113036072 political law case digests

7/25/2019 113036072 Political Law Case Digests

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Esmeña, Kimberly Marie F.

DE LLANA vs. ALBA

Facts:

This case pertains to the question of constitutionality of Batas Pambansa

Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Thereof

and for Other Purposes.". That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding,

erroneously entitled Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition

considered by this Court as an action for prohibited petition, seeking to enjoin

respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of the Commission onAudit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners sought to bolster their claim by imputing

lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation

of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the compensation and

allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the

determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed

completed.

Issue:

Whether or not the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the

security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges Under Article X,

Section 7 of the Constitution

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that there has not been shown

unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The Batasang Pambansa is

expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the

process toabolish existing ones. The termination of office of their occupants, as a

necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the

practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in the Supreme

Court. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the

abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the

abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with

an occupant whowould thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the

standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure



does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the

effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal

and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He

ceases to be a member of the judiciary.

In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in

accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far

as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, the Supreme Court be

consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need

be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle

that the Supreme Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law isinvolved. If such were the case, certainly the Supreme Court could not have its

say prior tothe action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it

could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put

in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant

positions created bythe reorganization. That remains in the hands of the

Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the

tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achievedby this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in

the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the

power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or

disregarded.

The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint,

even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with

distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic

principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and

another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. There is

an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and

forms part of every act to avoid any unconstitutional taint must be applied.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test of constitutionality.

Further, it is of the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is

precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded competence.

That is why it has long been well-settled under the constitutional system we have

adopted that the Supreme Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task

of reconciliation. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it



is the people who are endowed with rights, to secure which a government is

instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them either

expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise not for their own

benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the languageof ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." That is more than a moral

adjuration. It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain

rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill

hisresponsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security of

tenure provision to assure judicial independence.

Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.



MANILA ELECTRIC CO. vs. PASAY TRANSPORTATION CO.

Facts:

A petition before the court requesting the members of the Supreme Courtsitting as board of arbitrators to fix the terms upon which certain transportation

companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the MERALCO.

MERALCO submits the petition before the court by virtue of Act No. 1446, section

11 which states: ―Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other

person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines

and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or

corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to thegrantee herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed

by the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of arbitrators, the

decision of a majority of whom shall be final.‖

The parties to an arbitration may not oust the courts of jurisdiction of the

matters submitted to arbitration. It has been held that a clause in a contract,

providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred toarbitrators and to them alone, is contrary to public policy and cannot oust the

courts of jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not the members of the SC can sit as arbitrators and fix the

terms and compensation as is asked of them in this case

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in negative. The question in the instant petition is

not one of whether or not there has been a delegation of legislative authority to

a court. More precisely, the issue concerns the legal right of the members of the

Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators the decision of a majority of

whom shall be final, to act in that capacity.

The issue would not fall within the jurisdiction granted in the SC if it does, it

would mean that the courts would be ousted of jurisdiction and render the

award a nullity. If this is the proper construction, we would then have the

anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board



of arbitrators, taken wherefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the

Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would review the decision of its

members acting as arbitrators, members of the Supreme Court sitting as

arbitrators, exercising administrative or quasi judicial functions.

The members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be

considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would result in the

performance of duties which the members of the Supreme Court could not

lawfully take it upon themselves to perform.

It is a judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by theSupreme Court. Supreme Court being the guardian of constitutional rights,

should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government. Its

power should be confined strictly within that granted by the Organic Act.

Exercise of jurisdiction by the SC cannot mean exercise of jurisdiction by the

members of the SC sitting as board of arbitrators.

The award of execution is a part, and an essential part of every judgmentpassed by a court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment, in the legal sense

of the term, without it. Without such an award the judgment would be

inoperative and nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without a remedy. It

would be merely an opinion, which would remain a dead letter, and without

any operation upon the rights of the parties, unless Congress should at some

future time sanctions it, and passes a law authorizing the court to carry its

opinion into effect.

This is not the judicial power confided to the SC in the exercise of its

appellate jurisdiction. Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the Organic Act

and it would be illegal for the members of the SC to sit as arbitrators, the

decision of a majority to be final, to act on the petition of MERALCO.

Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.



DAZA vs. SINGSON

Facts:

After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House ofRepresentatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission

on Appointments among the several political parties represented in that

chamber. On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was

reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives.

Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and

joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing

their former party to only 17 members. On the basis of this development, theHouse of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on

Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving

this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a

new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the

petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional

member from the LDP.

The petitioner came to court contending he cannot be removed from the

Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent under

the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan. 5 His claim is that the reorganization

of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent

political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and

has not yet attained political stability.

Respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in

nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has

been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being the House of

Representatives which changed its representation in the Commission on

Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in

the Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be entitled

to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.

Issue:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has a jurisdiction over the matter



Whether or not change resulting from a political realignment validly

changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments

Ruling:On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the negative for it has the

competence to act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is

not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be

reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the

legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner

from the Commission on Appointments.

Tañada vs. Cuenco defined the term political question connotes, in legal

parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In

other words, it refers "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be

decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full

discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive

branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the

wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents contended

inter alia that the subject of the petition was an internal matter that only the

Senate could resolve. The Court rejected this argument, holding that what was

involved was not the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the respondents but the

legality of the choice in light of the requirement of the Constitution. The

petitioners were questioning the manner of filling the Tribunal, not the discretion

of the Senate in doing so. The Court held that this was a justiciable and not a

political question.

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present

case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators

Cuenco and Delgado by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral

Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-member and spokesman of the

party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-behalf of its Committee

on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the

Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination ... of the party

having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate and hence, is null and



void. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of

members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is

subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in

nature. It is clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial department topass upon the validity of the proceeding in connection therewith.

It is, therefore, the court‘s opinion that they have not only jurisdiction but

also the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties

herein." Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was made in

Cunanan v. Tan as it likewise involved the manner or legality of the organization

of the Commission on Appointments, not the wisdom or discretion of the Housein the choice of its representatives.

On the second issue, the Supreme Court in the negative. As provided in

the constitution, ―there should be a Commission on Appointments consisting of

twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected

by each House respectively on the basis of proportional representation‖ of the

political parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house ofCongress to see to it that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it

may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the

Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT the court.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby dismissed.



GARCIA vs BOARD OF INVESTMENTS

Facts:

This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board ofInvestments (BOI)/Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) approving the transfer

of the site of the proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and

the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to naphtha and/or

liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).

The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC) is a wholly government owned

corporation, located at Bataan. It produces 60% of the national output ofnaphtha. Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan

Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as a new

domestic producer of petrochemicals. Its application specified Bataan as the

plant site. One of the terms and conditions for registration of the project was the

use of ―naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its

petrochemical plant. The petrochemical plant was to be a joint venture with

PNOC. However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far EastCorporation, the major investor in BPC, personally delivered to Trade Secretary

Jose Concepcion a letter dated January25, 1989 advising him of BPC's desire to

amend the original registration certification of its project by changing the job

site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. The reason adduced for the transfer was

the insurgency and unstable labor situation, and the presence in Batangas of a

huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot owned by the Philippine Shell

Corporation.

