populism in europe: sweden

8/3/2019 Populism in Europe: Sweden

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PoPulism in EuroPE:

sWEDEn

Jamie Bartlett

Jonathan BirdwellJack Beneld

he rise o populism

in Europe can betraced through onlinebehaviour...


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First published in 2012 Demos. Some rights reserved

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ISBN 978-1-906693-98-5Copy edited by Susannah WightSeries design by modernactivity ypeset by modernactivity

Set in Gotham Roundedand Baskerville 10

PoPulism in EuroPE:

sWEDEn

Jamie BartlettJonathan BirdwellJack Beneld
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1

2

3

4

5

Acknowledgements

A note on terminology

Executive summary

Background

Who are Sweden Democrat Facebooksupporters?

Social and political views

Why do people support the SwedenDemocrats online?

What is the relationship between onlineand oline activism?

Annex: Methodology

Notes

Reerences

9

11

13

21

25

31

41

49

53

59

67

Ctet


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10

Ackwedgeet

Tis paper would not have been possible without the generoussupport o the Open Society Institute, or which we are verygrateul. In particular, we would like to thank Ellen Riotteand Heather Grabbe or their support, insight and helpuleedback throughout.

Tis research is based on an online survey o Facebooksupporters o the Sweden Democrat party. Te results do not,thereore, necessarily reect the views o the Sweden Democratparty or the ocial members o the party. Demos is anindependent think tank committed to undertaking innovativeresearch in areas o public interest. We are non-party political.Our results are set out objectively and accurately withoutnormative judgement.

At Demos we would like to thank Jack Beneld andStrachan Gray or the research they provided, as well asBeatrice Karol Burks and Ralph Scott or seeing the reportto publication. We would also like to thank Ellen Petterssonor the translations she provided, and the Swedish think tankFores particularly Karin Zelano or helping us to organisethe launch event in Stockholm.

All errors and omissions remain our own.

Jamie BartlettJonathan BirdwellFebruary 2012


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12

A te tegy

Tis paper is the second in a series o short country briengpapers released in 2012 about the online support o populistpolitical parties and street-based groups in Europe. Tesepapers are based on a data set o approximately 13,000Facebook supporters o these nationalist populist parties in 12European countries, which was published in the Demos report,e New Face o Digital Populism, released in November 2011.1

Troughout this paper, we reer to two primary data setsby the ollowing terminology:

Sweden Democrat (SD) Facebook supporters: Te primarydata source used in this report is a survey o 567 Facebooksupporters o the Sweden Democrat (SD) party, collectedby Demos during July and August 2011. All reerences to SDsupporters reer to this group unless otherwise stated.

PPAM: In order to draw comparisons between SD Facebooksupporters and the Facebook supporters o nationalist populistparties elsewhere in Europe, throughout this paper we reerto the data set collected or e New Face o Digital Populism.Tis includes 10,667 Facebook supporters o nationalistpopulist parties and movements in 11 Western Europeancountries. We reer to these as populist parties and movements(PPAM) throughout.

We also draw on European-wide survey data rom theEurobarometer survey and the European Values Study. Tesestudies are cited where relevant below.


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14

Exectve ay

Over the last decade, nationalist populist parties andmovements have been growing in strength across Europe.Tese parties are dened by their opposition to immigrationand multiculturalism, and concern or protecting nationaland European culture. On economic policy, they are oenvocal critics o globalisation and the eects o internationalcapitalism on workers rights. Tis is combined withanti-establishment rhetoric used to appeal to widespreaddisillusionment with mainstream political parties, the mediaand government. Oen called populist extremist partiesor the new right, these parties do not t easily into thetraditional political divides.

In Sweden, the Sverigedemokraterna (or SwedenDemocrats) have emerged rom their neo-Nazi past to win5.7 per cent o the vote (approximately 340,000 votes) in the2010 elections, thus entering parliament or the rst timewith 20 deputies.

Like many ar-right parties, the Sweden Democrat partyhas been particularly eective at mobilising young Swedes byusing online communication to ampliy its message, recruitnew members and organise. Indeed, the online social mediaollowing on Facebook o the Sweden Democrats (16,660)is greater than its ocial membership list (estimated at4,600).2 Tis mixture o online and oine political activityis how millions o people relate to politics in the twenty-rstcentury, particularly members o a younger, digital generation.Tis research aims to understand this new orm o politicalengagement. Te importance o Facebook and other socialmedia websites to nascent political movements can no longerbe underestimated.


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16Executive summary

Tese are the main results o our survey:

SD Facebook supporters are predominantly young and male. Tree-quarters o SD Facebook supporters are men, and almost two-thirds are between the ages o 16 and 20 years old. Tis makesthem substantially younger than the average age o Facebooksupporters o similar parties across Western Europe, where 32per cent are between the ages o 16 and 20 years old.

SD Facebook supporters are active voters and, given their youthulprole, the SDs voter share could grow in the next election. Nearlytwo-thirds (63%) o SD Facebook ans reported voting or SD atthe 2010 election. Tis percentage is quite high considering theyoung age prole o their Facebook supporters, and suggeststhat their share o the vote could increase at the next election.

SD Facebook supporters are also active ormal party members anddemonstrators. Nearly hal (46 per cent) reported being ormalmembers o the party, which is signicantly higher than theproportion o Facebook supporters o similar parties across

Western Europe (32 per cent). Moreover, a h reportedattending a demonstration in the past six months, which issignicantly higher than the gure or the Swedish populationas a whole (only 5 per cent).

SD Facebook supporters are democrats who think politics is an eectiveway to respond to their concerns, and renounce violence. Only 9per cent agreed with the statement it does not matter who youvote or, the lowest o all parties we surveyed in Europe. Moresignicant, 61 per cent agreed that politics is an eective way torespond to their concerns, which was a much higher proportionthan the average who believe this among other similar Europeanparties. Only 14 per cent o SD Facebook supporters agreed withthe statement violence is acceptable to achieve the right outcome,which compares with the average score across our Europe data seto 26 per cent. It is important to stress that agreeing that violenceis acceptable to ensure a certain outcome does not mean that SDFacebook ans are more prone actually to commit violence.

Tis report presents the results o a survey o 567responses rom Facebook ans o the Sweden Democrats. Itincludes data on who they are, what they think, and whatmotivates them to shi rom virtual to real-world activism.

Facebook was selected because it is the most widespreadand popular social media website used in Sweden and bysupporters o the Sweden Democrat party. At the time ocollecting the data in summer 2011, there were three mainFacebook interest groups related to the Sweden Democrats,with a total o 16,660 individual members. As o 14 February2012, the Facebook page o Jimmie kesson, the leader othe Sweden Democrats, had over 23,000 likes. By contrast,Fredrik Reineldt, the current prime minister o Sweden, hadonly 2,832 likes.

For two months in summer 2011 we targeted adverts atindividuals who were supporters o Sweden Democrat relatedgroups on Facebook. On clicking the advert, individualswere redirected to a survey, which they were invited tocomplete. Te survey and adverts were presented in Swedish,and were then translated back into English or the purposeso this report. Te data were then weighted in order toimprove the validity and accuracy o any inerences madeabout the online population. Although online recruitmentin social research is widespread, sel-select recruitment viasocial network sites brings novel challenges. Because thisis an innovative research method with both strengths andweaknesses, we have included a methodology section in anannex to this report.

ret

It is important to stress that the Sweden Democrats diversesupport base cannot be adequately understood throughFacebook alone, and many SD supporters are o course not onFacebook. Tis data set reers specically to Sweden Democrat(SD) Facebook supporters an important, but specic, sub-group o its support. It is with this important caveat that theseresults are presented.


