politics and fossil fuels - pearson...

Politics and fossil fuels

Within my memory, gasoline cost 19.9 cents per gallon. Anyone looking at a pump in a

service station realizes that those days are no more. The price of fossil-fuel energy was

unrealistically low, leading to the profligate use and wastage of the 1970s. We humans

were squandering the heritage of the past several hundred million years of geological

deposition, and we were doing it over a very short period of time. From this perspective,

the price rises following the 1970s energy crisis were a welcome dose of reality, and the

subsequent fall disappointing. The history of the real price of gasoline (corrected for

inflation) is shown in Fig. E12.2.1. Even with the price rises of the 2000s, the cost of

gasoline in the U.S. is still near its historic low in terms of real dollars, which was

experienced in the late 1990s.

Fig. E12.2.1 Average national cost of regular gasoline. The black solid curve is unleaded regular (phased inin 1976), while the red dashed curve is leaded regular (phased out in 1990). Price is given in 2000 dollars.

Energy, Ch. 12, extension 2 Politics and fossil fuels 2

The year 1969 saw the United States produce the most oil in the history of oil

production. The subsequent slow decline in production and in reserves went almost

unnoticed. The world was awash in imported oil. The new era began in November 1973

with the so-called Yom Kippur war between Egypt and Israel in the Mideast. The Arab

nations had control of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the

producers of the major fraction of exported crude oil, and embargoed exports to the

United States and other Western countries to put indirect pressure on Israel to settle

territorial disputes in the Sinai and to resolve the Palestinian refugee problem. In the wake

of the cutbacks, the price roughly quadrupled (see Fig. E12.2.2). R. D. Hershey, in a

retrospective article on the energy crisis of the 1970s, writes (12) that “it was no

coincidence, analysts agree, that huge price increases and the Arab embargo came not long

after United States oil production peaked, at 9.6 million barrels a day, in 1970.”

Fig. E12.2.2 Oil prices ($ per barrel) are given from 1949 to 2000. Solid line, cost in dollars of that year,dashed line, cost in 2000 dollars (constant dollar price). (U.S. Energy Information Agency) Note the verylow price prior to the 1973 energy crisis.

Prices were high enough and, because of long lines of cars waiting for gas and a crisis

atmosphere, nerves of politicians were raw enough that President Nixon (1969-1974)


proclaimed “Project Independence,” an attempt to assure a domestic supply of liquid

fossil-fuel energy (more broadly, it was President Nixon’s program to shield Americans

from world oil price fluctuations immediately following the first energy crisis). The

project was carried on by President Ford (1974-1977). These developments promised an

evanescent independence and a rapid depletion of domestic resources with attendant

environmental effects.(15) President Nixon, in office during the first energy crisis that

followed the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, was the first president to have to have an energy

policy; previous presidents had left energy to take care of itself (which it pretty much

did). No politician had noticed that laissez faire led to gas-guzzlers. No politician had

noticed that American production was peaking in 1969 and considered that that meant

more and more oil would have to be imported, making America vulnerable to foreign

countries; only M. King Hubbert did (see Extension 12.4, Hubbert and world oil

production).

President Carter (1977-1981) presided over still another administration that discovered

how vulnerable America was to foreign intervention. The revolution in Iran in 1979 led to

another quadrupling in oil prices and to gasoline rationing in parts of the country: cars

with odd-numbered license plates could buy gas only on odd-numbered days. The

political response this time was to push development of alternative energy sources (see

Chapters 9, 18 through 20, and 25) and of domestic coal for energy, an emphasis begun

with Project Independence.