Issues:

Whether or not the Supreme Court may take cognizance the instant case

Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in

approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to

Batangas

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled the first issue as a justiciable controversy

because first, Bataan was the original choice as the plant site of the BOI to

which the BPC agreed. That is why it organized itself into a corporation bearing



the name Bataan. There is available 576 hectares of public land precisely

reserved as the petrochemical zone in Limay, Bataan under P.D. No.1803. There

is no need to buy expensive real estate for the site unlike in the proposed

transfer to Batangas. The site is the result of careful study long before anycovetous interests intruded into the choice. The site is ideal. It is not unduly

constricted and allows for expansion. The respondents have not shown nor

reiterated that the alleged peace and order situation in Bataan or unstable

labor situation warrant a transfer of the plant site to Batangas. Certainly, these

were taken into account when the firm named itself Bataan Petrochemical

Corporation.

In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant‘s remaining in

Bataan, practically nothing is shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a

near-absolute discretion given by BOI to investors not only to freely choose the

site but to transfer it from their own first choice for reasons which remain murky to

say the least. And this brings us to a prime consideration which the Court cannot

rightly ignore. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution provides that: Xxx "The

State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on soundagricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full

and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in

both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino

enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices."The Court,

therefore, holds and finds that the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in

approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and

authorizing the change of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG

for the main reason that the final say is in the investor all other circumstances to

the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent advantage to the government has

been shown by this transfer. This is a repudiation of the independent policy of

the government expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own

affairs the way it deems best for the national interest.

On the second issue, the court holds and finds that the BOI committed a

grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant

from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from

naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in

the investor all other circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent



advantage to the government has been shown by this transfer. This is a

repudiation of the independent policy of the government expressed in

numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems best

for the national interest.

One can but remember the words of a great Filipino leader who in part

said he would not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one

subservient to foreign dictation. In this case, it is not even a foreign government

but an ordinary investor whom the BOI allows to dictate what we shall do with

our heritage.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby granted.



PACU vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

Facts:

This is a petition by the Colleges and Universities requesting that Act No.

2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be

declared unconstitutional, for they deprive owners of schools and colleges as

well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law,

they deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic

efficiency; and that their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education

unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute anunlawful delegation of legislative power.

Respondents on their answer submitted a mimeographed memorandum

contending that, the matter constitutes no justiciable controversy exhibiting

unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional questions; petitioners are in

estoppel to challenge the validity of the said acts; and the Acts are

constitutionally valid.

In support of their first proposition petitioners contend that the right of a

citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any

law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person

could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice

abhorent to our system of law and government. The Solicitor General on the

other hand points out that none of the petitioners has cause to present this issue,

because all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by

virtue of their permits. And they do not assert that the respondent Secretary of

Education has threatened to revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong

under the terms of law — and, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek

to obtain.

Respondent averred that it is an established principle that to entitle a

private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result

of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general to invoke the

judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must

show that he has sustained or is interest common to all members of the public.



The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the

interests of litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their protection

against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. Mere

apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw thepermit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy.

Issue:

Whether or not by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act no. 180 may be

declared unconstitutional

Ruling:The Supreme Court held in negative. In the first place, they believed that

the petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in

the form they seek to obtain and that there is no justiciable controversy

presented before the court. It is an established principle that to entitle a private

individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury and it is not

sufficient that he has merely invoke the judicial power to determined the validity

of executive and legislative action he must show that he has sustained commoninterest to all members of the public.

The power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when

the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protection

against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision of

actual cases and controversies and the authority to pass on the validity of

statutes is incidental to the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims

under the constitution and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the

constitution but it is legitimate only in the last resort and it must be necessary to

determined a real and vital controversy between litigants. Thus, actions like this

are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual positive relief and the court

does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question to satisfy scholarly interest

therein. The court however, finds the defendant position to be sufficiently

sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulation not

to invalidate the law because it needs no argument to show that abuse by

officials entrusted with the execution of the statute does not per se demonstrate

the unconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the litigation the court

conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if



the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the

Department of Education they fail to indicate which of such official documents

was constitutionally objectionable for being capricious or pain nuisance.

Wherefore, the petition for prohibition is hereby denied.



TAN vs. MACAPAGAL

Facts:

On October 6, 1971 petitioners Eugene A. Tan, Silvestre J. Acejas andRogelio V. Fernandez, respectively, of Roxas City, Romblon and Davao City, filed

for declaratory relief as taxpayers, but purportedly suing on behalf of themselves

and the Filipino people, in assailing the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution,

dealing with the range of the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.

The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the deliberating Constitutional

Convention was "without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution

and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek torevise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of a government

other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution merely empowered

to propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the

general plan laid down therein."

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners have locus standi on the case Whether or not actual controversy is present in the instant case

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that there is no legal standing to sue obtained

by the petitioners, in the categorical and succinct language of Justice Laurel:

"The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute

must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has

sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 5 There has

been a relaxation of this rule. As to the requirement in making a taxpayers suit as

a basis for legal standing, a negative answers has been contemplated. The

person who impugns validity of a statue must have a personal and substantial

interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a

result to its enforcement.

On the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled in accordance with the

controlling doctrine had the good sense to wait before filing his suit until after

the enactment of the statute for the submission to the electorate of certain

proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was only then that the matter was



ripe for adjudication. Prior to that stage, the judiciary had to keep its hands off.

The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other departments being left

alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. The legislative and executive

branches are not bound to seek its advice as to what to do or not to do.Judicial inquiry has to be postponed in the meanwhile. It is a prerequisite that

something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch

before a court may come into the picture. At such a time, it may pass on the

validity of what was done but only "when ... properly challenged in an

appropriate legal proceeding.

As long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is noroom for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete

what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted.

Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction. That is the command of the

Constitution as interpreted by this Court. Unless and until such a doctrine loses

force by being overruled or a new precedent being announced, it is controlling.

That is implicit in the rule of law.

Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration is denied.



DUMLAO vs. COMELEC

Facts:

This pertains to the Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunctionand/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in their own behalf and all others

allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on

Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa

Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional. Petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, a

former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, filed his certificate of candidacy for said

position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. He

specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process

guarantees of the Constitution. He alleges that the aforecited provision is

directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is

based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.

His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two

however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of ataxpayer‘s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office

of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring

persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of

complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already

disqualify them from office.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition filed contains the requisite of actual case or

controversy as a requisite for a review on certiorari

Whether or not the Batas Pambansa Blg.52 is unconstitutional

Ruling:

It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination

of actual cases and controversies. Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality

of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as

being contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution,

and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from implementing said provision.

Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that



provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the

COMELEC. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this

Court is being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the

abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinionfrom this Court to be rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record

Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction. Courts are

practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared

invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable

doubt. It is within the competence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications

for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided they are

reasonable, as in this case.

Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall

not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond

reasonable doubt. It is within the competence of the legislature to prescribe

qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided

they are reasonable, as in this case. The constitutionality of paragraph 1 section

4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is clear and unequivocal thus it does notdiscriminate and violate the equal protection rights of the petitioner.

Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the

accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy

the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation, according to the

fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso

contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is

disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone those charges

have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns

before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no

distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one

against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be

ineligible to run for public office.

Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of

only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion

of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can

stand by itself.



Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is

hereby declared valid and that the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas

Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "... the filing of charges for the commission of

such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigationshall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void for

being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to

an accused.



SUPLICO vs. NEDA

Facts:

An agreement made by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and HuJintao (Chinese President) held on October 2, 2007 regarding the ZTE National

Broadband Network Project. This case is a consolidation of cases filed by the

petitioner Rolex Suplico and the other petitioner questioning the act of the

Philippine Government in entering into such deal regarding the ZTE Project. The

respondents argues on the following grounds; that the court can no longer take

judicial review on the questioned act for there is no more justiciable controversy

to be resolved because the Philippine Government decided not to continuewith the ZTE National Broadband Network Project making it moot and

academic; that there is no perfected contract in this case that would prejudice

the government or public interest, stressing that it remained in the negotiation

stage; and that the matters raised concern executive policy, a political question

which the judiciary would generally pass upon.

Issue:Whether or not regardless of the its mootness the Court may take

cognizance

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that while there were occasions when the Court

passed upon issues although supervening events had rendered those petitions

moot and academic, the istant case does not fall under the exceptional cases.

It is no doubt that the petitions became moot when President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo, acting in her official capacity during the meeting held on

October 2, 2007 in China, informed China‘s President Hu Jintao that the

Philippine Government had decided not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project

due to several reasons and constraints.

Under the Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, it is mandatory and the Court has

no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official acts of the President of

the Philippines, who heads the executive branch of our government. It is further

provided in the above-quoted rule that the court shall take judicial notice of the

foregoing facts without introduction of evidence. Since we consider the act of



cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN Project

during the meeting of October 2, 2007 with the Chinese President in China as an

official act of the executive department, the Court must take judicial notice of

such official act without need of evidence. under Section 2, paragraph (m) ofRule 131 of the Rules of Court, the official duty of the executive officials of

informing this Court of the government‘s decision not to continue with the ZTE-

NBN Project is also presumed to have been regularly performed, absent proof to

the contrary. Other than petitioner AHI‘s unsavory insinuation in its comment, the

Court finds no factual or legal basis to disregard this disputable presumption in

the present instance.

Concomitant to its fundamental task as the ultimate citadel of justice and

legitimacy is the judiciary‘s role of strengthening political stability indispensable

to progress and national development. Pontificating on issues which no longer

legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy will do more harm than

good to the nation as a whole. Wise exercise of judicial discretion militates

against resolving the academic issues, as petitioners want this Court to do. This is

especially true where, as will be further discussed, the legal issues raised cannotbe resolved without previously establishing the factual basis or antecedents.

Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of

mootness. In the absence of actual justiciable controversies or disputes, the

Court generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where there is no

more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render

any ruling or make any pronouncement.

The Court is, therefore, constrained to dismiss the petitions and deny them

due course because of mootness and because their resolution requires

reception of evidence which cannot be done in an original petition brought

before the Supreme Court.

Wherefore, the petitions are dismissed.



NORTH COTABATO vs. REPUBLIC

Facts:

This pertains to the consolidated cases filed by the petitioners enjoiningthe respondents from signing the agreement when the MILF had a negotiation

with the government of the Philippines through a Memorandum of Agreement

on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) that was scheduled to be signed by the

Philippines in Malaysia.

The court then issued an injunction pending the signing of the MOA-AD.

While pending, the government of the Philippines ordered the Peace Panel onAncestral Domain, represented by Sec. Rodolfo Garcia and others to cancel

the Memorandum of Agreement and then further argued that case is already

moot and academic, therefore, there is no actual controversy for the court to

take cognizance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court may take cognizance of this present case,regardless of being moot and academic

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that regardless of its mootness, the Court will

take cognizance of the case for it may be capable of repetition yet evasive for

review. Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot

with the satisfaction of all the reliefs prayed for by petitioners and the

subsequent pronouncement of the Executive Secretary that "no matter what

the Supreme Court ultimately decides, the government will not sign the MOA."

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, this Court held that the "moot and academic"

principle not being a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in

resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds

that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of

exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the

constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide

the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet

evading review.



Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged

conduct, it does not automatically deprive the tribunal of power to hear and

determine the case and does not render the case moot especially when the

plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief against the possiblerecurrence of the violation.

The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them

into the domain of judicial review. The grounds cited above in David are just as

applicable in the present cases as they were, not only in David, but also in other

cases where the Court similarly decided them on the merits, supervening events

that would ordinarily have rendered the same moot notwithstanding.

There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount

public interest, involving a significant part of the country's territory and the wide-

ranging political modifications of affected LGU‘s. The assertion that the MOA-AD

is subject to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional

amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate

controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case,the government and its negotiating entity.

Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al. where the Court did not

"pontificate on issues which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case or

controversy as this will do more harm than good to the nation as a whole." The

present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in Suplico, what

was assailed and eventually cancelled was a stand-alone government

procurement contract for a national broadband network involving a one-time

contractual relation between two parties-the government and a private foreign

corporation. As the issues therein involved specific government procurement

policies and standard principles on contracts, the majority opinion in Suplico

found nothing exceptional therein, the factual circumstances being peculiar

only to the transactions and parties involved in the controversy.

In the case at bar, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of

agreements necessary to carry out the Tripoli Agreement 2001. The MOA-AD

which dwells on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli Agreement is the

third such component to be undertaken following the implementation of the



Security Aspect in August 2001 and the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and

Development Aspect in May 2002. Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary,

in his Memorandum of August 28, 2008 to the Solicitor General, has stated that

"no matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides, the government will notsign the MOA-AD, "mootness will not set in light of the terms of the Tripoli

Agreement 2001. Surely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another

one will be drawn up to carry out the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the Tripoli

Agreement 2001, in another or in any form, which could contain similar or

significantly drastic provisions. While the Court notes the word of the Executive

Secretary that the government "is committed to securing an agreement that is

both constitutional and equitable because that is the only way that long-lastingpeace can be assured," it is minded to render a decision on the merits in the

present petitions to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,

the public and, most especially, the government in negotiating with the MILF

regarding Ancestral Domain.

The present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply

the doctrine immediately referred to as what it had done in a number oflandmark cases. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly

the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the

Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will

again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents' actions

are capable of repetition, in another or any form.

Wherefore, respondents' motion to dismiss is denied. The main and

intervening petitions are given due course and is hereby granted. The

Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF

Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the

Constitution.



IBP vs. ZAMORA

Facts:

This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer forissuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on the constitutional

grounds in the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the

deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the Philippine National Police in

visibility patrols around the metropolis. Formulated Letter of Instruction the "LOI"

which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force

Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under the

leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila through a sustained streetpatrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially

those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include those

that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military

personnel.

Issue:

Whether or not the actions of the President was within the calling outpower of the president

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that Martial law is not needed to be declared so

that President can call for help provided it is to suppress lawless violence. When

the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,

invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested

in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke

such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis

thereof.

However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the

revocation or review of the President‘s action to call out the armed forces. The

distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power

to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped



together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any

qualification.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of theMarines, the civilian task of law enforcement is ―militarized‖ in violation of Sec. 3,

Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a

breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes

permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police

forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority

belonging to the PNP. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the

PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The realauthority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the

PNP, and not with the military.