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18Executive summary

ipcat

Our task in this report is to illuminate the phenomenon oonline supporters o the SD and present the results objectively.

We do not oer lengthy recommendations because ormulatinga response is a task or Swedish citizens and politicians. Tis isperhaps a more dicult task given the uid and dynamic waymany people now express their political preerences online,and the way social media allow or groups and individuals tonetwork and mobilise aster than ever. We hope this researchcan inorm that task.

It is clear that Swedish immigration policy is a keydriver o support or the SD. However, ndings rom theEurobarometer Survey suggest that this concern is not sharedamong the majority o the Swedish population. I mainstreampoliticians wish to appeal to the supporters o parties likethe SD, they must be bold in articulating and deending thebenets o immigration and candid in what is expected oimmigrants who come to Sweden. Tey must also learn tospeak about the importance o identity without resorting toxenophobia and the demonisation o minorities.

Te SDs supporter base is incredibly young, yet veryactive and motivated, and can mobilise in support o thegroup. Like many other young people across Europe, they useonline channels as a orm o political engagement, inormationand activism. Te SD with its young membership andleadership has been good at relating to this orm o politicalinvolvement. Tis is a challenge or other mainstream parties.

More generally, SD Facebook supporters believe thatpolitics is an eective way to address their concerns. In manyrespects this is to be welcomed. Despite having low trustin a range o other important social institutions such asthe government, the press and relig ious institutions SDsupporters are almost equally as likely to trust politicalparties as the Swedish population in general. Evidence romthe UK Citizenship Survey suggests that low levels o trustin social institutions are correlated with the likelihood o

justiying violent extremism. Maintaining or restoring trustin political institutions is an extremely important challenge

SD Facebook supporters are pessimist ic about Swedens uture,but not about their own uture. An overwhelming majority oSD Facebook ans were pessimistic about Swedens uture:81 per cent disagreed either a little or entirely with thestatement Sweden is on the right track. However, they wereno more pessimistic about their own personal lives than theSwedish average.

SD Facebook supporters have low levels o personal and institutionaltrust. Only 32 per cent o SD Facebook supporters agreedthat other people could be trusted ar lower than thegure or the Swedish general public. SD supporters alsoscored lower on this measure compared with Scandinaviangroups we surveyed. rust in institutions was much loweramong SD supporters than among the Swedish public,with the exception o the army where SD supportersare more trusting than the average Swedish public andpolitical parties where SD supporters are equally trusting.Interestingly, however, higher trust in the justice system wascorrelated with being more likely to vote, being a ormalparty member and participating in a demonstration.

he protection o Swedish culture and identity rom perceivedoutside threats is the main concern o supporters. Supporterscited immigration, Islamic extremism and multiculturalismas their top concerns. Over hal believed that the EuropeanUnion had resulted in a loss o control over national borders,and a loss o national identity. Signicantly, youngersupporters were more likely to cite disillusionment withmainstream parties as motivation or joining a SD Facebookgroup. Te issue o multiculturalism in particular appearsto motivate SD Facebook supporters to become ormal partymembers and to attend demonstrations.


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20Executive summary

or most o Western Europe. In our Europe wide survey,we ound that those online supporters who are also involvedin oine politics appear to be more democratic, have moreaith in politics, and be more likely to disavow violence.

While the causal relationship between these attitudes isnot clear, this is still powerul evidence to suggest thatencouraging more people to become actively involved inpolitical and civic lie is an important way orward.


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22

1 Backgd

Te Sweden Democrat party was ormed in 1988 as part othe wider emergence o ar-right and neo-Nazi parties inSweden during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Originallya direct continuation o the older ethnonationalist groupBevara Sverige Svenskt (Keep Sweden Swedish), early leadersincluded individuals associated with other extreme andar-right groups. Te partys ormative years were markedby electoral ailure. Te election o Mikael Jansson as leaderin 1995 saw the beginning o splits within the party betweenthose who wished to transorm SD into a respectable partyand those wishing to ollow tactics more in line with the extra-parliamentary activism o the majority o Swedish neo-Nazisduring the 1990s.3

In 1998 the SD general election campaign sought todownplay past links with the extreme right, with Jansson alsobanning the wearing o political uniorms at party meetings.SD also intensied eorts to orge alliances with other ar-rightpopulist parties in Scandinavia and across Europe in a bid tobolster its claim to be seen a serious movement. Despite thelate 1990s being a time when public support or right-wingradicals was in a period o decline, SD did enjoy limitedsuccess at a local, municipal level by winning a total o eightcouncil seats in 1998.4

In 1999, Nazism was ocially renounced by Jansson,precipitating renewed internal tension culminating in a urtherbreakaway in 2001 as the New Democrats sought to re-ormon a more traditional platorm.5

In 2002 the reormist tendency ound a model toemulate in the Danish ar-right Dansk Folkeparti and its leaderPia Kjrsgaard, who entered government as a junior coalitionpartner in 2002.6 Tree years later, the SDs gradual shi


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24Background

towards the political mainstream gathered new momentumas 26-year-old Jimmie kesson wrested the leadership rom

Jansson. A regional SD councillor and a ormer leader o thepartys youth wing, kesson had grown to prominence withinthe party campaigning against the EU and mass immigration,in particular Muslim immigrants. Te ollowing year, theparty gained 2.9 per cent o the vote at the general election,which although below the 4 per cent threshold necessary orparliamentary representation was still enough to entitle theparty to receive state unding.7

Te SDs had their electoral breakthrough in 2010,winning 5.7 per cent o the ballots cast (approximately340,000 votes) and entering parliament or the rst t imewith 20 deputies.8 kessons leadership and the shi inemphasis to Muslim immigrants were clearly eective,allowing SD to double the partys share o the vote. Inresponse, the seven other parties represented in the Swedishparliament placed what amounted to a cordon sanitairearound the SD, with the centre-right coal ition reusing toenter into power-sharing negotiations, preerring instead torule as a minority government.9

Having entered parliament, the SDs agenda remainsrmly centred on its opposition to immigration. One o

kessons rst actions in Parliament was to walk out o theRiksdags opening session in protest at a bishops sermonabout multiculturalism. In an interview with the BBC theollowing year kesson denounced Swedens longstandingimmigration policies as extreme beore accusing Muslimso living in parallel societies and linking increased levelso criminality with immigrants.10 Such arguments appear tohave had some success, and despite the initial shock at SDselection to parliament, its poll ratings have remained steady.11owards the end o 2011 and going into 2012, polls estimatedsupport at anywhere between 4.5 per cent to almost 9 percent, enough to maintain or even increase its Riksdagpresence in a general election.12

Meanwhile, attempts to alter the partys image havecontinued, despite setbacks including praise or the party in

the maniesto written by Anders Breivik, the perpetrator othe July 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway.13 In November 2011moves began to change the partys ocial programme romdemocratic, nationalist to social conservative as part o anideological evolution designed to place more emphasis onvalues and less on race.14 A womens wing (SD-Kvinnor) hasbeen added alongside the longstanding youth wing (SD-Ungdom) as well as a Youube channel (SD Webb V). Othermoves into social media include a party witter eed, as well asone maintained by kesson, which has over 6,000 ollowers.Te party is also active on Facebook the leaders page hasover 23,000 likes and one entitled Sweden Democrats inparliament yes please! has over 40,000 likes. In addition tothese pages, multiple smaller ones several representing localSD-supporting groups have been created. Tis attempt toestablish an online presence is indicative o SDs wider eortto transorm itsel into a modern party and an establishedpolitical orce able to build on the success it achieved in 2010and to inuence policy at a national level.


