by the prosecution, the case against the appellant is as follows:

On June 28, 1995, at around 8:30 in the evening, Ernesto Joquino, Jr. (Joquino), a tricycle driver, was having a conversation with Canni Ballesteros (Ballesteros) in front of Julie’s Bakeshop at Magsaysay St., Cadiz City. Berallo arrived and parked his tricycle in front of the bakeshop. The appellant approached Berallo and asked if he could take him and his companions to Hacienda Caridad for P30.00. When Berallo agreed, the appellant called Villatima, then wearing a fatigue jacket, and Bargo. They then rode Berallo’s tricycle.

Pacita Caratao, a dressmaker, was also in Julie’s Bakeshop at around the same time Joquino and Ballesteros were in front of the premises. She noticed Berallo sitting on a parked tricycle while the appellant was seated behind him. After buying bread, she approached Berallo and asked if he was going home to Lag-asan, hoping that she could ride with him. However, Berallo replied that he still had to ferry passengers. She thus decided to cross the street and take a passenger jeep. While inside the jeep, she saw two more persons boarding Berallo’s tricycle.

On June 29, 1995, SPO2 Jude dela Rama received a report of a robbery with homicide incident. Together with other policemen, he proceeded to Hacienda Sta. Ana, Cadiz City, where he saw Berallo lying dead in a sugarcane plantation about 20 meters away from the highway. They also noticed several traces of footprints near Berallo’s body and a tricycle sidecar in a canal beside the Martesan Bridge. Beside the sidecar was a fatigue jacket.

Dr. Merle Jane B. Regalado conducted the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of Berallo. She found that the victim sustained 15 stab wounds and died of severe hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds. Five of them were considered as fatal and caused the immediate death of Berallo. The wounds also indicated that they could have been inflicted by more than one person.

The follow-up investigation of the police team identified the appellant as one of the suspects. After having been apprised of his rights, appellant admitted that he and his co-accused took Berallo’s tricycle and, after detaching the motorcycle from the sidecar, brought the motorcycle to Barangay Oringao, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental and left the same at the house of Villatima’s aunt, Natividad Camparicio (Natividad).

Natividad denied knowledge of the incident but admitted that her nephew Villatima, together with the appellant, and another companion, were the ones who brought the motorcycle to her house in Kabankalan.

Nemia Berallo (Nemia) identified the motorcycle recovered from the house of Natividad as the one stolen from her deceased husband. She also testified on the sum of money and the value of the personal property stolen from her husband. She allegedly spent the sum of P2,400.00 for the purchase of the burial lot.

The Version of the Defense

Appellant denied any participation in the crime. He claimed that on June 28, 1995, at around 7 o’clock in the evening, he bought rice and other necessities for his family and proceeded to the public transport terminal to get a ride home. A tricycle with two passengers passed by and its driver inquired if he wanted a ride up to Segundo Diez. He boarded the tricycle and told the driver that he would alight at Canibugan, but the driver requested him to accompany them up to Segundo Diez. He agreed out of concern for the safety of the driver. Upon reaching Bangga Doldol, however, the passengers announced a hold-up. Armed with guns, the passengers told him and the driver not to make any wrong move, or they would be killed. Thereafter, the passengers tied the hands of the driver and dragged him towards the sugarcane fields. He no longer knew what happened to the driver since he remained in the tricycle. However, he suspected that the driver was killed by the two passengers.

Thereafter, the passengers went to Taytay Martesan and detached the sidecar of the tricycle. They then took him to a house at Barangay Oringao and did not allow him to leave the premises. The following morning, they returned to Cadiz City. The two passengers even accompanied him to his house and threatened him and his wife at gunpoint not to report the incident to the police authorities.

On June 30, 1995, at around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, policemen came to his house and asked where the motorcycle was taken. He told them of the location of the vehicle and insisted that he had nothing to do with the incident. He stressed that the two passengers whose names he did not know, were responsible for the crime committed.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On February 12, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision2 finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of robbery with homicide. It disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused RENE BARON Y TANGAROCAN (detained) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide as charged in the information and there being the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of treachery hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH.

The accused is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity for the death of the victim, Juanito Berallo and the amount of P5,050.00 for the cash and the value of the wrist watch and ring of the victim plus the amount of P2,400.00 for the purchase of the burial lot by way of reparation and in addition the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. The sidecar and the motorcycle are hereby ordered returned to the heirs of the victim.

The accused is further ordered to be immediately committed to the National Penitentiary for service of his sentence.

The Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby ordered to immediately forward the records of this case together with the Decision of this Court to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

The case against Rey Villatima and alias "Dedong" Bargo [both of whom are] at-large is hereby ordered archived and [to] be immediately revived upon their arrest.

Cost against accused Rene Baron.

SO ORDERED.3

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Before the appellate court, appellant alleged that the trial court erred in finding him guilty as charged and in not appreciating in his favor the exempting circumstance of irresistible force and/or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. However, the same was disregarded by the CA holding that all the requisites for said circumstances were lacking. The appellate court found that the alleged threat, if at all, was not real or imminent. Appellant had every opportunity to escape but did not take advantage of the same. Instead, he waited inside the tricycle as if he was one of the malefactors. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision4 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the APPEAL is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 12, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. 1675-C finding accused-appellant Rene Baron y Tangarocan guilty of robbery with homicide is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION reducing the death penalty to reclusion perpetua without parole conformably with R.A. 9346 and reducing the award of moral damages from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P50,000.00 to P25,000.00.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

Held:

The appeal is unmeritorious.

In this case, the prosecution successfully adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the real intention of the appellant and his companions was to rob the victim.

Concededly, there is no direct evidence proving that the appellant conspired and participated in committing the crime. However, his complicity may be proved by circumstantial evidence, which consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.7 Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.8 A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.9

In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution leads to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant and his co-accused conspired to commit robbery with homicide. When considered together, the circumstances point to them and no one else as the culprits.

This Court found from the records of this case, numerous and cumulative material circumstantial evidence from which one can derive a logical and necessary inference clearly showing the three accused to be responsible for the crime charged.

From [this] series of proven circumstantial evidence, the inescapable and natural conclusion is the three accused were in conspiracy with one another to kill the victim and cart away the

motorcycle as the combination of these numerous circumstantial evidence [is] enough to produce the strong moral certainty from an unbiased and [unprejudiced] mind to safely conclude that no other persons but the three accused conspired to perpetrate the crime as clearly the series of events indubitably [shows] that there was unity of purpose, concurrence of will, and that they all acted in concert towards the same end, the accused being together with a group when they rode the tricycle of the victim; all of them were together at the scene of the crime, they all rode in the same stolen motorcycle going to Barangay Oringao, Kabankalan City; all of them were together in hiding the stolen motorcycle in the house of Natividad Camparicio; and they were together as a group going to Cadiz City from Kabankalan City passing [through] and stopping [at] various cities and municipalities.10

The concerted manner in which the appellant and his companions perpetrated the crime showed beyond reasonable doubt the presence of conspiracy. When a homicide takes place by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there was an endeavor to prevent the killing.11There was no evidence adduced in this case that the appellant attempted to prevent the killing. Thus, regardless of the acts individually performed by the appellant and his co-accused, and applying the basic principle in conspiracy that the "act of one is the act of all," the appellant is guilty as a co-conspirator. As a result, the criminal liabilities of the appellant and his co-accused are one and the same.12

FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses SAAPIA B. ALONTO and DIAGA ALONTO.

G.R. No. 174654

August 17, 2011

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The only issue that confronts this Court is whether petitioner Felixberto A. Abellana could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal.

Assailed before this Court are the February 22, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78644 and its August 15, 2006 Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereto. The assailed CA Decision set aside the May 21, 2003 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. CBU-51385 and acquitted the petitioner of the crime of falsification of public document by a private individual because the Information charged him with a different offense which is estafa through falsification of a public document.4 However, the CA still adjudged him civilly liable.5

Factual Antecedents

In 1985, petitioner extended a loan to private respondents spouses Diaga and Saapia Alonto (spouses Alonto),6secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over Lot Nos. 6471 and 6472 located in Cebu City.7 Subsequently, or in 1987, petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying said lots to him. The Deed of Absolute Sale was signed by spouses Alonto in Manila. However, it was notarized in Cebu City allegedly without the spouses Alonto appearing before the notary public.8 Thereafter, petitioner caused the transfer of the titles to his name and sold the lots to third persons.