LOZANO vs. NOGRALES

Facts:

This pertains to the filing of the petitioners of this case in their capacities asconcerned citizens and taxpayers prayed for the nullification of House

Resolution No. 1109 entitled ―A Resolution Calling upon the Members of

Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or

Revise the Constitution, upon a Three-Fourths Vote of All the Members of the

Congress.

Both petitions seek to trigger a justifiable controversy that would warrant adefinitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for

the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners alleged

that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from the prescribed procedures to

amend the Constitution by excluding the Senate of the Philippines from the

complete process of proposing amendments to the Constitution and for lack of

thorough debates and consultations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court has the jurisdiction to take cognizance over the

instant case

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in negative. It is well settled that it is the duty of

the judiciary to say what the law is. The determination of the nature, scope and

extent of the powers of government is the exclusive province of the judiciary,

such that any mediation on the part of the latter for the allocation of

constitutional boundaries would amount, not to its supremacy, but to its mere

fulfillment of its ―solemn and sacred obligation‖ under the Constitution. This

Court‘s power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and

controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised

after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the

constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. The ―case-or-

controversy‖ requirement bans this court from deciding ―abstract, hypothetical

or contingent questions,‖ lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice

concerning legislative or executive action. Any attempt at abstraction could



only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions

unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary

does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.

More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality tolegislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to

abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination

of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the

people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and

legislative departments of the government.

An aspect of the ―case-or-controversy‖ requirement is the requisite of―ripeness.‖ the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness is that first, the fitness

of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties

entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of

ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a

question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a

direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.

In the case at bar , the fitness of petitioners‘ case for the exercise of

judicial review is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently

proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. Moreover,

House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall

convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions

to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of

procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet

been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has

yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential

example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as

anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a

positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court.

The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional

requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which

mandates courts of justice to settle only "actual controversies involving rights

which are legally demandable and enforceable."



While the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of

locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of ―personal injury‖ to the

broader ―transcendental importance‖ doctrine, such liberality is not to be

abused. It is not an open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to filepetitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit.

In the final scheme, judicial review is effective largely because it is not

available simply at the behest of a partisan faction, but is exercised only to

remedy a particular, concrete injury. When warranted by the presence of

indispensible minimums for judicial review, this Court shall not shun the duty to

resolve the constitutional challenge that may confront it.

Wherefore, petitions are dismissed.



KILOSBAYAN vs. GUINGONA

Facts:

Petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated is a non-stock domestic corporationcomposed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who

are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal. The

petitioner filed this case against the respondent seeking to prohibit or restrain

the implementation of the ―Contract of Lease‖ executed by the Philippine

Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management

Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on-line lottery system, also known as

―lotto.‖ The respondent, however allege that the petitioners have no standing tomaintain the instant suit, citing the court‘s resolution in Valmonte vs. Philippine

Charity Sweepstakes Office.

The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office has decided to establish an on-

line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying

its sources of funds. Thus, PCSO conducted bidding for a possible ―partner‖ or

lessee on the said venture of PCSO. The Philippine Gaming ManagementCorporation (PGMC), owned by a Malaysian group of companies. After learning

that the PCSO was interested in operating on an online lottery system, the

Berjaya Group Berhad, with its affiliate, the International Totalizator Systems, Inc.

became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. Considering the

citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to

reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by selling 35% out of the original 75%

foreign stockholdings to local investors. An open letter was sent to President

Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of an online lottery system due to ethical

and moral concerns, however the project pushed through.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners has legal standing to file this case

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that the preliminary issue on the locus standi of

the petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in their favor. A party's standing

before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its

discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the



landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality

because "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands

that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, and

technicalities of procedure." Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Courthad declared that it "is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be

entertained," or that it "enjoys an open discretion to entertain the same or not."

It would not further clarification of this complicated specialty of federal

jurisdiction, the solution of whose problems is in any event more or less

determined by the specific circumstances of individual situations, to set out the

divergent grounds in support of standing in these cases.

Other cases where they have followed a liberal policy regarding locus

standi include those attacking the validity or legality of (a) an order allowing the

importation of rice in the light of the prohibition imposed by R.A. No. 3452; (b)

P.D. Nos. 991 and 1033 insofar as they proposed amendments to the

Constitution and P.D. No. 1031 insofar as it directed the COMELEC to supervise,

control, hold, and conduct the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976; (c)the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at Roppongi, Minato-

ku, Tokyo, Japan; (d) the approval without hearing by the Board of Investments

of the amended application of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation to

transfer the site of its plant from Bataan to Batangas and the validity of such

transfer and the shift of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or

liquefied petroleum gas; (e) the decisions, orders, rulings, and resolutions of the

Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Internal Revenue,

Commissioner of Customs, and the Fiscal Incentives Review Board exempting

the National Power Corporation from indirect tax and duties; (f) the orders of

the Energy Regulatory Board of 5 and 6 December 1990 on the ground that the

hearings conducted on the second provisional increase in oil prices did not

allow the petitioner substantial cross-examination; (g) Executive Order No. 478

which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported

crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products; (h) resolutions of the

Commission on Elections concerning the apportionment, by district, of the

number of elective members of Sanggunians; and (i) memorandum orders

issued by a Mayor affecting the Chief of Police of Pasay City.



Supreme Court decided that the instant petition to be of transcendental

importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest

and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited

cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social,economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays

of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the

envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is

expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves

recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes

aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.

Wherefore, petitions are dismissed.



KILOSBAYAN vs. MORATO

Facts:

In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement(ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO.

(Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or atleast P35,000 per terminal

annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8years.

PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the

expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million.

The petitioner, Kilosbayan, which is composed of a civic-spirited citizens, pastors,priest, nuns and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice

and national renewal. It seeks to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is

substantially the same as the Contract of Lease be nullified. Petitioners

contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with the violative of PCSO‘s

charter and the decision of the Supreme Court that violated the law on public

bidding of contracts as well as Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution

in relation to the COA Circular No. 85-55-A.

ISSUES:

• Whether or not petitioners have legal standing in the case at bar

• Whether or not provisions of the Constitution are self-executing

RULING:

The Court ruled that petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these

various litigants with the same holding grounds has. Petitioners asset an interest

as taxpayers, but they do not meet the standing requirement for bring

taxpayer‘s suits. The standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled

rulings on ―real properties on interest‖ because no constitutional issues were

actually involved.

An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit

cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same

parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues

of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. Therefore, the



petitioners do not have legal standing on the case because they do not fall

under any of the categories of taxpayer‘s suits.

As to the provisions of the constitution that are invoked by the petitioners,Section 5, 12, 13 and 17 in the Article II of the Philippine Constitution, are not self-

executing where they do not confer the rights which can be enforced in the

courts but only to provide guidelines for legislative or executive action. By

authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined

that consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO

may be given this authority. That explains with what the court had said, ―the

morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se it isleft to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit‖. Furthermore, the Supreme

Court expounded the reason through stating that the policies and principles

invoked by the petitioners in this case do not permit of such right of the people

to a balanced and healthful ecology, indeed, as already stated, petitioner‘s

opposition is not really to the validity of the ELA but to lotteries which they regard

to be immoral. This is not, however, a legal issue, but a policy matter for

Congress to decide and Congress has permitted lotteries for charity.