President Reagan (1981-1989), followed in his policies by President George H. Bush

(1989-1993), presided over an era of lowered energy prices, mostly the result of

conservation efforts launched earlier, and allowed the initiatives proposed by his three

immediate predecessors to wither away. President Bush presided over an era of generally

lower oil prices, except for the period just prior to the Persian Gulf war. Alternative


energy research of all kinds was subject to funding cuts, and big cars once more came into

vogue. The Persian Gulf war fought by President Bush (to “retain international borders”)

was recognized to have followed from concern over the safety and availability of the

American oil supply. Given President Bush’s background in the oil drilling industry, it

came as no surprise that he attempted to ease regulations affecting drillers. Such efforts,

however, are counterproductive. Returns from exploratory drilling are diminishing; there

is a large import component; and the terrain is already well-surveyed.(16) Easing

restrictions can damage both the economy and the environment.(16)

Fig. E12.2.3 The U.S. government use of buildings became much more energy-efficient during the Clintonyears. Note the suppressed zero on the graph, which exaggerates the (substantial) fall in energy use.(National Energy Policy Development Group)

President Clinton (1993-2001) promised in his campaign to alter American energy

policies and revisited some of the policies discarded over the 12-year Reagan-Bush years.

One difference was President Clinton’s willingness early in his first term to propose a

“Btu tax”; when this failed in Congress, he accepted a much smaller gasoline tax, even

smaller than President Bush had been forced to accept in his “deficit reduction” agreement

with Congress. During President Clinton’s tenure, the Federal Government made great


strides in becoming more energy-efficient. Figure E12.2.3 shows the result of the energy-

conscious policies of the Clinton years.

Fig. E12.2.4 Fuel efficiencies of cars and pickup trucks.(National Energy Policy Development Group)

While President Clinton tried to get Congress to pay attention to energy issues and

proposed a new national policy of efficiency and renewables, the Republican Congress

noted the low price of energy and balked. President Clinton was generally more receptive

than his immediate predecessors to explore alternatives to energy use. Petroleum imports

increased substantially over his eight years, at least partly because of the soaring sales of

pickups and SUVs (not counted under CAFE, a law that limits the mileage of production

cars in the U.S., see Ch. 13 and Extension 15.3, SUVs and CAFE standards) used to

replace the family car (covered under the CAFE standards), Fig. E12.2.4. This placed the

Clinton administration in a dilemma, as the Kyoto Protocol (Ch. 17) mandated a return to

1990 carbon dioxide emissions levels as a first step, and the use of petroleum continued to

grow rather than recede during the Clinton administration’s eight years. President Clinton


also led a process that declared many areas held by the Federal Government to be

preserved from development.

Both President George W. Bush (2001- ) and Vice President Richard Cheney were

products of the oil industry, and saw things differently. President Bush either attempted

or succeeded in his first Presidential acts in rolling back many of President Clinton’s

protections for National Forests and Monuments and the environment in general. Vice

President Cheney convened a task force early in the administration made up mostly of

like-minded individuals from the cabinet that saw a new energy crisis (exacerbated in the

public mind because of the fallout from California deregulation—see Ch. 8, particularly

Extension 8.2, Deregulation in the 21st century). Figure E12.2.5 shows the predictions

of supply shortfall from the report of the National Energy Policy Development Group.

a.


b.

Fig. E12.2.5 The Vice President’s task force predictions for future supplies. a. Oil. b. Gas.(National Energy Policy Development Group)

The task force did bring to public attention a real problem with imports (see Fig. 12.3 b)

that had been growing ever more severe. However, its disinclination to listen seriously to

anyone not from the energy extraction sector, the lack of any suggestion that the

automobile industry CAFE mileage standards should be raised (they have not been

changed since 1991 and do not apply to SUVs as cars), and especially the Vice

President’s well-publicized remarks that conservation was morally good but ineffective

(untrue, see Ch. 9, Extension 8.2, and especially Fig. E12.2.6, taken from the Task Force

report itself)(17) led many in the public to dismiss the administration’s policy. This is

unfortunate, because there were a few sensible suggestions contained in this report

(among quite a few others that seemed not so sensible to many, if not most, experts).