On August 12, 1999,9 an Information10 was filed charging petitioner with Estafa through Falsification of Public Document, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 9th day of July, 1987, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, and with intent to defraud, did then and there falsify a public document consisting of a Deed of Absolute Sale of a parcel of land consisting of 803 square meters executed before Notary Public Gines N. Abellana per Doc. No. 383, Page No. 77, Book No. XXIII, Series of 1987 of the latter’s Notarial Register showing that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto sold their parcel of land located at Pardo, Cebu City, for a consideration of P130,000.00 in favor of accused by imitating, counterfeiting, signing or [causing] to be imitated or counterfeited the signature[s] of spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto above their typewritten names in said document as vendor[s], when in truth and in fact as the accused very well knew that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto did not sell their aforestated descri[b]ed property and that the signature[s] appearing in said document are not their signature[s], thus causing it to appear that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto participated in the execution of said document when they did not so participate[. Once] said document was falsified, accused did then and there cause the transfer of the titles of said land to his name using the said falsified document, to the damage and prejudice of spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto in the amount of P130,000.00, the value of the land .

CONTRARY TO LAW.11

During arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".12 After the termination of the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision dated May 21, 2003, the RTC noted that the main issue for resolution was whether petitioner committed the crime of estafa through falsification of public document.13 Based on the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court found that petitioner did not intend to defraud the spouses Alonto; that after the latter failed to pay their obligation, petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale which the spouses Alonto actually signed; but that the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized without the spouses Alonto personally appearing before the notary public. From these, the trial court concluded that petitioner can only be held guilty of Falsification of a Public Document by a private individual under Article 172(1)14 in relation to Article 171(2)15 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and not estafa through falsification of public document as charged in the Information.

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Felixberto Abellana GUILTY of the crime of falsification of public document by private individuals under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him to an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to SIX (6)YEARS, as maximum.

He is directed to institute reconveyance proceedings to restore ownership and possession of the real properties in question in favor of private complainants. After private complainants shall have acquired full ownership and possession of the aforementioned properties, they are directed to pay the accused the sum of P130,000.00 [with] legal interest thereon reckoned from the time this case was instituted.

Should the accused fail to restore full ownership and possession in favor of the private complainants [of] the real properties in question within a period of six (6) months from the time this decision becomes final and executory, he is directed to pay said complainants the sum of P1,103,000.00 representing the total value of the properties of the private complainants.

He is likewise directed to pay private complainants the following:

1. P15,000.00 for nominal damages;

2. P20,000.00 for attorney’s fees;

3. P50,000.00 as and for litigation expenses;

4. P30,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;

plus the cost of this suit.

SO ORDERED.16

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, petitioner raised the issue of whether an accused who was acquitted of the crime charged may nevertheless be convicted of another crime or offense not specifically charged and alleged and which is not necessarily included in the crime or offense charged. The CA, in its Decision dated February 22, 2006, ruled in the negative.17 It held that petitioner who was charged with and arraigned for estafa through falsification of public document under Article 171(1) of the RPC could not be convicted of Falsification of Public Document by a Private Individual under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(2). The CA observed that the falsification committed in Article 171(1) requires the counterfeiting of any handwriting, signature or rubric while the falsification in Article 171(2) occurs when the offender caused it to appear in a document that a person participated in an act or proceeding when in fact such person did not so participate. Thus, the CA opined that the conviction of the petitioner for an offense not alleged in the Information or one not necessarily included in the offense charged violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation

against him.18Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the trial court’s finding with respect to petitioner’s civil liability. The dispositive portion of the CA’s February 22, 2006 Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, We resolve to set aside the Decision dated May 21, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 13, Cebu City only insofar as it found the petitioner guilty of a crime that is different from that charged in the Information. The civil liability determinations are affirmed.

SO ORDERED.19

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in the Resolution dated August 15, 2006.

Hence, petitioner comes before us through the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the lone issue of whether he could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal by the trial court and the CA.

Our Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.20 In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.21 When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action.22 In other words, the "extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not exist."23

Here, the CA set aside the trial court’s Decision because it convicted petitioner of an offense different from or not included in the crime charged in the Information. To recall, petitioner was charged with estafa through falsification of public document. However, the RTC found that the spouses Alonto actually signed the document although they did not personally appear before the notary public for its notarization. Hence, the RTC instead convicted petitioner of falsification of public document. On appeal, the CA held that petitioner’s conviction cannot be sustained because it infringed on his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.24 The CA, however, found no reversible error on the civil liability of petitioner as determined by the trial court and thus sustained the same.25

We do not agree.

In Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.,26 we elucidated on the civil liability of the accused despite his exoneration in this wise:

While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. x x x

Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses.

Based on the records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly committed by the petitioner did not cause any damage to spouses Alonto.

First, the Information charged petitioner with fraudulently making it appear that the spouses Alonto affixed their signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale thereby facilitating the transfer of the subject properties in his favor. However, after the presentation of the parties’ respective evidence, the trial court found that the charge was without basis as the spouses Alonto indeed signed the document and that their signatures were genuine and not forged.

Second, even assuming that the spouses Alonto did not personally appear before the notary public for the notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the same does not necessarily nullify or render void ab initio the parties’ transaction.27 Such non-appearance is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the statements contained in the deed. "To overcome the presumption, there must be sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the [deed]. In the absence of such proof, the deed must be upheld."28 And since the defective notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute Sale, the transfer of said properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner remains valid. Hence, when on the basis of said Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner caused the cancellation of spouses Alonto’s title and the issuance of new ones under his name, and thereafter sold the same to third persons, no damage resulted to the spouses Alonto.1avvphi1

Moreover, we cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed upon the petitioner, to wit: to institute an action for the recovery of the properties of spouses Alonto or to pay them actual and other kinds of damages. First, it has absolutely no basis in view of the trial court’s finding that the signatures of the spouses Alonto in the Deed of Absolute Sale are genuine and not forged. Second, "[s]entences should not be in the alternative. There is nothing in the law which permits courts to impose sentences in the alternative."29 While a judge has the discretion of imposing one or another penalty, he cannot impose both in the alternative.30 "He must fix positively and with certainty the particular penalty."31

In view of the above discussion, there is therefore absolutely no basis for the trial court and the CA to hold petitioner civilly liable to restore ownership and possession of the subject properties to the spouses Alonto or to pay them P1,103,000.00 representing the value of the properties and to pay them nominal damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 22, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78644 and its August 15, 2006 Resolution are AFFIRMED insofar as they set aside the conviction of the petitioner for the crime of falsification of public document. The portion which affirmed the imposition of civil liabilities on the petitioner, i.e., the restoration of ownership and possession, the payment of P1,103,000.00 representing the value of the property, and the payment of nominal and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, is deleted for lack of factual and legal basis.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLOAssociate Justice

G.R. No. 173089               August 25, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.Hon. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biliran Province, Branch 16, and JAIME ABORDO, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the State, seeking to reverse and set aside the June 7, 2006 Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals(CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 01289, which dismissed outright its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for being the wrong remedy.

From the records, it appears that on October 7, 2002, at 12:30 o’clock in the morning, respondent Jaime Abordo(Abordo) was riding his motorcycle on his way home. He was met by private complainants Kennard Majait(Majait), Joeniel Calvez (Calvez) and Jose Montes (Montes). An altercation ensued between them. Abordo shot Majait in the leg while Calvez was hit in the lower left side of his abdomen. Montes escaped unhurt.

Abordo was charged with two (2) counts of attempted murder in Criminal Case Nos. N-2212 and N-2213 and one (1) count of frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. N-2211 before the Regional Trial Court, Biliran Province, Branch 16 (RTC). The trial court found no treachery and evident premeditation. Thus, in its August 29, 2005 Decision,2 the RTC held Abordo liable only for Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less Serious Physical Injuries with regard to Majait. It also appreciated four (4) generic mitigating circumstances in favor of Abordo. With respect to the complaint of Montes, Abordo was acquitted.

All three complainants moved for a reconsideration regarding the civil aspect. They filed a supplemental motion to include moral damages. Calvez without the conformity of the Provincial Prosecutor, filed a notice of appeal for both the civil and the criminal aspects. For said reason, Calvez later sought withdrawal of his motion for reconsideration and its supplement.

On October 24, 2005, the trial court dismissed Majait’s motion for reconsideration while Calvez’s motion to withdraw was granted. On said date, the trial court also dismissed Calvez’ appeal for not bearing the conformity of the Provincial Prosecutor.