Wherefore, the petition of as well as the motion for reconsideration is

Denied with finality.



JOYA vs. PCGG

Facts:

Petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus withPrayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin The

Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from auction sale

scheduled on 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters

Paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacañang and

the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in the custody of the Central

Bank, alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his

relatives and cronies.

The petitioners averred that they have the legal standing to file this

petition because they are Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply

concerned with the preservation and protection of the country‘s artistic wealth,

they have the legal personality to restrain the respondents Executive Secretary

and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic

creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to file the instant

petition

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that the altruistic and noble purpose of the

petition notwithstanding, there is that basic legal question which must first be

resolved: whether the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for this

Court to exercise its power of judicial review over this case.

The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity

of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless

there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the

question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case

or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible

opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must



be necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most important are

the first two (2) requisites.

On the first requisite, Supreme Court held that one having no right orinterest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in

an action. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is

brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the

constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and

substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain

direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The

term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by thedecree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere

incidental interest.

The interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a

desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party.

Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law.

They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons fromdifferent parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation,

which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-

Philippine arts.

On this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the

foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has

been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they

were placed on exhibit. Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of

antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and

dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an

occasion personal to them. When the Marcos administration was toppled by the

revolutionary government, these paintings and silverware were taken from

Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to the

Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino

administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership

of these paintings has automatically passed on the government without

complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just

compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government,



any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent

disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof

whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are

protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they arethe legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become

publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to

question their alleged unauthorized disposition.

Wherefore, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is

dismissed.



CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY

Facts:

Respondent Public Estate Authority entered into a Joint VentureAgreement (JVA) with AMARRI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom

islands. The agreement also requires the reclamation of an additional two

hundred fifty hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to

complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern

Reclamation Project-MCCRRP.

Petitioner Franklin I. Chavez filed this case as a taxpayer contending thatthe government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by respondent of the

reclaimed lands to AMARRI. The petitioner wants that PEA publicly disclose the

terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II of the 1987

Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to

private corporations. And also, the petitioner further asserts that he seeks to

enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public

dominion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing on the case

RULING:

Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner has standing to bring this

taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its

constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the

right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the

application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable

distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. The

thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the

sale of government lands worth billions of pesos, information which the

Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second

issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of

the public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply

with a constitutional duty to the nation.



The petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. In

Chavez v. PCGG, the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer's suit

on matters of transcendental importance to the public, thus "Besides, petitioner

emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is anissue of 'transcendental importance to the public.' He asserts that ordinary

taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity

of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised

are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the social,

economic and moral well being of the people.'

The mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personalinterest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, such as in

this case. He invokes several decisions of this Court which have set aside the

procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case involved public

interest.

In Tañada v. Tuvera, in ruling for the petitioners' legal standing, the Court

declared that the right they sought to be enforced 'is a public right recognizedby no less than the fundamental law of the land.' In Legaspi v. Civil Service

Commission, while reiterating Tañada, further declared that 'when a mandamus

proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal

interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore,

part of the general 'public' which possesses the right.' Further, in Albano v. Reyes,

we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have been involved

under the questioned contract for the development, management and

operation of the Manila International Container Terminal, 'public interest [was]

definitely involved considering the important role [of the subject contract] . . . in

the economic development of the country and the magnitude of the financial

consideration involved.' We concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure

provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for upholding

the petitioner's standing.

Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to

information and access to official records, documents and papers a right

guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a

former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two



basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal standing,

Supreme Court ruled that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves

the enforcement of constitutional rights to information and to the equitable

diffusion of natural resources, matters of transcendental public importance, thepetitioner has the requisite locus standi.

Wherefore, the petition is granted. The Public Estates Authority and Amari

Coastal Bay Development Corporation are permanently enjoined from

implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared

null and void ab initio.



DAVID vs. ARROYO

Facts:

This is a case of seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibitionalleging that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order

No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. On February 24,

2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a State of National Emergency

invoking Section 18, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also

issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry out appropriate actions to

suppress and prevent the lawless violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the

same. The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 were stated as follows, Protest by theKMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the cancellation of programs and activities for the

20th celebration of Edsa I as well as revocation of rally permits resulting in the

violent disposal of the said groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf

David and Ronald Llamas.

Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and confiscation of

news stories and various documents. Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran bythe police showing a 1985 warrant from the Marcos regime and attempts on the

arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al. The petitioners assail that various

rights stated in Article III of the 1987 Constitution have been violated, thus the

case at hand.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to file the instant case

Ruling:

Locus standi is defined as ―a right of appearance in a court of justice on a

given question.‖ In private suits, standing is governed by the ―real -parties-in

interest‖ rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, as amended. It provides that ―every action must be prosecuted or

defended in the name of the real party in interest.‖ Accordingly, the ―real-

party-in interest‖ is ―the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the

judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.‖ Succinctly put,

the plaintiff‘s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.



Here, the plaintiff who asserts a ―public right‖ in assailing an allegedly

illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may

be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be

suing as a ―stranger,‖ or in the category of a ―citizen,‖ or ‗taxpayer.‖ In eithercase, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection.

In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the

public order and the securing of relief as a ―citizen‖ or ―taxpayer. This Court

adopted the ―direct injury‖ test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that

the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have ―a personal and

substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct

injury as a result.‖The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and

Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409,

Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged ―direct injury‖

resulting from ―illegal arrest‖ and ―unlawful search‖ committed by police

operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not

question their legal standing. In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen

alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised the issue ofwhether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the

alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest

of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their

Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of

their basic rights, as applied in different cases, when the issue concerns a public

right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the

execution of the laws. In G.R. No. 171483, KMU‘s assertion that PP 1017 and G.O.

No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it

legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of

their members. We take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of

the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies

following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners,

Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(IBP), have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential

injury which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence

of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5.



This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the

whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue,

this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi. In G.R. No. 171424, Loren

Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there areno allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a

former Senator is of no consequence. She can no longer sue as a legislator on

the allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP

1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a media personality will not likewise

aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances

prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has

pending electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise ofno relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the

proceedings or result of her case.

To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits

with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions

thus call for the application of the ―transcendental importance‖ doctrine, a

relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the ―PP 1017 cases.‖This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.

Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent.

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual

incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need

to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high

office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court

litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed

from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully

attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.



GONZALES vs. NARVASA

Facts:

On December 9, 1999, a petition for prohibition and mandamus was filedassailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on

Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants,

advisers and assistants.

In his capacity as citizen and as taxpayer, he seeks to enjoin the

Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the

presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Petitioner also prays that theExecutive Secretary be compelled through a mandamus to furnish the petitioner

with information requesting the names of executive officials holding multiple

positions in government, copies of their appointments and a list of the recipients

of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to

Malacañang.

Issue:Whether or not petitioner possesses the requisites of filing a suit as a citizen

and as taxpayer

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner did not have standing to

bring suit as citizen. Petitioner did not in fact show what particularized interest

they have to bring the suit. As civic leaders, they still fall short of the requirements

to maintain action. Their interest in assailing the EO does not present to be of a

direct and personal character. Furthermore, they do not sustain or are in

immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement.