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26

2 Wh ae swedeDecat Facebkppte?

Tis chapter presents the socio-economic, age and gender datao SD Facebook supporters. Where possible, we present thisinormation in the context o broader Swedish society andmake comparisons to similar groups in Western Europe aspresented in the Demos report e New Face o Digital Populism.15

Degaphc ad gegaphy

Using Facebooks own publicly available advertising tool(see methodology in the annex or details) it is possible toidentiy the age and gender o all Swedish users o Facebook,in addition to deriving the basic demographic inormation oFacebook members who express a preerence or the SD or

join a SD-related Facebook group. Tis allows us to put SDsupporters in the context o the broader Swedish Facebookuser population.

Across the country as a whole, Swedish Facebook usersdisplay a near even gender split (49 per cent male and 51 percent emale), but among SDs Facebook supporters, 74 per centare male and 26 per cent are emale (n=16,660). Tis genderimbalance towards males is shared with similar ar-rightgroups or populist parties and movements (PPAMs) across

Western Europe.SDs Facebook supporters also tend to be young. In

act, they were the youngest o all the members o PPAMswe have surveyed: 63 per cent were between 16 and 20 yearsold, compared with an average o 32 per cent between 16and 20 years old among PPAMs (table 1). Te youth o SDsupporters is particularly noteworthy given that SwedishFacebook users in general tend to be older than in the othercountries surveyed 54 per cent are over 30 compared with


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28Who are Sweden Democrat Facebook supporters?

lower than the PPAM average (26 per cent). SD supportersare ar more likely than the average PPAM supporter to bestudents (45 per cent vs 30 per cent).

Table 2 Hghet edcata attaet sD Facebk ppte

(=567)

mae

(%)

Feae

(%)

ude 25

(%)

ove 25

(%)

Tta

(%)

Grundskolan

(compulsory

school)

16 21 20 12 18

Gymnasiet

(high school)

66 60 70 45 64

Hgskolan or

universitet (college

or university)

12 12 8 26 12

Yrkeskvalikationer

(proessional

qualication)

5 7 2 17 6

At 11 per cent, the SD unemployment rate wassignicantly lower than the unemployment rate or memberso PPAMs in other Scandinavian countries Norway(16 per cent), Denmark (17 per cent) and Finland (19 percent) despite the countries having similar or lower nationalunemployment rates. Tis gure is again most likelyinuenced by the disproportionately young prole o SDFacebook supporters. It is worth noting that among thoseover 30 years old, 15 per cent o SD Facebook supporters wereunemployed (table 3).

a pan-European average o 49 per cent. In contrast, each othe other Scandinavian countries had a below PPAM averageo 1620-year-olds: Norway (13 per cent), Finland (21 percent) and Denmark (24 per cent). Norway also had the oldestsupporters o any country surveyed 64 per cent were over 30.

Table 1 Age sD Facebk ppte (=16,660)

(ata tattc backet)

Age gp sD tta

(swede tta) (%)

Wete Epe PPAm

(Epea tta) (%)

1620 63 (18) 32 (19)

2125 14 (16) 19 (17)

2630 6 (12) 12 (14)

3140 9 (21) 17 (21)

4150 4 (16) 12 (15)

51+ 5 (17) 8 (13)

We cannot precisely pinpoint where SD Facebooksupporters are located, but we asked survey respondents whatwas the nearest large city to their location within 50km. Justunder a third o respondents responded Gteborg, another 30per cent cited Stockholm, while a h cited Malm and 13 percent Uppsala.

Edcat ad epyet

We asked online supporters at what institution they gainedtheir highest level o educational attainment and whetherthey were employed or not (table 2). Given the youth o SDFacebook supporters, it is not surprising that the SD hadthe highest proportion o respondents with only a schoolqualication (82 per cent) compared with a pan EuropeanPPAM gure o 45 per cent. Similarly, it is not surprising thatSD university attendance (12 per cent) is to be signicantly


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30Who are Sweden Democrat Facebook supporters?

Te percentage o SD Facebook supporters whoreported voting or SD is slightly lower than the PPAMaverage o 67 per cent. However, as can be seen in table 4,the very high proportion o respondents over the age o 30who voted or the SD (89 per cent) indicates the potentialor voting levels to rise as younger members mature.Indeed, the higher proportion o supporters under the ageo 20 suggests that many would not have reached the votingage at the time o the last parliamentary election in 2010.

SD Facebook supporters are also slightly less likely tohave taken part in a demonstration than the average PPAMsupporter (20 per cent vs 26 per cent). However, they areconsiderably more likely to have done so than the Swedishpublic in general, which according to the 2010 EuropeanSocial Survey suggests only 5 per cent have done so in thepast 12 months (table 4).

Te young age prole o SD Facebook supporters doesnot appear to prevent them rom becoming ormal partymembers. With nearly hal (46 per cent) reporting ormalparty membership, SD Facebook supporters are signicantlymore likely to be ormal members than the PPAM averageo 32 per cent. Only the English Deence League had ahigher percentage (76 per cent) o ormal members amongFacebook supporters.

Table 3 Epyet tat sD Facebk ppte (=567)

(ata tattc backet)

mae (%) Feae

(%)

ude 30

(%)

ove 30

(%)

Tta (%)

Employed 42 43 35 73 42

Unemployed 11 13 10 15 11 (7) 16

Student 46 42 54 3 45

mebehp ad vveet

o determine the extent to which SD Facebook supporters areinvolved in oine activity, we asked respondents a number oquestions about their involvement with the party, includingwhether they voted or SD, were ormal members o SD andhad participated in any SD-related demonstrations or streetprotests. Almost hal o SD Facebook supporters reportedbeing ormal members, while 62 per cent reported votingor SD and a h claimed to have taken part in a march ordemonstration in the last six months (table 4).

Table 4 oe vveet sD Facebk ppte (=567)

(ata tattc backet)

mae

(%)

Feae

(%)

ude 30

(%)

ove 30

(%)

Tta

(%)

Formal

members o SD

43 53 45 47 46

Voted or SD in

the last election

61 66 57 89 62

(5.7)17

Taken part in a

march or demo in

last 612 months

19 22 21 14 20

(5) 18


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32

3 sca ad ptcacce

We asked SD Facebook supporters a number o questionsabout their social and political views, trust in politicsand political institutions, and views about the uture orthemselves and their country. Where the inormation isavailable, we have drawn comparisons with national averagesbased on either the Eurobarometer Survey (in autumn 2011)or the European Values Study 2010, in order to make moremeaningul inerences.19 We also draw out comparisons withsupporters o PPAMs.

Tp tw bgget cce

When asked to rank their top two social and political concerns,taken rom a list o 18 current issues, the most commonresponses rom SD Facebook supporters were immigration andIslamic extremism (table 5). Tis mirrors the top two concernso the average PPAM supporter, although it is notable thatconcern over immigration and Islamic extremism is morepronounced among SD supporters: 49 per cent o SD Facebooksupporters cited immigration compared with 37 per cent osupporters o other PPAMs, and 32 per cent o SD Facebooksupporters cited Islamic extremism compared with 25 per cento supporters o other PPAMs. Around hal o SD Facebooksupporters cited immigration as a top concern, compared withonly 3 per cent o the total Swedish population.