Acting on Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuno’s Indorsement3 of the October 11, 2005 letter4 of Assistant City Prosecutor Nida C. Tabuldan-Gravino, a relative of Calvez, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA based on the following grounds:

GROUNDS FOR THE ALLOWANCEOF THE PETITION

(Petition for Certiorari before the CA)

I

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAD NO INTENT TO KILL, IN HOLDING HIM GUILTY OF ONLY SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES INSTEAD OF FRUSTRATED MURDER AND ATTEMPTED MURDER IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. N-2211 AND N-2212, RESPECTIVELY, AND IN ACQUITTING HIM OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. N-2213.

II

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN APPRECIATING FOUR (4) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.5

The CA, in the assailed Resolution, dismissed the petition outright. According to the appellate court, the filing of the petition for certiorari was the wrong remedy. As the State was questioning the verdict of acquittal and findings of lesser offenses by the trial court, the remedy should have been an appeal. Moreover, the petition for certiorariplaced the accused in double jeopardy. Specifically, the CA wrote:

x x x. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction but an error of law or fact – a mistake of judgment – appeal is the remedy. In view of the improper action taken by the herein petitioner, the instant petition should be dismissed.

Moreover, Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or final order unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. In the instant petition, the Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines is assailing the judgment of the public respondent in finding the accused guilty of lesser crimes tha[n] the ones with which he was charged and of acquitting him in another. It appears to us that the Solicitor General is also representing the interest of the private complainant Calvez when it questioned the dismissal of the latter’s Notice of Appeal dated October 10, 2005 with respect to the civil aspect of the case. Although the Solicitor General is allowed to file an appeal under such rule; however, we must point out that in filing this petition for certiorari, the accused is thereby placed in double jeopardy. Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the express injunction of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy.

We must emphasize that the prosecution cannot appeal a decision in a criminal case whether to reverse an acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed in a conviction because it would place him in double jeopardy. Hence,this petition is dismissible not only on the ground of wrong remedy taken by the petitioner to question an error of judgment but also on the ground that such action places the accused in double jeopardy.6[emphases and underscoring supplied]

Not in conformity, the OSG comes to this Court via this petition for review under Rule 45 presenting the following:

GROUNDS RELIED UPON FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI SEEKING TO ANNUL THE JOINT JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST 29, 2005 OF HON. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC OF BILIRAN, BRANCH 16 IN CRIM. CASE NOS. N-2211, N-2212 AND N-2213 WHICH WAS CLEARLY SHOWN TO BE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN THEREBY AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE PLAINLY ERRONEOUS JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST 29, 2005 OF HON. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC OF BILIRAN PROVINCE, BRANCH 16, IN CRIM. CASE NOS. N-2211, N-2212 AND N-2213.7

On January 19, 2009, the petition was given due course and the parties were ordered to submit their respective memoranda. The parties complied with the order.

We find that the appellate court erred in dismissing the petition outright.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable.8 The rule, however, is not without exception. In several cases,9the Court has entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases. Thus, in People v. Louel Uy,10 the Court has held:

Like any other rule, however, the above said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

In People v. Laguio, Jr.,11 where the acquittal of the accused was via the grant of his demurrer to evidence, We pointed out the propriety of resorting to a petition for certiorari. Thus:

By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated. [Emphases supplied]

In this petition, the OSG claims that Abordo’s acquittal in Criminal Case No. N-2213 was improper.1âwphi1 Since appeal could not be taken without violating Abordo’s constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy, the OSG was correct in pursuing its cause via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the appellate court. It was a serious error by the CA to have deprived the petitioner of its right to avail of that remedy.

As the case was summarily dismissed on a technicality, the merits of the petition for certiorari were not at all discussed. Thus, the proper recourse would be a remand to the CA.

A review of the records, however, shows that the case need not be remanded to the CA for appropriate proceedings. The OSG’s petition for certiorari, which forms part of the records, would not merit a favorable review even if it would be given due course simply because it is bereft of merit. For said reason, We deem that a remand of the case would only prolong the disposition of the case. It is not without precedent. "On many occasions, the Court, in the interest of public service and for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits, instead of remanding them for further proceedings, as where the ends of justice would not be sub-served by the remand of the case."12

The rule is that "while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice."13 The case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan,14 presents an instructive exception to the rule on double jeopardy, that is, when the prosecution has been denied due process of law. "The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy."15

A reading of the OSG petition for certiorari filed before the CA, however, fails to show that the prosecution was deprived of its right to due process. Primarily, the OSG petition does not mention or even hint that there was a curtailment of its right. Unlike in Galman, the

prosecution in this case was never denied its day in court. Both the prosecution and the defense were able to present their respective evidence, testimonial and documentary. Both parties had their opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and scrutinize every piece of evidence. Thereafter, the trial court exercising its discretion evaluated the evidence before it and rendered its decision. Certainly, there was no mistrial.

The arguments proffered in the said petition call for a review of the evidence and a recalibration of the factual findings. At the outset, the OSG faulted the trial court for giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of Abordo and his witnesses. It wrote:

In ruling that private respondent had no intent to kill private complainants, respondent judge thus accorded full faith and credit to the testimonies of private respondent and his witnesses Julito Bernadas and Melquiades Palconit. His findings, however, are contrary to law and the evidence. Therefore, he acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.16

It further pointed out that the CA "failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion."17 Subsequently, in its memorandum, it merely reiterated the purported errors of the trial judge in appreciating and assessing the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense. Apparently, it wants a review of the trial court’s judgment which it claimed to be erroneous.

The OSG then proceeded to show how the evidence should have been appreciated by the trial court in its favor and against Abordo to demonstrate that there was intent to kill on his part.

What the OSG is questioning, therefore, are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be resolved without violating Abordo’s constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy. An appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial court’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion. In the case of People v. Hon. Tria-Tirona,18 it was written:

Petitioner, via a petition for review on certiorari, prays for the nullification and the setting aside of the decision of public respondent acquitting private respondent claiming that the former abused her discretion in disregarding the testimonies of the NBI agents on the discovery of the illegal drugs. The petition smacks in the heart of the lower court's appreciation of the evidence of the parties. It is apparent from the decision of public respondent that she considered all the evidence adduced by the parties. Even assuming arguendo that public respondent may have improperly assessed the evidence on hand, what is certain is that the decision was arrived at only after all the evidence was considered, weighed and passed upon. In such a case, any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. Since no error of jurisdiction can be attributed to public respondent in her assessment of the evidence, certiorari will not lie. [Emphasis supplied]

Summing them all up, the CA clearly erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it by the OSG on the ground that it was the wrong remedy. There is, however, no need for the remand of the case to the CA as the petition for certiorari, on its face, cannot be given due course.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The June 7, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01289, dismissing the petition for certiorari for being the

wrong remedy is SET ASIDE. Acting on the petition for certiorari, the Court resolves to DENY the same for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZAAssociate Justice

CORAZON MACAPAGAL, Petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 193217

February 26, 2014

Facts:

On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa for misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount of P800,000.00, which is the value of the unreturned and unsold pieces of jewelry.6 Petitioner received the decision on

January 13, 2009 then she timely moved for reconsideration, but was likewise denied in an Order dated May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received on July 31, 2009. She supposedly filed a Notice of Appeal7 on August 3, 2009, but the same was denied on June 29, 2010 for having been filed out of time.8

Issue:

1. The regional trial court of manila, branch 9, gravely erred in denying the notice of appeal filed by the herein petitioner-appellant.

2. The regional trial court of manila, branch 9, gravely erred in denying the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial filed by the herein petitioner-appellant.9

Held:

We deny the petition.

It appears that petitioner assails not only the denial by the RTC of her notice of appeal but likewise seeks the reversal of her conviction for estafa.

First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial court’s denial of her notice of appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down the rules on where, how and when appeal is taken.

Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the appeal itself.10 A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal of a lower court’s decision or final order direct to the Supreme Court. However, the questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is not a decision or final order from which an appeal may be taken.11 The Rules of Court specifically provides that no appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can elevate the matter through a special civil action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the wrong mode of appeal in this petition under Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of Rule 65, the petition merits an outright dismissal.12

Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of courts.14 Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this should not be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an application will be directed.15 Direct resort to this Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case.16

Third, petitioner elevated to this Court not only the Order denying her notice of appeal but also the Decision convicting her of estafa and the Order denying her motion for reconsideration. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must

contain a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or judgment.18 Failure to comply with such requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.19

The main reason for the prescribed attachments is to facilitate the review and evaluation of the petition by making readily available to the Court all the orders, resolutions, decisions, pleadings, transcripts, documents, and pieces of evidence that are material and relevant to the issues presented in the petition without relying on the case records of the lower court.20

Lastly, this petition is bound to fail because of petitioner’s repeated disregard of the Rules and the Court’s lawful orders.1avvphi1 In a Resolution21 dated September 15, 2010, the Court required petitioner to fully comply with the Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which reads:

It is the duty of the counsel to make sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign, to determine which court has appellate jurisdiction, and to follow the requisites for appeal.28 Any error in compliance may be fatal to the client's cause.29 It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise.