As taxpayers, petitioners cannot attack the EO. There is no appropriation

granted from Congress but only an authorization by the president. There being

exercise by Congress of its taxing and spending power, petitioner cannot be

allowed to question the PCCR‘s creation. The petitioner has failed to show that

he is a real party in interest. In the petitioner‘s request of disclosure to public

information, the Court upheld that citizens may invoke before the courts the

right to information. When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a



public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that

the petitioner is a citizen.

Wherefore, the petition is dismissed with the exception that respondentExecutive Secretary is ordered to furnish petitioner with the information

requested.



PIMENTEL vs. ERMITA

Facts:

President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretariesof their respective departments without the consent of the Commission on

Appointments, while Congress is in their regular session. Subsequently after the

Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to

respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously

appointed in an acting capacity.

Senators being the petitioners, assailing the constitutionality of theappointments, assert that ―while Congress is in session, there can be no

appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office

needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first having

obtained its consent. Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can

issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the

consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session.

EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the President‘s power of appointment.

Issue:

Whether or not the President can issue appointments in an acting

capacity to department secretaries while Congress is in session

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. The essence of an appointment in

an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to

fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant

to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the

President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must

necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the

permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while

Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the

President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the

President‘s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department



secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her

choice even while Congress is in session. Ad interim appointments and acting

appointments are both effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim

appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas actingappointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-

interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for

confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the

Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily

filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing

the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo‘s issuance

of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of

Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

Wherefore, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby

dismissed.



ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:

Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing theCrime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so

defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the

valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the

effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with

the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the

element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal

Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.

The focal point of the case is the alleged ―vagueness‖ of the law in the

terms it uses. Particularly, in the terms; combination, series and unwarranted.

Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the

mentioned law.

Issue:Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi in attacking the

validity of the law using the facial challenge

Ruling:

On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute

vagueness. The petitioner‘s contention that it would not give a fair warning and

sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued.

Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioner‘s

reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited

by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is

utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction

cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute

is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a

reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute

precision or mathematical exactitude.

Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be

made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible



chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law,

the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge

to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the

challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists.

With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who

application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute

on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons

or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face

invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that

they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities areconstitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the

Plunder Law is more imagined than real.

Wherefore, Court holds that RA 7080, known as the Plunder Law, as

amended by RA 7659 the law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking

merit.



UMALI vs. GUINGONA

Facts:

Petitioner Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of the Bureauof Internal Revenue by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. On August 1, 1994, President Ramos

received a confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged

violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency

as Regional Director, more particularly the following malfeasance, misfeasance

and nonfeasance. Upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former

President authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of

the petitioner and immediately referred the Complaint against the latter to thePresidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for

investigation.

Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. And was

directed him to send in his answer, copies of his Statement of Assets, and

Liabilities for the past three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet. On October 6,

1994, acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, then President Ramosissued Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from the service, with

forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law.

ISSUES:

Whether or not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's right to Security of Tenure.

Whether or not Petitioner was denied due process of law.

Ruling:

The claim of CESO eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. Burden of

proof was on Umali, but he failed to adduce sufficient evidence. Petitioner was

not denied the right to due processes before the PCAGC. Records show

petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged

violations of internal revenue laws and regulations and he attended the

hearings before the investigatory body.

The constitutionality of PCAGC was only posed by the petitioner in his

motion for reconsideration before the RTC of Makati. It was too late to raise the

said issue for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings.



Charges included in AO No. 152 were based on the results of investigation

conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal charges before the

Ombudsman.

The petition is dismissable; issues posited do not constitute a valid legal

basis for overturning decision arrived at by the CA. Taking into consideration

that the charges in the Ombudsman were dismissed, BIR and Commissioner‘s

office were no longer interested in pursuing the case, and due to the position

taken by the Sol. Gen, The Court hereby GRANTS the petition. AO No. 152 is

considered LIFTED, and petitioner can be allowed to retire with full benefits.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby granted



LAUREL vs. GARCIA

Facts:

These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, theirrepresentatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the

3,179 square meters of land at 306 Ropponggi, 5-Chome Minato-ku, Tokyo,

Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990.

The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan

acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement

entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956, and is part of the indemnification to theFilipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World

War II. As intended, the subject property became the site of the Philippine

Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976. Due to

the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi

property has remained undeveloped since that time.

A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by formerPhilippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the

subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm where, at the end of the

lease period, all the three leased buildings shall be occupied and used by the

Philippine government. On August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a

committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government

properties in Tokyo and Kobe.

On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling

non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations‘ capital goods and services

in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including

the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first ―Whereas‖ clause. Amidst

opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been

pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting

with the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for bidding at a minimum

floor price at $225 million.



Issue:

Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated

by the Philippine Government.

Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have theauthority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. As property of public dominion,

the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its

ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an

application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the socialgroup. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens;

it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of

appropriation. The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2

of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended

for some public service.

The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time foractual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial

property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from

public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A

property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private

appropriation or ownership ―until there is a formal declaration on the part of the

government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108

Phil. 335 [1960]).

An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public

service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code

must be definite. A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976

is not relinquishment of the Roppongi property‘s original purpose. Executive

Order No. 296, though its title declares an ―authority to sell‖, does not have a

provision in this text expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties procured

from Japan for the government sector. It merely intends to make the properties

available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or other

disposition.



Further , President Aquino‘s approval of the recommendation by the

investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at the

very least, conditioned on a valid change in the public character of the

Roppongi property. It does not have the force and effect of law since thePresident already lost her legislative powers. The Congress had already

convened for more than a year. Assuming that the Roppongi property is no

longer of public dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the

respondents. There is no law authorizing its conveyance, and thus, the Court

sees no compelling reason to tackle the constitutional issue raised by petitioner

Ojeda.

Wherefore, the petitions are granted.



DANTE LIBAN vs. GORDON

Facts:

Petitioner Dante V. Liban et al, filed a petition in Court to declare RichardJ. Gordon as ―having forfeited his seat in the Senate.‖ The petitioners were

officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, while

respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) board of

Governors.

During Gordon‘s incumbency as a member of the Senate of the

Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the February 23, 2006meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors, in which the petitioners alleged that

by accepting the responsibility, Gordon deemed ceased to be a member of

the Senate as provided in Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution

Respondent contested that the petitioners‘ citation of a constitutional

provision had no basis, since PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled

corporation. Thus, prohibition under Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution did notapply to his case. Furthermore, service rendered in PNRC is a volunteer service

to which is neither an office nor an employment.

Issue:

Whether or not by accepting the PNRC position, did Gordon forfeit his

Senate Seat.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that accepting the PNRC position does not

forfeit Gordon his sit in the senate. The Philippine National Red Cross is a private

organization performing public functions. It does not have government assets

and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC

is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities

obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors.

Apart from that, PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be,

autonomous, neutral and independent to be able to conduct its activities in

accord to their fundamental principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality,

independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality.



Wherefore, Supreme Court declared that the office of the Chairman of

the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a

government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in

Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.