It is also signicant that the average SD Facebook an ismuch more concerned about multiculturalism than the averagePPAM supporter (26 per cent compared with 12 per cent).Tis is probably because the issue o multiculturalism guresstrongly in SD party literature and rhetoric.


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34Social and political concerns

Table 5 Tp tw bgget cce sD Facebk ppte (=567)

(ata tattc backet) 20

mae

(%)

Feae

(%)

ude 30

(%)

ove 30

(%)

Tta

(%)

Immigration 49 46 49 44 48 (3)

Islamic extremism 33 30 31 35 32

(N/A)

Multiculturalism 26 26 26 24 26

(N/A)

Crime 22 27 24 21 24 (9)

Unemployment 17 25 20 13 19 (16)

Ptc ad vtg

We also asked SD Facebook supporters questions to ascertaintheir views about the eectiveness o democracy in order togauge the level o disillusionment they eel with mainstreampolitical channels. Overall, the ndings are surprising, withSD Facebook supporters generally positive about voting andthe eectiveness o politics.

Only 9 per cent o SD Facebook supporters agreed withthe statement it does not matter who you vote or (table 6),which compares with a PPAM average o 16 per cent. Tis is inkeeping with a Scandinavian trend to register below-averagelevels o agreement on this measure: Norway (13 per cent),Denmark (10 per cent) and Finland (6 per cent).

Table 6 Extet t whch sD Facebk ppte agee that t de

t atte wh y vte (=567)

mae

(%)

Feae

(%)

ude 30

(%)

ove 30

(%)

Tta

(%)

Agree entirely 6 4 5 6 5

Agree a little 4 4 4 5 4

Disagree a little 8 4 7 9 7

Disagree entirely 76 85 80 72 78

More signicant, however, was the high percentageo SD Facebook supporters who agreed with the statementthat politics is an eective way to respond to my concerns(table 7): 61 per cent o SD Facebook supporters agreed withthe statement compared with just 35 per cent o supporterso other PPAMs. Again this was in keeping with theirScandinavian neighbours, all o whom displayed aboveaverage levels o condence: Norway (70 per cent), Denmark(41 per cent) and Finland (55 per cent).

Table 7 Extet t whch sD Facebk ppte agee that ptc

a eectve way t epd t the cce (=567)

mae

(%)

Feae

(%)

ude 30

(%)

ove 30

(%)

Tta

(%)






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Pea ad ata pt

As might be expected, an overwhelming majority o SDFacebook supporters were pessimistic about Swedensuture: 81 per cent disagreed either a little or entirely withthe statement Sweden is on the right track. Comparing thisto a similar question asked in the Eurobarometer Survey,we can conclude that SD Facebook supporters (and mostlikely their supporters in general) are much more pessimisticabout Swedens uture than the average Swedish person. Tatsaid, SD Facebook supporters display slightly higher levelso optimism or their country than the average or PPAMsupporters (14 per cent positive compared with only 10 percent). Tis higher optimism or their country was also evidentamong respondents in other Scandinavian countries: Norway(12 per cent), Denmark (27 per cent) and Finland (16 per cent).

When asked whether they thought their own lie wouldbe better or worse in 12 months time (table 9), SD supporterswere more optimistic than the PPAM average (38 per centcompared with 27 per cent replying that it would be better).

Again, this reected the trend o there being greater personaloptimism among Scandinavian respondents than amongthe average or PPAM respondents, as their responses wereall either at or above the average PPAM score. However, SDFacebook supporters displayed similar levels o personaloptimism to the Swedish general public (38 per cent vs 40 percent being optimistic).

Table 9 Whethe sD Facebk ppte thk the pea ve

w get bette we the ext 12 th (=567)

(ata tattc backet) 21

mae

(%)

Feae

(%)

ude 30

(%)

ove 30

(%)

Tta

(%)

Better 37 41 39 30 38 (40)

Worse 19 20 18 24 19 (5)

Same 43 39 42 43 42 (55)

Only 14 per cent o SD Facebook supporters agreedwith the statement violence is acceptable to achieve the rightoutcome, nearly hal the average score o supporters o otherPPAMs (26 per cent). Only supporters o the Germangroup Die Freiheit had a smaller percentage o supportersagreeing with the statement at 12 per cent. Once again, thisreects a general trend among all Scandinavian countriesor ewer people to agree that violence is acceptable:Norway (14 per cent), Denmark (15 per cent) and Finland(21 per cent). Moreover, as can be seen in table 8, there areonly marginal (i any) dierences in the response to thisquestion based on gender or age.

Beore proceeding it is important to stress that theresults o this question should not be misinterpreted.

Agreeing that violence is acceptable to ensure a certainoutcome does not mean that SD Facebook supportersare more prone actually to commit violence. Tere areunortunately no baseline data on this question or Swedishor European general populations, making inerences aboutthe relevance o the responses dicult.

Table 8 Extet t whch sD Facebk ppte agee that vece

acceptabe t acheve the ght tce (=567)

mae

(%)

Feae

(%)

ude 30

(%)

ove 30

(%)

Tta

(%)






20/39


despite their disillusionment with mainstream politics, SDFacebook supporters had similar levels o trust in politicalparties as the Swedish public in general. Tis is anotherindication, taken in conjunction with the data regardingvoting and the ecacy o politics above, that suggests SDsupporters combine disillusionment with mainstream politicsand institutions with an embedded commitment and belie indemocratic political channels or obtaining power.

Table 11 Extet t whch sD Facebk ppte ad the swedh

geea pbc tt ttt (=567)

ittt Ted t tt Ted t t tt

SD (%) Swedish

public (%) 25SD (%) Swedish

public (%)

Government 19 61 75 37

European Union 13 43 80 51

Trade unions 30 55 60 38

Army 69 63 23 28

Police 61 82 34 17

Justice and legal

system

28 73 65 25

Religious

institutions

6 28 86 65

Political parties 26 30 65 67

The press 7 45 86 54

SD Facebook supporters have slightly lower levels ogeneral trust in other people than the average or PPAMsupporters (32 per cent vs 33 per cent). Tis stands in contrast totrust levels o respondents in other Scandinavian countries, all owhom had above average levels o trust in other people: Norway(54 per cent); Denmark (38 per cent); and Finland (41 per cent).

Atttde twad the Epea u

Consistent with the majority o respondents rom PPAMs inother European countries, SD Facebook supporters are muchmore likely to have negative opinions o the EU. When askedwhat the EU means to them, the most common responses romSD supporters were waste o money, not enough controlat the external borders and loss o cultural and nationalidentity (table 10), which are similar to the average responseso supporters o other PPAMs when asked this question.

Table 10 Atttde sD Facebk ppte twad the Epea

u (=567) (ata tattc backet) 22

mae

(%)

Feae

(%)

ude

30 (%)

ove

30 (%)

Tta (%)

Waste o money 65 57 61 72 63 (36)

Not enough

control at external

borders

56 63 58 60 58 (17)

Loss o cultural

and national

identity23

59 53 56 62 57 (9)

More crime 43 44 43 44 43 (16)

Freedom to travel,

work and study 2437 32 35 37 36 (69)

Tt ttt ad pepe

rust in other people, as well as social institutions, is generallyconsidered as an important indicator o social capital indemocratic societies. Similar to respondents rom other PPAMsin Europe, SD Facebook supporters display very low levels otrust towards social and political institutions compared withtheir national compatriots (table 11). SD supporters were lesstrusting than the Swedish public o all public institutionsexcept the army, which is a trend that appears common acrossonline supporters o many PPAMs. Interestingly, however,


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Moreover, it is noteworthy that SD supporters aged 51+showed signicantly higher levels o trust than their youngercounterparts (albeit there were only very ew individuals inthat age category) (table 12).