Fig. E12.2.6 Fig. 4 from the National Energy Policy Development Group (R. Cheney et al.). The caption in theoriginal reads: Improvements in energy efficiency since the 1970s have had a major impact meeting nationalenergy needs relative to new supply. If the intensity of U.S. energy had remained constant since 1972,consumption would have been about 65 quadrillion Btus (74 percent) higher in 1999 than it actually was. Recallthat energy use is roughly related to GDP.

Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the Task Force report is its many missed

opportunities—and its rather cavalier dismissal of conservation efforts (conservation was

eventually mentioned in the report, but very little emphasis was placed in the important

savings that still await implementation). While the industrial sector, driven by economics,

has become much more efficient since 1973, room for improvement exists, and the report

mostly ignores that (there are recommendations that would reduce barriers to production

and sale of energy as a byproduct of process heat). The commercial sector is notoriously

loath to invest in projects that have a payback time greater than a few years (such as

improving building energy-efficiency), and that is not addressed in the report.

The consequences of savings have proven immensely fruitful over many years (amply

documented in many other places in this book). The Bush administration could be

accused of having sold out to energy producers on the basis of recommendations it did not


make in the Task Force report,(17) for example, favoring renewable energy, rescinding

poorly-considered Bush rollbacks in Clinton energy efficiency standards such as that for

air conditioners, accepting the utility of further efficiency improvements, encouraging

greater energy efficiency in automobiles through a reworking of the Corporate Average

Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, implementing a stronger energy efficiency program in

the Department of Energy, or emphasizing clean fuel technologies.

Cleveland and.Kaufmann make essentially the same point in a different way:(18)

The efficient use of energy could help reduce our dependence on oil.

Unfortunately, Vice-President Cheney has openly displayed disdain for this

path, claiming that energy efficiency may be a laudable ‘personal virtue,’ but

it should not be a centerpiece of energy policy. ... But in reality, just the

opposite is the case. In the last 20 years some of the world’s best scientists

and engineers have produced great innovations in the efficient use of energy.

Cars that get 70 or more miles per gallon, appliances that use half the energy

they did 10 years ago, lighting fixtures that last for years at a fraction of the

energy cost, and new homes that heat and cool with modest amounts of

energy are proven winners in energy and economic terms.

Instead, the report suggests easing regulations on industry (some of these are warranted,

others not), and rolling back standards that protect citizens’ health (especially the so-

called “new source review,” a Clinton administration EPA measure roundly hated by

utilities because it forces installation of equipment in older plants being renovated that

would decrease emissions). President Bush seems all too open to the industrial point of

view on these matters, issuing executive orders and ordering EPA acquiescence to

weakened standards.(19) His “Clear Skies” program, which rolled back clean air

regulations, was promulgated against the advice of the EPA.(20)


There has been considerable controversy, and lawsuits filed by environmental groups and

(in an unprecedented step) by the Congressional General Accounting Office trying to

determine exactly how much influence industry had in the setting the recommendations of

the Task Force.(21) The answer, on the basis of partial compliance, seems to be—plenty!

In addition to almost unlimited access for industry groups to the Task Force (including

Enron, which before its 2001 collapse apparently gained almost everything it wanted

from the Task Force and the President),(22) and lack of access for environmental

groups,(23) the revelation that several Bush Presidential Executive Orders have been taken

word for word from lobbyists’ letters have contributed to the perception (if not indeed

the reality) that the Bush administration is not really interested in the environment,

especially if its preservation collides with the ability of administration friends in the fossil

extraction industry to make money from it.(19)

The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge

The proud history of conservation in the United States has featured many prominent

Republicans (including Republican politicians). Perhaps the most famous politician

conservationist was Theodore Roosevelt, a weighty supporter indeed of National Parks

and the value of wilderness. In fact, for the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, the

Republican party was the political party of the conservationists. Many environmental

organizations were founded by Republicans or Republican-leaning donors (think of the

Rockefellers). The Democrats were too busy trying to create jobs to pay attention to

conservation of America’s natural splendors (one may admit that the Depression, with so

many people out of work for such a long time, was a good excuse for that attitude).