SERRANO de AGBAYANI vs. PNB

Facts:

A correct appreciation of the controlling doctrine as to the effect, if any,to be attached to a statute subsequently adjudged invalid, is decisive of this

appeal from a lower court decision. Plaintiff Francisco Serrano de Agbayani,

now appellee, was able to obtain a favorable judgment in her suit against

defendant, now appellant Philippine National Bank, permanently enjoining the

other defendant, the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan, from proceeding with an

extra-judicial foreclosure sale of land belonging to plaintiff mortgaged to

appellant Bank to secure a loan declared no longer enforceable, theprescriptive period having lapsed.

There was thus a failure to sustain the defense raised by appellant that if

the moratorium under an Executive Order and later an Act subsequently found

unconstitutional were to be counted in the computation, then the right to

foreclose the mortgage was still subsisting.

Plaintiff obtained the loan in the amount of P450.00 from defendant Bank

dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage

duly registered covering property described in T.C.T. No. 11275 of the province

of Pangasinan. As of November 27, 1959, the balance due on said loan was in

the amount of P1,294.00. As early as July 13 of the same year, defendant

instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings in the office of defendant

Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan for the recovery of the balance of the loan

remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against both defendants on

August 10, 1959, her main allegation being that the mortgage sought to be

foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of

maturity, July 19, 1944. She sought and was able to obtain a writ of preliminary

injunction against defendant Provincial Sheriff. Defendant Bank in its answer

prayed for the dismissal of the suit as even on plaintiff's own theory the defense

of prescription would not be available if the period from March 10, 1945, when

Executive Order No. 32 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent

legislative act extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to

be deducted from the computation of the time during which the bank took no

legal steps for the recovery of the loan.



Issue:

Whether or not the lower court erred in ruling the case at bar

Ruling:The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff's suit is thus manifest. From

July 19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial

foreclosure proceedings were started by appellant Bank, the time consumed is

six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive period was tolled however, from

March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953, when

the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years, two

months and eight days. Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially tothe foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before

prescription could be availed of as a defense.

Wherefore, the decision of January 27, 1960 is reversed and the suit of

plaintiff filed August 10, 1959 dismissed.



HACIENDA LUISITA vs. PARC

Facts:

The Hacienda Luisita is a 6,443 hectare parcel of land originally owned bythe Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera). In 1957, the

Spanish owners of Tabacalera decided to sell this land and its sugar mill, Central

Azucarera de Tarlac. Jose Cojuangco, Sr. took interest and requested

assistance from the Philippine government in raising the necessary funds

through: (a) the Central Bank, to obtain a dollar loan from the Manufacturer‘s

Trust Company in New York for the purchase of the sugar mill; and (b) the

Government Service Insurance System, to obtain a peso loan for the purchaseof the Hacienda.

The Central Bank used a portion of the country‘s dollar reserves as security

for Cojuangco‘s loan with the MTC on the condition that Cojuangco would

acquire Hacienda Luisita for distribution to farmers within 10 years from its

acquisition. On May 7, 1980, the Marcos government filed a case before the

Manila Regional Trial Court to compel Tadeco to surrender Hacienda Luisita tothe Ministry of Agrarian Reform so that the land could be distributed to the

farmers. On December 2, 1985, the Manila RTC ordered Tadeco to surrender the

land to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform.

When Corazon Aquino became President of the Philippines, President Aquino

issued Presidential Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, which

outlined her agrarian reform program. EO No. 229 included a provision for the

Stock Distribution Option, a mode of complying with the land reform law that

did not require actual transfer of the land to the tiller. On June 10, 1988,

President Aquino signed into law Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Law. The CARL included a provision that authorized stock

distribution as a mode of compliance; the SDO allowed a corporate landowner

to give its farmers and farm workers shares of its stocks in lieu of actually

distributing the land to them.

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to

DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the

resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI‘s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing



the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. The Court

however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that

there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Courtcannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP

must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the

original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries to choose whether they want

to remain as HLI stockholders or choose actual land distribution.

Issues:

Whether or not operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case. Whether or not Republic Act No. 6657 known as CARL is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled the instant case using the operative fact

doctrine. The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is

applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the

doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies todecisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the

force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they

may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on

this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and

consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution

approving the SDP of HLI.

The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine

by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs

because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they

received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to

choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or

not.

On the second issue, Supreme Court held that Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is

constitutional. The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on

the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the

earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case.



Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no

longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that

in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of

Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent graveviolation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of

constitutionality.

Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby denied.



SALAZAR vs. ACHACOSO

Facts:

On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro in a sworn statement filed with thePhilippine Overseas Employment Administration charged petitioner Hortencia

Salazar with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent

petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the

complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no

license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator

Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner.

It was stated that there will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia

being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal

recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has, No valid license or authority

from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers

for overseas employment; Committed/are committing acts prohibited under

Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.

On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty.

Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents as members of

a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. The group

assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's

Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the

petitioner.

Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized

properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Order

violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights,

and the properties were confiscated against her will and were done with

unreasonable force and intimidation.

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration can

validly issue warrants of search and seizure or arrest under Article 38 of the Labor

Code.



Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in negative. Under the new Constitution, it is only

a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. In one case, it was

declared that mayors may not exercise this power. Section 38, paragraph (c), ofthe Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by Presidential

Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to

Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under

Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.

The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of

authoritarian rule in its twilight moments. We reiterate that the Secretary ofLabor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence,

the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare

Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force

and effect. The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for

deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be

made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is

the sole domain of the courts.‖Furthermore, the search and seizure order was inthe nature of a general warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void,

because it must identify specifically the things to be seized.

Wherefore, the petition is granted.



PEOPLE vs MATEO

Facts:

On October 30, 1996, one for each count of rape in ten information filed,were filed against appellant Efren Mateo. The lower court found Mateo guilty

beyond reasonable doubt, imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The

Solicitor General, however, assails the factual findings of the trial court and

recommends an acquittal of the appellant.

Issue:

Whether or not the case should directly be forwarded to the SupremeCourt by virtue of the express provision in the constitution

Ruling:

Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review

over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua

or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the same

occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the moreserious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life

imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution

The same constitutional article has evidently been a thesis for Article 47 of

the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659,

as well as procedural rules contained in Section 3 of Rule 122, Section 10 of Rule

122, Section 13 of rule 124 and Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Rules of Court. It must

be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in

character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its

rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in favor of

the accused. In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the

Court, there has been a marked absence of unanimity on the crucial point of

guilt or innocence of herein appellant.

Some are convinced that the evidence would appear to be sufficient to

convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor

General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma.



Wherefore, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to

run for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the 16th election of

the IBP Board of Governors is hereby dismissed.



In re: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA

Facts:

This is a Petition filed by Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravaneraand Tony Velez, mainly seeking the disqualification of respondent Atty. Leonard

De Vera from being elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao in the 16th

Intergrated Bar of the Philippines Regional Governors elections. Petitioner Garcia

is the Vice-President of the Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while petitioners Ravanera

and Velez are the past President and the incumbent President, respectively, of

the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.