Table 12 Extet t whch sD Facebk ppte agee that pepe

ca be tted (=567) (ata tattc backet) 26

mae

(%)

Feae

(%)

Age

1630

(%)

Age

3150

(%)

Age

51+

(%)

Tta

(%)

In general

most people

can be

trusted

34 28 32

(68)

32 (74) 47

(64)

32

(68)

In general

most people

cannot be

trusted

50 63 53

(33)

57

(26)

37

(36)

53

(32)


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42

4 Why d pepeppt the swedeDecat e?

While the preceding chapter provides some indication owhy SD Facebook supporters are drawn to the party, we alsoasked respondents to explain what motivates their support intheir own words. Tis chapter presents our ndings regardingrespondents answers to an open-response question asking whythey supported the SD. Out o the 567 total survey responses,340 responded to this question.

able 13 provides a breakdown o the dierent categoriesthat we used to code and classiy the responses that wereceived. Responses could be placed in multiple categoriesi deemed relevant. Te three most common responses wereidentication with the partys values, their anti-immigrationstance and disillusionment with mainstream political parties.

We discuss the six most requently cited categories below, andgive examples o some o the responses SD supporters gave.

Gp vae

Respondents who were classied in this category cited, ingeneral terms, the values, principles, norms, belies, aspirationsor ideas o the SD as reasons or supporting the party. Justabout hal o those who responded to this question cited SDsvalues. Women were more likely to reer to SDs values as areason or supporting them, but there were no signicantdierences relating to age.


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44Why do people support the Sweden Democrats online?

Table 13 Why pepe ppted sD (=340)

mae

(%)

Feae

(%)

Age

1620

(%)

Age

2125

(%)

Age

2630

(%)

Age

3140

(%)

Age

4150

(%)

Age

51+

(%)

Tta

(%)

Group values 47 55 48 52 43 55 55 48 49

Anti-

immigration

34 42 39 27 47 30 32 26 36

Disillu-

sionment

10 17 12 17 9 2 10 10 12

Identity 13 2 10 13 4 11 16 10 10

Integrity 6 4 5 9 6 2 8 6 5

Anti-Islam 5 3 3 5 9 9 3 16 5

Other 3 1 2 5 2 4 3 0 3

Anti-EU 1 2 1 2 6 0 0 4 1

Economic 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 1

Anti-Semite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Anti-Roma 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Some o the respondents noted the unique position oSD, highlighting a mix o le-wing and right-wing views:

Because I like the ideology behind the party and that it does notexist in any similar parties in Sweden that stands any chance inthe parliament.27

What rst caught my interest or SD was the will to lower theabortion limit. e amily politic. I have always ound it dicultto eel at home with any party; I am in some ways both red andblue. SD is probably the party that represents my values in verymany questions, even that we need to be able to take care o thosewho already live here beore we can ll up with more.28

At-gat

Respondents were classied in this category i theyexplicitly mentioned immigration when explaining whythey supported SD. Over a third o those who respondedto the question cited immigration as a motivation. Tisgure was higher among SD supporters (36 per cent) thansupporters o any other PPAM. Te PPAM average was 18per cent; the PPAM group with the next highest number omembers citing immigrat ion as a motivation or joining theequivalent Facebook group was Belgiums Vlamms Belang(29 per cent). Te proportion o people who were hostileto immigration in other Scandinavian countries varied:Norway (9 per cent), Finland (11 per cent), Denmark(26 per cent) and Sweden (36 per cent).

Interestingly, women were more likely to citeimmigration as a motivation or supporting SD, as were thosein the 1620 and 2630 age groups, with the latter being themost likely group to cite immigration (47 per cent).

Some examples o responses rom people in thiscategory include:

Im not willing to help anyone other than genuine reugees.29

Mass immigration and cuts in the welare state. Sweden is goingunder. We have no democracy anymore. Womens issues withreligious reedom, womens rights are compromised and this isaccepted by politicians. Integration into Swedish society is amust. Swedishness must be celebrated, not oppressed in order orimmigrants to t in here. is means that politicians must respectSwedish culture, which they dont. How are immigrants supposedto respect or accept the culture when politicians dont?30


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Interestingly, identity among SD supporters appears tobe less o a sel-reported motivating actor than or the averagePPAM supporter (10 per cent vs 18 per cent). On average, the

joint second highest response when respondents rom PPAMswere asked why they supported SD was or reasons o identity.

Some examples o responses in this category include:

Because Sweden has to remain Swedish. With Swedish traditionand a Swedish people.35

Because I love Sweden.36

Because Sweden is on its way to stop existing there is nothingSwedish lef. We are more multicultural than any other [country]that exists. I want my country to be remembered as Sweden and nota mixed bag.37

itegty ad at-ia

Tere were 5 per cent o respondents in each o the integrityand the anti-Islam categories.

Te integrity category covers supporters who claimed toadmire SDs straight-talking and honest approach and those whobelieved party supporters were consistent in their convictions.Tis category diered rom the disillusionment category in thatit required respondents to speak o SD in a positive light, insteado merely displaying a lack o aith in other political parties.Tis is a typical response rom a respondent in this category:

Because they are the only party in Sweden that addresses questionsthat no one else addresses.38

It is sel-evident that the responses we categorised asanti-Islam explicitly mentioned Muslims in a derogatory way.In many instances, these responses could be cross-reerencedwith the anti-immigration category. Tese are two examples oresponses in this category:

My ancestry is rom Eastern Europe but my parents taught methat you go with the practice o the place you move to and respectthe country and integrate. Suddenly other parties want somethingcompletely dierent. It doesnt work in the long run. I want to livein Sweden, not a multicultural asco.31

Det

Respondents were placed in the disillusionment category whenthey said they supported SD because o their disenchantmentwith major political institutions, the political elite or thegeneral direction o their country.

Although this is the third most cited reason given bySD supporters or supporting the party, at 12 per cent theproportion o SD supporters in this category is lower than thator the average PPAM respondent (14 per cent). Signicantly,younger respondents were more likely to cite disillusionment asa motivation or supporting SD (17 per cent o 2125-year-olds,and 12 per cent o 1620-year-olds).

Many respondents in this category spoke about theirdisillusionment over other parties approach to immigrationand oen excused them o living in a antasy world:

It is the only party that addresses the problems with mass immigration.32

Obviously because the majority o todays politicians areincompetent.33

Because they are the only sane politicians who have a view o realityand do not live in their little *cking antasy world.34

idetty

Respondents were classied in the identity category when theyreerred to a love o Sweden, commitment to the preservationo traditional Swedish national and cultural values, orrepresentation o the interests o real Swedes when askedabout their reasons or supporting SD.


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I want Sweden to remain Swedish or as long as possible. emosques are or *ck's sake built on top o each other these days.39

I want my old Sweden back like beore 1985 when we put our ownrst and not the ideology Islam, which is evil and slowly destroys our

Swedish country and deprives us Swedes o our identity, our cultureand our history.40


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50

5 What the eathpbetwee e ade actv?

In e New Face o Digital Populism we ran a series o analysesto determine what background and attitudinal characteristicswere more likely to inspire online activists to get involvedin the real world through voting, becoming a ormal partymember, or attending a street demonstration or protest. Forthis report we ran the same analysis using cross tabulationswith SD Facebook supporters. As mentioned in chapter 2,63 per cent o SD Facebook supporters reported voting or theSD, 46 per cent reported being ormal members, and 20 percent reported participating in a demonstration in the six monthsbeore the survey.