The late 1960s and the 1970s were so fruitful of environmental legislation because of the

rising consciousness of Democrats to the value of the environment, helped along by Earth


Day, and the continued solid support of Republicans for natural conservation. However,

that consensus unraveled with the rise of President Reagan, who was an enviroskeptic

before the term had been invented. He famously chose James Watt, who was proud of

exploiting rather than protecting the environment, to be his Secretary of the Interior.

Reagan disciples generally adopted his antienvironmentalist approach and the Republican

party rather quickly lost its commitment to the environment. This is the backdrop to Vice

President Cheney’s attitude and that of his Task Force.

The National Energy Policy Development Group’s recommendation that the Arctic

National Wildlife Refuge (known as ANWR) and other areas currently closed to drilling

be opened to drilling generated considerable controversy. This was an early indication of

the Bush administration’s selective deafness and blindness. As former oilmen, the

president and vice president certainly understood the oil business, but many believe that

they were too close to be able to see the “big picture.” As we shall see below, the oil there

in ANWR would certainly help out a bit, but it would take quite some time before it

could be brought into production, and that “bit” would be very, very small in the grand

scheme of things.(24) ANWR is no Saudi Arabia, Iraq, or even Venezuela. In short, it is no

realistic solution to the yawning American thirst for oil.

President Eisenhower originally created the Wildlife Refuge in 1960 to protect the great

herd of caribou, the Porcupine herd. President George W. Bush had specifically endorsed

drilling in the Refuge during his campaign. This Development Group report supported

Republican Senators who had already introduced a bill in support of the Bush position to

allow drilling in the Refuge, and the Bush energy plan passed in the House of

Representatives.(25) However, with the Republican loss of their 51-50 Senate margin (the

Vice President voted with 50 Republicans to make the 51), and because they have a

significant number of opponents of drilling within their own party, the chances of drilling


in the immediate future have dimmed because the Democrats are generally opposed to the

drilling,(26) and the ANWR drilling bill ultimately lost in the Senate.(27) After the events

of September 11, 2001 and the rush to war against an Iraq that was somehow conflated

with al Qaeda,(28) the Republicans retook the Senate, but still were unable to pass

legislation allowing drilling in the Refuge, possibly because of soft oil company

support.(29)

Fig. E12.2.7 The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. (USGS, Ref. 35)

The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge consists of 19.5 million acres containing six different

ecosystems in Alaska’s northeast corner. According to Karen Boylan, refuge chief of

external affairs, as quoted by a reporter,(30) the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge has “been

called the American Serengeti—it’s that kind of visual, with animals as far as you can


see.” The part that could be opened lies along the coast, and is the meeting, feeding, and

breeding ground for many animals. There are about 200 species of animal in the Refuge’s

region, including 250 musk oxen, polar bear, 300,000 caribou, 300,000 snow geese and

about 160 other species of bird, and at least 40 species of fish.

The geological evidence for the oil lurking in the so-called 1002 Area of the Wildlife

Refuge is based on a survey done in 1985, using a caravan of vehicles, the traces of which

were still visible 15 years later (10% showing scuff marks or lower plant cover and an

additional 7% totally unrecovered and probably permanently damaged.(31) This raises the

question of the damage that could be done by any new survey, which would be 30 times

more detailed, and by placement of the drilling platforms.(31)

There is no doubt that drilling techniques have improved considerably in recent

years.(17,32,33,34) However, there must still be heavy equipment used, with the

consequent increase in the human population of this isolated area (it would quadruple)

and noise. A study by Wolfe (quoted in Ref. 31) found that the western part of the

central Arctic herd of caribou had shifted its calving away from the richest areas in

response to development close to those areas. Another study (also quoted in Ref. 31)

found that those caribou that summered among the oil fields in the west of the

Sagavanirktok River had over 20% fewer calves than those who summered in the

undeveloped east of the river. There are more animals in a smaller area than the North