Petitioners elucidate that at present, all the IBP regions, except Eastern

Mindanao, have had two National Presidents each. Following the rotation rule,

whoever will be elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region in the

16th Regional Governors elections will automatically become the EVP for the

term July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2005. Petitioners asseverate that it is in this light that

respondent De Vera had transferred his IBP membership from the Pasay,

Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa. The transfer of IBP membership to Agusandel Sur, they add that he could have been disbarred in the United States for

misappropriating his clients funds had he not surrendered his California license to

practice law.

Finally, they accuse him of having actively campaigned for the position of

Eastern Mindanao Governor during the IBP National Convention held on May

22-24, 2003, a prohibited act under the IBP By-Laws. The respondent asserts that

the Court has no jurisdiction over the present controversy, contending that the

election of the Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the

qualification of those who want to serve the organization, is purely an internal

matter, governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and exclusively regulated and

administered by the IBP.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. De Vera can still practice the profession in the

Philippines



Ruling:

This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature for the

petitioners to seek the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being

elected IBP Governor for the Eastern Mindanao Region.

Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated first for the

post. In this case, respondent De Vera has not been nominated for the post. In

fact, no nomination of candidates has been made yet by the members of the

House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming that

respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to decline the

nomination. We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets thebasic requirements provided in the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred.

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De

Vera while he was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final

judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of

the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he suffered

at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the caseto the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary

proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to

prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the

administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera‘s moral fitness to run for

governor.

On the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the

delegates from Eastern Mindanao in the Century Park Hotel to get their support

for his candidacy, again petitioners did not present any proof to substantiate

the same. It must be emphasized that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by

evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our Rules of Court.



SANGUNIANG BAYAN of TAGUIG vs. ESTRELLA

Facts:

The present controversy stems from an election protest filed by thenmayoral candidate Ricardo D. Papa, Jr. against Isidro B. Garcia, the candidate

proclaimed mayor of Taguig, Metro Manila in the May 8, 1995 elections. In his

protest, Papa impugned the results of all 713 precincts in the municipality.

On February 11, 1997, respondent issued an order directing the National

Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to examine the contested ballots in the presence of

a representative of both parties. The pertinent portion of the order provided thatso as to enable the court to get a complete overview of the matter, it was

better to have a handwriting expert examine the questioned ballots to settle

once and for all the questions and objections relative to the ballots.

Complainants claim that: respondent gave unwarranted benefits to Papa and

caused, on the other hand, undue injury to Mayor Garcia as well as to the

people of Taguig by depriving the latter of their duly elected mayor, and giving

Papa unwarranted benefits; the decision and reports were prepared, issued,and executed with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable

negligence; that respondent conspired, confederated, and confabulated with

the NBI officials concerned and Papa to make the NBI Reports and the decision

favorable to Papa; that respondent did not bother to check the figures and to

analyze the data contained in the reports, allegedly because a careful perusal

of said reports would have led to the discovery of flaws and mistakes; and that

the hasty transfer of ballot boxes from respondent's sala to that of Judge

Vivencio Baclig violated Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code which

requires the examination and appreciation of the ballots to be done by the

judge himself rather than mere reliance on the work of the Revision Committee.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Estrella acted in accordance with his duty

Ruling:

In the case at bench, the NBI necessarily examined xerox copies of 14,664

ballots from 713 precincts and without the guidance of objections from revisors,

the NBI document examiner, on his own initiative and determination, sorted out



as written by one person 12,274 ballots in six (6) groups. This was done in a record

time of less than two (2) months, from March 31, 1997 to May 19, 1997.

To conduct this kind of examination, involving enormous number ofballots, is almost impossible to accomplish. One would have to spread the

14,664 ballots from 713 precincts beside each other, in a floor or table space

bigger than the size of a basketball court, and by going over those thousands of

ballots, pick at random groups of ballots – six groups in all – and, by examining

them, reach a conclusion that the ballots in each of these groups were written

by one person.

It is no doubt that this is simply an impossible procedure. And we are not

convinced that through this method, the NBI could correctly and with scientific

precision invalidate 12,724 ballots of the protestee.

Indubitably, the foregoing has raised the suspicion of partiality on the part

of respondent. Verily, a judge must promote public confidence in the integrity

and impartiality of the judiciary. These stringent standards are intended to assureparties of just and equitable decisions and of a judiciary that is capable of

dispensing impartial justice in every issue in every trial.

Wherefore, Judge Santiago G. Estrella is hereby found guilty of serious

misconduct, partiality, and inexcusable negligence, and is ordered to pay a fine

in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).



SOLID HOMES Inc. vs. LACERNA

Facts:

On 1 April 1977, respondents Evelina Laserna and Gloria Cajipe,represented by their attorney-in-fact, Proceso F. Cruz, as buyers, entered into a

Contract to sell with petitioner Solid Homes, Inc., a corporation engaged in the

development and sale of subdivision lots, as seller. The subject of the said

Contract to Sell was a parcel of land located at Lot 3, Block I, Phase II, Loyola

Grand Villas, Quezon City, with a total area of 600 square meters, more or less.

The total contract price agreed upon by the parties for the said parcel of land

was P172,260.00, to be paid in the manner stipulated.

The respondents made the down payment and several monthly

installments. When the respondents had allegedly paid 90% of the purchase

price, they demanded the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the

Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the subject property upon the final payment

of the balance. But the petitioner did not comply with the demands of the

respondents.

The respondents whereupon filed against the petitioner a Complaint for

Delivery of Title and Execution of Deed of Sale with Damages, dated 28 June

1990, before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In their

Complaint, respondents alleged that as their outstanding balance was only

P5,928.18, they were already demanding the execution and delivery of the

Deed of Sale and the TCT of the subject property upon final payment of the said

amount.

The petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Answer, together with its Answer

dated 17 September 1990, asserting that the respondents have no cause of

action against it because the respondents failed to show that they had

complied with their obligations under the Contract to Sell, since the respondents

had not yet paid in full the total purchase price of the subject property. In view

of the said non-payment, the petitioner considered the Contract to Sell

abandoned by the respondents and rescinded in accordance with the

provisions of the same contract.



Issues:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in not reversing the

decision of the Office of the President.

Ruling:

The Petition is unmeritorious. The constitutional mandate that, ―no decision

shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly

the facts and the law on which it is based,‖ does not preclude the validity of

―memorandum decisions,‖ which adopt by reference the findings of fact and

conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.

This Court likewise declared that ―memorandum decisions‖ comply with

the constitutional mandate. It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the

1987 Constitution need not apply to decisions rendered in administrative

proceedings, as in the case a bar. Said section applies only to decisions

rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled ―Judiciary,‖ and all of

its provisions have particular concern only with respect to the judicial branch of

government.

Certainly, it would be error to hold or even imply that decisions of

executive departments or administrative agencies are oblige to meet the

requirements under Section 14, Article VIII. Given the fact that the respondents

have not yet paid in full the purchase price of the subject property so they have

yet no right to demand the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the

TCT, nevertheless, it was still within the HLURB Arbiter‘s discretion to proceed

hearing the respondents‘ complaint in pursuit of a judicious, speedy and

inexpensive determination of the parties‘ claims and defenses. Since petitioner

did not rescind the Contract to Sell it executed with the respondents by a

notarial act, the said Contract still stands. Both parties must comply with their

obligations under the said Contract. As ruled by the HLURB Board of

113036072 political law case digests

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