F Facebk t the vtg bth

Respondents who voted or SD were slightly more likely to beemale than those who did not. Meanwhile, non-voters weresignicantly more likely to be students and under the age o 30.

Voters were less likely than non-voters to cite immigrationas a top two concern, but more likely to cite multiculturalismand European integration. Voters were also more likely thannon-voters to distrust the EU and the press, and more likely totrust the justice and legal system and the army.

F Facebk t cad-cayg paty ebe

Respondents who reported themselves to be ormal partymembers were again slightly more likely to be emale thannon-members, but there were no age dierences between partymembers and non-members. Formal party members were alsoless likely to be unemployed.


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52What is the relationship between...

Formal members were more likely than non-members tocite multiculturalism as a top concern. However, non-memberswere more likely to cite immigration, rising prices and theeconomic situation. Formal party members were also morelikely than non-members to trust the police, the justice andlegal system, trade unions and political parties. However,ormal members were more likely to distrust the EU.

F Facebk t the teet

As with members and voters, demonstrators were marginallymore likely to be emale than non-demonstrators, whichdistinguishes SD supporters rom other PPAM supportersconsidered thus ar. Demonstrators also tended to be youngerthan non-demonstrators. Interestingly, demonstrators weremore than twice as likely to have attended college or universityas non-demonstrators.

Demonstrators were more likely to cite the environment,European integration and multiculturalism as a top concern.Non-demonstrators were more likely to cite immigration andIslamic extremism. Demonstrators were more likely to trustpolitical parties and the justice and legal system, and morelikely to distrust the police and the army.


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54

Aex: methdgy

Te methodology employed or the collection and analysis othis data is set out in detail in e New Face o Digital Populism.41

We thereore limit this section to SD specic issues.For e New Face o Digital Populism we collected data

rom Facebook supporters o nationalist populist politicalparties or street-based movements drawn mainly across

Western Europe. We ran a Facebook advert targeted atsupporters o all parties and/or party leaders Facebookpages over the summer o 2011. Each advert invited Facebooksupporters o the group in question to click on a link, whichredirected them to our online survey.

Our campaign ran over a three-month period, withno single advert being available or more than six weeks.On clicking the advert, participants were redirected to adigital survey page hosted by the website Survey Monkey,which set out the details and purpose o the survey alongwith an invitation to take part. Te size o target populationvaried rom country to country, depending on the size othe Facebook membership o the group in question. able 14gives the details o the data collected or the survey on SD.

Te unique impressions column lists the number ounique occasions the advert was displayed on the targetaudiences Facebook sidebar. Te click per impressions ratiowas relatively stable, at around 1 per cent. Te click to surveycompletion ratio was around 30 per cent. Tis non-responserate may be the result o some respondents deciding not totake part in the survey on reading the consent orm. Ourmethod to correct or non-response rates is discussed in theull methodology given in e New Face o Digital Populism.Te size o the nal data set was lower than the number osurveys completed because we removed incomplete surveys.


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56Annex: Methodology

be automatically claimed as a reliable basis or makinginerences about the oine group. Te use o socialnetwork surveys is subject to a well-known technical andmethodological critique ocusing on the nature o sel-entryinterest classication on Facebook, the lack o contentreliability on social networking sites, and the lack o internetaccess and usage in the broader population, all o which arecapable o biasing the results o the survey.

Tereore, we take care not to claim, at any point in thetext, that our sample represents or reects the ocial views othe group, or indeed o its oine membership.

Troughout the paper, we compare the SD results tothe pan-European study results presented in e New Face oDigital Populism.

In chapter 2, the gender and age o each o the groupsin question were collected directly rom the publicly availableFacebook group level data using the advertising toolmentioned above. Tis provides the most accurate results onthe Facebook membership or each group. Results relatedto education, employment and involvement in the group arebased on our weighted results.

In chapter 3 we give weighted results and providecomparative data where they are available rom the 2010/11Eurobarometer or European Values Survey. Where thequestions are not worded identically, or there were additionalanswer options, this is expressly identied.

Chapter 4 is based on the analysis o an open textquestion about why individuals joined the group in question.Tis open question allowed respondents to answer as theywished. A Swedish translator coded the responses. We reviewedthe content o the responses and created nine categories orthe responses, together with a category other. Responsescould all into multiple categories. We removed data relating torespondents who were not supporters o SD.

In chapter 5,we ran a cross tabulation analysis, in which wecompared those Facebook supporters who claimed to be partymembers against those who did not; those Facebook supporterswho had protested or marched in the previous six months

Table 14 Data cected vey swede Decat

Sweden Democrat Party

Date vey JulAug 2011

n pecfc Facebk teet

gp tageted

3

sze ppat tageted 16,660

n qe pe 2,191,724

Tta Facebk k cck 1,954

Tta vey epe 620

Fa data et 567

Data aay ad tat

We decided to use Facebook principally because the site is apopular mode o communication or supporters o many othe groups and parties we surveyed.

In order to increase the predictive validity o ourresults, we applied a post-stratication weight, using theknown demographics o the online population to correct thesamples balance o gender and age in line with the makeupo the group as a whole. o do this, we gathered backgrounddata on the composition o SDs Facebook group membershipusing Facebooks advertising tool (which is reely availableor any user to access). We gave each participant a weightedvalue on the basis o the prevalence o their demographicprole (age and gender) in the population at large. Althoughwe achieved demographic representativeness which cancorrect or systematic age or gender related bias it ispossible certain attitudinal sel-selection biases exist, becausethis was a sel-select survey. It is with this caveat that theresults are presented.

While the use o a post-stratication weight is animprovement on the use o unweighted data, it cannot


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58Annex: Methodology

last question had been completed. We provided the contactdetails o the lead researcher to all participants to cover theeventuality that they had questions not covered by the debrienotes, but ew participants made use o it.

We told participants that they could withdraw rom theresearch at any time beore completion as part o a preacepresented alongside the consent statement. Later we remindedthem o this right when they completed the survey via aparagraph in the debrie notes, oering the possibility oimmediate withdrawal via a check box. No participants optedto withdraw in this way.

We observed ethical and legal considerations relevant tothe storage and handling o data; all data were kept digitallyencoded in an anonymous ormat, and we didnt store any datacapable o identiying any participants.

We prepared or the eventuality that the researchuncovered inormation with serious security implications,particularly relating to participant support or violence;we took precautions to absolve the researcher o moralresponsibility towards the disclosure o inormation to agentso the criminal justice system by ensuring that the survey didnot ask or precise details o acts o violence or illegal politicalprotest. In order to preserve participant condentiality (thedeliberate exclusion by data capture systems o IP addresses)we removed rom the researcher the means to identiy andincriminate individual participants.

compared with those who had not; and those who reportedvoting or the SD compared with those who did not. Te samplesize was too small to undertake a logistic regression.

Ethca cdeat

As this research ocused on adolescents over the age o 16, noCriminal Records Bureau check was necessary; consequently,none was sought. Similarly, it was not necessary or us toobtain inormed consent rom participant parents or guardiansas Social Research Association ethics guidelines suggestsuch clearance should not be sought and is not requiredwhere investigating participants aged over 16. We sought andgained individual inormed consent rom all participants,who agreed to a consent statement presented at the starto the survey ailure to sign acceptance o this statementprevented them rom participating urther in the research.