G.R. No. 172873               March 19, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.ROLDAN MORALES y MIDARASA, Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt.1 Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of convincing the factfinder of his guilt. To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it ‘impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching certitude of the facts in issue.2

Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.3

Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.4

On appeal is the Decision5 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on April 24, 2006 affirming in toto the Decision6 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 103 finding appellant Roldan Morales y Midarasa guilty of the crimes of possession and sale of dangerous drugs.

Factual Antecedents

Appellant was charged in two separate Informations before the RTC with possession and sale of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), to wit:

Criminal Case No. Q-03-114256

That on or about the 2nd day of January, 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused not being authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drug, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in her/his/their possession and control, zero point zero three (0.03) grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Criminal Case No. Q-03-114257

That on or about the 2nd day of January, 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or

act as broker in the said transaction, zero point zero three (0.03) gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to both charges read in Filipino, a language known and understood by him.9 On motion of the City Prosecutor, the cases were consolidated for joint trial.10Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

The testimonies of PO1 Eduardo Roy (PO1 Roy) and PO3 Armando Rivera (PO3 Rivera) were presented by the prosecution:

PO1 Roy testified that on January 2, 2003, at about 2:00 p.m., he was on duty at Police Station 9 where he made a pre-operation report on the buy-bust operation to be conducted on the herein appellant that same afternoon.11He then proceeded to Brgy. San Vicente, Quezon City with PO3 Rivera for the operation.12 At a point near Jollibee, they met the informant who, upon seeing the subject appellant, went with him to meet PO1 Roy.13 After being introduced to the appellant as a buyer of "piso" worth of "shabu", appellant immediately produced a sachet containing the alleged drug. When appellant received the marked money amounting to P100.00,14 PO1 Roy raised his left hand, at which point his back-up officer, PO3 Rivera appeared and immediately arrested the appellant.15 The appellant was immediately brought to the Police Station for investigation, while the two sachets of "shabu" and aluminum foil discovered on the said appellant were brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination.16

PO3 Rivera testified that he was the back-up officer of PO1 Roy, the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation conducted against the appellant in the afternoon of January 2, 2003.17 In preparation for the said operation, he conducted a short briefing and recorded the particulars of the operation they were about to carry out: the place of the operation which is at the parking lot of Jollibee Philcoa; the identification of the suspect as the appellant; and the preparation of the buy-bust money to be used.18 With respect to the buy-bust money, he prepared oneP50.00 bill, two P20.00 bills and one P10.00 bill, by making the appropriate marking on the top portion of each bill and recording their respective serial numbers.19 Later that afternoon, police officers proceeded to the meeting place. PO3 Rivera positioned himself in a parked vehicle20 about 20 meters from the situs of the transaction.21He thus had a clear view of the appellant with the informant and PO1 Roy.22 Shortly thereafter, he saw PO1 Roy make the pre-arranged signal at which point he approached the appellant to arrest him.23 He recovered the marked money from the appellant and proceeded to frisk the latter.24 Upon conducting the body search, he found another sachet which he suspected to be "shabu" and two aluminum foils. Appellant was brought to the Police Station for detention, while the items seized from him were brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination.25The two sachets tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) while the aluminum foil sheets tested negative of the aforementioned substance.26

Both PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera identified a Joint Affidavit dated January 3, 2003 during their respective testimonies, which they acknowledged to have executed subsequent to the buy-bust operation.27

The defense presented the testimonies of Joaquin Artemio Marfori, Arsenia Morales and the appellant:

Appellant denied the charges against him.28 He testified that he is a resident of Dolores, Quezon where he worked in a fertilizer store.29 He was in Manila at that time to bring money for his parents who live at Cruz na Ligas.30 As his mother did not give him enough money for his fare back to Quezon, he sidelined as a parking attendant at Philcoa in order to earn the balance of his bus fare.31 However, sometime that afternoon, two male persons in civilian clothes suddenly approached him and his co-attendant, identified themselves as policemen and poked their guns at them.32 The said policemen handcuffed them and proceeded to frisk them.33 He averred that nothing was found on him and yet the policemen still brought him to the police station.34 He denied the allegation made against him that he sold, much less possessed, the "shabu" subject of this action.35 He further testified that in the tricycle on the

way to the police station, PO1 Roy took out a plastic of "shabu" from his (PO1 Roy’s) pocket and once at the station, the said policeman showed it to the desk officer and claimed that the plastic sachet was found on the appellant.36

He likewise denied having received the buy-bust money and claimed that the P50.00 bill and the two P20.00 bills, totaling P90.00, were given to him by his mother for his bus fare to Quezon.37 He disclaimed any knowledge of the P10.00 bill.38 He further testified that he personally knew PO3 Rivera prior to the arrest, since his first cousin and PO3 Rivera had a quarrel which he had no involvement whatsoever.39 He noted the fact that it was PO3 Rivera who arrested him.40

Witness Joaquin Artemio Marfori testified that he is the employer of the appellant in his agricultural and poultry supply store in Babayan, Calamba, Laguna.41 He further stated that he allowed the appellant to go on vacation on December 12, 2003 to celebrate the New Year with his family in Manila.42 However, the appellant failed to report back for work at the start of the New Year.43

Finally, witness Arsenia Morales (Arsenia) corroborated the testimony of her son that she gave him P90.00, consisting of one P50.00 bill and two P20.00 bills as bus fare back to Laguna where he worked.44 Thinking that her son was already on his way home, she was surprised to receive a call from her daughter informing her that her son, the appellant, was arrested for possession and sale of "shabu".45

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On April 29, 2004, the trial court rendered a Decision finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ROLDAN MORALES y Midarasa, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. Q-03-114257 for violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. [No.] 9165 for drug pushing [of] zero point zero three (0.03) gram of white crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine hydrochloride and is hereby sentenced to suffer Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos.

The Court likewise finds the accused ROLDAN MORALES y Midarasa GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. Q-03-114256 for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. [No.] 9165 for drug possession x x x of zero point zero three (0.03) gram of white crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine hydrochloride and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment term of Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Month to Thirteen (13) Years and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Fifty Thousand (P350,000.00) Pesos.

The sachets of shabu subject of these cases are ordered transmitted to the PDEA thru Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition after this decision becomes final.

SO ORDERED.46

The trial court held that the prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as the person who possessed and sold to the poseur-buyer the "shabu" subject of this case, during the buy-bust operation conducted in the afternoon of January 2, 2003.47 The trial court found that from the evidence presented, the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the following: (1) the fact of the buy-bust operation conducted in the afternoon of January 2, 2003 at the parking lot of Jollibee Philcoa which led to the arrest of the appellant; and (2) the corpus delicti, through the presentation in court of the two sachets of white substance which was confirmed by the Chemistry Report to be methylamphetamine hydrochloride ("shabu"), found in the possession of and sold by the appellant.48

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the Decision of the trial court in toto. It found that contrary to the allegations of the appellant, there was no instigation that took place.49 Rather, a buy-bust operation was employed by the police officers to apprehend the appellant while in the act of unlawfully selling drugs.50 The appellate court further held that what is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.51 Stripped of non-essentials, the CA summarized the antecedent facts of the case as follows:

PO1 Eduardo Roy prepared a pre-arranged report on the buy-bust operation to be conducted against appellant at Barangay San Vicente, Quezon City upon an informant’s tip that appellant was selling "shabu" in the said area. On the other hand, PO3 Armando Ragundiaz Rivera recorded the briefing, summary, identification of appellant and the buy-bust money to be used in the operation consisting of one (1) fifty peso bill, two (2) twenty peso bill[s] and one (1) ten peso bill. PO1 Roy who acted as the poseur-buyer and PO3 Rivera as his back-up proceeded to University Avenue corner Commonwealth Avenue, Barangay San Vicente, Quezon City together with the informant.