Slope near the 1002 Area, the area subject to drilling if drilling were to be

allowed.(31,35,36) And habitat loss has also been observed in the Canadian Arctic

following seismic exploration.(37,38)

The International Agreement for the Conservation of Polar Bears, an international treaty

signed by the U.S., became an issue in the controversy over the Wildlife Refuge. The Fish


and Wildlife Service reports that warned that opening the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge

to exploitation could adversely affect the bears and violate the treaty were renounced by

the Bush administration Secretary of the Interior, Gale Norton.(39) Further, when

biologists for the U.S. Geological Survey concluded after a three-year study that oil

development could affect caribou calving adversely,(40) they were ordered to reexamine

their conclusions. Just one week later, a revised report was released that claimed that the

impact would be minimal.(41)

Geological indications of oil have focused Presidential and conservationist attention on

this distant, seldom-visited area. The best geological estimates are that there are from 4 to

12 Gbbl in the area, with an expected value of 7.7 Gbbl, of which 3.2 to 5.6 Gbbl might be

profitably recovered at prices around $20 to $25/bbl (see Fig. E12.2.8 for an idea of how

the volume that is exploitable differs from oil in place).(30,31,35,42) Were the price of oil to

return to $12, the amount recoverable would be several hundred million barrels.(31,35)

However, oil companies estimate that 10.3 Gbbl can be recovered with 50% confidence

(see Table E12.2.1). These latter figures compare with the reserve estimate in the lower

48 states of 16.8 Gbbl remaining.(30)

Despite the rhetoric expended on it, there is no way this supply could possibly end

American dependence on imported oil. When the oil would come out of the wells starting

in 2010, it would represent something like 10% of today’s daily production. The yearly

amount of petroleum used by the U.S. is 7.2 Gbbl, so at the highest estimate the Wildlife

Refuge represents a two-year supply at current use rates. Most likely it represents

somewhere between half a year and three-quarters of a year’s domestic supply.


Fig. E12.2.8 Schematic graph illustrating petroleum volumes and probabilities. Curves represent categoriesof oil in assessment. An example of how one reads this graph is illustrated by the blue and orange linesprojected to the curve for economically recoverable oil. There is a 95-percent chance (i.e., probability, F95)of at least volume V1 of economically recoverable oil, and there is a 5-percent chance (F05) of at leastvolume V2 of economically recoverable oil.

Table E12.2.1

Volume of Oil (millions of barrels) in 1002 Area, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge

Part of Study Area 95th %ile Mean 5th %ile

Entire assessment area 1 5,724 10,322 15,955ANWR 1002 Area (Federal), TOTAL 4,254 7,668 11,799Undeformed part 3,403 6,420 10,224Deformed part 0 1,248 3,185 1 Includes 1002 Area shown in Fig. E12.2.7, Native lands, and adjacent State water areas within 3-mileboundary.Source: Ref. 35

This raises the legitimate question of which values, conservation or exploitation, are most

important. There have been many cases of improper dumping, even by companies such as

BP Amoco, which pride themselves on being “green.”(36) Given the controversy, and

given public opposition to drilling, the National Academy of Sciences was asked to

perform an 18-month long study of the effects of possible drilling.


Opponents of the drilling point out that increasing CAFE standards by just 3 mi/gal

would save more energy over the time the ANWR would be in production than would be

produced, and raising CAFE standards to 39 mi/gal from the current 27.5 mi/gal would

save at least 6 times the expected amount of oil production (about 8 Gbbl, Table E12.2.1).