Although we targeted the survey only at people aged over 16,a small number o individuals stated they were under 16 whenresponding to the question about age. We immediately deleteddata relating to these people.

We stated on the Facebook advert that we wererepresenting Demos, and were undertaking a survey oFacebook members o the group in question. On clicking theadvertisement link, the participant was redirected to the surveylanding page. On that page we pointed out that leaders o eachgroup had been inormed about the survey. Beore runningthe survey, Demos emailed each o the groups in question tolet them know about the survey. On the landing page we alsostated that we would be letting the party in question knowabout the results beore they were made public. Beore release,we emailed the parties and groups in question with the resultswhere they pertained to their members.

We did not brie participants ully on the studys aimsbeore completing the survey in order to avoid the exhibitiono demand characteristics. We provided only a broad overviewo the research at the start o the survey, and gave moredetailed inormation on the projects aims only aer the


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60

nte

1 J Bartlett, J Birdwell and M Littler, e New Face o DigitalPopulism, London: Demos, 2011, www.demos.co.uk/publications/thenewaceodigitalpopulism(accessed 16 Feb 2012).

2 Sverigedemokraterna tappar medlemmar, Vasabladet,25 Jun 2011, www.vasabladet./story/?linkid=160256(accessed 20 Feb 2012).

3 L Bakken, Fra kjelleren til Riksdagen, NRK,25 Sep 2010, www.nrk.no/nyheter/verden/1.7304305(accessed 20 Feb 2012).

4 See Partihistorik, Sverigedemokraterna,https://sverigedemokraterna.se/vart-parti/partihistorik/(accessed 16 Feb 2012).

5 Rydgren, Radical right-wing populism in Sweden andDenmark, p 22.

6 B Kianzad, Liberal no more: the ar-right gains in Swedenselection, Tme, 20 Sep 2010, www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2020349,00.html (accessed 16 Feb 2012).

7 P OMahony and N Meo, Far-Right party poised to takerst seats in Swedens parliament,Daily elegraph, 18 Sep2010, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/sweden/8011099/Far-Right-party-poised-to-take-rst-seats-in-Swedens-parliament.html (accessed 16 Feb 2012).
http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/thenewfaceofdigitalpopulismhttp://www.demos.co.uk/publications/thenewfaceofdigitalpopulismhttp://www.vasabladet.fi/story/?linkid=160256http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/verden/1.7304305https://sverigedemokraterna.se/vart-parti/partihistorik/http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2020349,00.htmlhttp://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2020349,00.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/sweden/8011099/Far-Right-party-poised-to-take-first-seats-in-Swedens-parliament.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/sweden/8011099/Far-Right-party-poised-to-take-first-seats-in-Swedens-parliament.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/sweden/8011099/Far-Right-party-poised-to-take-first-seats-in-Swedens-parliament.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/sweden/8011099/Far-Right-party-poised-to-take-first-seats-in-Swedens-parliament.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/sweden/8011099/Far-Right-party-poised-to-take-first-seats-in-Swedens-parliament.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/sweden/8011099/Far-Right-party-poised-to-take-first-seats-in-Swedens-parliament.htmlhttp://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2020349,00.htmlhttp://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2020349,00.htmlhttps://sverigedemokraterna.se/vart-parti/partihistorik/http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/verden/1.7304305http://www.vasabladet.fi/story/?linkid=160256http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/thenewfaceofdigitalpopulismhttp://www.demos.co.uk/publications/thenewfaceofdigitalpopulism


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62Notes

17 Te Sweden Democrats gained 5.7% o the vote at the 2010election. See NSD, European Election Data, Sweden:parliamentary election 2010, Norwegian Social ScienceData Services, http://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FStudy%2FSEPA2010_Display&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FCube%2FSEPA2010_Display_C1&top=yes(accessed 16 Feb 2012).

18 Te Demos survey gure provided is the percentage orespondents who answered yes to the question: Have youtaken part in a political march, protest, or demonstrationin the last six months? Te European Social Survey(round 5) gure provided is the percentage o respondentswho answered yes to the question: During the last 12months, have you done any o the ollowing? Have youtaken part in a lawul public demonstration?

19 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 74, 2010,http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_en.htm (accessed 18 Jan 2012).

20 Demos survey respondents were asked Please rank yourthree biggest concerns in order o importance rom thelist below. Tey were able to provide a maximum othree responses. Te Demos survey gure provided isthe percentage o survey respondents who ranked therelevant concern as their rst or second biggest concern.Eurobarometer (autumn 2011, split B) respondents wereasked: And personally, what are the two most importantissues you are acing at the moment? Tey were able toprovide a maximum o two responses. Te Eurobarometergure provided is the percentage o respondents whoranked the relevant concern as their rst or second biggestconcern. Demos survey respondents were able to selectsome options that were not available to Eurobarometerrespondents and vice versa.

8 Te Sweden Democrats: l iving with the ar-right,e Economist, 10 Sep 2011, www.economist.com/node/21528665 (accessed 16 Feb 2012).

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid; Jimmie Akesson: Swedish immigration is extreme,Hardtalk interview, 25 Jan 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/hardtalk/9372832.stm (accessed 16 Feb 2012).

11 Petzll backed by Sweden Democrat rebels, e Local, 28Sep 2011, www.thelocal.se/36404/20110928/ (accessed 16Feb 2011); Sweden Democrat members site shut down,e Local, 24 Sep 2010, www.thelocal.se/29218/20100924/(accessed 16 Feb 2012).

12 Te Sweden Democrats: l iving with the ar-right;D Jonasson, Sweden Democrats to become socialconservative, Stockholm News, 15 Nov 2011,www.stockholmnews.com/more.aspx?NID=8049(accessed 16 Feb 2012).

13 Te Sweden Democrats: l iving with the ar-right.

14 Jonasson, Sweden Democrats to become socialconservative.

15 Bartlett et al, e New Face o Digital Populism.

16 OECD,Labour Force Statistics, Organisation or EconomicCo-operation and Development, http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=251 (accessed 16 Feb 2012).
http://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2FSEPA2010_Display&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfCube%2FSEPA2010_Display_C1&top=yeshttp://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2FSEPA2010_Display&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfCube%2FSEPA2010_Display_C1&top=yeshttp://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2FSEPA2010_Display&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfCube%2FSEPA2010_Display_C1&top=yeshttp://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2FSEPA2010_Display&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfCube%2FSEPA2010_Display_C1&top=yeshttp://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2FSEPA2010_Display&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfCube%2FSEPA2010_Display_C1&top=yeshttp://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_en.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_en.htmhttp://www.economist.com/node/21528665http://www.economist.com/node/21528665http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/hardtalk/9372832.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/hardtalk/9372832.stmhttp://www.thelocal.se/36404/20110928/http://www.thelocal.se/29218/20100924/http://www.stockholmnews.com/more.aspx?NID=8049http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=251http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=251http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=251http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=251http://www.stockholmnews.com/more.aspx?NID=8049http://www.thelocal.se/29218/20100924/http://www.thelocal.se/36404/20110928/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/hardtalk/9372832.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/hardtalk/9372832.stmhttp://www.economist.com/node/21528665http://www.economist.com/node/21528665http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_en.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_en.htmhttp://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2FSEPA2010_Display&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfCube%2FSEPA2010_Display_C1&top=yeshttp://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2FSEPA2010_Display&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfCube%2FSEPA2010_Display_C1&top=yeshttp://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2FSEPA2010_Display&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfCube%2FSEPA2010_Display_C1&top=yeshttp://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2FSEPA2010_Display&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfCube%2FSEPA2010_Display_C1&top=yeshttp://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2FSEPA2010_Display&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FfCube%2FSEPA2010_Display_C1&top=yes


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64Notes

21 Both Demos survey respondents and Eurobarometer(autumn 2011) respondents were asked the question: Willthe next 12 months be better, worse or the same when itcomes to your lie generally?