PO1 Roy and the informant met appellant at the parking lot of Jollibee restaurant while PO3 Rivera positioned himself at the side of a parked car where he can easily have a clear view of the three. After PO1 Roy was introduced by the informant to the appellant as a buyer of "shabu", the latter immediately produced a sachet containing the said prohibited drugs and handed the same to him. PO1 Roy raised his left hand as the pre-arranged signal that the transaction was consummated. Thereafter, PO3 Rivera went to the area, introduced himself as a police officer and frisked appellant from whom he recovered the marked money and a matchbox, where the suspected "shabu" was placed, and two (2) aluminum foils. They informed appellant of his constitutional rights and brought him to the police station while the two (2) small transparent heat sealed sachets containing the suspected prohibited drugs and paraphernalia were turned over to the crime laboratory for examination, and which [was] later, found to be positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (commonly known as "shabu").52

Thence, the CA rendered judgment to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103 dated April 29, 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.53

Appellant elevated the case to this Court via Notice of Appeal.54 In our Resolution dated July 12, 2006, we resolved to accept the case and required the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs simultaneously, if they so desire, within 30 days from notice.55 Both parties adopted their respective appellant’s and appellee’s briefs, instead of filing supplemental briefs.56

Our Ruling

Appellant claims that he should not be convicted of the offenses charged since his guilt has not been proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.57 In support of his contention, appellant alleges that the arresting officers did not even place the proper markings on the alleged shabu and paraphernalia at the time and place of the alleged buy-bust operation.58 Appellant hence posits that this created serious doubt as to the items and actual quantity of shabu recovered, if at all.59

The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, insists that the direct testimony of the two arresting officers sufficiently established the elements of illegal sale and possession of shabu.60

At the outset, we draw attention to the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case: the appeal throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.61 On the basis of such review, we find the present appeal meritorious.

Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the trial court’s findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal.62 However, this rule admits of exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the case have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.63 After due consideration of the records of this case, evidence presented and relevant law and jurisprudence, we hold that this case falls under the exception.

In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.64

On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.65 Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt.66

With respect to corpus delicti, Section 21 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 provides:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources or dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

In People v. Partoza,67 we held that the identity of the corpus delicti was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. In the said case, the apprehending policeman did not mark the seized drugs after he arrested the appellant in the latter’s presence. Neither did he make an inventory and take a photograph of the confiscated items in the presence of the appellant. There was no representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected public official who participated in the operation and who were supposed to sign an inventory of seized items and be given copies thereof. Hence, we held in the afore-cited case that there was no compliance with the statutory safeguards. In addition, while the apprehending policeman admitted to have in his possession the shabufrom the time the appellant was apprehended at the crime scene to the police station, records are bereft of proof on how the seized items were handled from the time they left the hands of the said police officer.

We declared in People v. Orteza,68 that the failure to comply with Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 implied a concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of the corpus delicti:

In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.

The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the seized marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe the procedure and take custody of the drug.

More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies with regard to when and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the accused due to the prosecution's failure to indubitably show the identity of the shabu.

Likewise, in People v. Obmiranis,69 we acquitted the appellant due to flaws in the conduct of the post-seizure custody of the dangerous drug allegedly recovered from the appellant, together with the failure of the key persons who handled the same to testify on the whereabouts of the exhibit before it was offered in evidence in court.

In the instant case, it is indisputable that the procedures for the custody and disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs, as mandated in Section 21 of RA 9165, were not observed. The records utterly failed to show that the buy-bust team complied with these procedures despite their mandatory nature as indicated by the use of "shall" in the directives of the law. The procedural lapse is plainly evident from the testimonies of the two police officers presented by the prosecution, namely: PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera.

PO1 Roy, in his testimony, failed to concretely identify the items seized from the appellant. Moreover, he confirmed that they did not make a list of the items seized. The patent lack of adherence to the procedural mandate of RA 9165 is manifest in his testimony, to wit:

Fiscal Juradox x x You mentioned that you gave the pre-arranged signal, what is that?WitnessA- Raising my left hand.Q- And what happened next?A- My back up PO3 Rivera came.Q- What [did] your back up do when you raised your hand?A- He arrested Morales.Q- What were you doing when he arrested Morales?A- I put the informant away from the scene.Q- And what happened next after that?A- We brought him to the police station.Q- How about the shabu, what did you do with it?A- We brought it to the crime lab.Q- How did you send it to crime lab?A- Shabu and paraphernalia recovered by my companion from the suspect.Q- How many items were sent to the crime lab?A- 2 shabu and paraphernalia.Q- What are the paraphernalia?A- Foil, sir.Q- How many foil?A- I cannot recall.Q- What happened to the accused in the police station?A- He was investigated.Q- Do you know the accused?A- Yes, sir.Q- What is his name?A- Roldan Morales.x x x xFiscal JuradoQ- If the said sachet and paraphernalia will be shown to you, how would you be able to identify the said items?WitnessA- I could not recall "pare-pareho yung shabu"Atty. MosingI will object because that would be leading on the part of the prosecution because he could not identify on what shabu.CourtThat question is overruled.

Fiscal JuradoI am showing to you an item, would you be able to identify?CourtFiscal showing several shabu.WITNESSA- This one.Fiscal JuradoQ- There is another plastic sachet?WitnessA- Recovered.Q- How about these two?A- I was not the one who confiscated that.Q- What happened to the said item submitted to the crime lab?A- Positive, sir.x x x xFiscal Juradox x x xQ- How about the specimen forwarded to the crime lab?WitnessA- My companion brought that.Q- What was your participation in the case?A- Poseur buyer.x x x xAtty. Mosingx x x xQ- After the arrest you brought the suspect and the items to the station?A- Yes, sir.Q- Did you not make a list of items you have confiscated in this case?A- No, we turned it over to the investigator.Q- You have presented the buy bust money a while ago, was that buy bust money suppose to be turned over to the investigator?A- No, inquest. Upon request, I was the one who received it.70 (Emphasis supplied)The testimony of the other arresting officer, PO3 Rivera further confirms the failure of the buy-bust team to observe the procedure mandated under Section 21 of RA 9165:CourtQ- Where did you position yourself?WitnessA- Parked vehicle.Fiscal JuradoQ- What did you notice?WitnessA- The confidential informant introduced our poseur buyer to the suspect and after a few conversation I waited and I saw the pre-arranged signal. And when he raised his left hand that is the signal that the transaction is consummated.Q- After he made that signal, what did you do?A- I rushed to the area and arrest[ed] the suspect.Q- Who was the person you took x x x custody [of]?A- Roldan MoralesQ- And what did you do with him?A- Because he ha[d] a marked money I got hold of it and arrest[ed] him.Q- And what did you do with him?A- I frisked him.Q- And what was the result of your frisking?A- A box of match which I was able to recover [containing] another suspected shabu.Q- Where did you find that on his body?A- Front [pocket of] pants.Q- How about the match?A- The same.Q- What else did you find?A- Aluminum foil.Q- And after you recovered that evidence, what did you do with the accused?

A- We informed him of his constitutional rights and brought him to the station.Q- How about the items you recovered?A- Delivered it to the crime lab for examination.Q- What else did you deliver [to] the crime lab?A- Request, sir.71 (Emphasis supplied)

Other than PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera, the prosecution did not present any other witnesses. Hence, the investigator, referred to by PO1 Roy in his testimony as the one who took delivery of the seized items, was not identified nor was he presented in court. More importantly, the testifying police officers did not state that they marked the seized drugs immediately after they arrested the appellant and in the latter’s presence. Neither did they make an inventory and take a photograph of the confiscated items in the presence of the appellant. There was likewise no mention of any representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected public official who participated in the operation and who were supposed to sign an inventory of seized items and be given copies thereof. None of these statutory safeguards were observed.

Even PO1 Roy, the poseur-buyer, was not certain as to the identity of the confiscated shabu, to wit:

Fiscal Jurado:

Q- If the said sachet and paraphernalia will be shown to you, how would you be able to identify the said items?

Witness

A- I could not recall "pare-pareho yung shabu".72

The procedural lapses in the handling and identification of the seized items

collectively raise doubts as to whether the items presented in court were the exact same items that were confiscated from appellant when he was apprehended.

While this Court recognizes that non-compliance by the buy-bust team with Section 21 of RA 9165 is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground therefor, for and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the siezed items are properly preserved by the apprehending team,73 these conditions were not met in the case at bar. No explanation was offered by the testifying police officers for their failure to observe the rule. In this respect, we cannot fault the apprehending policemen either, as PO1 Roy admitted that he was not a PDEA operative74and the other witness, PO3 Rivera, testified that he was not aware of the procedure involved in the conduct of anti-drug operations by the PNP.75 In fine, there is serious doubt whether the drug presented in court was the same drug recovered from the appellant. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the corpus delicti.1avvphi1

Furthermore, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to reveal the identity of the person who had custody and safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending presentation in court. Thus, the prosecution likewise failed to establish the chain of custody which is fatal to its cause.1avvphi1

In fine, the identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. There was likewise a break in the chain of custody which proves fatal to the prosecution’s case. Thus, since the prosecution has failed to establish the element of corpus delicti with the prescribed degree of proof required for successful prosecution of both possession and sale of prohibited drugs, we resolve to ACQUIT Roldan Morales y Midarasa.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 24, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00037 affirming the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103 dated April 29, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET

ASIDE. Appellant Roldan Morales y Midarasa is ACQUITTEDbased on reasonable doubt, and is ordered to be immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five days from receipt.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLOAssociate Justice

G.R. No. 170289               April 8, 2010

ROSIE QUIDET, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Conspiracy must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself for it is a facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold. In case of reasonable doubt as to its existence, the balance tips in favor of the milder form of criminal liability as what is at stake is the accused’s liberty. We apply these principles in this case.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeal’s (CA) July 22, 2005 Decision1 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23351 which affirmed with modifications the March 11, 1999 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 20 in Criminal Case Nos. 92-079 and 92-080.