Just setting new standards for tire performance would save about as much energy over 50

years as using the oil from the Reserve (50 years is the expected production life of oil

from the Reserve).(43)

Controversy and distortions

There has been ample exaggeration on both sides of the political controversy. According

to Washington Post reporter Michael Grunwald,(44)

drilling proponents exaggerate how much oil the United States can expect to

recover from the refuge and how much it would reduce the nation’s

dependence on foreign producers, while critics understate the potential

benefits of oil production. Anti-drilling forces have warned of ecological

catastrophe based on scant scientific evidence, while pro-drilling forces have

twisted facts to suggest that oil exploration would have no environmental

impact at all.

Similarly, some environmentalists describe the refuge as if it were Alaska’s

last pristine place, when in fact the state has enough protected public land to

blanket all of Texas. And some proponents argue that opening the Arctic

should be no big deal because drilling is allowed in some wildlife refuges, when

in fact this would be the first refuge opened to drilling since the 1960s.

Koomey et al. cite the media in the ANWR controversy as a major offender because of

misuse of numerical facts.(45) They say


Although it is not surprising that proponents of drilling believe large amounts

of oil will be found there and that opponents believe the amount is smaller,

what is surprising is the extent to which the media have misunderstood and

poorly represented the underlying science. With few exceptions, the media

have characterized the story of the Arctic Refuge as a brawl between

impassioned pursuers of economic benefits and equally fervent defenders of

wildlife, not bothering to dig into the science itself to understand how much

oil is likely to be found. Yet that science is critical to sound decision making

about the Refuge.

Part of the problem, Koomey et al. say, is a clouding of the distinction between the 1002

Area and the Refuge as a whole.(45) Adding this in can inflate the results by over 30%.

Another problem is conflation of distinct ideas—substituting the numbers representing

economically recoverable reserves, oil in place, and technically recoverable resources for

one another. After determining physically how much oil is likely to exist in a region,

geologists must use models to determine how likely it is to recover oil from the ground

given oil company costs and profit expectations. The amount of oil recoverable by any

technological means possible is not the amount of oil recoverable profitably (and

remember that after it is brought to the surface, it must somehow be gotten to market

from a distant corner of the world). The ANWR study uses constant 1996 dollars, and

any analysis at a later date must factor this in. Part of the problem in making estimates is

lack of knowledge. The lower 48 states have been so thoroughly explored that knowledge

of the varying geological factors is known and estimates made on the basis of that

accumulated knowledge; in upper Alaska, there are still many unknowns, which clouds

the likelihood of finding a given amount of oil even more. These considerations all played

a role in the analysis of Ref. 35, whose work remains unchallenged.

All the reports and all the persuasive arguments, Koomey et al. say, are based on Ref. 35.

However, “advocates have simply gravitated toward the particular set of numbers that


most strongly support their views and then represented those numbers to the media as

USGS findings.”(45) Proponents of drilling could use the most expansive numbers they

can find, assuming the whole region (not just 1002), citing technically recoverable oil, and

a 5% probability number. Opponents could do the opposite, pointing just to the 1002

Area, being pessimistic on the economics of recovery, and the 95% probability numbers.

Using this same study, proponents could say 16 billion barrels are there for the taking,

opponents could say that no oil can be obtained. Media coverage might quote both figures

and the unsuspecting reader would believe that these values bracket the true value: “The

average high estimate cited [in the media] was 13 billion barrels and the average low

estimate was 7.6 billion barrels, leaving readers to conclude that a number somewhere in

the middle—about 10 billion barrels—would be roughly right. Comparing the average 10

billion barrel figure from the media reports to the mean curve ... at ($20/barrel) indicates

that the media reports (on average) implicitly overstated the economically recoverable

reserves in the 1002 Area by about a factor of three.” Koomey et al. say that this “is

muddled science at best and, on the whole, a great disservice to policymaking.”(45)

Most stories gave no background information on distinctions important to the results of

the study of Ref. 35. More than half the stories gave no information about the type of

study cited. Issues of recoverability were blurred or absent from most stories. Only two

stories actually specified the geography, 1002 Area vs. Refuge; only three mentioned the

probability distinctions.(45)