22 Both Demos survey respondents and Eurobarometer(autumn 2011) respondents were asked the question: Whatdoes the European Union mean to you personally? Bothsets o respondents were allowed to select multiple options.

23 Te Demos survey gure provided is the percentage orespondents who selected the option loss o cultural andnational identity. Te Eurobarometer (autumn 2011) gureprovided is the percentage o respondents who selected theoption loss o cultural identity.

24 Te Demos survey gure provided is the percentage orespondents who selected either the option reedom totravel or the option study and work anywhere in the EU.Te Eurobarometer (autumn 2011) gure provided is thepercentage o respondents who selected the option reedomto travel, study and work anywhere in the EU.

25 Demos survey respondents were asked: o what extentdo you trust the ollowing: [institution]? Eurobarometerrespondents were asked: For each o the ollowinginstitutions, please tell me i you tend to trust or tend not totrust [institution]. In each case respondents selected eithertend to trust or tend not to trust. Te percentages citedor government, European Union, political parties andthe press are derived rom the Eurobarometer (autumn2011). Te percentages cited or all other institutions arederived rom the Eurobarometer (autumn 2010) as they donot appear in the later survey.

26 Demos survey respondents were asked: o what extentdo you agree with the ollowing statement: in general,most people cannot be trusted. Respondents were ableto select any one o the ollowing options: agree entirely,agree a little, disagree entirely, disagree a little orneutral. Te Demos survey gures provided are thepercentages o respondents who either selected disagreeentirely or disagree a little, or agree entirely or agreea little. Te national statistics provided are drawn romthe World Values Survey (www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/

WVSAnalizeQuestion.jsp). Respondents who took part inthe World Values Survey asked: Generally speaking, wouldyou say that most people can be trusted or that you cantbe too careul in dealing with people? Respondents wereable to select any one o the ollowing options: most peoplecan be trusted, cannot be too careul or dont know. Te

World Values Survey gures provided are the percentageso respondents who selected most people can be trustedand cannot be too careul. Te age group breakdown orthe World Values Survey is as ollows: 1529, 3049 and50+. Te age breakdown or the Demos survey is as statedabove.

27 Eersom att jag gillar ideologin bakom partiet och att detinte nns ngra eerliknande partier i Sverige som harngon chans verhuvudtaget i riksdagen.

28 Det som rst ngade mitt intresse r SD var viljan attsnka abortgrnsen. Familjepolitiken. Jag har alltid hasvrt att nna mig hemma i ngot av blocken, jag r nogp stt och vis bde rd och bl. SD r nog det partiet sommotsvarar mina egna vrderingar i vldigt mnga rgor,ven att vi mste kunna ta hand om dem som redan bor hrinnan vi kan ylla p med mer.

29 Jag r inte villig att hjlpa ngra andra n riktiga yktingar.
http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalizeQuestion.jsphttp://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalizeQuestion.jsphttp://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalizeQuestion.jsphttp://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalizeQuestion.jsp


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66Notes

38 Drr att det r det nda parti i Sverige som tar tag irgor som inga andra tar tag i.

39 Jag vill att Sverige ska rbli svenskt s lnge sommjligt.Moskerna byggs ju r an p varann nu r tiden.

40 Jag vill ha mi gamla sverige ter som re 1985 d vivrnade vra egna i rsta hand och inte idiologin islam somr ondska och sakta rsttr vr svenska land och tar irnoss svenskar vr identitet vr kultur vr historia.

41 Bartlett et al, e New Face o Digital Populism.

30 Massinvandring och alla nedskrningar i vlrden.Sverige r p vg att g under. Vi har ingen demokratilngre. Kvinnosaksrgor. Med religionsrihet, skommer kvinnortryck. Och accepteras av politikerna.Detta r skrmmande. Kvinnans vrde sjunker ju erkvinnortryckare som kommer hit. Assimilering till densvenska kulturen r ett mste. Det svenska mste hyllas, interaktas om invandrarna ska kunna nna sig till rtta hr.Det krver att politikerna respekterar den svenska kulturen.Det gr dom inte. S hur sjutton ska invandrarna kunnaacceptera och respektera det svenska? Det r omjligt.

31 Min pbr kommer rn steuropa men mina rldrarlrde mig att man ska ta seden dit man kommer. Respekteradet land man kommit till och smlta in. Pltsligt vill andrapartier ngot helt annat. Det unkar inte i lngden. Jag villbo i Sverige inte ett multikultifasko.

32 Det r det enda partiet som tar upp problematiken medmassinvandringen.

33 Uppenbarligen drr att majoriteten av dagens politikerr inkompetenta.

34 Fr dom r dom nda vettiga av alla politker som har enverklighets syn och inte lever i sin lilla j*vla antasi vrld.

35 Fr att Sverige mste rbli Svenskt Med Svensk traditionoch ett Svenskt olk.

36 Eersom jag lskar Sverige.

37 Fr att sverige r p vg att sluta existera det nns ju ingesvenskt kvar av sverige vi r mer mngkulturellt n n annatsom nns jag vill att mitt land ska minnas som sverige ochinte n blandat komplott.


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68

reeece

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Petzll backed by Sweden Democrat rebels, e Local,28 Sep 2011, www.thelocal.se/36404/20110928/(accessed 16 Feb 2011).

Sverigedemokraterna tappar medlemmar, Vasabladet,25 Jun 2011, www.vasabladet./story/?linkid=160256(accessed 20 Feb 2012).

Sweden Democrat members site shut down, e Local,24 Sep 2010, www.thelocal.se/29218/20100924/(accessed 16 Feb 2012).

Te Sweden Democrats: l iving with the ar-right,e Economist, 10 Sep 2011, www.economist.com/node/21528665 (accessed 16 Feb 2012).

Bakken L, Fra kjelleren til Riksdagen, NRK, 25 Sep 2010,www.nrk.no/nyheter/verden/1.7304305 (accessed 20 Feb 2012).
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70References

Bartlett J, Birdwell J and Littler M, e New Face o DigitalPopulism, London: Demos, 2011, www.demos.co.uk/publications/thenewaceodigitalpopulism(accessed 16 Feb 2012).

European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 74, 2010,http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_en.htm (accessed 18 Jan 2012).

Jonasson D, Sweden Democrats to become socialconservative , Stockholm News, 15 Nov 2011,

www.stockholmnews.com/more.aspx?NID=8049(accessed 16 Feb 2012).

Kianzad B, Liberal no more: the ar-right gains in Swedenselection, Tme, 20 Sep 2010, www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2020349,00.html(accessed 16 Feb 2012).

NSD, European Election Data, Sweden: parliamentaryelection 2010, Norwegian Social Science Data Services,http://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FStudy%2FSEPA2010_Display&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2FCube%2FSEPA2010_Display_C1&top=yes (accessed 16 Feb 2012).

OMahony P and Meo N, Far-Right party poised to takerst seats in Swedens parliament,Daily elegraph,18 Sep 2010, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/sweden/8011099/Far-Right-party-poised-to-take-rst-seats-in-Swedens-parliament.html (accessed 16 Feb 2012).

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