Factual Antecedents

On January 13, 1992, petitioner Rosie Quidet (petitioner), Feliciano Taban, Jr. (Taban), and Aurelio Tubo (Tubo) were charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 92-079 for the death of Jimmy Tagarda (Jimmy) allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of October 1991 at 8:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less, at Barangay Looc, Salay, Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Feliciano Taban, Jr., Rosie Quidet and Aurelio Tubo, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating, x x x and [sic] helping one another, taking advantage of the darkness of the night, in order to facilitate the commission of the offense with the use of sharp pointed x x x instruments which the accused conveniently provided themselves did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab one Jimmy Tagarda thus the victim sustained several wounds in different parts of his body and as a consequence of which the victim died immediately thereafter.

CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.3

On even date, the aforesaid accused were charged with frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 92-080 for the stab wounds sustained by Jimmy’s cousin, Andrew Tagarda (Andrew), arising from the same incident, viz:

That on or about the 19th day of October 1991 at 8:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less, at Barangay Looc, Salay, Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, and with the use of sharp pointed x x x instrument, and x x x conspiring, confederating and helping one another, and taking advantage of the night [in] order to facilitate the commission of the offense, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and stab one Andrew Tagarda thereby hitting his left chest and nose, the accused having performed all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Homicide as a consequence except for reason or cause independent of the will of the accused that is, the stab was deflected by the victim.

CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.4

Upon arraignment, all the accused entered a plea of not guilty in Criminal Case No. 92-080 (frustrated homicide). Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 92-079 (homicide), Taban entered a voluntary plea of guilt while petitioner and Tubo maintained their innocence. Accordingly, on

June 24, 1992, the trial court rendered a partial judgment5sentencing Taban to imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordering him to pay the heirs of Jimmy P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.6 Thereafter, joint trial ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

On October 19, 1991, at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Jimmy, Andrew, Edwin Balani7 (Balani), and Rolando Mabayo (Mabayo) visited a friend in Sitio Punta, Looc, Salay, Misamis Oriental. Along the way, they saw Taban, together with petitioner and Tubo, come out of the house of one Tomas Osep (Osep). Taban suddenly stabbed Andrew on the chest with a knife. Andrew retaliated by boxing Taban. Jimmy tried to pacify Andrew and Taban but the latter stabbed him in the abdomen. Taban then immediately fled.

Meanwhile, after Jimmy fell down, Tubo threw a drinking glass at Andrew’s face while petitioner boxed Andrew’s jaw. Tubo stabbed Jimmy who was then lying face down on the ground twice on the back with an ice pick after which he fled. Petitioner then boxed Jimmy’s mouth. At this juncture, Balani rushed to Jimmy’s aid and boxed petitioner who retaliated by punching Balani. Thereafter, petitioner left the scene. Mabayo was unable to help Jimmy or

Andrew because he was shocked by the incident.

After the incident, Jimmy was brought to the clinic of Dr. Precioso Tacandang (Dr. Tacandang). Jimmy was then in critical condition, thus, Dr. Tacandang advised the relatives of Jimmy to bring him to the Northern Mindanao Regional Training Hospital. Upon arrival at the aforesaid hospital, Jimmy was declared dead by the attending physician, Dr. Cedric Dael (Dr. Dael). Jimmy sustained a vital or mortal stab wound at the epigastric area four centimeters below the cyphoid process and another stab wound on the left lumbar. Andrew, who sustained minor injuries, was treated by Dr. Dael.

Version of the Defense

On the night of the stabbing incident, Taban, Tubo and petitioner were drinking liquor in the house of Osep. Taban left the group to urinate on a nearby coconut tree. Outside Osep’s house, he was suddenly boxed by Andrew and kicked by Jimmy causing him to fall near a fishing boat. There Taban found a fishing knife with which he stabbed Jimmy and Andrew in order to defend himself. After which, he fled for fear for his life. Meanwhile, petitioner went out to look for Taban. As he was stepping out of Osep’s house, he was boxed by Balani. Petitioner fought back. Andrew tried to help Balani but petitioner was able to evade Andrew’s attacks. Instead, petitioner was able to box Andrew. Petitioner then called out to Tubo to come out and run. When Tubo stepped out of the house, neither Taban nor petitioner was present but he saw a person being lifted by several people. Upon seeing this, Tubo, likewise, fled for fear for his life.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On May 16, 1995, the RTC rendered a judgment finding petitioner and Tubo guilty of homicide8 and all three accused (petitioner, Tubo and Taban) guilty of frustrated homicide, viz:

1) In Criminal Case No. 92-079, accused Rosie Quidet and Aurelio Tubo are hereby sentenced, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances present, to the penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF PRISION MAYOR with its medium period as minimum under the Indeterminate Sentence Law to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL in its medium period [as maximum] under the same law.

2) In Criminal Case No. 92-080 for Frustrated Homicide, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances present, this court hereby sentences all the accused [Feliciano Taban, Jr., Rosie Quidet and Aurelio Tubo] in this case to an Indeterminate

Sentence [Law] of FOUR (4) YEARS OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its medium period as the minimum under the Indeterminate Sentence Law to TEN (10) YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR in its medium period as the maximum under the same law. With costs.

3) To pay jointly and severally the heirs of Jimmy Tagarda in the sum of P50,000.00 for Criminal Case No. 92-079;

4) And likewise to pay solidarily the heirs of the victim Andrew Tagarda the sum of P10,000.00 for committing the crime of Frustrated Homicide.9

The period of preventive imprisonment during which the accused were detained pending the trial of these cases shall be credited in full in favor of all the accused.

SO ORDERED.10

The trial court found that the stabbing of Jimmy and Andrew was previously planned by the accused. The active participation of all three accused proved conspiracy in the commission of the crimes. Furthermore, the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses cannot be offset by the defense of plain denial.

From this judgment, only petitioner appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On July 22, 2005, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision, affirming with modifications, the judgment of the RTC, viz:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision is herebyAFFIRMED with the following modifications: (a) That in Criminal Case No. 92-080 the crime is only Attempted Homicide; and (b) the civil indemnity in the amount of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos which was awarded to the heirs of Andrew Tagarda be deleted as the same has not been fully substantiated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.11

In upholding the conviction of the accused for homicide, the CA held that conspiracy was duly established as shown by the concerted acts of the accused in inflicting mortal wounds on Jimmy. Hence, all of the accused are guilty of homicide for the death of Jimmy.

The CA, however, disagreed with the trial court’s finding that the accused are liable for frustrated homicide with respect to the injuries sustained by Andrew. According to the CA, the accused failed to inflict mortal wounds on Andrew because the latter successfully deflected the attack. Andrew suffered only minor injuries which could have healed within five to seven days even without medical treatment. The crime committed, therefore, is merely attempted homicide.

The CA also deleted the award of civil indemnity to the heirs of Andrew because the same was not fully substantiated.

Issue

Whether the Decision of the CA finding petitioner to have acted in conspiracy with the other accused (Taban and Tubo) in the commission of the offenses charged is in accordance with law and/or jurisprudence.12

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner claims that the evidence merely established that: (1) Taban went out of Osep’s store while petitioner and Tubo remained inside; (2) a commotion took place between Taban

and Andrew; (3) after this altercation, petitioner and Tubo stepped out of Osep’s store; and (4) petitioner’s participation in the incident is limited to boxing Andrew after the latter had already been stabbed by Taban, and boxing Jimmy’s mouth after the latter had been stabbed by Taban and Tubo in succession.

Petitioner insists that it cannot be said that he had the same criminal purpose and design as Taban and Tubo. His participation was not necessary to the completion of the criminal acts because by the time he boxed Andrew and Jimmy, the stabbing had already taken place. The evidence further established that the stabbing incident was purely accidental and that the accused had no grudge against the victims. Also, petitioner was unarmed negating his intent to kill.