The authors suggest some remedies, such as reporting the variables involved, taking care

to check numbers with the source, and not implicitly implying that “all debates have two

equal sides.”(45) It is difficult to avoid centering a story on a person, and the case that

person is trying to make, and the data that person is using for a specific purpose. The

authors of Ref. 45 say that “media treatment of this issue encouraged this outcome


because it focused on what certain individuals and institutions said, rather than what the

scientific results were.” They conclude that “[t]oo often, technical topics are treated in

the media as identical to political debates. There is a value-based political component to

any debate over public policy, but there are also facts about which reasonable people do

not disagree.”

And the rest of Alaska?

While many Alaskans support the drilling,(46) they might disagree with President Bush

that the ANWR is “desolate.”(47) Several hundred people live along the coast. In addition,

tourists apparently disagree, and want to see the area, in large numbers. Alaskans have

learned that tourism is potentially as big a business as big oil.(46,48)

Even if the Wildlife Refuge is not touched, Alaska will apparently experience a renascent

exploitation in other areas (about 95% of Alaska is open to drilling) due to the fact that

the price of oil remained relatively high for a long time.(49) New fields are still being

uncovered. And a 1990 study that had suggested that drilling in the Refuge would create

750,000 jobs had been overstated; however, it appeared on reanalysis that drilling could

create over 46,000 jobs in Alaska and Canada.(50) In any case, it will not be possible for

the ANWR or any other U.S. domestic source to displace imported oil to any appreciable

extent.

The administration and the state are opening other regions to the oil companies. Bidding

for areas in the Beaufort Sea took place in 2003.(51,52) The National Petroleum Reserve-

Alaska, another possible environmental flashpoint, is being studied to see whether drilling

can take place on 8.8 million acres there.(53) A coalition filed suit to stop the

administration from proceeding with drilling, citing disregard of several federal laws.(54)


The Bush administration also decided to allow now-roadless areas that had been under

federal protection due to decisions of previous presidents to be opened to development.

An estimated 4 trillion cubic meters of gas resources are thought to underlie the mountain

west, and 820 billion cubic meters lies under land that would have been off-limits under

the Clinton administration’s forest protection plan.(55) This further demonstrated the

administration’s determination to change the rules in favor of industry and exploitation.

The specter of climate change also haunts oil companies. Warming is apparently occurring

as predicted, reducing the number of days that rigs can be supported on frozen soil. New

ways to test for oil are being explored as a result.(56,57) Alaska is facing a big bill as a

result; new roads are needed, and food that sustains Alaskan natives might no longer be

available.(56)

The rest of the world

The Bush administration also decided to oppose a plan for rich nations to help poor

nations adopt renewable energy rather than contributing to pollution and greenhouse

warming, and to “remove incentives and other supports for environmentally harmful

energy technology.”(47) The plan was embodied in a report by a G8 Task Force (the G8 is

the group of the world’s economically strongest countries—the G7—plus Russia). The

report’s authors hoped to end wealthy nations’ support of fossil fuel projects in

developing countries. Critics seized on the Bush administration’s stance as yet another

demonstration of its complicity with the oil industry.

Between the decisions to open federal lands to more exploitation and to ditch the Clinton

administration’s arsenic rules on water quality (see also Extension 13.2, Getting more


fresh water) for “scientific” reasons, environmentalists have had more problems with the

George W. Bush administration than any since President Reagan’s administration, when

Interior Secretary Watt generated a strong backlash. Even rock stars, in addition to

prominent energy experts, have taken shots at the Bush administration plan.(48)

All of these national policy developments have hinged on presidential perceptions or

misperceptions. The point is that presidential energy policies and ideas, such as Project

Independence, arise from political considerations. It is not possible to discuss fossil fuel

utilization without discussing human influence and activity.

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