Petitioner also cites People v. Vistido13 where it was ruled that conspiracy was not established under facts similar to the present case. In Vistido, the accused was merely convicted of slight physical injuries.

Respondent’s Arguments

Respondent contends that conspiracy was duly established. Petitioner was not merely present during the commission of the crime but he aided Taban and Tubo by inflicting blows on Andrew and Jimmy after the latter were stabbed. The simultaneous movement of the accused towards the victims and their successive escape from the crime scene clearly evince conspiracy. Respondent also stresses that the factual findings of the trial court should be accorded respect for it is in a better position to evaluate testimonial evidence.

Our Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

The existence of conspiracy was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, petitioner is criminally liable only for his individual acts.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.14 The essence of conspiracy is the unity of action and purpose.15 Its elements, like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests.16 However, in determining whether conspiracy exists, it is not sufficient that the attack be joint and simultaneous for simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of will or unity of action and purpose which are the bases of the responsibility of the assailants.17 What is determinative is proof establishing that the accused were animated by one and the same purpose.18

As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to evaluate the testimonial evidence, are accorded respect by this Court. But where the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which can affect the result of the case, this Court is duty-bound to correct this palpable error for the right to liberty, which stands second only to life in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot be lightly taken away. In the instant case, we find that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo in committing the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide.

Both the trial court and the CA ruled that the evidence duly established conspiracy. In particular, the CA noted:

[T]his Court HOLDS that there was conspiracy. x x x

With respect to Criminal Case No. 92-080 (for frustrated homicide), it was revealed that after Andrew’s chest was stabbed by Taban, Tubo also threw a drinking glass at Andrew’s face while [petitioner] boxed Andrew’s jaws.

From the foregoing facts, it can be inferred that all the accused acted in solidum in trying to inflict injuries to Andrew. Had it been otherwise, Tubo and [petitioner] would have just left the scene of the crime.

With respect to Criminal Case No. 92-079 (for homicide), it was revealed that after Andrew was stabbed by Taban using a double-bladed knife, Taban subsequently stabbed Jimmy before fleeing from the crime scene. Moments later, while Andrew was recovering from fist and glass blows from [petitioner] and Tubo, Tubo [straddled] Jimmy and stabbed him twice with an icepick before [he] left. [Petitioner], on the other hand, delivered a fist blow to Jimmy’s mouth notwithstanding the fact that Jimmy was already stabbed by Taban and Tubo.

From the foregoing facts, it can be inferred that all the accused in Criminal Case No. 92-079 confederated and mutually helped each other to insure the killing of Jimmy Tagarda. Hence, conspiracy was present in the cases at bar.19

We disagree. To determine if petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo, the focus of the inquiry should necessarily be the overt acts of petitioner before, during and after the stabbing incident. From this viewpoint, we find several facts of substance which militate against the finding that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo.

First, there is no evidence that petitioner, Taban or Tubo had any grudge or enmity against Jimmy or Andrew. The prosecution eyewitnesses (Andrew and Balani) as well as the three accused were one in testifying that there was no misunderstanding between the two groups prior to the stabbing incident. During the testimony of prosecution witness Balani, the trial court itself grappled with the issue of motive:

COURT: (to the witness)

Q- [W]hen you saw Feliciano Taban and Tubo stabbing Jimmy Tagarda, you mean to tell this court that they were enemies?

A- No sir.

x x x x

Q- Now, was there any information that you received that the reason why the accused Taban and Tubo stabbed Jimmy Tagarda and Andrew Tagarda was x x x of some previous misunderstanding?

A- No, I did not know.

Q- Until now, you cannot tell this court the reason why the stabbing took place except the fact that the group of the accused were having [a] drinking session and your group also had a [prior] drinking session somewhere?

A- Yes, sir.20

Second, the stabbing incident appears to have arisen from a purely accidental encounter between Taban’s and Andrew’s groups with both having had a drinking session. On direct examination, prosecution witness Andrew testified that Taban, Tubo and petitioner successively went out of Osep’s house to engage their group. This version of the events made it appear that the three accused laid in wait to carry out the crimes. However, on cross-examination, Andrew contradicted himself when he stated that it was only Taban who their group initially saw with a knife outside Osep’s house and who suddenly stabbed Andrew.1avvphi1 After he was stabbed, Andrew stated that he retaliated by boxing Taban and it was only then when he (Andrew) saw Tubo and

petitioner come out of Osep’s house.21 The records of the preliminary investigation of this case confirm this latter version of the events when Andrew stated that it was only after the commotion between him and Taban that Tubo and petitioner stepped out of Osep’s store to help Taban defend himself in the ensuing fight.22 Significantly, when the defense on cross-examination confronted Andrew with this inconsistency between his statements on direct examination and the preliminary investigation, Andrew answered that at the time of the incident it was only Taban that he saw.23 The same observation can be made on the testimony of the prosecution’s second eyewitness, Balani. While on direct examination Balani claimed that the three accused successively came out of Osep’s house, on cross-examination, he modified his stance by stating that it was only Taban who initially accosted their group and that petitioner and Tubo were inside Osep’s house prior to the commotion.24 This material inconsistency in the testimonies of the prosecution’s eyewitnesses belies the prosecution’s theory that the three accused had a pre-conceived plan to kill Jimmy and Andrew.

Third, unlike Taban and Tubo, petitioner was unarmed during the incident, thus, negating his intent to kill the victims. By the prosecution witnesses’ account, petitioner’s participation was limited to boxing Andrew and Jimmy after Taban and Tubo had stabbed the victims. His acts were neither necessary nor indispensable to the commission of the crimes as they were done after the stabbing. Thus, petitioner’s act of boxing the victims can be interpreted as a mere show of sympathy to or camaraderie with his two co-accused.

Taken together, the evidence of the prosecution does not meet the test of moral certainty in order to establish that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo to commit the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide. We agree with petitioner that this case is similar to People v. Vistido25 and the ruling there applies with equal force here. In Vistido, we held thus –

There is no question that "a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another where, between them, there has been conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime charged." It is, likewise, settled that "to establish conspiracy, it is not necessary to prove previous agreement to commit a crime, if there is proof that the malefactors have acted in consort and in pursuance of the same objective." Nevertheless, "the evidence to prove the same must be positive and convincing. As a facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold, conspiracy requires conclusive proof if we are to maintain in full strength the substance of the time-honored principle in criminal law requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt before conviction."

In the case at bar, the evidence for the prosecution does not comply with this basic requirement. To begin with, there is no evidence that appellant and his co-accused had any enmity or grudge against the deceased. On the contrary, the cousin of the deceased, Reynaldo Pagtakhan, testified that prior to the stabbing incident, they did not have any quarrel with them. In the absence of strong motives on their part to kill the deceased, it can not safely be concluded that they conspired to commit the crime involved herein.

Neither could it be assumed that when the appellant and his co-accused were together drinking wine, at the time and place of the incident, they were there purposely to wait for and to kill the deceased. For, they could not have surmised beforehand that between 3:00 and 4:00 o'clock in the morning of November 1, 1969, the deceased and his cousin — after coming home from their work at the cemetery — would go to the Marzan Restaurant, and thereafter, would take a taxi for home, and then, alight at M. Francisco Street. The meeting between the appellant's group and the deceased appears to be purely accidental which negates the existence of conspiracy between the appellant and his co-accused.

Besides, the appellant was unarmed; only his two companions (Pepito Montaño and one John Doe) were armed with daggers. If he (appellant) had really conspired with his co-accused to kill the deceased, he could have provided himself with a weapon. But he did not. Again, this fact belies the prosecution's theory that the appellant had entered into a conspiracy with his co-accused to kill the deceased.

Moreover, although the appellant and his co-accused acted with some degree of simultaneity in attacking the deceased, nevertheless, the same is insufficient to prove conspiracy. The rule is well-settled that "simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of will nor the unity of action and purpose which are the basis of the responsibility of two or more individuals." To establish common responsibility it is not sufficient that the attack be joint and simultaneous; it is necessary that the assailants be animated by one and the same purpose. In the case at bar, the appellant Raymundo Vistido and the accused Pepito Montaño, did not act pursuant to the same objective. Thus, the purpose of the latter was to kill as shown by the fact that he inflicted a mortal wound below the abdomen of the deceased which caused his death. On the other hand, the act of the appellant in giving the deceased one fist blow after the latter was stabbed by the accused Pepito Montaño — an act which is certainly unnecessary and not indispensable for the consummation of the criminal assault — does not indicate a purpose to kill the deceased, but merely to "show off" or express his sympathy or feeling of camaraderie with the accused Pepito Montaño. Thus, in People vs. Portugueza, this Court held that:

"Although the appellants are relatives and had acted with some degree of simultaneity in attacking their victim, nevertheless, this fact alone does not prove conspiracy. (People vs. Caayao, 48 Off. Gaz. 637). On the contrary, from the nature and gravity of the wounds inflicted on the deceased, it can be said that the appellant and the other defendant did not act pursuant to the same objective. Florentino Gapole's purpose was to kill the deceased, as shown by the fact that he inflicted a mortal wound which almost severed the left arm. The injury inflicted by the appellant, merely scratching the subcutaneous tissues, does not indicate a purpose to kill the victim. It is not enough that appellant had participated in the assault made by his co-defendant in order to consider him a co-principal in the crime charged. He must have also made the criminal resolution of his co-accused his own. x x x." and, in People vs. Vicente, this Court likewise held:

"In regard to appellant Ernesto Escorpizo, there seems to be no dispute that he stabbed Soriano several times with a small knife only after the latter had fallen to the ground seriously wounded, if not already dead. There is no showing that this accused had knowledge of the criminal intent of Jose Vicente against the deceased. In all likelihood, Escorpizo's act in stabbing the fallen Soriano with a small knife was not in furtherance of Vicente's aim, which is to kill, but merely to 'show off' or express his sympathy or feeling of camaraderie with Vicente. x x x."

By and large, the evidence for the prosecution failed to show the existence of conspiracy which, according to the settled rule, must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself. In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the defendants is separate and individual, each is liable for his own acts, the damage caused thereby, and the consequences thereof. While the evidence shows that the appellant boxed the deceased, it is, however, silent as to the extent of the injuries, in which case, the appellant should be held liable only for slight physical injuries.26

We reach the same conclusion here. For failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner’s liability is separate and individual. Considering that it was duly established that petitioner boxed Jimmy and Andrew and absent proof of the extent of the injuries sustained by the latter from these acts, petitioner should only be made liable for two counts of slight physical injuries. In addition, he should pay P5,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of Jimmy and another P5,000.00 as moral damages to Andrew.27 Actual damages arising from said acts cannot, however, be awarded for failure to prove the same.

Anent the penalty imposed on Taban and Tubo, in Criminal Case No. 92-080, the CA correctly modified the same. The crime committed was attempted homicide and not frustrated homicide because the stab wounds that Andrew sustained were not life-threatening.28 Although Taban and Tubo did not appeal their conviction, this part of the appellate court’s judgment is favorable to them, thus, they are entitled to a reduction of their prison terms.29 The rule is that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.30

Anent the award of damages for which Taban and Tubo should be made solidarily liable, in Criminal Case No. 92-079, the trial court properly awarded civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Jimmy. Civil indemnity is automatically granted to the heirs of the deceased victim without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of the crime.31 In addition, the trial court should have awarded moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00 in consonance with current jurisprudence.32 As to actual damages, the prosecution was able to prove burial-related expenses with supporting receipt33 only to the extent of P5,000.00. In People v. Villanueva,34 we held that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less thanP25,000.00, the award of temperate damages for P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages for a lesser amount. We explained that it was anomalous and unfair that

the heirs of the victim who tried but succeeded in proving actual damages amounting to less than P25,000.00 would be in a worse situation than those who might have presented no receipts at all but would be entitled toP25,000.00 temperate damages.35 Accordingly, an award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages is proper under the premises. As to loss of earning capacity, the same cannot be awarded due to lack of proof other than the self-serving testimony of Jimmy’s mother. In Criminal Case No. 92-080, the CA correctly ruled that Andrew is not entitled to an award of actual damages for failure to substantiate the same. However, he is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for the pain, trauma and suffering arising from the stabbing incident.36 It may be noted that the afore-discussed higher indemnities are not favorable to Taban and Tubo who did not appeal, but in line with our ruling in People v. Pacaña,37 they shall be held solidarily liable therefor since these amounts are not in the form of a penalty.38

Finally, the records indicate that the three accused were placed under preventive imprisonment prior to and during the trial of this case. This can be surmised from the motion to grant bail filed by petitioner which was subsequently granted39 by the trial court. It is not clear, however, for how long and under what conditions they were put in preventive imprisonment. The trial court should, thus, determine the length and conditions of the preventive imprisonment so this may be credited, if proper, in favor of the accused as provided in Article 2940 of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 22, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeal’s in CA-G.R. CR No. 23351 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1) In Criminal Case No. 92-079, Rosie Quidet is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of slight physical injuries and is meted the sentence of fifteen (15) days of arresto menor. He is ordered to pay the heirs of Jimmy Tagarda P5,0000.00 as moral damages. Feliciano Taban, Jr. and Aurelio Tubo are ordered to solidarily pay the heirs of Jimmy Tagarda P50,0000 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages andP25,000.00 as temperate damages.

2) In Criminal Case No. 92-080, Feliciano Taban, Jr. and Aurelio Tubo are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted homicide and are meted the sentence of four (4) months of arresto mayor in its medium period as minimum to four (4) years of prision correccional in its medium period as maximum. They are ordered to solidarily pay Andrew Tagarda P30,000.00 as moral damages. Rosie Quidet is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of slight physical injuries and is meted the sentence of fifteen (15) days of arresto menor. He is ordered to pay Andrew Tagrda P5,000.00 as moral damages

3) The period of preventive imprisonment of Feliciano Taban, Jr., Aurelio Tubo and Rosie Quidet shall be credited in their favor in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

4) The bail bond of Rosie Quidet is cancelled.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLOAssociate Justice

ARNEL COLINARES, Petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 182748

December 13, 2011

Facts:

The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares (Arnel) with frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.

The RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.

Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision but deleted the award for lost income in the absence of evidence to support it.3 Not satisfied, Arnel comes to this Court on petition for review.

In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required Arnel and the Solicitor General to submit their respective positions on whether or not, assuming Arnel committed only the lesser crime of attempted homicide with its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, he could still apply for probation upon remand of the case to the trial court.

Issue:

Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced probationable penalty, whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.

Held:

Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.

But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.

Firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances of his case.

Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set aside; and,two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.

The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This requirement "outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused—to wager on the result of his appeal—that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an ‘escape hatch’ thus rendering nugatory the appellate court’s affirmance of his conviction."17

Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.

Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for probation.

In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum.lavvphil This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.

The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose

Here, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court now finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months.

Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced penalty, it would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the probation law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.

ROLDAN MORALES y MIDARASA, Appellant.

G.R. No. 172873

March 19, 2010

Facts:Roldan Morales was charged in two separate Informations before the RTC with possession and sale of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The trial court and the Court of Apelas found Morales guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

Issue:What is the nature of appeal in criminal cases?

Held:Appeal in criminal cases possess a unique nature. The appeal throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. On the basis of such review, we find the present appeal meritorious.

Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the trial courts findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this rule admits of exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the case have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied. After due consideration of the records of this case, evidence presented and relevant law and jurisprudence, we hold that this case falls under the exception.

The identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. There was likewise a break in the chain of custody which proves fatal to the prosecutions case. Thus, since the prosecution has failed to establish the element of corpus delicti with the prescribed degree of proof required for successful prosecution of both possession and sale of prohibited drugs, we resolve to ACQUIT Roldan Morales.

ROSIE QUIDET, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

G.R. No. 170289

April 8, 2010

FACTS: On January 13, 1992, petitioner Rosie Quidet, Feliciano Taban, Jr., and Aurelio Tubowere charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 92-079 for the death of Jimmy Tagarda. The trial court found that the stabbing of Jimmy and Andrew was previously planned by the accused.  The active participation of all three accused proved conspiracy in the commission of the crimes.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that conspiracy was duly established as shown by the concerted acts of the accused in inflicting mortal wounds on Jimmy. Hence, all of the accused are guilty of homicide for the death of Jimmy.The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals as to the issue of conspiracy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court committed an error when it reviewed the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the RTC as to the existence of conspiracy

HELD:As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to evaluate the testimonial evidence, are accorded respect by this Court. But where the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which can affect the result of the case, this Court is duty-bound to correct this palpable error for the right to liberty, which stands second only to life in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot be lightly taken away.  In the instant case, we find that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo in committing the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide.

 Both the trial court and the CA ruled that the evidence duly established conspiracy. We disagree. To determine if petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo, the focus of the inquiry should necessarily be the overt acts of petitioner before, during and after the stabbing incident. From this viewpoint, we find several facts of substance which militate against the finding that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo.